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sense_n divine_a reason_n revelation_n 1,589 5 9.4988 5 false
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A48871 An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding; Essay concerning human understanding Locke, John, 1632-1704.; Wynne, John, 1667-1743. 1696 (1696) Wing L2735; ESTC R23044 115,066 330

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Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Th●s also holds in matters of Fact know●●le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no bo●y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be
urged or assented to as a matter of Faith wherein Reason has nothing to do Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to over-rule all our Opinions Prejudices and Interests and hath a right to be received with a full Assent Such a submission as this of our Reason to Faith takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge this shakes not the foundations of Reason but leaves us that use of our Faculties for which they were given us CHAP. XIX Of wrong Assent or Error ERROR is a mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that which is not true The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these Four First Want of Proofs Secondly Want of Ability to use them Thirdly Want of Will to use them Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability First Want of Proofs by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had but also of those Proofs which are in being or might be procured The greatest part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves or of collecting the Testimonies of others being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition whose Lives are worn out only in the provisions for living These Men are by the constitution of Humane Affairs unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build and which are necessary to establish those Opinions For having much to do to get the means of living they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries It is true that God has furnished Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take if they will but seriously employ them that way when their ordinary Vocations allow them leisure No Man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think on his Soul and inform himself in matters of Religion were Men as intent on this as they are on Things of lower concernment There are none so enslaved to the necessity of Life who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge Secondly Want of Ability to use them There be many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies These cannot discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie nor follow that which in it self is the most probable Opinion It is certain that there is a wide difference in Mens Understandings Apprehensions and Reasonings to a very great Latitude so that one may without doing injury to Mankind affirm that there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between some Men and some Beasts But how this comes about is a speculation thô of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose Thirdly For want of Will to use them Some thô they have opportunities and leisure enough and want neither Parts nor Learning nor other Helps are yet never the better for them and never come to the knowledge of several Truths that lie within their reach either upon the account of their hot pursuit of Pleasure constant Drudgery in Business Laziness and Oscitancy in general or a particular aversion for Books and Study and some out of Fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those Opinions which best suit their Prejudices Lives Designs Interests c. as many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts who have reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good posture How Men whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings can satisfie themselves with a lazy Ignorance I cannot tell But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of Knowledge I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest Contem●ers of Knowledge to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen that however they may think Credit Respect and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower condition who surpass them in Knowledge They who are blind will always be led by those that see or else fall into the Ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his Understanding Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability which are First Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident but doubtful and false taken for Principles Propositions looked on as Principles have so great an influence upon our Opinions that it is usually by them we judge of Truth and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for Probable with us that it will not be allowed Possible The reverence born to these Principles is so great that the Testimony nor only of other Men but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules The great obstinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions thô many times equally absurd in the various Religions of Mankind are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional Principles so that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes renounce the Evidence of their Senses and give their own Experience the Lye rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these Sacred Tenents Secondly Received Hypotheses The difference between these and the former is that those who proceed by these will admit of matter of Fact and agree with Dissenters in that but differ in assigning of Reasons and explaining the manner of Operation These are not at that open defiance with their Senses as the former they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently but will by no means admit of their Reports in the explanation of Things nor be prevailed on by Probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Thirdly Predominant Passions or Inclinations Let never so much Probability hang on one side of a Covetous Man's Reasoning and Mon●y on the other it is easie to foresee which will prevail Thô Men cannot always openly gain-say or resist the force of manifest Probabilities that make against them yet yield they not to the Argument Not but that it is the nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side but yet a Man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries and not permit a full and satisfactory