although we daily see their Effects And that because of the Distance and Remoteness of some and the Minuteness of others and therefore we cannot come to a scientifical Knowledge in Natural Things much less to that of Spiritual Beings of which we have only some few and superficial Ideas 3. Want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have Because the Mechanical Affections of Bodies have no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any sort of Body and any Perception of any Colour or Smell which we find in our Minds And so the Operations of our Minds upon our Bodies are unconceiveable by us And the Coherence and Continuity of Parts of Matter and the original Rules and Communication of Motion are such as we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have 4. Want of finding out such intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another And this for want of due Application of Mind in acquiring examining and due comparing those Ideas and by ill use of Words which have so much perplexed and confounded Mens understanding 2. You own the many Failings in our Reason By which you understand two Faculties in our Minds viz. Sagacity and Illation the one finding out and the other ordering the intermediate Ideas so as to discover the Connexion between them But Reason you say fails where our Ideas fail us and because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of our Ideas both as to Matter and our own Minds and the Divine Operations and for want of intermediate Ideas and by proceeding upon false Principles and dubious Expressions 3. As to Propositions you own these things 1. Those are according to Reason whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable 2. Those are above Reason whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles 3. Those are contrary to Reason which are inconsistent with or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas 4. As to Faith and Divine Revelation you own 1. That Faith is the Assent to any proposition not thus made out by deductions of Reason but upon the Credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation 2. That things above Reason and not contrary to it are properly Matters of Faith and to be assented to on the Authority of Divine Revelation Thus far I have endeavoured with all possible Brevity and Clearness to lay down your Sense about this matter By which it is sufficiently proved that I had reason to say that your Notions were carried beyond your Intention But you still seem concerned that I quote your Words although I declare that they were used to other purposes than you intended them I do confess to you that the Reason of it was that I found your Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon and that he had nothing which look'd like Reason if that Principle were removed which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold And so I suppose the Reason of my mentioning your words so often is no longer a Riddle to you I now proceed to other particulars of your Vindication Among other Arguments against this Principle of Certainty I instanced in the Being of Spiritual Substances within our selves from the Operations of our Minds which we do perceive by Reflection as Thinking Doubting Considering c. This Argument I yielded to be very good but that which I urged from thence was that it could not be from those simple Ideas of the Operations of the Mind because you had affirmed that it is impossible for us by the Contemplation of our Ideas to be certain without Revelation that a material Substance cannot think This is a point in my apprehension of great consequence and therefore I must more strictly examine what you say in answer to it Which is That thinking is inconsistent with the Idea of Self Subsistence and therefore hath a necessary Connexion with a Support or Subject of Inhesion i. e. If there be Thinking there must be something that Thinks But the question is Whether that something be a Material or Immaterial Substance But this Thinking Substance is in your Sense a Spirit The question I put is Whether Matter can think or not If not then the Substance which thinks must be Immaterial if it can think then there can be no evidence from the Idea of Thinking to prove the Substance which thinks to be Immaterial This I take to be plain Reasoning which you must allow because it is about the Agreement or Disagreement of two simple Ideas viz. Matter and Thinking But you say That the general Idea of Substance being the same every-where the Modification of Thinking or the Power of Thinking joyned to it makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modification it has as whether it has the Modification of Solidity or not As on the other side Substance which hath the Modification of Solidity is Matter whether it has the Modification of Thinking or not And therefore if I mean by a Spiritual an Immaterial Substance you grant that you have not proved nor upon your Principles can it be demonstratively proved that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks I have thus set down your own Words that you may not complain I have done you Injury But when you put in demonstratively proved I suppose you mean in the way of Certainty by Ideas for concerning that our dispute is And therefore when you add That you expect that I should conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy you must give me leave to say this is going off from the business before us which is about your Principles of Certainty from Ideas for it was only to that purpose that I brought this argument to prove that we cannot from our Ideas be certain of one of the points of greatest importance viz. that there is a Spiritual Substance within us and yet the operations of our Mind are made one of the Sources of those simple Ideas which are made by you the Foundation of Knowledge and Certainty So that the point before us is whether this Assertion of yours That the Power of Thinking may belong to modified Matter doth not overthrow your Certainty by Ideas No say you that which you are certain of by the Idea is only That there is in us a Spiritual Substance and that you say implies no more than a Thinking Substance i. e. that by Thinking you can prove you have a Power of Thinking which I believe may be demonstratively proved But I pray Sir consider how this question arose it was from your distinguishing Spiritual and Corporeal Substances from
your own Concessions For if the ground of Certainty be resolved into the Agreement and Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition is it not natural enough from hence to infer that from whencesoever this Proposition comes I must judge of it by the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it You make a Distinction between the Certainty of Truth and the Certainty of Knowledge The former you say Is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for and the latter When we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition But our question about Certainty must relate to what we perceive and the means we have to judge of the Truth and Falshood of Things as they are expressed to us which you tell us Is by the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas in the Proposition And in another place Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is certain Knowledge and when-ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the Reality of Things there is certain real Knowledge and then conclude I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty real Certainty consists which what-ever it was to others was I confess to me heretofore one of those Desiderata which I found great want of So that here is plainly a new Method of Certainty owned and that placed in the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas But the Author already mention'd professes to go upon the same grounds and therefore it was necessary for me to examine them He saith That the simple and distinct Ideas we receive by Sensation and Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning and that our Knowledge is in Effect nothing else but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas And that where our Perception is not immediate our Certainty comes from the clear and visible Connexion of Ideas For he saith That if the Connexion of all the intermediate Ideas be not indubitable we can have no Certainty Wherein now do his grounds of Certainty differ from yours But he applies them to other Purposes I grant he doth so and that was it which I had said for your Vindication But the question now is whether your general expression had not given him too much occasion for it It is true that Ch 3. he distinguishes the means of Information from the ground of Perswasion and he reckons all Authority Divine as well as Human among the means of Information and the ground of Perswasion he makes to be nothing but Evidence and this Evidence he saith lies in our Ideas Ch. 4. in the Agreement or Disagreement of them p. 19. and he places Certainty in our clear Perceptions of this Agreement or Disagreement which you call clear and visible Connexion of Ideas And wherein then lies the difference as to the grounds of Certainty But his design is to overthrow the Mysteries of Faith This is too true But upon what grounds Is it not upon this Principle that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition Now let the Proposition come to us either by Human or Divine Authority If our Certainty depends upon this we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it and so he thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions upon your grounds of Certainty But you say you own the infallible Truth of the Scriptures and that where you want the Evidence of Things there is ground enough for you to believe because God hath said it I do verily believe you because I have a far greater Opinion of your Sincerity and Integrity than I see reason for as to the other Person who pretends mightily to own the Authority of Scripture at the same time when he undermines it For his Words are The Authority of God or Divine Revelation is the Manifestation of Truth by Truth it self to whom it is impossible to lye p. 16. But when he comes to state the point how far we are to believe upon Divine Revelation he hath these Words Sect. 2. ch 1. n. 10. The natural Result of what hath been said is That to believe the Divinity of Scripture or the Sense of any Passage thereof without rational Proofs and an evident Consistency is a blameable Credulity and a temerarian Opinion ordinarily grounded upon an ignorant and wilfull Disposition And in the next Chapter he saith That Revelation is not a necessitating Motive but a mean of Information Not the bare Authority of him that speaks but the clear Conception I form of what he says is the ground of my Perswasion And again Whoever reveals any thing his words must be intelligible and the matter possible This rule holds good let God or Man be the Revealer As for unintelligible Relations we can no more believe them from the Revelation of God than from that of Man Sect. 2. ch 2. n. 16. p. 42. But what are all these things to you who own That where you want the Evidence of things the Authority of Revelation is ground enough for you to believe I do not impute them to you but I must say that he alledges no ground for his sayings but your ground of Certainty For in the same Page he saith That the conceived Ideas of things are the only subjects of Believing Denying Approving and every other act of the understanding All the difference we see is that he applies that to Propositions in Scripture which you affirm'd of Propositions in general viz. that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in them But I shall do you all the Right I can as to this matter by shewing what Reason I had to say that your Notions were turn'd to other purposes than you intended them and that I shall make appear from several passages in the same Book 1. You own the great Defects of Humane Knowledge notwithstanding the simple Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection And from these things 1. The Paucity and Imperfection of our Ideas in general because our Sensation and Reflection goes so little a way in respect of the vast extent of the Universe and the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Creator of it So that what we see in the intellectual and sensible World holds no proportion to what we see not and whatever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest 2. The want of Ideas which we are capable of because although we have Ideas in general of Bulk Figure and Motion yet we are to seek as to the particulars of them in the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe
To be moved only by Impulse from another Body and from the free Determination of our own Thoughts are two Ideas as disagreeing with each other as we can well imagine But if Matter may Think it may have Liberty too because you join these together but if it be uncapable of Liberty which goes along with Thinking how can you imagine it should be capable of Thinking I argue from your Notion of Personal Indentity which you place in self Consciousness For you tell us That a Person is a thinking intelligent Being that has Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that Consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and seems to you essential to it From whence it follows that if there can be no Self-consciousness in Matter then it cannot think because it wants that which you say is Essential to it It being impossible for any one to perceive but he must perceive that he doth perceive But what is there like Self-consciousness in Matter Or how is it possible to apprehend that meer Body should perceive that it doth perceive For Bodies you say operate only by Impulse and Motion i. e. one Body upon another But how can a Body operate upon it self without Motion Those you call the Secondary Qualities of Bodies are only you say the effect of the Powers in some Bodies upon others endued with Sense and Perception So that the effects of these Powers in Bodies or of the Primary Qualities of Bulk Site Figure Motion c. is not upon themselves but upon other Bodies either by changing those Primary Qualities in them by different Site Figure Motion c. or producing those Effects in us or which we call Sensible Qualities But either of these ways there is no possibility for Matter to operate upon it self in a way of Self-consciousness If then every intelligent thinking Being have this so inseparably belonging to it that you say It is impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he doth perceive and it be impossible from the Idea of Matter to make out that a meer Body can perceive that it doth perceive I think it is more than probable in the way of Ideas that Matter cannot think 5. I argue from the power of Abstracting which you make proper to a thinking Substance This is done say you by considering Ideas in the Mind as separate from the Circumstances of Time and Place And this power of abstracting you add puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to You tell me That you did not say the chief Excellency of Mankind lies chiefly or any ways in this that Brutes cannot abstract for Brutes not being able to do any thing cannot be any Excellency of Mankind But I hope it is the Excellency of Mankind that they are able to do what the Brutes cannot And you say This puts a perfect distinction between Man and Brutes and I had thought in comparing Man and Brutes that which put a perfect Distinction was the chief Excellency with respect to them But let that be as it will the thing I insist upon is the power of Abstracting following that of Thinking so closely that you utterly deny it to Brutes but if it may be in the power of Matter to think how comes it to be so impossible for such Organized Bodies as the Brutes have to inlarge their Ideas by Abstraction Pomponatius thinks to avoid the Argument from Abstraction to prove the Souls Imateriality by saying That in the most abstract Speculation the Mind rests upon Particulars Vniversale in singulari speculatur But this doth not reach the force of the Argument which is not whether the Mind hath not an Eye to Particulars when it forms Universal Notions but whether the power of forming such Abstract Ideas from Particulars do not argue a Power which meer Matter can never attain to And all that Philosopher hath said doth not amount to the least Proof of it 6. Lastly I argue from the Reason you give why God must be an Immaterial Substance For these are the words in your Letter And the Idea of an Eternal actual knowing Being is perceived to have a Connection with the Idea of Immateriality by the Intervention of the Idea of Matter and of its actual Division Divisibility and Want of Perception c. Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial and this is drawn from the Idea and Essential Properties of Matter and if it be so Essential to it that from thence you concluded God must be an Immaterial Substance I think the same Reason will hold as to any thinking Substance Because the Argument is not drawn from any thing peculiar to the Divine Perfections but from the general Idea of Matter But after all you tell me That God being Omnipotent may give to a System of very subtil matter Sense and Motion Your words before were a Power to perceive or think and about that all our debate runs and here again you say That the Power of Thinking joined to Matter makes it a Spiritual Substance But as to your Argument from God s Omnipotency I answer That this comes to the same Debate we had with the Papists about the Possibility of Transubstantiation For they never imagin'd that a Body could be present after the manner of a Spirit in an ordinary way but that by God's Omnipotent Power it might be made so but our Answer to them was That God doth not change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their own Nature And that it was as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit as for a Body and Spirit to be the same The same we say in this Case We do not set bounds to God's Omnipotency For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance but we say that while he continues the Essential Properties of Things it is as impossible for Matter to think as for a Body by Transubstantiation to be present after the manner of a Spirit and we are as certain of one as we are of the other These things I thought necessary on this occasion to be cleared because I look on a mistake herein to be of dangerous Consequence as to the great Ends of Religion and Morality which you think may be secured although the Soul be allowed to be a Material Substance but I am of a very different Opinion For if God doth not change the Essential Properties of things their Nature remaining then either it is impossible for a Material Substance to think or it must be asserted that a Power of thinking is within the Essential Properties of Matter and so thinking will be such a Mode of Matter as Spinoza hath made