Selected quad for the lemma: sense_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
sense_n	father_n	son_n	word_n	4,740	5	4.9419	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A49423	A letter about liberty and necessity written to the Duke of Newcastle / by Thomas Hobbes. With observations upon it by a learned Prelate of the Church of England lately deceased.	Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.; Laney, Benjamin, 1591-1675. Observations upon a letter of Mr. T. Hobbs to the Duke of Newcastle.	1676 (1676)	Wing L343; ESTC R14544	24,278	120

Agent that he can change his Will and make that not to be last which once was last that is he hath power over his last Will I mean over that which for the time was the last and was as serious and resolv'd as the last And for those Actions which he calls only Intentions and Inclinations I see no reason why they should not be called Wills seeing 1. they are acts of the Will for no application of the Soul to any thing upon a reason can proceed from the inferiour Sensitive part and therefore must either be acts of the Will or be nothing at all And 2ly by Mr. Hobbe's own rule and definition of Will every one of those successive Appetites are Wills because 'till another consequent Appetite followed they were the last for the time and therefore in their courses and turns all are Wills Indeed after they are changed and unwilled again I think no man desires they should be still called Wills when they cease to be at all Fourth Point To say he is a free Agent is all one to say He hath made an end of Deliberation Here I shall call Mr. Hobbs again to his own reflection whether a man cannot be said to be free before he hath made an end of Deliberation rather than after As when I desire to have a friend dine with me I meaning to ask him first whether he be ingaged or resolv'd for any other company do use these words Sir are you free and if he answers me that he is free I presently apprehend that he is not resolv'd for any particular but is still capable of a resolution to dine with me Not but that he may be said to be free too that hath made an end of Deliberation but in another sence that is he is free from all doubts that come by Deliberation But the same may be free also before Deliberation is ended but it is from particular determinations and resolutions which is the freedom we defend to do or not to do And this seems to be a greater and more proper Freedom than the other for he that is free from Deliberation acts indeed freely but it is in that one way to which he is resolved But he that is so free as to go any way is more free than he that goes but freely in one way Fifth Point Liberty is the absence of all Impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsecal qualities of the Agent If it will content Mr. Hobbs That shall be allow'd to be one sence of the word but if I may have leave to do but what he desires I should do reflect I find another sence and the very same which is denied by him A Liberty from Necessity As when a Father recommends a Wife to his Son the Son hath no doubt liberty to take that Wife in Mr. Hobbs his sence And yet if the same Son should desire his Father to give him his liberty the Father would presently apprehend that he desired somewhat that he had not given him that is leave as well to refuse her if he saw cause as to take her he would not cavil with him and say You have the liberty in that you are ty'd to her but if he means to give him his liberty his meaning also will be to absolve him of the necessity to take her By this we see that no advantage is gotten to Mr. Hobbs by reflection which shews a Liberty from Necessity reflected also Sixth Point is an argument to prove That all Actions are necessitated because they have necessary Causes I deny the Consequence For when he sayes That all Actions have their necessary Causes his meaning is if his meaning agree with the reason he gives of it That it is necessary they have Causes because saith he nothing can have beginning from it● self Now can any one imagine that a reflecting man should think this a good consequence Nothing can have beginning from it self and therefore every thing is necessitated that because an Effect must necessarily be produced by some Cause that therefore the Cause did necessarily produce that Effect For good Sir reflect again and bethink your self That as some Effects cannot be produced but by a concurrence of many Causes together every one of these is necessary to the producing of the Effect and yet not any one of these doth necessitate the Effect but rather it is necessary that nothing should be effected if that cause be single and alone Seventh Point is another argument to prove That voluntary actions are necessitated because they have sufficient Causes and all sufficient Causes are necessary That all sufficient Causes are necessary sufficient may have a double meaning either when there is sufficient virtue and aptness in the things to produce the Effect if they were us'd and imployed by the Agent or else when the Agent also actually imployes them to that purpose 'till the work be produc'd Take sufficient in this latter sence and all men will confess that the Effect will follow necessarily But the Power which the Will is said to have over sufficient Causes is understood of such onely as are sufficient in the first sence i.e. such as have aptness in them to produce the Effect when they are used which is a sence both common and reasonable As I have sufficient to pay all my Debts I have sufficient to defray the charges of a years travel and yet neither pay a Penny nor stir a foot Eighth Point charges the Definition of a Free Agent that is given by others with Nonsense and Contradiction viz. That when all things needful to produce the Effect be present can nevertheless not produce it For the Nonsense let it lie between us a while 'till the matter be examined a little and then let them take it that have most right to it If there be any Nonsense in the Definition it must be either in the meaning of them that use it or in the words they use to express their meaning When they speak of all things needful to produce the Effect their meaning is well known to be of all except the Agent 's Will or if it were not known to Mr. Hobbs it might and ought to have been from the very words of the Definition which plainly suppose the Will of the Agent to be yet undetermined All things needful in this sense may well be and yet nothing produc'd because the Agent hath not yet resolv'd to use them But if Mr. Hobbs will make them mean what they do not he may very well make them speak what they should not Now if their meaning imply no Contradiction or Nonsense as certainly it doth not then of necessity the words must or it will not be difficult on whom to bestow the Nonsense And for the words to say there be all things needful when yet the Agent is excepted who is no less needful than any of the rest let the common language of men or as Mr. Hobbs is pleased

hear such words no argument can be sufficient because Experience and Matter of Fact is not verified by other mens Arguments but by every mans own Sense and Memory For example how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not Nunc stans to a man that says these words by custom and never considers how he can conceive it himself in his mind Also the 6th point that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a Cause can no other way be made known but by crying how he can imagine it but if he try he shall find as much reason if there be no Cause of the thing to conceive it should begin at one time as an other that is he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible and therefore he must think there was some special Cause why it began then rather than sooner or later or else that it began never but was Eternal For the 7th point that all Events have necessary Causes it is there proved in that they have sufficient Causes Further let us also in this place suppose any Event never so casual as the throwing for example Ambs-ace upon a Pair of Dice and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown for seeing it was thrown it had a beginning and consequently a sufficient Cause to produce it consisting partly in the Dice partly in outward things as the posture of the parts of the Hand the measure of Force applied by the Caster the posture of the parts of the Table and the like In summe there was nothing wanting which was necesarily requisite to the producing of that particular Cast and consequently that Cast was necessarily thrown for if it had not been thrown there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it and so the Cause had not been sufficient In the like manner it may be proved that every other Accident how contingent soever it be is produced necessarily which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against The same also may be proved in this manner Let the case be put for example of the Weather 't is necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain if therefore it be not necessary it shall rain it is necessary it shall not rain otherwise there is no necessity that the Proposition It shall rain or not rain should be true I know there be some that say it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass but not singly that it shall rain which is as much as to say one of them is necessary yet neither of them is necessary and to seem to avoid that absurdity they make a distinction that neither of them is true determinatè but indeterminatè which distinction either signifies no more but this One of them is true but we know not which and so the Necessity remains though we know it not or if the meaning of the distinction be not that it hath no meaning and they might as well have said One of them is true Tytiricè but neither of them Tupatulicé The last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversie namely that there is no such thing as an Agent which when all things necessary to Action are present can nevertheless forbear to produce it or which is all one that there is no such thing as Freedom from Necessity is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged for if it be an Agent it can work and if it work there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the Action and consequently the Cause of the Action is sufficient and if sufficient then also necessary as hath been proved before And thus you see how the inconveniences which his Lordship Bishop Bramhal objecteth must follow upon the holding of Necessity are avoided and the Necessity it self demonstratively proved To which I could adde if I thought it good Logick the inconvenience of denying Necessity as that it destroyeth both the Decrees and the Prescience of God Almighty for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by Man as an Instrument or foreseeth shall come to pass a man if he have Liberty such as his Lordship affirmeth from Necessitation might frustrate and make not to come to pass and God should either not foreknow it and not decree it or he should foreknow such things should be as shall never be and decree that which shall never come to pass This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it and I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it onely to my Lord Bishop and so praying God to prosper Your Lordship in all Your Designs I take leave and am my most Noble and most Obliging Lord Rouen Aug. 20. 1645. Your most Humble Servant THO HOBBS The POSTSCRIPT ARguments seldom work on men of Wit and Learning when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion if any thing do it it is the shewing them the Cause of their Errour which is this Pious men attribute to God Almighty for Honours sake whatsoever they see is Honourable in the world as Seeing Hearing Willing Knowing Justice Wisdom c. but deny him such poor things as Eyes Ears Brains and other Organs without which we Worms neither have nor can conceive such Faculties to be and so far they do well But when they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophically then they consider them again as if he had such Faculties and in that manner as we have them this is not well and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties We ought not to dispute of God's Nature he is no fit subject for our Philosophy True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants and in giving God such Honour both in Attributes and Actions as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain OBSERVATIONS Upon A LETTER Of Mr. T. Hobbs to the Duke of NEWCASTLE Which he calls His Opinion about Liberty and Necessity THE Design of the Letter or as he himself speaks in one part of it that in which the whole Controversie consists is That Voluntary Agents do always act necessarily or which is all one act without liberty that is from necessity And this Opinion of his is first set down in 8 Points and then as the Title of the next Part imports so many Reasons to those Points The first Point is That by Spontaneity is meant Inconsiderate Proceeding c. without Deliberation I call this the first Point not because I find Spontaneity described here but because at the entrance of his Reasons he declares that to be his design It 's true that he saith somewhat of the Bishops Opinion concerning it but very doubtfully as he had cause for he shall not find among any that maintain the difference between Spontaneous and