69. positively says That we know nothing of the Divine Essence but that God is an Infinite Mind Very well and if he grant him to be an Infinite Mind let him prove this Infinite Mind to be three distinct Infinite Minds if he can The Truth is Infinite Mind or Spirit is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature and Convertible with it and whatsoever is so belongs equally to all the Three Persons and consequently cannot be ascribed to them plurally any more than the Deity it self it being as uncapable as that of being multiplied Upon which Account if the Three Persons are with equal Truth said to be one Infinite Mind or Spirit and to be one God they can no more be said to be Three distinct Infinite Minds than they can be said to be Three distinct Gods So that which way soever the Argument be proposed either That one Infinite Mind is Father Son and Holy Ghost or That Father Son and Holy Ghost are one Infinite Mind it still overthrows this Author's Hypothesis That the said Three Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Argument IV. My Fourth and Last Argument against the same shall be this Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the Athanasian Form so belongs to them all in Common that it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest But the Attribute Infinite Mind or Spirit may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in and according to the Athanasian Form And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest The Major is as evident as that no Attribute can be Common to several Subjects and yet peculiar and appropriate to each of them And the Minor is proved by Instance thus The Father is an Infinite Mind the Son is an Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is an Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds but one Infinite Mind And this I affirm to be as good Divinity as any part in the Athanasian Creed and such as I shall abide by both against this Author and any other whatsoever But now let us see how his Assertion cast into the Athanasian Model shews it self as thus The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three distinct Infinite Minds but one distinct Infinite Mind And this is so far from being true that it is indeed neither Truth nor Sence For what Truth can there be in denying That Three Persons of which every one is said to be a distinct Infinite Mind are Three distinct Infinite Minds And what sence can there be in affirming or saying That they are but one distinct Infinite Mind Whereas the Term distinct is never properly used or applyed but with respect had to several Particulars each discriminated from the other but by no means where there is mention made only of one Thing and no more as it is here in this Proposition But to make what allowances the Case will bear and for that purpose to remit something of the strictness of the Athanasian Form by leaving out the word distinct in the last and illative Clause we shall then see that our Author's Hypothesis will proceed thus The Father is a distinct Infinite Mind the Son is a distinct Infinite Mind and the Holy Ghost is a distinct Infinite Mind and yet they are not Three Infinite Minds but one Infinite Mind Thus I say it must proceed in the Athanasian way with the word distinct left out of the Conclusion Nevertheless even so the Inference is still manifestly and grosly false in both the branches of it For it is absolutely false That Three distinct Infinite Minds are not Three Infinite Minds and altogether as false That Three Infinite Minds are but One Infinite Mind The Author's Hypothesis put into the Athanasian Model must needs fall in with that Fallacy sometimes urged against us by the Socinians viz. The Father is a Person the Son a Person and the Holy Ghost a Person and yet they are not Three Persons but one Person which is manifestly Sophistical by arguing ab imparibus tanquam paribus viz. Concluding that of an Attribute Relative and Multiplicable which can be concluded only of such as are not So. For the Athanasian Inference holds only in Attributes Essential and Common to all the Three Persons joyntly or severally taken and not in such as are Proper Personal and Peculiar to each As also in such as are Absolute as the Attribute of Mind or Spirit without the word distinct is and not in such as are Relative For those Attributes which agree to the Divine Persons Personally Peculiarly and Relatively can never Unite or Coincide into one in the Inference or Conclusion In a word Infinite Mind or Spirit is a Predicate perfectly Essential and so in its Numerical Unity Common to all the Three Divine Persons and for that cause not to be affirmed of or ascribed to either all or any of them with the Term distinct added to it or joyned with it For that would multiply an Attribute that cannot be multiplyed And now what I have here discoursed upon and drawn from the Athanasian Creed with respect to this particular Subject I leave to our Author's strictest Examination For my own part I rely upon this Creed as a sure Test or Rule to discover the falshood of his Hypothesis by So that as long as it is true that God is one numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit and as long as the Athanasian Form duely applied is a firm and good way of Reasoning this Author's Assertion That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is thereby irrefragably overthrown And therefore I shall not concern my self to produce any more Arguments against it Only by way of Overplus to and Illustration of those which have already been alledged I cannot but observe the Concurrent Opinion of the Philosophers and most Learned Men amongst the Heathens about God's being one Infinite Mind or Spirit as a necessary deduction no doubt made by Natural Reason from the Principles thereof concerning the Divine Nature For most of the Philosophers looked upon God as the Soul of the World as One Infinite Mind or Spirit that animated and presided over the Universe For so held Pythagoras as Cicero in his first Book de Naturâ Deorum and Lactantius in his Book de irâ Dei tells us Pythagoras quoque unum Deum confitetur dicens Incorpoream esse mentem quae per omnem Naturam diffusa intenta vitalem sensum tribuit In like manner the Great Hermes being asked What God was answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Maker of all Things a most Wise and Eternal Mind Thales called him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God the Mind of the World Diogenes Cleanthes and Oenipides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
not be long before we find him bestowing a like cast of his Kindness upon the School-men too But since notwithstanding all this He allows the Fathers good Men to have meant well and taught right albeit by reason of a certain Infelicity and Awkwardness they had in representing what they meant by what they wrote their meaning ought by no means to be gathered from their own words as possibly also for the introducing a new and laudable Custom amongst the Fathers and Sons of the Church that the Sons must teach the Fathers to speak our Author has for these and the like Reasons in great Charity and Compassion to their Infirmities provided two other and better words of his own Invention viz. Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness by which alone the True Sense and Doctrine of the Fathers in all their Writings about this Article of the Trinity may or can be understood Nevertheless how kind soever this design of his may be yet to me it seems very unreasonable For in the first place it is upon the most allowed grounds of Reason a just and a sufficient Presumption that the Fathers were wholly Strangers to what our Author intends by these two words for that they never so much as mention or make use of the words themselves Whereas to be Self-Conscious and Mutually-Conscious were things no doubt easie enough not only for the Fathers but for any Man else of Common Sense to find out and understand and they might also without much difficulty have been applyed to the Divine Nature as well as other Acts of Knowledge and therefore since the Fathers never used them in this case it is but too plain that they never thought them fit or proper for this purpose For the Arian Controversie was then viz. in the 4th and 5th Centuries in which also the most Eminent of the Fathers wrote against it at the Highest Among which Writers Gregory Nyssen whom this Author so often quotes has a Passage which in this case is to me very remarkable and a Rational ground to conclude that he knew nothing of Mutual-Consciousness as it is here applyed by this Author For that speaking of the Unity of the Divine Persons in respect of one Common though Single Nature he expresses it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of which certainly he could not have chosen a more apposite and proper place to have expressed the same by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had that Father had the same Notion of it which this Author so much contends for But it seems he was either less Happy or more judicious in this Particular And besides all this it is most worthy to be Noted That the very Terms in which the Orthodox Writers expressed themselves about the Trinity and whatsoever related to it were severely canvased and examined and some of them settled by Councils which is a fair proof that the said Terms were fixed and authentick and exclusive of all others and consequently of those of this Author as well as of the Notion signified by and couched under them which he would here with such Confidence obtrude upon the World by and from the Credit of the Fathers though their Writings demonstrate that they were wholly unconcerned both as to his Doctrines and his Expressions Nor can any Want or Penury of words be here pleaded for their silence in this Matter since the Greek being so happy above all other Languages in joyning and compounding words together in all probability had the Fortunes of Greece as the word is been concerned in the case we might have heard of some such words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or since most such words as in English terminate in ness usually in the Greek terminate in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 possibly we might have met with some such made-words as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 since these do more properly import Consciousness than the former which rather signifie Self-Conscience and Mutual-Conscience and so in strictness of Speech differ something from the other But he who seeks in the Greek Fathers for these words or any thing like them as applyed to the Trinity may seek longer than his Eyes can see Nor will his Inquest succeed at all better amongst the Latines For although that Language be extremely less copious than the other and so affords no one Latine word either for Self-Consciousness or Mutual Consciousness but what we must first make and being made would sound very barbarously yet no doubt there were ways and words enough to have otherwise expressed the same thing had they found it the fittest and best Notion to have expressed this great Article by But no such thing or word occurs in any of their Writings But why do I speak of the Greek and Latine Fathers When the very Schoolmen the boldest Framers and Inventors of Words and Terms of all others where they think them necessary to express their Conceptions by notwithstanding all their Quiddities Hoecceities and Perseities and the like have yet no word for Self-Consciousness and Mutual Consciousness which is a sufficient Demonstration that either the thing it self never came into their Heads or which is most likely that they never thought it of any use for the explication of this Mystery which yet they venture further at than any other Writers whatsoever But after all though this Author is very much concerned to ward off the charge of Novelty and Singularity from his Notions for which I cannot blame him this being a charge sufficient to confound and crush any such Notion applyed to so Sacred and received an Article as the Trinity and for this cause is not a little desirous to shelter it with the Authority of the Fathers yet I assure the Reader That he is no less careful and concerned to keep the Glory of the Invention wholly to himself and would take it very ill either of Fathers School-men or any one else should they offer to claim the least share in it For he roundly tells us That the Fathers were not so happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this Mystery Page 126. Line 5. nay and that how right a Judgement soever they might have of it yet in down-right Terms That they knew not how to explain it Page 126. Line 18. which I confess is no small Complement passed upon himself a thing which he is seldom or never failing in but in good earnest a very course one upon the Fathers In short he would appropriate the Credit of the New Invention entirely to himself but with admirable and more than Metaphysical Abstraction at the same time clear himself of the Novelty of it and so in a word prove it of at least 12 or 13 hundred years standing in the World when yet the Author of it was Born since Conventicles began in England as is well known But I frankly yield him the Invention as perfectly his own and such an one too as he
nothing is so but a Mind or Spirit it may as I have said imply a Mind but it does not directly signifie it But admitting that it does both does this expression prove That the Son is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinct from the Father By no means For not only the Son but the Father may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Holy Ghost 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet they are not Three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Reason of this is because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an Essential Attribute following the Divine Nature and therefore common to all the Three Persons and not a Personal Attribute peculiar to any one of them So that granting the Son to be as truly and properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as this Author would have him yet we absolutely deny That he is a distinct 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Father And this Expression I am sure is far enough from proving him to be so From Nyssen he passes to St. Athanasius who he tells us observes out of these words of our Saviour John 10. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that our Saviour does not say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that by so speaking he gave us a perfect Duality of Persons in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and an Unity of Nature in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All which is very true and that this distinction of Persons overthrows the Heresie of Sabellius and the Unity of their Nature the Heresie of Arius But then this is also as true that all this is nothing at all to our Author's Purpose For how does this prove either that the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Or that Self-Consciousness is the proper ground or Reason of their distinction Why yes says He If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wisdom then the Son is also an Eternal but begotten Mind and Wisdom Very true but still I deny that it follows hence That the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begetting and the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begotten are Two distinct Minds or Wisdoms but only one and the same Mind or Wisdom under these Two distinct Modifications of Begetting and being Begot But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of a distinct Mind or Wisdom out of those words of the Nicene Creed in which the Son is said to be God of God Light of Light very God of very God By which words I cannot imagine how this Author thinks to serve his turn unless that by Light must be meant Infinite Wisdom or Infinitely Wise Mind and that this must also infer the Father and Son to be Two distinct Infinitely Wise Minds or Wisdoms one issuing from the other But if so then the same words will and must infer them also to be two distinct Gods and very Gods For all these words stand upon the same level in the same Sentence and then if we do but joyn the Term Distinct equally with every one of them we shall see what Monstrous Blasphemous Stuff will be drawn out of this Creed In the mean time let this Author know once for all That Light of Light imports not here Two distinct Lights but one Infinite Light under Two different ways of Subsisting viz. either by and from it self as it does in the Father or of and from another as it does in the Son All which is plainly and fully imported in and by the Particle of signifying properly as here applyed Derivation or Communication in the thing which it is applyed to And this is the clear undoubted sense of the Word as it is used here In the mean time I hope the Arians and Socinians will joyn in a Letter of Thanks to this Author for making such an Inference from the Nicene Creed In the next place he comes to St. Austin where though I am equally at a loss to find how he proves his Point by him any more than by those whom he has already produced yet I will transcribe the whole Quotation into the Margin that so both the Reader may have it under his Eye and the Author have no cause to complain that he is not fairly dealt with Now that which he would infer from thence seems to be this That God the Father is Infinitely Wise by a Wisdom of his own distinct from that Wisdom by which the Son is called The Wisdom of the Father and consequently that they are Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms or Infinitely Wise Minds This I say is that which he would inferr and argue from St. Austin or I know not what else it can be But this is by no means deducible from his words for the Father is wise by one and the same Infinite Wisdom equally belonging both to the Father and the Son but not by it under that peculiar Formality as it belongs to the Son For it belongs to the Son as Communicated to Him whereas it belongs to the Father as Originally in and from Himself And whereas it is objected That if the Father should be Wise by the Wisdom which he Begot then he could not be said to be Wise by a Wisdom of his own but only by a Begotten Wisdom proper to the Son I Answer That neither does this follow since it is but one and the same Essential Wisdom in both viz. in him who Begets and in him who is Begotten Though as it is in him who is Begotten it is not after the same way in Him who Begets So that it is this determining Particle as or Quatenus which by importing a distinction of the manner causes a quite different application of the Term while the Thing is still the same For the Father himself is not denominated Wise even by that very Wisdom that is Essential to Him considered as Personally determined to the Son for so it must be considered as Derived and Communicated and no Divine Perfection can agree to the Father under the Formal Consideration of Derived and Communicated albeit the Thing it self which is Derived and Communicated absolutely considered may and does In a word the Father is Wise by one and the same Wisdom which is both in himself and in his Son but not by it as it is in the Son But by the way it is worth observing That this Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies the Father to be Wise by this Begotten Wisdom which the Son is here called and which in the Sense we have now given of it is very true and alledges St. Austin and Lombard to abett him in it This very Man I say Page 131. Line 24. affirms That the Son is that Wisdom and Knowledge wherewith his Father knows himself Where If for the Father to be Wise and to know himself be formally the same Act and as much the same as his Wisdom and Knowledge can be as it is manifest they are then I leave it to this
as defective as the Thing he Argues for is Absurd Nevertheless let us see what the main Conclusion is which he would draw from the Premises Why it is this That the Father is Eternal Wisdom or Mind and the Son Eternal Wisdom and Mind I give you his very Terms And who denies this Or what does it conclude for him For still I ask Does he who says That the Father is Eternal Wisdom or Mind and the Son Eternal Wisdom and Mind by saying so affirm That the Father and the Son are Two distinct Eternal Wisdoms or Minds Any more than he who says That the Father is God and the Son God affirms them to be Two distinct Gods Let him say it if he can and he shall not fail of a through Consutation as soon as it can be Printed off But to give the Reader an Account of the whole matter in short This Author has espoused a very Heterodox and dangerous Notion viz. That the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits and in order to the proof of this would perswade us That there are Two distinct Wisdoms one in the Father and the other in the Son and that for this Reason Because the Father who is Essentially Wise cannot be said to be Wise by that begotten Wisdom which is in the Son albeit the Son be yet said to be the Wisdom of the Father but that the Father must have one distinct Wisdom of his own and the Son another distinct Wisdom of his own This I am sure is the full Account of his Argument from top to bottom In Answer to which I have plainly and undeniably shewn That the Father is Wise by one and the same Essential Wisdom common to Father Son and Holy Ghost though not under that particular Modification as it Subsists in the other Two Persons but by that peculiar Modification by which it is appropriated to and Subsists in his own And that those different Modifications do not for all that make it any more than one single Numerical Wisdom but only one and the same under so many distinct Modes of Subsistence determining it to so many distinct Personalities This is the Sum both of his Opinion and of mine and I referr it to the Judicious Reader to arbitrate the Case between us with this profession and promise that if in all or any one of the Quotations alledged by him he can shew That it is either expresly affirmed or necessarily implyed That the Father and the Son are two distinct Infinite Minds I will without further proof of any sort forthwith yield him the Cause and withal renounce all my poor share in Common Sense and Reason nay and all belief of my own Eyes for the future But there is one Clause more which he brings in as one part of his main Conclusion Page 103. Line 33. viz. That if we confess this of the Father and the Son to wit That they are each of them Eternal Mind or Wisdom there can be no dispute about the Holy Ghost who is Eternal Mind and Wisdom distinct both from Father and Son Now this is perfectly gratis dictum without either proof or pretence of proof and that whether we respect the Orthodox or the Heterodox and Heretical And First For the Orthodox they utterly deny the Holy Ghost to be an Eternal Mind or Wisdom distinct both from the Father and the Son and I challenge this Author to produce me but one reputed Orthodox Writer who affirms it In the mean time it argues no small Confidence to give it the mildest Term in this Man to Assert that as certain and without Dispute which is neither granted on one side nor so much as pretended to be proved on the other But Secondly If we respect the Heterodox and Heretical who no doubt can dispute as much as others will this Man say That these also grant this his Assertion about the Holy Ghost without any dispute No it is certain that they neither do nor will For this Author may be pleased to observe That as some in the Primitive Times allowed the Son to be only like the Father so they made the Holy Ghost a downright Creature and an inferiour Agent to both Such were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 under their Head and Leader Macedonius as we see in St. Austin de Haeresibus Cap. 52. hereby placing him as much below the Son as they had placed the Son below the Father or rather more Whereupon I appeal even to this Author himself whether those who did so would without all dispute have allowed the Holy Ghost to be an Eternal Infinite Mind or Wisdom distinct both from the Father and the Son and upon that Account Essentially and Necessarily equal to them both Let this Author rub his Fore-head and affirm this if he can and for the future take notice That it becomes a True and Solid Reasoner where a Thing is disputed fairly to prove it and not boldly and barely to presume it In the last place he alledges the Judgment of all the Fathers indefinitely in the Case And truly where he cannot cite so much as one of them to the purpose I think he does extremely well to make short work of it and with one bold Impertinent stroke to alledge them all together His Allegation is this That it is usual with the Fathers to represent the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity as distinct as Peter James and John Well and what then Why That then the said Three Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits I deny the Consequence and to give a particular Answer to this general Allegation I tell him That it is a Fallacy of the Homonymy of the Word and that the Term as distinct is Ambiguous For it may either signifie 1. As Real Or 2. As Great a Distinction As for the first I grant That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity differ as really as Peter Iames and Iohn Forasmuch as they differ by something in the Thing it self or ex parte rei antecedent to and independent upon any Apprehension or Operation of the Mind about it which is a Real difference and whatsoever is so is altogether as Real as the Difference between one Man and another can be But Secondly If by Real distinction be meant as great a distinction so we utterly deny that the Three Divine Persons differ as much as Peter and Iames and Iohn do or that the Fathers ever thought they did so For this would inferr a greater difference or distinction between them than even our Author himself will allow of even such a difference as reaches to a Division or Separation of the Persons so differing And since it is impossible for the Persons of the Trinity to differ so it is hard to imagine upon what bottom of Reason our Author should measure the Distinction or Difference of the Three Divine Persons by the Distinction or Difference that is between Peter Iames and Iohn
case abundantly sufficient St. Cyril of Alexandria says expresly Christ's saying that he is in the Father and the Father in him shews the Indentity of the Deity and the Unity of the Substance or Essence And so likewise Athanasius Accordingly therefore says he Christ having said before I and my Father are one He adds I am in the Father and the Father in me that he might shew both the Identity of the Divinity and the Unity of Essence And so again St. Hilary The Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father by the Unity of an inseparable Undivided Nature By which Passages I suppose any Man of sense will perceive That the thing which the Fathers meant and gathered from those words of our Saviour since expressed by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was no Unity of Mutual Consciousness which they never mention but an Unity of Essence or Nature which they expresly and constantly do Nor does this very Author deny it as appears from his own words though he quite perverts the sence of the Fathers by a very senceless Remark upon them Page 125. lines 20 21. This Sameness or Unity of Nature says he might be the Cause of this Union in the Divine Persons viz by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not explain what this Intimate Union is Now this Author has been already told That the Question here is not what explains this Union but what this Union is But besides this his mistake of the Question I desire him to declare what he means by the Cause of this Union as he here expresses himself For will he make an Union as he calls an Unity in the Divine Persons by Sameness of Nature a Cause of their Intimate Union by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mutual In-being of them in each other and affirm also this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the same thing with Mutual Consciousness If he does so he makes the same thing the Cause of it self For the Sameness of Nature in the three Persons and their Mutual In-being or Indwelling are the very same thing and the same Unity though differently expressed But however if we take him at his own word it will effectually overthrow his Hypothesis For if the Sameness of the Divine Nature in the three Persons be as he says the cause of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the same with Mutual Consciousness it will and must follow That this Sameness or Unity of Nature can no more consist in Mutual Consciousness than the Cause can consist in its Effect or the Antecedent in its Consequent And this Inference stands firm and unanswerable against him But as to the Truth of the Thing it self though we allow and grant the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons and the Mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the said Persons in each other to be the same Thing yet we deny That this their Mutual In-being is the same with their Mutual Consciousness But that their Mutual Consciousness follows and results from it and for that cause cannot be formally the same with it And so I have done with his 3d. Argument which he has drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and is indeed nothing else but a bold down-right Perversion of Scripture and a gross Abuse of the Fathers 4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of St. Austin who though he does not as our Author confesses Name this Mutual Consciousness yet he explains a Trinity in Unity as he would perswade us by Examples of Mutual Consciousness particularly by the Unity of three Faculties of Understanding Memory and Will in the same Soul all of them Mutually Conscious to one another of the several Acts belonging to each of them And his 9th Book is spent upon this Argument In which he makes the mind considered with its knowledge of it self and its love of it self all three of them as he says but one and the same Thing a faint Resemblance of the Trinity in Unity And this is what he Argues from St. Austin To which I Answer First That Faint Resemblances are far from being solid Proofs of any Thing and that although similitudes may serve to illustrate a thing otherwise proved yet they prove and conclude nothing The Fathers indeed are full of them both upon this and several other Subjects but still they use them for Illustration only and nothing else And it is a scurvy sign that Proofs and Arguments run very low with this Author when he passes over those Principal Places in which the Fathers have plainly openly and professedly declared their Judgment upon this great Article and endeavours to gather their sence of it only from Similitudes and Allusions which looks like a design of putting his Reader off with something like an Argument and not an Argument and of which the Tail stands where the Head should For according to the true Method of proving things the Reason should always go first and the Similitude come after but by no means ought the Similitude ever to be put instead of the Reason But Secondly To make it yet clearer how unconclusive this Author's Allegation from St. Austin is I shall demonstrate That this Father does not here make use of an Example of Mutual Consciousness by shewing the great disparity between the thing alledged and the thing which it is applyed to and that as to the very Case which it is alledged for For we must observe That the Mutual Consciousness of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is such as is fully and entirely in each Person so that by virtue thereof every one of them is truly and properly Conscious of all that belongs to the other Two But it is by no means so in those three Faculties of the Soul Understanding Memory and Will For though the Understanding indeed be Conscious to all that passes in the Will yet I deny the Will to be Conscious to any Thing or Act that passes either in the Understanding or the Memory and it is impossible it should be so without exerting an Act of Knowledge or Intellection which to ascribe to the Faculty of the Will would be infinitely absurd It is true indeed That one and the same Soul is Conscious to it self of the Acts of all these three Faculties But still it is by virtue of its Intellectual Faculty alone that it is so And the like is to be said of its Knowledge and of its Love of it self For though it be the same Soul which both Knows and Loves it self yet it neither knows it self by an Act of Love nor loves it self by an Act of Knowledge any more than it can Will by an Act of the Memory or Remember by an Act of the Will which is impossible and amongst other proofs that it is so it seems to me a very considerable one That if a Man could remember by his Will this Author in all likelyhood would not forget
Author to the same Sarcastical Irony which he passed upon his Socinian Adversary Page 92. line 17 c. Right very Right Sir a plain Demonstration But still there is one half of his Promise to be yet accounted for viz. The proving his Opinion to have been the constant Doctrine of the Schools And how does he acquit himself as to this Why in a very extraordinary manner too For first instead of alledging the Authority of the School-men he tells us Page 138. That they are of no Authority at all but as they fall in with the Fathers And withall That instead of doing so They use to mistake and clog the sence of the Fathers with some peculiar Niceties and Distinctions of their own And that the Truth is the vain Endeavours of reducing this Mystery to Terms of Art such as Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Hypostasis Person and the like which he says some of the Fathers used in a very different sence from each other have wholly confounded this Mystery And here I cannot but desire the Reader to judge whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procuring Credit to an Hypothesis upon the score of its being the constant Doctrine of the Schools by telling the World as this Man here does that the School-men are a Company of Impertinent Fellows of little or no Authority in themselves and who have by their useless absurd Niceties consounded this whole Mystery For if they are of no Authority but what they derive from the Fathers as he avers why does he quote them upon the same level with the Fathers and plead them both as two distinct Authorities And if they do nothing but pervert and confound this Mystery why instead of alledging them does he not earnestly caution his Reader against them and disswade him from having any thing to do with their dangerous and absurd Writings This certainly is a way of proving a Point by Testimony and Authority so beyond all Example ridiculous that unless the Reader will vouchsafe to read these Passages in the Author himself and so take his Conviction from his own Eyes I can hardly blame him if he refuses to believe my bare Affirmation in a thing so Incredible As for the Terms Essence Substance Subsistence Person and the like which he so explodes I hope I have given my Reader a satisfactory Account both of their usefulness and of the uselesness of such as this Author would substitute in their room in Chap. 2. at large to which I referr him And whereas he says Page 139. line 25. c. That the Deity is above Nature and above Terms of Art and that there is nothing like this Mysterious Distinction and Unity and therefore no wonder if we want proper words to express it by at least that such Names as signifie the Distinction and Unity of Creatures should not reach it It by all this he means that there are no Terms of Art Comprehensive and fully expressive of the Divine Nature and the Mysterious Distinction and Unity of the Persons belonging to it none that I know of thinks otherwise But if he means that no Terms of Art can be of any use to aid us in our inadequate imperfect Conceptions of those great things so as thereby we may conceive of them in some better degree and clearer manner than we could without such Terms pray then of what use are his Self-Consciousness and Mutual Consciousness in this Matter For I suppose he will allow these to be Terms of Art too and such I am sure as he has promised the World no small wonders from But if he will allow any usefulness in those two Terms of Art of his own Inventing towards our better Apprehension of the Divine Nature and Persons the same and greater has the constant use of all Church-Writers proved to be in the Terms Essence Substance Hypostasis Person c. as the properest and most significant the fittest and most accommodate to help and methodize Men's thoughts in discoursing of God and Immaterial Beings of all or any other Terms of Art which the Wit of Man ever yet invented or pitched upon for that purpose And I hope the known avowed use and experience of such great Men and those in so great a number is an abundant overpoise to the contrary Affirmation of this or any other Novel Author whatsoever But all this it seems he endeavours to overthrow and dash with Three Terrible confounding Questions Page 139. Lines 22 23 c. Which yet I can by no means think so very formidable but that they may be very safely Encountered and fairly Answered too As Qu. 1. What says our Author is the Substance or Nature of God I Answer It is a Being existing of and by it self Incorporeal Infinite Eternal Omniscient Omnipotent c. Qu. 2. How can Three distinct Persons have but One Numerical Substance I Answer Every whit as well as they can be said to have but one Numerical God-head or Divine Nature or as they can have one Numerical Mutual Consciousness common to them all Qu. 3. What is the Distinction between Essence and Personality and Subsistence I Answer The same that is between a Thing or Being and the Modes of it And he who neither knows nor admits of a difference between these is much fitter to go to School himself than to sit and pass judgment upon the Schoolmen And as for the Terms Subsistence and Personality they import the last and utmost Completion of the Existence of Things by vertue whereof they exist by themselves so as neither to be Supported by nor Communicable to any Subject Of which two Modes Personality belongs only to Intelligent Beings but Subsistence to all others to whom the aforesaid Definition does agree And this is the True Proper Difference and Distinction between these Two And this Author may take Notice of it if he pleases However having thus answered his Questions tho' to what purpose he proposed them I cannot imagine yet that he may see how ambitious I am to follow his great Example I shall in requital of his three Questions propose these four to him As First Since in Page 139. he affirms the Deity to be above Nature and all Terms of Art so that we want proper Words and Names to express the Distinction and Unity of the Divine Persons by and that such as signifie the Distinction and Unity of Creatures cannot reach it I desire to know of him upon what ground of Reason it is That speaking of this same Mysterious Unity and Distinction in Page 106. lines 11 12 c. He says That the Fathers used several Examples and alluded to several kinds of Union thereby to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God-head For if the Deity be so far above Nature and all Terms of Art that there is an utter want of words or Names to express the Unity of it by How could any Examples or Allusions drawn from Nature though never so many form
Men of whom alone we now speak both an Act of Knowledge and of Self-reflection too may be without an Act of Love consequent thereupon And if the former may be without the latter then they are not inseparably united as this Author here says they are PARADOX He says That Love is a distinct Act and therefore in God must be a Person P. 133. Answ. If this be a true and good Consequence then the Ground and Reason of it must be This That every distinct Act in God is and must be a distinct Person And if so then every Decree in God whether it be his Decree of Election or of Reprobation if there be such an one or of creating the World and sending Christ into it and at last of destroying it and the like are each of them so many Persons For every Divine Decree is an Act of God and an Immanent Act too as resting within him and as such not passing forth to any Thing without Him that Maxim of the Schools being most true that Decreta nihil ponunt in esse Nor is this all but most of the Divine Acts are free also so that there was nothing in the Nature of them to hinder but that they equally might or might not have been which applied to the Divine Persons would make strange work in Divinity In the mean time if this Author will maintain this Doctrin viz. That Acts and Persons are the same in God as I think he ought in all Reason to maintain the immediate consequences of his own Assertion I dare undertake that here he will stand alone again and that he is the only Divine who ever owned or defended such wretched Stuff PARADOX These three Powers of Understanding Self-reflection and Self-Love are one Mind viz. in Created Spirits of which alone he here speaks adding in the very next words What are mere Faculties and Powers in Created Spirits are Persons in the Godhead c. Pag. 135. at the latter end Answer This is a very gross Absurdity and to make it appear so I do here tell him That the Three foremention'd Powers are no more one Mind than three Qualities are one Substance and that very Term Powers might have taught him as much Potentia and Impotentia making one Species of Quality under which all Powers and Faculties are placed So that his three powers of Understanding Self-Reflection and Self-Love are one only Unitate Subjecti as being subjected in one and the same Mind but not unitate Essentiae as Essentially differing both from one another and from the Mind it self too in which they are Certainly if this Man did not look upon himself as above all Rules of Logick and Philosophy he would never venture upon such absurd Assertions PARADOX He tells us That the Son and Holy Ghost Will and Act with the Father not the Father with the Son and the Holy Ghost Pag. 169. Line 13 14 c. Answ. This is a direct Contradiction For if the Son and Holy Ghost Will and Act with the Father the Father must Will and Act with the Son and the Holy Ghost And he who can find a distinct sense in these two Propositions and much more affirm the first and deny the latter has a better Faculty at distinguishing than any Mortal Man using his Sense and Reason will pretend to It being all one as if I should say I saw Thomas William and John together of whom William and John were in the Company of Thomas but Thomas was not in the Company of William and John And I challenge any sensible thinking Man to make better sense of this Author 's fore-mention'd Assertion if he can But this must not go alone without a further cast of his Nature by heightning it with another Contradiction too which you shall find by comparing it with pag. 188. line 4. where he affirms That Father Son and Holy Ghost act together having before expresly told us here That the Father does not will and act with the Son and Holy Ghost which very Assertion also to shew him the further fatal Consequences of it absolutely blows up and destroys his whole Hypothesis of Mutual Consciousness by destroying that upon which he had built it For if the Father may and does Will and Act without the Son and Holy Ghost then farewel to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for they must never be alledged in this Cause more PARADOX Nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature Page 234. Line 22 23. Answer This is a most false Assertion and directly contrary to Scripture And to prove it so I shall lay down these Four Conclusions First That the Godhead or Divine Nature neither is nor can be visible to a Corporeal Eye by an immediate sight or Intuition of the Godhead it self Secondly That God is visible to such an Eye only by the special Signs or Symbols of his Presence Thirdly That God is visible by a Body personally united to him only as the said Body is such a Sign or Symbol of his peculiar Presence And Fourthly and Lastly That a Body actually assumed by God for a Time is during that Time as true and visible a Symbol of his Presence as a Body or Nature personally united to him can be And thus it was that God appeared visibly to the Patriarchs in Old Time and particularly to Abraham to Gideon and to the Father and Mother of Sampson who thereupon thought that they should Die for having seen God Face to Face For generally all Interpreters hold the Person who thus appeared to have been the Second Person of the blessed Trinity the Eternal Son of the Father though sometimes called simply the Angel and sometimes the Angel of the Covenant from the Office he was then actually imployed in by his Father as the extraordinary Messenger and Reporter of his Mind to holy Men upon some great Occasions This supposed I desire this bold Author to tell me Whether the second Person of the Trinity God equal with the Father was personally united to the Body which he then appeared in or not If not then the forementioned Assertion That nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature falls shamefully to the Ground as utterly false But if he was personally united to it then these Paradoxes must follow 1. That he either laid down that assumed Body afterwards or he did not if he did then an Hypostatical Union with God may be dissolv'd and not only so but there may be also a thousand personal Unions one after another if God shall think fit to assume a Body and appear in it so often which would be contrary to the sense of all Divines and to all Principles of sound Divinity which own but one hypostatical Union and no more Or 2. He still retains an Union to that assumed Body and then there is a double hypostatical Union viz. One to the visible Body assumed by him in
signifies to initiate or enter one into Sacred Rites or Doctrines or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 another Greek word and that in the judgment of Eustathius and Stephanus more regularly and naturally signifying to shut or close up and most commonly apply'd to the shutting of the eyes or mouth the solemn posture of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Initiati in the Rites of the Gentile Worship And lastly one of no small Note for Critical as well as other Learning will needs run it up even to a Hebrew Original deriving it from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies res abscondita aut secretum Concerning which it must be confessed That there is a more than ordinary agreement between the Hebrew and Greek word both as to Sound and Signification But whether this be not wholly accidental is lest to the Criticks in these Languages to determine In the mean time most account 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word purely and perfectly Greek And the Original of it lies so manifestly in one of the two fore-mentioned Greek words that it seems a needless Curiosity or rather a meer Fancy to seek for it elsewhere But whatsoever the Origination of the word is it always imports something hidden or concealed especially with reference to Sacred or Religious Matters And in this Sence it occurs frequently if not always in prophane Writers from whence the Holy Pen-men of the New Testament seem to have borrow'd and apply'd it to some of the Great and Arduous Truths of Christianity such as human Reason cannot give a clear and explicit Account of This therefore being the undoubted Notation and Signification of the Word I shall deliver the Nature of the thing it self in this Definition viz. That a Mystery is a Truth reveal'd by God above the Power of natural Reason to find out or comprehend This I take to be a full and proper Definition of a Mystery And accordingly I shall consider the several Parts of it distinctly As First That it is a Truth By which we exclude every thing from being a Mystery that is absurd or contradictious since a Truth can by no means be so And consequently hereby stand excluded also the Fooleries and Falsities of all other Religions how Mysterious soever they may be pretended to be and with how much Solemnity and Confidence soever delivered Secondly The next Qualification is That it be revealed by God viz. as to its Existence That there is such a thing For otherwise as to the Nature of the thing it self and several other respects in which it may be known the Revelation of it is not suppos'd to extend so far In a Word as a Mystery implies some Revelation of a Thing so it follows That all Revelation does not overthrow the Mysteriousness of it But only such a plenary and entire Revelation of it as leaves nothing in the Nature of it abstruse or undiscovered But now though Revelation be a necessary Ingredient in this Definition yet it is not sufficient something more being still required Since nothing hinders but that the same thing may be both revealed by God and known upon other accounts too As the Moral Law was revealed by God to his People and may be drawn and demonstrated from Principles of Natural Reason also And therefore the Third Property of a Mystery is That it surpass all the Power of Natural Reason to discover or find it out And that not only as to the Quid sit or particular Nature but also as to the Quòd sit of it too For that there are or should be such or such things to consider only the bare Existence of them no Principle of humane Reason by its own natural or improved Light could ever have found out as might be easily shewn by Induction through the several Mysteries of our Religion such as are the Trinity the Incarnation the Mystical Union of Christ with the Church the Resurrection of the Body and the like of all and each of which meer Reason could never have made a discovery Fourthly The fourth and last Condition of a Mystery express'd in the foregoing Definition of it is That it be such a Thing as bare Natural Reason even after it is discovered cannot comprehend I say comprehend that is know it perfectly and as far as it is capable of being known I do not say That it is or ought to be wholly Unintelligible For some knowledge no doubt may be had of it As first we may know the Signification and Meaning of the Words or Terms in which it is delivered or revealed to us Likewise as to the thing it self we may have some imperfect defective knowledge of that too Such as the Apostle Paul calls a knowing in part and seeing as through a glass darkly 1 Cor. 13. 12. which words manifestly and naturally import That something is known though in a very imperfect manner and degree and that something also remains still unknown which shall hereafter be clearly and fully discovered and made known unto us So that I think nothing could give us a truer and more satisfactory account of the Nature of an Evangelical Mystery than this Scripture viz. That it is a Truth of which we know something at present though very imperfectly but are ignorant of a great deal more belonging to it And this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this obscure and abstruse part of it is that which properly constitutes and denominates a Sacred Truth a Mystery and consequently we may reckon the Account given us of a Mystery by St. Chrysostome a true and exact Description of it by its principal Property viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Homily 7. on the 2 Corinth and Homily 19. on the Epistle to the Romans Where I desire the Reader still to observe that I do not affirm That this last Acception of the Word is either the Original Sence of it or that the Heathen Writers used it in this Signification all that they intended to signifie by the Word Mysterium seeming to have been only that it was Quid sacrum secretum But this I affirm That the Fathers and Writers of the Christian Church generally used it in the Sence specified that is They affix'd a farther Sence to it of their own but still such an one as carried with it something of Analogy and Cognation to the first whereby it signify'd only something obscure or occult in sacred Matters So that now if any one should argue That in the Writers of the Christian Church Mysterium signified only Quid sacrum secretum because it signified no more in the Heathen Writers from whom they borrowed it this would be very inconsequent and ridiculous and all one as if because Sacramentum in the Heathen Writers signified only a Military Oath Therefore in the Ancient Christian Writers it must signifie so too For the Christian Writers apply it to signifie those two great Rites of Christianity Baptism and the Holy Eucharist though still in this instance as well as
conclusion therefore I do here assert That the gross and Material Imaginations which Men form to themselves of Substance proceed not from the thing it self but from the grossness and fault of the Persons who take up these Imaginations And accordingly I affirm to this Author That that Assertion of his in Page 69. That we can form no Idea of Substance but what we have from Matter is false and manifestly proved to be so And moreover That it is not only as possible but as easie to form in the mind a conception of a Substance or Being Existing by it self which is all one as abstracted from and strip'd of all conception of Matter and Corporeity as it is to frame to our selves a conception of Truth or Wisdom or of a Being eternally True and Wise separate from all those gross Qualifications And consequently that the word Substance with others of the like import may be most fitly and significantly applyed to the Divine Nature and the Persons of the Holy Trinity which was the thing to be proved But because our Author avers in Page 70. That if we consider God as Truth and Wisdom which is his true Nature and Essence without confounding our mind with some material conceptions of his Substance as he had already affirmed all conceptions of Substance must needs be then these things viz. the Difficulties before-mentioned concerning our Apprehensions of God are all plain and easie Where by the way it is observable That he calls Truth and Wisdom the true Nature and Essence of God whereas in this very Page as well as in 68. he had excepted against the Term Essence no less than that of Substance as by reason of the gross Material Ideas raised by it in the Mind very unfit to be applyed to God So happy is this Author above other Men that he can rectifie the most improper words and expressions barely by his own using them But because he is so positive in making the Terms Truth and Wisdom an effectual Remedy against all the Inconveniences alledged from the Terms Essence and Substance as applyed to the Deity this brings us to our second Proposition viz. That the same Objection lies against the Terms Truth Wisdom Goodness c. as applicable to the Deity that are made against Essence Substance Existence and the like In order to the proving of which I shall observe That Truth may be taken in a three-fold sense First For the truth of Propositions which is called Logical Secondly For an Affection of Being which is Truth Metaphysical And Thirdly and Lastly As it is a Qualification of Men's Words and Actions and consists properly in an Agreement of the Mind with both Concerning all which I observe That the Truth of Propositions is no further eternal than as it exists in the Mind of God That the Metaphysical Truth of Things is eternal or not eternal as the Being or Thing it belongs to is or is not so And for the Moral Truth of Men's Words and Actions it is no more eternal than the said Words and Actions the proper Subject of them can be said to be This premised I would here ask our Author Whether the first Notions we actually entertain of Truth and Wisdom are not drawn from the Observations we make of these things in Men that is in Beings sensible and Material and consisting of Body as well as Soul and accordingly cloathed with sensible Accidents and Circumstances I cannot imagine that he will deny this since we do not speak immediately or converse visibly with God or Angels and I suppose also that he now speaks of Truth Wisdom Goodness c. not as they are exhibited to us in Books or Propositions but as they actually exist and occur in persons and consequently as they are first apprehended by us in Concretion or Conjunction with Men that is with Beings so Compounded Qualified and Circumstantiated as above expressed and as we find see and observe them in Men's Words and Actions in what they speak and what they do and these are certainly very sensible things and such as incurr into and affect the sence as much as Matter it self can do And if so I desire to hear some satisfactory Reason Why the Observation of Substance in Material Beings and our first Occasional collection of it from thence should so necessarily pervert and cause such a grossness in our Conceptions of it as to make it hardly if at all possible to conceive of Substance without the gross Conception of Matter and yet that the same consideration and cause should not equally take place in Truth and Wisdom and equally pervert and thicken our Apprehensions of them when they are equally drawn from sensible gross and Material Objects viz. the Words and Actions of Men which they both Exist in and Converse about For I can see no ground why the same Reason should not infer the very same thing and the same Antecedents draw after them the same Consequents whatsoever they are applyed to For the Argument à Quatenus ad omne c. is certain and infallible If it be here said That Truth and Wisdom in the proper Notion and Conception of them imply no Communication at all with Matter I Answer That as the Notion of them is Abstracted and gathered up by the Discourses of Reason it does not but so neither does that of Substance after such an Act of the Mind has passed upon it So that hitherto the Case is much the same in both But to carry the matter a little further Truth and Wisdom as observed in and amongst Men are certainly finite Things For whatsoever exists in a finite Subject whatsoever the Object be which it converses about or is terminated upon is certainly it self finite also And here I would have this Author tell me Why a Notion drawn off and borrowed from finite Things should not be as apt to perplex and confound our Minds when applyed to an Infinite Being as a Notion abstracted from a Material Being can be to distract and confound our Thoughts when applyed to an Immaterial I must confess I can see nothing alledgeable for one which may not be as strongly alledged for the other All that can be said is what has been mentioned already viz. That Reason may and does extract some Notions from a finite Being that may be properly applicable to an Infinite due allowance made for the disproportion between both and in like manner I affirm That it can and does draw Notions from a thing endued with Matter which may as well agree to Things Spiritual and Immaterial So that I cannot perceive that Truth Wisdom or Goodness have upon this Account any Preheminence or Advantage over Essence Substance Existence and the like Terms at all but the one may be applyed to the Divine Nature as well and properly as the other But this is not all for I affirm in the 3d Place That Essence Substance Nature Existence and other Terms equipollent to Being considered precisely
much at present That the Greek Writers in expressing the Godhead or Divine Nature whensoever they do not use the Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constantly express it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and sometimes by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 while 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were commonly used in the same sense And likewise the Latins where they express not the same by Deitas or Divinitas do as constantly express it by Natura and Substantia which words stand now particularly condemned by this Presuming Man and that not only in Defiance of all the Ancients but also of the Church of England Her Self which has set her Authorizing Stamp upon those Two Words Substance and Person by applying them to this Subject both in her Articles and Liturgy In the first of them teaching us That in the Unity of the Godhead there are three Persons of one Substance Power and Eternity Artic. 1. And in her Liturgy rendring the Athanasian Creed by the same words Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance As likewise that Passage in the Nicene Creed by the Son 's being of one Substance with the Father And again in the Doxology at the Communion on Trinity Sunday it gives us these full and notable words One God one Lord not one onely Person but three Persons in one Substance After all which with what face can this strange Anomalar Son of the Church while he is sucking her Breasts and at the same time poysoning the Milk with which she should feed her Children I say with what Face can he aver to the World That this word Substance thus embraced owned and used by her ought to be thrown away as the Direct Cause of all the Errours Men are apt to fall into about this great Mystery And that we can have no Notion of Substance but what implies in it something gross and material Which were it so can any one imagine that the Church of England would ever have made use of such a word as could serve for nothing but a Snare and a Trap to betray the Understandings and Consciences of Men into such Errours as may cost them their Souls This is so fouly Reflexive upon her that I would have any Man living give me a good Reason Why this Author should not be call'd upon by Publick Authority to give the Church satisfaction for the Scandal given to all the Orthodox Members of it by the Contumely and Reproach which he has passed upon those Terms and Words which She has thought fit so solemnly to express her Faith and her Devotions by But some Men such is the Regard had to her Laws and Discipline will venture to utter and write any Thing that the Bookseller will pay them for though they throw their Conscience and Religion into the Bargain But God himself who resisteth the Proud seems to have took the Matter into his own Hands and to shew his Controlling Providence over the Minds and Hearts of Men has at length brought this Scornful Man to eat his own words the hardest Diet certainly that a proud Person can be put to and after all the black Dirt thrown by him upon the School-men and their Terms to lick it off again with his own Tongue So that after he had passed such a Terrible Killing Doom upon these words Essence Substance Subsistence Suppositum Person and the like here in his Vindication all on a suddain in a relenting Fit he graciously reaches out his Golden Scepter of Self-Contradiction and Restores them to Life again in his Apology And that the Reader may behold both sides of the Contradiction the more clearly I think it the best and fairest way to give him the Sense of this Author if it may be so call'd in his own Words Vindication I Have not troubled my Reader with the different signification of Essence Hypostasis Subsistence Persons Existence Nature c. which are Terms very differently used by the Greek and Latin Fathers and have very much obscured this Doctrine instead of explaining it P. 101. l. 12. The School-men have no Authority where they leave the Fathers whose sense they sometimes seem to mistake or to clog it with some peculiar Niceties and Distinctions of their own P. 138. l. 28. The Truth is that which has confounded this Mystery viz. of the Trinity has been the vain endeavour to reduce it to Terms of Art such as Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Hypostasis and the like Pag. 138. l. the last P. 139. l. 1. And speaking of the Ancient Fathers in the same Page he tells us They nicely distinguished between Person and Hypostasis and Nature and Essence and Substance that they were three Persons but one Nature Essence and Substance But that when Men curiously examined the signification of these words they found that upon some account or other They were very unapplicable to this Mystery Hereupon he asks the following Questions in an upbraiding manner viz. What is the Substance and Nature of God How can three distinct Persons have but one Numerical Substance And What is the distinction between Essence and Personality and Subsistence And Lastly At the end of the same Page He confesses that some tolerable Account of the School-Terms and Distinctions might be given but that it would be a work of more difficulty than use Apology HE viz. the melancholy Stander-by is very angry with the School-Doctors as worse Enemies to Christianity than either Heathen Philosophers or Persecuting Emperours Pray what hurt have they done I suppose he means the corruption of Christianity with those barbarous terms of Person Nature Essence Subsistence Consubstantiality c. which will not suffer Hereticks to lie concealed under Scripture-Phrases But why must the School-men bear all the blame of this Why does he not accuse the Ancient Fathers and Councils from whom the School-men learn'd these Terms Why does he let St. Austin escape from whom the Master of the Sentences borrowed most of his Distinctions and Subtleties But suppose these unlucky Wits had used some new Terms have they taught any new Faith about the Trinity in Unity which the Church did not teach And if they have only guarded the Christian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns which disguised Hereticks cannot break through is this to wound Christianity in its very Vitals No no They will only prick the Fingers of Hereticks and secure Christianity from being wounded and this is one great Cause why some Men are so angry with the School-Doctors tho' the more General Cause is because they have notIndustry enough to Read or understand them Apology P. 4 5. I have to prevent all exceptions given the Reader the whole Paragraph in which the last Clause strikes Home indeed tho' in such Cases some think this Author would do well to take heed of striking too Home and Hard for fear the Blow should rebound back again and do execution where
Term One True God or One only True God and the Term One True God or One only True God including in it no more than the Term One God and consequently if he asserts That these Terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to and predicated of the Son and the Holy Ghost we have him both Arian and Macedonian together in this Assertion And I believe his Adversary the Author of the Notes could hardly have desired a greater Advantage against him than his calling it as he does a Corruption of the Athanasian Creed to joyn the Term One True God to every Person of the Trinity adding withal That upon the doing so it would sound pretty like a Contradiction to say in the close That there was but One True God These are our Author's words but much fitter to have proceeded from a Socinian than from one professing a belief and which is more a defence of the Trinity But in answer to them I tell him That the repeated Attribution of The One True God or Only True God to each of the Three Persons is no Corruption of that Creed at all Forasmuch as these Terms The One True God and the only True God import an Attribute purely Essential and so equally and in Common belonging to all the Three Persons and not an Attribute properly Personal and so appropriate to some one or other of the said Persons And if this Author would have duly distinguished between Essential and Personal Attributes he could not have discoursed of these Matters at so odd a rate as here he does And therefore I deny it to be any Contradiction let it sound in his Ears how it will to conclude That the said Three Persons notwithstanding this Repetition are not Three True Gods but only One True God But he says That such a Repeated Application implies as if each Person considered as distinguished and separated from the other were the One True God To which I Answer 1. That to imply as if a thing were so and to imply that really it is so makes a very great difference in the case indeed so great that this Author must not think from words implying only the former to conclude the latter which yet must be done or what he here alledges is nothing to his purpose But 2. I Answer yet farther That the forementioned words do indeed imply and which is more plainly declare That the Three Persons who are said to be the One or only True God are while they sustain that Attribute really distinct from one another but it does not imply That this is said of them under that peculiar Formality as they are distinct and much less as separated which latter they neither are nor can be The truth is what he has said against the repeated Application of this Term to every one of the Three Persons may be equally objected against all the repeated Predications in the Athanasian Creed but to as little purpose one as the other since albeit all these Predications do agree to Persons really distinct yet they agree not to them under that formal and precise consideration as distinct For nothing but their respective Personal Relations agree to them under that Capacity and this effectually clears off this objection But here I cannot but wonder that this Man should jumble together these two Terms distinguished and separated as he does twice here in the compass of eight Lines when the signification of them as applyed to the Three Divine Persons is so vastly different that one of these Terms viz. distinguished necessarily belongs to them and the other which is separated neither does nor can take place amongst them Nay and when this Author himself has so earnestly and frequently contended for the difference of them as all along asserting the distinction of Persons and as often denying their separation But he proceeds and says That this Expression of The One or only True God is never that he knows of attributed to Son or Holy Ghost either in Scripture or any Catholick Writer Which words methinks as I cannot but observe again do not look as if a Man were Writing against the Socinians Nevertheless admitting the Truth of his Allegation That this Term the One True God is not to be found expresly attributed to the Son or the Holy Ghost will he infer from hence that therefore it neither can nor ought to be so For if that be attributed to them Both in Scripture and Catholick Writers which necessarily and essentially implys The One True God and does and must signifie the very same Thing is it not all one as if in Terminis it had been ascribed to them Doubtless there are several other Expressions in the Athanasian Creed as hardly as this to be found elsewhere However the Thing being certain from other words equivalent this exception is of no force at all nor by any one who understands these Matters is or ought to be accounted so and much less can I see to what end it should be insisted upon by any one while he is encountring the Socinians And therefore whereas he says This Attribute or Title viz. The One True God cannot so properly be ascribed to any one Person but only to the Father whom he tells us the Fathers call the Fountain of the Deity what he here designs by the words so properly which seem to import degrees of Propriety I cannot well tell But this I ask in short May it be properly attributed to the Son and to the Holy Ghost or may it not If not then they are not properly The One True God nor consequently are they properly The True God For whatsoever any one properly is that he may be properly said to be And as for the Father 's being the Fountain of the Deity I hope he looks upon this Expression only as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native Sence for fear the Consequences of it may engage him too far to be able to make an handsome Retreat which I assure him if he does not take heed they certainly will But in a word I demand of him Whether the Father 's being the Fountain of Deity does appropriate and restrain the Thing expressed by the One True God to the Father in contra-distinction to the other Two Persons or not If it does then the same Absurdity recurs viz. That neither is the Son nor the Holy Ghost the One True God and consequently neither simply really and essentially God But on the other side if the Father 's being the Fountain of the Deity does not appropriate the Thing signified by the One True God to the Father then it leaves it common to the other Two Persons with Himself and to each of them And whatsoever is so may with the same Propriety and Truth of Speech be ascribed to and affirmed of them as it is often ascribed to and affirmed of the Father Himself The Truth is this Man 's adventurous and unwary way of
would have kindled such a Fire for them as would have torrified them with a vengeance But as he has stocked the Church with such plenty of New Hereticks and all of his own making so could he by a sway of Power as Arbitrary as his Divinity provide for them also such a Furnace as that of Nebuchadnezzar whom in his Imperious Meen and Humour he so much resembles yet he must not think That the Sound and Iingle of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness how melodiously soever they may tinkle in his own Ears will ever be able to Charm Me◠over to the Worship of his Idol or make them Sacrifice their Reason and Religion either to Him or to the New Notions which he has set up And indeed I cannot but here further declare that to me it seems one of the most preposterous and unreasonable things in Nature for any one first to assert Three Gods and when he has so wel furnished the World with Deities to expect that all Mankind should fall down and Worship Him CHAP. VI. In which is Considered What this Author pretends to from the Authority of the Fathers and School men in behalf of his Hypothesis and shewn in the first place That neither do the Fathers own the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Minds nor Self-Consciousness to be the Formal Reason of their Distinction I Have in the foregoing Chapters debated the Point with this Author upon the Reason and Nature of the Thing it self But that is not all which he pretends to defend his Cause by endeavouring to countenance it also with great Authorities and that in these positive and remarkable words This is no New Notion says he but the constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools Page 101. These are his very words and I desire the Reader carefully to consider and carry them along with him in his Memory For as they are as positive as Confidence can make them so if they are not made good to the utmost they ought severely to recoil upon any one who shall presume to express himself at such a Rate And now that we may do him all the right that may be The way to know whether this Author's Hypothesis be the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools is in the first place truly and fairly to set down what this Author's Doctrine is and wherein it does consist as we shall declare what the received Doctrine of the Fathers and Schools is in our Eighth Chapter Now we shall find That the whole Doctrine delivered by him concerning the Blessed Trinity is comprehended under and reducible to these four Heads First That the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Secondly That Self-Consciousness is the Formal Reason of Personality and consequently that each of the Divine Persons is such by a distinct Self-Consciousness properly and peculiarly belonging to him Thirdly That the Three Divine Persons being thus distinguished from one another by a distinct Self-Consciousness proper to each of them are all United in one and the same Nature by one Mutual Consciousness Common to them all And Fourthly and Lastly That a Trinity in Unity and an Unity in Trinity by this Explication and Account given of it is a very Plain Easie and Intelligible Notion These four Heads or Particulars I say contain in them a full and fair representation of this Author 's whole Hypothesis concerning the Oeconomy of the Blessed Trinity And I am well assured That the knowing and Impartial Reader neither will nor can deny that they do so In the next place therefore that we may see how far our Author makes good all the said Particulars by the Authority of the Fathers as he has peremptorily promised and undertook to do I think it requisite to consider how the Fathers expressed themselves upon this Subject and how this Author brings the said Expressions to his purpose For surely the natural way of knowing any Writer's Mind is by the Words and Expressions which he pretends to deliver his Mind by But concerning these we have our Author declaring First That he has not troubled his Reader with the signification of Essence Hypostasis Substance Subsistence Person Existence Nature c. Pag. 101. and some of his Readers could give him a very good Reason why though I fear too true for him to be pleased with But the Reasons which he himself alledges for his not troubling his Readers either with these Terms or the Explication of them are First That they were very differently used by the Fathers themselves Page 101. And be it so yet still for all that used by them they were and that not so very differently neither the chief difference having been about the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which yet was fairly accorded and well high setled between the Greeks and the Latines before the end of the 6th Century as shall be further made to appear in our Eighth Chapter And his next Reason for his not troubling his Reader forsooth with these Terms is Because they have as he tells us very much obscured the Doctrine of the Trinity instead of explaining it Page 101. which being one of the chief Things which he might conclude would assuredly be disputed with Him for Him thus to presume it before he had proved it is manifestly to beg the Question In the mean time certain it is That these and these only were the Terms which the Father 's used in their Disputes about the Trinity and by which they managed them and consequently were they never so Ambiguous Faulty or Improper as they are much the contrary yet whosoever will pretend to give the Sence of the Fathers must have recourse to them and do it by them and to do otherwise would be to dispute at Rovers or as the word is to speak without Book which may much better become our Author in the Pulpit than in the management of such a Controversie And now let the Reader whom he is so fearful of troubling with any Thing that is to the Purpose judge Whether this Man has not took a most extraordinary way of proving his Doctrine the very same with the Fathers For neither in the first place does he set down what the Doctrine of the Fathers concerning the Trinity was which yet one would have thought was absolutely necessary for the shewing how his own Doctrine agreed with it which he professed to be his design Nor in the next place does he either use or regard or offer to explain those Terms which the Fathers all along delivered that their Doctrine in but is so far from it That he reproaches explodes and utterly rejects them as serving only to obscure this Doctrine instead of explaining it Which in my poor Judgment is such a way of proving the Fathers on his side as perhaps the World never heard of before and will be amazed at now But it is his way and it will
always alledged it one or perhaps sometimes both of these two ways First By way of Allusion or Illustration as I have already noted in the foregoing Chapter and as it is the nearest Resemblance of and Approach to this Divine Unity of any that could be found in Created Beings For still their Argument proceeds only by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the one side and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the other as appears from that place quoted out of Maximus P. 107. which Terms surely do not of necessity import an Identity of the Case but only some Similitude in the parts of the Comparison Secondly The Fathers used the forementioned Example as an Argument à minore ad majus viz. That if several Individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature upon which Nyssen's who le Argument turns much less could this be said of the Three Divine Persons Forasmuch as it is not only certain but evident That Persons merely distinguished from one another and no more must have a greater Unity of Nature than such as are not only distinguished but also divided from one another by a separate Existence And let any one stretch this Argument of the Fathers further if he can I do not in the least deny but several Expressions may have dropped from the Fathers which if we look'd no further might be drawn to a very inconvenient sense But then also it is as little to be denied That the same Fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same Points have declared themselves in such Terms as are very hardly if at all reconcileable to those Occasional and Accidental Expressions And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both it ought much rather to be taken from what was Asserted by them designedly than what was Asserted only occasionally To which I shall add this further Remark That a due consideration of the Circumstances under which those Fathers wrote may very well Apologize for the Deseâ—â—s of some of their Arguments For the Grand Controversie which exercised the Orthodox Writers of the fourth and part of the fifth Century was that with the Arians So that we have the less cause to wonder if some of their Reasonings about the Trinity seem to look no further than the proof of a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons while they had to deal with Adversaries who would not allow so much as this between the Father and the Son but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Likeness of Nature between them which together with the foregoing Considerations may serve as a Key to let us into the true Explication of several Passages of the Fathers about the meaning of which we might otherwise possibly be something at a loss And the same likewise may serve to give a fair Account of what has been alledged by Petavius and mistook by this Author upon the present Subject For to traverse and examine all Petavius's Allegations particularly would require a full and distinct Work by it self But still our Author seems extremely set upon making good his first step of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature from the Fathers and to that purpose he tells us Page 107. Line 23. That one thing wherein the Fathers place the Unity of the Godhead is that all the Three Persons have the same Nature by which he means as shall be shewn presently Specifically the same Nature and a few Lines after he tells us again That some of the Fathers went further than this and plac'd the Essential Unity of the Divine Nature in the Sameness of Essence Lines 30 31 32 of the same Page Now here I would desire this Author to inform me of Two Things First By what Rule of speaking or upon what Principle of Divinity Logick or Philosophy Sameness of Nature ought to signifie one Thing and Sameness of Essence to signifie another and withal to be so contra-distinguished to each other that in the degrees of Unity this latter must be a step beyond the former For the Fathers I am sure make no such distinction but use the words Sameness of Nature and Sameness of Essence as well as the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themselves promiscuously so that neither by their Native signification nor yet by their use do they import any more than one sort of Unity Secondly Whereas in Page 106. Lines 23 24. he makes the first step towards this Unity to consist in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Coessentiality which also in the next Page Line 23. c. he explains by Sameness of Nature And whereas in Page 121. he makes a Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence the next step introducing it with the word Secondly and telling us That the Fathers added it to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he had before made the first step And whereas notwithstanding this having in Page 107. told us That Sameness of Nature was one Thing wherein the Fathers placed the Unity of the Divine Nature within seven Lines after he tells us That some of the Fathers went further and placed it in the Sameness of Essence which yet it is manifest all along that he reckons not the same Thing with Numerical Unity of Essence I desire to know of him whether there be Two second steps in this Unity or whether there be one between the first and the second For he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature one step Page 106 107. And Sameness of Essence a further step Page 107. Line 30. c. And then Numerical Unity of Nature another step calling it also the Second Page 121. Line 5. These Things I must confess I am utterly unable to give any Consistent Account of and I shrewdly suspect that our Author himself is not able to give a much better But it is still his way to forget in one place what he has said in another and how kind soever he may be to himself I should think it very hard for another Man to forget himself so often and to forgive himself too Nevertheless our Author without mincing the Matter roundly Asserts a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons telling us Line 23. c. of the fore-cited Page 107. That this is absolutely necessary to make the Three Persons one God and that it is impossible that they should be so without it where it is evident that he means a Specifick Unity both from this that it was the Subject which he had been there treating of as also from this that immediately after he mentions another sort or degree of Unity as a step further than this which since nothing can be but a Numerical Unity it follows That that which was one step short of a Numerical must needs be a Specifical And now is it not strange that in Page 109. which is but the next
to proceed That Assertion of this Author That God is properly Energy or Operation contains in it more Absurdities than one For first he takes Energy and Operation for the same Thing whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is properly vis activa and Operation is only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or actual Exercise of that vis or Power But whether it signifies one or both it is certain that God is properly neither of them For as I have shewn before we must speak of God as we are able to conceive of him and we conceive of God not as of an Action but as of an Agent that is as of a Substance acting or exerting it self and upon this Account I do here tell this Author that it is impossible for Humane Reason to conceive of Action or Operation but as founded in Substance and that nothing would more confound and overturn all the Methods Ways and Notions of Men's Minds than to endeavour to conceive of it otherwise And therefore if God is sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Action it is by a Metonymy of the Adjunct for the Subject or the Effect for the Cause for truly and properly he is not so And now if this Author shall think to take Sanctuary in that known Expression of God That he is a pure simple Act he may please to take notice that the Term Act is Ambiguous and sometimes signifies an Actus Entitativus which is no more than the Entity or Being of a Thing and sometimes an Actus Physicus which is the Operation or Exertion of some Active Power And it is in the former sense only in which God is said to be a pure simple Act and not in the latter And by this Author's Favour every Substance Essence or Nature is such an Act which quite spoils all his fine Notion about expressing God only by Terms of Energy and Operation in exclusion of those of Nature Essence and Substance This I thought fit to premise as throwing up the very foundation of all his Arguments and indeed of his whole Hypothesis And so I come to his Argument the Sum of which is this That the Divine Nature is Divine Energy or Operation and therefore That the Unity of Divine Operation is Unity of Divine Nature and Lastly That this Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Consciousness Now it is certain That there is not one of all these Three Propositions true but that is no fault of mine since if they were cast into a Syllogism that would not mend the Matter for the Syllogism must proceed thus Unity of Divine Energy or Operation is Mutual-Consciousness Unity of Divine Nature is Unity of Divine Energy or Operation And therefore Unity of Divine Nature is Mutual-Consciousness Every one of which Propositions is still salse And yet I shall referr it to this Author himself or to any one who has Read and Considered his Book to form a better Argument from what he has said of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with reference to the present Subject if he can Nevertheless whether it be an Argument or no Argument my Answer to his Allegation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with relation to the Unity of the Divine Nature and to Mutual-Consciousness is thus First That it is one Thing to be a Proof of a Thing and another to be that wherein the Nature of the Thing proved does consist Thus actual Ratiocination is a certain Proof of a Principle of Reason yet nevertheless it is not that wherein a Principle of Reason does consist since that may be and continue when actual Ratiocination ceases In like manner I will allow the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be a Proof of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But I absolutely deny That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Energy is that wherein the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Nature is or ought to be placed or that the Fathers ever accounted it so how truly and strongly soever it might in their Judgment inferrit What the Fathers designed to prove by Unity of Operation in the Three Divine Persons is evident from the following Passages to which Twenty times as many might be added Gregory Nyssen tells us that those whose Energy is the same have their Nature altogether the same And St. Basil That those who have the same Operations have also the same Essence or Substance But the Operation orEnergy of the Father and the Son is one as appears in that Expression Let us make Man And again Whatsoever the Fatherdoes that likewise does the Son and therefore there is but one Essence of the Father and the Son And again The Sameness of Operation in the Father Son and Holy Ghost evidently shews That there is no difference in their Essence or Substance And accordingly St. Austin The Operation cannot be diverse where the Nature is not only equal but also undivided From all which it is most clear That the Fathers alledge this Unity of Operation only as a Proof or Argument of this Unity of Nature or Essence And therefore since nothing can be a proof of it self That they did not take Unity of Operation and Unity of Nature for one and the same Thing But Secondly Supposing but not granting that it were so viz. That Unity of Operation did not only prove but really was it self this Unity of Nature or Essence yet how will this Author prove that Unity of Nature or Unity of Operation is properly Mutual-Consciousness Is there so much as one Tittle in the Fathers expressing or necessarily implying that it is so And as to the Reason of the Thing it self Will any one say That there is no other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belonging to the Divine Nature but Mutual-Consciousness Or that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the whole Latitude and Compass of it extends no further Nay on the contrary does it not Exert it self in Infinite other Acts And what is yet more does it not more properly belong to any other of the Divine Acts than to an Act of Knowledge bare Knowledge as such being of it self unoperative and Mutual-Consciousness is but an Act of Knowledge I protest I am ashamed to dispute seriously against such Stuff 2. His next Argument to prove That Mutual-Consciousness is formally that Unity of Nature which is in the Three Divine Persons is taken from another Expression of the said Gregory Nyssen viz. That there is amongst the Divine Persons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Concerning which this Author has the boldness to appeal to any one to judge whether this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this single Motion of the Will which at the same instant is in Father Son and Holy Ghost can signifie any thing but Mutual Consciousness which makes them Numerically One Page 117. Lines 8 9 10 c. And he adds That it is impossible they should have such a single Motion of Will passing through them all without this Mutual Consciousness Page 124. Lines 30 31. And this is the
himself so often as he does It is clear therefore on the one side That the Acts of Understanding Memory and Will neither are nor can be Acts of Mutual Consciousness and on the other that Father Son and Holy Ghost do every one of them Exert Acts of Mutual Consciousness upon one another and consequently that as to this thing there is a total entire difference between both sides of the Comparison For which cause it is to be hoped that this Author himself will henceforth Consult the Credit of his own Reason so far as to give over proving That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Blessed Persons consists wholly and solely in the Mutual Consciousness of the said Persons by Examples taken from such Created Things as are by no means Mutually Conscious to one another But to manifest yet further the Vanity of this his Allegation out of St. Austin I shall plainly shew wherein this Father placed the Unity of the Three Divine Persons And that in short is in the Unity of their Nature Essence and Substance This is the Catholick Faith says he that we believe Father Son and Holy Ghost to be of one and the same Substance And again Let us believe in the Father Son and Holy Ghost These are Eternal and Unchangeable that is One God of one Substance the Eternal Trinity And moreover speaking of such as would have Three Gods to be Worshipped he adds That they know not what is the meaning of one and the same Substance and are deceived by their own Fancies and because they see Three Bodies separate in three Places they think the Substance of God is so to be understood I think it very needless to add the like Testimonies from other Fathers how numerous and full soever they may be for our Author having here quoted only St. Austin I shall confine my Answer to his Quotation and think it enough for me to over-rule an Inference from a Similitude taken out of St. Austin by a Plain Literal Unexceptionable Declaration of St. Austin's Opinion The Sum of the whole Matter is this That the thing to be proved by this Author is That the Three Divine Persons are One only by an Unity of Mutual Consciousness And to prove this he produces only a Similitude out of St. Austin and that also a Similitude taken from things in which no such thing as Mutual Consciousness is to be found By which it appears that his Argument is manifestly lame of both Legs and as such I leave it to shift for it self 5. In the fifth and last place He tells us That the Fathers also resolved the Unity of the God head in the three Divine Persons into the Unity of Principle meaning thereby that though there be three Divine Persons in the God-head Father Son and Holy Ghost yet the Father is the Original and Fountain of the Deity who begets the Son of his own Substance and from whom and the Son the Holy Ghost eternally proceeds of the same Substance with the Father and Son so that there is but one Principle and Fountain of the Deity and therefore but one God Page 128. line 6. Now all this is very true but how will our Author bring it to his purpose Why thus or not at all viz. That the Numerical Unity of Nature in the three Divine Persons by being founded in and resolved into this Unity of Principle does therefore properly consist in Mutual Consciousness This I say must be his Inference and it is a large step I confess and larger than any of the Fathers ever made Nevertheless without making it this Author must sit down short of his Point And yet if he really thinks that his Point may be concluded from hence why in the Name of Sence and Reason might he not as well have argued from Gen. 1. 1. That God created the Heavens and the Earth and that therefore the Three Divine Persons are and must be one only by an Unity of Mutual Consciousness For it would have followed every whit as well from this as from the other But since the Creation of both I believe never Man disputed as this Man does while he pretends to prove his Mutual Consciousness from the Unity of Principle in the Oeconomy of the Divine Persons And yet if he does not design to prove it from thence to what purpose is this Unity of Principle here alledged where the only Point to be proved is That the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Persons is only an Unity of Mutual Consciousness But to come a little closer to him If this Author can make it out that the Father Communicates his Substance to the Son and the Father and the Son together Communicate the same to the Holy Ghost by one Eternal Act of Mutual Consciousness common to all three Persons then his Argument from Unity of Principle to an Unity of Nature consisting in Mutual Consciousness may signifie and conclude something but this he attempts not nor if he should would he or any Man living be ever able to prove it But he is for coming over this Argument again and tells us That as Petavius well observes it does not of it self prove the Unity that is to say the Numerical Unity of the God-head but only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sameness of Nature i. e. as he elsewhere explains himself the Specifick Sameness of Nature And that therefore the Fathers thought fit to add That God begets a Son not without but within Himself Page 128. line 17 c. In Answer to which Observation though it affects the Point of Mutual Consciousness the only thing now in hand no more than what he had alledged before yet in vindication both of the Fathers and of Petavius himself I must needs tell this Author That it is equally an Abuse to both For as to the Fathers it has been sufficiently proved to him That neither is there any such thing as a Specifick Unity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons nor that the Fathers ever owned any such but still by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 held only a Numerical Unity of Nature and no other so that their saying That God begot a Son within himself was rather a further Explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than any Addition at all to it And as for Petavius whereas this Man says That he has observed That this Argumentation of the Fathers does not of it self prove the Numerical Unity of the God-head in the three Persons I averr That Petavius observes no such thing He says indeed If this Reasoning viz. from Unity of Principle were considered Absolutely and Universally it would prove rather a Specifick than a Numerical Unity of Nature and gives a Reason for it from Humane Generation But then he does by no means say That the Fathers Arguments in this Case ought to be so considered but plainly limits them to the Divine Generation as of a peculiar kind
differing from all others And thereupon no less plainly Asserts That when the Father begets the Son he Communicates to him the same Numerical Substance and Nature and says expresly That the force and strength of the Fathers Argumentation is taken from the proper Condition and Nature of the Divinity and the Divine Generation from whence they collect not any kind of Unity of Essence but only a Singular and Numerical Unity in the three Divine Persons Which he makes good by Instances from St. Athanasius and St. Hilary And this is the true state of the Case and shews That Petavius understood the Fathers whether he who takes upon him to be his Corrector and Confuter does or no. In the mean time it is shameless to insinuate in this manner that Petavius represented these Arguments of the Fathers as proving only the Specifick Sameness of Nature and not the Numerical Unity of the God-head when he plainly shews That they designed thereby to prove a Numerical Unity of Essence in the Divine Persons and nothing else But this Author seems to assume to himself a peculiar Privilege of saying what he will and of whom he will In which nevertheless I cannot but commend his Conduct as little as I like his Arguing For that as he makes so bold with so Learned and Renowned a Person as Petavius So he wisely does it now that he is laid fast in his Grave For had Petavius been living and this Man wrote his Book in the same Language in which Petavius wrote his which for a certain Reason I am pretty well satisfied he never would there is no doubt but Petavius would have tossed him and his New Notion of three distinct infinite Spirits long since in a Blanket and effectually taught him the difference of insulting over a great Man when his Head is low and when he is able to defend himself We have seen how little our Author has been able to serve himself of the fore mentioned Resolution of the Unity of the Divine Nature into an Unity of Principle by way of Argument in behalf of his Mutual Consciousness Nevertheless though it fails him as an Argument yet that he may not wholly lose it he seems desirous to cultivate it as a Notion and upon that score tells us That it needs something further both to Complete and Explain it which with reference to his own Apprehensions of it I easily believe but however I shall take some Account of what he says both as to the Completion and Explication of it And First For the Completion He tells us That Father Son and Holy Ghost are Essential to one God and that upon this Account there must be necessarily three Persons in the Unity of the God-head and can be no more As to which last clause he must give me leave to tell him That it is not the bare Essentiality of the three Persons to the God-head which proves that there can be no more than three belonging to it but it is the Peculiar Condition of the Persons which proves this without which the Essentiality of the Three would no more hinder the Essentiality of a Fourth or Fifth than the Essentiality of Two could take away the Essentiality of a Third And therefore though the Proposition laid down by him be true yet his Reason for it will not hold But one choice Passage quoted by him out of a great Father I must by no means omit viz. That upon Account of this Unity of Principle St. Austin calls the Trinity Unam quandam summam Rem Page 123. line 8. Concerning which I desire any Man living except this Author to declare freely whether he thinks that St. Austin or any one else of Sence and Learning would call three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which are neither Numerically nor Specificully nor so much as Collectively one Unam quandam summam Rem But in the Second Place As for his Explication of the said Notion he tells us That he shall proceed by several steps and those as he would perswade us very plain and Universally acknowledged by all Page 126. lines 16 17 c. Nevertheless by his good leave I shall and must demur to two of them as by no means fit to be acknowledged by any and much less such as are acknowledged by all And they are the Third and Fourth In which he tells us That in the first place Original Mind and Wisdom and in the second That Knowledge of it self and lastly Love of it self are all of them distinct Acts and so distinct that they can never be one simple individual Act And withal that these Acts being thus distinct must be Three substantial Acts in God that is to say Three subsisting Persons By which three substantial Acts he must of necessity mean three such Acts as are three Substances Forasmuch as he adds in the very next words That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God Page 130. line 7 8 9. to the middle of the page Now against these strange Positions I Argue thus First If the three fore-mentioned Acts are so distinct in God that they can never be one Simple Individual Act then I inferr That the said three Acts cannot possibly be one God Forasmuch as to be one God is to be one pure simple indivisible Act. And thus we see how at one step or stroke he has Ungodded the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity For these three Acts he tells us are the three Persons in the God head Though I believe no Divine before him ever affirmed a Person to be an Act or an Act a Person with how great Confidence soever and something else this Man affirms it here Secondly If those three Acts in the God-head are three distinct infinite Substances as he plainly says they are by telling us Page 130. line 19. That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God then in the God-head there are and must be three distinct Gods or God-heads Forasmuch as an infinite Substance being properly God every distinct infinite Substance is and must be a distinct God These I affirm to be the direct unavoidable Consequences of those two short Paragraphs in Page 130. which he makes his Third and Fourth Explanatory Steps But because he may here probably bear himself upon that Maxim That there is nothing but Essence and Substance in God which yet by the way might better become any one to plead than himself let me tell him That that Proposition is not absolutely and in all Sences true If indeed he means by it That there is no Being whether Substance or Accident in God besides his own most Pure Simple Indivisible Substance or Essence which is the commonly received sence of it it is most true But if he therefore affirms That neither are there any Modes or Relations in God this will not be granted him For in God besides Essence or Substance we assert That there is that which we call Mode Habitude and Relation And by one or
other of these in Conjunction with Essence or Substance we give account of all the Acts Attributes and Personalities belonging to the Divine Nature or God-head This is the constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysicians in their Discourses upon God and without which it is impossible to Discourse intelligibly of the Divine Acts Attributes or Persons And as it stands upon a firm bottom so it may well be defended And if this Author has ought to except against it I shall be ready to undertake the defence of it against him at any time But still that he may keep up that Glorious standing Character of Self-Contradiction which one would think to be the very Ratio formalis or at least the Personal Property of the Man Having here in Page 130. made a very bold step by Asserting the three Divine Persons to be three distinct Acts and so distinct that they can never be one Simple Individual Act. In the very next Page but one viz. 132. line 13. he roundly affirms That the Father and the Son are one single Energy and Operation Now how safe and happy is this Man that no Absurdities or Contradictions can ever hurt him Or at least that he never feels them let them pinch never so close and hard What remains is chiefly a Discourse about the different way of the Son 's issuing from the Father and the Holy Ghost's issuing from both As that the former is called Generation because the Son issues from the Father by a Reflex Act and the latter termed Procession because the Holy Ghost issues from both by a Direct Act. But why a Reflex Act must needs be termed properly a Generation and a Direct Act not be capable of being properly so accounted this our Acute Author very discreetly says nothing at all to though under favour all that he says besides leaves us as much in the Dark as we were before And for my own part I cannot think my self concerned to clear up a Point wholly foreign to that which alone I have undertook the Discussion of And thus I have finished my Dispute with Him concerning the Authorities of the Fathers alledged in behalf of his Notion of Mutual Consciousness as that wherein he places the Unity of the Divine Nature belonging to the three Blessed Persons The Sum of which whole Dispute is resolved into this single Question viz. In what the Father 's placed the Unity in Trinity And if they placed it in the Sameness or Unity of Nature Substance or Essence words applyed by them to this Subject at least a thousand Times and still used to signifie one and the same thing then it is plain that they did not place it in an Unity of Mutual Consciousness For I suppose no Man this Author himself not excepted will say That Essence or Substance and Mutual Consciousness are Terms Synonymous and of the same signification And as the whole Dispute turns upon this single Question so in the management of it on my part I have with great particularity gone over all the Proofs by which this Author pretends to have evinced his Doctrine from the Fathers The utmost of which Proofs amounts to this That the Fathers proved an Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common to them all And moreover sometimes illustrated the said Unity by the three Faculties of the Understanding Memory and Will being one with the Soul which they belonged to And lastly That they resolved the Unity of the Trinity into an Unity of Principle the Father being upon that account styled Principium fons Deitatis as communicating the Divine Substance to the Son and together with the Son to the Holy Ghost And what of all this I pray Do all or any of the fore-mentioned Terms signifie Mutual Consciousness Why No But this Author with a non obstante both to the proper signification and common use of them all by absolute Prerogative declares them to mean Mutual Consciousness And so his Point is proved viz That Mutual Consciousness is not only an Argument inferring the Unity of the Divine Nature in the three Blessed Persons which yet was all that the Fathers used the fore-mentioned Terms for but which is more That it is that very thing wherein this Unity does Consist This I say is a true though a short Account of all his Arguments upon this Subject and according to my custom I refer it to the Judicious Reader to judge impartially whether it be not so and withall to improve and carry on the aforesaid Arguments in his behalf to all further advantage that they may be capable of But in the issue methinks the Author himself seems to review them with much less confidence of their Puissance than when at first he produced them For if we look back upon the Triumphant Flag hung out by him at his Entrance upon this part of his Work the only proper time for him to Triumph in and when he declared That his Explication of the Trinity was the Constant Doctrine of the Fathers and the Schools Page 101. lines 24 25. who could have imagined but that he then foresaw that he should prove his Point with all the strength and evidence which his own Heart could desire And yet alas Such for the most part is the vast distance between Promises and Performances that we have him bringing up the Rear of all with this sneaking Conclusion Page 138. line 22 c. It must be confessed says he That the Ancient Fathers did not express their sence in the same Terms that I have done But I leave it to any Indifferent and Impartial Reader whether they do not seem to have intended the same Explication which I have given of this Venerable Mystery These are his words and I do very particularly recommend them to the Reader as deserving his peculiar Notice For is this now the Upshot and Result of so daring a Boast and so confident an Undertaking to prove his Opinion the constant Doctrine of the Fathers viz. That though the Fathers speak not one word of it nay though they knew not how to express themselves about it Page 125. line 18. yet that to an Indifferent Reader and a very indifferent one indeed he must needs be in the worst sence they may seem to intend the same Explication he had given of it So that the sum of his whole Proof and Argument amounts to this and no more viz. That to some Persons videtur quod sic and to others videtur quod non For see how low he sinks in the issue First of all from the Fathers positive saying or holding what he does it is brought down to their Intending it and from their Intending it it falls at last to their seeming to intend it and that is all And now is not this a worthy Proof of so high a Point And may it not justly subject this
Unity or Communication and distinction c. St. Basil also Writing against such as would derogate from the Equality of the Divine Persons speaks of the Trinity thus Either let these Inexpressible things be silently Reverenced or Religiously and Becomingly Represented And again in a Discourse against such as used Contumelious Words of the Trinity speaking there of the Holy Ghost as Essentially one with the Father and the Son he says the Intimate Conjunction between him and them is hereby declared viz. by the Scripture there quoted by him and applyed to them but the Ineffable Manner of his Subsistence hereby Inviolably preserved So that still we see with this Father the Oeconomy of the Three Divine Persons in the Blessed Trinity is a thing Ineffable and above all Description or Expression Nazianzen also speaks of the Trinity under these Epithetes styling it the Adorable Trinity Above and before the World before all Time of the same Majesty of the same Glory Increate and Invisible above our Reach and Incomprehensible And the same Epithetes are given it by Nicephorus Patriarch of Constantinople in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus declaring the Trinity to be of One and the same Essence Transcendent in its Substance Invisible and Inconceivable And Lastly Eulogius Arch-bishop of Alexandria sets it forth thus We divide not says he what is but One we part not the Singularity nor distract the Unity but so Assert this Unity in an Eternal Singularity as to ascribe the same to Three distinct Hypostases by no means subjecting things above our Understanding to Human Reasonings nor by an Over-curious Search undervaluing things so much above all Search or Discovery Having given this Specimen of what the Greek Fathers and Writers thought and spoke of the Trinity let us now pass to the Latines And amongst these we have in the first place St. Hilary expressing himself thus The Mystery of the Trinity is Immense and Incomprehensible not to be express'd by Words nor reach'd by Sence Imperceivable it blinds our Sight it exceeds the Capacity of our Understanding I understand it not Nevertheless I will comfort my self in this That neither do the Angels know it nor Ages apprehend it nor have the Apostles enquired of it nor the Son himself declared it Let us therefore leave off complaining c. After him let us hear St. Ambrose The Divinity of the Holy Trinity says he is to be believed by us to be without beginning or end albeit hardly possible to be comprehended by the Mind of Man Upon which Account it may be not improperly said concerning it That we comprehend this only of it that in truth it cannot be comprehended To St. Ambrose succeeds St. Austin In this Trinity says this learned Father is but one God which is indeed wonderfully unspeakable and unspeakably wonderful To the same purpose Fulgentius So far as I can judge only the Eternal and Unchangeable Trinity ought to be looked upon by us as worthy to be esteemed Incomprehensibly Miraculous and as much exceeding all that we can think or imagine of it as it surmounts all that we are After him we shall produce Hormisda Bishop of Rome in a Letter to Iustinian the Emperour about the beginning of the Sixth Century speaking thus The Holy Trinity says he is but One it is not multiplyed by Number nor grows by any Addition or Encrease Nor can it either be comprehended by our Understanding nor in respect of its Divinity be at all Divided And a little after Let us Worship Father Son and Holy Ghost distinct in themselves but with one indistinct Worship that is to say The Incomprehensible and Unutterable Substance of the Trinity And presently again Great and Incomprensible is the Mystery of the Holy Trinity In the last place St. Bernard delivers himself upon the same Subject thus I confidently affirm says he that the Eternal and Blessed Trinity which I do not understand I do yet believe and embrace with my Faith what I cannot comprehend with my Mind I have here as I said given a Specimen of what the Ancient Writers of the Church both Greek and Latin thought and said of the Blessed Trinity and it is I confess but a Specimen since I think that enough for an Universally acknowledged and never before contradicted Proposition Whereas had it but in the least seemed a Novelty as this Author's Hypothesis not only seems but unquestionably is I should have thought my self obliged to have brought as many Quotations for it from Antiquity as would have filled a much larger Book than I intend this shall be But as for those which I have here produced I do solemnly appeal to any Man living Christian or not Christian who does but understand these Languages whether the Fathers now Quoted by me and all the rest upon the same Subject speak agreeably to them looked upon Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity as a Plain Easie and Intelligible Notion So that if the Judgment of the Fathers and of this Author be in this point one and the same it must unavoidably follow That either the Fathers have not yet declared their Judgment and Doctrine or that this Author has not yet declared his Since so much as has been declared on the one side is a direct and gross Contradiction to what has been Asserted on the other And moreover the fore alledged Testimonies of the Fathers are such that we are not put to draw what we contend for by remote far fetched Consequences from them but it lies plain open and manifest in them in words too clear and full to be denyed and too convincing to be evaded So that we are sure both of their Words and Expressions and of the common sence of all Mankind to expound and understand them by And will this bold over bearing Man after all this Claim their meaning to be the same with his What his meaning is he has told us forty times over viz. The Unity in Trinity c. is so far from being an Unintelligible Notion that it is not so much as difficult how much soever the dull mistaken World has for near 1700 Years thought otherwise And now if this be the true Account and state of this Matter that when the Fathers say of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Trinity that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is to say Ineffable Inconceivable Unintelligible Incomprehensible and if possible transcending the very Notion of the Deity it self above all Humane Understanding and Reason Discourse and Scrutiny I say if by all this he can prove that the Fathers meant That it was a very Plain Easie and Intelligible Notion as by affirming that those who used all these Expressions meant the same with himself he does and must affirm or say That they knew not their own meaning or at least were not able to express it but in words quite contrary to it I must needs own the
of the Trinity and some other Tracts upon the same Subject against the Arians He I confess frequently and particularly in Book 4. de Trinit p. 36. Basil. Edit 1570. calls the Three Divine Persons Tres Substantias but it is evident that he took Substantia in the same sence with Subsistentia or Hypostasis forasmuch as he else where often affirms that which must of necessity infer this to be his meaning As for instance in his Book de Synodis contra Arianos Page 223. he tells us That Nullam diversitatem aut dissimilitudinem admittit Geniti Gignentis Essentia And again That there is Indifferens in Patre Filio divinitatis substantia p. 224 And nulla differentis Essentiae discreta Natura ibid. And nulla Originalis substantiae diversitas ibid. And that there is between them nulla diversitas Essentiae p. 225. None of all which Propositions could possibly be true if the Divine Persons were three distinct Substances according to the proper sence and signification of the Word Substance And therefore the Learned Forbesius in his Historico-Theological Instructions Book 1. Chap. 2. quoting the aforesaid Passage after the Words Tres substantias subjoyns these of his own Eo nempe sensu quo Graeci dicebant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And accordingly St. Hilary explaining himself further in his fore-cited Book de Synodis contra Arianos p. 226. says That though between the Father and the Son there was nulla diversitas Essentiae yet they did respuere Personalium Nominum Unionem ne Unus Subsistens sit qui Pater dicatur Filius Which Words manifestly infer That the Father is said to be a Father and the Son to be a Son by a distinct Subsistence proper to each of them And again speaking of those Fathers who opposed the Heresie of Sabellius says of them Idcircò Tres Substantias esse dixerunt Subsistentium Personas per Substantias edocentes non substantiam Patris Filii Spiritus Sancti diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes p. 228. By which Words he speaks all that the Greeks meant by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Latines of the following Times by Subsistentia For which reason it is that the Learned Collator and Editor of this Father's Works uses now and then to such Passages as these to add an Explicatory Marginal Note to this purpose as in Page 36. Book 4. de Trinitate he puts in the Margin Tres Substantiae id est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in this Book de Synodis c. p. 227. he remarks in the side Trina in Divinis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which manifestly shews what the Judgment of Learned Men was concerning St. Hilary's sence in the use of the words Tres Substantioe with reference to the Divine Persons From St. Hilary we pass to St. Ierome who indeed scrupled the use of the Word Hypostasis as applyed to the Divine Persons in Epistle 57. to Pope Damasus But that he did only scruple it and not absolutely refuse or reject it is evident from several other Passages in that Epistle which shewed his Judgment to be that there was nothing of it self ill and hurtful in the use of it For had he judged otherwise surely he would not have told Damasus that he was ready to own the Expression of Tres Personas Subsistentes And moreover That if Damasus would command the use of the Term Hypostasis he would use it But his Exception against it for it was not the Word Person as a great Man mistakes it but the Word Hypostasis which St. Ierome demurred to the use of was built upon these Two grounds both expressed in the same Epistle First That Hereticks abused or made an ill use of this Term to deceive and impose upon the Minds of Weak and Unwary Persons And in good earnest that must be a very extraordinary Word indeed which is uncapable of being one way or other abused by some and misunderstood by others Secondly The other ground which as there is great reason to believe was the main and principal cause of St. Ierome's dislike of this Term was its being imposed by an Incompetent Authority viz. That some of the Greek Church would needs command him and him a very warm Man too who was of the Latin Communion to the use of that which the Latin Church had not obliged him to And Calvin in Lib. 1. Chap 13. of his Institutions Sect. 5. shrewdly intimates the peculiar Pique which St. Ierome bore to the Eastern Bishops to have been the chief if not the sole cause of his Exception against this Word adding withal that it was not fairly done of him which Calvin was a very Competent Judge of to Assert as in that Epistle he does that in omnibus Scholis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was nihil aliud quà m Hypostasis which Calvin there says Communi tritóque usu passim refellitur But after all it seems St. Ierome could relent from his stiffness and reconcile himself to this so much scrupled Expression For in his Epistle or Discourse ad Paulam Eustochium de assumptione Beatoe Marioe speaking of our Saviour's exercising Two distinct kinds of Operation according to his Two Natures combining in one Person has these Words Per hoc quod audiérant quod viderant quod tractârant viz. Apostoli verbam vitoe erat nihil aliud ex duabus Naturis quà m Unum juxta Subsistentiam vel Personam Hieronym Tom. 9. p. 113. Edit Paris apud Nivellium 1579. So that I am in good hopes that for the future St. Ierome's Authority will not be alledged against expressing the Divine Persons by Hypostases till it be proved that there cannot be a Greek and a Latin Word for one and the same Thing For what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies in the Greek That it is certain Subsistentia signifies and declares to us in the Latin As for St. Austin though he looks upon the Word Hypostasis or Subsistentia as new and strange to the Latines in the sence in which it was used by the Greeks yet he is so far from a bridging the Greeks in their way of speaking that he very amicably allows even of those Latines also who chose to follow the Greek Expression as to this Particular in his 5th Book de Trin. Chap. 8 9. where he tells us Qui hoec tractant Groeco eloquio dicunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Latinè ista tractantes cùm alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent verbis dicunt Unam Essentiam vel Substantiam Tres autem Personas ibid. By which this Father manifestly shews That the Latines indeed undestood the very same Thing by Persona which the Greeks did by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they really rendered one by the other though they were not generally so ready to use the Term. And here I suppose the Reader will easily perceive that my Intent is not to establish the use of the
which he appeared of old and the other to that Body which he was Born with in the World All which Positions are horrid and monstrous but unavoidably consequent from the foregoing Assertion But for the further Illustration of the Case I do here affirm to this Author That God is as visible in an assumed Body whether of Air or Aether or whatsoever other Materials it might be formed of as in a Body of Flesh and Blood personally united to him I say as visible For notwithstanding the great difference of these Bodies and the difference of their Union and Relation to God One being by a temporary Assumption and the other by a personal Incarnation yet no Corporeal Eye could discern this Difference during the Appearance but that one was for the time as visible as the other and therefore since both of them were truly Symbols of God's peculiar Presence the only way by which the Divine Nature becomes visible to a Mortal Eye it demonstratively overthrows that positive false Assertion of this Author That nothing can make God visible but a personal Union to a visible Nature PARADOX All the Circumstances of our Saviour's Birth and Life and Death were so punctually foretold by the Prophets and so peremptorily decreed by God that after he was come into the World there was no place for his Choice and Election And he could not shew either his Love or his Humility by choosing Poverty Death c. Page 242. Line 5. Answer This is False Absurd and Dangerous and indeed next to Blasphemous as overthrowing the whole Oeconomy of Man's Redemption by the Merits of Christ. For that which leaves no place for Choice leaves no possibility for Merit For all Merit is founded in freedom of Action and that in Choice And if Christ after his Incarnation had not this he could not Merit And whereas the Author says That Christ chose all this as the second Person of the Trinity antecedently to his Incarnation I Answer That this is indeed true but reaches not the present Case For what he did before he was Incarnate was the Act of him purely as God but a meritorious Action must still be an humane Action which could not proceed from the second Person before his Assumption of an humane Nature I readily grant and hold That the Actions of Christ's humane Nature received a peculiar Worth and Value from its Union with his Divine Person yet still I affirm that this Worth and Value was subjected and inherent in his humane Actions as such and thereby qualified them with so high a degree of Merit So that whencesoever this Merit might flow they were only his humane Actions viz. such as proceeded from him as a Man that were properly and formally meritorious And whereas this Author states the Reason of this his horrid Assertion upon the Predictions of the Prophets and the peremptory Decrees of God concerning all that belonged to or befell Christ I do here tell him That neither Predictions nor Decrees though never so punctual and peremptory do or can infringe or take away the freedom of Man's Choice or Election about the things so decreed or foretold how difficult soever it may be for humane Reason to reconcile them and if this Man will affirm the contrary he must either banish all Choice and Freedom of Action or all certain Predictions and peremptory Decrees out of the World let him choose which of these two Rocks he will run himself against for he will be assuredly split upon either This vile Assertion really deserves the Censure of a Convocation and it is pity for the Church's sake but in due time it should find it PARADOX Concerning Person and Personality he has these following Assertions which I have here drawn together from several parts of his Book viz. The Mind is a Person Page 191. Line 21 22. A Soul without a Vital Union to a Body is a Person Page 262. Line 17. And the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour governing power and Constitutes the Person Page 268. Line 28. A Beast which has no Reasonable Soul but only an Animal Life is a Person c. Page 262. Line 18 19 20. And again We may find the Reasonable and Animal Life subsisting apart and when they do so they are Two Persons and but One Person when United Page the same at the end of it And lastly One Agent is One Person Page 268. Line 2. Answer In all these Propositions so confidently laid down by this Man there are almost as many Absurdities and Falsities as there are Words I have already shewn this of some of them in Chap. 3. and therefore I shall be the briefer in my Remarks upon them here And first for that Assertion That the Mind is a Person To this I Answer That the Mind may be taken Two ways First Either for that Intellectual Power or Faculty by which the Soul understands and Reasons Or Secondly For the Rational Soul it self In the former Sense it is but an Accident and particularly a Quality In the second it is an Essential part of the whole Man and therefore upon neither of these Accounts can be a Person For neither an Accident nor a Part can be a Person which as such must be both a Substance and a compleat Substance too And secondly Whereas he says That a Soul without a vital Union to the Body is a Person I tell him That the Soul without such an Union is still an incomplete Being as being originally and naturally designed for the Completion and Composition of the whole Man and therefore for that reason cannot be a Person And then Thirdly whereas he adds That the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour governing Power and Constitutes the Person I answer That it is the former and does the latter only as it is the prime essential part of the whole Man and for that very cause is an incomplete Being as every part is and must be and consequently cannot be a Person In the next place for an Answer to his saying That a Beast is a Person I refer him to his own positive Affirmation pag. 69. line 18. That a Person and an Intelligent Substance are reciprocal Terms And the same may serve for an Answer to his next Absurdity That when the Reasonable and the Animal Life subsist apart they are Two Persons For the Animal Life separate from the Rational is void of all Reason and the very Definition of a Person is That it is Suppositum Rationale aut Intelligens In the last place By his saying That One Agent is One Person which I am sure he affirms universally of every single Agent he makes every Living Creature under Heaven a Person For every such Creature is endued with a Principle of Life and Action and accordingly acts by it and by so acting is properly an Agent From all which it follows That this Author as great as his Retinue may be has many more Persons in his Family
than the difference of a Noun from an Adverb which we know is below a Person Paramount to all rule to take notice of Though by his good leave the Church of England both Writes and Teaches better Latine to such as are disposed to learn it Again in Page 139. in the Quotation on the side we have these Words cited out of the third Book of Optatus Milevitanus Recordamini quomodò à vobis jamdudum Matris Ecclesiae membra distracta sunt non enim Unumquamque demum semel seducere potuistis Of which Passage I must confess I could make neither Sence nor Grammar till consulting the Author himself of Albaspinaeus's Edition instead of Unumquamque demum I found it Unamquamque Domum which no doubt is an admirable Various Lection of which this Author ought to have the Glory upon the Text of such a Father But this is not all the Blunders which this fruitful Sentence affords us there being yet another viz. recedit for resedit and that such an one as utterly perverts the sence of the Author who speaks here of some who left and some who remained in the Communion of the Church opposing them in this respect to one another as Aut ivit uxor aut resedit maritus aut Parentes seducti sunt filii sequi noluerunt aut stetit frater migrante sorore c. Thus the Father here speaks but pray what opposition could there be between aut ivit uxor aut recedit maritus any more than there is between going away and departing Besides that all the rest of the Verbs running in the Preterperfect Tense this must needs do so too or make a very gross fault in the Construction So that this is an Illiterate Perversion of the sence of this Father Upon which as well as upon other occasions I look upon this as the only sure Rule of dealing with this Author's Quotations viz. To trust them no further than one can see them in their Originals In like manner Page 178. in the place there quoted in the Margin out of St. Cyprian's 55. Epist. and not the 52d as this Author there mistakes it we meet with these words à Coepiscoporum suorum Corpore ab Ecclesiae Unitate discisserit But the word in St. Cyprian is as it ought to be descisceret from descisco to fall off between which and the other word used by this Author there is a wide difference descisceret being a most proper Latine Word but discisserit so far from Proper that it is not so much as Latine And in Page 187. Line the last we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which makes the whole Period neither Sence nor Greek Again Page 188. Line the last but one we have this Passage Videte annon dicantur martyres sed aliquid Alium dici mereantur which being there put for Aliud is a downright Solecism And lastly in Page 198. in the Quotation in the Margin we have those remarkable words Simiarum more qui cùm homines non sint homines tamen imitantur Which is another Solecism every whit as bad and scandalous as the former Now all these Words and Passages I assure the Reader as they stand in the Authors from whence they are quoted carry a very different face from what this Writer has given them which shews that whensoever the words of the Fathers are transcribed into any of his Books they are quite out of their Element For amongst them as they stand here there are some such vile faults or rather such clamorous sins in Grammar that should a School-Boy tender an Exercise to his Master with but Two or Three such in it he would soon find himself very roundly and severely took up for them and that perhaps more ways than one But Hands that can restore dispossessed Princes may Write any Thing and Authorize what they have Wrote by their very Writing it For otherwise the Truth is the Latine which the forecited Passages are dressed up in seems a sort of Providential Latine as being above all Rules and Laws of Speaking and Writing whatsoever As for faults about Accents such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Vind. P. 102. Line 3. And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Page 113. Line 2. of the Quotation in the Margin and the like they are too numerous for me to trouble the Reader with But this I desire him to take notice of upon the whole that has been produced by me That as none of the forementioned Faults are in the Table of the Errata so some of them in the first Edition of his Vind. Trin. stand Corrected in the second as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Page 115. Line 1. of the Quotation in the Margin of the first is Corrected into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the second And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Page 121. Line 21. in the former is changed into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the latter And therefore according to the old Maxime That Exceptio firmat Regulam in non Exceptis it is to me a sufficient proof That since this Author Corrected some Passages and not others which yet need correcting as much if not more it was because His Acuteness did not see that these last needed any Correction at all And in such a case some are of Opinion that where the Words escape it the Author himself ought to have it But because some perhaps will hardly be satisfied with so General a Charge without an Allegation of more Particulars I shall here give the Reader a Catalogue of this Author's Greek Errata in the 2d Edition of his Vindication of the Trinity which should in Reason be thought the most correct together with their Correction confronting them Greek Errata Correction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro Semicol  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Punctum interrogationis post 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pro Semicol  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
best way of Illustrating Things is by example I shall also take this course here Thus for instance For any one to own a Thing for a great and sacred Mystery the very Notion and use of the word Mystery importing something Hidden and Abstruse and at the same time to affirm it to be very Plain Easie and Intelligible is Nonsense To say That in Men Knowledge and Power are Commensurate nay That Knowledge is Power so that whatsoever a Man knows how to do he is by vertue thereof also able to do it is contrary to the Common Sense of all Mankind and consequently Nonsense To say A Beast is a Person and yet to say withal That a Person and an Intelligent substance are Terms reciprocal is both Nonsense and Contradiction too with a Witness To affirm That a specifical Unity can make any Thing or Person Numerically One is Nonsense To affirm That there are two distinct Reasons and two distinct Wills in each Man and those as really distinct as if the same Man had Two distinct Souls is Nonsense And to affirm That the Body which is utterly void of any Intellectual Power or Faculty is conscious to all the Dictates and Commands of the Will is gross and inexcusable Nonsense So that whereas this Author according to his mannerly way charges his Adversary with unintelligible Nonsense p. 227. l. 6. it must needs be granted that he has much the advantage of him in this Particular since all must acknowledge that his own Nonsense is very Intelligible And here I could easily direct him where he may be supplyed with several more such Instances as those newly alledged but that I think these may suffice for the Purpose they are produced for In the mean time I would advise him for the future to use this rude Word more sparingly and cautiously and to apply it only where the generally received way of speaking applies it And now and then also to cast his Eye upon his own Writings These things I say I would advise him to and to consider withal how unreasonable and unjust it is for him to bestow about the Word so freely upon others while he keeps the Thing to himself CHAP. XII Containing a Brief Review and Conclusion of the whole Work I AM at length come to a close of that Work which I should much more gladly have been Prevented than engag'd in by being a Reader rather than the Author of a Reply to this Man 's strange unjustifiable Innovations upon this great Article of our Religion But it is now a considerable Time that the Book here Animadverted upon has walked about the World without any publick Control And though in private Discourse generally censur'd by all yet as to the Point undertook by me hitherto Answered by none which may well be Matter of Melancholy Consideration to all Hearty Lovers of our Church and Ancient Christianity Whereas I dare say had this Heterodox Piece been wrote and published in a Language understood by Foreigners we should long since have had several Confutations of it sent us from abroad and probably not without some severe Reflexions upon the English Church and Clergy for their silence in a Cause which so loudly called for their Defence To take off therefore this Reproach from our Church in some degree at least I have while others far more able to Defend it chuse rather to sit still and enjoy it ventur'd to set my weak Hand to the Vindication of a Principal Article of her Faith against the rude Attacks of this bold Undertaker In which though I freely own that all that has been done by me in it is extremely below the Dignity of the Subject which I have employed my self in yet I am well assured that I have fully and effectually answered this Man and if it should prove otherwise I must ascribe it to a peculiar Misfortune attending me since none besides has hitherto wrote against him but has confuted him In the Work I have here presented the Reader with I have examined and gone over all that I conceive requires either Answer or Remark and that according to the following Method and Order which I shall here briefly set down I have in the first place laid my Foundation in the Explication and State of the Sense of the Word Mystery which I shew in General signifies something Concealed Hidden or Abstruse in Religious Matters and amongst Christian Writers not only that but something also neither Discoverable nor Comprehensible by bare Reason According to which I shew that this Author 's frequent affirming that his Hypothesis and Explication of the Trinity rendred the Notion thereof very Plain Easie and Intelligible was utterly incompatible with the Mysteriousness of the same I shew also upon what absurd Grounds he stated the Nature of a Contradiction according to which joyned with another of his Assertions I shew That no Man could be justly charged with Contradiction though he discoursed never so incoherently and falsely upon any Subject whatsoever From hence I proceeded to consider the Ancient Terms constantly received and used by Councils Fathers and Schoolmen in speaking of the God-head and Trinity which this Author in his Book had confidently and avowedly condemned as obscuring and confounding Men's Notions about these great Matters and upon a distinct Explication of each of them I shew the Propriety and singular usefulness of them both against all his Exceptions and above those other Terms which he would needs substitute in their Room And under the same Head I laid open the Contradiction of his Vindication and his late Apology to one another as I had done before in my Discourse about the Nature of a Mystery From hence I passed to his New Notions of Self-Consciousness and Mutual-Consciousness in the strength of which two Terms he pretended to make a Trinity in Unity a plain easie and intelligible Notion nay so very plain as to solve all Difficulties about it these being his very words And as he pretended Self-Consciousness to be the formal constituent Reason of Personality Universally both in Beings Create and Uncreate I first Demonstrated the contrary in Created Beings and that both from the general Reason of Things and from Two manifest Instances and withal examined and confuted several extremely absurd Propositions and Assertions advanced by him concerning Personality From this I passed on and proved that neither could this Self-Consciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons shewing the impossibility thereof by several clear and unquestionable Arguments And in the next place with the same Evidence of Reason I proved That Mutual-Consciousness could not be the Ground or Reason of the Unity or Coalescence of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Divine Nature and all this upon known allowed Principles of Philosophy as well as Divinity And so I Naturally went on to the examination of that monstrous Assertion of his by which he holds and affirms the Three Divine Persons to be