and effective as the first By first and Second Notions I both understand Terms or Words and the Notions signified by them 27. So much for the Object of Apprehension which is Sense and Notion and for the Grounds of that Object which is Sentiment Now for the Affections of Apprehension if a good one and they are two namely Cleerness and Distinctness 28. Cleerness of Apprehension which is in the Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the Eye is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness and presupposes Light 29. Light is that which manifests and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its Objects or that which manifests them to it and is either Light of Revelation which is also called Light of Faith or Light of Nature which is also called Light of Reason where Reason is Appropriately taken and most strictly 30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit and is chiefly in the Holy Scriptures The Light of Nature is All other Light whatever but that of Revelation whereby we See and Apprehend things and is that we have by Sense and Discourse 31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights in that of Nature and that of Revelation though more cleerly in the latter than in the former as that God is Good and that he is the Maker and Conserver and supreme Director of All things Other things are onely to be seen in the Light of Revelation being of a nature not to be discovered but in and by it as the Mysteries of Christian Religion the Doctrine of the Trinity the Incarnation of God c. 32. The Lights of Faith and Nature of Revelation and Reason though they be not the same yet are not contrary I mean that what is shewn or seen to be true in one Light can never be shewn or seen to be false in the other What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condition'd to be This or to be That or else by Reason rightly acting to be so or so it is never contradicted by Revelation Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogie for him to believe against his Faculties is to believe a Contradiction If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense and to Reason judging according to Sense I cannot hold my self obliged by any Revelation to believe them Flesh and Blood but in a Notion consistent with the judgment Sense and Reason make of them that is not flesh and blood substantially but sacramentally not flesh and blood really but only by signification Else Truth might be Incongruity Inconsistency Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery I am so far from making truth of it that I cannot make any sense of it I might as well believe that two and two make not four or three and three six as that it is not Bread or Wine which to my Eye my Taste my Touch in a word which being an Object of Sense to all Examinations of my Sense is so What is against Sense is against Knowledge 33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of Faith may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation above Reason not so assisted but acting onely by the Aids of Nature but still it is Reason sees in both As I can see an Object with a Tube that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon-light but still it is the Eye that sees in both the Organ is the same although the Lights be not It is the same Reason and Understanding the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation as it is that sees by the Light of Nature and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one as by the other 34. The great Designe of God in all the Doctrines and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion is to affect the hearts of men and therefore as 1. He represents and reveals them in first Notions so 2. He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones and usually 3. He representeth one thing by many Notions 1. To make it more Affective and withal 2. to signifie that no one Notion he represents the thing in is adequate and just to it Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ and our Communion with him by that between the Vine and Branches between the Husband and Wife between the Head and Members As also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them from their Darkness into his most marvellous Light He compares it to Generation to Adoption to Creation In fine the New Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant but also a Testament and a Promise All which resembling and comparative expressions may and ought to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signifie and the making of them more affective but neither of them so to be insisted on as if it were adequate or just 35. The Light of Faith and Revelation must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature I mean we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason Spiritual things cannot be discern'd but spiritually and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals In Points of mere Revelation we ought entirely to confine our selves to the Notions Comparisons Similitudes and Representations God himself hath made of them without pretending to be wise above what is written and to say or understand just how in themselves the things are abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in 36. He that pretends to understand the Mysteries of Christian Religion or any Point of meer Revelation stript of those Notions Resemblances and Comparisons when they be not revealed or discovered but in them as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation but in that of Reason or Nature so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light no wonder if he either erre or trifle about them 37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God the proper Object as well as Author of Revelation in that manner that he speaks of himself who Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions not in such as adequate and adjust him but such as do proportion and suit with us as if he had an Understanding Will and Affections and did purpose Ends and elected Means to compass them did consult and decree and were touched with the Affections of Joy Grief Love Hatred Anger Revenge c. 38. They that tell us that he is not angry that Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to him and
Imprimatur November 23 1677. Guil. Jane R. P. D. Hen. Episc. Lond. à sacris domest Organum Vetus Novum OR A DISCOURSE OF REASON AND TRUTH WHERE IN The Natural Logick common to Mankinde is briefly and plainly described By RICHARD BURTHOGGE M. D. In a Letter to the most Honoured Andrew Trevill Esq. of Èthe in the County of Cornwal Marc. Ant. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 7. 1. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LONDON Printed for Sam. Crouch at the Princes Arms a Corner-shop of Popes-head ally in Cornhil 1678. FOR The most Honoured ANDREW TREVILL Esq AT E the in the County of Cornwall SIR THat of making many Books is no End was truly said by the wisest man that ever was Not in this sense only that multitudes of Books begetting in the mindes of those that read them infinite Distractions deprive them of the Benefits they might receive from fewer but in another that there is a Prolifickness in Books that one produces another and this a third and so on without End and consequently that the labour men are at in making them is not onely Useless but Endless You will have reason to believe this second Sense to be as just and true as the first when you consider that I who lately wrote an Apology for the Deity am obliged by the Reflexions made upon it now to write Another to defend it and no question but the Latter may be as obnoxious to Unjust Exceptions as the Former So that if Occasion given be also taken there will never be an End of writing but by what gives End to the Writer However having received an Invitation to adde something to the former Essay I am at last resolved both in justice to my self and to my Book to comply with it and to enter into thoughts of the Causes that not irrationally may be presumed to have had an Influence on the Objectors and into most of the Objections and then to offer to them by way of Obviation such Considerations as it may be will not prove unuseful to Rectifie Mistakes in other Matters as well as in this And the main Causes I intend to touch on not to mention Envy c. are Three Proud Ignorance Ignorant Zeal and Impertinent Reasoning 1. Proud Ignorance consists in a mans presumption of his own Omniscience for the Sciolist is ever most conceited so that he presently and peremptorily condemneth that for Errour which himself hath never learnt for Truth as if there were no growth in Knowledge or that any Humane Understanding were adequate to Verity Whereas Capacities of the largest size are yet but narrow and they that know most do but the better know how little it is they know and how much they are to seek The most the Wisest know is that their own and others Ignorance is the surest Object of Knowledge True Knowledge is not conceited it is humble and aspireth after more If any man think that he knoweth any thing he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know 2. Ignorant Zeal a cause of very general influence into many Mistakes not onely in matters of Religion but also in points of Philosophy what is it but a Horse of high metal without eyes Indeed nothing is more commendable in Religion or administers a better Argument of Sincerity in its Professors than fervency of Zeal but then it must be Zeal according to Knowledge and managed with discretion or else it is but Rage and Fury not Zeal Zeal regulated by the Holy Scriptures that is Zeal according to Knowledge and governed with Wisdom is Fire from the Altar but then Irregular Zeal Zeal without Knowledge Zeal without Wisdom is Wild-fire which as the corruption of the best is worst hath nothing more pernicious than it self to Church or State Zeal without Knowledge may be stiled Blinde Zeal and is that when men are passionately concerned for or against an Opinion and Practice from a strong but groundless and unwarranted perswasion that what they do and what they are for is highly to the honour and glory of God and what they oppose is against it as if they knew abstractly of themselves and by their own discoursings what is for God's Glory or what is otherwise further than it hath pleased God himself in his Word to reveal it That onely is for God's Glory which is grounded on God's Word The Word of God is able to make the Man of God perfect The Corinthians had a Zeal for God but not according to Knowledge and so had the Jews who persecuted and murther'd the Christians but thought they did God good service What manner of men they were who among them call'd themselves the Zealous Josephus hath left on Record Yes the Disciples of Christ in Zeal too they would have Fire from Heaven and cite an Example but our meek and blessed Saviour tells them they knew not the Spirit they were of They took it to be a Spirit of Zeal but He knew it to be a Spirit of Passion A persecuting furious Spirit is none of Christ's it is Antichrist's The Wrath of man worketh not the Righteousness of God Zeal without Wisdom may be call'd Imprudent Zeal and is Zeal unseasonably and unsitly shewn in circumstances of time place and persons that will not bear it as when men shall take their Pearls their Reprehensions Counsels Instructions or whatever other instances a Zeal is shewn in and cast them before the Swine and that though they have a Prospect themselves or an Advertisement from others of the probable ill success both that the Pearls shall betrodden under foot and they themselves be rented This is not to employ and use Zeal but to lose it There is a time for every Purpose and every thing is beautiful onely in that time Pearls so cast are cast away 3. Impertinent Reasoning the third Cause I mention'd and a Cause of all others of most general influence into Errours and Mistakes I call not onely that which of the Logicians is named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a passing and arguing from one thing to another when yet there 's no Agreement no Connexion between them but that also which is bottomed on single Mediums and runs on in a long but simple line and train of Consequences from thing to thing or else is founded but on second Notions and inlaid with them which way of Reasoning must be shewed to be Impertinent and that by shewing a better pertinent one Thus Sir I am arriv'd to what I principally design'd and I crave your pardon if for my Readers satisfaction as well as for mine own I now enlarge and take the boldness to let him understand my apprehensions of Reason both as to its nature and the interest it hath in Religion and how I think it must be circumstanced and condition'd to assure us of Truth By which Performance if I gain no more I shall this that as well the persons that approve my former Essay as those that cavil it will know the Rule
and Method I proceeded by in framing it which to the former will afford a greater Confirmation if it be Right and to the latter a fairer rise of Assaulting me if it be not 1. Before I can proceed to shew what Reason is I am first to shew the many sences the Word is taken in which not done by most is one occasion of the great Confusion in their talks about it And Reason to omit some other sences not so necessary here is in ordinary Language taken either largely or strictly or appropriately and most strictly 2. Reason largely taken is the same with Minde or Understanding and so is commonly affirmed to exert it self in three Acts the Apprehension of simple Terms the Composition of those Terms by way of Affirmation and Negation and Discourse or illation of one thing from another Reason strictly taken is the Understanding as it issues out in its third Act not in the Apprehension of simple Terms nor in the Composition of them but in Discourse and Illation and so Reason is the Understanding as it argues discourses infers But Reason is appropriately taken or most strictly as it is oppos'd to Faith and Revelation of which hereafter 3. Reason taken for the Minde or Understanding is that Faculty whereby a man is said to be Reasonable Intelligent Understanding as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to be Seeing or 't is that Faculty whereby a man is said to Elicite Acts of Reason or to Understand as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to See I so define it by the Act for that the Act is better known than the Faculty To Understand as well as to see is a first Notion and he must be very simple that understands not what is meant by it nor are there any Notions more intelligible whereby to mark Faculties than those of their Acts. Acts we see being conscious of them when we exert them but Faculties we see not we know not but by their Acts. 4. The Acts of Reason in this large sence as the same with Minde or Understanding to speak of them as they offer and present themselves to mine without confining of my self to Notions of the Schools or common Logicians are Two Apprehension and Judgement 5. Apprehension is that Act of Understanding whereby it is said to See or Perceive things and is the same in relation to the Minde that Seeing is in relation to the Eye 6. Apprehension is Conversant with things either as in themselves or as they are noted and they are noted either by simple words or else by Propositions which are words joyned by way of Affirmation or Negation both which the Minde sees or apprehends but as it hath the Sense of them Sence or Meaning is the Motive and immediate Object of Apprehension as Colour is of Seeing The Eye sees nothing but under Colour the Minde apprehends nothing but under Sense 7. I know well that Truth is usually affirmed the proper adequate immediate formal Object of the Intellect but it is not so Not Truth but Sence or Meaning is the proper adequate immediate Object of the Minde as to its first Act that of Apprehension Truth is onely the proper adequate immediate Object of it as to another which is called Assent and is a kind of Judgement I understand and apprehend a Proposition which is false that is I have a Sence and Meaning of it though when I Understand or Apprehend it I refuse my Assent So that it is not Verity that is the Motive and immediate Object of Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension but Sence or Meaning 8. Sence or Meaning is that Conception or Notion that is formed in the Minde on a proposal to it of an Object a Word or Proposition as Colour is that Sentiment begotten and caused in the Eye upon the impression of its Object on it 9. To understand this we are to consider That to us men things are nothing but as they stand in our Analogie that is are nothing to us but as they are known by us and they are not known by us but as they are in the Sense Imagination or Minde in a word as they are in our Faculties and they are in our Faculties not in their Realities as they be without them no nor so much as by Picture and proper Representation but onely by certain Appearances and Phaenomena which their impressions on the Faculties do either cause or occasion in them 10. Every Faculty hath a hand though not the sole hand in making its immediate Object as the Eye makes the Colours it is said to see the Ear the Sounds the Fancy the Idols and so the Understanding the Conceptions or Notions under which it apprehends and sees things So that all the immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation to use the word in its largest sence are Entia Cogitationis All Appearances which are not properly and may I use a School-term formally in the things themselves conceived under them and consequently conceiv'd as if they had them but so onely in the cogitative Faculties No such thing as Colour but in the Eye nor as Sound but in the Ear nor as Notion Sense or Meaning but in the Minde These though they seem in the Objects and without the cogitative Powers yet are no more in them than the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed 11. So that all immediately cogitable beings that is all immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation are either Entities of Sense as the immediate Objects of Sense Colour Sound c. or of Imagination as the Images therein the Idols it frames or of Reason and Understanding Mental Entities the Meanings or Notions under which the Understanding apprehends its Objects which Notions though they seem to the Understanding to be without it and to be in the things understood yet as I said before are no more without it or in the things themselves than Colours are without the Eye or Sounds without the Ear or Sapours without the Tongue although they seem so to Sense 12. Faculties and Powers Good Evil Virtue Vice Verity Falsity Relations Order Similitude Whole Part Cause Effect c. are Notions as Whiteness Blackness Bitterness Sweetness c. are Sentiments and the former own no other kind of Existence than the latter namely an Objective one A Notion that will free the Minde of much Intanglement in framing Notions We generally conceive Faculties Good Evil and other Notions under which the Minde apprehends things to be Realities and to have an Existence of their own without the Minde and though there were no Minde to think of them when indeed they are but Noemata Conceptions and all the formal being any of them have is onely in it And no wonder if he that takes Noemata to be Realities findes himself confounded by that mistake in forming his Conceptions about them Notions therefore are very aptly though somewhat barbarously stiled by the School-men Conceptus Objectivi Notions of the
of Assent that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it is oftner an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding than of a pure clear impartial Reason 73. Wherefore others of the Antients as well as of the Moderns abundantly convinced of the insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth and yet unwilling to have Nature so liberal in other matters exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual Judgement They have conceited humane understanding furnish'd by her with certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations that is with Connatural and Ingrafted Notions Principles designedly implanted in the Minde to be a rule to it to direct it Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit which they call Intelligence in the Practical another which is called Synteresis in both a Constellation of Principles shining with their own Light and imparting it to others that want it not much unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits that those of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferiour 74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Principles ingrafted in the Minde by Nature in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen it would follow that Contemplation of our own mindes acquainting us with the Chain Concatenation and Sorites of the Principles therein and Propositions deducible therefrom would more import to the rendring us Philosophers not to say Divines also than observation of the World and Experience and so the greatest School-men those Metaphysical Alchymists that insisted much on this Method and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels should have been the wisest and most fruitful of men Whereas we know the men and the manner of their Communication all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute but also empty and barren and no more agreeing with Realities and in our Analogy than Light with Darkness Again the Soul in its state of Union and Conjunction with the Body is so dependent on it in all its Operations that it exercises none without the Aids of it Ratiocination it self it is an Animal act not an abstract Action of the Soul but a Concrete act of the Animal it is the Man reasons And in the ordinary method of Nature we receive into our Mindes no Impressions no Images but what are handed to them by our Senses I am apt to think that person who should never have seen nor heard nor tasted nor smelt nor felt any thing would have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's or Notions as his Memory with Images and would understand as little as he had sensed Besides those very Principles themselves we call First ones or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and light Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them or minde them It will appear if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Mindes that even these are not assented to but on the Evidence they bring I mean not assented to naturally but as other Propositions are judicially For instance that the whole is greater than the part we assented not unto it on the first hearing but first considering what was meant by Whole what by Part what by Greater what by Lesser and then having sensibly either by Eye-sight or by Imagination compared one unto the other we evidently saw it to be so that the Notion of Greater even to Sense ever agreed to the whole and that of Less to the Parts The like that Two and Two make Four This is the way we first admitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others Onely the Propositions which are call'd Anticipations or first Principles are Propositions of so easie sensible and plain an evidence and so obvious that we early admitted them so early that we cannot well remember when we first did so and therefore they are stiled Anticipations or proleptick Notions for being of so early an admission and existence in our Mindes they preceded all our after knowledges whose acquirement we well remember Further Beings are not to be multiplied without Necessity and there is none of faigning such Anticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Minde in inquisitions after Truth since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye the Ear the Nose the Tongue to direct them and why then in the Minde Besides Reflection on our ordinary reasonings evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles but to the Object discoursed of nor need we to do otherwise if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion Form Ground of Truth that runs through all things true which Form or Notion of Truth assoon as the Understanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned apprehends in an Object it cannot but acknowledge it to be true as it would another to be white or black wherein it is assured by the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned that there is the Form of Whiteness or Blackness As for Anticipations they are too particular and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth which is infinite Let those Anticipations be reckoned and then Experiment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Questions and of Truth relating to them 75. Thus I have shewn the Indications Marks and Notions of Truth that in my judgement are not proper adequate or useful it now remaineth that I shew one that is And Truth as it is the Ground Motive and Reason of Assent is objective Harmony or the Harmony Congruity Even-lying Answerableness Consistence Proportion and Coherence of things each with other in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Truth is universal and exact Agreement or Harmony 76. On the other hand Falsity as the ground motive and reason of Dissent is Objective Disharmony or the disharmony incongruity inequality unanswerableness inconsistence disproportion and incoherence of things in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity 77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth is an appearance of Congruity A thing is probable when it hath some consistence and agreement it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them Improbability is apparent Incongruity 78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony apparent Proportion and Falsity Disharmony Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that shall consult with Nature and common sense 79. In Nature it is plain For Harmony it is the Reason of the World the World was made by it cannot be known but by it The rule of Proportion is
to do so I am as sure that once there were such persons as William the Conquerour and Henry the Eight and that there are or lately were such Cities as Rome and Constantinople as I am that Two and Two make Four or that the Whole is greater than the Parts 91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable and of a contingent nature may be called Confidence but in matters of a necessary firm and immutable nature it is Science Infirm Assent or Assent with Dubitation is called Opinion Suspition is a beginning Assent or an inclination to believe a thing and is short of Opinion Suspition on grounds is called just suspition Suspition on no grounds is mere suspition Probability is appearance of Truth And ground of Suspition is Appearance of Probability Suspition is also called Presumption 92. Assent on Evidence by the testimony of our own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned is as firm as firm can be and is called Knowledge Assent to a thing upon anothers knowledge and not our own is called Belief To Believe is to take a thing upon anothers word and if that word be divine the belief is called Faith or if but humane it is called simply Belief or Credit Belief is grounded on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed for he that believes another believes him to have wisdom enough not to be imposed upon or deceived himself and Veracity or Truth which among men is called Honesty enough not to impose upon or to deceive him The Word of God therefore is the most proper object of belief God being so wise he cannot be deceived and so true he cannot deceive Notoreity of a thing of a fact is the certainty of it on Common Knowledge It is not Presumption nor Probability but Certainty 93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth if it be firm is called Errour If infirm and with dubitation it is erroneous Opinion 94. Ratiocination Speculative is either Euretick or Hermeneutick Inventive or Interpretative and this latter again is either interpretative of the World the Book of Nature or of the Scriptures the Book of God But of these perhaps another time as also of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical and is either that of Prudence 1. Humane or 2. Christian or of Conscience Now on the whole Matter who seeth not the share and interest that Reason hath in matters of Religion Men are reasonable Creatures and therefore their Religion must be reasonable Every Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kinde Faith it self it is a rational Act If I have any reason to believe Men I have all reason to believe God and Ratiocination is as much imploy'd in points of Revelation as in points of mere Reason Truth is the immediate reason of Assent in matters of Revelation as well as in others and there is an Analogie of Faith as well as of Nature the Mediums are different but Ratiocination is the same in both We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual in the one as Natural things with Natural in the other Thus are the Bereans applauded as persons of nobler and more generous Mindes than those of Thessalonica because they took not all on trust as these did but examined the things were told them and compared them with the Scriptures It is easie also to infer that if any person shall give himself the trouble of disproving what in my Apologie I presented to the World to do it to Conviction he must produce a frame and Scheme of Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical than mine and must account for those Phaenomena which I therein essay'd to solve in a method more perspicuous and natural and with more agreeableness and uniformity of Notions than I have or else he will not Confute but confirm it I say this to shew the fairer play to those that undertake to answer me if after I have said it any shall resolve to do so and I say no more to shew the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objections whispered up and down that in themselves they have as little force and evidence and as little conviction as those that make them have yet had either Courage to own them to the world or Candour to own them to me Thus Sir I have performed what I principally designed I have shew'd the nature of Reason I have shewed the true method of Reasoning as also the nature of Truth and up and down my Discourse dispersedly the causes of Errour and I have shew'd the extent of Reason In which performance whatsoever other Incongruity or Errour I may have been guilty of sure I am I have committed none in dedicating it For to whom could I address a Discourse of Reason and of Truth more properly than to a Person who is so great a Lover and owner of both and withal who is so perfectly honoured as you are by all that have the happiness to know you But by none more than Sir Bowdon Aug. 14. 1677. Your most humble Servant and Son Richard Burthogge BOOKS Printed for and sold by Samuel Crouch in Popes-head-ally FEltham's Resolves Divine Moral Political with new Additions Clark's Martyrologie His Lives of the Fathers The Sabbath of Rest to be kept by the Saints here By N. Smith Master of Arts. Cole's English Dictionary Dr. Thomson's method of Curing His Epilogismi Chymici Sleepy spouse of Christ alarm'd in several Sermons By J. B. Recommended in a Preface by Mr. Nath. Vincent Purchasers Pattern much enlarged The English Tutor or the plain Path-way to the English Tongue with examples of most Words from one to six Syllables both in whole Words and also divided with Rules how to spell them by way of Question and Answers