violently and more than ordinarily moved that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain there it signifies to the mind that something or other is to be felt and what is this but Pain as if it were in the Foot by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause as being hurtful to the Foot But the Nature of Man might have been so order'd by God that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing viz. either it self as 't is in the Brain or it self as it is in the Foot or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts or lastly any other thing whatsoever but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body In the like manner when we want drink from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat which moves the Nerves thereof and by their means the inward parts of the Brain and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health So of the Rest. From all which 't is manifest that notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God 't is impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable For if any cause should excite not in the Foot but in the Brain it self or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain that self same motion which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled the Pain would be felt as in the Foot and the sense would be naturally deceived for 't is consonant to Reason seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot than from any other I say 't is reasonable that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot rather than of any other part And so if a dryness of Throat arises not as 't is used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body but from an unusual Cause as it happens in a Dropsie 't is far better that it should then deceive us then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health and so of the Rest. And this consideration helps me very much not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject but also to correct and avoid them For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage and seeing I can use almost alwayes more of them than one to Examine the same thing as also I can use memory which joyns present and past things together and my understanding also which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors I ought no longer to fear that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false But especially those â—xtravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn'd off as ridiculous and perticularly the chief of them viz. That * of not distinguiâ—hing Sleep from Waking for now I plainly discover a great difference between them for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life as whatever happens to me awake is and certainly if while I were awake any person should suddenly appear to me and presently disappear as in Dreams so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went I should rather esteem it a Spâ—ctre or Apparition feign'd in my Brain then a true Man but when such things occur as I distinctly know from whence where and when they come and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth if after I have called up all my senses memory and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them that clashes with other truths For God not being a Deceiver it follows that In such things I am not deceived But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS ADVRTISEMENET CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS AMong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy as being Penn'd by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury a Man famously known to the World abroad but especially to his own the English Nation and therefore 't is likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen then what proceeds from a Stranger and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violenâ— Opposition of so Potent an Enemy And yet it must be Confess'd that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehendâ—d by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs's Philosophy especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English and therefore not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Discâ—urse to English Readers And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly VVho certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon VVhat Foundations it was Built OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS BY THE FAMOUS THOMAS HOBBS Of MALMESBURY WITH DES-CARTES'S ANSWERS OBJECT I. Against the First Meditation Of things Doubtful 'T IS evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation that there is no sign by Which we may Distinguish our Dreams from True 〈…〉 Phantasmes which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground we may well doubt whether any Thing Be or Not We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation But Because Plato and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same incertainty in sensible Things and because 't is commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 't is hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions ANSWER Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as true were proposed by Me only as Probable and I made use of them not that I may vend them as new but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my
Instance it cannot be said that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the Poyson for of that he is wholly Ignorant but he is said to Desire the Meat only as being of a grateful Taste and from hence nothing can be concluded but That Mans-Nature is not All-knowing which is no Wonder seeing Man is a Finite Being and therefore nothing but Finite Perfections belong to him But We often err even in those things to Which we are Impelled by Nature as when sick men desire that Meat or Drink which will certainly prove Hurtful to them To this it may perhaps be reply'd That they Err in this because their Nature is Corrupt But this Answers not the Difficulty For a sick man is no less Gods Creature then a Man in Health and therefore 't is as Absurd to Imagine a Deceitful Nature imposed by God on the One as on the Other And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the Laws of its Nature when it is ill contrived and tells the hours falsly 〈◊〉 when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer Machine or Movement made up and compounded of Bones Nerves Muscles Veins Blood and Skin so that tho there were no mind in It yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it those only excepted which Proceed from the Will and consequently from the Mind I do easily acknowledge that it would be as natural for him if for example sake he were sick of a Dropsie to suffer that Driness of his Throat which uses to bring into his mind the sense of Thirst that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink by Which his disease would be encreased As supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink when 't is Requisite And tho if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it Errs from its Nature when it tells the Hours wrong and so considering the Movement of a Mans Body as contrived for such Motions as are used to be performed thereby I may think That also to Err from its Nature if its Throat is Dry when it has no want of Drink for its Preservation Yet I Plainly discover that this last Acceptation of Nature differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While for this is only a Denomination extrinsick to the Things whereof 't is spoken and depending on my Thought while it Compares a sick man and a disorderly Clock with the Idea of an healthy man and a Rectified Clock But by Nature in its former Acceptation I Understand something that is Really in the Things themselves which therefore has something of Truth in it But tho Respecting only a Body sick of a Dropsie it be an Extrinsick Denomination to say that its Nature is Corrupt because it has a Dry Throat and stands in no need of Drink yet respecting the Whole Compound or Mind joyn'd to such a Body 't is not a meer Denomination but a real Error or Nature for it to thirst when drink is hurtful to it It remains therefore here to be inquired how the Goodness of God suffers Nature so taken to be deceivable First therefore I understand that a chief difference between my Mind and Body consists in this That my Body is of its Nature divisible but my Mind indivisible for while I consider my Mind or my self as I am only a thinking Thing I can distinguish no parts in Me but I perceive my self to be but one entire Thing and tho the whole Mind seems to be united to the whole Body yet a Foot an Arm or any other part of the Body being cut off I do not therefore conceive any part of my Mind taken away Neither can its Faculties of desiring perceiving understanding c. be called its Parts for t is one and the same mind that desires that perceives that understands Contrarily I cannot think of any Corporeal or extended Being which I cannot easily divide into Parts by my thought and by this I understand it to be divisible And this alone if I had known it from no other Argument is sufficient to inform form me that my mind is really distinct from my Body Nextly I find that my mind is not immediately affected by all parts of my body but only by the Brain and perhaps only by one small part of it That to wit wherein the common sense is said to reside Which part as often as it is disposed in the same manner will represent to the mind the same thing tho at the same time the other parts of the body may be differently order'd And this is proved by numberless Experiments which need not here be related Moreover I discover that the nature of my body is such that no part of it can be moved by an other remote part thereof but it may also be moved in the same manner by some of the interjacent parts tho the more remote part lay still and acted not As for example in the rope A B C D if its end D. were drawn the end A. would be moved no otherwise than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn and the end D. rest quiet So when I feel pain in my Foot the consideration of Physicks instructs me that this is performed by the help of Nerves dispersed through the Foot which from thence being continued like Ropes to the very Brain whilst they are drawn in the Foot they also draw the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach and therein excite a certain motion which is ordain'd by Nature to affect the mind with a sense of Pain as being in the Foot But because these Nerves must pass through the Shin the Thighs the Loins the Back the Neck before they can reach the Brain from the Foot it may so happen that tho that part of them which is in the Foot were not touch'd but only some of their intermediate parts yet the same motion would be caused in the Brain as when the Foot it self is ill affected from whence 't wil necessarily follow that the mind should perceive the same Pain And thus may we think of any other Sense I understand lastly that seeing each single motion perform'd in that part of the Brain which immediately affects the mind excites therein only one sort of sense nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case than that of all those Senses which it can cause it should cause that which cheifly and most frequently conduces to the conservation of an healthful Man And experience witnesses that to this very end all our senses are given us by Nature and therefore nothing can be found therein which does not abundantly testifie the Power and Goodness of God Thus for Example when the Nerves of the Feet are
't is easier proved to be then our body BY yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so great Doubts that I shall never forget them and yet I know not how to answer them but being plunged on a suddain into a deep â—ulf I am so amazed that I can neither touch the bottome nor swim at the top Nevertheless I will endeavour once more and try the way I set on yesterday by removing from me whatever is in the least doubtful as if I had certainly discover'd it to be altogether false and will proceed till I find out some certainty or if nothing else yet at least this certainty That there is nothing sure Archimedes required but a point which was firm and immoveable that he might move the whole Earth so in the present undertaking â—reat things may be expected if I can discover but the least thing that is true and indisputable Wherefore I suppose all things I see are false and believe that nothing of those things are really existent which my deceitful memory represents to me 't is evident I have no senses that a Body Figure Extension Motion Place c. are meer Fictions what thing therefore is there that is true perhaps only this 〈◊〉 there is nothing certain But how know I that there is nothing distinct Doubts and Solutiâ—ns from all these things which I have now reckon'd of which I have no reason to doubt Is there no God or whatever other name I may call him who has put these thoughts into me Yet why should I think this When I my self perhaps am the Author of them Upon which Account therefore must not I be something 't is but just now that I denied that I had any senses or any Body Hold a while Am I so tied to a Body and senses and I cannot exist without them But I have peswaded my self that there is nothing in the World no Heaven no Earth no Souls no Bodies and then why not that I my self am not Yet surely if I could perswade my self any thing I was But there is I know not what sort of Deceivour very powerful and very crafty who always strives to deceive Me without Doubt therefore I am if he can deceive me And let him Deceive me as much as he can yet he can never make me not to Be Whilst I think that I am Wherefore I may lay this down as a Principle that whenever this sentence I am I exist is spoken or thought of by Me 't is necessarily True But I do not yet fully understand who I am that now necessarily exist and I must hereafter take care least I foolishly mistake some other thing for my self and by that means be deceived in that thought which I defend as the most certain and evident of all Wherefore I will again Recollect what I believed my self to be heretofore before I had set upon these Meditations from which Notion I will withdraw whatever may be Dispâ—oved and the Foremention'd Reasons that in the End That only may Remain which is True and indisputable What therefore havâ— I heretofore thought my self A Man But what is a man shall I answer a Rational Animal By no means because afterwards it may be asked what an Animal is and what Rational is And so from one question I may fall into greater Difficulties neither at present have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties But I shall rather here Consider what heretofore represented it self to my thoughts freely and naturally whenever I set my self to understand What I my self was And the first thing I find Representing it self is that I have Face Hands Arms and this whole frame of parts which is seen in my Body and which I call my Body The next thing represented to me was that I was nourish'd could walk had senses and could Think which functions I attributed to my Soul Yet what this soul of mine was I did not fully conceive or else supposed it a small thing like wind or fire or aire infused through my stronger parts As to my Body truly I doubted not but that I rightly understood its Nature which if I should endeavour to describe as I conceive it I should thus Explain viz. By a Body I mean whatever is capable of Shape or can be contained in a place and so fill's a space that it excludes all other Bodys out of the same that which may be touch'd seen heard tasted or smelt and that which is capable of various Motions and Modifications not from it self but from any other thing moving it for I judged it against or rather above the nature of a Body to move it self or perceive or think But rather admired that I should find these Operations in certain Bodys But How now since I suppose a certain powerful and if it be lawful to call him so evil deluder Doubts and Solutions who useth all his endeavours to deceive me in all things can I affirme that I have any of those things which I have now said belong to the nature of a Body Hold Let me Consider Let me think Let me reflect I can find no Answer and I am weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain But Which of these Faculties did I attribute to my Soul my Nutritive or Motive faculty yet now seeing I have no Body these also are meer delusions Was it my sensitive faculty But this also cannot be perform'd without a Body and I have seem'd to perceive many things in my sleep of which I afterwards understood my self not to be sensible Was it my Cogitative Faculty Here I have discovered it 't is my Thought this alone cannot be separated from Me I am I exist t is true but for what time Am I Why I am as long as I think For it May be that When I cease from thinking I may cease from being Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily ture In short therefore I am only a thinking thing that is to say * Places noted with their Asterisk are refer'd to in the following Objections a mind or a soul or understanding or Reason words which formerly I understood not I am a Real thing and Really Existent But what sort of thing I have just now said it A thinking thing But am I nothing besides I will consider I am not that structure of parts which is called a Mans Body neither am I any sort of thin Air insfused into those Parts nor a Wind nor Fire nor Vapour nor Breath nor whatever I my self can feign for all these things I have supposed not to Be. Yet my Position stands firm Neverthless I am something Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which I suppose not to exist because to me unknown are in reality nothing different from that very Self which I know I cannot tell I dispute it not now I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I have knowledge I am sure that I exist I
as now it is the more or the less I consider the Composition of the Wax In the interim I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre for though I revolve these things with my self silently and without speaking yet am I intangled in meer words and am almsot deceived by the usual way of expression for we commonly say that we see the Wax it self if it be present and not that we judge it present by its colour or shape from whence I should immediately thus conclude therefore the Wax is known by the sight of the eye and not by the inspection of the mind only Thus I should have concluded had not I by chance look'd out of my window and seen men Passing by in the Street which men I as usually say that I see as I do now that I see this Wax and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments which perhaps may cover only artifical Machines and movements but I judge them to be men so that what I though I only saw with my eyes I comprehend by my Iudicative Faculty which is my Soul But it becomes not one who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar to draw matter of doubt from those ways of expression which the Vulgar have invented Wherefore let us proceed and consider whether I perceived more perfectly and evidently what the Wax was when I first look'd on 't and believed that I knew it by my outward senses or at least by my common sense as they call it that is to say by my imagination or whether at presâ—nt I better understand it after I have more diligently enquired both what it is and how it may be known Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true What was there in my first perception that was distinct What was there that seem'd not incident to every other Animal But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents and consider it as if it were naked with it's coverings pull'd off then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind though yet perhaps my judgment may erre But what shall I now say as to my mind or my self for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a mind Why shall I say should not I who seem to perceive this Wax so distinctly know my self not only more truly and more certainly but more distinctly and evidently For if I judge that this Wax exists because I see thâ—s Wax surely it will be much more evident that I my self exist because I see this Wax for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing but it cannot be when I see or which is the same thing when I think that I see that I who think should not exist The same thing will follow if I judge that this Wax exists because I touch or imagine it c. And what has been said of Wax may be apply'd to all other outward things Moreover if the notion of Wax seems more distinct after it is made known to me not only by my sight or touch but by more and other causes How much the more distinctly must I confess my self known unto my self seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the peroeption of Wax or any other Body does also encrease the proofs of the nature of my Mind But there are so many more things in the very Mind it self by which the notion of it may be made more distinct that those things which drawn from Body conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be mention'd And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in for seeing I have now discover'd that Bodies themselves are not properly perceived by our senses or imagination but only by our understanding and are not therefore perceived because they are felt or seen but because they are understood it plainly appears to me that nothing can possibly be perceived by me easier or more evidently than my Mind But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion I am willing to stop here that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon MEDITAT III. Of GOD and that there is a God NOw will I shut my eyes I will stop my ears and withdraw all my senses I will blot out the Images of corporeal things clearly from my mind or because that can scarce be accomplish'd I will give no heed to them as being vain and false and by discoursing with my self and prying more rightly into my own Nature will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self I am a Thinking Thing that is to say doubting affirming denying understanding few things ignorant of many things willing nilling imagining also and sensitive For as before I have noted though perhaps whatever I imagine or am sensible of as without me Is not yet that manner of thinking which I call sense and imagination as they are only certain Modes of Thinking I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention'd whatever I know or at least Whatever as yet I perceive my self to know Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me of Which I have not yet taken Notice I am sure That I am a Thinking Thing and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make me certain of any Thing I Answer that in this My first knowledge 't is Nothing but a clear and distinct perception of What I affirm Which would not be sufficient to make me certain of the Truth of a Thing if it were Possible that any thing that I so clearly and distinctly Perceive should be false Wherefore I may lay this Down as a Principle Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very Certain and manifest Which I afterwards found to be doubtful Therefore What sort of Things were they Viz. Heaven Earth Stars and all other things which I perceived by my Senses But What did I Perceive of These Clearly Viz. That I had the Ideas or Thoughts of these things in my mind and at Present I cannot deny that I have these Ideas in Mee But there was some other thing Which I affirm'd and Which by Reason of the common Way of Belief I thought that I Clearly Perceived Which nevertheless I did not really Perceive And that was that there were Certain Things Without Me from whence these Ideas Proceeded and to which they were exactly like And this it was Wherein I was either Deceived or if by Chance I Judged truly yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my Perception But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry as that
and known by Me but also by attentive Consideration I perceive Innumerable particulars concerning the Shapes Number and Motion of These Bodies The Truth whereof is so evident and agreeable to my Nature that when I first discover'd them I seemed not so much to have Learnt any thing that is new as to have only remembred what I have known before or only to have thought on those things which were in me before tho this be the first time that I have examin'd them so diligently One thing there is worthy my Consideration which is that I find in my self innumerable Ideas of certain things which tho perhaps they exist nowhere without Me yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing and tho they are Thought upon by me at my will and pleasure yet they are not made by Me but have their own True and Immutable Natures As when for example * I Imagine a Triangle tho perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts nor ever will Exist yet the Nature thereof is determinate and its Essence or Form is Immutalle and Eternal which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended and such like which I now clearly know whether I will or not tho before I never thought on them when I imagine a Triangle and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And 't is nothing to the purpose for me to say that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape for I can think of Innumerable other Figurâ—s which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them as well as of a Triangle which certainly are all true seeing I know them clearly and therefore they are something and not a meer Nothing for 't is Evident that what is true is something And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated that what I clearly perceive is True And tho I had not demonstrated it yet such is the Nature of my Mind that I could not but give my Assent to what I so perceive at least as long as I so perceiâ—e it and I remember herâ—tofore when I most of all relied on sensible Objects that I held those Truths for the most certain which I evidently pâ—rceived such as are concerning Figures Numbers with other parts of Ariâ—â—â—metick and Geometry as also whatever relates to pure and abstracted Mathematicks Now therefore iâ— from this alone That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind it follows That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing does Really belong to it Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the Existence of a God Certainly I find the Idea of a God or infinitely perfect Being as naturally in me as the Idea of any Figure or Number and I as clearly and distinctly understand that it appertains to his Nature Always to Be as I know that what I can demonstrate of a Mathematical Figure or Number belongs to the Nature of that Figure or Number so that tho all things which I have Meditated upon these three or four days were not true yet I may well be as certain of the Existence of a God as I have hitherto been of Mathematical Truths Doubt Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident but looks rather like a sophism for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish'd from his Essence so that I may Imagine God not to Exist Solution But considering it more strictly 't is manifest that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley so that 't is no less a Repugnancy to think of a God that is A Being infinitely perfect who wants Existence that is who wants a Perfection then to think of a Mountain to which there is no Valley adjoyning Doubt But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing or a Mountain without a Vally yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally it does not from thence follow that there Is a Mountain in the World so supposing me to think of a God as Existing yet does it not follow that God Really Exists For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things and as I may imagine a Winged Horse tho no Horse has Wings so I may imagine an existing God tho no God exist Solution 'T is true the Sophism seems to lie in this yet tho I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Vally it does not from hence follow that a Mountain or Vally do Exist but this will follow that whether a Mountain or a Vally do or do not Exist yet they cannot be seperated so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing it follows that Existence is Inseperable from God and therefore that he Really Exists Not because my Thought does all this or Imposes any necessity on any Thing but contrarily because the nâ—cessity of the thing it self viz. of Gods Existâ—nce Determines me to think thus for â—tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence that is A Being absolutely perfect without the Cheif Perfection as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings Doubt And here it cannot be said that I am forced to suppose God Existing after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections seeing Existence is one of them but that my First Position viz. His Absolute Perfection is not necessary Thus for example 't is not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle But supposing that I think so I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein and yet this is evidently False Solution For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a God yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a First and Cheif Being and as it were bâ—ing forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an Idea thereof I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of Perfections tho I do not at that time count them over oâ— Remark each single One which necessity is sufficient to make me hereafter when I come to consider Existence to be a Pâ—rfection conclude Rightly That the First and Chief Being does Exist Thus for example I am not obliged at any time to imagine a Triangle yet whenever I please to Consider of a Right-lined Figure having only three Angles I am then necessitated to allow it all those Requisites from which I may argue rightly
comprehended by three Lineâ— but I also behold with the eye of my mind those three lines as it were before Me and this is that which I call imagination But if I convert my Thoughts to a Chiliogone or Figure consisting of a Thousand Angles I know as well that this Is a figure comprehended by a Thousand sides as I know that a Triangle is a Figure Consisting of three sides but I do not in the same Manner Imagine or behold as present those thousand sides as I do the three sides of a Triangle And tho at the time when I so think of a Chiliogone I may confusedly represent to my self some Figure because whenever I Think of a Corporeal Object I am used to Imagine some Shape or other yet 't is evident that this Representation is not a Chiliogone because 't is in nothing different from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a Milion-angled figure or any other Figure of More sides Neither does such a Confused Representation help me in the least to know those Properties by which a Chiliogone differs from Other Polygones or Manyangled Figures But if a Question be put concerning a Pentagone I know I may Vnderstand its Shape as I Vnderstand the Shape of a Chiliogone without the help of Imagination but I can also imagine it by applying the Eye of my Mind to its Fives sides and to the Area or space contained by Them And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a peculiar sort of Operation in the Mind to imagine a Thing which I require not to Vnderstand a Thing which New Operation of the Mind plainly shews the difference between imagination and pure Intellection Besides this I Consider that this Power of Imagination which is in me as it differs from the Power of Vnderstanding does not appertian to the Essence of Me that is of my mind for tho I wanted it yet certainly I should be the same He that now I am from whence it seems to follow that it depends on something different from my self and I easily perceive that if any Body whatever did Exist to which my Mind were so conjoyn'd that it may Apply it self when it pleased to Consider or as it were Look into this Body From hence I say I perceive It may so be that by this very Body I may Imagine Corporeal Beings So that this Manner of Thinking differs from pure Intellection only in this that the Mind when it Vnderstands does as it were turn it self to it self or Reflect on it self and beâ—â—o'ds some or other of those Ideas which are in it self But when it Imagines it Converts it self upon Body and therein beholds something Conformable to that Idea which it hath understood or perceived by Sense But 't is to remembred that I said I easily conceive Imagination May be so performed supposing Body to Exist And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self from thence I probably guess that Body does Exist But this I only say probably for tho I should accurately search into all the Argumentâ— drawn from the distinct Idea of Body which I find in my Imagination yet I find none of them from whence I may necessarily conclude that Body does Exist But I have been accustomed to Imagine many other things besides that Corporeal Nature which is the Object of pure Mathematicks such as are Colours Sounds Tasts Pain c. but none of these so distinctly And because I perceive these better by Sense from Which by the Help of the Memory they come to the Imagination that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them I ought at the same time to Consider Sence and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of Thought which I call Sense I can deduce any certain Argument for the Existence of Corporeal Beings And first I will here reflect with my self what those things were which being perceived by Sence I have heretofore thought True and the Reasons why I so thought I will then enquire into the Reasons for which I afterwards doubted those things And last of all I will consider what I ought to think of those Things at Present First therefore I have always thought that I have had an Head Hâ—nds Feet The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses and other Members of which This Body which I have look'd upon as a Part of Me or Perhaps as my Whole self Consists And I have also thought that this Body of Mine is Conversant or engaged among many Other Bodies by which it is Liable to be affected with what is advantagious or hurtful What was Advantagious I judged by a certain sense of Pleasure what was Hurtful by a sense of Pain Furthermore besides Pleasure and Pain I perceived in my self Hunger Thirst and other such like Appetites as also certain Corporeal Propensions to Mirth Sadness Anger and other like Passions As to What hapned to me from Bodies without Besides the Extension Figure and Motion of those Bodies I also perceived in them Hardness Heat and other tactile Qualities as also Light Colours Smells Tasts Sounds c. and by the Variation of these I distinguish'd the Heaven Earth and Seas and all other Bodies from each other Neither was it wholly without Reason upon the account of these Ideas of Qualities which offer'd themselves to my Thoughts and which alone I properly and Immediately perceived that I thought my self to Perceive some Things Different from my Thought viz. The Bodies or Objects fro whence these Ideas might Proceed for I often found these Ideas come upon me without my Consent or Will so that I can neither perceive an Object thâ— I had a mind to it unless it were before the Organs of my Sense Neither can I Hinder my self from perceiving it when it is Present And seeing that those Ideas which I take in by sense are much more Lively Apparent and in their kind more distinct than any of those which I knowingly and Willingly frame by Meditation or stir up in my Memory it seems to me that they cannot proceed from my self There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me but from some other Things Without Me. Of Which Things seeing I have no other Knowledge but from these Ideas I cannot Think but that these Ideas are like the Things Moreover Because I remember that I first made use of my senses before my Reason and because I did perceive that those Ideas which I my self did frame were not so Manifest as those which I received by my senses but very often made up of their parts I was easily perswaded to think that I had no Idea in my Vnderstanding which I had not First in my sense Neither was it without Reason that I Judged That Body which by a peculiar right I call my Own to be more nighly appertaining to Me then any other Body For from It as from other Bodies I can never be seperated I was sensible of all
Appetites and Affections in It and for Iâ— and lastly I perceived pleasure and Pain in its Parts and not in any other Without it But why from the sense of Pain a certain Grief and from the sense of pleaâ—ure a certain Ioy of the Mind should arise or Why that Gnawing of the stomach Which I call Hunger should put me in mind of Eating or the driness of my Throat of Drinking I can give no other Reason but that I am taught so by Nature For to my thinking there is no Aâ—â—inity or â—ikeness between that Gnawing of the Stomach and the desire of Eaâ—ing or between the sense of Pain and the sorrowful thought from thence arising But in this as in all other judgments that I made of sensible objects I seem'd to be taught by Nature for I first perswaded my self that things were so or so before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it But afterwards I discover'd many experiments The Reasons why I doubt my senses wherein my senses so grosly deceived me that I would never trust them again for Towers which seem'd Round a far off nigh at hand appear'd square and large Statueâ— on their tops seem'd small to those that stood on the ground and in numberless other things I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived and not of my outward only but of my inward senses also for what is more intimate or inward than Pain And yet I have heard from those whose Arm or Leg was cut off that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain tho I feel pain therein To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt Medit. 1. The first was that while I was awake I could not believe my self to perceive any thing which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive tho I were a sleep And seeing I cannot believe that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake The other Cause of Doubt was that seeing I know not the Author of my Being or at least I then supposed my self not to know him what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appear'd to me most true And as to the Reasons which induced me to give credit to sensible Things 't was easie to return an answer thereto for finding by experience that I was impelled by Nature to many Things which Reason disswaded me from I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature And tho the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will I thought I should not therefore conclude that they proceeded from Objects different from my self for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me tho as yet unknown to me which might frame those perceptions But now that I begin better to know my self and the Author of my Original How far the senses are now to be trusted I do not think that all things which I seem to have from my senses are rashly to be admitted neither are all things so had to be doubted And first because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive may be so made by God as I perceive them the Power of understanding clearly and distinctly one Thing without the other is sufficient to make Me certain that One Thing is different from the Other because it may at least be placed apart by God and that it may be esteem'd different it matters not by what Power it may be so sever'd And therefore from the knowledge I have that I my self exist and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my Nature or Essence but that I am a thinking Being I rightly conclude that my Essence consists in this alone that I am a thinking Thing And tho perhaps or as I shall shew presently 't is certain I have a Body which is very nighly conjoyned to me yet because on this side I have a clear and distinct Idea of my self as I am only a thinking Thing not extended and on the other side because I have a distinct Idea of my Body as it is onely an extended thing not thinking 't is from hence certain that I am really distinct from my Body and that I can exist without it Moreover I find in my self some Facultâ—es endow'd with certain peculiar waies of thinking such as the Faculty of Imagination the Faculty of Perception or sense without which I can conceive my whole self clearly and distinctly but changing the phrase I cannot conceive those Faculties without conceiving My self that is an understanding substance in which they are for none of them in their formal Conception includes understanding from whence I perceive they are as different from me as the modus or manner of a Thing is different from the Thing it self I acknowledge also that I have several other Faculties such as changing of place putting on various shapes c. Which can no more be understood without a substance in which they are then the foremention'd Faculties and consequently they can no more be understood to Exist without that substance But yet 't is Manifest that this sort of Faculties to the End they may exist ought to be in a Corporeal Extended and not in a Vnderstanding substance because Extension and not Intellection or Vnderstanding is included in the Clear and Distinct conception of them But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things of which Faculty I can make no use unless there were in my self or in something else a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas But this cannot be in my self for it Pre-supposes no Vnderstanding and those Ideas are Produced in me tho I help not and often against my Will There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty but that it should be in some substance different from me In which because all the Reallity which is contain'd Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty ought to be contain'd Formally or Eminently as I have Formerly taken notice this substance must be either a Body in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Formally or it Must Be God or some Creature more excellent then a Body In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Eminently But seeing that God is not a Deceivour 't is altogether Manifest that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself or Mediately from any other Creature wherein their Objective Reallity is not * contain'd Formally but only Eminently And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Beings but rather a strong Inclination to believe that
they are sent from Corporeal Beings there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a Deceiver if these Ideas came from any Where but from Corporeal Things Therefore we must conclude that there are Corporeal Beings Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by my sense for Perception by sense is in many Things very Obscure and Confused but those things at least which I clearly and distinctly Understand that is to say all those things which are comprehended under the Object of Pure Mathematicks those things I say at least are True As to What Remains They are either some Particulars as that the Sun is of such a Bigness or Shape c. or they are Things less Clearly Understood as Light Sound Pain c. And tho these and such like Things may be very Doubtful and Vncertain yet because God is not a Deceiver and because that Therefore none of my Opinions can be false unless God has Given me some Faculty or other to Correct my Error hence 't is that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining Truth even in these very Things And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever I am taught by Nature has something therein of Truth By Nature in General I understand either God himself or the Coordination of Creatures Made by God By my Own Nature in Particular I understand the Complexion or Association of all those things which are given me by God Now there is nothing that this my Nature teaches me more expresly then that I have a Body Which is not Well when I feel Pain that this Body wants Meat or Drink When I am Hungry or Dry c. And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are True And by this sense of Pain Hunger Thirst c. My Nature tells me that I am not in my Body as a Mariner is in his Ship but that I am most nighly conjoyn'd thereto and as it were Blended therewith so that I with It make up one thing For Otherwise when the Body were hurt I who am only a Thinking Thing should not therefore feel Pain but should only perceive the Hurt with the Eye of my Vnderstanding as a Mariner perceives by his sight whatever is broken in his Ship and when the Body wants either Meat or Drink I should only Vnderstand this want but should not have the Confused sense of Hunger or Thirst I call them Confused for certainly the Sense of Thirst Hunger Pain c. are only Confused Modes or Manners of Thought arising from the Vnion and as it were mixture of the Mind and Body I am taught also by Nature that there are many other Bodies Without and About my Body some whereof are to be desired others are to be Avoided And because that I Perceive very Different Colours Sounds Smells Tasts Heat Hardness and the Like from thence I Rightly conclude that there are Correspondent Differences in Bodies from which these different perceptions of sense proceed tho perhaps not Alike And because that some of these perceptions are Pleasant others Vnpleasant 't is evidently certain that my Body or rather my Whole self as I am compounded of a Mind and Body am liable to be Affected by these Bodies which encompass me about There are many Other Things Also which Nature seems to teach Me but Really I am not taught by It but have gotten them by an ill use of Passing my Judgement Inconsiderately and from hence it is that these things happen often to be false as that all space is Empty in which I find nothing that works upon my Senses That in a hot Body there is something like the Idea of Heat which is in me That in a White or Green Body there is the same Whiteness or Greenness which I perceive And the same Taste in a bitter or sweet Thing c. That Stars Castles and Other Remote Bodies are of the same Bigness and Shape as they are Represented to my senses and such like But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter which I cannot Distinctly perceive it behoves me here to determine more Accurately What I mean when I say That I am taught a Thing by Nature Here I take Nature more strictly then for the Complication of all those Things which are Given me by God For in this Complication there are many things contain'd which relate to the Mind alone as That I perceive What is done cannot be not Done and all Other things which are known by the Light of Nature but of these I speak not at present There are also many Other Things which belong only to the Body as That it tends Downwards and such like of these also I treat not at Present But I speak of those Things only which God hath bestowed upon me as I am Compounded of a Mind and Body together and not differently Consider'd 'T is Nature therefore thus taken that teaches me to avoid troublesome Objects and seek after pleasing Ones but it appears not that this Nature teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our senses before that we make by our Vnderstanding a diligent examination of outward Objects for to Enquire into the Truth of Things belongs not to the Whole Compositum of a Man as he Consists of Mind and Body but to the Mind alone So that tho a star affect my eye no more then a small spark of Fire yet there is in my Eye no Real or Positive Inclination to believe One no bigger then the Other but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat and Coming too nigh I feel Pain yet there is no Reason to perswade me That in the Fire there is any thing like either that Heat or that Pain but only that there is something therein Whatever it be that excites in us those sensations of Heat or Pain and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on my senses it does not from thence follow that there is no Body there for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature because I use these perceptions of sense which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is advantagious or hurtful to the Compositum whereof the mind is part and so far only they are Clear and Distinct enough as certain Rules immediately to discover the Essence of External Bodies of Which they make known nothing but very Obscurely and Confusedly I have * Medit. 4. formerly shewn how my Iudgment happens to be false notwithstanding Gods Goodness But now there arises a new Difficulty concerning those very things which Nature tells me I am to prosecute or avoid and concâ—â—ning my Internal senses Wherein I find many Errors as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat devours therein some hidden Poyson But in this very