Perception More intire for here again we have the prospect lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent whereas in the other it opens gradually and successively the Light stealing in upon us more and more as we go further and further as it does upon Men that travel toward the East To which may be further added that Intuitive Knowledge supposes and proceeds from perfection of the Understanding whose Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear For it must be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas themselves Whereas Demonstrative Knowledge and the necesslty of Reasoning in order to it is founded upon the narrowness of our Intellectual Capacities which not being able to perceive the Truth or Falshood of a Proposition by the single collation of the two Ideas that compose it are fain to make use of a third as a common measure between them and so from the consideration of something more clear and better known to proceed in the search of what is more obscure and less known Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the most Perfect Beings God and Angels Though as to Angels I make no great doubt but that in the Consideration of very compounded Questions and such as include a multiplicity of Relations they are fain to use Reasoning as well as we as in the more simple ones we use Intuition as well as they though perhaps after a much more perfect manner and by such compendious and facilitating Rules as we know nothing of And as they may be supposed when they do reason to reason better and more expeditely than we so with equal probability it may be presumed considering the great disproportion of Natures and States between us that they use Intuition in very many things wherein we are forc'd to have recourse to Reasoning 21. Hereafter indeed when as the Scripture tells us all that is imperfect about us shall be done away and we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only like but equal to the Angels we shall be able to see 't is to be hoped by Intuition too and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of but thought impossible things that were not only above our Reason but as we thought contrary to it We shall not only be able to reason better than we do now but shall in most things not stand in need of any Reasoning at all but shall with one simple View glance over and through the Relations of Ideas and so have an intire prospect of the fair Field of Truth But at present we must travel it over and that with many a weary step there being but very few things that we know by Intuition no more than just to give us a taste of the great Priviledge of Heaven and to incourage both our Desires and our Hopes of that perfect State when we shall be so far from needing any Logic to direct us in our reasoning that we shall have in comparison but little need or use even of Reason it self But in this present state of our Nonage and Infirmity our Necessity of it is very great For our Intuition is so short-sighted and reaches so very little a way that as if we knew no more than what we can by this Means attain to the Compass of our Knowledge would be so very Scanty that we should not have near light enough to direct us in our journey through the World So if we would Know more and see to a further distance from us we must assist our Feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glass Now Reason is this Glass Naturally indeed a very good Prospective but which Logic and especially Algebra has improved into a Telescope But yet still 't is but an Artificial way of seeing and all Art supposes and argues a Defect in Nature And though it be a great help yet we know 't is no very great Commendation to a man's eye-sight to see with Spectacles 22. And why then are we Proud And why proud of that which should rather deject us and make us Humble of our Imperfections and our Defects Our Natural Reason is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men and both together give us but little Light and help us to see but a very little way off and that after the most imperfect and defective Manner such as upbraids our Ignorance at the very same time that it increases our Knowledge our Reason not so much inlightning as betraying the Darkness of our Understandings Some few things indeed we know as Angels do by Intuition or else we could not so much as reason like Men but still the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Rational and Demonstrative kind and we are fain to use Clues and Chains to Conduct our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth to proceed in a Train from one thing to another to walk step by step and feel out our way with wariness and Caution like Men that go in the Dark And such indeed is our state in this Body and in this World 'T is now a kind of Night with us as having for the Most part only the Lesser Light Reason for our Difection As for the Greater Intâ—ition we have little more of that than of the refracted Beams of the Sun a little before its rising and after its setting enough to make a Twilight a Mixture of Light and Darkness but such a Mixture as is very unequal Darkness making the far greater part of the Composition And is not this Consideration sufficient if there were nothing else to take down our Pride and inspire us with a Sentiment of the profoundest Humility and Self-dejection If not let us Consider that even this Lesser Light that is to govern our present Night and Darkness does oftentimes fail us and suffer an Eclipse Let us Consider that we have a darker side yet and are subject to a Much lower Dispensation There being many things and those of the highest Nature and greatest importance wherein our Reason is utterly at a loss and cannot help us out and with respect to which being destitute of Sight we must be Content to walk altogether by Faith Concerning which in the following Chapter CHAP. II. Of Faith 1. FAith is a Term of great Ambiguity as well as Reason but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings I shall only define in what sense I here take it and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is requisite to the Present Design 2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith but for the Act or Habit of Faith and that not Ethically consider'd as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity Fidelity Honesty and the like but Logically as it signifies a certain Assent Judgement or
a desperate Argument when there is nothing else to be said for it 2. Which of these is the Evasion either the denying or the allowing this Distinction will best appear by the Examination of it which besides its Serviceableness to our Clearer proceeding in what we are now upon I am the rather induced to undertake because as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject there are divers that employ this Distinction few that have attempted to explain it and none that has taken care to justifie it Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written professedly about it and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curiosity and Importance should be so little Consider'd though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good and there is no reason why we should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Excellent Person has Meditated concerning it with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think necessary and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Conceptions hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd and that nothing of any Consequence will be overlook'd that belongs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd and almost Virgin Subject 3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Account He proposes in general two things 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be understood 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction but grounded upon the Nature of things As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propositions as Mere Reason that is unassisted by Revelation would never have discover'd to us whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undiscoverable by mere Reason but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle or to some Conclusion of right Reason 4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave and with due deference to his high Character remarque that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Reason as they use the Phrase in this Distinction opposing it to Contrary to Reason For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Reason to which we reply that they are not Contrary to Reason but only Above it They cry out that this is no Distinction but a mere Shift and Evasion pretending that the I arts of it fall in together and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it and therefore not to be believ'd Now 't is most plain that both they that use this Distinction and they against whom it is used do not Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it For besides that to mean that our Mysteries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason it is also too little a thing to intend by Mystery since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a sufficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation it can be none now after they are reveal'd And therefore if we say of these Mysteries now that they are above Reason we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undiscoverableness And 't is as plain that that our Adversaries do not so understand us For they deny that things above Reason are to be believ'd and that because according to them above Reason and contrary to Reason are all one But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibility of things above Reason as that signifies only undiscoverable by Reason alone much less would he say that what is above Reason in that Sense is also contrary to it No without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction and the Mysteries if they may be so call'd that are built upon it But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense any more than we 5. Instead therefore of saying undiscoverable he should have said incomprehensible by Reason Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction things Contrary to Reason by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repugnant c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do not understand even when discover'd and not such as we are not able only to Discover since otherwise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable which in my judgment ought to be expung'd as the Production of the first Mistake 6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea To which the Man is supposed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bottom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them he would easily acknowledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good But if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes but contrary to their Informations and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect but false and delusory and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit 7. Now I not only allow this Comparison but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate even to the Sense the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it which certainly would make the Comparison
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
quickly see the Regularity of the most uneven and odd-figured Parts and how wonderfully they conspired like the Flats and Sharps of Musick to the Order and Harmony of that excellent and surprizing Beauty that results from them But being not able to reach this we are not competent Judges of the rest which by the way should repress our forwardness to fit in Judgment upon things so far above the Cognizance of our Court and though we know the Measures of God to be all Wise Good Just and Holy yet this is only an implicit Knowledge founded upon an External Evidence only much after the same manner as it is in Faith even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfection without any clear and immediate discernment of the Internal Connexion that is between the things themselves We believe 't is all well and right because the Infinitely Wise God sits at the Helm but then again because he is so Infinitely Wise we cannot found the Depths of his Wisdom as indeed it would be very strange if an Infinitely Wise Agent should not be able to do things Wisely and yet beyond our Understanding nor reconcile all his particular proceedings to the Laws of Reason and Equity but the more we study about these things the more we are at a loss the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it till at last we find our selves obliged to cry out with the most inspired Apostle O the Depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God how unsearchable are his Iudgments and his Ways past finding out And all for want of an Intire and Comprehensive View of them For if the Knowledge of some very Compounded Truths be impossible without the Clear Perception of the Simple Principles upon which they depend and a Man would to no purpose beat his Brains about the Consideration of Conical Sections till he has first well possessed himself of Ordinary Geometry how much less then may we conclude are the Intricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simultaneous Idea of the Universal Systeme whereof they are parts to which they relate and from their Concentricity with which they receive all their Order and Beauty but which is in a manner lost to us for want of Compass enough in our Prospect By which single Instance it appears among many others that might have been given how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may disable us from Comprehending many Particular Truths and consequently that the same Infinity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent must also hinder us as much from being able to comprehend every Particular Truth So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehensible by us and consequently Human Reason is not Commensurate to all Truth not only as Collectively but even as Distributively Consider'd And therefore not as Distributively because not as Collectively 22. But then to raise our Speculation a little higher I consider yet further that the Infinity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Extent but also an Infinity of Nature that is that the Compass of Truth is not only Boundless and illimited and that it has in it an inexhaustible Spring which like the Source of Light is never to be drawn dry by the most thirsty draught of the whole Intellectual World but also that there are Particular Truths of a Nature truely infinite and by consequence incomprehensible to any Understanding that is not so For we are here to recollect what has been already shewn that Truth is Consubstantial and Coessential with God and with the Divine Ideas Now though these Ideas are all equally of the Essence and Nature of God and so far equally Divine it being impossible that there should be any thing in God that is not God yet there is this general and very remarkable Difference between them that some of these Divine Ideas are Absolute and some Relative That is some are of the Essence of God Simply and Absolutely as He is in Himself without any Relation to any thing out of Himself And others again are of the Essence of God consider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in Act or in Possibility and only so far forth as the Divine Essence is representative of Creatures Or if you will thus We may consider a twofold Being in Ideas Esse Reale and Esse Ideale or Repraesentativum Some Ideas are Divine not only according to their Esse Reale for so they are all but also according to their Esse Repraesentativum as representing God to the Mind that Contemplates them Others again are Divine only according to their Esse Reale being indeed of the Substance of God but not representing him but his Creatures and so are Divine in the same sense as the Idea of a Body is Spiritual viz. Essentially only not Representatively Which Diversity indeed resolves into the former because they are of the Essence of God not as it is absolutely in itself but only as it is representative of Creatures according to such a certain Modality and Limitation of Perfection And accordingly though they are truly Divine Ideas as well as the other yet they are not said to be Ideas of God as not representing him but his Creatures The short is The Essence of God may be consider'd either as it is absolutely in it self according to its Infinite Simplicity or as it is in relation to and representative of things without either of an Actual or of a Possible Existence And so the Ideas or Essential Perfections of God are of two sorts Either such as are of the Essence of God consider'd in the first sense as it is in it self or else such as are of the same Divine Essence only in the second sense as far forth as that Essence is representative of things out of it self upon which by the way I suppose must be grounded if we will resolve things into their last Principle the common distinction of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunicable The Incommunicable Attributes of God being those Perfections that are of the Divine Essence Simply and Absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and the Communicable those that belong to the Divine Essence Relatively consider'd and as representative of Creatures to whom accordingly they are in their Measure truly applicable whereas the former are not but are peculiar to God alone which sufficiently shews the difference between this double order of Divine Ideas But to make it yet more intelligible by an Instance The Idea of the Divine Immensity or that Perfection in God which we call his Immensity is of the Essence of God according to the first sense as it is simply and absolutely in it self being no other than the Substance of God as it is universally diffused intirely present in and filling all places without being circumscribed by any yet without any Local Extension But now the
that knows no bottom 25. I use a little Figure and Imagery here the better to impress this upon the Imagination of those who are not so well habituated to the Conception of things by Pure Intellection but the thing it self needs none of the advantages of the Metaphorical way being strictly and severely true And by these two Instances it may appear what a vast difference there is between these two sorts of the Divine Ideas the Absolute and the Relative those that are of the Essence of God as in himself and those that are of the same Divine Essence as it is in relation to Creatures The First Infinite and Incomprehensible the Second Finite and Comprehensible For you see here the Idea of Extension is clear and distinct and such as we can fully and adequately Conceive but the Idea of the Divine Immensity has nothing clear and distinct in it but is all over Darkness and Obscurity and such as quite astonishes and confounds us with a Thousand difficulties upon the first application of our Thoughts to it as indeed do all the Absolute Attributes and Perfections of God which are all equally Infinite and equally incomprehensible to Finite Spirits however they may be able to Comprehend that which in the Essence of God is representative of and carries a Relation to those Realities which either actually do or possibly may exist out of it And in this I say no more setting aside only the Rationale of the thing than those who tell us that the Incommunicable Attributes of God are Infinite and Incomprehensible They are so But what is it that makes them Infinite and Incomprehensible Even the same that makes them Incommunicable viz. their being of the Essence of God as it is in it self according to its Absolute Simplicity and not as it is in Relation to Creatures For 't is most evident that the Essence of God as it is simply and Absolutely in it self is every way Infinite and Incomprehensible and therefore all those Ideas and Perfections of his which are in this Absolute Sense Essential to him must be also of an alike Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature Which by the way may serve to Silence the presumptuous Cavils of those who draw Objections against the Existence of God from the incomprehensibility of his Attributes since if there be a God he must have incomprehensible Attributes which unless we ascribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him 26. But to resume our Point we see then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Prospect of Infinite and Incomprehensible Truths even of a Compass as large as the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence For though all Created things are of a Finite Nature and though even the Divine Ideas that represent them as far as representative of them must fall under the same limited Consideration yet those Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God that have no such external Reference but are of the Divine Essence as it is in its pure simple abstracted Self must necessarily partake of the Divine Infinity and be as unbounded as God himself And since Truth as was before observ'd is Coessential and Consubstantial with the Divine Ideas I further Conclude that though those Truths which regard the Actualities and Existencies of things or if you please things that do actually exist be Finite because the things themselves are so and though even those that regard the Divine Ideas themselves are also Finite supposing the Ideas to be of the inferiour Order such as are of the Divine Essence only as it is representative of and in relation to Creatures yet those Truths which respect those Divine Ideas of the Superiour Order that are of the Absolute Essence of God as it is in it self purely and simply Consider'd and so are not only Essentially but even Representatively Divine as truly representing God and being in a strict and proper sense his Ideas I say the Truths of this Order and Character must necessarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Creatures yea above all other Ideal Truths even as far as what is of the Simple and Absolute Essence of God transcends that which in the same Essence is only Relative to things without and can therefore be no less than Infinite We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths even allthose which regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God These Divine Ideas and Perfections are all Infinite as that Glorious Essence whose Ideas they are and whom they represent and so also are the Sublime Truths which result from them They are of a Nature strictly Infinite and if Infinite then by Consequence Incomprehensible I mean to all understandings that are not so For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough to represent Infinite so neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Comprehend it For as the actual knowledge of any intelligent Being can never exceed its intellectual Power so neither can its Power exceed the measure of its Essence A Finite Being therefore must have a Finite Understanding and a Finite Understanding must have a Finite Perception Since then our Understandings are Finite 't is plain that our Perception of Infinite must also be Finite 'T is true indeed that Objective Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits and so we may be said in some respect to have an Infinite Thought as far as the Operation of the Mind may be denominated from the quality of the Object but yet still we think according to the Measure of our Nature and our Perception of Infinite can be no more at the most than Finite But now a Finite Perception bears no proportion to an Infinite Intelligible besides that to perceive such an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is but only Partially and inadequately But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be said to be a Comprehension of that thing even though the thing be Finite much less then when it is Infinite Whereby it plainly appears that if there be an Order of Infinite Truths the same will also be Incomprehensible Ones and since again as I have shewn there is an Order of such Truths even all those that regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence it clearly follows that there is an Order of Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth even Distributively consider'd since there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend which was the thing to be proved 27. And of all this we may have a plain and visible illustration in the foremention'd Instance of the Divine Immensity This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely Insinite as being of his Divine Essence as it is Absolutely in it self and not as in Order to or representative of Creatures And as Infinite 't is also Incomprehensible by any but God himself Accordingly the Complex Truth that
against their being so Reveal'd supposing the plain obvious and literal Construction of the Words does naturally and directly lead to such a Sense And that it does so is not I think offer'd to be denied and the thing it self is plain enough to extort an acknowledgement but then 't is pretended that there is a Necessity of having recourse to a different Construction and to understand the words in another Sense because of the unconceivableness and incomprehensibleness of that which their proper and Grammatical Scheme does Exhibit But by the Tenour of this whole Discourse it evidently appears that there is no such Necessity since to admit an incomprehensible Sense has nothing absurd or inconvenient in it and that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it From whence it plainly follows that 't is no more an Objection against its being Reveal'd than 't is an Objection against the Belief of it supposing it were Reveal'd there being nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reasonable Obstruction against either 5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and most Natural Sense and not seek out for Forc'd and Strain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehensibility of that which is apparently Genuin and Natural And if the Revelation be otherwise plain and such as we would accept of in another Case and about matters which we can well Comprehend we ought not to think it the less so because the Sense of it so understood is such as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehensions and Conceptions of things For notwithstanding that it may be true since by this time we may be sufficiently satisfied that there are many Incomprehensible Truths The Incomprehensibility of a thing is therefore no Argument against its being Reveal'd any more than 't is against the Belief of it supposing it were Which opens an immediate Entrance to the Christians Mysteries which I doubt not would be thought sufficiently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehensibility of them the only Objection that can be pretended against their Revelation 6. I have hitherto argued upon the Supposition that the Mysteries of Christianity those Doctrines I mean that are so call'd are above Reason and such as do transcend our Comprehension and have shewn that even upon that Supposition there is no reasonable Objection against the Belief of them that they are never the less Believable for their being Incomprehensible But what if I should recall this Concession and put our Adversaries to the proof that they are indeed above Human Reason and Comprehension They cannot be ignorant that there are those that Contend they are not and with great shew of reason offer to prove it by endeavouring to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account of them If these Men should be in the right which I do not think necessary at present to inquire into it would be a further Advantage to our Cause and such as though I do not now insist upon it I need not lose the Benefit of But if it should prove that they are not in the right the Cause of our Christian Mysteries is not much Concern'd in the loss of that Pillar but can support it self well enough without it as having another that is sufficient to bear its weight since though we should suppose these Sacred Doctrines to be never so Incomprehensible to our Reason it does by no Consequence follow as from the Argument of this whole Discourse is apparent that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith 7. Should any one now be so fond of Objection as to draw one against the Mysteries of Christianity from the use of the Word Mystery in Scripture which knows no other Mysteries but such as before the Revelation of them were undiscover'd not Considering whether they were in themselves Conceivable or no I must tell him that I do not know that ever I met in any Controversie with a less pertinent Objection as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer who heaps together a great many Texts to shew the signification of the Word Mystery in the New Testament that it signifies not things in themselves inconceivable but only such as were not known before they were Reveal'd Well be it so as this Gentleman pretends though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwise yet what is this to the purpose For do we Dispute about Names or Things The Question is not whether the Scripture expresses inconceivable things by the Name of Mysteries but whether there be not things in Scripture above our Conception call them by what Name you will and if there be whether their being so above our Conception be an Argument why they should not be Believ'd Now to these inconceivable things it has been the Common Use of Church-Writers to apply the Name of Mysteries which if the thing be granted he must be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will Contend about it But the Learned Bishop of Worcester has already prevented me in the Consideration of this Objection for which reason together with the Frivolousness of it I shall pursue it no further CHAP. X. The Conclusion of the whole with an Address to the Socinians 1. AND thus I have led my Reader through a long Course of Various Reasoning and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me though I hope his Journey has not been without some Pleasure that may deceive and some Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it I have shewn him what Reason is and what Faith is that so he may see from the Absolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another and how the Darkness and Obscurity of the Latter may Consist with the Light and Evidence of the Former I have also Consider'd the Distinction of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason and shewn it to be real and well-grounded and to have all that is requisite to a good Distinction And for the further Confirmation of it I have also shewn that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth From which Great Principle which I was the more willing to discourse at large and thoroughly to settle and establish because of its Moment and Consequence to the Concern in hand I have deduced that weighty Inference that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument of its not being true which Consequence for the greater Security of it because it is so Considerable in the present Controversie I have also proved Backwards by shewing that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then Human Reason contrary to what was before demonstrated would be the Measure of Truth Whence I infer again ex Absurdo that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true From this last Consequence I infer another of no less Moment and