Senses are deceived in taking for Bread and Wine what is not so The second is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the Eucharist they may be as well mistaken in every thing else so that their Depositions have nothing certain The third is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the discovery of their Objects be they what they will The Proofs of Christian Religion are of no value The better to comprehend the Force of this Argument I believe 't will not be amiss to pass over it again and carefully to examine its Propositions The first appears to me very evident for I have always taken Error to be the persuading of a Man's self That a thing is what it is not or to judg that it is not what it is This being granted it cannot be denied but that our Senses do deceive us in the Eucharist if they attempt the perswading us That it is any other thing than what it is Yet this they do if Transubstantiation takes place For in fine if this Doctrine were true the Eucharist would not be Bread and Wine but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. And yet our Senses attest the contrary they all unanimously say with one Voice that it is not our Lord's Body and Blood but Bread and Wine To prove what I say Shew the Eucharist to an Infidel who has no knowledg of your Mystery and ask him what it is He 'l answer without hesitation 't is Bread and Wine Ask a Child the same question he will return you the same answer In fine offer it to a Brute and he will do what he is wont when ordinary Bread and Wine is set before him Now what is the common light to this Infidel this Child and brute Beast nothing else but that of Sense whereupon it cannot be denied but our senses tell us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and it appears impossible to affirm that it is not so without giving the lye to these Faculties This will appear more clearly if you please to consider That the Faculty which tells us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is the same which makes us discern other Objects and makes us say of each of them This is such a thing Who will deny that 't is by means of the Senses we discover what is present to us In effect those who have lost the use of their Senses do discern nothing and those who are not absolutely deprived of these Faculties yet have them weak'ned through defect of the Organs are easily mistaken Lead a blind Man within some paces of a Statue and ask him what that is which stands before him He will answer you he do's not know offer the same question to another that is not quite blind but yet has bad Eyes He 'l tel you perhaps 't is a Man. Whereas on the contrary a Man whose sight is good will tell you presently 't is a Statue Is it not plain then That 't is the Sight which discerns this Object When then we see the Eucharist and we touch and taste it we say it's Bread and Wine it 's clear we say it from the relation of our Eyes our Hands and our Mouths And consequently if it be found that 't is not Bread and Wine it cannot be denied but that 't is our Senses which have cheated and deceived us It is not worth the while to set upon the proving of a thing which your Divines willingly grant One might produce some hundred's of places in their Works where they affirm what I say (a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses Chap. 6. They maintain that the Fathers (b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. have strictly charged their People not to trust their Senses in this occasion extreamly blaming those who suffer themselves to be guided by these Faculties in a matter wherein according to them we should follow no other Light than that of Faith and Revelation They pretend nothing do's more enhance the merit of this Faith Than her raising her self above the Senses and perswading her self of the contrary of what these Faculties do witness to us I doe not doubt Sir but you have observ'd all this in the reading of your Authors It 's true answer'd he and I will not contest with you about this first Proposition But I will not grant you the second For in fine what necessity is there that the Senses deceiving us in this Object they cannot faithfully instruct us in any other Is it not very likely that this is a single Error and without any consequence May they not deceive us in this occasion and in some others without extending this to all In effect the greatest Lyars do sometimes tell true and perhaps there is not one amongst this sort of People but speaks more Truth than Lies Why may we not then say the same thing of our Senses You have not well comprehended my meaning rerepli'd I for I did not say That if our Senses be deceived in the Eucharist they must necessarily be deceived in every thing else But only that they may be so that the thing is not impossible and we shall never be certain of the contrary unless we know it by some other way This is all I say and I hope to shew you in what follows that I need no more In the mean time my Proposition thus exprest is undenyable In effect he that deceives once may deceive always and 't is sufficient a Witness be once detected of Falsity to be suspected all his Life Thus the Senses according to you making untrue reports on the Eucharist we may as well suspect them to do the same on other things This is clear but to make it more unquestionable be pleased to consider That if the Senses do once deceive their relation is no longer a certain Mark and an unquestionable Proof of Truth For how can we look on that to be a certain Mark of Truth which is sometimes joyn'd with Error And consequently To have no other Foundation for ones Perwasions than the relations of our Senses this would be to rest on uncertain and doubtful Marks and to expose ones self to the greatest likelihood of being deceived To say the same thing in another manner let me Sir ask you Whether the bare relation of our Senses without any other Succours be a sufficient Motive to persuade us what they attest or not If it be 't is not possible our Senses can once deceive us for if they should we should have a sufficient Motive to persuade us of a thing which is false which we must be far from saying For were this so we should be bound to deceive our selves and this Error would not only be excusable but necessary there would be an Obligation of falling into it and 't would be a fault if we did not But this is intollerably absurd Now if the Testimony of our Senses be not a sufficient Foundation whereon to ground a solid
bereaved of all his five Senses or only of the two principal ones Sight and Hearing suppose him at the same time both Deaf and Blind how will you make him understand the solidity of these Proofs You may speak to him long enough of the Prophecies of the Old Testament of our Saviour's and Moses his Miracles and other things which establish the Truth of Christian Religion This will be just the same as if you discoursed to a Stone It 's only our Senses then which make us receive these Proofs So that should we know That those of the Apostles and other Witnesses of the Truth could not deceive them this would signify nothing to us should we have just reason to believe we might be deceived by ours By consequence the certainty of Sense is doubly necessary to establish the solidity of the Proofs of Christianity and these Proofs will be two ways uncertain if the report of our Senses be not to be trusted See now Sir if there be any thing more true than what I told you a while ago That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys these Proofs and takes from them all their Validity See whether in supposing this Doctrine one may hinder Libertines from using this arguing It 's contrary to good Sense to receive this Revelation which destroys it self which overthrows its own Foundations which annuls and discredit's the means by which it endeavours to establish it self and whose Proofs cannot be true without being false nor assured without being uncertain This is what may be said of Christianity if it be true it teaches things contrary to the relation of our Senses For in fine Christianity has hitherto establish'd it self only on the depositions of these Faculties Hereby it has met with belief in the Minds of Men. If then one of its Maxims be we must not trust any of our Senses it 's evident and unquestionable we may say of it what we now affirmed It 's evident it is self-contradictory enjoining us on one hand to believe the report of our Senses when they instruct us in what should induce us to receive it and forbidding us at the same time to hearken to them in one of its chiefest Doctrines It overthrows its own Foundations seeing it destroys the faithfulness of our Senses on which the persuasion which we have of its truth is grounded Hereby it annuls and discredits the means by which it endeavours to set up it self and this is so visible that we need not undertake to shew it In a word its Proofs cannot be true without being false nor certain without being uncertain In effect if the Proofs of Christianity be good whatever it say's is true and if whatever it says be true these Proofs be nothing worth seeing one of the things which it affirms is That the report of our Senses whence these Proofs be taken is uncertain Is it not true Sir That setting up Transubstantiation the Infidels would on very good grounds use this Arguing In particular would they not have reason to complain that they are not sincerely dealt with seeing we pretend to convince them by the Depositions of Witnesses which we do not produce till we have strip'd them of all their Authority and declared them unfaithful and deceivers After this great Interest I see nothing which is worth contending for and if our Faith loses the means of establishing it self in the World as she do's lose it in losing her Proofs It 's not worth the while to demonstrate the other Consequences of your Doctrine nor particularly the Disorders which the uncertainty of our Senses once establish'd would infallibly bring forth into the World. They are both infinite and inexplicable because that in effect our Senses are almost the only Guides which we follow and their Fidelity is the chief Foundation of all the certainty we can have therein Your abstracted Truths which are perceivable only to the Understanding and which are so useful in Sciences are of little use in the Commerce of the World wherein Men apply themselves to things which be singular which are not known but by the interposition of the Senses So that to ruin the certainty of our Senses is to turn all into confusion and reduce Men to such a condition that they shall not take a step without being troubled with some Scruple But as I have already observ'd this is not the Point 'T is sufficient I have shew'd That the solidity of the Proofs which establish the Truth of Christian Religion depends on the certainty of our Senses so that Transubstantiation absolutely destroying this certainty invalidates these Proofs and stops the Mouths of those who undertake the Conversion of the Infidels This single Consequence is dreadful enough and we need not draw any other to shew the falsity of the Principle whence it flows It 's better to pass to my third Proof which is to shew That your Doctrine overthrows the certainty of our Reason as well as that of our Senses and gives such an establishment to Scepticism as bereaves us of all means of finding out the Truth And this is what I intend to make clear to you if I have not already tired your patience I shall hear you with all my Heart answer'd he but I must tell you That before I hear your third Argument I should be very glad to examine the two you have already offered me for I see abundance of things which I might oppose against what you have said but they lying something obscurely and confusedly in my Mind I must beg time of you to bring them into some clearness and order which as soon as I have done I shall not fail to wait on you with an account of them I easily consented to what he desired telling him I wish'd every Body would as maturely examine these great Points before they determin'd themselves I blam'd the rashness of those whose Eyes are dazl'd with the first glance of an Argument whereby they fall into a ridiculous lightness or an insupportable obstinacy Mr. N. spake to the same purpose and our conversation having for some time been on this Point I took my leave of him and departed CONFERENCE III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses THE next Day Mr. N. took the pains to come to me and immediately told me he had carefully appli'd himself to examine my Reasons and believed he had found a solution of them I have observed said he to me that both your Propositions depend on the same Supposition to wit That Transubstantiation is directly contrary to the reports of our Senses and that whereas this Doctrine tells us the Eucharist is no longer Bread nor Wine but the proper Body and Blood of our Saviour our Senses on the contrary tell us That this Sacrament is not the Body and Blood of our Saviour but real Bread and Wine This has inclined me to think That tho our Divines have not considered your Proofs in the same manner you have proposed them
our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity IT 's not many days since I came to Mr. N. and found him in his Study having his Eyes fix'd on a Book with the reading of which he seem'd to be so taken up as made me think I should do him wrong to interrupt him Intending therefore to withdraw without his seeing me I could not do it without some small disturbance which made him turn his Head towards the place where I was and hastily arise towards me You shall not be gone said he for I prize your Company at another rate than thus to lose it The loss repli'd I would rather be mine and I am afraid lest I should deprive you of the pleasure of some delightful reading as knowing by experience how vexatious it is to be disturb'd at such a time What you say answered he after he had made me sit down is very true I am not a little pleas'd with reading good Books and I doubt not but this which lies before me is of that number But you have wherewith to make me amends for this Interruption for I doubt not but before we part you will increase the Pleasure which this reading afforded me and approving this Book as I dare say you will you 'l not a little confirm me in the good Opinion I have of it and make me read it henceforward with greater earnestness Your esteem of the Book repli'd I is enough to gain my approbation I am not wont to make Appeals from your Judgment having been always so pleas'd in following it that 't is now become a kind of Law which I never violate But perhaps I never saw this Book That can't be answer'd he this Book has been too famous for you not to see it especially considering it's some Years since 't was publish'd In a word 't is the Book which the Ingenious Mr. Huet has written to establish the Truth of Christian Religion (a) P. Dan. Huetii demonstratio Evangelica I do not repent said I of my engagement to approve of it for I have read it with great delight not to mention the Style which is delicate and want's no Ornaments I sind it replenish'd with judicious Observations and such as lie out of the common Road full of great sense and plainness In short 't is a Work worthy its Author who hold's a considerable Place amongst Learned Men. I have only one thing to say against the Book and that with regret because I know you will not herein agree with me Let 's hear it however said he It is repli'd I That this Book was made by one of your Party If that be all the fault answer'd he I am much mistaken if Mr. Huet ever corrects it You may judg what you please of it replied I my Opinion is That this is a capital Fault and spoil's the whole Work. For whereas this would have been an excellent Piece had it been wrote by a Protestant coming from a Person of your Communion it loses all its Force and Conviction and overthrows its own Arguments and should it fall into the hands of a knowing Infidel he could with one word answer it This is very surprising says Mr. N. and you must be a very great Bigot in your Religion to offer such a strange and incredible Paradox Has your Belief the priviledg of making bad Arguments good Ones and is ours so unhappy as to corrupt the best Things and change Demonstrations into Sophisms as oft as they pass through our hands There may be repli'd I some Truth in what you now say and I give an Instance of this from one of your Authors (b) Education of a Prince who shews That the greatest part of Seneca's Maxims are false and ridiculous in the Writings of That Philosopher whereas they would be very proper and excellent in the Writings of a Christian The same may I say of Mr. Huet and the rest of your Authors who undertake this Subject The best Proofs become Paralogisms in their Writings and 't is by passing over into ours that they resume their strength and due efficacy And this is one of the Effects which your Transubstantiation operates destroying the most convincing Arguments you can offer the Infidels and giving them an infallible means to defend themselves and right to maintain That if these Proofs be good Transubstantiation is not a part of the Christian Religion or if Transubstantiation be a part of the Christian Religion these Proofs he of no validity It 's certian if they be Men endued with sense they will lay hold of the first of these Propositions In effect it 's apparent That Mr. Huet's Proof are valid and good in themselves whereas 't is not certain That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches not to say that it ought to be taken for granted that it is not one of them It is so strange and offensive and so little agrees with the whole Body of reveal'd Truths either in general or particular that a Man needs only the use of his Senses free from all prejudices to perceive That this comes not from the same Spring and that the Author of Christianity is a very different Person from the Author of Transubstantiation Such Infidels then that are discerning Men will separate what 's offered to them jointly They will embrace Christianity and reject Transubstantiation They will receive this Holy Religion as coming from the Spirit of God and put from them your Doctrine as a humane Invention However 't is not long of you That they cast not themselves into the other aforementioned extremity I mean the persuading themselves that the Proofs of the Christian Religion be invalid Yet you are for persuading them not only That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which the Gospel teaches but moreover one of its principal ones one of the most essential Points of Christian Religion and that which can be least spared And consequently if these Infidels be simple enough to believe this and after such an Error have any reason left they will only make use of it to perswade themselves That that Religion which teaches such an incredible Doctrine could not have been revealed by the Spirit of Truth and that the Proofs which were made use of to establish the Divinity of it are of no validity I am so strongly possessed with the belief of Transubstantiation said Mr. N. That I believe no Objections in the World are capable to make me doubt one minute of the truth of it Yet I must acknowledg 't would be a terrible Temptation to me could you convince me of what you say It does so highly concern us That the Proofs of Christianity be valid That there are few Things but what ought to be sacrific'd to so great an Interest and I know no greater prejudice against a Doctrine than to shew that it weakens these Proofs and gives advantage to such dangerous Adversaries as those are against whom we
obtain what I demand I shall be willing it should be in the manner you please whether it be the Senses or the rational Faculty or what other Faculty you will which makes us distinguish the Substances all this is indifferent to me provided you grant me That 't is the same Faculty which discerns that which makes us become Christians This being granted 't will be undeniable that this Faculty cannot be accused of deceiving us in what she tells us of the Eucharist without taking from it whatever it has of Certainty and Authority in the Facts which serve for a Foundation to Faith. Here 's then my second Proof perfectly reestablish'd I shall now do the same thing for the first I drew it hence That the Certainty of the Senses being incomparably greater than that we call Moral should it be granted that Transubstantiation was one of the Doctrines which Christianity obliges us to believe the Objections which might be made against this Holy Religion would have more strength than the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it because that in effect these Proofs have only a moral Evidence whereas the Objections which may be offered against this Holy Religion might have the Evidence of all the Senses which clearly witness against Transubstantiation You do not grant me this last Proposition you affirm 't is not the Senses but Reason which says the Eucharist is Bread and Wine because you pretend there 's only this last Faculty in a condition to discern the Substances and that should the Senses give some Indication they would do it in a manner equally doubtful and indirect I have already declared my unwillingness to enter into all these Discussions for whatever the Faculty is which makes us discern whether the Substances in general or that of the Eucharist in particular it 's sufficient it is a natural Faculty In this Supposition I thus reestablish my first Proof The certainty which accompanies the Functions of the natural Faculty which makes us discern one Substance from another is greater than that we call Moral If then this Faculty tells us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine as it must be granted it does one may offer against Transubstantiation and consequently against Christianity allowing Transubstantiation to be one of its Doctrines one may I say offer against it a greater certitude than that of the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it whereby 't will be more rational to reject than embrace it This Consequence is necessary and whatever past in our first Conference does invincibly prove it So that I only need to establish the Principle whence I draw it viz. That the certainty whereby we commonly discern the Substances from one another is greater than that we call Moral And this is all you can desire of me and if I convince you I expect from your justice no further contentions about it It 's then easy to make you acknowledg this Be pleased then to consider that when we are only morally assured of a thing the certainty we have of it is not comparable to that which those have on whose Testimony it 's believed For Example I am only morally assured of Cesar's Victories and Alexander's Conquest But the Souldiers which serv'd under these two Captains and were in their Armies and shared with them in their Labours these Souldiers I say were far more certain of them than I am yea more than the Historians themselves to whom they related them and on whose Testimony I believe them I am only morally certain of the being of the Cities of Jerusalem Rome and Constantinople having never been in those Places But those that have been and lived there those are far more certain of it than I can be because in effect they have seen these Cities with their own eyes You gave me the Reason of this in our first Conference tho indeed you made the Application of it to the certainty of the Senses But it not being the Application which makes the solidity of it 't will be still as strong whatever use is made of it You tell me we know the things of which we have that which we call a moral certainty only because they are attested to us by Persons whom we have no cause to suspect and who tells us they have seen them with their own Eyes But tho these Persons be not in any sort suspected by us we are far from being so assured of the truth of their Testimony as we are from the Reports of our Senses it 's impossible for us to doubt we see what we do see but it 's not impossible for us to doubt whether others have seen what they tell us We see in this respect the bottom of our own Hearts but we see not all that passes in the Hearts of others We have great Reasons to believe they do not deceive us but these Reasons have not the evidence which accompanies this inward sense of our own Actions which is commonly called Conscience You made me observe in the second place that our Senses do not attest to us the truth of things of which we have no other Certitude than that we call Moral whereas we may easily have a Moral Certainty of most things which are attested to us by our proper Senses My Senses for example do not inform me there 's a City call'd Rome wherefore I have no other than a moral Certainty of it But I do not only know by my own Senses there is a City call'd Paris I know it moreover by those of others who see and have seen it a thousand times so that I have a double Certainty of the being of this Town the moral one and that of Sense By consequence as two is more than one so that Certainty which is merely Moral is necessarily inferior to that of the Senses Suppose we now they are not our Senses but some other Faculty which makes us immediatly discern things yet this will not hinder us from saying still That those who are assured of the Existence of any thing by the reports of this Faculty whatever it be have greater certainty of it than those who know it only from the Testimony of those who have informed themselves by themselves and from the exercise of their own proper Faculties So that take it how we will it is clear that when we are assured only morally of a thing we are much less than those on the Testimony of whom it is believed Or to speak better it is plain that the moral Certainty do's still suppose another greater in those whose Authority is its Prop and Foundation If I then shew you one may have this kind of Certitude term'd moral touching Substances which are no longer or are now in distant parts and where we have never been but I do not say enough if I shew you we may have the highest degree of this kind of certainty shall I not hereby convince you That the moral Certainty is always inferior to that which attends
SIX CONFERRENCES Concerning The Eucharist Novemb. 5. 1678. MR. A. Pulton Jesuit having in his Remarks published Novemb. 4. declared in efféct in P. 29 30. that the Principles of Philosophy which contradict the Doctrine of Transubstantiation are to be renounc'd and that Christians have the same ground to believe Transubstantiation as the Blessed Trinity and demanding How great the Confusion of Dr. T. will be at the Day of Judgment when he shall find that Teâ—â— true The sid Dr. Tenison the Publisher of THIS BOOK does so far as concerns these Particulars refer Mr. Pulton to IT and for the rest of his Remarks he will in due time give a very just Answer to them Books lately printed for Richard Chiswell A Dissertation concerning the Government of the Ancient Church more particularly of the Encroachments of the Bishops of Rome upon other Sus. By WILLIAM CAVE D. D. Octavo An Answer to Mr. Serjeant's Sure Footing in Christianity concerning the Rule of Faith With some other Discourses By WILLIAM FALKNER D. D. 40. A Vindication of the Ordinations of the Church of England in Answer to a Paper written by one of the Church of Rome to prove the Nullity of our Orders By GILBERT BVRNET D. D. Octavo An Abridgment of the History of the Reformation of the Church of England By GILB BVRNET D. D. Octavo The APOLOGY of the Church of England and an Epistle to one Signior Scipio a Venetian Gentleman concerning the Council of Trent Written both in Latin by the Right Reverend Father in God JOHN JEWEL Lord Bishop of Salisbury Made English by a Person of Quality To which is added The Life of the said Bishop Collected and written by the same Hand Octavo The Life of WILLIAM BEDEL D. D. Bishop of Kilmore in Ireland Together with Certain Letters which passed betwixt him and James Waddesworth a late Pensioner of the Holy Inquisition of Sevil in Matter of Religion concerning the General Motives to the Roman Obedience Octavo The Decree made at ROME the Second of March 1679. condemning some Opinions of the Jesuits and other Casuists Quarto A Discourse concerning the Necessity of Reformation with respect to the Errors and Corruptions of the Church of Rome Quarto First and Second Parts A Discourse concerning the Celebration of Divine Service in an Unknown Tongue Quarto A Papist nor Misrepresented by Protestants Being a Reply to the Reflections upon the Answer to A Papist Misrepresented and Represented Quarto An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England in the several Articles proposed by the late BISHOP of CONDOM in his Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church Quarto A Defence of the Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England against the Exceptions of Monsieur de Mâ—aâ—â— late Bishop of Condon and his Vindicator 40. A CATECHISM explaining the Doctrine and Practices of the Church of Rome With an Answer thereunto By a Protestant of the Church of England 80. A Papist Represented and not Misrepresented being an Answer to the First Second Fifth and Sixth Sheets of the Second Part of the Papist Misrepresented and Represented and for a further Vindication of the GATEGHISM truly representing the Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome Quarto The Lay-Christian's Obligation to read the Holy Scriptures Quarto The Plain Man's Reply to the Catholick Missionaries 240. An Answer to THREE PAPERS lately printed concerning the Authority of the Catholick Church in Matters of Faith and the Reformation of the Church of England Quarto A Vindication of the Answer to THREE PAPERS concerning the Unity and Authority of the Catholick Church and the Reformation of the Church of England Quarto THE Pillar and Ground of Truth A Treatise shewing that the Roman Church falsly claims to be That Church and the Pillar of That Truth mentioned by S. Paul in his first Epistle to Timothy Chap. 3. Vers 15. 4o. The Peoples Right to read the Holy Scripture Asserted 4o. A Short Summary of the principal Controversies between the Church of England and the Church of Rome being a Vindication of several Protestant Doctrines in Answer to a Late Pamphlet Intituled Protestancy destitute of Scripture Proofs 4o. Two Discourses Of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead An Answer to a Lato Pamphlet Intituled The Judgment and Doctrine of the Clergy of the Church of England concerning one Special Branch of the King's Prerogative viz. In dispensing with the Penal Laws 4o. The Notes of the Church as laid down by Cardinal Bellarmin examined and confuted 4o. Preparation for Death Being a Letter sent to a young Gentlewoman in France in a dangerous Distemper of which she died The Difference between the Church of England and the Church of Rome in opposition to a late Book Intituled An Agreement between the Church of England and Church of Rome A PRIVATE FRATER to be used in Difficult Times A True Account of a Conference held about Religion at London Sept. 29 1687 between A. Pulton Jesuit and Tho. Tennison D. D. as also of that which led to it and followed after it 4o. The Vindication of A. Cressener Schoolmaster in Long-Acre from the Aspersions of A. Pulton Jesuit Schoolmaster in the Savoy together with some Account of his Discourse with Mr. Meredith A Discourse shewing that Protestants are on the safer Side notwithstanding the uncharitable Judgment of their Adversaries and that Their Religion is the surest Way to Heaven 4o. Six Conferences concerning the Eucharist wherein is shewed that the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion A Discourse concerning the pretended Sacrament of Extreme Vnction with an account of the Occasions and Beginnings of it in the Western Church In Three Parts With a Letter to the Vindicator of the Bishop of Condom SIX CONFERENCES CONCERNING The Eucharist Wherein is shewed That the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion Imprimatur Septemb. 12. 1687. Jo. BATTELY LONDON Printed for Richard Chiswell at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Church-yard MDCLXXXVII The CONTENTS Of the Six Conferences concerning the EUCHARIST CONFERENCE I. THe First Proof That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity CONF. II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion CONF. III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses CONF. IV. The Third Proof That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration CONF. V. Wherein is finally shew'd That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism and absolutely destroys the certainty of First Principles CONF. VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine fo the Trinity is demonstrated SIX CONFERENCES Concerning the EUCHARIST CONFERENCE I. That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of
what I do not know but by the relation of my Senses than of that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence But this is not all for I say but one half of what may be alledg'd The Example which you have made use of gives me occasion to add something stronger You ask me if it be more evident there 's a City called Rome than 't is evident that it 's now Day You do not consider That I do not only know by myown Senses it is Day but by those of others For were I in fine blind yet I might know this with certainty I need only to be led to the Exchange to Church to Dinner c. for this purpose And therefore I take it for granted That the blind Men about our Streets are as certain 't is Day as that there is such a place as Rome I believe then That the Evidence which arises from the relations of Sense considered alone is not greater than the moral Evidence being impossible to be less as I now proved I affirm That in this Supposition to demand whether 't is more evident it is Day than whether there be such a City as Rome is just as if you should ask whether two be more than one The Existence of Rome as to us has but one only Evidence and that a moral one Whereas it is now Day has two the Moral Evidence and the Evidence of Sense Each of these two is at least equal to that of the Existence of Rome It is at least then as much again evident it is Day as that there 's a City called Rome Yet is it true said I it 's more evident the Eucharist is Bread and Wine than that it is Day Only the Senses of those who live and are awake at present attest the latter whereas the Senses of all Men who live or have lived since the planting of the Gospel have affirm'd the former All our Senses do not attest it 's now Day only our Sight tells us so whereas all our Senses tell us That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine In effect take a consecrated Host take consesecrated Wine Ask your Eyes what they are Ask your Nose your Palat and your Hands Ask them ten thousand times the same Question they will ever answer you what they have always answer'd those who have consulted them on this Matter They will tell you 't is Bread and Wine In a word the Senses never attested any thing in a more clear expressive and authentic manner than what they depose on the Subject of the Eucharist And if they deceive us herein they are not to be believed in any thing whatever Grant we then the Proofs of Christianity do use the highest degree of Moral Evidence seeing the Testimony of our Senses circumstanc'd in the manner as that is which shew's us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine hath at least twice as much evidence as that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence it 's beyond all question that this Testimony is twice again as evident as the Proofs of Christianity This is clear and I doe not believe you either will or can deny it Here then are three grand Conclusions which I draw from this Principle The first That if Transubstantiation were one of the Doctrins of Christianity as you pretend Christian Religion would be opposed with greater strength than Mr. Huet could bring forth to maintain it In effect did Transubstantiation make a part of Christian Religion one might oppose against it whatever is offered against Transubstantiation I have now shew'd you one may oppose against Transubstantiation all the evidence of Sense One might offer all this same Evidence against Christianity were it true that Christianity comprehended Transubstantiation This is that which opposes Christianity in your Principles Let 's see now what Mr. Huet do's to maintain it He brings Arguments which as we have already observ'd are only grounded on moral Evidence which is never half so great as that of sense If then two be more than one it 's clear That granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Christian Doctrins Christianity is attack'd with greater strength than Mr. Huet can defend it with It is clear according to this Supposition an Infidel will more strongly prove That Christian Religion is false than Mr. Huet can prove it is true All which would never be were Transubstantiation put out of the number of Christian Doctrins By which means the Proofs of this Holy Religion would conserve all their strength and the Infidels would have nothing that 's rational to oppose against them These Proofs are most solid in themselves and capable of convincing every reasonable Body who searches the Truth and is disposed to follow it through all parts where he finds it There 's nothing but Transubstantiation which weakens them Granting Transubstantiation these Proofs will be of no validity Take away this Doctrine our Proofs subsist and have their effect It do's not belong then to your Doctors who hold Transubstantiation to defend Christianity The best Arguments will never be good ones in their Mouths Only we can propose them without weakning them So that I told you nothing but what you find true when I affirmed a while ago That Mr. Huet's Book which would be an excellent Work were it writ by a Protestant is without conviction coming from a Man of your Party And this is Sir my first Conclusion The second follows which is That whereas an Infidel to whom was offered Mr. Huet's Arguments without any mention of Transubstantiation or who should suppose that Christianity do's not oblige us to believe it would be irrational should he not embrace a Religion so well grounded so in like manner he would fall in to as great a fault and act as much against Reason if supposing the contrary and letting himself be perswaded one cannot be a Christian without believing Transubstantiation he should receive both Transubstantiation and Christian Religion What I have now been saying to you does necessarily draw along with it this Consequence But to remark more clearly the necessity of it be pleased to observe That what makes an Infidel a Christian are the Reasons which perswade him That the Christian Religion was revealed by God. In effect that which induces us to believe Things are the Reasons good or bad which seem to us to uphold the Opinion which we embrace So that should one Persuade ones self of any thing without Ground or Reason that Man will act foolishly and sottishly though the thing it self should be true So the Infidel who shall make himself a Christian without Reason would apparently offend against good Sense And this is the general Notion of your Divines which I need not alledg to you for having read them you must needs remember them A Man then never believes without Reason if he believes wisely and judiciously But it seldom hapning that the Reasons are all on one side there being commonly some for and some against
yet I might find in their Writings wherewith to defend my self by what they answer to the direct Testimony of our Senses which your Authors have always objected I have enquired into what they have said on this Subject and found five different Solutions Some of them have absolutely denied without reserve that our Senses have any certainty Others acknowledg that these Faculties do not deceive us in the things comprehended in the order of Nature but they will not suffer us to consult them in Matters of Faith. Some allow them a certainty in Matters of Faith but say 't is a certainty inferior to that of Faith. Most of them assure us That the Senses do not perceive the Substance so that the Error wherein one falls by persuading one's self that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is not in the Senses but in our Reason Others do in fine acknowledg that our Senses do well perceive the Substance but in an indirect manner and with great incertitude so that their report is not certain but in reference to the accidents I am well assured the two first Answers be false and should I not otherwise know it your second Reason would not permit me to doubt of it For in fine were our Senses without certainty whether in general or in particular in Matters of Faith the Proofs of Christian Religion would be but mere delusions as you sufficiently convinced me Yesterday The third of these Answers supposes a Thing which is false to wit That a Faculty which has certainty may ever have need of being corrected It supposes another which is very doubtful and in which our Divines are not agreed viz. That Faith has more certainty than the Testimony of our Senses Moreover granting all this to be true I know not whether one might make use of it against your Reasons You do not speak of the certainty which a Man that believes already may have of the Truths of Salvation but only of that which one might give an Infidel But the means to perswade an Infidel that the Senses may deceive must be by convincing him of the Divinity of our Religion which accuses the Senses of Infidelity And the way to convince him of the Divinity of this Religion must be by Reasons which suppose that these Faculties do not deceive us I do not then make any great reckoning of these three Answers and therefore I shall not oppose them against you But 't is not the same with the two last for if it be true that our Senses reach not so far as the Substance but perceive only the Accidents all that these Faculties learn us of the Eucharist is That this Sacrament still retains the Accidents of Bread and Wine which is a true Notion and contains nothing contrary to our belief Should we say moreover with those who make the second Answer That our Senses well perceive the Substance but yet in a manner indirect and subject to Error and Deceit one may truly say That Transubstantiation is contrary to the report of our Senses but not to this direct and certain report whence springs this firm perswasion called Experimental Knowledg It will be only contrary to this indirect and uncertain Report which can only establish a tottering Opinion which is almost as often false as true This being granted you cannot reestablish your Proofs unless you distinctly maintain these three things First That the Senses do perceive the very Substance it self either directly or indirectly however with certainty The second That this Certainty which our Senses give us touching the Substances is greater than that of the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity The third That this Certainty is the ground of these Proofs and that they cannot subsist if our Senses may be deceived in the discerning of these kind of Objects ' I would be an easy matter for me said I to him to maintain this against all opposition But others (a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses having already done it and this Discussion being likely to engage us into difficult Enquiries and the force of my Arguments not depending thereon I therefore am willing to wave that dispute and betake my self to what is so evident and undeniable as I am sure must satisfy you Will you not grant me Sir That we do every day discern one Substance from another Will you not grant me for Example that I now distinguish whatever is in this Chamber and that I can truly say This is a Table this is a Book this is a Bed this a Chair I do not say there 's certainty in these Judgments I make I do not determine which is the Faculty which makes me do it I only say I do do it Can you deny me this to be true or shall I set about the proving of it No answer'd he A Man must be void of Sense that requires it Will you then in the second place deny me pursued I that I make this judgment by some of the Faculties which God has given me I mean those Faculties purely natural which are common to all Men and perform their Functions without any supernatural assistance internal or external without any external Revelation without any inward illumination of the Spirit I am far from denying it answered he and I am perswaded there 's no Catholick that questions it This said I is enough and I need no more for the subsistence of my Proofs And to convince you of what I say I shall bring them to this Head I shall retrench whatever you dislike in them and instead of the Senses which trouble you I shall only speak of that natural Faculty which makes us distinguish one Substance from another You 'l see they will keep all their strength and be wholly sheltred from your Distinctions I begin with the second There being some necessity for it It consisted of these three Propositions 1. If Transubstantiation has place our Senses deceive us in the report they make of the Eucharist 2. If our Senses deceive us in the report which they make of the Eucharist they may as well deceive us in every thing else 3. If our Senses may deceive us in every thing the Proofs of Christianity are of no solidity This is the sum of my Second Proof which I offered you yesterday Now be pleas'd to observe how I further express it 1. If Transubstantiation has place the natural Faculty which God has given us whereby to distinguish one Substance from another this Faculty deceives us in the notice it gives us of the Eucharist 2. If the natural Faculty whereby we distinguish one Substance from another be mistaken on the Subject of the Eucharist nothing hinders but that it may be the fame on other Substances 3. If the natural Faculty whereby we discern the Substances has no certainty the Proofs for Christian Religion be of no weight You see Sir that forming my Argument in this manner your Distinctions are beside the purpose and
effect these People agreeing in nothing and it being in the mean time imimpossible to reason without laying down something it 's clear there 's no reasoning against them without granting what 's in question which is one of the greatest saults a Man that argues can fall into It 's then impossible fairly to deny what I said when I affirm'd That Transubstantiation opens a door to Scepticism and puts men into a necessity of denying every thing What I said at first is a small matter that it makes void Mr. Huet's proofs it spares none overthrowing generally and without exception whatever establishes the truth of Christian Religion So that if I justifie this as I am perswaded I easily can I shall be sorry to add any thing to the proof which this alone surnishes me with In effect those who shall be capable of digesting this may digest every thing I believe you are in the right said Mr. N. and I do acknowledg if you can convince me Transubstantiation draws along with it Scepticism you will make me suspect it In effect I conceive nothing more dangerous nor at the same time so ridiculous as Scepticism and you can never speak any thing too bad of it which I will not subscribe to But I do not much fear your proving what you talk of And I for my part said I do not doubt but I shall do it Shall I not do it if I convince you that in admitting Transubstantiation one is engaged not to rely on any evidence be it of what kind it will. For in short Sir you know the whole dispute with the Sceptics is to know Whether there be any thing certain The Sceptics absolutely deny this We as to our parts affirm That as there are things doubtful and uncertain so there are some we are sure of and which one may and ought to believe and when we be asked what those things be we answer they are precisely those which are evident Because that in effect according to us the evidence of a thing is the foundation of its certainty and infallible mark of its truth The Sceptics on the contrary say that evidence and falsity have nothing inconsistent that they may be found together and therefore to conclude a thing to be true because of its being evident is ill reasoning and an exposing of ones self to manifest danger of being deceiv'd So that the whole amounts to this Whether one may or ought to rely on the evidence of a thing as an infallible mark of truth For if we cannot the Sceptics have reason and we can offer nothing against them And consequently if I shew you that in granting Transubstantiation there is no evidence of whatever rank it may be which does not consist very well with error and falsity Now shall I not hereby shew you that this Doctrine draws after it the whole train of Sceptical doubts I suppose then a man must be a perfect Sceptic or none at all For the mitigations which some would introduce be absolutely ridiculous For in fine we must assure our selves of whatever is evident or assure our selves of nothing seeing we cannot assure our selves of any thing but on the account of its evidence And consequently if evidence be the lawful ground of certitude we must be sure of whatever is evident and put away all Scepticism without reserve On the contrary if the evidence of a thing be not sufficient to produce a certainty of it we can be sure of nothing we must be perfect Sceptics and never believe or do any thing So that all those who are not perfect and compleat Sceptics are not Sceptics at all seeing they part with the fundamental maxim of their ridiculous System I agree with you in all this says Mr. N. and will acquit you of your promise if you show me that Transubstantiation separates Evidence from Truth This is no hard matter to do reply'd I for in effect I know but two sorts of evidences the one which strikes the senses the other which is perceiv'd by the mind I have shew'd you that if Transubstantiation takes place the first is a most unfaithful Note of the Truth I have shew'd you that amongst this great multitude of things which strike the senses there is not perhaps one which they do more distinctly perceive than the matter of the Eucharist I have shew'd you that 't is an object which shews it self not only to one or two of our senses as most of those things do which make us apprehend them but generally and without exception all those which God has given us I have shew'd you That they all unanimously do depose that 't is Bread and Wine and that whatever precaution they use to hinder themselves from being deceived they all find the same thing and never change their language This then being a thing which you do believe to be false and in effect it cannot be true if your Transubstantiation be receiv'd you see my only task is to convince you That according to your Principles this first kind of evidence may lead us into error I am not agreed in that reply'd he For tho our senses may deceive us in the Eucharist they deceive us only in respect of the substance therein contained but will make us faithful reports on the accidents And you know our Divines and Philosophers confine the certainty of the senses to the bare accidents By which means there lyes open a large field for these saculties to exercise their functions in without running a risk of being mistaken This field said I to him is not so vast as it appears to you Your Authors and especially Bellarmin * Bell de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. do not pretend the senses have certainty in respect of all sorts of accidents without exception They count two different ranks the one which are only perceiv'd by one sense as Colours by the Sight Sounds by the Ear Scents by the Smell The others which are perceiv'd by more than one sense as Greatness Scituation Figure Motion They call the first proper Objects and the second common ones They add that the report of our senses is not certain but only in respect of their proper Objects but as to the common ones they may easily be déceived Here 's then the certainty of the Senses reduced to half the size you gave it But this is not all for Bellarmin stops not here He moreover distinguishes the judgments we may make on the proper Objects of our Senses in Generals and in Particulars For example when we see a Colour we may say first in general of it This is a colour not a scent or savour We may say likewise in particular This is such a colour 't is white or red not green or black He tells us the Senses are not certain but in the first of these judgments they often deceiving us in the second See Sir whereunto this Doctrine reduces the certainty of the Senses For my part I could like as
form to ones self a distinct Idea of Bread and Wine without bringing in all the Modusses of these two Substances and distinctly conceiving the Mass of these Modusses without conceiving the Bread and Wine See now Sir if according to the Maxims of the Cartesians you dare affirm there 's Bread and Wine in the Eucharist as you say there 's that which makes the Essence of Bread and Wine Being not well versed in the new Philosophy saies Mr. N. I shall not undertake to answer what you now offered me But shall reserve my reply till you undertake to shew me our belief destroys the Principle of the Schools which tell us That two contradictory Propositions cannot be true And I am even impatient to see how you will prove this I will easily shew you said I That this Doctrine includes a great number of Contradictions and consequently of necessity either this Doctrine must be false or the contradictory Propositions may be true It 's certain if I undertake to shew you by Arguments that your belief is contradictory I shall I imagine be engaged in great contests with you We must run over all the knotty Questions of the Schools and examine their nicest Distinctions And this is as little pleasant to me as I believe 't is to you But I have another less tiresome way than this first Which is to shew you Sir That your Doctors agree 't is contradictory to say divers things which are the necessary consequences of your belief which they easily grant every time they think not of Transubstantiation and when the Idea of this Doctrine which commonly confounds their Senses leaves them some liberty of judging of things according to the light of nature Behold here an example of what I say Transubstantiation according to the common Sentiment of the Schools do's necessarily imply the Existence of Accidents without a Subject I affirm That this very thing is a pure Contradiction and here 's the manner how I shew it You will allow me it 's a Contradiction to affirm That an Accident is not an Accident 'T is your Suarez who teaches it in so many words If the Accident * Suar. Met. disp 32. sect 1. n. 4. says he has no Subject 't is not an Accident but a Substance You do not rightly comprehend this Author's meaning says Mr. N. The Essence of the Accident do's not consist to be actually in a Subject but only to may be therein to be proper to this 'T is this Disposition and this Aptitude which makes the Essence of the Accident and which never leaves it and this is whatever Suarez meant in the passage you have cited You deceive your self reply'd I Suarez sense is That Accidents will be Substances if they be not actually in some Subject To behold more distinctly this truth observe if you please that he does not say this but to prove there are Substances for thus he speaks He says it cannot be denied but there are Accidents seeing this is a thing which the Senses attest Whence he concludes there are Substances because if there were not Substances the Accidents would be without a Subject and if they had no Subject they would not be Accidents but Substances Had this Jesuit the Thought you impute to him his Argument would be reduced to this There are Accidents The Accidents are proper to have Subjects These Subjects must be Substances Then there are Substances But first if Suarez meant this 't is strange he did not say it He has spoken enough in his Life not to be to seek to express his Thoughts and not to use such uncouth ways as these would be Moreover in attributing to him this sense you make him make a ridiculous Argument For in fine what will this consequence be Accidents are proper to exist in SubSubstances There are then Substances This is just as if I should say The Fire is proper to melt Ice Therefore where ever there is Fire there must necessarily be Ice Water is proper to quench Fire Where ever then there is Water there is also Fire This may suffice on the Subject of your first Contradiction The second is a little more palpable It consists in your making the Body of Christ to be in several places at once without losing its Unity For in fine if it be in several places at once it 's separate from its self and if it be separate from it self 't is no longer one only Body All Philosophers agree there 's no certainer mark of a real distinction than separation especially that which they call mutual and which they say consists in separate things subsisting each apart after the Separation The mutual separation of two Extreams saith Suarez * Suar. Met. in indice voce distinctio is an evident sign they be really distinguisht Elsewhere he says this is the principal sign †Idem Met. disp 7. Sect. 2. n. 9 10. He also affirms it matters not to know Whether the separation be made naturally or supernaturally and that all one can say of it is That when the separation is made naturally the distinction is more visibly and apparently known than when God does does it by Miracle Yet he affirms it to be then no less real And of this he gives us a considerable example He says if we consult only natural reason we shall be apt to doubt whether Quantity be distinct from Matter because in effect these two things do never subsist without one another in the order of Nature But he adds That the Mystery of the Eucharist does not permit us to doubt of their distinction seeing that Quantity does therein Miraculously subsist without Matter On this same Principle Suarez and all your other Doctors affirm it impossible that the Modusses should subsist without the things Modifide no not by an effect of Infinite power because say they there being no real distinction between the Modus and the thing Modifide it 's impossible the Modus should subsist without the thing Modifide There cannot then be a real separation between that which is not really distinct and to suppose such a separation is a manifest contradiction Yet your belief supposes this It supposes the Body of Jesus Christ in several places at a time I mean in several separate places which have no contiguity between them but are distinguished by considerable spaces and by a great number of Bodies which lye between them Let 's imagine three Consecrated Hosts one here the other in China and the third in America The Body of Christ is in all these three places and at the same time in Heaven It 's perfectly entire in each of these four places It 's then separate and far distant from it self Pray tell me Sir is not this fair reasoning to say The body and the soul of a child of God are two distinct Substances for after death the body remains in the Sepulchre and the soul goes to Heaven This is what cannot be denied But if this reasoning
most famous Divines acknowledg it we know it essential to all changes to have two different Terms one of which is destroy'd and the other produced and you 'l agree with me herein if you run over all the changes remarkt hitherto whether Substantial or Accidental Natural or Supernatural You 'l see there 's always an Accident if the change be accidental or a Substance if it be substantial which ceases to exist and another Accident or another Substance which begins to exist and takes the place of the Accident or Substance which is destroy'd And consequently if the Bread were chang'd into the Body of Jesus Christ the Body of Christ must necessarily be produced by this change And as it would be produced by it self it would have a real relation to its self contrary to that Maxim which implies That nothing produces it self and That nothing relates to its self In fine Sir this is a constant Maxim and ever suppos'd tho it be never exprest That whatever has all the sensible marks of a thing is that thing That having the essence of it it ought to bear its name Hereon depends the certainty of discerning whether of single things or Species For in fine our judgments cannot pierce into the bottom of things or discover their essence by this sort of knowledg call'd intuitive in the Schools We only know them by the help of the sensible marks which distinguish them So that to overthrow this Maxim is to render the discerning of things absolutely impossible or at least doubtful and uncertain And yet this is the effect of Transubstantiation It places the Body of Christ in the Eucharst under the sensible marks of Bread and Wine where there 's none of these two Substances and you believe our Lords Body exists in a place where it has none of the marks which are wont to make it known and to distinguish it from the rest of things This Sir may suffice to shew you That Transubstantiation absolutely overthrows the certitude of our Notices I believe you perceive That if it subsists the first Principles be false Demonstrations themselves deceive us our Senses are subject to a thousand delusions and in a word we ought to doubt of whatever we have hitherto held for most certain and we have nothing else to do but to plunge our selves into Scepticism which I reckon to be the most deplorable condition in the world seeing 't is the total annihilation of our reason Mr. N. was about answering me but was hindred by the coming in of one of his Friends who had business with him We having been a great while together I laid hold on this occasion to take my leave of him CONFERENCE VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine of the Trinity is Demonstrated AFTER this last Conversation there past some days before I saw Mr. N. again He came not to me and I was unwilling to force a visit on him but having at length by good hap met with him alone in his usual Walks I joyn'd my self to him We fell at first into several Discourses and at length on Matters of Religion when I made bold to ask him Whether he had thought on what had past in our former Conferences He answer'd That he had in truth ruminated thereon after I had left him but he was resolved to disturb himself no more with those Matters For to what purpose said he unless to shake a mans faith and discompose his mind For I am so perswaded of the truth of Transubstantiation and I find it has such strong tyes with the Principles of Christianity that I do not at all doubt but it makes up a part of this holy Religion So that your reasons tending only to shew me that if Transubstantiation be a Doctrine of Christianity we are to blame in being Christians I not doubting of the first must insensibly doubt of the second Wherefore I had rather once for all to banish these thoughts out of my head and remain in the state wherein I have hitherto lived than to run the risk of turning Libertin which is the thing in the world I most hate In effect continued he without giving me time to answer If your way of arguing be good I could make use of it against the Mystery of the Trinity and easily direct your proofs against this Capital Truth and that with the same success as you have done against Transubstantiation Take for example the most specious Objection of the Arrians and Socinians They affirm this great Mystery absolutely ruins one of the most certain Principles of Sciences What we believe reduces it self to two Heads First That the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from one another the Father is not the Son and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. The other That neither of these Persons is really distinguisht from the Divine Essence which they possess That the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost God and what is more That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are but one God possessing only one Divinity so that the Divinity of the Father is the same with that of the Son and that of the Father and the Son is not different from that of the Holy Ghost Pray Sir now inform me how to accord all this with the principle which passes for unquestionable in Metaphysics to wit That if two Subjects be not distinct from a third they cannot be distinguisht between themselves How can this principle subsist if it be true that the Divine Persons which are most distinct in themselves are not at all from the Essence which is common to them what can you say in this Demonstration When two Subjects do not really differ from a third They differ not really from one another The Persons of the Trinity differ not really from the Divine Essence which they possess Then they differ not really from one another You will grant me that this is a Physical Demonstration and otherwise evident than those call'd Moral May I not then apply to the Trinity the first proof you have used against Transubstantiation and say That if this Mystery made part of the Christian Religion the Objections the Insidels bring to oppose it would have more force than the proofs which establish the Divinity of it seeing these proofs have only a Moral evidence and the Objections which might be brought against them have all the evidence term'd Physical I say the same thing of your second proof I need only change therein two words and instead of Sense and Transubstantiation say Reason and the Trinity I need only say If the Mystery of the Trinity be true our Reason deceives us in the judgment she makes of it in thinking to see clearly and distinctly That the persons of the Divinity are not different from one another If our Reason deceives us in this it may as well deceive us in all other
Consult all the Sects of the Philosophers all the people in the Universe to know whether it be now day or whether an Horse be greater than an Ant you will find I do not say not a Sect or Nation but not any one particular person that denies this The light of Sense has moreover this advantage over that of Reason that it 's less liable to be disordered by prejudices Prejudices make people doubt who are strongly possessed by them of Truths which a free Reason and a disengaged mind clearly perceives What is there for example which my reason perceives more distinctly than the impossibility of a Body's being in two places without division Yet your Reason imagines to see the contrary Whence comes this but from the prejudice wherewith one of us is possess'd But 't is not the same with the Senses There 's no prejudice which hinders them from seeing Objects such as they are which we must always understand of the most apparent and grossest Objects There are two sorts of clearness says an Author much esteem'd among you * Lawful Prejudices chap. 14. the one so lively and piercing that it 's impossible for men not to see it and which is such as cannot be darkned by any cloud of Prejudices or Passions whereby it shews it self uniformly to all men of this kind adds he are things exposed to the Senses In a word It 's a thousand times easier to deceive our Reason than our Senses There 's no truth so certain which a Sophister will not render doubtful by his Subtilties and Artifices Even the most learned People are sometimes deceived and we have seen but too many Examples of this in all Ages But deceive my Senses if you can on Objects as familiar as those we now spake of Go and inform any one That the food he commonly uses is not Bread and Beer The evidence of Sense then has great advantages over that which is perceiv'd only by Reason whence appears the Possibility of my Proofs being good and your two first objections being not so Nay the thing is not only possible but true and I hope to convince you of it with little trouble Whatever you have hitherto said to me turns on these two Suppositions The first That Reason sees evidently on one hand the truth of this maxim of the Philosophers That when two Subjects be not distinct from a third they are not so from one another The second That there 's more evidence in this than there is in the Reasons which establish the Truth of Christian Religion But I first affirm to you It 's impossible these two Suppositions can be true And if they were the Arians and Socinians wou'd have good grounds to deny the Mystery of the Trinity For first if our Reason evidently saw the Truth of the Maxim you bring against me we must necessarily say one of these two things Either that in effect this Maxim is true or that Evidence is not a certain mark of Truth Here 's no medium You must of necessity take one of these sides The second differs in nothing from Scepticism you must therefore take the first It must be said that according to you the Maxim of the Philosophers is true That 's my thought says Mr. N. Are you of the same mind repli'd I on the subject of the Opposition which you think you evidently see between this Maxim and the Mystery of the Trinity Do you think this to be a true and real Opposition Or do you believe it to be false altho you evidently see it Should I say it 's false answer'd he you wou'd make me the same Objection you have already made you will tell me there may be error in things most evident seeing I might evidently see Opposition where there is none and that thus Evidence wou'd not be the mark of Truth and consequently That the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing To avoid such dangerous Extremities I had rather tell you that this Opposition is as true as 't is evident You believe then said I to him that effectively and in the Truth of the thing the Mystery of the Trinity is directly against an unquestionable Maxim. You believe there 's a real Contradiction between these two things and that 't is impossible to make them agree This is certainly true answer'd he Then said I the Sceptics must have good grounds seeing Contradiction is not the note of Falsity What is there more unquestionable than this Maxim That if a Proposition be true that which contradicts it must necessarily be false Is not this the Foundation of certainty You now see Sir on what precipices you cast your selves and what are the unavoidable Consequences of your Suppositions Hence you see the necessity of acknowledging there are some false and that in effect if the Philosophers Maxim be true it 's not contrary to the Mystery of the Trinity or if there be any Opposition between this Mystery and this Maxim we must not conclude the Maxim to be false seeing it's impossible the Mystery shou'd be so But this is not all I wish you wou'd explain your self on Mr. Huets Sentiment I lately mention'd to you Which Demonstrations do you believe most certain Physical or Moral ones Or to speak more precisely wherein think you lies most certainty and evidence in the Demonstration you brought against me in the name or the Socinians and Arians or in those Mr. Huet makes use of to prove the Truth of the Christian Religion Take which side you will you cannot escape me If you say the advantage lies on the side of Mr. Huets Proofs you deliver up to me your Objection In this Supposition right Reason will have us believe the Trinity notwithstanding the difficulties therein seeing nothing's more conformable to her Maxims than always to prefer that which is more evident before that which is less But if you say on the contrary That the Arians and Socinians Objection has more strength than Mr. Huets Proofs You hereby acknowledg That the Doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to good Sence and ought therefore to be rejected whether by retrenching of it from the number of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches supposing it can be separated from it or by rejecting the whole of Christianity supposing this Doctrine be inseparable from the rest In effect were these Proofs and this Objection of an equal force they wou'd bring the mind into suspence whence right Reason cou'd not draw it out She wou'd not know on which side to determine her self and finding at bottom of this Religion things which will appear to her evidently false She wou'd carry us as far off from it as She wou'd bring us near it in making us comprehend the force of the Proofs which authorize it Moreover making two contrary Judgments on the Subject of Religion one that it is true because the Proofs produced in its favour are good the other that it is false because it teaches
is true But it 's commonly far less evident That God has reveal'd what he has in effect reveal'd Whence it happens men are so divided about the things which are pretended to be revealed from God. Yet this Author says nothing of this second perswasion He speaks only of the first He conceals the weak side and shews only the strongest It 's certainer says he that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us Be it so But is it certainer that God has revealed such and such a Doctrine than 't is certain one and two are three and that if I think I am This he will not say Yet if he does not say it he must acknowledg he has ill reasoned For if what Reason says be more certain than it 's certain God has reveal'd the Doctrine of which one is perswaded he shall have far less certainty of the Truth of this Doctrine than of what Reason sees distinctly But let us stop a while at what this Author has chosen and which he has made his strong hold It 's certainer says he That what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us He makes Reason to say this and consequently his sense is that this act of Reason which perswades us That what God says is true is more certain than what our Reason perswades us But what does he mean Does he mean that this act is more certain than any act of Reason whatever If this be so he contradicts himself For this very act being an act of Reason if it has more certainty than any act of Reason 't will be more certain than it self Does he mean that this act is the certainest of all and that there 's no other which equals the certainty of this If this be his sense 't is easie to shew him his mistake First is this act more certain than that which perswades us of the existence of God Let him say which he will he cannot escape me For to what purpose is it to know That Truth is essential to God supposing he exists if it be less certain that he does exist If on the contrary these two acts be equally certain and if the actual existence be as clearly comprehended in the Idea we have of God as the unquestionable truth of what he attests the perswasion we have of this second Truth is not the certainest of all those perceived by Reason seeing the perswasion of Gods existence is no less certain Is it more certain That whatever God says is true than it 's certain That nothing of what appears to us is false This no man will say seeing we judg neither that God exists nor that whatever he says is true nor that we can affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it but because all this appears evident So that here we have a third perswasion which is no less certain than that which we were to think to be the most infallible But says this Author God is more uncapable of deceiving us than our Reason is of being deceived I grant it But how do we know this but by our Reason and consequently we have only a certitude of Reason and we are not more certain of it than that we are certain That our Reason does not deceive us whether in this or other things which be as evident as this This little subtilty might pass did we not fear being mistaken in matters of Faith without accusing even God himself of deceiving us But a man must be a fool that has such an irrational thought When we do doubt of matters of Faith this doubt does never tend to perswade us God has deceiv'd us in revealing to us what is hard to be believ'd but rather perswades us we are mistaken in taking that for a Divine Revelation which is only a Doctrine of men So those who doubt do never compare the certitude of their Reason with the certainty of Gods Testimony Neither have they ever the least temptation to imagin the first greater than the second But they always compare this act of their Reason which has perswaded them God has revealed to 'em what appears to them incredible with this other act of their Reason which makes them find incredible what they believ'd God had revealed to them And therefore we may cease to believe without imagining God has deceiv'd us or that our Reason is more incapable of being deceiv'd than God of deceiving us And consequently from Gods being more incapable of deceiving us than our Reason of being deceiv'd does in no wise follow That Faith has greater certainty than Reason Let this Author then pardon me if I say ' Twou'd be a grievous scandal to Infidels were it so That Christian Religion taught things directly contrary to Reason and which shou'd appear such not at first sight but on mature deliberation after all possible care to prevent being deceived and after long and serious reflexions which will not at all permit doubtings of the matter 's being what it appears But it is also true Christian Religion has not a Doctrine which is in this sort contrary to the lights of Reason and this cannot be denied without contradicting all your School-Divines For first if it be true Christianity teaches things contrary to Reason what will become of what Cardinal Richlieu and the Author of the Art of Thinking say The first affirms (a) Richl method Book 1. ch 1. That natural light deceives no body and the other says (b) Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That things exactly consider'd what we see evidently and from Reason or from the faithful report of our Senses is never contrary to what is taught us by Divine Faith. What will become of what all your Divines say (c) Vasq in 1. disp 123. cap. 1 Valent Tom. 3. disp 1 quaest 1 Punct 4 Bell. de Not. Eccles cap. 11. Maerat de fid disp 16 Sect. 5. That the Mystery of the Trinity is far above Reason but not contrary to it Wou'd it not be contrary to Reason if being true it shou'd appear to it evidently false What will you think of what these same Divines teach after your Angelical Doctor (d) Tho. Aqu. part 1. quaest 1. art 8. That 't is impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Salvation As Faith says he is grounded on infallible Truth and it being impossible to shew that which is contrary to Truth so it is clear that the proofs made use of against Faith are not Demonstrations but Objections which are solvible What will become of what passes for unquestionable in your Schools (e) Cajet in 1 quaest 1 art 8 Vasq in 1 disp 11 cap. 2 3. Valent. ubi seq Conint de act sup disp ii dub ii Rhod. Tom. 1 disp 6 quaest 1. Sect. 3. Mart. de fid disp 5 Sect. 4. That one may Demonstratively prove not in truth That the Mystery of the Trinity and all the others are