them can be said to be an Intelligent Person But let us see whether Infinite mind and Intelligent Person do or can properly and logically import the same Thing which I utterly deny and that for these Reasons 1. Because Mind signifies an Absolute Being nothing relative belonging to the Definition of it nor was it ever used by Writers but in an Absol ute Irrelative sence so that we have here both Signification and Definition together with Vniversal Vse for the Absoluteness of the Term mind But the Term Person applied to the Divine Persons is always Relative and does and must signify Relatively 2. Because the Term Infinite mind is adequately predicated of God and we properly say that God is an Infinite Mind But the Term Infinite Intelligent Person cannot be so predicated of God for if there be Three such Intelligent Persons in the Godhead we can no more by a proper and Natural Predication say that God is an Intelligent Person that we can say That God is the Father 3. Because if Infinite mind and infinite Intelligent Person be Terms equipollent and importing the same Thing Then since this Author elsewhere affirms that Three Infinite minds may be one Infinite mind it will follow as we observed before that Three Infinite Intelligent Persons may be also one Infinite Intelligent Person for as much as in Terms Equipollent the same Things may and must be equally affirmed and denied of both of them And this Consequence will affect this Author throughout this whole Dispute From all which I conclude That an Infinite mind is not formally and properly an Infinite Intelligent Person nor Equipollent to it and since it is not so I conclude further That unless it may be allowed to any particular Member of the Catholick Church and a private one too to draw off a word from its proper Signification Definition and Universally received use and that in a Principal Article of Faith and to fasten an arbitrary sence of his own upon it quite different from all These as a Relative sence is from an Absolute then it cannot be allowed to this Author to interpret Three Infinite Minds by Three Infinite Intelligent Persons in the Article of the Trinity For at this Rate there can be nothing certain in any Article or Proposition of the Christian Faith as setled by Councils and received by the Church But to shew how far this Man of Confidence without shame can stretch his Interpreting faculty let this Notable Instance suffice For having affirmed over and over in his Vindication and particularly p. 66. That not to acknowledge the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits was Heresy and Non-sense Here in his Defense p. 81. l. 20. He tells us That his meaning there was That to assert Three distinct Divine Persons who are not Three distinct Infinite Intelligent Persons was Heresy and Nonsence And Nonsence no doubt it is with a vengeance But in answer to so wretched an Evasion I demand of this Man whether ever he knew any Divine or Writer in the World who owned a Person and did not understand by the same an Intelligent Person Nay so far is he from having any ground for such a Pretence that in strictness of speech the Term Intelligent added to Person is a meer Redundancy and Tautology For as much as it is Essentially Implyed in the formal Notion of a Person which is defined Suppositum Intelligens and therefore for this Man to suppose any one to assert Three Persons and to deny them to be Three Intelligent Persons is as much as to suppose that a Man may assert Three Persons and yet deny them to be Three Persons The very supposal of which is certainly a Degree of Nonsence next to the asserting it But besides I hope this Man is not so very Ignorant as to affirm that a Mind and an Intelligent Person have the same signification For suppose that it might be truly said That a Mind is an Intelligent Person that does not prove it to signify the same that Intelligent Person does any more than because Homo is truly said to be Animal therefore Homo and Animal are Terms perfectly Synonymous and that by one we are still to understand the other which yet if they properly signified the same Thing we certainly ought to do In a word I refer it to the whole World to judge Whether if a Man may be suffered thus to interpret what he writes or says he may not upon these Terms discourse of Men and explain his meaning by Angels discourse of Trees and say he means Houses But such Absurd Liberty especially in strict disputation must not be endured And accordingly after all these shiftings and struglings he begins to despond and plainly declares p. 81. l. 19. That he will not contend about the Term Three Infinite Minds By which I must tell him that he effectually gives up the Thing in dispute for as much as the main stress and force of the Argument rests upon the proper and received sence of the Terms And whereas he says that no body before him had so expresly used these Terms Three Infinite Minds or Spirits it has been already proved against him that they were actually used and insisted upon long before by several Hereticks on the one Hand and condemned by the Catholick Church on the other But to shew That He and his Tritheism are not to be parted so but that however to save a broken Pate he quits the Term Three Infinite Minds he yet holds fast the Thing signified by it as if the Heresy lay not in the Thing but in the word He tells us p. 81. l. 29. That if the Dean thinks an Intelligent Person to be a Mind and means no more by Three Minds than Three Intelligent Persons let the Animadverter confute him if he can Which is just as if he should say If the Dean by a Cock means a Bull let the Animadverter confute him for saying a Cock has two horns and four legs if he can But to his ridiculous Plea I answer First That the Animadverter will dispute with no Man's thoughts or meaning but with his words Secondly That the Defender here quite changes the Question Which is not Whether an Intelligent Person be a Mind but whether A Mind be formally and Convertibly an Intelligent Person which has been already both denied and disprove And thirdly and lastly That in the Holy Trinity the Animadverter admits abating still for the forementioned Absurdity of the Tautology every Intelligent Person to be a Mind but for all that denies Three Infinite Intelligenâ— Persons to be Three Minds For as much as they are Intelligent by vertue of one Infinite Intelligent Mind common to them all And whereas he adds That of he means by Three Minds Three Intelligent Persons let the Animadverter try his skill to make Tritheism of Three Minds and excuse Three Intelligent Persons from the same Charge My answer is First That the Animadverter
do or can inferr in it a Plurality of Minds forasmuch as the said Acts belong to the Three Divine Persons as has been just now observed by vertue of that One Infinite Mind from which they flow and which is numerically one and the same in all Three But this Author is now upon an higher strain and resolving under the Protection of a Licence to open himself farther than before tells us in plain Terms That if every Person in the Trinity considered as a distinct Person be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind there is he confesses an end of his Notion p. 8. And I think it had been well for the Church and himself too if it had never had a Beginning But then he adds with unsufferable Presumption and equal Falshood That with that there will be an End of a Trinity of Persons also and that we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names not in the Vnity of the Godhead but in the Vnity of One Person who is the whole Deity These are his detestably Heretical and senseless Words In answer to which I demand of this Confident Man How he dares in defiance of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church place a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names upon the same Level as if they all indifferently amounted but to the same Thing Whereas Names are certainly of Arbitrary Imposition whether God or Man imposes them and Postures none ascribe to God but that silly Sort of Men the Anthropomorphites But as for Modes they result eternally and necessarily from the Divine Nature and eternally and inseparably remain in it and withal import such distinct Relations as can never coincide in one and the same Person and how then can this Ignorant Man talk of the Vnity of one Person who is the whole Deity or Godhead when these Three Relations can never concur in such an Vnity of Person but all of them may and do concur in the Vnity of the Godhead In a word I do here ask this bold Man whether he will venture to affirm That the Divine Nature determined or modified by such a certain subsistence or subsisting Relation is a meer Mode or no and I do here leave it to his second Thoughts whether he will venture to say so And if not why does he here against his Conscience reproach the Doctrine of the Catholick Church for so it is as if it established a Trinity of meer Modes Which it is so far from that I do here affirm against this Author and others who speak like him upon this Subject That according to the sence of the Catholick Church The Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Relative Modes of Subsistence or Three subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature included in all and each of them or again They are the Divine Nature it self subsisting with Three distinct Relations This I say I affirm and doubt not but that to all Men of sence it confutes the Three Divine Persons being Three meer Modes and shews withal what an irrational Blasphemous Cavil it is to call them so For certainly a Mode in concretion with the Essence cannot with the least pretence of Reason be called a meer Mode And This I do again avouch for the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Trinity and do over and over challenge this Pert Novellist to disprove it if he can But in the next place he is for confirming his Trâ—â—â—theistical Assertion with this Invincible Argument as he thinks Poor Man p. 8 9. If says he every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as Distinct be not an Infinite and Eternal Mind as it must be if every distinct Person be God unless any Thing else than an Infinite Mind can be God then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Eternal Minds yet there is no Heresy in it nor any intended by it In answer to which I must tell him That I shall not much concern my self about what he intends it being his old way when he is pressed with his Words to fly to his Intentions but shall only consider what his words express or infer And whether they carry any Heresy in them or no shall appear presently And in order to this I must remind him of these Two Things First That God and Infinite Eternal Mind are Terms perfectly equipollent And Secondly That in Terms equipollent putting one in the room of the other you may argue with the same consequence from one that you can from the other According to which rule we will try the force of his Argument by proposing it with the bare change of one of the forementioned Terms for the other Thus. If every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as distinct be God as it must be if every distinct Person be an Infinite and Eternal Mind unless any thing else than God can be an Infinite Mind then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Gods yet there is no Heresy in it nor in spight of his words any intended by it Now let this Author consider how he will allow of this Conclusion for if his own Conclusion holds good this is certainly good also since the Validity of the Consequence is the same in Both the Matter of the Argument being the same and the Form of it the same too There must be therefore a gross Fallacy in the Argument it self and it lies in the Homonomy of the Term as distinct For the English Particle as and the Latine quà or quatenus thus applied has Two Significations 1. The first importing any Qualification specifying affecting or any way denominating the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies no more than a Person who is distinct or a Person under this Qualification or Denomination 2. But secondly the other Signification of the Particle as is causal and imports a causal Connexion of the Term to which it is joined with some Predicate or Attribute belonging to the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies as much as a Person because distinct or by reason of his distinction And this makes an Attribute to be necessarily and universally predicated of its Subject so that if the Subject be multiplied the Thing predicated of it must be multiplied too but in the former Signification of the Particle as it is not so for as much as the Predication imported thereby is only Accidental and has no causal necessary nor Universal Connexion with it's Subject Accordingly in the causal sence of the Term as distinct I must tell him that no Person in the Godhead as distinct is an Infinite Eternal Mind that is to say This Attribute belongs not formally to his Distinction and that his Distinction is not the cause or reason that it is affirmed of him For it is an Attribute Springing from the Divine Nature which is in the Person and not from his Personality or Personal Distinction for as much as that does
not properly and formally make him to be God nor is that wherein his Godhead does precisely consist though by Reason of the Persons including in him the Nature it does indeed imply and suppose him to be God And thus all the Ancient Orthodox Divines and Doctors of the Church distinguish in each Person Two things though intimately and inseparably United viz. The Godhead or Divine Nature and the Personal distinguishing Relation so that what agrees to the Person upon one Account does not properly belong to him upon the other and consequently to make the Personal Distinction the Proper Reason of any essential Predication is utterly false and illogical And accordingly to say that Infinite Eternal Mind which is an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature as such belongs to any One Person by reason of his Personal Distinction is false forasmuch as this would inferr it to belong to that Person only since his Personal Distinction belongs only to himself It belongs indeed to him though distinct but not because distinct but wholly because of his Divine Nature which belonging equally to all the Divine Persons all the Essential Attributes of the said Nature must equally belong to all the Three Persons too From all which it follows That since Infinite Eternal Mind is an Attribute not springing from Personal Distinction even in Distinct Persons nor agreeing to the said Persons upon that account but springing wholly from that One Divine Nature which is Common to them All it can never inferr the Three Persons though Distinct to be Three Infinite Eternal Minds since as I shew before the Connexion between a Distinct Person as the Subject and between Infinite Mind as the Predicate not being causal the Multiplication of the Subject can never inferr the Multiplication of the Predicate And this I affirm to be a full and true Account of this Matter and a clear Solution of the Fallacy which this Man 's whole Argument depended upon and consequently that his Tritheistical Hypothesis That the Three Distinct Divine Persons must be therefore Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits is even by his own Confession would he stand to it at an end And the Truth is there is nothing in his whole Book but pittiful wretched Fallacy join'd with gross Ignorance of the Subject he writes of from first to last And yet after all This he makes his Hypothesis the only Rule to understand most of the Scriptures by which represent to us the Vnion between the Father and the Son and particularly that about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 expressed Iohn 14. v. 11. by the Son 's being in the Father and the Father in the Son For says he That the Father should be in the Son and the Son in the Father so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended with several like Expressions is made very Possible and Intelligible by a mutual conscious Sensation but nothing else will afford us any Conception of it Def. p. 9. To which I answer what if it does not And what Christian is concern'd to have any such Conception For did the Catholick Church ever pretend to any beyond the bare Knowledge of the Signification and Sense of the Terms in which it was revealed And did not the bare Revelation of it sufficiently make out the Possibility of it to us without any further Explication What does this Profane Man mean thus to state the very Possibility of a Thing expresly reveal'd in Scripture upon his New-found Exposition of it so that unless this be admitted we must even in spight of Revelation look upon it as Impossible Good God! whither are we running But to shew moreover That his Exposition is as Forced as New Our Saviour expresses this Circumincession by words importing mutual Inexistence But says this Man a Man made it seems to Correct Revelation it self by putting it into properer Words That such a mutual Inexistence cannot be conceived Possible unless we understand it of Mutual Consciousness that is of quite another Thing from what the Words signifie for certain it is that mutual Inexistence is not mutual Consciousness nor can mutual Consciousness be mutual Inexistence But in short will this Man say That the mutual Inexistence of the Father and the Son understood according to the very Letter implies in it a Contradiction I question whether he will dare say so whatsoever the Thing asserted by him may inferr For as for that pittiful Objection against the same Thing 's comprehending another Thing and being comprehended by it c. it is a meer Toy founded only in that old Maxime Omne continens est majus contento drawn off from Material Quantitative Beings and so not applicable to Immaterial and Spiritual as has been fully shewn in the 9 th Chapter of the Animadversions p. 299 and 300. But if this Author will not venture to say that such a mutual Inexistence understood according to the Letter implies in it a Contradiction then let him give the Church a Satisfactory Reason Why our Saviour's Words should not be understood in their own Natural Proper Sence but in this Man 's New Sence which is both Improper and Figurative and never heard of before But with a bold Front he says That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here spoken of is not otherwise Possible and Intelligible which Two Words he is perpetually jumbling together as if there might not be many things Possible and yet by Humane Reason not Intelligible But I must here tell him what I dare say he knew not before viz. That it is one thing Positively to apprehend and know a Thing not to be Possible which I defie him to prove this mutual Inexistence even understood literally not to be and another Thing not to apprehend or Know How or by what way a Thing is Possible And this latter I affirm ought never to supersede our Assent to any Thing if revealed to us nor to make us doubt of the Revelation nor are we at all concerned about any further Explication of the Thing so Revealed nor whether we ever know any more of it or no And this is my Opinion may serve an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man which is but another word for a Theological Quack a great deal of trouble But so far is this Man's Mutual-Consciousness from being the only Thing that can render this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intelligible That unless a Mutual Inexistence be presupposed no such Thing as a Mutual-Consciousness can here take place since it is essentially founded in that For surely Father and Son must exist mutually in one Another before they can know or be conscious to themselves that they do so But this point of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 has been so fully debated and so throughly cleared in the Animadversions both in the seventh Chapter from page 201 to the 207. inclusively and in the ninth Chapter from page 295 to 301. that there needed not to have been so much as one word said of it here But as
been more proper Terms used by the Church to express a Trinity in Vnity by than those Ancient ones made use of all along about it viz. than Three Subsistences in one Individual Nature which he says differ nothing from each other but in their different manner of Subsistence These are his Words And when the Impartial Reader has perused them and compared them with what is cited out of his Vindication concerning this very Term Subsistence and Subsistences amongst others set down in the second Chapter of the Animadversions and the 63 and 64 th pages I suppose he will find it high time to bless himself For I here challenge this shameless Man to reconcile or do any thing like reconciling what he says here to what he has said there if he can And yet as great a Perversion as a word mis-applied and forced from its true Signification must inevitably cause in so nice as well as great a Point as this is it is not however barely this Author 's not hereafter using this Term Three Minds as equipollent to Three Persons that will justifie him if he still retains the Sence of it and therefore I must here tell him That if he holds the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Absolute Beings Three Distinct Infinite Spirits Three Distinct Infinite Substances as Substance stands contradistinct to Subsistence let him abandon and lay aside the Use of the word Minds never so much he is yet a Tritheist and a Real Assertor of Three Gods But after all the Judicious Reader may here observe what a pleasant Manager of Controversie this Man is For he first asserted the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits affirming withal in most impudent manner That to hold otherwise was Heresie and Nonsence see his Vindicat. p. 66. lin 26. But when the World cried out of this scandalous Tritheism and the Animadverter even in the Judgment of the Animadverter's spightfullest Enemies had throughly confuted it and on the contrary maintained That the Three Divine Persons are Three Distinct Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Eternal Mind included in or belonging to all and each of them Why then this Man according to his Excellent and Known Talent of Tacking about fairly comes over to his Adversary so far as to proclaim shamelesly to the World That though he spoke indeed of Minds yet he meant only Subsistences whereas it is impossible that Minds should be Subsistences or Subsistences Minds Such a Felicity is it for a Man whose Word is so apt to throw him into a Plunge to have a trusty Meaning still ready at hand to fetch him out again But if this be to defend an Hypothesis then the way to carry a Cause is to give it up and the surest Conquest to quit the Field In the next place he passes from the distinction of the Divine Persons to the Unity and Identity of their Divine Nature And here according to his constant custom of charging the Fathers with some defect or other in expressing themselves he tells us That they were at a greater loss for words to express this latter by than the former p. 16. l. 26. There being but one word to do it viz. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this too of it self not sufficient Concerning which I must tell him in the first Place That the Truth receives no prejudice at all from there being no other one word to express this Unity or Identity of the Godhead in the Divine Persons by since God be thanked there are several very significant words and ways to explain this one word by But the main question is whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sufficient to express this or no And here I must tell this presuming Man who denies it to be so First That the Nicene Fathers and the Catholick Church with them then thought it so And secondly That the Nature of the Thing necessarily proves it so And in order to this I would have him take notice That the sence of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be measured by the proper condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it relates to and therefore though the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may in it self be indifferent to signify either a specifick or numerical Agreement in Nature according as the Nature is to which it refers yet when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is joined with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importing such an Essential Unity in it as renders it uncapable of all multiplication as an Eus summà perfectum or an Infinite Nature in the very notion of it must be there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must of necessity signify an Agreement in a numerical Unity and Identity of Nature and no other for still the condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to measure the sence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And accordingly I do affirm against this Man That there is no such Thing as Specifick Vnity or Identity or any Thing like it or Analogous to it belonging to the Divine Nature but only a Numerical Vnity and no more Which being the highest and perfectest sort of Vnity is above and instead of all other Unities whatsoever And the reason of this is because all Specifick Vnity of Nature is founded in the Imperfection and defect of the said Nature as rendring it capable of multiplication which is certainly a defect And let him take this Rule with him for once which I defy him to overthrow viz. That in Naturam non multiplicabilem non cadit Vnitas Specifica for as much as Specifick Vnity is but one common conception of the Mind gathered from the Agreement it finds in a Plurality of Particular Natures amongst themselves as every Created Individual has it's particular distinct Nature to it self and not a Part of a Common Nature shared amongst all the Individuals But will this Man affirm that there are Three particular Divine Natures out of which the Mind may form such a Specifick Vnity as we have been speaking of Let him therefore either renounce his very share in common sence and Reason or disclaim this abominable Absurdity of a Specifick Vnity in the Divine Nature or of any Thing so much as like it or Analogous to it or in his own words p. 17. that perfectly answers it And whereas he alleges the Fathers explaining the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by examples of a Specifick Vnity in Created Beings I tell him that the Fathers used not these Examples as Instances for representation of the like Vnity amongst the Divine Persons but as a ground for arguing aà minore ad majus against the Arians who would not allow so much as a Specifick Vnity of Nature between the Father and the Son whereupon the Fathers thus argued against them If you will allow the Generation of a Son in the Divine Nature certainly it ought to be more perfect or at least as perfect as that
Terms every way adequate and convertible as even this Author himself grants and that God and Infinite Intelligent Person are not so But he goes on and tells us That it is custom only which has more reconciled us to the word Person than Mind and that setting aside this Dispute viz. of the Trinity it is the sense of all Mankind which he learnedly proves from its being the sense of the Socinians That the same Thing is to be understood by an Infinite Mind and an Infinite Person Thus He p. 83. l. 4. But can any Thing be more absurd and Ridiculous than to talk of setting aside this Dispute viz. Concerning the Trinity when it is the Subject of this Dispute alone which we are here concerned in and to allege the sense of all Mankind about these Terms before there was any Revelation of a Trinity to apply them to and this also in opposition to the Universal sense of the Christian Church concerning the same founded upon such a Previous Revelation Those indeed who in Ancient Times owned one God but knew nothing of a Trinity might use the Terms Infinite Mind and Infinite Person indifferently and take the latter in as absolute a sense as they did the former But what is this to us Christians after General Councils and the Universal constant use of the Church has added a Relative signification to the word Person as applied to this subject but never used the words Mind or Spirit but according to their Original and Universal signification in a sense Absolute and Irrelative And therefore admitting his Evangelist Plato as he reads him quoted by Dr. Cudworth to have held Three Infinite Minds to be one God it is not at all the less an Absurdity and a Contradiction to all Principles of Reason and Religion for its being held by Plato though I confess it appears more manifestly so by this Author 's holding it too whose talent lyes so remarkably this way But he tells us That the Dispute whether there be one or Three Infinite Minds or Intelligent Persons in the Godhead is of an higher Nature than to be determined by convertible Terms p. 83. l. 12. which I positively deny and affirm that although the Thing disputed be of never so high a Nature yet Reason is able to determine these Two Things concerning it First Whether it be contrary to Reason or no And secondly That if it be so it ought not to be reckoned as an Article of Religion To both which I add that to argue from Terms convertible is as sure a way of Ratiocination as the Mind of Man can proceed by and consequently that if Reason arguing this way proves the Absurdity and Impossibility of Three distinct Infinite Minds in one and the same Infinite Mind or Godhead we need no further Arguments to overthrow it But as for the Author's Complement to the Animadverter viz. That he learnedly proves what every School-Boy knows The Animadverter bids me tell him that School-Boys generally know Greek Latine and Grammar which is more than some confident Writers or rather Copy-mongers can pretend to But he proceeds and says that since the Animadverter has made God and Infinite Mind or Spirit only equipollent and convertible Terms the Defender may allow him this and still deny his Major Proposition That therefore Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Gods For though God is an Infinite Mind and an Infinite Mind is God yet it does not follow That Three distinct Infinite Minds are Three distinct Gods no more than that Three Infinite Intelligent Persons are Three distinct Gods p. 83. l. 27. All which is profound Reasoning indeed viz. That because in Terms not Equipollent or Convertible as the Terms God and Infinite Intelligent Person are not the multiplication of one Term does not multiply the other therefore neither must it do so in Terms perfectly Equipollent as God and Infinite Mind confessedly are But I shall divide my Answer to what he has here said into Two parts and consider First The force of Arguing from Equipollents And secondly Examine whether the Term Distinct Infinite Persons which puts the case as high as it can be does as much infer Three distinct Gods or Three distinct Infinites as the Animadverter contends that Three distinct Infinite Minds do and must And First For the matter of Equipollency Whereas this Author in the forecited place says That he may allow the Animadverter That God and Infinite Mind or Spirit are equipollent and convertible and yet deny that therefore Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Gods I answer That an Ignorant unwary Adversary may allow a great deal more than will do him good But whatsoever this Man either grants or denies as for ought I see Cross and Pile may be the Logick he proceeds by in both I do affirm that if God and Infinite Mind are Terms equipollent then according to all the Principles of Reason and Rules of Argumentation which have hitherto obtained in the World the multiplication of one equipollent necessarily and unavoidably infers the multiplication of the other And the better to make this out and to relieve his Ignorance in some measure I would have him take notice First That the Reason of this mutual Inference between Terms equipollent is because the equipollency of Terms imports a perfect formal Identity in their signification or Thing signified by those Terms for I speak now of equipollent Terms only not Propositions As for instance Homo and Animal Rationale are Terms properly and formally equipollent and then I hope that for one and the same thing I say formally the same to be multiplied and not to be multiplied will be granted impossible In the next place I must tell this Author That the Conditions of equipollent Terms are these First That they require the same Signs viz. of Universality Singularity and Particularity Secondly That they require the same Predicates whether affirmative or negative And thirdly and lastly That they have the very same consequents These I say are the Necessary and Essential Conditions of equipollents for supposing a failure of any of them they cannot be so much as equipollent Which thus premised we are to observe further That this Author himself allows the Terms God and Infinite Mind or Spirit to be Terms equipollent p. 82. l. 25. From whence I infer that if there be a plurality of Infinite Minds there must be a plurality of Gods too since if one should be multiplied and not the other there could be no Identity of signification nor consequently equipollency in the Terms which can never take place where one equipollent Term may be truly affirmed and the other as truly denied of any Thing or any Thing of either of them which is so very plain that that fundamental ground of all discourse Impossibile est idem simul esse non esse cannot be more self-evident And therefore let us see what this Man alleges next If God says he be an Infinite
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Humane Nature together If this be not a Supernatural Effect and consequently no Natural Vnion let this Man assign me any one that ever was or can be reputed such And therefore let him take notice for the future That it is not the bare Terms or Extreams of an Vnion as that it is between Two Natures that can make it Natural But an Agent acting and joining those Natures together according to the Ordinary Course of Nature which must make it formally so and which can never be wrought by any Agent so working where one of the Natures to be united is Finite and the other Infinite But as I said before what is all this to this present Argument which has nothing to do with the Hypostatick Vnion but only with that way or kind of Union by which Created Beings are united together And will this Man argue from one sort of Union to another between which there is no Cognation at all Wherefore let the Charge not only of Boldness but Prophaneness too rest upon him who dares make the common way of Natural Unions the measure of a Supernatural and that such a one as exceeds all the Miracles that Omnipotence it self ever yet wrought in the World But now as he tells us he is for quitting the School-Terms which he never understood and for speaking so as all may understand him And here the first Oracle thus delivered by him is this viz. That the Soul may be a Compleat and Perfect Person but not a Perfect Man p. 49. l. 28. To which I answer That a perfect Man is essentially a Compound Nature or Being And that an Humane Person is essentially so too And that therefore the Soul being as essentially a simple Vncompounded Being can neither be a Perfect Man nor a Perfect Person But this is such a Proposition that I shall say no more of it but leave it wholly to the Reader 's Admiration Nevertheless to dis-encumber him from such Stuff as this Man's Ignorance is still throwing in his way I think fit here to note the Difference between a Perfect and a Compleat Being Now a Thing is said to be Perfect in respect of its Essence as wanting nothing that is Essential to it But it is called Compleat in respect of its Subsistence as subsisting so by it self as to be neither a Part nor Adjunct of another Thing Accordingly the first of these is the Perfection of a Man considered barely as a Man as an Animal Rationale compounded of Soul and Body But the other is the Perfection of a Person or of a Man considered not only as a Rational Nature but as a Rational Nature completely subsisting From whence it follows That neither does the Perfection of a Man nor the Perfection of a Person depend upon the Perfections or Operations belonging to him as being neither Essential to him as a Man or as a Person and consequently though they be never so defective yet he who has the Essence or Essentials of a Man is a Perfect Man and he who has this Essence or Nature of a Man completed with the Proper Subsistence of the same is a Perfect Person But our Author is for explaining this matter to us further by an Instance Let us says he consider a Soul vitally Vnited to a Body with Organs so indisposed for Sensation that a Man can neither see nor hear nor tast nor smell but only just lives and breaths you will not say this is a perfect Man p. 50. l. 8. Yes good Sir I both will and do say so For he who has the perfect Essence of a Man is a perfect Man whether Halt or Blind or Deaf and as defective in the Actual Exercise of his faculties as of his Limbs But you will say do not all these great defects render a Man more Imperfect than he would be otherwise Yes as to his State or Condition they do but not as to his Nature or Essence And therefore this Author may take notice That there is a twofold Perfection belonging to a Man the first Essential which we have been hitherto speaking of and properly consists in that perfection of Nature or Essence without which he could not be a Man The other is Extra-essential and in respect of the former Accidental and may as we have noted be called a perfection of State or Condition and consists properly in an Integrity of Parts and a right disposition of the Faculties enabling a Man to exert all the Operations belonging to him And I do here according to all the Principles of Philosophy and the concurrent sence of Philosophers affirm that notwithstanding an Universal failure of all those Accidental Perfections a Man is as perfectly a Man by vertue of his bare Essence and as perfectly a Person by vertue of his Compleat Subsistence as if he had them all in their highest Pitch But our Author goes on If says he a Compleat Person may not be a Compleat and perfect Man then the Formal Reason of Personality and the Natural Perfection of a Man are Two Things p. 50. l. 15. I grant they are so But utterly deny That a Compleat Person can be otherwise than a Perfect Man though there may be a Perfect Man who is not a Person For every Person includes in it a Nature Rationalis which makes a Perfect Man and besides that a Compleat Subsistence of the same which makes the Person and whereas he says That the whole Personality must be in the Soul if a Man be a perfect Man who is united to a Body which is worse than none p. 50. l. 20. I must tell him first That there is no such Thing as a Man's being united to a Body for though the Soul is united to a Body yet the Man is not but contains both Body and Soul united to one Another And I must tell him further That the Soul 's being united to a Body which is worse than none does not make that Body less an Essential Part of the Man and of the Person than if it were the most accomplish'd Body in the World In the mean time I must desire the Reader to take Notice of the Intolerable Absurdity of this Author 's affirming a Man to be united to a Body and that his own Body too For at this rate the Man must be one Term of the Vnion and his Body the other But still he goes boldly on and tells us p. 51. l. 2 3. That the Soul is the Person and the Body only the Instrument or Organ of it In answer to which I must tell him That not the Soul but the whole Compositum is the Person and that the Body is not the Instrument of the Soul as of the Principal Agent but of the whole Compositum and moreover that the Soul is as much the Instrument of the said Compositum as the Body is or can be and lastly That Both of them are such Instruments as are also Vital Essential Parts of the Compound