Selected quad for the lemma: sense_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
sense_n divine_a reason_n revelation_n 1,589 5 9.4988 5 false
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A25395 The morall law expounded ... that is, the long-expected, and much-desired worke of Bishop Andrewes upon the Ten commandments : being his lectures many yeares since in Pembroch-Hall Chappell, in Cambridge ... : whereunto is annexed nineteene sermons of his, upon prayer in generall, and upon the Lords prayer in particular : also seven sermons upon our Saviors tentations [sic] in the wildernesse. ... Andrewes, Lancelot, 1555-1626. 1642 (1642) Wing A3140; ESTC R9005 912,723 784

There are 2 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

ditches Deus antem habet viam suam regiam God hath his owne high way 2. Besides the goodnesse of wit paines are necessarily required and divers are commonly of such weake natures Gods way is so easie that aswel the weake ●s the strong may walke in it that they cannot take such paines Many also cannot intend such paines because their callings are not for it but are busied otherwise so that the most part should be excluded from this way But that way is inconvenient which lieth through many inconveniences 3. We see by daily experience before we come to Divinity how many yeeres we spend so that all who are cut off before they come to these yeeres should be debarred this felicity But God hath set downe his way a short way so that we need no more but believe assecuti sumus and we have attained Porphyri●s his objection against saith But they use to object one thing against faith which Porphyrie against the Christians of his time That it is a signe of simplicity to be too credulous and that was a stoppe to many at that time that they would not come to God by beleefe lest they should be misliked But the Philosopher can tell them that none is too credulous Nisi qui aut stulto The solution aut improbo credit but he that believeth either a foolish or a wicked man But these two necessarily are excluded from God Deus enim ipsa veritas falsum dicere non potest Deus ipsa prudentia neque fallere neque falli potest Ide● perfectae veritati perfecta sapientia perfectae honestati perfect a conjuncta est justitia nullus ergo incredulitati locus For God who is truth it selfe cannot lie God who is wisedome it selfe can neither deceive nor be deceived therefore to perfect truth is joyned perfect wisedome to perfect honour perfect justice no place therefore is left for incredulity That the way of beleefe is firme and grounded upon Gods Word ●s proved from foure effects Now that this way of beleeving is sure and that this whereon it is grounded is the Word of God though set forth by men it may appea●● by t●ese foure effects or circumstances as Origen against Celsus 1. healing of incurable diseases as leprosie dropsie palsie men possessed with foule spirits such as physicke durst never attempt to cure 2. They raised divers from death 3. They shooke the powers of Heaven 4. Simple and unskilfull men proved wonderfull and skilfull in one day of all tongues Therefore there must needs have beene in them a Divine power that wrought these things in them Therefore we see it in the certainety of the effect though not in the certainety of the cause Credulity more in reason then in faith This suspition of credulity is more in the way of reason then of beleefe three reasons 1. There being 288. sects of philosophy and every one having his reasons for his opinion therefore in that way there must needs be many crosse-waies Cum veritatis via sit simplex unica since the way of truth is simple and one therefore impossible it is that a man seeing such diversity of opinions should not be but in greatest uncertainty and doubt Adeóque in incredulitatem labatur vel maximam and so fall into great incredulity 2. Arist 1. Demonstr That there is no necessary thing without the mixtion of contingency in it therefore no absolute demonstration Therefore nothing but is subject both to knowledge and contingency ubi hoc where this is there is uncertainety Therefore nothing but may have diversity of opinions by reason of our memories and the confusion of our notions 3. And chiefely in cognoscendis primis causis In knowing the first causes they themselves confesse that they are in the darke both in respect of the object quia immaterialia because immateriall and in respect of the fountaine and cause of our knowledge quia principia rationis meae a sensibus ducuntur Deus coelestia sensibus non subjiciuntur The memory is able to reteine distinct notions because the principles of my reason are drawne from sence but God and divine things are not subject to sense as the Philosopher saies in his metaphysicks God is a thing above reason God above nature and sense Sense can give no rules of God and celestiall natures For our reasons and understanding are confounded illa autem simplicia inconfusa but they are simple and unconfounded Therefore we cannot come to him by reason therefore there must be some other way Now that it is necessary that there can be no other way then beleefe If they should take away beleefe Without beliefe no humane society there should be an overthrow of all things and so they should neither be friends to any nor any to them If any one were to report any thing to another that was not at the sight of that thing and he to whom this thing were reported should not beleeve them unlesse they brought their proofs for the least circumstance non adigeret eos ad insaniam would it not make them mad 2. August in his booke to Honoratus August cap. 10. de utilitate credendi of the utility of beleeving If one should come to me and say to me Augustine shew me the true way by reason then I say to him you come to me in dissimulation and hypocrisie not in any good meaning then will he protest his good meaning and bolster it out with words as much as he can Faith which they deny in words they prove by their acts then will I say I beleeve you yet you cannot perswade me by reason now therefore seeing you will have me to beleeve you in this is it not equity that you beleeve me seeing the profit of your beleefe doth not redound to me but to you 3. None of them all dare once call in question the words of a Prince and God being at least as good as a Prince ipsius verbo non credendum existimare quanta impietas to thinke hat this word is not to be beleeved what impiety 4. Arg. apertum manifestum de actu quem vocant patres explicito it is plaine and manifest concerning the act which the fathers call explicite There is none of them all but doth beleeve and ought to beleeve therefore the way of beleefe is not altogether to be rejected The necessity of beleeving There are certaine matters which are to be knowne that cannot be demonstrated by reason or sense c. but must necessarily be beleeved as wh●ther he whom he calleth his father be his father c. Istiusmodi quotidie creduntur quia ratio ea persuade●e non potest Such are daily beleeved because reason is not able to perswade them in these we can say no more but that we beleeve them Among which is the comming to a place We therefore making God the end of our journey must beleeve that he is Si
be by authority and that by Commandement Permission or by counsell provoking others to seeke after knowledge and to increase it in others as much as we can for our knowledge must be to helpe others for there are three uses of it First to teach them that are ignorant Secondly to resolve them that are in doubt and to strengthen them that waver Thirdly to comfort them that are in distresse and the afflicted conscience And thus much for knowledge which is the first duty of the minde Now perfect understanding bringeth in the second dutic of the minde that is Beliefe for fulnesse of knowledge is scire ut credas Beliefe so to know that thou mayst beleeve Beliefe addeth two things The first which is in John 6.69 the manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. we beleeve a ssuredly know that thou art Christ c. Secondly the measure that is the fulnesse of perswasion which in Ephes 3.12 is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 boldnesse And Heb. 10.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the full assurance of faith and it is often used in the translated sense To make it plainer there is in every proposition a double part a contradiction sometimes a man holdeth neither part because he seeth equall reasons may be brought on both sides and it is called doubting as Luke 12.29 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1. Dubitatio Doubting and seeke not ye what ye shall eate or what yeeshall drinke neither be ye of a doutfull minde or be ye not like Meteors puft up and ready to be carried away with every blast If he encline to one part yet so 2. Opinio Opinion as he feareth lest the reasons of the other part should convince him then it is an opinion as Acts 26.28 Agrippa was perswaded 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost to be a Christian 3. Scientia Knowledge but yet he rejected it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost thou perswadest me to be a Christian Gen. 45.27 3. When we fully consent to one part it is called knowledge beyond both the other an evidence and assurance of the true part Knowledge is in three manners First it is either of sense Secondly or by discourse of * * * Ratio why neither of the former knowledges bee so sure as the 3d. and that in faith there is choice made of this especially 1. in the knowledge by sense if the object be absent there is straight a knowledge by faith 2. in knowledge by discourse if the object bee of too great excellency straight comes in the knowledge by revelation reason Thirdly or by relation of other men and that is properly the knowledge of faith 1. Knowledge by sense such was the knowledge of Josephs brethren that had seene him in Aegypt and therefore knew him 2. Knowledge by discourse such was Jacobs when he saw the Charets he gathered straight that his sonne Joseph was alive 3. By relation of others as Jacob knew that his sonne yet lived when his sonnes told him When a thing cannot be present to the sense then must we relie our selves wholly to the third as 1. Kings 10.6 the Queene of Sheba must first heare of Solomons wisdome in her owne Land before she can come to him and heare him her selfe For matters of reason there is nothing absent from it but the absence of our understanding is said then to be as John 3.9 when a thing exceedeth the capacity of him that should understand as that of so great a Rabin in Israel therefore we must rely our selves in this also to the third meanes 1 Cor. 2.9 for the first no eye hath seene no eare hath heard which can certifie us of the things which God hath prepared for them that love him and for the second he addeth it hath not at any time ascended into the heart of man that is it exceedeth the reason of man to thinke of them Therefore the third must necessarily be brought in Job 36.26 Behold God is excellent and we know him not neither can the number of his yeares be searched out Our other knowledge of Sense and Discourse are bounded within the limits of naturall causes but God is supernaturall therefore this is plaine which is Esay 7.9 Nisi credideritis non stabiliemini if ye beleeve not surely ye shall not be established Not that but after we have beleeved we may seek a reason that we may be able reddere rationem A difference betweene the knowledge by discourse und by religion in the knowledge by discourse 1. commeth a thought ' then an establishing of the thought and then when we see it evidently cometh the consent but in faith its first consented to then conceived 1. Pet. 3.15 the meanes of this because in the action of beliefe will beares the greatest sway the will being moved with her object i. blessednesse annexed to it Ratio because great honor is given to him by it therefore it is evident that this is the certainest and best way of knowledge as it is 1 Pet. 3.15 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Be ready alwayes to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you because grace doth not make voide nature but as it is 2 Cor. 10.5 we must use the meanes as the hand-maide because it holds in captivity the understanding of man and still as it is Acts 4.31 looke for the Holy Ghost to teach us those things that our nature is not able to beare For Faith then it thus differeth from Science In science first there goeth an inquiring thought and then followeth the assent but in faith there is the assent first and then the conceiving of that we have consented to Psal 18.45 As soone as they beare of me they shall obey me It is conceptus cum assensione a conceiving with an assent because the object of the understanding doth not constraine us to beleeve but the will holdeth it prisoner and keepeth it captive Rom. 10.10 Beliefe being an act of the understanding should first come à mente from the intellect but he there saith we must corde credere beleeve with the heart and the will hath a speciall act in it The reason why it pleased God thus to institute the powers of the mind is that if reason could first have conceiveed the things that pertaine to God little or no glory at all had come to God by it Againe this is ratio scientisica the profound meanes of the wisedome of the flesh we see how God doth confound and cast them downe and in Religion the ground of it is contrary to that of Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Not to beleeve is the way of Philosophy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To beleeve of Divinity and Lucian he scoffed at it For warrant of it somewhat hath beene spoken before I will therefore add a little now Cyrill in his fifth Catechisme and Cyprian in his Exposition upon Saint Matthew And Chrysostome and other