the Nature of the Son and Spirit whose Natures are short of the Perfections of the Father's Nature and consequently their Natures are not Divine because the Divine Nature contains all Perfections but theirs want those that not only in themselves are the greatest and most excellent but the want of which is as he saith pag. 7. an abatement of all other Perfections And if the Father's Nature is independent and the Son 's and Spirit 's dependent it shews they have different kinds of Nature as different nay as opposite as Dependent and Independent But what can be a more staring Contradiction than that Beings that do eternally and necessarily exist and are Almighty yet notwithstanding this have not a Power to keep themselves in Life and Being no not a Moment and yet at the same time have a Power inherent in themselves from all Eternity to give Life and Being to all things whatever which also do entirely depend on them for the continuation of the same It is a contradiction to say a necessary Nature is dependent because a necessary Nature is that Nature which contains in it self the formal Reason why it cannot but be but a dependent Nature is so far from having any thing in it self that makes it necessarily exist that it not only owes to another its Existence but hourly depends upon another having no Power in its self to continue it in Existence which is the dependence of a Creature not of a Creator Is not a dependent Creator as great a Contradiction as an independent Creature And did ever any but our Author join necessary Existence and Dependence together How can they as I intimated Sect. 62. having necessary Existence be said more to depend on the Father for their continuance in Being than the Father on them since they as necessarily and as eternally exist as he who can no more hinder theirs than his own Existence nor could he more forbear emaning them from all Eternity than existing himself And if his Existence was without a Cause his emaning must be so too since the one was as necessary and eternal as the other In created Beings all necessary Emanations have the same cause as the Beings from whence they emane but God having no Cause of his Being his necessary Emanations must have no cause also And consequently eternal and necessary Existence as I observ'd in the same Sect. 62. is as great a Perfection as Self-existence since one is without a Cause as much as the other nay there can be no difference between them for if the Father is self-existent the Emanations that issue forth from him must be so too since they are emanatory Substances which were not produced by the Will and Power of the Father from nothing but they emaned from something which since there was nothing else to emane from must be the Father's self-existent Substance to which it was essential to have Emanations and consequently they have the same Existence as the Substance in which they existed when they emaned nor could their emaning make them lose their Self-existence But more of this hereafter But he says they depend on the Father for the continuation of their Being as the Streams on the Fountain or the Rays on the Sun But there 's no material Substance that depends upon another for its Existence or continuance in Existence all Matter is equally old and has subsisted ever since the Creation and Generation and Corruption is nothing but Matter according to the Laws of Motion changing its Shapes and Figures and therefore such Similies are not to the purpose because we are not speaking of any supposed Form or Figure of the Son and Spirit but of the Existence of their Substances viz. whether they have them by any third way different from both Creation and Self-existence As to the Streams depending on the Fountain it is no more than this that if the Water did not issue out of the Ground it could not run along the Ground if it did not bubble up in the Fountain it could no more flow to the next Place than if it stop'd there it could flow to a third but this does not make one part of the Water give being to another part or continue it in Being it is the same Body of Water which was in the Fountain that is now in the Streams And as to the Rays they no way depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in Being except the Sun by a creating Power makes them to exist and by the same Power continues them in Existence If the Rays are as some imagin parts of the AEther set in motion by the Sun they no more depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in Being than the Sun does on them but if they emane from the Body of the Sun they have the same cause of their Being and continuance in Being as the Sun it self because they like unto all other necessary Emanations were parts of the Body whence they emaned and consequently have the same Origin as the Sun it self And if the Sun had been self-existent they because parts of it would have been so too nor would their emaning destroy their Self-existing or any ways cause them then to depend on the Sun for their continuance in Being since the least Substance is as much a Substance as the greatest and consequently equally able to subsist by it self so that notwithstanding his altogether unlike Similies it 's evident if the Son and H. Spirit are Eternal and Necessary they are as self-existent and independent as the Father and consequently Gods in as high a Sense as he who if he were not a necessary Being would not be independent nor self-existent and consequently those three must go together but if their Natures are dependent and not self-existent they are so far from containing all Perfections and being as truly Divine as the Father's that they are truly created Natures or from no-beings made to be and like all such Beings as I observ'd Sect. 62. in God they live and move and have their Being I said Sect. 62. If the Persons have the same unlimited Perfections tho the manner of their getting them was different this would not cause any inequality between them to which he answers it would that is in reference to their manner of Existence though not in reference to their meer Essence But if there is not only a different manner of their getting their Essences but their Essences when gotten exist after a different manner which he must mean or else contradict himself and agree with me it 's impossible they should have the same kind of Nature because to exist is common to all Natures it 's the different manner of Existence that makes the difference between Natures and consequently a Nature that has a more excellent manner of Existing will be a more excellent kind of Nature And therefore if the Natures of the Son and Spirit had not only a different way of having their Existence
THE REFLECTIONS ON THE XXVIII PROPOSITIONS TOUCHING THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY In a LETTER to the Clergy c. maintain'd against the Third Defence of the said Propositions By the same Hand 1 Tim. 2. 5. For there is one God and one Mediator between God and Men the Man Christ Jesus Printed in the Year MDCXCV The REFLECTIONS upon the XXVIII PROPOSITIONS c. maintain'd THough there is nothing in the third Defence of the 28 Propositions c. that can as far as I can perceive enervate the least Objection that is urged in my Letter yet because the Doctrine therein maintained tends to subvert the Foundation of the Christian Religion by introducing a Plurality of Gods I cannot but think my self in Conscience oblig'd to shew the Vanity of those Pretences that are urg'd in its behalf especially since the Defender's writing with so great an Assurance of his own Performance and so much contempt of the Reflections may have some influence upon some weak and prejudiced Readers Had the Author design'd a just Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity he should have taken notice of what is said against it in general but more especially of what is urged against the real Trinitarians wherein he is equally concerned with them and not only of those additional Absurdities of his own Hypothesis Therefore I shall now set down his Opinion both as I find it in his Propositions and in the Defences of them and then shew the weakness of his Notions either with new Arguments or at least with enforcing those that were mentioned in my Reflections The Defender in his Propositions asserts That there are three Eternal and necessary Divine Beings or Substances each of which has unlimited Power Wisdom and Goodness and that so many Men or Angels are not more expresly distinguished in Scripture as different Persons or Substances Prop. 16 17. And pag. 8. of the second Defence I do affirm the Son and Spirit to be absolutely perfect Beings in reference to the Perfections of their Nature they are all boundless and Infinite So pag. 10. The Father's Existence being without a Cause does not make him to have another sort of Nature from that of the Son and Spirit which may be a necessary Nature and uncreated and constituted of all the boundless Perfections of which the Nature of the Father consists abstracted from the consideration of the manner of his Existence and in the same Page The Divine Nature speaking of the Nature of each doth comprehend all Perfections So pag. 11. An Essence of the same Kind though not the same numerical One So that here are three divine eternal necessary Natures or Essences as different as three Human or Angelical Natures which at first sight appear as much to be three Gods as three human Natures to be three Men which is a revolting to Polytheism or Plurality of Gods except he can shew that either two of these Divine Natures are not Gods or that these three Divine Natures are but one God We will therefore see what he saith to these two Points 1. He says that the Name of God is used in more senses than one in Scripture In the highest Sense the Father alone is God he is the only Independent the only True the only Good and Great and Self-existent God The Son and Spirit have a right to the Name of God next to that which is appropriated to the Father they depend on him with an entire dependance both for their Being and continuance in Being But is not this inconsistent with what is said before because it is first to assert that the different Ways or Manners of having their Natures does not make any difference in their Natures the second and third are as truly Divine as the First and then in effect to suppose it does because the Father has several Perfections the others are uncapable of To this he replies the Perfections the Father has above them belong immediately to his Existence not to his Nature but what is Existence abstracted from the Nature that exists but a Chimera If the Nature did not exist it would not be a Nature To say such a Nature exists is to say it is not only in our imagination but really or in act To make the Existence of a Nature a distinct thing from the Nature that exists and to suppose it to be the Subject in which the Attributes or Perfections of Independance and being the first Original of all things do exist is to suppose it a Substance because we have no other Idea of a Substance but that it is a Subject in which Properties exist which would be to make two distinct Substances in God his Nature that exists and the Existence of his Nature abstracted from the Nature What is the Existence of God the Father but the Existence of the Nature of God the Father except he exists distinct from his Nature And consequently if Self-existence be so great a Perfection it sheweth that the self-existent Nature of the Father is more perfect than the not self-existent Nature of the Son But suppose Self-existence which is Existence of the Father belongs to the Existence of the Father which by the way is only supposing Existence to belong to Existence yet Self-existence as I observed in my Letter is only a Perfection as it supposeth necessary or independant Existence and all those Perfections that belong to a necessary or self-existent Nature so that Self-existence barely considered in it self abstractedly from those Perfections notwithstanding his denial is no more a Perfection than any other way of having Existence if that way supposeth the same Perfections As suppose there was some Matter self-existent and some other Matter not self-existent and the Nature of the one were not any way different from the Nature of the other would they not be both equally Perfect and a parcel of Guinea's made of the One be as good as a parcel of Guinea's made of the other Or how could it be possible they being alike for Weight Colour Duration c. to distinguish them And if it be so in lower Natures the reason is the same in the highest Natures But however to carry the Simily as high as we can suppose a Human self-existent Father had two Sons who had all the Perfections of Human Nature and did as necessarily and independently exist as He there can be no reason assigned but that they would be Men in the highest Sense and as absolutely perfect as the Father He saith in pag. 44. of the first Defence That if a Human Father could be suppos'd to be Self-existent and that his Sons had the now mentioned kind of Dependance upon him viz. as the Light on the Sun the consequence must be that their Nature is short of the Perfection of their Father's Nature notwithstanding the many Properties they agree in which is owning that Self-existence and Independence belong to the Nature and that therefore the Nature of the Father is different from
appears he holds the Three Persons to be One God as having an Essence of the same kind but to be Three numerical Gods And to make his Polytheism look as heathenishly as possible he saith p. 19. that the individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Persons And then Self-existence Being the first Original and Independence signify much His Lordship makes the same Answer to my 4th Prop. as he did to my 2d i. e. he has answered it already What can be more extravagant than this Fancy on which the Weight of more Hypotheses than one depends viz. that Angels exist by voluntary Creation but the Son and H. Ghost by necessary Emanation It 's common with the Trinitarians to use these Terms Generation Emanation Procession it 's common also with the most eminent of them to acknowledg that it 's a difficult Thing to understand a dangerous Curiosity to enquire a bold Presumption to determine wherein these Terms differ and the Reason is tho' they are asham'd to own it because they know not what they would have their Terms signify In common speaking we know what is meant by To generate or beget To emanate or flow from To proceed To go or come forth but those Terms cannot be applied to the Father Son and H. Ghost in that natural obvious Sense why then should they be applied to them at all when no Man can distinctly say what they are to signify 'T is granted we have not an adequate Conception of God there may be something in his Nature whereof we have no just Idea but that which we cannot understand how can we talk of How can we form Propositions of Things out of the reach of our Knowledg But by this one particular Term EMANATION his Lordship will venture to say This is what is meant A more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation and to his Term Emanation he adds this Epithet Necessary so then the more excellent Way of Existence than by Creation is necessary Existence and so it is but then the Son does not necessarily exist That Being which could not but be ever was and that Being which ever was could be from no other But because his Lordship is wont sarcastically to deride my Arguing who am indeed an obscure and unlearned little Fellow tho' for ought he knows I may equal the very great Abilities of that DYING MARTYR yet a Trinitarian to my Knowledg who starves to the Reproach of this Nation to whom the envious Jovian allow'd the Praise of Mediocrity I shall therefore seek a little shelter from Authority that his Lordship may not renounce his Senses if any Man of Sense be of his Mind The Author I am going to quote is Dr. Cudworth a good Man and very near of his Lordship's Make too who in his Intellectual System contradicts his own and his Lordship's Hypothesis as plainly and liberally as heart can wish p. 210. Self-existence and necessary Existence are essential to a perfect Being and to none else But his Lordship teaches that the latter and not the former is essential to a perfect Being and that the Son is absolutely perfect tho' not in his strictest Sense without Self-existence and that the Self-existence which belongs to the Father does not belong to his Essence tho' he who can separate Self-existence from the Father's Essence may with as much Reason deny the Existence of his Essence for the Father is as certainly self-existent as he is existent Cudworth again p. 726. Nothing could exist of it self from Eternity naturally and necessarily but that which contains necessary and eternal Self-existence in its Nature I am apt to believe this Author put in that Phrase of it self to save an Emanation or two but it will not do it for he constantly makes Self-existence and necessary Existence inseparable Perfections And p. 748. he speaks full and home against his own and the Bp. of Gloucester's Tritheism in these words Tho' it be certain that something did exist of it self necessarily from all Eternity yet it is certain likewise that there can be but one such thing Necessity of Existence being essential to no more Now if Necessity of Existence be essential but to One I pray Sir what will become of his Lordship's necessary Emanations Cudw p. 764. Because something did certainly exist of it self from Eternity unmade therefore also is there actually a necessary existent Being The Doctor proves the necessary Existence of a Being from its Existing of it self from Eternity i. e. from its necessary Existence as I had done before Let the Reader judg if it be not a good Argument P. 13. his Lordship says A Creature communicating its Nature does not forgo its own individual Nature but neither does he communicate his own individual Nature nor any part thereof Here I beg his Pardon for the Creature does forgo a part a seminal part thereof the bodily Substance of the Foetus is by the wonderful Providence of God made from the bodily Substance of the Parents and as far as the bodily Substance of Men may be call'd their Nature they waste their Nature to produce their like How Souls are produced he says not neither I. But hitherto he has not offer'd any thing to make me retract my Assertion That we have no other Notion of the word Communicate but to impart or give and what one Person doth impart or give of any essential and singular thing THAT himself hath not but he hath it to whom it is given Who questions the Power of God to generate his Like He made Man in his own Likeness endued him with rational Faculties with noble Excellencies of Mind but the Unitarians do not see how God can communicate all his infinite Perfections for that is to communicate himself to beget himself to multiply himself which deserves a harder Name than I can give it Prop. 10. There seems to be no Contradiction nor the least Absurdity in asserting that God is able to communicate every one of his Perfections except those of Self-existence and being the first Original of all things Against this I did affirm and see no Cause I have to retract that for the same Reason as Self-existence and being the first Original of all things are incommunicable for the very same Infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness were incommunicable also and to make good this Affirmation 't was proper for me to declare why the former were incommunicable that the Reader might judg wherein the latter were not so likewise for the Reason alledg'd All that his Lordship has to offer is that I attempt to prove a self-evident Principle but that 's not so great a Fault I hope as to attempt to prove an evident Contradiction such as That two Persons have all Perfections necessary to essentiate a perfect God tho' they have not absolutely all Perfections That God the Father has more Perfections than are necessary to essentiate a perfect God That the
omniscient omnipotent and omnipresent but if we mean by Divine Honours such as agree to him that could do nothing of himself that judgeth as he hears and hath all Judgment committed to him by the Father that sent him that all Men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father that sent him I agree that such Divine Honour is due to the Son Divine Honour in the former Sense the Son himself forbad to be paid him even after he should leave the World and go to the Father Joh. 16. 23. At that day ye shall ask me nothing verily verâ—â—y I say unto you whatsoever ye shaell ask the Father in my Name he will give it you and ver 26. At that day ye shall ask in my Name I think he does not well to take no notice of the Account which the Unitarians give â—â— that Text. Will he build so great a Duty as is the worshipping of another besides one with the Worship due only to the One God upon the Interpretation of the Particle as which he cannot deny does in several places of Scripture import not an Equality in the things spoken of not the just Measure and Nature of the Duty enjoin'd but the Necessity of it and some Similitude which it bears to what was before-mentioned To love our Neighbour as our self is not to be understood equally with our self for that is impossible and contrary to the very Principles of Humane Nature for omnes sibi melius esse malle quam alteri but we should do the one as certainly as we do the other It is but just and equal that the great and only God be honoured with all the Powers and Faculties of our reasonable Natures and that Jesus Christ be honoured with an Honour next to that He saith Christ is not God in the highest Sense therefore say I the highest Honour is not to be paid him I said upon his 19th Prop. that the Socinians are not willing to confess that the Honour of the Father is as muoh taken care of in his Explication as they do wish it were He answers Sure they will not say that their own Hypothesis doth give more Honour to the Father than THAT which speaks him the Author of all that the other Persons either have or are I reply Yes they will because it 's more honour to be the voluntary Author of what the Son and H. Spirit have and are as the Unitarians hold than to be the necessary Author or indeed no Author as his Ldp. holds Upon my saying that it is not our Duty to think as honourably as we can of any Person but God the Father Almighty his Lordship answers He meant by as honourably as POSSIBLY we can as honourably as LAWFULLY we can Dr. S th made Dean Sherlock pay dear for this Evasion but I will not write after that furious Example preserving my Respects to his Lordship All I say is His Ldp. is a well-meaning Man and in 20 other places where his Words sound tritheistically and contradictorily I believe he meant honestly P. 40. From that Text I will not give my Glory to another his Lordship argues that the Son of God is not a Creature as if God had said I will give my Glory to no other but my Son But it 's a plain and good Consequence This taking the Words in an universal Sense because God will not give his Glory to another therefore no other no not the Son is to be worshipped with that Honour which is due to the Father As to my Animadversion on his 20th Prop. he appeals to you my Friend to judg Every Man that reads will judg and some will be biass'd by one Prejudice and some by another and some may chance to examine diligently to consider freely and to judg impartially among this latter sort of Readers I fancy I may have the most Friends but the other I fear are all his Prop. 21. he says His Explication agrees well with that of the Nicene Fathers and Athanasius I grant it of what some of them have said in divers places of their Works concerning the Trinity but it 's nevertheless true that in other places it disagrees with what that Council and Saint have taught For you must know Sir that even they are not all of a piece but sometimes Orthodox sometimes Heterodox and often need the Assistance of a candid Reader to interpret them according to a pretended sound Meaning quite contrary to the Grammatical Sense of their words As for his agreeing with them I wonder which of the Antients ever taught That 2 Beings which depend on God are as almighty as the God on whom they and all things depend I wonder which of the Antients found out the two Senses in one of which the Son and H. Ghost were each of them essentially God and in the other not I question whether there be any such Stuff among the School-men but if he can produce me the Father who has fallen into this particular Weakness that Tho' the Name of God is us'd in more Senses than one in H. Script yet the Name of GOD in H. Script is always to be understood in the highest Sense I will never question but he has Antiquity on his side whether any Truth and Sense or no. As for his Compliment that he knows not whether there be more of Arrogance than Ignorance or Ignorance than Arrogance in the Remark about Credit from the Judgment of the Antient Fathers it looks as if it was borrowed from Dr. S th it has the Air of his impatient Opiniativeness but does not at all become the better Nature of the Bp. of Glocester But he finds I am a sort of an Adversary that would not permit him to treat me otherwise And how did I compel him to treat me as he suspects he has done with too much Freedom Why I took a Liberty with him But Sir you can assure him that when I compos'd my MS. I knew not who was the Author of the 21 Propositions and could not dream they should have been printed my Aim was only to let you then my very new Acquaintance privately know my private Judgment I am none of your Proselyte nor no Man's else I profess sincerely I fell into what I hold touching the Trinity by freely thinking and seriously considering what I occasionally met with here and there now and then To conclude I thank his Lordship for his good Wishes and I do really believe now he has vented his Anger that he is sincere in them for which I make him this Return I heartily wish all Good to him as I ought upon many Accounts 1. In general because he is a very worthy and good Man 2. In particular because he hates Persecution 3. Because he has not only sworn to the Government but looks upon King William who gave him his Preferment as our Deliverer not Conqueror our just and lawful King and no Usurper But I cannot thank him for his Advice He would have me think it possible that those Opinions which I take for most evident and most necessary Truths may be gross and dangerous Errors Why my Opinion is that the Being of God and the Reasonableness of H. Religion are most evident and necessary Truths and no Man living shall perswade me to that Modesty as to think it possible for these to be gross and dangerous Errors Again He would have me believe that I may be mightily mistaken when I am most confident Indeed this Piece of Advice has not so ill a face as the other but his Lordship might have spar'd it for I will not be most confident but when the Truth is most plain and evident I am Sir Yours FINIS
pleads they are not three Gods because there is an immediate Union in their spiritual Substances But I say no Union whatever can make three each of which is one God to be but one God because it is first saying each is one God and then denying it by saying all three are but one God so that it cannot without a manifest Contradiction be said that while each remains one God they can any way be united into one God for three of the same kind will be thrice what one of the same kind is If Union make them one God it must either identify them by making them one and the same God and consequently there can be no real distinction between them or it must make none of them God by making them parts of God which by Union compose one God For we have no other Idea of Composition but of one thing being made up of several which by being united constitute that one and which whether material or immaterial we cannot conceive but as parts of the thing they constitute For since each is not the whole it must be only a part of the whole whatever our Author pag. 54. says to the contrary I would willingly know why they are not as much three Gods though suppos'd substantially united as if they were not united since each has in himself distinctly from the others all the Perfections of the Divine Nature and they could have no more if they were separate It is as much Idolatry to adore three united as three ununited Gods since in both Cases you equally rob God of his Honour by paying it to two numerically diverse and different Gods And being Substances they are in their Natures capable of subsisting apart from one another He pag. 53. misrepresents what I say concerning Union as though I argued against the bare possibility of their being united and not of their becoming one God by Union while each remain'd God distinct from the others and then makes a long Harangue about Mystery in which he says if he do not seriously cry Mystery I know what I know of him But however to do him the fuller Justice I will mention what he further says concerning this Union In his first Defence pag. 19. He saith They are as much one with one another as they without the most apparent contradiction are capable of being one A Heathen would not have scrupled to have said as much of his Gods But he goes on and says They are much more than specifically one but then it is evident they cannot be so much distinguished as so many Men or Angels which are but specifically one But he will not allow that they are identified or numerically one p. 53. but if we cannot apprehend any Medium between numerical and specifical Oneness then in professing to believe it we profess we know not what But I suppose he will say at this turn as he does in his second Defence pag. 26. Well suppose this Is it impossible for a thing to be of which we sorry Mortals have no Idea I say no by no means but with humble Submission he 's a very sorry Mortal that requires us to believe Words without any Idea's annex'd to them But let our Author say what he will he has still a Simily to help him out This Medium between specifick and numerical Unity is as great a Unity as that between the Sun its Splendour and the Light of both But those must be either different or the same thing if different though of the same Kind there can be but a specifick Unity or if the same a numerical Unity If by the Light he means a thin Collection of minute Particles as he pag. 58. defines it then he supposes the Splendor to be a second Sun emitting a small sort of active subtile and piercing Particles but if by Light and Splendor he means those Idea's those Particles cause in us he cannot distinguish between Splendour and the Light of the Splendor because Splendour is but a greater degree of Light caused by those minute Particles in a greater Quantity or more directly striking our Eyes so that his Simily is every way faulty But because in his often repeated Similies about the Sun its Light and Heat he supposes somewhat in the Sun or which does exist by emaning from it analogous to our Idea's of Light and Heat I told him Sect. 69. That though there is in the Sun a Power to produce in us Heat and Light as well as Pain and Pleasure yet there are no such Sensations or Qualities in the Sun which though pag. 57. he argues against yet he says the very same thing but lest his Reader should perceive it he calls the Effects which when one pretends to talk Philosophically is very improper by the Names of the Causes and will not say that Heat is caused by but that Heat is a close Collection of minute subtile active piercing Particles and Light a thinner Collection of them But do Clothes and Exercise by causing Heat Produce a Collection of such Particles Why do they not sometimes produce Light which is but a less close Collection But in arguing thus he grants all I would have viz. That there are no such Qualities in the Sun or emaning from it but the Sun being a Body in perpetual Agitation there are minute Particles flowing from it which by their Figure Texture and Motion alter the Figure Texture and Motion of some of the smallest parts of our Hands and Eyes and thereby produce in us Light and Heat which are as much meer perceptions as Pain and Pleasure And I say again there has not been any Book writ these late Years on this Subject but what proves there 's nothing in Matter besides Bulk external Figure and internal Configuration of its minute Parts which by their Motion produce in us Heat Light Colour Sound Taste c. But enough of this Our Author says in his first Defence pag. 20. That outwardly and in reference to the Creation they the three Divine Natures are perfectly one and the same God as concurring in all the same external Actions though in relation to one another there is a real distinction between them But if there is no distinction between them in respect of the Creatures to whom they are one and the same God why do the Trinitarians worship them as numerically different Gods for if they adored them as the same God it would be as impossible to worship the one and not the other as to worship and not to worship the same God But can there be a real and not a real distinction between them The reason he gives why the three Divine Natures are but one God is as surprizing as the thing it self it is because they concur in all the same external Actions But if each is God does it not suppose three concurring Gods Can one and the same God be said to concur with himself Is it not directly agaisnt the Honour of the Father who
is God in the highest Sense to suppose him but a concurring God It is in a manner ungodding him since we cannot say then that we owe more than the third part of our Being Preservation and Happiness to him For to attribute them wholly to him would be robbing the other two who equally concur with him of what is their due and no Action can be wholly attributed to one which jointly belongs to Three But if it be injurious to each Divine Nature to ascribe to it but a Third of those Benefits we receive it must be injurious to say they concur'd in conferring them But if he says each wholly does all external Actions then he contradicts himself in supposing each concurs for he that wholly does an Action can never be said to concur in doing it And if the Father be the Original of Mankind there cannot be a second and third Original except Men can have as many Origins A second Original is as great nonsense as a Second First and a first Original is no more Sense than a First First But I refer the Desender to my Letter from Sect. 77 to 83. where I have handled this Point more fully By this time I believe it is evident to an impartial Reader that nothing our Author has affirmed of the Son and Holy Spirit does abate of their being Gods in the highest Sense or make them one and the same God with the Father and consequently there cannot be a more open and grosser Polytheism than his Hypothesis of three eternal and necessary Divine Natures But The Defender is not content with asserting three such Natures which one would think sufficiently absurd but he also runs into a Number of Inconsistences concerning the Manner of the Existence of two of these Natures in making them such and yet not self-existent or from none but that they had their eternal Beings from another Now as it is evident that whatsoever is self-existent is eternal because there is no Author or Cause of its being so it is as evident that whatsoever is not self-existent but has receiv'd its Being from another or has been caused to be cannot be from Eternity because to receive a Being or to be caused to be supposeth the Non-being to precede Being They must once not be otherwise they were not capable of being caused to be and consequently they could not always have been in being or from Eternity What can be a more manifest Contradiction than that that which had ever been should once be caused to be or that that which had been from all Eternity should from not-being be produced caused or emaned into Being Or must not that which is emaned into being sometime or other begin to be Or can that which has a Beginning be from Eternity which necessarily supposeth no Beginning For we have no Idea of any thing being from Eternity but that it had no Origin But our Author pag. 46. says That the Son and Spirit had an Origin And Prop. 6. The Father is the Original of all other Beings in which the Son and Holy Spirit are comprehended So that we must if we can believe that two necessary Natures had an eternal Origin or Beginning and that they have been caused to be tho they have always been It 's as great a Contradiction to say that that which has had an Origin has been from Eternity as that that which will have an End shall last to Eternity And if what has had an Origin can be from Eternity Creation which is but giving an Origin to things may be from Eternity And why might not God cause a thing to be voluntarily as well as necessarily from Eternity since in both Cases Being is equally bestow'd And every Being that is not without a Cause as God the Father alone is must have a Beginning for there is no Medium between having Being from none and from some one and what has Being from some one must once be without Being and so have a Beginning And if God be Eternal because he is Self-existent by parity of Reason what is not Self-existent cannot be from Eternity Eadem est ratio contrariorum is as undoubted a Maxim as any whatever so that nothing can be more evident than that To have an Origin or Cause or not to be self-existent and to be from Eternity are inconsistent And if they are inconsistent in themselves whatever Terms you express them in they will be still inconsistent Whence it favours to say no worse of great prejudice and fondness of an Hypothesis that when a thing is a Contradiction in some Terms to seek out others to hide the Contradiction But our Author is so unhappy in his Attempt that the very Terms he makes use of viz. To have Existence from God by way of necessary emanation contain in themselves a direct Contradiction for whatsoever substantial Being or Nature emaneth from another must before its Emanation exist some way or other in the Nature it emaneth from otherwise it is impossible to emane from it but it must emane from nothing which is the very same as Creation For every Nature must either emane from nothing or from the Nature in which it pre-existed But to suppose a Nature to exist by emaning is to suppose it did not exist before its Emanation and consequently could not emane from another Nature but from nothing Except it first emaned from the Nature and afterward existed which puts me in mind of a certain Poet who introduces Adam in great haste going to be created So that if the Son and H. Spirit did not exist before their Emanation it is impossible they should emane from God otherwise than that God by the voluntary exercise of his Divine Power emaned them from nothing and consequently they could not emane or issue forth as he Prop. 15. terms it from the Divine Nature But if the Son and Holy Spirit did exist before they emaned they did not exist by Emanation but were self-existent as the Nature of the Father Upon my asserting of which Sect. 58. he answers pag. 47. But I say with as great assurance that whatsoever Substance emanes from another must owe its existence to that other and the contrary is a manifest Contradiction but to whom I know not except to himself But I must beg leave to dissent and tell him that all Substances whatsoever owe their existence to God and not to the Substance they emane from and that all Generation Emanation or Procession in created Beings is only the different Forms and Figures which the various Coalitions of Matter according to the Laws of Motion do produce and consequently whatever Substance emanes from another however it may be modified by it does not owe its Existence to it but is as old as the Creation it self And by Parity of Reason whatsoever emanes from a self-existent Substance does not owe its Existence to the Substance it emanes from but is as self-existent as that Substance Though to exist by
so because their Books are full of Distinctions without Difference He further says That tho the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father yet they are still in him and ever have been in him But to emane from to issue forth and proceed from and yet still to be in are Contradictions in our Conceptions And our Author Pag. 45. makes emaning from and kindling the same But what is kindling but separating the Parts of any thing one from another by a violent rapid Motion And what is the Emanation of the Rays which he so much insists on but their separation from the Body of the Sun In the next Sect. 60. he wholly mistakes the Argument and then wanders to God's Decrees which is nothing to the Purpose in a Discourse of substantial Emanations Upon my saying Sect. 63. What greater Absurdity can there be than that Beings which have infinite Perfections should want some Besides a long Harangue about Infinite he answers It is no monstrous Business to imagine that a Being which has not every Perfection may have those it is possest of in the highest degree To which I reply that it is monstrous that a Divine Nature which he owns contains all Perfections should want some Perfections and those the chiefest Or that Natures that are as he says boundless and infinite should not have infinite Perfections which is to make them to use his Word unlimited in Essence but limited in the Perfections of Essence as wanting the greatest the want of which abates as he says pag. 7. and consequently bounds their boundless Perfections Nor can they have in the highest Degree those Perfections they are possest of as unlimited Power Wisdom and Goodness For if the Father be the only Wise the only Good and greater than the Son and Spirit they have not those Perfections in the highest Degree nor are they as I have already proved unlimited God cannot communicate any of his Attributes without communicating all because he cannot communicate any without communicating his Divine Essence in which as all Properties do in a Substance they inseparably exist And if God communicate his Essence he must communicate with it his Self-existence and Independency which are also inseparable from his Essence I must now beg leave to transcribe my Sect. 68. that the Reader may the better see whether it contains so GROSS A CONCEIT and such BEASTLY STUPIDITY as our Author pag. 55. charges it with If they the three supposed infinite Substances are more than one they cannot be Infinite because being Substances of the same Sort they must be bounded and limited one by another If the Substance of the Father be every where How can the Substance of the Son be every where too at the same time and after the same manner For if Beings can be in the same Place at the same time in the same manner as they must be if they are of the same sort it is impossible to distinguish them because we have no other mark of distinction between Beings but that they cannot be in the same Place at the same time in the same manner I hope our Author will grant that two Numbers will determine one the other because if they did not they would be one and the same and consequently whatever things we predicate two or more of they must bound one another otherwise they could not be two what makes them two must necessarily limit them so that two Infinites are a plain Contradiction because nothing can be Infinite which is determined but if they are two they must be determined otherwise they would not be two but one and the same One Infinite cannot contain or comprehend another Infinite if it did it would be the same and not another therefore that other must determine it What is not all of the same kind and so is singular must have bounds or limits otherwise it would be all and this is so very plain that should a Man in any other Case affirm more than one Infinite of the same kind he would scarce be thought to be in his Senses Who was ever so ridiculous as to assert more than one Infinite Space more than one infinite Duration yet neither Space nor Duration are corporeal Substances To suppose two infinite Spaces or Durations must we not necessarily suppose an end or limit to one before the other can commence To suppose two Infinites of the same sort is to suppose an infinite addition to that which is already Infinite therefore it 's very evident that whatever Nature or sort a Being is of if we conceive more than one we cannot conceive any of them as Infinite nor can we believe that the three Persons are as he supposes as different as so many Men or Angels and yet believe that each of them can be after the same manner every where because holding both is to believe them distinct and not distinct different yet the same And this must necessarily be as long as we have no other marks of Identity and Diversity but that Beings cannot be after the same manner in the same Place at the same time If our Author had any other marks of Identity and Diversity he ought to have discovered them before he was so free of his obliging Expressions If there can be more than one Infinite of a sort there can no reason be assign'd why there may not be an infinite Number as well as two or three so that it would not be absurd to suppose an infinite number of Spaces Durations c. And if more than one infinite Being can be every where an infinite Number may as well be every where and by parity of Reason a vast Number of finite Spirits may be in the very same Space as contains one which our Author very roundly supposes and says They that do not suppose it have no manner of Notion of what they believe But Mr. Lock whom I never heard charg'd with beastly stupidity or of having no Notion of what he says in his Essay of Human Understanding Ch. Identity speaks thus We have Idea's but of three sorts of Substances first God second finite Intelligences third Bodies Though these three sorts of Substances do not exclude one another out of the same Place yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same Place or else the Notions of Identity and Diversity would be in vain There could be no such distinction of Substances or any thing else from one another And if other Authorities after this great Man were not needless I might add the Learned Cusanus who Lib. 3. de mente says Impossibile est plura esse Infinita quoniam alterum esset in altero finitum There cannot be more than one Infinite because the one would make the other Finite And another Learned Author says Quicquid actu est infinitum ei nequit dari mensura Deus est actu infinitus nequit ergo ei dari mensura
not only own the Churches Faith the Athanasian Creed but if he is of the Clergy solemnly subscribe to it and devoutly read it with all its damnatory Clauses when it asserts but one Substance one Uncreate one Eternal c. and affirms the Holy Spirit to proceed from both the Father and the Son the contrary of all which he asserts in his Propositions and makes God the Father to have two Sons both issuing from him by way of Emanation and consequently the Son is not as contrary to all Creeds as well as the Scripture God's only Son But I shall conclude only adding that as it is contrary to the Genius of Religion and is the way to eternize Errors so it betrays a mean and low Spirit to embrace an Opinion for the sake of a Party though never so venerable And for my part as I have been taught to call no Man Master but Christ so I will own no other Name but that of Christian and not of any distinguishing Party or Sect and therefore will be chargeable with no controverted Doctrine further than what I expresly own and that I do the Unity of the Nature of God which is certainly of all Doctrines the most fundamental and which I have abundantly shown from the Consideration of his Essence his Attributes his Works and from the Duty and Worship we owe him POSTSCRIPT AND now I am at leisure to bestow a word or two upon my pert Adversary the Enquirer who in an Advertisement to his View of the Considerations charges me presently with a double deplorable Impotency and that for no other reason but saying the Enquiry being so fully examined by an abler Hand I shall only observe c. but instead of answering and shewing the weakness of those few Observations I added he only vents his spleen in studied Raillery and contemptuous Expressions But it 's usual for Men highly conceited when their weaknesses are expos'd to grow angry And I find the calm and sober Enquirer not exempt from the same Infirmity He says I rave in my Dream in supposing he makes Parts in God or three inadequate Gods And for reply says I appeal to that little Sense he has left himself whether Power alone be God exclusively of Wisdom and Goodness Then adds he 't is an inadequate or a notcompleat Notion of God and then by his profound reasoning not eternal But is not this disowning and owning three inadequate Gods For where is the Difference between three inadequate Gods and three each of which is God and yet none of them is God in a compleat and adequate Sense And if the Father alone be no more God than Power alone exclusive of Wisdom and Goodness he must certainly be God in a very inadequate Sense for neither Power exclusive nor inclusive of Wisdom and Goodness is God but all three Properties of the Father who could not be said to be eternal except he had not only Power but all the Divine Attributes I wonder with what assurance he can deny that his Hypothesis makes three inadequate Gods since he says pag. 47. When you predicate the Name of God of any one of them the Persons you herein express a true but inadequate conception of God Now if you predicate the Name of God of every one of them singly and then add them together in one Number I appeal to the Enquirer's great Sense how far short that comes of three inadequate Gods And he further adds in the same Place As the Body is the Man not excluding the Soul and the Soul the Man not excluding the Body so each is God not excluding the others which at best is but making each to be God but in part as the Body or the Soul is but Man in part though with this difference that each of the three Persons is but the third of God when the Body or the Soul is the Moiety of the Man For each of these conceived by it self are as he words it pag. 51. individual Essences but conceived together they are the entire individual Essence of God Which I aver is destroying the Godhead of each since each can be no more God than the Third of an Essence can be the entire Essence it self And whether this is not making parts and composition in God I refer the Reader to what I have said pag. 12. And this notion was by the Antients counted a kind of Sabellianism vid. Petav. Adden ad Tom. 2. de Trin. pag. 866. and it was by some of the Fathers called Atheism Id. L. 1. de Tr. C. 6. § 3. as observ'd by an Answer to the Animadversions on the Dean of P. c. pag. 164. And it is by the acknowledgment of his own Party Blasphemy against God the Father whom they all own to be God in the most perfect Sense and who if he were not so the addition of the other two would not make one God in the most perfect Sense because he could not communicate to his Son and his Holy Spirit those Perfections he had not in himself But to do him Justice he seems pag. 48. to be asham'd of this Notion and says That the Father is the only true God but withal adds THAT neither excludes the Son nor Spirit from being the true God Not to take notice of the Contradiction that the Father is the only true God and yet others are the true God as well as he This is directly to destroy his Hypothesis and is asserting what pag. 6. of his Enquiry he says no Man that considers with ever so little Intention and Sincerity will offer at namely That they are three and one in the same respect for if the Father be the one only true God and all three but the same one only true God the three and the one are the same in all respects whatever and there can be no more difference between them than between the self-same God and himself So that if each single Person be God but in an inadequate Sense the Trinity must be so too because that is no more than what each Person is the true God And p. 78. of the View he is forc'd to own that the Father is God in the most adequate and perfect Sense of the Word and consequently all three can be no more Thus the three and the one are the same in the same respect and if there is more in the three in any respect whatever than in the Father it must either be a Perfection or an Imperfection if a Perfection the Father is not God in the most perfect sense of the Word if an Imperfection then the Father is God in a more perfect Sense than all three together But I will say no more on this Point since I have in my Letter fully proved that neither Son nor Holy Spirit can be the same God with the Father and consequently if there is but one God the Father is that one God exclusively both of Son and Spirit I cannot but remark that this
Jesus Christ is not said of him but of God his Father and what is really said of the Lord Christ does only prove him to be more honourable than his Brethren but still leaves him inferiour to his Father I will give one Instance of each Remark His Lordship affirms that the Author to the Hebrews chap. 1. ver 10 11 12. expresly applies he means in the strict literal Sense some Verses of the 102d Psalm to the Son of God I affirm he doth not To prove my Negative I premise 1. That those Verses if then extant in that Epistle did not seem to Clemens Romanus the most antient Father we have who lived in the first Century to be so applied neither to Aquina in the 13th nor to Deodati in the last Age. The two last were Trinitarians 2. Allowing those Verses genuine as we have them the Account given by the Unitarians is most agreeable 3. Setting aside those two Considerations yet it 's most manifest that the 10th Verse as applied to the Son of God was not so intended by the Divine Author for ver 2. the Author says God the Father made the Worlds and if he should v. 10. ascribe laying the Foundation of the Heavens and the Earth to the Son then he contradicts himself in the same Chapter If his Lordship should say the Text tells us God made the Worlds by his Son I reply That 's not enough for his Hypothesis it will not therefore follow that the Son has unlimited Perfections Infinite Power c. but rather the contrary He cites Rom. 9. 5. to prove the Knowledg and Wisdom of Christ to be Infinite without taking notice of the different Pointings and consequently Readings mentioned by Erasmus and Curcelleus and other Observations given in the Answer to Mr. Milbourn and besides does not fairly read the Text as it is even in our English Translation To prove the Power of Christ to be limited and not infinite I cited Mat. 26. 53. where he says to Peter Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father and he shall presently give me more than twelve Legions of Angels His Lordship answers There 's no Necessity it should be implied in these words that Christ had not Power to deliver himself without praying to his Father If so would it not then be a Mockery to pray to his Father for that which he had in his own Power before he pray'd for 't He pursues his Answer thus Greater Works are recorded of Christ without any mention of his praying for Ability to do them If I studied to nick him with his own Raillery on me here I might ask Who told him so and what were those greater Works It 's certain Christ had not before he pray'd for it that Power for which he pray'd Well! but says his Ldp. Christ's Power being originally from the Father he took all Opportunities of giving the Father the Glory of what he did If he designs this to prove Christ's Power infinite he has very ill luck at Argument for this is a fair and full yielding up the Cause To give Glory to the Father for the Works which he did signifies no less than to acknowledg he did them not by a Power of his own but by a Power communicated from the Father and for which he praises the Father which are the Characters of a dependent finite Being His next Remark is still more against himself viz. when Christ thus said that he could have obtain'd Legions of Angels by Prayer he thought fit to declare in the Ears of his Enemies how dear he was to God tho' they hated him The dearer one is to God the greater must be his Power but he that is dearest acts by a borrowed Power and that may perhaps be greater than we can imagine but cannot be infinite To rivet his Pleadings against himself he is pleas'd to add that Christ did industriously conceal the highest Sense in which he was the Son of God This is a most weak Conceit and if Chrysostom was the Author of it his Ldp. is as much beholden to him as Ajax was to Hector for the Sword wherewith he stabb'd himself If Christ conceal'd the highest Sense wherein he was the Son of God then it is very disingenuously done of the Trinitarians to pretend to prove that highest Sense from any Words of Christ and if the Words of Christ do not deliver that Sense I am afraid it will be found that the Apostles did as industriously conceal it as their Master for the Words of Christ are indeed strain'd when interpreted this way but not more than the Words of the Apostles for the same Purpose And if Christ conceal'd that highest Sense from his Enemies he also conceal'd it from all others for those Discourses which were industriously fram'd to conceal it from Men not dispos'd to believe it could not sufficiently reveal it to Men dispos'd to believe it Prop. 12. It 's intolerable Presumption to conclude c. Here his Ldp. is pleas'd to disown the Grammatical and Natural Signification of his Censure in that angry Phrase intolerable Presumption He does not mean by it a Presumption that should not be tolerated But if I let him take sanctuary in his Meaning it shall be upon condition that he will excuse my having display'd the odious Consequences of his Words taken in their proper Signification By intolerable Presumption he meant a most high Presumption and he will still say that to conclude there is no way of being immediately from God but by Creation is a wonderful Boldness I will leave it with the Reader whether it be not a greater Boldness for any Man to determine there is a way of being immediately from God besides by Creation when neither do the Scriptures speak of nor can the Reason of Man apprehend any such which tho' he does not positively determine yet he builds upon it I admire and honour him that he would not persecute when it was in his Power I had affirmed that necessary Emanation was a thing whereof we have no Idea which not being able to deny he asks Is it impossible for a thing to be whereof we have no Idea Is God bound to give us Idea's of what he can or has produc'd I answer to the first It is possible To the second God is not bound to give us Idea's of what he can or has produc'd but then we are no ways concern'd nor can we reason or discourse about those things whereof we have no Idea's Therefore it 's high Presumption to affirm this or that concerning them but to impose such Affirmations on the Faith of others is the raging Madness of a persecuting Spirit which it is the Honour of his Ldp. to detest But what he seem'd but just now afraid to assert here he makes no Scruple to assert We have says he a clearer Idea of necessary Emanation than of voluntary Creation Of voluntary Creation we have this Idea God of his own Free-will and by his Almighty
to play with Expressions by chance ambiguous than to answer Arguments Upon my Remark to his 15 Prop. he asks Who are they that determine any Notion to be true while they cannot conceive it to be so Why Sir in general they are the Trinitarians but in particular and more especially his Ldp. he is the Man for does he not expresly determine in this very Prop. that there is an unconceivably close Union between them the supposed 3 Persons Therefore unless he can conceive an unconceivable Notion or doubt of that which he determines to be true he is notoriously guilty of determining that Notion to be true which he cannot conceive to be so I grant him there may be a stricter Union between God and Christ than we know of but here I am bold and fixt there can be no such Union between them as contradicts the Notions he has implanted in us According to him the 3 Persons are 3 distinct Beings and there can be no distinct Being without its distinct Nature so 3 distinct Beings are 3 distinct Natures and 3 distinct Natures continuing so can never become one single Nature what Union soever there is between them I wonder the Trinitarians should so constantly amuse their Readers with that unsutable Comparison of Soul and Body in Union for 't is plain that in their Union they are that one thing which neither of them can be in a State of Separation Prop. 16. Such an Union as this between them being acknowledg'd by us together with the fore-mentioned intire Dependence of the Son and H. Spirit upon the Father the Unity of the Deity is as fully to all Intents and Purposes asserted by us as it is necessary or desirable it should be The End for which the Unity of the Deity was ever asserted What does he mean by this very odd Phrase My Sense is that it 's asserted because it is true and that the Consequence of its being true is this the Service of our whole Hearts is therefore due to him alone and our lower Respects to other Objects according as his Word and our own Reason directs us but we cannot both to God and Christ pay the Service of our whole Hearts notwithstanding their Union in Will and like Natures For if we love one Master with our whole Hearts we have no Affections left for any other but as he shall direct us and he cannot direct us to love another equally with himself Unity of Nature or 3 Beings united in 1 Nature is no better nor worse than 3 Beings in 1 Being 3 Natures in 1 Nature 3 and not 3 in the same respect which is a Contradiction if any thing be so Upon his 17 Prop. I had told him he was an Ismaelite Trinitarian whose Hand is against all the Heads of Trinitarian Expositors To this he replies 'T is false But since he deals so bluntly with me I will 1. Set down some of his Contradictions not consequential but broad Contradictions 2. Not to be wanting in the least to the Vindication of my Censure I will plainly show that I said no worse of his Lordship upon the account of his Hypothesis than he himself had said before of himself The first of his 28 Prop. is this The Name of GOD is used in more Senses than one in H. Scripture but in his first Def. p. 23. speaking of Perfections necessary to essentiate a God in the absolutely highest Sense he has these words Which the Name of God is ever to be understood in in the H. Scripture In the same Def. p. 17. he affirms that H. Script saith not of what Nature that Unity is which it ascribes to God But Prop. 13. of the 28. he says The Oneness so frequently affirmed of him in Script is a numerical Oneness In his second Def. p. 13. he says The individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Persons But Prop. 15 he says Each of them has a Right to the Name of God in a Sense next to that in which it is appropriated to the Father This Contradiction he is in love with it often occurs P. 10. of 2d Def. distinguishing between Perfections which he makes to belong to the Father's Existence and Perfections which belong to his Divine Nature or Essence he contends that the Son and H. Spirit have all the Perfections of the Divine Nature as well as the Father But p. 23. of first Def. he observes that Athanasius S. Basil Greg. Nazianzen and S. Chrysostom with several of the Latin Fathers interpret those Words of Christ MY FATHER IS GREATER THAN I to have been spoken not of his Humanity but his Divinity and himself gives his Judgment to their Sentence Prop. 16. of the 28. he affirms it to be evident from H. Script that the Son and H. Spirit have unlimited Power c. which also he allows 2d Def. p. 10. to be an essential Perfection but 2d Def. p. 24. he acknowledges that the Power of Judging the World was a Power committed to Christ not as Man and not essentially in him Prop. 17. he determines that they the 3 Persons are always spoken of in Script as distinct Beings or Persons according to the proper Signification of this word both from the Father and from each other nor are so many Men or Angels more expresly distinguished as different Persons or Substances by our Saviour or his Apostles than the Father Son and H. Ghost are But 1st Def. p. 20. he says They are outwardly and in reference to the Creation perfectly One and THE SAME God as concurring in all the fame external Actions I hope the Reader will allow me at least that these Instances do sufficiently prove that his Lordship's Hand is against one of the Heads of the Trinitarians I mean himself That it is also against all the other he will excuse me the Labour of proving by a tedious Induction of Particulars for Prop. 17. of the 21. he affirms that his Explication is the best and easiest way of reconciling those Texts which according to the other Hypothesis are not reconcilable but by offering extream Violence to them Here he prefers his Hypothesis indefinitely to all other Hypotheses Here 's no Restriction no Exception Nay in the Conclusion he doubts not to pronounce that the many Explications of the adorable Mystery have had little better Success than to make Sport for the Socinians My Animadversion on his 18 Prop. I have a better Opinion of since I saw his Answer than when I first pen'd them However I shall examine a few Lines P. 37. l. 30. How can he say saith his Ldp. that Jesus Christ desir'd not Divine Honours to be paid to him except he mean it when he was on Earth I mean as a plain Reader would imagin that Christ desired not any Divine Honours to be paid him either in one State or other meaning by Divine Honours such as are due to him that is by Nature
but one God I shall only instance one Authority which may be instar omnium and that is Grotius de verit relig Christ. The first Attribute of God saith he in the beginning of that excellent Book is that he is one God and no more This is thence collected that he is that Being which is necessarily and by himself for whatsoever is necessarily or by it self is not considered in Kind but as it is in Act but if you suppose more Gods then you will find nothing in each of them why any of them should necessarily be and no reason why there should be rather two than three or ten than five Add hereunto that the multiplicity of singular things of the same kind proceeds from the fecundity of Causes by reason of which fewer or more things are brought forth but God has no Origin nor Cause So that this great Man is contrary to our Author in every thing 1. In supposing it impossible there should be more than one necessary Being 2. That more than one such necessary Being would infer more than one God and that God could not out of the Fecundity of Causes multiply his Kind 3. Whatever had a Cause or Origin could not be God 4. That there is no difference between necessary Being or Being by it self or without a Cause they are really one and the same with Him and so they are with all that have writ on this Subject They suppose God self-existent or without a Cause because he is necessary and eternal They never make use of our Author 's admirable distinction pag. 50. of having necessary Existence from another and necessary Existence from one's self He asks me pag. 48. whether I think that God can be the necessary Cause of nothing or whether the Perfection of his Nature does not determin Him to do what is best or to do what he in his infinite Wisdom knows fit to be done To which I answer That the Question between us is not what the Perfection of his Nature doth determin him to but what the Perfection of his Nature is whether three perfect necessary Natures or one only which is questioning whether the Unity of God be a Perfection or not Whatsoever is necessarily in God must contain the highest Perfection otherwise it would not be essential to his Nature but God being in his own numerically one Nature absolutely and infinitely Happy and Perfect two other Divine Natures cannot be in Him or which is all one with our Author emane from him necessarily because they can add no Perfection great or little to Him who in his one Nature contains all Perfections whatever He and they together can be no more Good Powerful Wise than he is alone He alone is All-sufficient and two other such Natures can make him no more Therefore it must be directly contrary to the Nature of God and highly injurious to his Honour to suppose his Nature necessarily to emane two Persons who must be needless ad intra to God himself and as useless ad extra as God himself is All-sufficient But if God gave a Being freely to the Son and Holy Spirit because he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done they are no more necessary Beings than all other Beings which God also produced because he in his infinite Wisdom knew it fit to be done or that the Perfection of his Nature did determin him to what was best and consequently they as all others continue in Being because God's Wisdom thinks it best But to say that God acted otherways than so that is necessarily in producing or causing the Son and Holy Spirit to exist who are as distinct and different from Him as two Men are from all other Men is either to make him act without understanding or else to act contrary to his Mind for Necessity only takes Place where Thoughts are wholly wanting or else the Power to act or forbear acting according to the Direction of Thought But if God did not give them then Beings neither as necessitated nor because he in his Wisdom thought fit which our Author calls necessarily he could not there being no middle way give them their Beings at all or be the Original or Cause of them and consequently they having no Origin or Cause must be as much without a Cause or self-existent as the Father and the same necessity if I may so say that made the Father to exist must make them exist And the Father upon supposition that they necessarily eman'd can be no more the Original of them than of his own Nature because the same Necessity that made his Nature exist made it emane It was as essential to it to emane as to exist and consequently the emaning Natures must be as self-existent and independent as his own Nature since they no more depend on him for Existence or continuance in Existence than his own Nature does Which very thing would the Defender seriously consider it would make him abate of his confidence in his Hypothesis But more of this hereafter 2. Now I shall remind him that tho the Design of his Propositions is to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity is not contradictory to natural Reason yet they as I observ'd Sect. 64. directly destroy the Unity of God which is the second Point I am to examine and that we may be assured there are not three Persons or Divine Natures in the Godhead he affirms Prop. 13. That the Godhead or GOD in the highest Sense can be but ONE NUMERICALLY and therefore the Oneness so frequently affirmed of him in Scripture is a numerical Oneness and in his Answer to the Consid. to which he refers me he says pag. 23. That the Name of GOD in Scripture is ever to be understood in the absolutely highest Sense How could an Unitarian in more direct Terms deny a Trinity What he urges in behalf of the Trinity is pag. 17. where he says The Holy Scripture doth abundantly declare the Unity of God but no where distinguisheth of Unity nor says of what Nature that Unity is which it ascribes to God But is not this directly contradicting Prop. 13. where he declares of what Nature or sort the Unity of God is to wit a numerical Unity and pag. 22. That the Name of God in Scripture is ever to be understood in that highest Sense And indeed it had been very absurd to suppose the Scripture did frequently inculcate that God is one and yet not let us know in what Sense he is one except it be obvious to common Reason what that Oneness is to wit one eternal absolutely perfect necessary Being It 's most certain that when we ascribe any thing to God as a Perfection we ascribe it in the highest Sense and consequently the Oneness of God must be taken in that Sense I desire to know what will destroy the Unity of God if every thing Treble in him will not do it as three Natures with three unlimited Powers Wisdoms Goodnesses But he