Dispositions properly Previous to that Form And therefore does as truly by Informing that Matter Make or constitute the Man One Thing as any other Corporeal Form does any Body in Nature 14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man which is immediately united with the Soul as the Matter with its Form and therefore is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual and includes both Natures Whence when that Part is affected after its peculiar Nature Corporeally the Soul is affected after its Nature that is Spiritually or Knowingly which Part Cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Glandula Pinealis 15. Therefore the Manner how and the Reason why those Corporeal Effluviums do come to affect the Soul and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form in that part whence follows that the one cannot be affected but the other must be affected too after its Different manner proper to its Distinct Nature In the same manner abating the Diversity peculiar to each of those Natures as when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon the Form of it or the Complexion of Accidents making up one Thing with it does also suffer Change Whence by the way is seen the Reason of that received Maxim that Actiones Passiones sunt suppositorum So that 't is the whole Thing which acts or suffers tho' according to this or that Part of it and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it as it were distinctly 16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 't is Spiritual which we will call the Seat of Knowledge must whatever it is be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies and to their several Modes as can be conceived and as far as Matter can bear Abstract from them all both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the Different Effluviums by which their several Natures are to be understood as also more fit to beget in the Soul Universal Notions such as are those of Ens or Being by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of Judging and Discoursing is managed Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is Confused or Indistinct as those of Ens or Being are and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion Thus when we see a Thing a-far off and have but a Confused View of it it only appears to us to be something we know not particularly what or A Thing without making us know in the least what Kind of Thing or Body it is Afterwards coming nearer we discern it moves it self whence we gain the Notion of a Living Thing Then approaching still nearer we by a more distinct Impression know 't is a Horse And lastly when it is within convenient Distance to give us a perfectly Distinct View of it we know 't is such a Particular Horse of our own 17. That Part called the Seat of Knowledge must moreover be the most Sensible and the most Tender that can be imagin'd that as was said the least Effluviums may affect it And yet it must not be of a Glutinous Nature so as to entangle them and make them stick there but that reverberated thence they may light in some near adjacent place to serve by their renewed Impulses afterwards for the Use of Memory and to excite again former Knowledges as also as will be shewn to cause Reflex Acts. That it must not be in the least Glutinous appears hence evidently that did the Effluviums stick there we should whether we would or no perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects which would also hinder our Perception of others by mingling the former Effluviums with those which supervene 18. The orderly disposure of the world by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which are more Noble and more Perfect does evince that this Part call'd the Seat of Knowledge is the most Supremely Noble production of Material things and nearest ally'd as it were to Spiritual Nature that can be imagin'd so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corporeal things are center'd in it Whence tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physician that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a baser part of Man's Body than the Intestinum Rectum yet I cannot approve of Cartesius his Conceit that it is a Glandule which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own not only specifically distinct from other parts but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it 19. Whether amongst its other Special Qualities it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark do reflect Light and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances which we call Fancies or Phantasms do spring thence I leave to others to determin I think it is the Interest of those who make the Septum Lucidum to be the Seat of Knowledge to embrace that Opinion 20. Those Effluviums sent out from Bodies have the very Natures of those Bodies in them or rather are themselves Lesser Bodies of the Self-same Nature as the smallest imperceptible parts of Bread and Flesh are truly Bread and Flesh which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump and therefore by Application of themselves they imprint the very Body it self or a Body of that Nature on that material part which is the Seat of Knowledge Whence the Soul being at the same time affected after her manner or Knowingly as that part was affected she has also the very Nature of that Body as far as the Sense exhibits it put in her by that conformable Impression when she has a Notion of it 21. Therefore those Effluviums striking the Seat of Knowledge and immediately as has been said falling off from it do affect it as a Thing distinct from the Mâ—n For they are not there as belonging at all to the Intrinsecal Constitution of the Body but as meer strangers to it Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her and consequently is that Body as 't is another Thing from her which illustrates the Explication of knowing given formerly and that 't is to be another thing as it is another 22. The Reason why those Effluviums containing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow do not breed a Notion in the Soul of their whole Essences is because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the Senses which being diverse and each of them according to their circumstances apt to be affected diversely do therefore receive and imprint them after a different Manner For example those which by the smart motion of the Ayr do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which
be prov'd that what we maintain is Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes e'er we ought to think or imagin that God will have any hand in it And if we can prove this we need no Immediate or particular Recourse to God's favouring us by doing This or That to make good our Argument 4. I must deny too consequently to my former Doctrine that Sensible Qualities are nothing in the Objects but Powers to produce various Sensations in us unless it be meant that they have Powers to send out such Effluviums into the Brain by the Senses as imprint their very Natures in our Mind and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them existing in the Bodies themselves nor be Resemblances of them If this be true why are they call'd Ideas which either signifies Resemblances or Nothing Again since the Bodies are put to cause them how can we think they are nothing like them Can any Man think the Effect is nothing like the Cause when every Effect can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause or something coming into the Subject from the Efficient which was in it some way or other before Lastly If these Secondary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones viz. of Solidity Extension Figure and Mobility in our Understanding why should not those Primary Qualities in re as well compound those Secondary ones in the Thing or out of our Understanding And if they do as 't is evident they must since they are all there then why are not those Secondary Ideas full as like those Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Thing as the Primary Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the same Thing and consequently resemble them as well as the others did their proper Originals I much doubt that the Author rather consulted his Fancy in this particular than his good Reason And because those Effluviums or the Figures of Parts which cause our Sensations are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves as the Primary ones did but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance he judges hence they are Nothing like the others Whereas Reason will inform Reflecters that since Colour is nothing but the Surface of a Body as 't is apt to reflect Light the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a White Thing which is apt to reflect much Light is to our Reason and in our Notion such as it was in the Thing imprinting it and consequently every thing Acting as it is such as came from it Whence those who by Reflex Thoughts and using their Reason do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whiteness do make it consist in such a Reflexion of Light bringing Effluviums with it from a Surface so advantagiously Figur'd And so the Notion of Whiteness is the same in the Thing and in the Understanding viz. those Effluviums thus Figur'd or Modified however the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing as 't is White which indeed Fancy never does 5. The Reason why the Pain which we feel is not in the Thing that Caus'd it and Sensible Qualities are so is because these last are Proper Univocal and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out Effluviums of their own Natures but Pain being an Affection of the Soul springing from a Perception that its dear Compart is hurt and disorder'd is an Improper Remoter and Equivocal Production The Altering Disordering or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature is as was shewn the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents but 't is Accidental to their manner of Operating that they cause Pain or Pleasure even remotely and it lights only that sometimes they do this because the Subject or the Body in which they produce these their proper Effects haps to be Identified with a Knowing Nature only which is properly capable to Grieve or be Delighted when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body which is Part of the Man and in some sort himself The like is to be said of Manna and other such Instances The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach are Natural Proper and Immediate Effects of it but the Pain ensuing thence which is a Spiritual Disposition of the Mind is a Remote Accidental and Improper Effect of it 6. By this Time Mr. Locke sees that I agree with him that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to cause our several Sensations and that this Power is that which we call such a Quality of it But I disagree with him that they are only Powers to cause such a Motion and affirm it is a Power when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites as with Light to convey Visible Qualities Moisture Gustable ones c. to send out Effluviums of their own Nature to the Brain which therefore are Inherent in and Proper Parts of those Objects whether they cause Actual Sensation or no. The Sun sends out his Beams which scatter'd thinly at this remote distance from the Fountain are therefore one of Mr. Locke's Secondary Qualities which we call Light yet contracted by a Burning-Glass they perform the Proper Effect of Fire Burning whence we ought to conclude they are of the Nature of Fire Can we then deny or doubt but that the Body of the Sun which communicates or sends them out is it self Fire or that being such those Rays and the Sun have no Similitude with one another Or that when they strike the Eye they stop there and are not carry'd into the Brain Hippocrates tells us that Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles meaning that they are pervious to the Humours which are gross Things in comparison of the Sun-Beams How can it then be doubted but that they reach the Fancy and thence the Soul and imprint their Notions or Natures there And tho' some may deny they are the same in the Mind as they are in Nature yet can it with any Shew of Reason be deny'd they are at all like the Cause that produced them The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities to what Sense soever they belong 7. To close this Discourse I am apt to think that Mr. Locke intended to oppose those who hold that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities Next I declare that tho' the Thing has accidentally a Power in it to make it self perceiv'd yet taking the Thing as an Object as he does it is but Improperly called a Power and not Properly as are our Powers or Faculties of Seeing Hearing Knowing c. are For the Act being the End for which the Power was given the Faculties or Powers are better'd and perfected by being reduced to Act and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object Whereas neither the Object or Thing nor
could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it it had none Lastly Are those Species they put when purify'd perfectly like the Thing or imperfectly If perfectly like then they are the same with it as our Notions are and so the Thing it self is in the Soul and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose for the Thing being there in Person as it were there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Species of it self If they be imperfectly like the Thing they are no more but Resemblances of it and then 't is already abundantly demonstrated that the Thing can never be known by them So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul or how the Thing could come to be known by them 5. The Ideists on this Occasion have taken two ways and both of them very short ones which is to skip over all those Difficulties at one Leap The Cartesians tell us in one Word That God gave the Soul her Ideas or as some of them say some of them at the same time he gave her her Being and that by having those Ideas in her she comes to know and so by making this quick work the Question is at an End This is soon said but not so easily proved Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence to hinder its Currency in the Preface to my Method and in the Book it self as Occasion presented and shall add many more in case their Opposition shall invite me to it But what needs any more since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply Other Ideists there are who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question and finding by Experience that they have Ideas and Resemblances in their Head when they know they content themselves with That without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former for 't is much more wise and safe in order to the Common Good of Learning to wave an obscure Point totally than by advancing false Positions in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy to affirm what cannot be maintain'd Tho' I must declare that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point which influences the whole Body of Science ought not to be pretermitted For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my Method reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented which seems to offer it self at present 6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul and particularly as it is the Form of such an Animal Body which may not improperly be called Physicks or Animasticks Besides it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration Yet I think I may promise my Readers that the Positions I shall lay down orderly to clear it will have that Coherence amongst themselves and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences that it will be hard in just Reason to find any considerable Flaw in it I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point and these are my Thoughts 7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects and on the Matter 's side by Dispositions to further Productions Thus Wood is heated by Degrees e're it becomes Fire and breaks out into a Flame and in the Generation of every thing in Nature there are are many Previous Alterations of the Matter ere it acquires Another Form or becomes Another Thing 8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of God as he is the First Cause that if in the Ordinary Course of the World the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes to step in to Nature's Assistance and help her immediately by his own Hand Thus when the Individuality is compleated that is when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes so that it is become distinct from all other Entities or apt to be This and so fitted for Existence which Existence Second Causes cannot give God whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of does give them Existence immediately by himself 9. Therefore if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo that grown riper it is apt as far as is on the Matters side to act Comparatively which is the Disposition for Rationality And that this cannot be done but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature which Second Causes cannot produce it is certain God will by himself assist it by infusing such a Form 10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Comparatively that is to Judge and Discourse since we experience that we do this actually now in part by the means of the Brain or something that 's near it or belongs to it 11. Wherefore since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us of which Compounded or Compared we are to Judge and Discourse which we call Simple Apprehensions or Notions it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part as to convey into the Soul such Notions 12. Wherefore since Bodies in their whole Quantity or Bulk cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies upon the least Motion of Natural Causes Internal or External which is never wanting should send out Effluviums or most minute and imperceptible Particles which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs called the Senses and so be carried to the Brain 13. This Natural Compound called Man is truly One Thing and not aggregated of more Things Actually Distinct since the Form called the Soul did tho' not so Naturally yet as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter taking it as Seconded and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause as the Form of Fire or of any other Body in Nature does out of the
Sensation our own Existence as well as that of any other Body whatever I doubt not but Mr. Locke will grant they would Since then the Embryo in the Womb lies in a Roundish Posture why may not one part of it by touching another or operating upon it cause in us as soon as the Soul which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions is in it a Notion of our own Existence by way of Sensation Especially since Operation is nothing but the Existence of the Agent Body press'd or imprinted as it were upon another by Motion Certainly it becomes us who deny Innate Ideas to shew how all our First Notions do come into us by Impressions on the Senses and not to say rawly that some of them come by Intuition which is the Way of Knowing Proper to Angels whose Knowledges are all Innate and none of them Acquir'd either by Sense or Discourse for they have neither This I say is certainly best for the Interest of our Tenet of which Intuition gives but a slender Account I believe Mr. Locke proceeds upon this that he finds he not only does but must as firmly assent to the Proposition Ego sum as he does to the most Evident Proposition whatever nor can he at all doubt of it nor can it need Proof But my Judgment is that this Introversion and Studying our own Interiour is a very Fallacious Guide and will often lead us astray if we keep not a steady Eye attentively bent to our Principles which he seems here to neglect For many Positions need no Proof and force our Assent and yet their Certainty may depend on Different Causes 10. The 12th Chapter treats of the Improvement of our Knowledge which Mr. Locke says does not depend on Maxims But First he mistakes the Use of General Maxims They are not made for the Vulgar or Beginners to gather Knowledge by them tho' it may be observ'd that Men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose nay sometimes make Proverbs of them Nor was this Maxim a Whole is bigger than a Part ever intended for Boys or to teach them that their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger or such like but being premised to the ensuing Proofs they are occasionally made use of by Learned Men in the Process of their Discourse to clinch the Truth of the Point when it needs it by their Self-Evidence In the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to Metaphysical Principles and made use of them in my Preliminaries and Reflexions as Occasion presented to make my Discourses Evident and to rivet the Truths I advance in the Minds of my Readers as any Attentive Peruser of them may easily observe He speaks against our Receiving Principles without Examination and of Principles that are not Certain that is against such Sayings as are no Principles for if they can either need or admit of Examination or if they be not Certain none but meer Fops will let them pass for Prinples Yet tho' Mr. Locke does thus oppose Maxims and Principles 't is notwithstanding very evident that himself must make use of some Maxims and Principles all the while he disputes aganst their Usefulness otherwise he cannot discourse at all or his Discourse can have no Force In the same manner as he that wrastles with another must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground or he will fall himself instead of overthrowing his Adversary Let us then examin his Principles He alledges that the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles depends only upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas This then is one of his Principles both because it runs through good part of his 3d and 4th Books as also because 't is Equivalent to this Universal All Certainty of Principles depends c. Now this is so far from Self-evident that it needs Examination enough and is one of those I judge not Certain and therefore can be no Ground or Principle at all Nor is it possible it should unless the Word Idea be cleared to mean Spiritual Notions in our Mind and not meer Resemblances or Material Representations in our Fancy to clear which tho' the whole Treatise needs it no Provision is made but on the contrary those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded as is shewn in my First Preliminary Another Principle seems to be this None ought with a Blind and Implicit Faith to Receive and Swallow Principles This is of Universal Influence and Self-Evident and therefore in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle For Principles were not Principles if they needed either Faith or Deductions of Reason to make them go down since they ought to be Evident by their own Light But what Good can this do to any but to such as have renounc'd Common Sense even to Ridiculousness And perhaps Mr. Locke had some such weak Writers in his Eye when he advanc'd this cautious Position as a Warning to Learners 11. Now the General Maxims and Principles on which the Learned Part of the World has hitherto proceeded can onely be overthrown if they must needs be so by other Principles more Evident than themselves are or else it will be but a drawn Match and so they may hope still to stand as the Lawyers phrase it in their full Force Effect and Vertue We are to consider then what Principle Mr. Locke has substituted in their room when they are discarded for 't is a very ill Case to be left without any Principles at all 'T is this All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles and consequently the Way to improve our Knowledge is to get and fix in our Minds Clear Distinct and Compleat Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them Proper and Constant Names Now if the Ideas must be Clear the Terms must be very Simple and consequently as was shewn above General ones and this will force us back upon General Maxims which it was intended we should avoid as good for little To be Distinct if we go to work like Artists we must distinguish those General and Common Notions which will bring us back into the old Road of those Ten Common Heads called Predicaments and consequently of Genus Species and Differences which was lately dislik'd I suppose because it was too much travell'd in and beaten tho' I think such a Common Path should not be left because some may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the way Lastly Compleat Ideas as he grants are not to be had of the Species much less of the Individuums And as for Names 't is not we that are to annex them but the Common Usage of the Vulgar or of the Generality of Learned Men in case they be Artificial ones for these are they who gave them their Constant and Proper Signification Whence is seen that so many Difficulties are involv'd in this one Thesis or Principle besides what is said
being such as were we awake and had our rational fears about us we neither durst attempt nor could possibly perform without extream hazard But not to insist on these let us reflect on our selves even when perfectly awake and we shall discover that however we are set on work by Motives or Reasons yet we know not at all how the outward parts of our Body only which we experience in Brutes and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them do perform any of their Operations What Man living though supposed the wisest much less the Generality knows how or by what passages he is to send Animal Spirits into the Muscles whence all our Motion proceeds or into what Muscles or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an Outward Action What Feats of Activity does a Rope-dancer show us How many ways does he distort wind turn poize stretch and ply the parts of his Body To do which the Animal Spirits are to be sent now into this now into that Muscle to move this or this or that Limb or Joint sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement or quick Motion sometimes fewer to move them more moderately sometimes none at all into any of them when he has a mind to surcease all Motion and sit still Yet he knows no more than a Brute or a Stone does how he is to do any of this nor can give the least account how it is done All this is transacted by the wise Contrivance of the Body which is so framed as to be subservient to the Design the Man as he is Knowing and Rational had projected And the same is done in Brutes when either actual Impressions are made upon them from the Objects or those former Impressions are again excited in the Brain which done all the frisking motions of Pursuance and Avoidance which they perform do follow by a Course of Natural or Material Causes and withal according to those measures and degrees as are proportioned to the Efficacy of the first impellent Cause the Object in their Imagination the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of which to the Nature of the Animal is that which sets all the Engine on work at first 11. Nor can the Objection bear any force that some Actions of Brutes resemble Reason even though it seems more then is found in Men since we experience that a Watch which is the work of an Artificer performs the Operations proper to it and tells us the time of the day with more exactness than the best Reason we have can do without such helps So that the Watches acting according to reason demonstrates indeed there was Reason in the Framer of it but argues none at all in the Engine it self Wherefore however the Actions of some Brutes may bear a show of Reason this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a Rational or Wise Maker but not that themselves acted knowingly or rationally while they did these Actions For my self I must declare that I have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the Action of a young Vine exerting and twisting its little Fingers about other things near it to support it self as it grew up as all the forementioned Circumstances weighed and abated at any Operation of a Brute and I doubt not but a Campanella who maintained that every thing in Nature had perception or some such other man of fancy would discourse and descant on it thus The poor week limber Vine knew and was well aware that not being able to support it self it would when it increast in length fall down flat on the ground and so be exposed to be trampled under foot and hurt and therefore did very prudently cling about other Vegetables or Poles near it to sustain it self and avoid that inconvenience And I dare affirm that we lose the best part of our Natural Contemplation by putting Brutes to have Knowledge for what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing Power in them should know or who admires it in a Man Whereas it justly raises our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artificer to see things which are made of meer Matter act with as much Wisdom and Prudence for their own preservation as the wisest Knower can by his best Wit of which he is so proud and sometimes with much more No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables do administer to devout Reflecters occasions of very high Contemplation and shall the Operations of sensitive Beings which are incomparably more excellent and more admirable as being the Top and Master-piece of this Material World afford little or none at all Now if their Nature be to have Knowledge in them and it be a thing common to all Creatures and expected that GOD should give to every thing what is its Nature there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment GOD has given Brutes a Knowing Power and that Power makes them know and there 's an end of our Admiration and consequently of our Contemplation and of that devout Admiration to which our Astonishment at the several Actions of those Natural Automata would otherwise raise us 12. I beg pardon for this long digression I thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point both because it is a very concerning and useful Preliminary as also to manifest how the using the word Idea hand over head as we may say and taking it Equivocally and indifferently for Phantasms and Notions leads this Great Man as it must needs have done every Man into great mistakes For Phantasms Beasts may indeed have they being no more but Effluuiums emitted from other Bodies and received by the portalls of the Senses into the Brain where the Animal Spirits stand readily waiting to move the Brute according as those Tinctures are agreeable or disagreeable to the Compound but Notions or which is the same Meanings or Apprehensions they cannot have for these being made by Direct Impressions upon our Spiritual part the Mind only which can mean or apprehend to judge they have any such would conclude they had a Spiritual and consequently an Immortal part in them which I am sure we shall both of us deny Besides had they Meanings or were capable of any they would be capable of the Meanings of our Words at least those amongst them which are most Docil and could Speak would not fail if well taught and educated to know much of our Language and Answer in some few occasions Pertinently which none of them ever did designedly and if they hap to do so by accident none thinks they meant as they spoke but all mankind laughs at the odd Chance as at a pleasant Jest. Those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their Names as Nurses do to little Infants and why might not Beasts learn them as well as Children at least learn as much in many years as they do in two or three Indeed some Words and
the Existence of their Subject But when we have a Notion of any Mode in Nature we conceive it as some way or other Existing therefore their Notion must connotate the Subject or Thing by whose Existence only they do Exist 13. It would not be hard to multiply Arguments to prove this nice Point fetch'd both from Metaphysicks and also from Logick and the Verification of all Propositions did I conceive it to be needful But I see plainly that all the Arguments in my former Preliminary do conspire with their united Force to make good this Fundamental Position For if this Truth be once firmly establish'd that our Notions are the Things themselves as far as they are conceiv'd by us it must follow that all our Science being built on those Notions has for its Solid Basis the very Thing it self and not any other Things or Nothings distinct from the Thing known such as are their pretty Spiritual Looking-Glasses those Unaccountable Inexplicable Unnecessary and Useless Things called Ideas And I hope I may rest confident that those Proofs of mine will abide the Shock of the most Strenous Opposition since unless that Grand Leading Truth be Certain 't is demonstrable that no Man living can know any thing at all For 't is confess'd that nothing can be known but by the Means of those Ideas or Representations of it And those Arguments evince that unless the Thing it self be in our Mind first those Ideas or Resemblances cannot possibly give us any Notice or Knowledge of it 14. Note First On this Occasion we may reflect on the Sagacity of that great Speculater and Observer of Nature Aristotle and may gather at the same time his true Sentiments in this Particular that when he came to range all our Natural Notions into his Ten Common Heads he did not express the Modes or Accidents by Abstract Words but Concrete ones lest his Scholars should hap to think they were certain Kinds of Entities Distinct from the Subject whereas they were Nothing but the Subject or Substance it self considered as thus affected or thus modify'd For he does not call them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Quantitas Qualitas as we do but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Quantum Quale nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Relatic but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Relata or more simply 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ad aliquid Which last is abetted by our Common Language as when we ask What is he to me the Answer is Your Friend your Father c. Where the Words to me express formally what we call Relation and the Words is he both signifie that the Relation is a Mode or Accident intrinsecal to the Subject however it be Consider'd in order to another and withall that it has no Being but that of the Thing or Subject signify'd by the Pronoun He Which amounts to this that what we call in an Abstract Word Relation is nothing in reality but the Thing Considered thus or in order to another Individuum which we call to be thus Modified or conceived to be according to such a manner Related The same is observable in the rest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Agere Pati Habere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quando ubi which have the Force of Concretes for 't is only the Subject that can be conceived or said to Act Suffer be in such a Place or Time or have such a kind of Habiliment Whereas were it not for that reason he could have express'd them in Abstract Terms perhaps more handsomly as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tempus Lecus Actio Habitus had it not been his Intention to avoid Abstract Terms lest the manner of Expression should represent it as a kind of Thing Distinct really from the Subject and so lead Men to take a Fancy for a Reality as it happens in the Mis-acception of the Word Space which breeds the Conceit of Vacuum And he was less sollicitous to do this in the first Predicament call'd by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because there was no Danger Men should take the Essence of the Thing to be a distinct Thing from the Thing it self as there might be in the others So that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd as a most certain and most Fundamental Maxim by all who pretend to true Philosophy that Whatever Conception of ours has not the Thing or Res either consider'd in part or in whole in its Notion has no Reality in it and is a meer Fancy Note Second Hence we may gather the proper manner of Signifying found in Abstract and Concrete Words as such viz. that the Concrete Word Album for Example signifies directly the Subject and indirectly the Form or Mode conceived to be in it And the Abstract Word Albedo signifies directly the Form or Mode and indirectly the Subject which indirect manner of signifying is properly called Connotating 15. This uncommon Doctrine might perhaps sink better into the Reader 's Consideration if it were illustrated by an Instance We will take then Mr. Locke's Position of an Infinite Imaginary Space or Vacuum To make good which Tenent he imagins that Vacuum signifies a Space without Body Which to my Judgment is as much as to say it signifies a Contradiction or Chimera For I positively deny we can have any Notion of Space without including Body however we may have a Fancy of it And I as positively affirm that Space can signifie nothing but Body according to such a Mode called Space or Quantity For to wave my former Proofs I ask him whence he had first the Notion or Idea of Space He is too acute to hold Innate Ideas It was Acquir'd then or wrought in him And by what but by the Thing that is by the Body It was the Body then which he saw it was the Body thus modify'd that imprinted it self thus on his Senses and caused such a manner of Idea in his Mind Wherefore to conceit that we can have an Idea of Space without Body whereas he never had an Impression or Idea of Space but what was in Body and a Mode of it and so Identify'd with it is to relinquish our Solid Natural Conceptions and run to Fancies to abandon the Firm Ground of all our Knowledge the Thing and to pursue instead of it an Aiery Nothing for Modes or Manners without the Thing of which they are Modes signifie a meer Nothing and can be Nothing else or which is the same 't is to discard our well-grounded Notions and to entertain in their Room meer Phantastick Resemblances The Notion of Space then being an Impression of and from the Thing is the Thing or the Body conceived according to that abstracted Respect or Mode called Space Wherefore to put Space beyond all Bodies or where there is no Body is a plain Trucking our Natural Notions for Appearances that are Groundless and coined by our Imagination Perhaps he will say we can clearly Abstract the Idea of Space from that of Body which is so far
supports its Modes in their Being Nor will it do us any Harm loqui cum vulgo to speak as vulgar Philosophers use provided we do Sentire cum doctis or make wiser Judgments of the Literal Sense of those Words than they perhaps ever meant 12. The word Suppositum is another Name of Ens or Thing in a manner tho' not altogether the same with Substance For Substance is I conceive meant for the Essential Notion of the Thing as it is contradistinguisht from Accidental or Unessential ones and Suppositum does over and above relate also to the very Nature of the Thing or to the Complexion of Accidents which constitutes its Essence and not only to the Modes as each of them singly is a meer Accident and had Being by it or in it Whence the Notion of Suppositum is the most Confused of any other and signifies that which has all the Forms in it Whatever whether they be Essential ones or Accidental and not only those Modes or Accidents which naturally belong'd to it at first as Properties or inseparable Accidents but those also which accru'd to it since and are meerly Accidental to it 13. Hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word Suppositality which is the Abstract of the Suppositum For it signifies manifestly the Thing according to the precise Notion of the Suppositum or of what has all the aforesaid Forms in it How agreeable this discourse is to Christian Language and Principles will easily appear to Solid Divines 14. The word Individuum which is another name of Ens us'd by the Learned and as is seen in those usual words the same Individual thing is got into our vulgar Language is a Logical Expression distinguishing the Notion of a Particular only which is properly a Thing from the Generical and Specifical Notions in regard both these latter do bear a Division of their Notions into more Inferiour ones and so that each of the Inferior ones contains the whole Superiour Natures in it which the others do signify as the whole Definiton Notion or Nature of an Animal or of a Sensitive Living Thing is found in Man and also in Brutes and the whole Definition or Notion of Man is found in Socrates and Plato But the particular Natures of Socrates and Plato which are signify'd by those words and their Definitions could they bear any cannot be divided into more which have the particular Natures of Socrates and Plato in them And therefore they are called Individuums that is such as cannot be divided into more which have the Natures signified by those words in them as could the Generical and Specifical Notions of Animal and Homo whence Individuums are the Lowest and Narrowest Notion that can possibly be in the Line of Ens. 15. The Individuum is call'd by the Latin Schools Substantia prima and the Superiour Notions in the Line of Ens. Substantiae Secundae which signifies that only Individuums are in propriety of Speech Entia or Capable of Existing For since as was shown above nothing that is Common or Undetermined can exist none of the others can have any Actual being at all but in the Individuum as a kind of Metaphysical Part of its Intire Notion and a Part in what Sense soever that word be taken can not possibly be but in the whole If this then be their meaning as I believe it is nothing can be more true and Solid Only I must note that it is less properly and less Logically exprest and that Aristotle speaks more exactly when he calls the Former 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or primò Substantia and the latter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Secundò Substantia which words denote that the former is Ens in its Primary and Proper signification of that word and the latter only Analogically that is in a Secondary and improper Sense which prima and Secunda Substantia do not express For both these may be properly Entia still for any thing those words tell us tho' one of them may have an Order of Priority to the other as Prima and Secunda in some such Sense as we call God the Primum Ens considering him in order to Creatures 16. From Words used by Philosophers which belong to the Line of Ens we come to those which are made use of to express the Modes or Manners how a Thing is which in a generall Appellation the Schools have call'd Accidents This Word is certainly very improper For who can think that Quantity or as they will needs call it Extension is Accidental to Body or as some may take that Equivocal Word that 't is but by Chance or by Accident that Bodies have any Bigness in them at all The best Sense I can give it in pursuance to my own Grounds is this that Accidental which is the Denominative from Accident may mean such Notions as are Not Essential or which is the same they may mean the Thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any Order to Being nor expresses any such Order by the Word which signifies its Notion And were this Sense universally accepted and attributed to the Word Accidents it would be a True and Solid one For 't is evident that none of the Words that signifie any of those Accidents does in the least import in its Signification either Being or any Respect or Order to it as does Ens and all those Words which do formally and properly express it or belong to it Whence the Notions signify'd by such Words are not Essential ones or relating properly and precisely to the Essence but Modish as we may term it or expressing some Manner How the Thing is which is a quite different Notion from that of Ens or Thing or of what formally is found in that Line I do believe that divers of the Wisest and most Learned School-men did take the Word Accidents in this Sense tho' the Propriety of that Word fetch'd from its Radix did not invite much less oblige them to do so I doubt also that the Usage of that Word in that warrantable Sense I have now assign'd was not so Common and universally Current even among the School-men as to force it to bear that Sense as appears by their thinking that Accidents were certain kinds of little Adventitious Entities much less among the Modern Ideists who through their Shortness in Logick and Metaphysicks do make Quantity or Extension the Essential Form of Body which is to put Bigness in the Line of Being or to make Bigness and Being or the Mode and the Thing to be in the same Line of Notions and Intrinsecal to one another Whereas a Thing must first be conceiv'd to be e'er it can be after such a Mode or Manner 17. For the Reason lately given I cannot but judge that the Word Mode or as some call it Modification is far more proper than the Word Accidents to signifie those last Nine Common Heads
which are hardest of all to explicate as wanting any Common Genus or any thing like it to explicate them by I intended once to dilate upon them in this Preliminary as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve But seeing upon Review how Prolix I have been already in my Preliminaries I am forced to content my self with Noting them in short leaving it to others to enlarge upon them They are these distributed into their several Ranks 23. First Ens taken in its whole Latitude for the Thing and its Modes Secondly The Properties of Ens taken in that large Signification such as are Unum Verum Bonum and their Opposites Non-Unum or Divisum Falsum and Malum For the Notions of all the Modes being improperly Entia have by Consequence only improper Essences or Entities of their own and consequently Properties of those Improper Essences Thirdly Idem Diversum and in general Relatum taking this last Word in the largest Sense for all kinds of Respects whatsoever In which Signification all Things or properly called Entia do relate to Existence and all their Modes or Accidents do respect them diversly as certain Manners how they are Of which Nature also are the aforesaid Common Words Mode and Accident which are Transcendents in respect of the Nine last Predicaments Fourthly Completum Incompletum Partial and Total Generical and Specifical Superior and Inferior Simple and Compound and such like Most of which kind of Transcendents seem rather to respect the Manner of Being which Things have in our Understanding than the Manner of Being they have out of it Of the last Sort are Which What That which Something Somewhat c. which are the most Confused Words imaginable and signifie any Notion but that of meer Nothing By these we make a Bastard or Illegitimate Definition of Ens and say that a Thing is That which is capable of Existing c. I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition because the Notion of the Genus which is one part of a proper one has a Determinate Sense Whereas That which which for want of a better supplies the place of the Genus has none For 'T is to be noted that in all Transcendents unless perhaps some of those of the Fifth Sort which have a kind of blind Confused Sense the Name only is Common or Applicable to more and not the Notion for having no one Notion that is Common to all those Common Heads they have none till it be Determin'd since no Notion can exist in the Mind unless it be This or That or one any more than a Thing can exist in Nature unless it be determin'd to be such a Particular or Individual Thing Much less has any of them proper Differences dividing them by more and less of the Common Notion as every Notion that is truly Common to more may and must have 23. Whence extreme Care must be taken how Students in Philosophy do use these Transcendent Words and that they do distinguish their Sense most exactly when they have Occasion to make use of them For they having an Indifferency to many Senses and those as vastly disparate as the Common Heads themselves are that is as the Schools properly phrase it Senses differing toto Genere I may add Generalissimo it must follow that every time they do use them confusedly or with a Conceit that they are Univocal their Discourse must needs straggle widely now one way now another and thence confound all our Commonest Notions which of all others ought to be kept Distinct the want of doing which hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms in which only Science consists and breeds innumerable and most Enormous Errours It would be tedious I doubt to my Readers tho' perhaps not hard for me to show what Prodigious Inconveniences do arise from the Mis-acceptions of one of those many Different Senses such Words may bear for Another I will only bring one Instance hoping that by this as by a Sea-mark my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occasions 25. The Word Compounded may either mean the Composition of Matter with its Essential Form or that of the Essence with its Suppositum which is conceived to have the Essence in it or of the Superiour Notions of Ens with the Individuum All which are Compositions belonging to the Line of Ens. Coming next to the Modes or Accidents the whole Ens or Suppositum may be considered as Compounded with its Primary Mode called Quantity or with some Quality or Relation Or with some Action or Passion Time Place Situation or Habit. Whence accrues to the Subject the Denominations of Agent Patient Living or being at such a time or in such a Place Sitting Armed c. All which Nine last Compositions are Modifying or Accidental ones and not Essential or such as concern directly and precisely the Notion of Thing or Being as did those of the first sort Now come Cartesius and his Followers who loath to say the Body and Soul are two Suppositums and wanting Skill in Metaphysicks to comprehend what the Union of Entitative Parts is or how made which are Points too hard for Mathematicians and of which de la Forge tho' he talks prettily can make nothing at all they would have the Soul and Body compound One Thing because they Act together or assist one another mutually to produce some sorts of Actions Whereas Action being only a Mode and so presupposing the Res or Thing which it modifies can only determin and denominate its Subject to be Acting and therefore Joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the Soul and Body Co-Acters which is a vastly disparate Notion from the Constituting and Denominating them One Thing as common Sense informs us We will put an Instance My Hand and my Pen do both of them concur to the Action of Writing and so compound one Joint-Acter nay they depend mutually on one another as to the producing this Action For the Hand cannot write without the Pen nor the Pen without the Hand Besides they are in some sort fitted to one another in order to perform this Action for the Fingers are so fram'd as to hold and guide the Pen very commodiously and the Pen taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my Hand so as to draw the Letters such as they ought to be Lastly which is much more and a Parallel very agreeable to the Co-action of Soul and Body they both of them do modifie each other's Action For the best Scrivener writes but scurvily with a Bad Pen and the Best Pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful Hand And yet the Hand and the Pen are not one Jot the nearer being one Thing notwithstanding their Concurrence to this Joint-Action tho' it be qualify'd with Mutuality Fitness of the Co-Agents and the Modification which the Action receives from both of
Entity or Capacity of Being from the Thing as well as we can its Solidity or any of the rest And certainly that Notion which Expresses Reality or an Order to Being should claim a Right to be consider'd in the first place I cannot but judge that the Methodizing of his Ideas on this manner would certainly have made his ensuing Discourses more Orderly and consequently more Clear But every Man is Master of his own Thoughts and of his own Method Nor did Mr. Locke intend to write an Exact Logick which is what I aym'd at and therefore took that way that best suted with his own ingenious Conception which was that as all our Notions as we both of us hold come into our Mind by our Senses so he apprehended it the properest way to treat of them as they are the Objects of This or That or many different Sensations 2. His 4th Chapter of Solidity gives me Occasion of making some few Reflexions which I shall touch on slightly or omit because they recurr hereafter First His using the word Solidity in his New Sense seems very Improper For all our Words do either Signify our Natural Notions which are Common to all Mankind whose Meaning therefore is to be taken from the Usage of the Vulgar or else Artificial ones invented by Artists to express the Notions they are Conversant about Whereas the Word Solidity taken as it is here seems to agree to neither I do not remember it is ever us'd in an Artificial Sense but by Mathematicians who signify by it the Triple Dimension of Quantity which is quite different from his Sense of it And the Vulgar Understand and Use the Word Solid as opposit to Fluid and say that the Earth is Solid or Firm and the Water Fluid or apt to be Diffus'd both which Senses are vastly different from Impenetrability of the Potential parts of Quantity which is the meaning he gives it So that as far as I have read no Man ever used the Word Solidity in his Sense but himself and it is not at all allowable to Him Me or any Man to give a new Sense to any Word not given it before For this discourse of mine shows it can have no Proper Sense at all and on the other side he does not take it in a Metaphorical Sense as we use to do when we transferr it to Spiritual Things and call a Notion or a Discourse Solid All Words are indeed Ad placitum but 't is Mankind that must please to agree in their Signification nor must they be at the Beneplacitum of Particular Men or Private Authors 3. He declines with some reason the Word Impenetrability because it is Negative But why might not then Extension have serv'd which bears the same Sense For that whose Notion or Nature it is to have its parts without one another cannot bear the having them within one another or their being Penetrated within themselves which is his Notion of the Word Solidity He conceives his Solidity to be most intimately connected with and Essential to Body and no where to be found or imagin'd but only in Matter But why his Solidity should be deem'd Essential to Body at all he gives no reason and I am well assur'd no Man living can give any For it confounds the Line of Substance or Ens with that of Quality which jumbles all our Commonest Notions together by making the Thing and its Mode to be the same Essential Notion Nor is it Solidity only that is necessarily found in Matter for neither can Extension Divisibility Measurability Space Impenetrability c. be found any where but in things made of Matter But what I most wonder at is why Quantity should be totally wav'd and neglected That Word having been used by all the Learned World till of late is as has been shown Preliminary 5th § 18. most Proper and either directly or by Immediate consequence involves all the rest in its Signification For if a Body have Bigness or Quantity in it it must be Extended and cannot be Contracted into a Point Line or Surface It must be Divisible or One in the Notion of Quantity And if it must be Extended and cannot be crampt into an Indivisible its parts cannot be penetrated within one another however it may be pierced or Divided by another Body by shoving its potential parts towards either side Lastly it must be Measurable or Proportionable to a Body of the same Quantity So that I see not what imaginable Priviledge can accrue to Solidity above the rest And it seems to me a New and Groundless assertion that Impenetrability tho' we abate the Negative manner of Expression is Essential at all to Body more than any of the rest that is not at all 4. This acute Writer in pursuance of his Doctrine about Solidity proceeds to prove there may be Pure Space or Vacuum because we can have an Idea of Space left by a Body without the Idea of another Solid Thing or a Body coming in its Room I Answer we may Indeed have a Fancy of such a Thing as we may of many other Contradictions so they be not exprest in directly opposit Terms v. g. of a Golden Animal or a Chimera c. But I utterly deny that we can have a True and Solid Notion of it taken from the Thing it self as all Ideas must be that are not Phantastick He thinks there is no Necessity one Body should follow another that is moved from such a Space and that the Maintainers of it do build their Assertion on the Supposition that the World is full What other Men hold of the World 's being Full I know not nor what they mean by it but I will candidly deliver my Sentiment and the Demonstration for it a priori which is this I take my Notion of Quantity from the Thing or Body and I have shewn above that that Notion is the Nature of the Thing as 't is Quantitative or Affected with such a Mode Here is my firm Ground and here I fix my Foot 5. Proceeding hence and reflecting on this Nature of Quantity in my Mind I discourse it thus I am to find out in what its Analogical Essence or Entity consists and I discover it must be in that which expresses its proper Unity Seeing then Divisibility best expresses its Unity for what is Divisible or Capable to be more is eo ipso One I have found out the Essential Notion or Nature of Quantity and since what is Divisible or not yet Divided is Continued and what is Continued as to its Quantity is not Discontinued or Divided according to its Quantity therefore Continuity is its proper Unity which consists in being Indivisum in se or within its own Notion and Formally constitutes its Subject such Wherefore since the Essence of Quantity is the Commonest Affection of Body taken in its whole Latitude as including all Bodies it follows that Continuity which is its Unity must be found in them
of Spiritual Natures without making long Excursions into Metaphysicks and perhaps this plain Discourse may help much towards it it being fetch'd from our most Natural Notions and known to us as it were by a kind of Experience Let us take then any Spiritual Mode or Accident a Virtue for Example and let it be that of Temperance which done let us ask our Natural Thoughts how Long Broad or Thick that Virtue is Is it as little as a Barly-corn or as big as a House Is it a Yard in Length or but an Inch Is it as Thick as a Wall or as Thin as a Wafer c. And Honest Nature would answer for us that 't is Nonsense to ask such a Question its nature being perfectly of another kind and utterly disagreeable to any of these Accidents Again Let us ask what Colour or Figure it is of Is it Blew Green or Yellow Is it Round Four-square or Triangular Is it Rare or Dense Hot Cold Moist or Dry And we shall discover that the Asker if serious would be look'd upon by all Mankind as a Fool or a Mad-man such Qualities as these being as much Disparate from the Subject we are Enquiring about as Knowledge is to a Beetle or Science to a Mushrom And yet it would not be wonder'd at that such Questions as these should be ask'd of any Body whatever And what does this amount to but that Nature assures us by her free and sober Acknowledgment of it that this Spiritual Mode call'd Virtue or Temperance is quite different from the whole Nature of Body and from any Corporeal Thing that by our Senses ever enter'd into our Fancy Since then this Spiritual Mode or Accident has nothing at all to do with Body or its Modes it is clearly evinced by the Ingenuous Confession of Unprejudiced Nature that the Subject of it which we call a Spirit is so vastly removed from all we can say of Body Being only excepted that 't is perfect Nonsense to attribute any thing to it which we find in Corporeal Natures Since then we can truly say of Corporeal Natures that they are Long Short Diffus'd Extended Commensurate to one another in their Bulk Motion Duration c. we must be forced to deny all those of Spirits and to Judge that they have nothing to do with any of these nor can bear the having such Modes apply'd to them or said of them under Penalty of forfeiting our plainest Reason and contradicting Common Sense And if it be such an Absurdity to apply them to Created Spirits how much more absurd must it be to explicate God's Eternity Infinity or Immensity by such gross Resemblances or an Imaginary Order to the Short and Fleeting Natures of Corporeal Creatures 8. Lastly to sum up all I deny that the Notion of Motion is taken from the continu'd Train of Distinguishable Ideas and I affirm that it is Imprinted by the Object without me and is one continually successive and undistinguish'd Mode there as it is in the Thing I deny too that Duration is Motion or Succession but only Being tho' our Being it being Unconstant and Fleeting is accompany'd with Succession and subject to Motion and Time and commensurate to them only not as 't is Being but as 't is Fleeting or perpetually Changing some way or other I deny it also as the most prodigious Enormity a Rational Soul could be liable to thro' its giving up the Reins of Reason to wild Fancy to say that our Measure of Time is applicable to Duration before Time For Mr. Locke makes Duration inconceivable without Succession and there could be no Succession before the World when there was only one Unchangeable God in whom is no Shadow of Vicissitude or Succession Does not the plainest Sense tell us that we cannot apply one thing to another but there must be One and Another and where 's that Other Duration or Succession before Time or before the World whenas 't is confess'd there was none Can any Man apply a Mode of Thing to Nothing which yet must be avowed by this Author for before the World there was nothing but God to whom it could not be apply'd and therefore there was nothing for Mr. L. to apply it to But this is parallel to that seducing Fancy that inveigled his Reason to hold a Vacuum he took the Notion of Space from Body and then apply'd it to what was neither Spirit nor Body but meer Nothing and here he took his Notion of Duration or Succession from Bodies moving and when he has done he would apply it to what 's not Body nor Spirit neither nor Motion nor like it but contrary to it that is he would apply it to meer Nothing I desire he would please to consider that the Thing to which Another is Apply'd must exist as well as that which is Apply'd to it and this antecedently to his Application of one to the other Wherefore both Space and Duration being both Modes or Accidents he must first prove there is something beyond the World to which he can apply the Mode of Space or something before the World to which he can apply the Mode of Successive Duration or it is perfect Nonsense even to talk of Applying one to the other But this he has not done and his way of attempting to do it seems to be this first he fancies he can apply those Modes to something there and then and thence concludes there must be Things there to which they may be apply'd as if his Fancy could create Entities at Pleasure or to please her Humour Nor matters it that we can apply stated Measures of Duration and thence imagin Duration where nothing does really endure or exist or by this means imagin to morrow next Year or seven Years hence for we cannot apply them by our Reason but only upon Supposition that they will exist and then there will be also some Thing or Subject supposed fit for them to be apply'd to whereas an imaginary Space beyond the World or imaginary Time or Succession before or after the World neither is now nor can there ever be any possible Subject to which they can be Apply'd and so the Application of them can bear no manner of Sense I must confess the word imagin which Mr. L. uses cap. 14. § 32. is very fit for his purpose and gives the greatest Semblance of Truth to his Discourse But by his Leave our Imagination cannot create Entities nor make Things to which he is to apply his Ideas to exist when they do not nor ever will exist and unless it can do this his Application is no Application for to apply a Thing or Mode of Thing to Nothing is no Application at all Both Space and Successive Duration are Modes Proper to Body whence only we had them and a Mode without the Thing of which 't is a Mode Modes having no Entity of their own is a meer Nothing Let him prove then first that there are beyond or before the
Reflex Notions have for their proper Object the Direct ones which are already in our Minds Wherefore if the Notion of Infinity can be had any other way than by adding Non to Finite it must come from our Reason finding out by Discourse that there is a First and Self-existent Being whose Essence and Attributes are beyond all Limits or actually Infinite Whence follows that since clear Reason demonstrates that all Created Entities and consequently all the Modes belonging to them are Finite and only God is Infinite in his Essence and in all his Intrinsecal Attributes And Reason also tells us that all which is in God to whom only the Notion of Infinite can belong is most highly Positive the same Reason teaches us to correct in our Thoughts the Grammatical Negativeness of the Word Infinite which can only be apply'd to Him and to look upon it and esteem it as most perfectly Positive 5. I cannot pass by unreflected on a Passage § 16. in which Mr. Locke's Fancy imposes strangely upon his Reason He says that Nothing is more unconceivable to him than Duration without Succession What thinks he of the Duration of God in whom is no Vicissitude or Shadow of Change which Text I believe no Man at least no Christian but holds to be Plain and Literally True whereas Succession is essentially perpetual Change Let him please to reflect that To Endure so long is nothing else but to be so long which done by cutting off so long in both those Sayings he will sind that To Endure is neither more nor less but simply To be Whence his Conceit is so far from being True that Nothing more wrongs Duration or Being than does Succession or Motion And therefore our Duration here which is Unsteady Unconstant and Transitory is justly reputed to be the worst sort of Duration or Being and the next to Not-Being or Not-Enduring at all Again Common Sense tells us that nothing moves meerly for Motion's sake and therefore that all Motion is to attain something which is Not-Motion but the End of it that is Rest. Wherefore Eternal Rest or that Duration called Eternity is the End of all the Motion of the whole World conformably to what the Holy Scripture speaking of the State of Eternity tells us that Tempus non erit amplius Time nor consequently Succession shall be no more Wherefore since taking away Motion and Succession 't is impossible to imagin any thing in Duration but only Being and Eternity is an infinitely better Duration or State of Being than this Transitory one which is Successive it follows that Eternal Rest in which we have all we can have or could acquire by Motion at once is the only true Duration and our Duration here only the way to it So far is Duration from being Unconceivable without Succession if we guide our Thoughts by Principles and not by meer Fancy REFLEXION Eleventh ON The Eighteenth Nineteenth and Twentieth CHAPTERS 1. THE three next Chapters of Simple Modes are very suitable to Mr. Locke's Doctrine delivered formerly and almost all of them agreeable to Nature particularly the 20th which gives us more genuin Definitions of the several Passions and more aptly in my Judgment expresses them than Mr. Hobbes has done tho' he is justly held to have a great Talent in delivering his Conceptions But I must deny that the Perception or Thought made by Impressions on the Body by Outward Objects is to be called Sensation For if Thoughts be Sensations then the Sense can Think which being the proper Act of the Mind I believe none will say if he reflects that our Soul is of a Spiritual Nature Nor are the Modes of Thinking at all proper to the Senses The Truth is that Man having two Natures in one Suppositum all the Impressions upon him as he is an Animal do also at the same time I may say the same Instant affect him also as he is Spiritual whence they are to be called Sensations as they are receiv'd in that material Part called the Seat of Knowledge and the same Direct Impressions as they proceed farther and affect his Soul are call'd Notions or Simple Apprehensions Wherefore as the two Natures in Man are Distinct and have their Distinct Properties and Modes so the Words that are to express what 's peculiar to each of those Natures are to be Distinguish'd too and kept to their proper Signification which cannot be if Thought which is peculiar to the Mind be confounded with Sensation which properly belongs to the Corporeal part But I suspect the Printer may be here in the Fault and not the Author the Sense in this place being something imperfect 2. To the Question proposed Cap. 19. § 9. Whether it be not probable that Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul I answer That 't is more than probable for 't is Demonstrable that 't is only the Action and not the Essence of it For in such Natures as are potential or apt to receive Impressions from other things as the Soul is in this State and therefore their Essence does not consist in being Pure Acts as Angels are Being must necessarily be presuppos'd to Operating especially when their first Operation as Thinking is to the Soul is a meer Passion caus'd by Impressions from another thing which are therefore purely Accidental to the Subject that receives them And I wonder Mr. Locke would even propose this as a Question to be yet decided or think it but Probable since he has formerly maintain'd assertively That Men do not always think For if it be not certain that Thinking is not the Essence of the Soul it follows necessarily that Men must always think since the Soul can never be without her Essence or what 's Essential to her 3. His Position that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain however it may hap to be misunderstood by some well-meaning Bigots is a most solid Truth and is exceedingly useful to explicate Christian Principles and to shew God's Wisdom and Goodness in governing Mankind Connaturally He proposes to him Fulness of Joy and Pleasures for evermore and such as being Spiritual and most Agreeable to the Nature of the Soul are Pure Durable and filling the whole Capacity of its boundless Desire not Transitory Mean and Base which tho' they cloy never satisfie Heaven would not be Heaven if it were not infinitely Pleasant and Delightful nor would Hell be Hell if it were not Penal And in case that Explication of Epicurus his Tenet which is given it by some of his Followers be truly his which makes Man's Summum Bonum consist in Pleasure at large and chiefly in the best Pleasures of the Mind it would not misbecome a Christian Philosopher Whence results this Corollary that The whole Body of Christian Morality depends as on its Practical Principle upon our making a wise Choice of the Pleasures we pursue here For the Object of our
Will and consequently of its Acts of Love is an Appearing Good and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually whence since that which breeds Pleasure in us must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant or most Agreeable to our True Nature Reason such as the best Spiritual Goods are and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best Greatest and Purest Pleasure Eternal Glory REFLEXION Twelfth ON The 21th CHAPTER 1. IN this Chapter of Power I find more to admire than confute The Author always Ingenious even when he errs has here much out done his former self Particularly his Explication of Freewill is generally speaking both Solid and Acute and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness and Virtue is both Learned and Pious Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method in making my Discourses Subservient and in shewing them to be Agreeable to Christian Principles 2. 'T is an excellent Thought that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit For Bodies can act no otherwise than as they are acted on themselves nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body or by some Spiritual Agent which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it without any Mixture of Patiency because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects yet the Clearest Idea of Action is given us by our Reason finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit or pure Act and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature nor from the Body it operates on by Reaction as is found in Corporeal Agents And our Reason gives us this Idea as it does many other Reflex ones by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents nor can they of themselves alone begin to move themselves nor move one another Circularly and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel Now Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul according to her Faculty call'd Will moving the Body gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd formerly and shown that the Soul by reason of her Potential State here cannot principiate any Bodily Action nor the Man neither unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent which is in act it self 3. He Judges with good reason that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct Entity has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy which humour of Multiplying Entities I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power and affirming that they only differ formally in Degree He shows clearly how in proper Speech the Will is not Free but the Man unless it be signified with a Reduplication that by the Word Will is meant Man according to that Power in him call'd the Will For Powers as he discourses well belong only to Agents and are Attributes only of Substances and not of the Powers themselves Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position that the Understanding and Will are the same Power Those who make them two do this because they find in the Notion of Will only a Power of Acting and not of knowing and in the Notion of Understanding only a Power of knowing and not of Acting But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will which they call a Blind Power by which they make one of those Powers formally as such to work upon the other as if the former were an Agent and the latter a Patient I add moreover that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible for what avails it the Will to be directed by the Understanding if it does not know how the Understanding directs it And to make the Will to know is to make it a knowing Power which is to make the Will tho' they never meant it to be the Understanding Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good the Man pursues it and so becomes or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting which is what we call Will. 4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse beginning from the Principles in this affair if exprest Literally and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences may set this whole business in a Clearer Light and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action and therefore is Free as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour Which tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them yet not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand they can never be steady but are now and then liable to some Errours 5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man and considering him barely as an Animal and wrought upon as other Animals are I discourse thus Particles agreeable to the Nature of the Animal being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain do if they be but Few lightly affect it and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it If more they make it as we say begin to Fancy it But if they be very many and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength cause naturally a Tendency towards it and powerfully excite the Spirits so as to make the Animal pursue it that is they will become such a Principle of Action which in meer Animals we call Appetite To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice or Freely but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone But if we consider this Animal as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it things will be order'd after another manner For those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain even into the Soul it self which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them Nor only so but she can reflect upon her own Operations too and know that she knows them by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers which she finds is a Nobler part of the
Conclusions and no Grounds Whence it does also destroy all Science it self which consists in Universal Knowledges as Experience does in particular ones for such Universal Truths cannot be had if General Maxims be disallow'd as Logick demonstrates This Ingenious Author thinks the need of such Maxims might be supply'd by having Clear and Distinct Ideas Which rightly understood comes over to us for Art and Nature both inform us that the Clearness of our Notions consists in their being more General and as they approach nearer to the Highest Genus they are still Clearer Now the Metaphysical Verity of a General Idea or Notion if put into a Proposition is perfectly Identical and a General Maxim Hence appears that it is a most Fundamental Errour in the Ideists that they rate the Clearness of their Ideas from the fresh fair and lively Appearances they make to the Fancy Whereas only the Definition by explicating the true Essence of a Thing shews us Distinctly the true Spiritual Notion of it The former of these is obvious and sensible and as I may say lies and appears uppermost and therefore is Superficial and a Material Representation made in the Fancy The Later is more Retruse it requires more Reflexion and Labour to attain it it is Intelligible not Sensible but once gain'd it is Solid Durable and being indeed the very Nature of the Thing it is the Ground of all our Discourses about it and of those several Knowledges concerning it Hence the Followers of Fancy become liable to take Similitudes for Notions and Representations for Things which makes their Productions very Plausible to other Men's Fancies for as they were the Productions of Fancy so they sute best with Men of Fancy but they fall short of instructing their Judgments To give an Instance of this Distinction of Notions from Phantasms They think that the Idea of a Quadrate for Example or Circle is very Clear and Distinct and that the Idea of Quantity is very Obscure and Confused Whereas to the Notion of the two former there goes the Notion both of Quantity of the Termination of Quantity or Figure and moreover of such a Figure all which being Essentially involv'd in the Notion of a Quadrate or Circle must needs make their Notions less Intelligible and less Clear than is that of Quantity only However the fair Pictures of the former on Paper or in the Fancy enveigles them to think otherwise Let us but reflect how many Truths are deduced by Geometricians out of the Notions of a Quadrate or a Circle and what large Treatises of Trigonometry are drawn out of the Notion or Nature of a Triangle and we shall discover how Compounded and Confused those Notions are in reality however we seem while we mind only the Pictures of them to have very clear Conceptions of them and to comprehend them distinctly and fully Now all these Truths are involv'd confusedly in the Notion or Nature of these Figures For all Discourses concerning any Notion whatever are nothing but running Division as we may say upon the Nature of that Object as their Ground and all Descants upon it are meerly that very Notion Unfolded and Explicated at large and consider'd on all sides and throughly Which comprising them all in its Bowels is therefore not so Clear and Distinct as Fancy makes us imagin Whence is seen evidently that Fancy and the first and obvious Appearance is not to be the Judge or Test of the Clearness or Confusedness of our Notions but Reason reflecting well on the Simplicity or Compoundedness of those Notions themselves and on the Reasons why they are so 10. Lastly 't is objected That such Maxims are Dangerous because if our Notions be wrong loose or unsteady General Maxims will serve to confirm us in our Mistakes and to prove Contradictions Now tho' our Judgments may be such yet I cannot conceive how our Notions can be Wrong Loose or Unsteady They are what they are and being the Things in our Understanding their Existence is fix'd there and as unalterable as our Soul it self their Subject is Notions are the same as our Meanings of the Words and tho' we may mistake what the Word signifies to others or to the Generality yet if I mistaking or not mistaking have such a Meaning of it in my Mind which only can mean or apprehend that Meaning is truly in me Nor tho' I be rectify'd as to the Common Use of that Word and put another Name to it yet my Meaning whether properly or improperly signify'd is still indivisibly and unalterably the same But suppose this so why must General Maxims be held Dangerous and Faulty when the Fault Confessedly lies in other Things Mr. Locke grants General Maxims to be True and Self-evident and 't is extravagantly odd to think that Propositions so qualify'd can be Guilty of leading Men into Errour If then he only means that the Mis-application or Abuse of them does great Harm he magnifies General Maxims while he intended to disparage them For it is generally noted that those are the Best Things that Mis-us'd do the Greatest Harm By this Argument we must lay aside all Religion as well as General Maxims since not all the Things in the World put together have done so great Mischief as Mis-us'd Religion Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum 11. To show General Maxims or self-evident Propositions may demonstrate Contradictory Positions he instances in Cartestus's making Body to be nothing but Extension and in his own Tenet making Body to be Extension and Solidity together Whence by this Maxim what is is the former may demonstrate there can be no Vacuum the latter that there may And I must in behalf of Truth take leave to tell them both that neither Extension alone nor Extension and Solidity together are any more the Notion of Body than a Horse-shoe is a Pancake For Body signifies a Thing and their Extension and Solidity are onely Modes or Accidents of that Thing and therefore the Notions of them do differ toto genere which is a greater and wider mistake than to say a Man is a Horse or an Apple is an Oyster these being all comprehended under the same Common Genus If out of Aversion to Metaphysicks and Disregard to true Logick which teaches us to distinguish our Notions exactly Learned Men will not be brought to Consider what the Word Thing and Body which is such a Thing mean they must necessarily fall into Fundamental Errours and so stumble every step they take The Notion of Thing evidently relates to Being one way or other But it does not formally signify Actual Being as Existence does therefore it can onely consist in this that is a Power to be or is Capable of Being actually And this Thing call'd Body since we experience it is alterable and Changeable Substantially or into another Thing must necessarily have a Power in it to be Alter'd or become another Thing which Power we call Matter our Common Speech and Common
Sense telling us that when a New Thing is made 't is not Created or made of Nothing but of the Matter that pre-existed in the former Compound But this Matter alone since it is a meer Power to be another Thing being of its own Notion utterly Indeterminate which is the true Sense of Aristotle's Description of it is not capable of Existing or a Thing for nothing in Common can exist but what is determinately This Therefore this Matter or Power needs another Compart conceiv'd to determin it which the Schools call the Form by which it is made capable to be or a Thing and without which it cannot be such It being evident then that every single Mode or Accident does something distinguish Bodies therefore such a Complexion of them as so distinguishes Matter that it makes it differ from all other Bodies it does consequently determin it to be This and no other and therefore constitutes it such a Thing or constitutes it Capable to Exist which is to make it this Thing or an Individuum Now if we leave all Consideration of Matter out of the Notion of Body and make it consist of Modes or Accidents only as he seems to tell us that himself and Cartesius do we must put those Modes to have no possible Subject but to hover in the Air none knows how and therefore we must needs discourse incoherently and be too hard for our selves by raising at every turn puzzling Difficulties we cannot solve All our Grounds must fail us when we do not distinguish between the Mode or Manner how a Thing is and the Thing it self Nor do I think Cartesius holds Body to be Extension but Extended Matter How Mr. Locke comes not to treat of Matter in his whole Book I know not but I fear it is because his Fancy cannot frame an Idea or Similitude of it By which it seems to me Evident that very many of his Ideas are meer Fancies coin'd by his Imagination For 't is evident he must have a Notion of it since he very well knows the meaning of those Words A Power to be a Thing or Matter which Meaning is the same with our Notion of it As for Vacuum which he again mentions here my Demonstration against it is in short this waving many others mention'd above All our Natural Notions are taken from Body and amongst them that of Space therefore they are nothing but Body inadequately consider'd and either Body or some Mode of Body Therefore whatever our Fancy may suggest it is impossible there should be Space where there is no Body since the Mode having no distinct Entity of its own cannot be where the Thing which gives it Being is not Therefore to put Space where there is no Body or a Vacuum is a direct Contradiction Each Part of which Discourse has been made good in its proper place 12. In his Second Instance of Man he seems again not to distinguish between the Fancy and the Notion of a Man which I have shewn in my Method Book 1. Less 2. § 24. Next he seems not to reflect that an Imperfect Conception of the Thing is of the whole Thing confusedly Thirdly 't is evident that Men do only err or discourse wrong by imperfectly conceiving thro' this Reason because they are not so wise as to consider that there may be more Modes wrap'd up in the Thing than we yet distinctly discover In which case they may err by mis-applying their General Maxims for which they must blame themselves and not the Maxim it self But I absolutely deny that any Man can possibly have the true and distinct Notion of Man unless he conceives him to be Rational As for what he tells us he has discours'd with very Rational Men who have actually deny'd they are Men I can only say I wonder how they escap'd Bedlam where I dare say there are many Men who are more Rational than they And my Opinion is that those very Rational Men were very high-flown Ideists For such Men by deserting their Natural Notions taken from the Things and the Conduct of true Logick and poring perpetually on their own Interiour and being withall unable to see the Difference between those Ideas they find there or to distinguish betwixt Fancies and Spiritual Conceptions are unless they be otherwise Masters of an Excellent Genius connaturally disposed by their Principles to be Fanaticks in Philosophy and to entertain as wild Fancies as the Deepest Enthusiasts Witness Cartesius his mad Fit of Enthusiasm which lasted some Days when he was laying his Principles as is writ in his Life and those Self-strangers now spoken of who actually deny'd they were Men Whom to requite Mr. Locke with a parallel Story I cannot liken so well to any thing as to a famous Humourist one John Band who serv'd my Lady Wootton in Kent This Fellow in the Heat of Summer going out in a Cart drawn by two Horses fell asleep in the Cart The Horses not hearing any cry Gee ho to urge them forwards took their Opportunity to rest themselves and stood still A Companion of his coming by and seeing how matters stood under-propp'd the Cart took out the Horses and having set them up return'd and lay behind the Hedge to observe how John would behave himself when he miss'd his Horses Who awaking got up rub'd his Eyes and in the Dawning of his Reason broke out to himself in these Words Either now I am John Band or I am not John Band If I am John Band I have e'en lost two Horses But if I am not John Band I have found a Cart. So that all John's Hopes were that he was not himself for then he had been on the better hand I much doubt that both he and Mr. Locke's Rational Men wanted the help of an Identical Proposition which tho' Mr. Locke holds they are not in the least Instructive would have made them all so wise as to know that Every Thing is what it is 13. But to be serious I cannot but admire that this Ingenious Author should in his 8th Chapter so ridicule Identical Propositions or esteem them Trifling He told us in his 2d Chapter that that Knowledge he calls Intuitive is of Self-evident Propositions and Identical ones are such He assures us that in every Step Reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge there is an Intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas Consonantly to which I have demonstrated in my Method Book 3. Liss 1. § 3. that all the Force of Consequence which gives the Nerves to all our Discourse must be an Identical Proposition Moreover he says Chap. 4. that we know each Idea to be it self and not another and that no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but with it self which are perfectly Identical Speeches and equivalent to these The same is the same with it self or Every Thing is what it is nay and General Maxims too against which he shew'd himself much offended in that Chapter