the admirable wisdom of God in contriving the several parts of the body of man So that that whole book contains in it a most full and pregnant demonstration of a Deity which every man carries about with him in the structure of his body on which account men need not go out of themselves to find proof of a Deity whether they consider their minds or their bodies of which it may be more truly said then Heraclitus of old did of his Stove Etiam hic Dii sunt So that of all persons I should most wonder at those whose imployment particularly leads them to the understanding the parts and nature of mans body if the proverb be not a great injury to them since they have fuller insight into this demonstration of a Deity in the Fabrick of mans body then many others who converse only with some jejune and sapless writings And certainly whatever is imagined to the contrary by men of weak understandings the best way to cure the world of Atheism is true Philosophy or a search into the natures of things which the more deep and profound it is the more impossible will it be found to explicate all the phaenomena of nature by meer matter and Motion It was wisely observed of a great person and Philosopher that a narrow and slight inspection into nature enclined men of weak heads to Atheism but a more through insight into the causes of things made them more evidently see the necessary dependence of things on the great and wise Creator of them A little knowledge of Philosophy is apt to make mens heads dizzy and then in danger of falling into the gulf of Atheism but a more careful and diligent view of it brings them into sobriety and their right wits again Such a slight inspection had the followers of Epicurus into the nature of things for when they found how in the present state of the world the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter would handsomly salve many appearances of nature they drunk with the success reel presently into an Infinite space and there imagine they behold infinite worlds made of the concretion of Atoms and ever since their eyes have been so dusted with these little Atoms that they could see nothing else in the world but them Which how gross and unreasonable it is will appear from our present subject for who but Lucretius or Epicurus could ever think that our nostrils were at first fashioned as they are meerly by the violent impulse of the air within which would force its self a passage out But how came the air into the body before it was forced out did it first break open the lips make all that round cavity in the mouth for a passage through the aspera arteria but if when it was in it would come out again was not the mouth wide enough to let it go or did the first man shut his mouth on purpose to finde another vent for the air if so how chance the force of the air did not carry away the epiglottis or if it got safely up to the nose how came it not to force a passage out about the eyes rather then to go down so low first But if we believe these rare contrivers of mans body all the inward vessels of the body were made by the course of water as channels are but how is it possible to imagine that the Oesophagus and the stomack should be so curiously contrived by the meer force of water and that all the Intestines should be made only as channels to let it out again when it was once in but how comes then such a kind of reciprocation and Peristactick motion in those vessels how come the several coats of them to be so firme if it had been only a forced passage it would have been direct and through the substance of the parts as we finde it to be in all forced passages in the body of the earth Besides if the water received into the stomack forced the passage through the guts how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for its self or did it not like that passage when other things came into it and therefore found out a more secret one into the bladder but if that were made by the water how came it to be so full of membranes and so subject to dilatation Thus ridiculous will men make themselves rather then shew themselves men in owning and adoring that infinitely wise and powerful God who orders all things in the world according to the counsel of his Will What can be more plain and evident then the peculiar usefulness of the several parts of mans body is What other intent can be imagined that man is formed with a mouth but only for taking in of nourishment and for receiving and letting forth of air or that an infant is so ready to open his mouth but that there are breasts and milk for him to suck in order to his nourishment Why should the Oesophagus be so hollow and the stomack so wide but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the meat down and the other for the fermentation of it whence come all the other vessels to be so conveniently placed were it not for the distribution of nourishment into the several parts or for conveying away the excrements of it Can any one think that the several muscles and tendons should be placed in the more solid parts for any other end then for the better motion of them or that the nerves should be derived from the brain into the several parts of the body for any other design then to be the instruments of sense and motion or that the continual motion of the heart should be for any other purpose then for receiving and distribution of the blood through the arteries into the parts of the body or that the eye with all its curious fabrick should be only accidentally imployed in seeing These things are so plain that however the Epicureans may more easily lose themselves and deceive others in explaining the appearances of nature in some inanimate beings yet when they come with their blind concourse of Atoms to give an account of the parts of animals they miserably befool themselves and expose themselves only to contempt and pitty It were easie to multiply examples in this kind but I shall only mention one thing more which is if all the parts of mans body have no higher original then the concourse of Atoms in the first man and woman by what were the umbilical vessels formed whereby the Child in the womb receives its nourishment by what atoms was the passage of the succus nutritius framed from the mother to the child how come those vessels to close up so naturally upon the birth of the child and it to seek its nourishment in quite another way Will the particles of matter which by their concretion formed the first pair salve this too Thus still we see how
its self A common and universal effect must flow from some common and universal cause So the Stoick argues in Tully If there were no God non tam stabilis opinio permaneret nec confirmaretur diuturnitate remporis nec una cum seculis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset It is strange to think that mankind in so many ages of the world should not grow wise enough to rid its self of so troublesom an opinion as that was of the Being of God had it not been true We see in all the alterations of the world other vain opinions have been detected refuted and shaken off if this had been such how comes it to remain the same in all ages and Nations of the world Opinionum commenta delet dies naturae judicia confirmat It is a great discredit to Time to make it like a river in that sense that it bears up only lighter things when matters of greatest weight are sunk to the bottom and past recovery This may pass for a handsom allusion as to the opinions and writings of particular persons but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the universal consent of the world for these common notions of humane nature are so suited to the temper of the world that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built ship though of good burden doth furrow the Ocean So that if we must adhere to the Allegory it is easily replyed that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink but the unsuitableness of their superficies to that of the water so we see a small piece of wood will sink when a stately ship is born up so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the dictates of nature may soon be lost but such as lye so even upon the superficies of the soul will still float above the water and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time Thus we assert this universal consent of mankind as to the existence of a Deity to be a thing so consonant to our natural reason that as long as there are men in the world it will continue But now it is hardly conceivable according to the Principles of Epicurus how mankind should universally agree in some common sentiments much less how it should have such an anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God For if the soul be nothing else but some more active and vigorous particles of matter as Diogenes Laertius tells us that his opinion was that the soul was nothing else but a Systeme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the most smooth and round atoms if so it is very hard apprehending how any such things as anticipations or commctions can be lodged in the soul For if our souls be nothing else but some small sphaericall corpuscles which move up and down the body as the Epicurean Philosophy supposeth then all our knowledge and perception must depend on motion which motion must be by the impression of external objects which Lucretius acknowledgeth and contends for Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam Notitiam veri If then our knowledge of truth comes in by our senses and sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward objects what becomes of all common notions and of the Prolepsis of a Deity unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by sense which Epicurus himself denyes when he attributes to the Deity not corpus but quasi corpus as Tully tells us and therefore he is not a proper object of sense So that it is impossible there should be any such thing as a natural notion which may be the ground of universal consent among men according to the doctrine of Epicurus And therefore it stands to all reason in the world that if our senses be the only competent Iudges of truth men should differ about nothing more then such things which cannot be tryed by the judgement of sense Such as the notion of a God is for where should men be more uncertain in their judgements then in such thing which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of but we are so far from finding it so that men are nothing so much agreed about the objects of sense as they are about the existence of a Deity and therefore we see this universal consent of mankind concerning a God cannot be salved by the principles of those who deny it according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common notions Neither can this universal consent of mankind be enervated with any greater probability by those Atheists who assert the eternity of the world and resolve this consent wholly into meer tradition such as the Fables of Poets were conveyed in from one to another For I demand concerning this tradition Whether ever it had any beginning or no If it had no beginning it could be no tradition for that must run up to some persons from whom it first came again if it had no beginning it was necessary that it should alwayes be on the same accounts on which they make the world eternal And if it be necessary it must be antecedent to any free act of mans will which tradition supposeth and so some false opinion would be found to be as necessary as the worlds being eternal and by consequence the worlds being eternal may be a necessary false opinion but if any false opinion be once granted necessary it then follows that our faculties are not true and that nature is a necessary cause of some notorious falsity which is the highest impeachment the Atheist could have laid upon his only adored nature which must then have done that which Aristotle was ashamed to think ever nature should be guilty of which is something in vain for to what purpose should man have rational faculties if he be under an unavoidable necessity of being deceived If then it be granted that this tradition had once a beginning either it began with humane nature or humane nature did exist long before it if it began with mankind then mankind had a beginning and so the world was not eternal if mankind did exist before this tradition I then enquire in what time and by what means came this tradition first to be embraced if it doth not supppse the existence of a Deity Can any age be mentioned in history wherein this tradition was not universally received and which is most to our purpose the further we go back in history the fuller the world was of Deities if we believe the Heathen histories but however no age can be instanced in wherein this tradition began first to be believed in the world we can trace the Poetick Fables to their true original by the testimonies of those who believed them we know the particular Authors of them and what course they took in divulging of them we find great
to be deceived I grant the imperfection of our minds in this present state is very great which makes us so obnoxious to errour and mistake but then that imperfection lies in the prâ—neness in mans mind to be led by interest and prejudice in the judgement of things but in such things as are purely speculative and rational if the mind cannot be certain it is not deceived in them it can have no certainty at all of any Mathematical demonstrations Now we find in our own minds a clear and convâ—ncing evidence in some things as soon as they are propounded to our understandings as that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time that a non-entity can have no proper attributes that while I reason and discourse I am these are so clear that no man doth suspect himself deceived at all in them Besides if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things to what purpose is there an Idea of true and false in our minds if it be impossible to know the one from the other But I say not that in all perceptions of the mind we have certain evidence of truth but only in such as are clear and distinct that is when upon the greatest consideration of the nature of a thing there appears no ground or reason at all to doubt concerning it and this must suppose the minds abstraction wholly from the senses for we plainly find that while we attend to them we may judge our selves very certain and yet be deceived as those who have an Icterism in their eyes may judge with much confidence that they see things as clearly and distinctly as any other doth Besides there are many things taken for granted by men which have no evidence of reason at all in them Now if men will judge of the truth of things by such principles no wonder if they be deceived But when we speak of clear and distinct perception we suppose the mind to proceed upon evident principles of reason or to have such notions of things which as far as we can perceive by the light of reason do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend if in such things then there be no ground of certainty it is as much as to say our Faculties are to no purpose which highly reflects either upon God or nature It is a noble question as any is in Philosophy What is the certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the truth of things or what ground of certainty the mind hath to proceed upon in its judgement of the truth of such objects as are represented to it Nothing can render the Philosophy of Epicurus more justly suspected to any â—ational and inquisitive mind then his making the senses the only certain conveyers of the truth of things to the mind The senses I grant do not in themselves deceive any but if I make the impressions of sense to be the only rule for the mind to judge by of the truth of things I make way for the greatest impostures and the most erring judgements For if my mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the imagination hath received from the impressions upon the Organs of sense it will be impossible for me ever to understand the right natures of things Because the natures of things may remain the same when all those things in them which affect the Organs of sense may be altered and because the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter may make such an impression upon the senses which may cause an Idea in us of that in the things themselves which yet may be only in the manner of sensation As some Philosophers suppose it to be in heat and cold Now if the mind judgeth of the nature of things according to those Idea's which come from the impressions made upon the Organs of sense how is it possible it should ever come to a right judgement of the natures of things So that in reference even to the grossest material beings it must be the perception only of the mind which can truly inform us of their proper nature and essence Besides there are many Idea's of things in the mind of man which are capable to have properties demonstrated of them which never owed their original to our senses and were never imported to the mind at the Keyes of the senses Such are most Mathematical figures which have their peculiar properties and demonstrations such are all the mutual respects of things to each other which may be as certain and evident to the mind as its self is now it is plain by this that all certainty of knowledge is not conveyed by the senses but our truest way of certain understanding the nature of any thing is by the clear and distinct perception of the mind which is founded on the Truth of our faculties and that however we may be deceived when we do not make a right use of our reason because of the imperfection of our present state yet if we say our mind may be deceived when things are evident and clear to them upon plain principles of reason it is highly to reslect upon that God who gave men rational faculties and made them capable of discerning Truth from falshood 2. That we have clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God For which we are to consider the vast difference which there is in our notion of the nature of God and of the nature of any other being In all other beings I grant we may abstract essence and existance from each other now if I can make it appear that there is evident reason ex parte rei why I cannot do it in the notion of God then it will be more plain that necessity of existence doth immutably belong to his nature It is manifest to our reason that in all other beings which we apprehend the natures of nothing else can be implyed in the natures of them beyond bare possibility of existence no although the things which do apprehend do really exist because in forming an Idea of a thing we abstract from every thing which is not implyed in the very nature of the thing now existence being only contingent and possible as to any other being it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea because it doth not belong to its essence for we may fully apprehend the nature of the thing without attributing existence to it But now in our conception of a Being absolutely perfect bare possibility or contingency of existence speaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of kim for how can we conceive that Being absolutely perfect which may want that which gives life to all other perfections which is existence The only scruple which mens minds are subject to in apprehending the force of this argument lies in this Whether this necessary existence doth really belong to the nature of that being whose Idea it is or else
impossible it is to go no further then our selves to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite power and Being which produced all these things and hath left so plain an inscription of himself upon the works of nature that none but those who shut their eyes can abstain from seeing it I come now to the third evidence of a Deity which is that there are some beings in the world which cannot depend upon matter or motion i. e. that there are some spiritual and immaterial substances or Beings for if the thing be acknowledged it is unbecoming a man to contend about words the consequence of this for the proving a Deity neither hath been nor I suppose will be denyed by such who question an infinite Being the same principles leading to the denying and the proof of both and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above matter in the world If there be then such things in the world which matter and motion cannot be the causes of then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial Beings and that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men and to some extraordinary effects which are produced in the world 1. I begin with the nature of the soul of man And herein I must confine my self to those arguments which directly prove my present purpose and on that account must quit all those common arguments to prove the souls immortality from the attributes of God for all these do suppose the existence of a Deity as already evident neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the soul meerly from the phoenomena of sensation which they endeavour to prove cannot be performed by meer matter and motion for granting all this yet the utmost that can be proved by it is no greater immortâ—lity in our souls then in the souls of Brutes and in the sense in which that is admitted I suppose an Epicurean will not deny the soul of man to be immortal as Demonax in Lucian said when he was asked whether the soul were immortal or no it is said he but as all things else are for those who make the soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active particles of matter do not think that upon death they are annihilated but that only they are dispersed and dissipated or in the Platonists phrase may return to the soul of the world These wayes I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in man which we now enquire for much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an hypothesis as praeexistence which makes men apt to suspect the cogency of such reasons which tend to prove the immortality of the soul which are linked with a supposition not only inevident either to sense or reason but likewise needless and impertinent For I know no one argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the soul that doth in the least infer any necessity of praeexistence but on the same accounts it will prove the souls eternity Being therefore thus at liberty to enquire into the nature of the soul considered in her self our only way must be to finde out such peculiar properties in the soul of man which cannot be salved on supposition there were nothing else but matter and motion in the world Supposing then that all sensation in man doth arise from corporeal motion which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers and that the highest conceptions which depend on sense can amount no higher then imagination which is evident if it can then be proved that there is a principle of action in man which proceeds in a different way of operation then sensation does and that there are such operations of the soul which are not imaginations it will be then clear that there is a principle in man higher then matter and motion Now although it be a task sufficiently difficult to explain the manner of sensation its self in a meer mechanical way supposing no higher principle then meer matter yet it will appear far more difficult nay impossible without a spiritual or immaterial Being to salve such appearances in man which transcend the power of imagination which will appear by these following operations of the mind which every one who hath it may finde within himself 1. Correcting the errors of imagination For if all our perceptions were nothing else but the images of corporeal things left in the brain the judgement of the mind must of necessity be according to the impressions which are made upon the organs of sense But now if our minds can and do form apprehensions of things quite different from those which are conveyed by sense there must be a higher principle of knowledge in man then imagination is For which the common instance of the just magnitude of the Sun is very plain If we judge according to the image which is conveyed to the brain by our eyes we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger then he seems to us to be nay though the sight be advantaged by the help of Telescopes it cannot receive such an image or Idea of the Sun which answers to its just magnitude viz that it is 160. times bigger then the earth From whence now comes this apprehension of the bigness of the Sun above that proportion which can possibly come in at our senses If it be said that by the observation of the lessening of objects according to the proportion of distance the mind may come to understand how much bigger the Sun may be then he seems I grant it but withall enquire how the imagination comes to have proportions and distances which are meâ—r respects and can have no corporeal phantasmes whereby to be represented to it so that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident that there is some principle in man beyond imagination Again when the mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far and sindes the Sun to be so great what Idea is there of this magnitude in the mind the mind cannot six its self on any thing but it must have an Idea of it from whence comes this Idea not from corporeal phantasmes for none of them could ever convey the cue magnitude of the Sun to the mind and therefore the forming of this Idea must be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of imagination and is a principle above it So in the sight of a stick when under water the representation of it by the sense to imagination is as crooked for corporeal motion carries things to the eye without any judgement upon them the eye conveyes the image to the brain and according to the rules of corporeal perception must presently take every thing for true which is conveyed thither now from what principle is it that this error of our senses is correcteà So in many other things wherein our imaginations are quite puzled
unavoidable on the Stoical Hypothesis of Gods being corporeal and confined to the world as his proper place And so much for this second Hypothesis concerning the Origine of the Universe which supposeth the eternity of matter as coexisting with God I come now to that which makes most noise in the world which is the Atomical or Epicurean Hypothesis but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origine of the Universe For otherwise supposing a Deity which produced the world and put it into the order it is now in and supremely governs all things in the world that many of the Phaenomena of the Universe are far more intelligibly explained by matter and motion then by substantial forms and real qualities few free and unprejudiced minds do now scruple But because these little particles of matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of nature that therefore there should be nothing else but matter and motion in the world and that the Origine of the Universe should be from no wiser principle then the casual concourse of these Atoms is one of the evidences of the proneness of mens minds to be intoxicated with those opinions they are once in love with When they are not content to allow an Hypothesis its due place and subserviency to God and providence but think these Atoms have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the world For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the serviceableness of this Hypothesis which hath given it entertainment among men of Atheistical spirits Epicurus himself in his Epistle to Pythocles urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his opinion that he brought no God down upon the stage to put things in order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which his Paraphrast Lucretius hath thus rendered Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam Naturam rerum If this opinion then be true the history of the Creation quite falls to the ground on which account we are obliged more particularly to consider the reason of it The Hypothesis then of Epicurus is that before the world was brought into that form and order it is now in there was an infinite empty space in which were an innumerable company of solid particles or Atoms of different sizes and shapes which by their weight were in continual motion and that by the various occursions of these all the bodies of the Universe were framed into that order they now are in Which is fully expressed by Dionysius in Eusebius and very agreeably to the sense of Epicurus in his Epistles to Herodotus and Pythocles and to what Plutarch reports of the sense of Epicurus though he names him not if at least that book be his which Muretus denyes the words of Dionysius are these concerning the Epicureans 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that according to this opinion all the account we have of the Origine of the world is from this general Rendes-vous of Atoms in this infinite space in which after many encounters and facings about they fell into their several troops and made up that ordered Battalia which now the world is the Scheme of It was not imprudently done of Epicurus to make the worlds infinite as well as his space and Atoms for by the same reason that his Atoms would make one world they might make a thousand and who would spare for worlds when he might make them so easily Lucretius gives us in so exact an account of the several courses the Atoms took up in disposing themselves into bodyes as though he had been Muster-Master-General at that great Rendes-vous for thus he speaks of his Atoms Quae quia multimodis multis mutata per omne Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis Omne genus motus caetus experiundo Tandem deveniunt in taleis disposituras Qualibus haec rebus consistit summa creata And more particularly afterwards Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis Ponderibusque suis consuërunt concita ferri Omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertentare Quaecunque inter se possunt congressa creare Ut non sit mirum si in taleis disposituras Deciderunt queque in taleis venere meatus Qualibus haec rerum â—enitur nunc summa novando Thus we see the substance of the Epicurean Hypothesis that there were an Infinite number of Atoms which by their frequent occursions did at last meet with those of the same nature with them and these being conjoyned together made up those bodyes which we see so that all the account we are able to give according to this Hypothesis of all the Phaenomena of the Universe is from the fortuitous concourse of the Atoms in the first forming of the world and the different contexture of them in bodies And this was delivered by the ancient Epicureans not with any doubt or hesitation but with the greatest confidence imaginable So Tully observes of Velleius the Epicurean beginning his discourse fidenter sane ut solent isti nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset Confidence was the peculiar genius of that sect which we shall see in them to be accompanied with very little reason For those two things which make any principles in Philosophy to be rejected this Atomical Hypothesis is unavoidably charged with and those are If the principles be taken up without sufficient ground in reason for them and if they cannot give any sufficient account of the Phaenomena of the world I shall therefore make it appear that this Hypothesis as to the Origine of the Universe is first meerly precarious and built on no sufficient grounds of reason Secondly That it cannot give any satisfactory account of the Origine of things 1. That it is a precarious Hypothesis and hath no evidence of reason on which it should be taken up and that will be proved by two things 1. It is such an Hypothesis as the Epicureans themselves could have no certainty of according to their own principles 2. That the main principles of the Hypothesis its self are repugnant to those Catholick Laws of nature which are observed in the Universe 1. The Epicureans according to their own principles could have no certainty of the truth of this Hypothesis And that 1. Because they could have no certain evidence of its truth 2. Because their way of proving it was insufficient 1. That they could have no certain evidence of the truth of it I prove from those criteria which Epicurus lays down as the only certain rules of judging the truth of things by and those were sense Anticipation and Passion Let sense be never so infallible a ruie of judgement yet it is impossible there should be any evidence to
sense of the truth of this Hypothesis and let him extend his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as long as he please which was his great help for correcting the errors of sense viz. as it was in the Roman court when the case was not clear ampliandum est So Epicurus would have the object represented every way it could be before he past his judgement yet this prudent caution would do him no good for this Hypothesis unless he were so wise as to stay till this world were crumbled into Atoms again that by that he might judge of the Origine of it There is but one way left to finde out the truth of things inevident to sense as by Epicurus his own confession all these Atoms are which are now the component particles of bodyes much more those which by their fortuitous concourse gave Being to the world and that is if something evident to sense doth apparently prove it which is his way of proving a Vacuity in nature from motion but though that be easily answered by principles different from those of Epicurus and more rational yet that very way of probation fails him in his present Hypothesis For what is there evident to sense which proves a fortuitous concourse of Atoms for the production of things nay if we grant him that the composition of bodyes is nothing else but the contexture of these insensible particles yet this is far from being an evidence to sense that these particles without any wise and directing providence should make up such bodyes as we see in the world And here when we speak of the evidence of sense we may well ask as the Stoick in Tully doth whether ever Epicurus found a Poeme made by the casual throwing of letters together and if a concourse of Atoms did produce the world cur porticum cur templum cur domum cur urbem non potest why did it never produce a cloyster a temple a house a city which are far easier things then the world I know Epicurus will soon reply that things are otherwise in the world now then when it was first produced I grant it and from thence prove that because no such thing ever happens in the world now as a meerly casual concourse of Atoms to produce any thing Epicurus could have no evidence from sense at all to finde out the truth of his Hypothesis by And as little relief can he finde from his second Criterium viz. Anticipation for by his own acknowledgement all Anticipation depends on the senses and men have it only one of these four wayes 1. By incursion as the species of a man is preserved by the sight of him 2. By proportion as we can inlarge or contract that species of a man either into a Gyant or Pygmy 3. By similitude as we may fancy the image of a City by resemblance to one which we have seen 4. By composition whereby we may joyn different images together as of a horse and man to make a Centaure Now though it be very questionable how some of these wayes belong to a Criterium of truth yet none of them reach our case for there can be no incursion of insensible particles as such upon our senses we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them but what is this to the proving the truth of the Hypothesis Similitude can do no good unless Epicurus had ever seen a world made so the only relief must be from composition and that will prove the Origine of the world by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaures in the world which we verily believe These are the only Criteria by which Epicurus would judge of the truth of natural things by for the third Passion relates wholly to things Moral and not Physical and now let any one judge whether the Hypothesis of the Origine of the Universe by Atoms can ever be proved true either by the judgement of sense or by Anticipation The way they had to prove this Hypothesis was insufficient and that was by proving that the bodyes of the world are compounded of such insensible particles Now granting the thing I deny the consequence for what though the composition of bodyes be from the contexture of Atoms doth it therefore follow that these particles did casually produce these bodyes nay doth it at all follow that because bodyes upon their resolution do fall into insensible particles of different size figure and motion therefore these particles must be praeexistent to all bodyes in the world For it is plain that there is now an Universal lump of matter out of which these insensible particles arise and whether they return on the dissolution of bodyes and all these various corpuscles may be of the same uniform substance only with the alteration of size shape and motion but what then doth this prove that because particular bodyes do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of insensible paerticles of that matter which exists in the world that therefore this whole matter was produced by the casual occursions of these Atoms It will ask more time and pains then is usually taken by the Philosophers either ancient or modern to prove that those things whatsoever they are whether elements or particles out of which bodyes are supposed to be compounded do exist separately from such compounded bodyes and antecedently to them We finde no Aristotelian elements pure in the world nor any particles of matter destitute of such a size figure and motion as doth make some body or other From whence then can we infer either the existence of Aristotles materia prima without quiddity quantity or quality or the Epicurean Atoms without such a contexture as make up some bodyes in the world Our profound Naturalist Dr. Harvey after his most accurate search into the natures and Generation of things delivers this as his experience and judgement concerning the commonly reputed elements or principles of bodyes For speaking of the different opinions of Empedocles and Hippocrates and Democritus and Epicurus concerning the composition of bodyes he adds Ego vero neque in animalium productione nec omnino in ulla corporum similarium generatione sive ea partium animalium sive plantarum lapidum mineralium c. fuerit vel congregationem ejusmodi vel miscibilia diversa in generation is opere unienda praeexistere observare unquam potui And after explaining the way which he conceived most rational and consonant to experience in the Generation of things he concludes his discourse with these words Idemque in omni generatione furi crediderim adeo ut corpora similaria mista elementa sua tempore priora non habeant sed illa potius element is suis prius existant nempe Empedoclis atque Aristotel is igne aqua aëre terra vel Chymicorum sale sulphure Mercurio aut Democriti Atomis utpote natura quoque ipsis perfectiora Sunt inquam mista composita etiam tempore priora element is
he likewise asserted although one would think if gravity were the cause of motion then the more gravity the swister the motion would be from hence I say it were not easie to conceive how the Atoms should embrace each other in a parallel line if they fell down as Lucretius expresseth it like drops of rain and therefore they saw a necessity to make their motion decline a little that so they might justle and hit one upon another But this oblique motion of the Atoms though it be the only refuge left to salve the Origine of things by a concourse of Atoms is yet as precarious and without reason as any other supposition of theirs whatsoever Tully chargeth this motion of declination with two great faults futility and inâ—fficacy quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter tum ne efficit quidem quod vult It is a childish fancy and to no purpose For first it is asserted without any reason at all given for it which is unworthy a Philosopher neither is it to any purpose for if all Atoms saith he decline in their motion then none of them will stick together if some decline and others do not thâ—s is as precarious as any thing can be imagined to assign a diversity of motion in indivisible particles which yet have all the same velocity of motion and as Tully saith Hoc erit quasi provincias atomis dare quae recte quae oblique fâ—rantur as though Epicurus were the General at this Rendesvous of Atoms who stands ready to appoint every one his task and motion This Plutarch tells us was the great charge against Epicurus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he introduced such a motion of declination out of nothing upon no pretence of reason And Turnebus tells us that the ground why they desired so small a declination was because they were conscious to themselves that it was founded upon no ground of reason Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpae timide eam ponebant minimam sibi post ulabant To which purpose Turnebus cites those verses of Lucretius Quare etiam at que etiam paulum inclinare necesse est Corpora nec plusquam minimum ne fingere motus Obliquos videamur id res vera refutet Namque hoc in promptu manifest unique esse videmus Pondera quantum in se est non posse obliqua meare Esupero cum praecipitant quod cernere possis Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai Declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese But this argument of Lucretius will hold if at all further then this little declination for it is no more they desire then as little as may be imagined quo nihil possit fieri minus Tully expresseth it but if they may decline a little why not a great deal more nay it is impossible to conceive but a little oblique motion at first will in an infinite space grow to be very oblique for there is nothing to hinder the motion which way it bends now if there be never so little motion of declination the Atom will be inclined that way and what then should hinder but that the obliquity in a motion through a great space should at last come to be very great there being no center at all to guide the motion towards and the gravity not hindering this little declination Therefore Tully asks that question Cur declinet uno minimo non declinet duobus aut tribus why only it declines one minime and not two or three for saith he it is no impulsion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minime neither is there any impediment in the space to hinder it from declining more so that as he well saith optare hoc quidem est non disputare this is to beg Hypotheses and not to prove them which is the thing we have proved Epicurus to do Which was the first thing promised viz. that this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious and is built on no foundation of reason 2. It is unsatisfactory and insufficient as well as precarious for should we grant his two main principles Atoms and his infinite empty space yet we deny that ever his Atoms with all their occursions would ever produce those things which are in the Universe To run through the noted Phaenomena of the Universe and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them from a fortuitous concourse of Atoms is a task too large to be here undertaken There are only three things which I shall rather suggest then insist upon to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them and shall then leave it with the reader to judge what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the Epicurean Hypothesis and whether it be not the height of credulity as well as infidelity to believe the world ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms 1. The great varieiy of appearances in nature which are attributed to particles of the same nature only with the alteration of size shape and motion That some things in the world should have no other reason given of them may not only be tolerable but rational as in the objects and operations on the organs of sense those affections which are mistaken for real qualities c. But that all those effects which are seen in nature should have no other cause but the different configuration and motion of Atoms is the height of folly as well as impiâ—ty to imagine that the particles of matter as they are in men should be capable of sensation memory Intellâ—ction volition c. meerly because of a diffâ—rent shape size and motion from what they have in a piece of wood is a riddle that requires a new configuration of Atoms in us to make us understand May it not be hoped that at least one time or other by this casual concourse of Atoms the particles may light to be of such a nature in stones as to make them flic in plants to make them all sensitive and in beasts to make them reason and discourse What may hinder such a configuration or motion of particles if all these effâ—cts are to be imputed to no higher principle We see in other bodies what different appearances are caused by a sudden alteration of the particles of the matter of which they are compounded why may it not fall out so in the things mentioned neither can this be unreasonable to demand 1. Because the motion of these particles of matter is casual still according to them and who knows what chance may do for the seminal principles themselves are I suppose according to them of the same uniform matter with the rest of the world and so are liable to different motion and configuration 2. Because all particles of matter are supposed to be in continual motion becausâ— of that
there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in bigness or motion it is manifest that this universal matter to whom motion is so essential and natural will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in nature for nothing could be caused by this thin and subtile matter but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our senses and what a strange kind of visible world would this be From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise God who must both put matter into motion and regulate the motion of it in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the world And this necessity of the motion of matter by a power given it from God is freely acknowledged by Mr. Des Cartes himself in these words Considero materiam sibi libere permissam nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem ut plane quiescentem illa autem impellitur à Deo tantundem motus five translationis in ea conservante quantum abinitio posuit So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of matter doth freely confess the necessity not only of Gods giving motion in order to the Origine of the Universe but of his conserving motion in it for the upholding it So that we need not fear from this Hypothesis the excluding of a Deity from being the prime efficient cause of the world All the question then is concerning the particular manner which was used by God as the â—fficient cause in giving being to the world As to which I shall only in general suggest what Maimonides sayes of it Omnia simul creata â—rant postea successive ab invicem separata although I am somewhat inclinable to that of Gassendus majus â—st mundus opus quam ut assâ—qui mens humana illius molitionem possit To which I think may be well applyed that speech of Solomon Then I beheld all the work of God that a man cannot finde out the work that is done under the Sun because though a man labour to seck it out yea further though a wise man think to know it yet shall he not be able to sinde it CHAP. III. Of the Origine of Evil. Of the Being of Providence Epieurus his arguments against it refuted The necâ—ssity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion Providence proved from a consideration of the nature of God and the things of the world Of the Spirit of nature The great objections against Providence propounded The first concerns the Origine of evil God cannot be the author of sin if the Scriptures be true The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of man doth not charge God with mans fault Gods power to govern man by Laws though he gives no particular reason of every Positive precept The reason of Gods creating man with freedom of will largely shewed from Simplicius and the true account of the Origine of evil Gods permitting the fall makes him not the author of it The account which the Scriptures give of the Origine of evil compared with that of Heathen Philosophers The antiquity of the opinion of ascribing the Origine of evil to an evil principle Of the judgment of the Perâ—â—ans Aegyptians and others about it Of Manichaism The opinion of the ancient Greek Philosophers of Pythagoras Plato the Stoicks the Origine of evil not from the necessity of matter The remainders of the history of the fall among the Heathens Of the malignity of Daemonâ— Providence vindicated as to the sufferings of the good and impunity of bad men An account of both from natural light manifested by Senecâ— Plutarch and others IT being now manifest not only that there is a God but that the world had its Being from him it thence follows by an easie and rational deduction that there is a particular band of Divine providence which upholds the world in its Being and wisely disposeth all events in it For it is a most irrational and absurd opinion to assert a Deity and deny providence and in nothing did Epicurus more discover the weakness and puerility of his judgment then in this Indeed if Epicurus had no other design in asserting a Deity then as many ancient Philosophers imagined to avoid the imputation of direct Atheism and yet to take away all foundations of Religion he must needs be said to serve his Hypothesis well though he did assert the Being of an excellent nature which he called God while yet he made him sit as it were with his â—lbows folded up in the heavens and taking no â—â—gnizâ—nce of humane actions For he well knew that if the belief of Divine providence were once rooted out of mens minds the thoughts of an excellent Being above the Heâ—vens would have no more aw or power upon the hearts and lives of men then the telling men that there are Iâ—wels of inestimable value in the Indies makes them more ready to pay taxes to their Princes For that Philosopher could not be ignorant that it is not worth but power nor speculation but interest that rules the world The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord then the greatest Prince in the world that hath nothing to do with him and he thinks he hath great reason for it for he neither fears punishment nor hopes for reward from him whereas his Landlord may dispossess him of all he hath upon displeasure and may advantage him the most if he gains his favour Supposing then that there were such an excellent Being in the world which was compleatly happy in himself and thought it an impairing of his happiness to trouble himself with an inspection of the world Religion might then be indeed derived à relegendo but not à religando there might be some pleasure in contemplating his nature but there could be no obligation to obedience So that Epicurus was the first sounder of a kind of Philosophical Antinomianism placing all Religion in a veneration of the Deity purely for its own exâ—â—llency without any such mercenary eye as those who serve God for their own ends as they say are apt to have to reward and punishment And I much doubt that good woman whom the story goes of who in an Enthusiastick posture ran up and down the strects with emblems in her hands fire in the one as she said to burn up Heaven and water in the other to quench Hell that men might serve God purely for himself would if she had compassed her design soon brought Proselites enough to Epicurus and by burning Heaven would have burnt up the cords of Religion and in quenching Hell would have extinguished the aw and fear of a Deity in the world Indeed the incomparable excellency and perfection which is in the Divine nature to spirits advanced to a noble and generous height in Religion makes them exceedingly value their choice while they disregard what ever rivals with God for it but were it not for