Selected quad for the lemma: sense_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
sense_n	catholic_n	church_n	universal_a	1,773	5	9.0565	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29193	Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied.	Bramhall, John, 1594-1663.	1657 (1657)	Wing B4214; ESTC R34272	289,829	584

of reasoning at the best which may illustrate something but prove nothing And of all comparisons this is one of the worst which is drawn from the sensual appetite to the rational appetite The rational appetite and the sensual appetite are even as like one to another as an apple and an oyster The one is a natural Agent the other is a free Agent The one acts necessarily the other acts contingently I take the word largly The one is determined to one the other is not determined to one The one hath under God a Dominion over it self and its own acts The other hath no Dominion over it self or its own acts Even the will it self when it acts after a natural manner which is but rarely in some extraordinary cases as in the appetite of the chiefest good being fully revealed or in a panical terrour which admitteth no deliberation acts not freely but necessarily How much more must Agents meerly Natural which have neither reason to deliberate nor dominion or liberty to elect act necessarily and determinately So to answer a comparison with a comparison his Argument is just such another as this The Gally-slave which is chained to the oare is a man as well as the Pilot that sits at the sterne therefore the Gally-slave hath as much dominion in the ship as the Pilot and is as free to turn it hither and thither So falls this dreadfull engine all in pieces which should have battered down the Fort of Liberty His gentle reprehension That if I have not been able to distinguish between these two questions I have not done well to meddle with either And if I have understood them I have dealt uningenuously and frandulently would better become me who defend liberty than him who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events If he think I have not done well yet according to his own grounds he may rather blame the causes that do necessitate me than blame me who am irresistibly necessitated to do what I do Fraud and deceit have no place in necessary Agents who can do no otherwise then they do He might as well accuse the Sea to have dealt fraudulently with him because he mistook the tide and could not passe over the Foard at an high water as he purposed Such is the power of truth that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for He doth see in part already that I understand the vanity of his distinction and shall see it better yet before this Treatise be ended Yet if I would be so courteous as to forgive him all this his distinction would not prejudice me The places of Scripture alledged by me in my former defence do not onely prove that a man is free to do if he will but much more that a man is free to chuse and to elect that is as much to say as to will and determine it self An answer to his Fountains of Arguments in this Question IT is a certain rule Contraries being placed one besides another do appear much more clearly He who desires to satisfie his judgment in this controversie must compare our writings one with another without partiality the Arguments and Answers and pretended absurdities on both sides But T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause before hand and if it be possible to anticipate and preoccupate the judgements of his readers with a Flourish or Preludium under the specious name of Fountains of Arguments So before a serious war Cities use to personate their adverse party and feign mock-combats and skirmishes to encourage their friends wherein you may be sure their own side shall conquer As Players make their little puppets prate and act what they please and stand or fall as they lend them motion which brings to my mind the Lions answer in the Fable when the picture of a man beating a Lion was produced to him If a Lion had made this picture he would have made the Lio●… above and the man beneath It is a sufficient answer to this prologue That Mr. Hobbes that is an adversary made it Nihil est quin male narrando possit depravarier What had he to do to urge arguments fo●… me or to give solutions for me or to pres●… the inconveniences and absurdities which flow from fatal destiny on my behalf I ga●… him no commission I need none of his help yet by this personated conflict he hoped to have stolen an easie victory withou●… either blood or sweate I will not tire out my selfe and the reader with the superfluous repetition of those things which we shall meet with again much more opportunely in their proper places Some Authours are like those people who measuring all others by themselves believe nothing is well understood until it be repeated over and over again Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere nisi idem dictum est centies But whatsoever is new in this Preface if it have but any one grain of weight I will not faile to examine and answer it either here or there And first I cannot chuse but wonder at his confidence that a single person who never took degree in schooles that I have heard of except it were by chance in Malmesbury should so much sleight not onely all the scholars of this present Age but all the Fathers Schoole-men and old Philosophers which I dare say he hath not studied much and forget himself so far as to deny all their authorities at once if they give not him satisfaction to make his private and crasy judgement to be the standard and seale of truth and himself an universal Dictatour among Scholars to plant and to pull up to reform and new modulate or rather turn upside down Theology Phylosophy Morality and all other Arts and Sciences which he is pleased to favour so much as not to eradicate them or pluck them up root and branch as if he was one of Aesops fellows who could do all things and say all things He is not the first man in the World who hath lost himself by grasping and ingrossing too much As the Athenians used to say of Metiochus Metiochus is Captain Metiochus is Surveier Metiochus bakes the bread Metiochus grinds the Corn Metiochus doth all an evill year to Metiochus He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed but his meaning is to be the sole Interpreter of them himself without any respect to the perpetuall and universall tradition of the Catholick Church or the sense of all ancient Expositors Well for once I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the authority of Councells Fathers Schoolmen and Philosophers meet him singly at his own weapon yet with this protestation that if he value his own single judgement above all theirs he comes within the compasse of Solomons censure Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes there is more hope of a fool than of him He telleth us That the Attributes of God are oblations given onely for honour but

confirmed to them by the testimony and authority of such persons whose judgment and veracity they esteemed We have had enough of his understanding understandeth and will willeth or too much unlesse it were of more weight What a stir he maketh every other Section about nothing All the World are agreed upon the truth in this particular and understand one another well Whether they ascribe the act to the Agent or to the form or to the faculty by which he acteth it is all one They know that actions properly are of Individuums But if an Agent have lost his natural power or acquired habit as we have instances in both kinds he will act but madly He that shall say that natural faculties and acquired habits are nothing but the acts that flow from them That reason and deliberation are the same thing he might as well say that wit and discourse are the same thing deserveth no other answer but to be sleighted That a man deliberating of fit means to obtain his desired end doth consider the means singly and successively there is no doubt And there is as little doubt that both the inquiry and the result or veredict may sometimes be definite or prescribe the best means or the only means and sometimes indefinite determining what means are good without defining which are the best but leaving the election to the free Agent Castigations of the Animadversions Num. 27. I Do not know what the man would have done but for his trifling homonymy about the name of Will which affoardeth him scope to play at fast and loose between the faculty and the act of willing We ended with it in the last Section and we begin again with it in this Section The faculty of the will saith he is no will the act only which he calleth volition is the will As a man that sleepeth hath the power of seeing and seeth not nor hath for that time any sight so also he hath the power of willing but willeth nothing nor hath for that time any will Quantum est in rebus inane What profound mysteries he uttereth to shew that the faculty of willing and the act of willing are not the same things Did ever any Creature in the World think they were And that the faculty doth not alwayes act Did ever any man think it did Let him leave these impertinencies and tell us plainly whether the faculty of willing and the act of willing be not distinct things And whether the faculty of the will be not commonly called the will by all men but himself and by himself also when he is in his lucidae intervalles Hear his own confession To will to elect to chuse are all one and so to will is here made an act of the will and indeed as the will is a faculty or power of a mans soul so the will is an act of it according to that power That which he calleth the faculty here he calleth expressely the will there Here he will have but one will there he admitteth two distinct wills to will is an act of the will Here he will not endure that the faculty should be the will there he saith expressely That the will is a faculty All this wind shaketh no Oates Whatsoever he saith in this Section amounteth not to the weight of one graine If he had either known what concupiscence doth signifie which really he doth not or had known how familiar it is both name and thing in the most modest and pious Authours both Sacred and prophane which he doth not know he would have been ashamed to have accused this expression as unbecoming a grave person But he who will not allow me to mention it once to good purpose doth take the liberty to mention it six times in so many lines to no purpose There hath been an old question between Roman-Catholicks and Protestants Whether concupiscence without consent be a sin or not And here cometh he as bold as blind to determine the difference committing so many errours and so grosse in one short determination that it is a shame to dispute with him thrashing those Doctours soundly whom he professeth to honour and admire not for ill will but because he never read them He maintaineth that which the Romanists themselves do detest and would be ashamed of As first That concupiscence without consent is no sin contrary to all his much admired Doctours Secondly That there is no concupiscence without consent contrary to both parties which we use to call the taking away the subject of the question Thirdly That concupiscence with consent may be lawful contrary to all men Though the Church of Rome do not esteem it to be properly a sinne yet they esteem it a defect and not altogether lawful even without consent much lesse with consent Fourthly That concupiscence makes not the sin but the unlawfulnesse of satisfying such concupiscence or the designe to prosecute what he knoweth to be unlawful Which last errours are so grosse that no man ever avowed them before himself When lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin that is when a man hath consented to the suggestion of his own sensuality Though he scorn the School-men yet he should do well to advise with his Doctors whom he professeth to admire before he plunge himself again into such a Whirly-pool Castigations of the Animadversions Num. 28. IF I should give over the well known terms of the rational or intellectual will so well grounded in nature so well warranted by the authority and practise of all good Divines and Philosophers to comply with his humour or distemperd imaginations I should right well deserve a Bable The intellectual appetite and the sensitive appetite are both appetites and in the same man they both proceed from the same soul but by divers faculties the one by the intellectual the other by the sensitive And proceeding from several faculties they do differ as much as if they proceeded from several souls The sensitive appetite is organical the intellectual appetite is inorganical The sensitive appetite followeth the judgement of the senses The intellectual appetite followeth the judgement of the understanding The sensitive appetite pursueth present particular corporal delights The intellectual appetite pursueth that which is honest that which is future that which is universal that which is immortal and spiritual The sensitive appetite is determined by the object It cannot chuse but pursue that object which the senses judge to be good and flie that which the senses judge to be evill But the intellectuall appetite is free to will or nill or suspend and may reject that which the senses say to be good and pursue that which the senses judge to be evil according to the dictate of reason Then to answer what he saith in particular The appetite and the will are not alwayes the same thing Every will is an appetite but every appetite is not a will Indeed in the same man appetite and will is