of one question and Answer in the Catechism Dost thou not think that thou art bound to belâ—â—ve and do as they have promis'd for thee Ans Yes verily and by Gods help so I willâ— and I heartily thank our Heavenly Father that he hath called me to this state of Salvation throâ— Iesus Christ our Saviour Now a state of Salvation is certainly something moreâ— than a mere faederal Relation And I pray unto God to give me his grace that I may continue in the same to my Lifes end â—â—t this learned Author says â—hat all Caâ—â—châ—mens are not Converted oâ— Râ—generated and some by â—heir own faultâ— never will be but certainly it would be the greatest curse imaginable to teach a Child to pray that he may remain in a state of unregeneration The Reverend Dr. doth not take the least notice of this part of that Answer in his explication of it so that I do not certainly know what his particular sentiments are herein It is to on purpose to tell us that it is not easily conceiveable how Children can be regenerate in Baptism since the Scripture doth warrant it and the Church affirmâ— it perhaps it would be dfficult for them to explain the manner how adult Persons are Regenerate Iohn 3. 8. The wind bloweth where it listeth and thou hearest the sound thereof but thou knowest not whence it come thanâ— whether it goeth So is every one that is born of the Spirit But to return from this digression He urges further cuj tandem bono indulgebitur nobis illa naturalis lex c. Is it that there might be some previous dispositions in the Soul by degrees to dispose it to better obedience to its precepts Let us suppose this for once and see what Answer he returns unto it He tells us that these previous dispositions to virtue are things altogether as unintelligible as Aristotle's substantial forms which lye hid no body knows how in the bosom of the matter till at last they show themselves in their proper shapes But here he seemes again Eâdem Chord â— oberrare before heargu'd from supernatural things to Natural now he argues from Physical to things of a moral and more immaterial nature Aristotles substantial forms are unintelligible ergo the Law of Nature is so too for they are as like one annother as ever they can look for like as substantial forms lye hid in matter till they find or take occasion of coming out â—o these Natural principles do just the same in reference to the Soul This indeed is evident affirmation but I see little of proof in it There are indeed real difficulties and absurditys urg'd against substantial forms but I know none against these Natural notions in the sence before asserted All that seems to be materially objected against this natural inscription is that there is they say no need of it in order either to the knowledge of truth or obligation to duty these they say may be accounted for other ways But supposing this for once to be true but not granting it to be so this is no argument against what is here asserted viz Natural Inscription for what if God should afford us more ways in order to the coming to the knowledge of truth and goodness then we fancy to be absolutely necessary have we any reason to blame providence for it But he tells us Pa. 336. c. That the Soul doth make certain Aphorisms or generall Rules for the direction of humane Life Post maturam tandem experientiam After mature experience Such as these Honestum vitio ac libidini esse praeferendum c. Which afterwards he calls genealis norma de honesto apud homines stabilita But I would only ask him in what place and in what Age it was that Men thus generally met to determine and fix the Rules of right and wrong by a general consent For a further answer hereto I shall refer my Reader to my former discourse of humane naâ—ure Pa. 54. There is one thing more wherein this Gentleman seems to affect some kind of peculiarity tho' I think it is rather in expression than in notion That the Christian Religion especially as to the Dutys of it are no ways contrary to Natural reason but highly agreeable thereunto is certainly true and tends much to the honour and reputation of Christianity But then why we should so far strain the common sence and acceptation of the word Natural as to apply it to all the misteriâ—s and miracles of our Religion I do not understand We have sufficient reason from the nature of God and from Divine Revelation to believe all the instituted parts of Christianity but I know no reason why we should asâ—ert the Naturalness of em ' if I may so speak But he designs here to advance a seeming paradox pa. 263. Quoniam res videtur ardua firme inaudita pa. 248. grandia suscipimus cum omnes quâ—tquot vidimus sunt huic opinioni oppositi ut qui maximè He makes use indeed of a peculiar way of speaking but when he has explain'd what he means by it and in what sense he understands it the notion is common and ordinary per naturam intelligo rectam rationem usum morem hominum communem tandem traditionem receptam Pa 264. a very large acceptation of Nature If God has adapted some of his institutions either to the custom of former Ages or to the apprehensionâ— of Mankind we have so much more reason to acknowledg his condescension to our infirmitiesâ— but we have none from hence to call em ' Natural Pa. 271. nec communi usui aut rerum naturae adversantur seu miracula seu prophetiâ—â— Iesu Christi One might almost think here that he asserted Spinosa's opinion that miracles were not above nor contrary to Nature but his meaning is more innocent he only means that Miracles were pretended to by other Religions and that they were made use of by Christ in naturae restaurationem for the benefit of Mankind and the support of humane Nature Pa. 286. There he tells us that even Evangelical Faith it self doth no way interfere with his former Doctrine But his Reason seems very strange and not much for the honour of Christianity sed si nos ipsos consulamus comperiemus corda nostra spontè paâ—ere anilibus fabulis ut qui credulitati naturâ nostrâ obnoxij simus c. It were to be wish'd that Men would â—xpress common thoughts in a common and ordinary way But some Men think to gain to themselves the Reputation of great Notionalists by dressing up common and ordinary Notions in a new form of words thus seeming to speak something great and aboue the oâ—dinary pitch of other Men when many times there is vâ—ry little or nothing in their pompousâ— ways or speaking If the learned Author of the Catechetical Lectures hath in any other part of his Book which yet I have not met with explained the point before mentioned in a way
indeed nothing has a necessary connexion with nothing is certainly true but then it seems to border too near upon those Propositions which add no light to the understanding which bring no encrease to our knowledg that is trifleing Propositions P a. 307. of Eâ—say Mr. Norris blames Mr. Lock because he has not given us a just and real difinition of an Idea and may â—ot Mr. Lock blame Mr. Norris his difiâ—iâ—ion Pa. 30 of his reflexions upon Mr. Lock 's Essay when he tells us that an Idea is a partial representation of the Divine omniformity or the omniâ—orm Essence oâ— God partially represented eitâ—er as in it selfe unintelligible or as not so agreeable to the honour and dignity of the Divine â—ssence I could have wish'd that Mr. Lock had further explain'd what relation those opperations of the mind which he calls Ideas of reflexion have to the precedent impressions made upon the sense Pa. 44. § 24. That seems to suppose sensible impressions alwayes to preceed the reflexions of the mind But on the other hand Intuitive knowledge viz. of the existence of our Souls doth neither suppose nor is it self any operation of the mind about any sensible impressions going before Mr. Lock charg'd me with some kind of a inconsistency of expression in one place saying that the Soul exerted those notions in one another that they exerted themselves But t is a great sign that matter and Argument run low when Men thus meanly carp at words I hope I have sufficiently vindicated my self as to that particular but if I should follow the example of so great a Master and be thus severely critical it perhaps would be difficult for himself to avoid the like censures pa. 323. of his Essay § 14. 1 st Edit Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds what ever they are and produce generall certain pâ—opositions I dare not be over confident that I rightly understand the period but if this be the sense of it which seemes to be so that the ideas produce these generall certain propositions I humbly conceive it the more proper way of speaking to say that the Soul by the aids and assistance of these ideas produce those propositions than that the ideas themselves should do it I do not speak this as if there was here any just occasion of exception but only to show how easily men may be ill natur'd if they pleas'd I am sorry I have not the concurrence of Mr. Becconsall's opinion in this point too of innate notions I shall therefore briefly examine some passages of his relating to this subject first I do not well understand why he should grant the Law of nature to be innate or implanted in the minds of Men as he tells us Pa 2 d. That â—he Gentiles had a Law of action implanted in â—he very frame and Constitution of their Natures and Pa. 6. The Law of Nature is implanted in the minds of Men as rationall beings And yet at the same time to reject the Doctrine of innate inscriptions as he calls ' em Pa. 75. Whereas I humbly conceive that the Law of Nature is either the same with these naturall inscriptions or innate notions or the one so Founded in the other that they must both stand or fall together if by being implanted in the minds of Men he mean only a power or faculty in the Soul of collecting those truths by rational disquisitions then I think he has not done right neither to himself nor his Reader by so expressing it But he says Pa. 75. that the frame and order of things both within and without us with the exercise of our own facultys upon 'em will present us with a Scheme of moral duty and a true measure of action and that too as clearly as if it was imprinted upon the mind with the first lineaments of its being I do not deny the great use and advantage of our naturall faculties in order to that end that is to those whose circumstances are such that they have abilitys and opportunities to employ 'em so that is Christians may possibly do it but a great part of the Gentile world cannot But how does he prove that this Scheme of duty will thus be as clearly presented to us as if it was imprinted with the First lineaments of our beings This seemes to be barely asserted without proof Whereas the contrary seemes more probable that the double evidence of natural inscription and Rationall deduction would add to the cleareness of the thing And therefore he says There seemes to be no visible necessity for haveing recourse to innate ideas or inscriptions Those who assert innate inscriptions justly suppose themselves on the defensive part and they who write against 'em can challenge no other than that of opponents Now barely to plead the no necessity of a thing is no necessary argument against him who positively asserts the matter of fact that it is so for many things may be and are so of which perhaps there is no necessity that they should be so And this seemes sufficient to abate the force of the Argument If nothing further could be added for what if God has given us greater assistances than perhaps were absolutely necessary in a thing of so great concernment we have no reason to take it ill But then why may we not assert if not a necessity yet a great conveniency of these naturall notions viz. In respect of that part of the Gentile world who have neither ability nor inclination to make such profound disquisitions into the nature of Man and the reason of things as are necessary to attain to the naturall knowledge of duty And if Mr. Becconsall had more fully consider'd the Barbarous state of the greatest part of the Heathen World t is probable he would have found 'em subjects not capable of such rationall enquiry's as his way of Arguing supposes ' em But he goes on If innate ideas be serviceable to Mankind they must be so in order to supply the defects â—f reason and consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of reason These natural notions of truth and goodness are some of the greatest strokes wherein consists the Image of God imprinted upon the minds of Men in order to make them what they are rational and Religious now if this Learned Author or any else call this a supplying the defects of Reason I shall not much oppose it only I should rather call 'em the fundamental principles of all Reasoning And consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of Reason I do not understand the necessity of this consequence at all for how can these things be fit and proper aids to supply the defects of reason if they themselves cannot or dare not undergoe the most exact trialls and disquisâ—tions of reason He gives his reason in the following words For if innate ideas are to be examined and judged on by the working of reason What then We might have
we know all things for that intellectual Light which is in us is nothing else but a participated similitude of that increated Light in which the eternal Reasons are contain'd Now I do not see that this is any acknowledgment at all of our seeing all things in God in that way that Monsieur Malbranch and Mr. Norris explains it that the Soul knows all things that is universals wherin Aristot. did aâ—sert all Science truly so call'd to consist these things we know in their eternal Reasons but he adds by the participiation of which we know all things so that we do not see them under that formality as they arâ— in God but as by participiation these eternal Reasons are deriv'd to us for that intâ—llâ—ctual Light that is in us is nothing but a participated similitude of that inâ—reased Light in which the eternal Reasons are â—ontain'd that is originally in God but derivatively or by way oâ— participation in us so that I am perfectly of Aquinas's Opinion according to this Interpretation which whether it be more true in it sâ—lf or more â—ikely to be Aquinâ—s's mâ—aning is lâ—ft to the Reader to judge But if this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch be a truth it has the least appâ—arance of Truth of any in the whole World all our outward Sâ—nsâ—s give Tâ—stimony against it and our inward faculties do not in the least seem to favour it we compare Ideasâ— and disâ—ourse and draw consâ—quences from â—ormer Prâ—mâ—sâ—s just acâ—ording to the mâ—thoâ—s of the other Hypothesis but if it be said that after the use of all these means that notwithstanding we see and know all things in God one might be almost perswaded to think that either God would have made these means under the superintendence of his own Providence effectual to those ends they seem at least design'd for or else to use his own way of arguing would have made use of that more easie and simple way which he might have done by exhibiting or producing the knowledge of these thingâ— more immediately by himself without the concurrence of these outward means which are indeed nothing but useless and ineffectual Conditions Lastly As for the Scriptures he urges in favour of his Opinion I think they do not prove what they were intended for that all our knowledge is from God that he is the Father of Lights and teaâ—hes Man Wisdom that Christ is the true Light that enlightens every one â— c. No Body here denys this but the dispute is not so much about the thing it self as the manner of it that is whether all the Knowledge we arrive at here in this World be only by seeing all things in God accâ—râ—ing to his Hypothesis Monsieur Mâ—lbranch thought perhaâ—s it woulâ— be some â—dvantage to his câ—usâ— if he coulâ— procure it some countâ—nance frâ—m Scripture but when his quotations are so little to the purpose they serve only to create prejudices against it tâ—us others are apt to believe there is but little strength in the cause when Men are forâ—'d to use such inconclusive Arguments in the defence of it Norâ— do I think that those brought by Mr. Norris amount to any necessary Proof St. Iohn he says calls Christ the true Light that is the only Light but may not oâ—her subordinate Lights be also true Lights Is not the light of a Candle a true Light tho' it be inferiour to that of the Sun But however it will not hence follow but that this only true Light may have several ways and methods of giving light to the World besides that of seeing all things in God c. He cites also Io. 17. 17. Sanctifie them by thy Truth thy word is Truth which is not he says meant of the written word but of the substantial and eternal word as appears from the Context but I do not see how any Argument can be drawn from that place unless it be from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which yet doth not always signifie the substantial and eternal word of God but sometimes the preaching of the Gospel as appears from the 20th Verse for all those who shall believe in me through thâ—â—r word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by tâ—e prâ—acâ—iâ—g of the Gospel Laâ—â—ly The Apostle says exprâ—sly 1 Cor. 1. 30. of this divine Word that he is made unto us Wisdom which is exactly according to our Hypothesis that we see all things in the ideal World or divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pa. 222. of Reason and Religion but in answer to this 1. By Wisdom is not here meant natural but divine and evangelical Wisdom 2. The Apostle there speaks of Christ Jesus of Christ more especially as he is made known to us by the Gospel for he is there said to be made to us Righteousness Sanctification and Redemption as well as Wisdom but I suppose he will not say that we see our Sanctification or Redemption that is the ways and methods of these in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or â—deal World or any other ways than as they are reveal'd to us in Scripture 3. May not Christ be made to us Wisdom unless we see all things in the Ideal World I shall here only further observe what Theophylact says upon this place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. non dixit sapienâ—es nos fecit sed factus est nobis sapientia doni largitatem sc. ostendens perinde ac si dicat seipsum nobis tradidit I have now finish'd those short Remarks upon those two Subjects viz. the law of Fashion and innate Notions not only in answer to Mr. Lock but to some other Learned Persons also who seem to favour his Opinion in the second particular and now if any expression herein seems too harsh or not becoming the Character of such great and learned Men though I hope there is not yet if there be any such I do hereby wholly recall it I hope we are all pursuing the same general design viz. the search of Truth and if so then the detection of any error will but be the promoting of the same common end we all aim at for my part I shall think it so as to my self I would not have Mr. Lock think that pa. 88. I do there in the least insinuate that he held the materiality of God or that I went about to draw him into a Controversie wherâ—in he is nothing concern'd I do freely grant that he asserts the spirituality of the divine Essence in the most strict and proper Sense of it I was once in hopes that he was convinc'd of the Certainty of the Souls Immateriality too by what he said pa. 5th of his Answer to some remarks added to his reply to the Learned Bishop of Worcester but what his Opinion herein is at present I know not I shall here only propound these two things to Mr. Locks serious Consideration 1. Whether asserting the immateriality of the Soul be not a good Fence or stop against the inlet of that dangerous Opinion of the materiality of the diviâ—e Essence 2. Whether it be worthy of a Christian Philosopher to make a bâ—re poâ—â—â—biliâ—y the ground of his asserting things of this Nature for I think he is vâ—ry unfortunâ—â—e in his choice who happens upon sâ—câ—â—n Opinion in Philosophy that it is not poâ—â—â—ble for Omnipotence to make good I shall not here enter into that dispute whether Tully held the Soul to be material or immaterial yet this I think must be granted by all who attentively read and impartially consider his 1st Tusculan Question that whatever nature he held the Soul to be of he makes God to be the same But it is not so much to the purpose to consider what Opinions the Heathen Philosophers entertain'd in things of this Nature as what is worthy of a Christian Philosopher to think of ' em FINIS ERRATA PAge 5 Line the last for hunc read huic p. 12 Line 7 for appeâ—l r. appeal'd p. 15 l. 2. for watsoevâ—r r. whatsoever p. 20 l. 19 for concidere r. coincidere p. 24. l. 13 for quit r. quote p. 27 r. misled p. 38 l 15 for the r. that p. 39 l 18 for mâ—asurer r. measure p. 41 placâ— the Figure 199 200 l. 22 in the l. â—bove 21 p. 4 last line r. prevailing p 45 l 22 reâ—d Mâ—n's p. 48 l. 19 r. prâ—cede p. 54 l. 1 r. sepaâ—ation p. 62 l. 25 for moral r. natural p. 65. l. 4 r. God l. 17 r benignity p. 69 l. 13 r. convenient p. 72 l. 2 r. defendi possint p. 77 l 13 r. hankering p. 85 l 18 dele the second not p. 88. l 13 â—or made use of r. câ—â—ryed on p. 8 l. 27 dele the first And p. â—0 l 7 r â—pâ—curuâ—'â— p. â—5 l. 14 after those add to p. 98 l. 1â— r. other p. â—14 l. 6 r. assert p 116 l. 22 r. ingenuouâ— p 134 l. the last r. externâ—l p. 139 l. 5 r. as p. 140 l. the last r. virtutum p. 141 l. 14 dele much p. 154 l. 12 r. inveâ—tigatio p. 158 l 10 r. very p. 160 l 24 r. ante diluvian