Selected quad for the lemma: sense_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
sense_n brain_n motion_n nerve_n 2,721 5 11.0566 5 true
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A43995 Humane nature, or, The fundamental elements of policy being a discovery of the faculties, acts, and passions of the soul of man from their original causes, according to such philosophical principles as are not commonly known or asserted / by Tho. Hobbs. Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. 1684 (1684) Wing H2244; ESTC R27431 44,473 106

There are 4 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

the interiour the Laws of Refraction still observed Now the interiour coat of the Eye is nothing else but a piece of the Optick Nerve and therefore the Motion is still continued thereby into the Brain and by Resistance or Re-action of the Brain is also a Rebound into the Optick Nerve again which we not conceiving as Motion or Rebound from within do think it is without and call it Light as hath been already shewed by the Experience of a Stroak We have no Reason to doubt that the Fountain of Light the Sun worketh by any other Ways than the Fire at least in this Matter And thus all Vision hath its Original from such Motion as is here described for where there is no Light there is no Sight and therefore Colour also must be the same Thing with Light as being the Effect of the lucid Bodies their Difference being only this that when the Light cometh directly from the Fountain to the Eye or indirectly by Reflection from clean and polite Bodies and such as have not any particular Motion internal to alter it we call it Light but when it cometh to the Eye by Reflection from une●en rough and coarse Bodies or such as are affected with internal Motion of their own that may alter it then we call it Colour Colour and Light differing only in this that the one is pure and the other perturbed Light By that which hath been said not only the Truth of the Third Proposition but also the whole Manner of producing Light and Colour is apparent 9. As Colour is not inherent in the Object but an Effect thereof upon us caused by such Motion in the Object as hath been described so neither is Sound in the Thing we hear but in our selves One manifest Sign thereof is that as a Man may see so also he may hear double or treble by Multiplication of Echoes which Echoes are Sounds as well as the Original and not being in one and the same Place cannot be inherent in the Body that maketh them Nothing can make any Thing which is not in it self the Clapper hath no Sound in it but Motion and maketh Motion in the internal Parts of the Bell so the Bell hath Motion and not Sound that imparteth Motion to the Air and the Air hath Motion but not Sound the Air imparteth Motion by the Ear and Nerve unto the Brain and the Brain hath Motion but not Sound from the Brain it reboundeth back into the Nerves outward and thence it becometh an Apparition without which we call Sound And to proceed to the rest of the Senses it is apparent enough that the Smell and Taste of the same Thing are not the same to every Man and therefore are not in the Thing smelt or tasted but in the Men So likewise the Heat we feel from the Fire is manifestly in us and is quite different from the Heat which is in the Fire for our Heat is Pleasure or Pain according as it is great or moderate but in the Coal there is no such Thing By this the Fourth and last Proposition is proved viz. That as in Vision so also in Conceptions that arise from other Senses the Subject of their Inherence is not in the Object but in the Sentient 10. And from hence also it followeth that whatsoever Accidents or Qualities our Senses make us think there be in the World they be not there but are Seeming and Apparitions only the Things that really are in the World without us are those Motions by which these Seemings are caused And this is the great Deception of Sense which also is to be by Sense corrected for as Sense telleth me when I see directly that the Colour seemeth to be in the Object so also Sense telleth me when I see by Reflection that Colour is in the Object CHAP. III. 1. Imagination defined 2. Sleep and Dreams defined 3. Causes of Dreams 4. Fiction defined 5. Phantasms defined 6. Remembrances defined 7. Wherein Remembrance consisteth 8. Why in a Dream a Man never thinks he dreams 9. Why few Things seem strange in Dreams 10. That a Dream may be taken for Reality and Vision 1. AS standing Water put into Motion by the Stroak of a Stone or blast of Wind doth not presently give over moving as soon as the Wind ceaseth or the Stone setleth so neither doth the Effect cease which the Object hath wrought upon the Brain so soon as ever by turning aside of the Organs the Object ceaseth to work that is to say Though the Sense be past the Image or Conception remaineth but more obscure while we are awake because some Object or other continually plieth and solliciteth our Eyes and Ears keeping the Mind in a stronger Motion whereby the weaker doth not easily appear And this obscure Conception is that we call Phantasie or Imagination Imagination being to define it Conception remaining and by little and little decaying from and after the Act of Sense 2. But when present Sense is not as in Sleep there the Images remaining after Sense when there be many as in Dreams are not obscure but strong and clear as in Sense it self The Reason is That which obscured and made the Conceptions weak namely Sense and present Operation of the Object is removed for Sleep is the Privation of the Act of Sense the Power remaining and Dreams are the Imagination of them that sleep 3. The Causes of Dreams if they be natural are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts of a man upon his Brain by which the Passages of Sense by Sleep benummed are restored to their Motion The Signs by which this appeareth to be so are the Differences of Dreams old Men commonly dream oftener and have their Dreams more painful than young proceeding from the different Accidents of Mans Body as Dreams of Lust as Dreams of Anger according as the Heart or other Parts within work more or less upon the Brain by more or less Heat so also the Descents of different sorts of Flegm maketh us a Dream of different Tastes of Meats and Drinks and I believe there is a Reciprocation of Motion from the Brain to the Vital Parts and back from the Vital Parts to the Brain whereby not only Imagination begetteth Motion in those Parts but also Motion in those Parts begetteth Imagination like to that by which it was begotten If this be true and that sad Imaginations nourish the Spleen then we see also a Cause why a strong Spleen reciprocally causeth fearful Dreams and why the Effects of Lasciviousness may in a Dream produce the Image of some person that had caused them Another Sign that Dreams are caused by the Action of the inward Parts is the Disorder and casual Consequence of one Conception or Image to another for when we are waking the Antecedent thought or Conception introduceth and is cause of the Consequent as the Water followeth a mans Finger upon a dry and level Table but in Dreams there is commonly no Coherence and
Of the Powers of the Mind there be two Sorts Cognitive Imaginative or Conceptive and Motive and first of Cognitive For the understanding of what I mean by the Power Cognitive we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our Minds continually certain Images or Conceptions of the Things without us insomuch that if a Man could be alive and all the rest of the World annihilated he should nevertheless retain the Image thereof and all those Things which he had before seen or perceived in it every one by his own Experience knowing that the Absence or Destruction of things once imagined doth not cause the Absence or Destruction of the Imagination it self This Imagery and Representations of the Qualities of the Thing without is that we call our Conception Imagination Ideas Notice or Knowledg of them and the Faculty or Power by which we are capable of such Knowledge is that I here call Cognitive Power or Conceptive the Power of Knowing or Conceiving CHAP. II. 2. Definition of Sense 4. Four Propositions concerning the nature of Conceptions 5. The First proved 6. The Second proved 7 8. The Third proved 9. The Fourth proved 10 The main Deception of Sense 1. HAving declared what I mean by the Word Conception and other Words equivalent thereunto I come to the Conceptions themselves to shew their Differences their Causes and the Manner of the Production so far as is necessary for this Place 2. Originally all Conceptions proceed from the Action of the thing it self whereof it is the Conception Now when the Action is present the Conception it produceth is also called Sense and the Thing by whose Action the same is produced is called the Object of the Sense 3 By our several Organs we have several Conceptions of several Qualities in the Objects for by Sight we have a Conception or Image composed of Colour and Figure which is all the Notice and Knowledge the Object imparteth to us of its Nature by the Eye By Hearing we have a Conception called Sound which is all the Knowledge we have of the Quality of the Object from the Ear And so the rest of the Senses are also Conceptions of several Qualities or Natures of their Objects 4. Because the Image in Vision consisting of Colour and Shape is the Knowledge we have of the Qualities of the Object of that Sense it is no hard matter for a Man to fall into this Opinion that the same Colour and Shape are the very Qualities themselves And for the same cause that Sound and Noise are the Qualities of the Bell or of the Air And this Opinion hath been so long received that the contrary must needs appear a great Paradox and yet the Introduction of Species visible and intelligible which is necessary for the Maintenance of that Opinion passing to and fro from the Object is worse than any Paradox as being a plain Impossibility I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these Points That the Subject wherein Colour and Image are inherent is not the Object or thing seen That there is nothing without us really which we call an Image or Colour That the said Image or Colour is but an apparition unto us of the Motion Agitation or Alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits or some internal Substance of the Head That as in Vision so also in Conceptions that arise from the other Senses the Subject of their inherence is not the Object but the Sentient 5. Every Man hath so much Experience as to have seen the Sun and the other visible Objects by Reflection in the Water and Glasses and this alone is sufficient for this Conclusion that Colour and Image may be there where the Thing seen is not But because it may be said that notwithstanding the Image in the Water be not in the Object but a Thing meerly Phantastical yet there may be Colour really in the Thing it self I will urge further this Experience that divers Times Men see directly the same Object double as two Candles for one which may happen from Distemper or otherwise without Distemper if a Man will the Organs being either in their right Temper or equally distempered the Colours and Figures in two such Images of the same Thing cannot be inherent therein because the Thing seen cannot be in two Places One of these Images therefore is not inherent in the Object but seeing the Organs of the Sight are then in equal Temper or Distemper the one of them is no more inherent than the other and consequently neither of them both are in the Object which is the First Proposition mentioned in the precedent Number 6. Secondly that the Image of any Thing by Reflection in a Glass or Water or the like is not any Thing in or behind the Glass or in or under the Water every Man may grant to himself which is the Second Proposition 7. For the Third we are to consider First that every great Agitation or Concussion of the Brain as it happeneth from a Stroak especially if the Stroak be upon the Eye whereby the Optick Nerve suffereth any great Violence there appeareth before the Eyes a certain Light which Light is nothing without but an Apparition only all that is real being the Concussion or Motion of the Parts of that Nerve from which Experience we may conclude That Apparition of Light is really nothing but Motion within If therefore from lucid Bodies there can be derived Motion so as to affect the Optick Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto there will follow an Image of Light somewhere in that Line by which the Motion was last derived to the Eye That is to say In the Object if we look directly on it and in the Glass or Water when we look upon it in the Line of Reflection which in Effect is the Third Proposition namely That Image and Colour is but an Apparition to us of that Motion Agitation or Alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits or some internal Substance in the Head 8. But that from all lucid shining and illuminate Bodies there is a Motion produced to the Eye and through the Eye to the Optick Nerve and so into the Brain by which that Apparition of Light or Colour is affected is not hard to prove And first it is evident that the Fire the only lucid Body here upon Earth worketh by Motion equally every Way insomuch as the Motion thereof stopped or inclosed it is presently extinguished and no more Fire And further that that Motion whereby the Fire worketh is Dilation and Contraction of it self alternately commonly called Scintillation or Glowing is manifest also by Experience From such Motion in the Fire must needs arise a Rejection or casting from it self of that part of the Medium which is contiguous to it whereby that part also rejecteth the next and so successively one part beateth back another to the very Eye and in the same manner the exteriour part of the Eye presseth
when there is it is by Chance which must needs proceed from this That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike whereby it cometh to pass that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits 4. As when the Water or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents receiveth one Motion compounded of them all so also the Brain or Spirit therein having been stirred by divers Objects composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense As for Example the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain and at another Time the Colour of Gold but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain From the same Cause it is there appear unto us Castles in the Air Chimaera's and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Natura but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces at several Times And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind 5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination which for Clearness contendeth with Sense as well as a Dream and that is when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing than the rest An Example whereof is the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun Also those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark whereof I think every Man hath Experience but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious are Examples of the same And these for Distinction-sake may be called Phantasms 6. By the Senses which are numbred according to the Organs to be five we take Notice as hath been said already of the Objects without us and that Notice is our Conception thereof but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again we take Notice that is again that is to say that we have had the same Conception before which is as much as to imagine a Thing past which is impossible to the Sense which is only of Things present This therefore may be accounted a Sixth Sense but internal not external as the rest and is commonly called Remembrance 7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past we are to remember that in the Definition of Imagination it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying or growing more obscure An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together but none of the smaller Parts by themselves and as more or fewer Parts be represented so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear Seeing then the Conception which when it was first produced by Sense was clear and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly and when it cometh again is obscure we find missing somewhat that we expected by which we judge it past and decayed For Example a Man that is present in a Foreign City seeth not only whole Streets but can also distinguish particular Houses and Parts of Houses but departed thence he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did some House or Turning escaping him yet is this to remember when afterwards there escape him more Particulars this is also to remember but not so well In Process of Time the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only which is almost to have forgotten it Seeing then Remembrance is more or less as we find more or less Obscurity Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole To see at a great Distance of Place and to remember at great Distance of Time is to have like Conceptions of the Thing for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance the other by Decay 8. And from this that hath been said there followeth That a Man can never know he dreameth he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self and consequently he can take Notice of nothing but as present whereas to think he dreameth is to think those his Conceptions that is to say obscurer than they were in the Sense so that he must think them both as clear and not as clear as Sense which is impossible 9. From the same Ground it proceedeth that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons as they would do waking for waking a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before and remember nothing of how he came there but in a Dream there cometh little of that kind into Consideration The Clearness of Conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust unless the Strangeness be excessive as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt and then most commonly he waketh 10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived as when his Dream is past to think it real for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind and in such Order as he useth to do waking and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awaketh all which may happen I know no {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth or to take it for a Vision CHAP. IV. 1. Discourse 2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts 3. Ranging 4. Sagacity 5. Reminiscence 6. Experience 7. Expectation 8. Conjecture 9. Signs 10. Prudence 11. Caveats of concluding from Experience 1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind Series or Consequence of one after another may be casual and incoherent as in Dreams for the most part and it may be orderly as when the former Thought introduceth the latter and this is Discourse of the Mind But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words I will to avoid Aequivocation call it Discursion 2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another is their first Coherence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense As for Example from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter because their Names are read together from S. Peter to a Stone for the same Cause from Stone to Foundation because we see them together and for the same Cause from Foundation to Church and from Church to People and from People to Tumult and according to this Example the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any
out-goe whom we would not is Indignation To hold fast by another is to love To carry him on that so holdeth is Charity To hurt ones self for hast is Shame Continually to be out-gone is Misery Continually to out-go the next before is Felicity And to forsake the Course is to die CHAP. X. 1. HAving shewed in the precedent Chapters that Sense proceedeth from the Action of external Objects upon the Brain or some internal Substance of the Head and that the Passions proceed from the Alteration there made and continued to the Heart It is consequent in the next Place seeing the Diversity of Degrees in Knowlege in divers Men to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers Tempers of their Brain to declare what other Causes may produce such Oddes and Excess of Capacity as we daily observe in one Man above another As for that Difference which ariseth from Sickness and such accidental Distempers I omit the same as impertinent to this Place and consider it only in such as have their Health and Organs well disposed If the Difference were in the natural Temper of the Brain I can imagin no Reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses which being equal both in the wise and less wise infer an equal Temper in the common Organ namely the Brain of all the Senses 2. But we see by Experience that Joy and Grief proceed not in all Men from the same Causes and that men differ very much in the Constitution of the Body whereby that which helpeth and furthereth vital Constitution in one and is therefore delightful hindereth it and crosseth it in another and therefore causeth Grief The Difference therefore of Wits hath its Original from the different Passions and from the Ends to which the Appetite leadeth them 3. And first those Men whose Ends are sensual Delight and generally are addicted to Ease Food Onerations and Exonerations of the Body must needs be the less thereby delighted with those Imaginations that conduce not to those Ends such as are Imaginations of Honour and Glory which as I have said before have Respect to the future For Sensuality consisteth in the Pleasure of the Senses which please only for the present and take away the Inclination to observe such Things as conduce to Honour and consequently maketh Men less curious and less ambitious whereby they less consider the Way either to Knowledge or other Power in which two consisteth all the Excellency of Power cognitive And this is it which Men call Dulness and proceedeth from the Appetite of sensual or bodily Delight And it may well be conjectured that such Passion hath its Beginning from a Grossness and Difficulty of the Motion of the Spirit about the Heart 4. The Contrary hereunto is that quick Rangeing of Mind described Chap. 4. Sect. 3. which is joyned with Curiosity of comparing the Things that come into the Mind one with another in which Comparison a Man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected Similitude of Things otherwise much unlike in which Men place the Excellency of Fancy and from whence proceed those grateful Similies Metaphors and other Tropes by which both Poets and Orators have it in their Power to make Things please or displease and shew well or ill to others as they like themselves or else in discerning suddenly Dissimilitude in Things that otherwise appear the same And this Vertue of the Mind is that by which Men attain to exact and perfect Knowledge and the Pleasure thereof consisteth in continual Instruction and in Distinction of Places Persons and Seasons and is commonly termed by the Name of Judgement for to judge is nothing else but to distinguish or discern And both Fancy and Judgement are commonly comprehended under the Name of Wit which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits contrary to that Restiness of the Spirits supposed in those that are dull 5. There is another Defect of the Mind which Men call Levity which betrayeth also Mobility in the Spirits but in Excess An Example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious Discourse have their Minds diverted to every little Jest or witty Observation which maketh them depart from their Discourse by a Parenthesis and from that Parenthesis by another till at length they either lose themselves or make their Narration like a Dream or some studied Nonsence The Passion from whence this proceedeth is Curiosity but with too much Equality and Indifference for when all Things make equal Impression and Delight they equally throng to be expressed 6. The Vertue opposite to this Defect is Gravity or Steadiness in which the End being the great and Master-Delight directeth and keepeth in the Way thereto all other Thoughts 7. The Extremity of Dulness is that natural Folly which may be called Stolidity But the Extream of Levity though it be natural Folly distinct from the other and obvious to every Mans Observation I know not how to call it 8. There is a Fault of the Mind called by the Greeks {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} which is Indocibility or Difficulty of being taught the which must needs arise from a false Opinion that they know already the Truth of that is called in question for certainly Men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the Evidence is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians and what is commonly discoursed of in other Books and therefore if the Minds of Men were all of white Paper they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right Method and by right Ratiocination delivered to them But when Men have once acquiesced in untrue Opinions and registred them as Authentical Records in their Minds it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such Men than to write legibly upon a Paper already scribled over The immediate Cause therefore of Indocibility is Prejudice and of prejudice false Opinion of our own Knowledge 9. Another and a principal Defect of the Mind is that which Men call Madness which appeareth to be nothing else but some Imagination of some such Predominancy above the rest that we have no Passion but from it and this Conception is nothing else but excessive vain Glory or vain Dejection which is most propable by these Examples following which proceed in Appearance every one of them from Pride or some Dejection of Mind As first we have had the Example of one that preached in Cheapside from a Cart there instead of a Pulpit that he himself was Christ which was spiritual Pride or Madness We have had also divers Examples of Learned Madness in which Men have manifestly been distracted upon any Occasion that hath put them in Remembrance of their own Ability Amongst the learned Men may be remembred I think also those that determine of the Time of the Worlds End and other such the Points of Prophecy And the gallant Madness of Don Quixotte is nothing else but