similitude viz. a natural union of these supposed distinct essences without which they are not under the greatest union possible and which being supposed necessary and eternal cannot admit these should be more than one God 2. I note that what he opposes to it so defectively represented is as defective that the Christian Trinity doth not use to be represented thus c. What hurt is there in it if it can be more intelligibly represented than hath been used But his gentle treatment of this hypothesis which he thought as he represents it not altogether unintelligible and which with some help may be more intelligible became one enquiring what might most safely and with least torture to our own minds be said or thought in so awful a Mystery It however seems not proper to call this an hypostatical union much less to say it amounts to no more It amounts not to so much For an hypostatical or personal union would make the terms united the unita the things or somewhats under this union become by it one hypostasis or person whereas this union must leave them distinct persons or hypostases but makes them one God In the use of the Phrase hypostatical or personal union the denomination is not taken from the subject of the union as if the design were to signifie that to be divers hypostases or persons but from the effect or result of the mentioned union to signifie that which results to be one person or hypostasis As the matter is plain in the instance wherein it is of most noted use the case of the two Natures united in the one Person of the Son of God where the things united are not supposed to be two Persons but two Natures so conjoyn'd as yet to make but one person which therefore is the Negative result or effect of the union viz. that the person is not multiply'd by the accession of another Nature but remains still only one But this were an union quite of another kind viz. of the three hypostases still remaining distinct and concurring in one Godhead And may not this be supposed without prejudice to its Perfection For the Schools themselves suppose themselves not to admit a composition prejudicial to the Perfection of the Godhead when they admit three modes of subsistence which are distinct from one another and from the Godhead which they must admit For if each of them were the very Godhead each of them as is urged against us by you know who must have three Persons belonging to it as the Godhead hath And your self acknowledge three somewhats in the Godhead distinct or else they could not be three I will not here urge that if they be three somewhats they must be three things not three nothings for however uneasie it is to assign a Medium between something and nothing I shall wave that Metaphysical contest But yet collect that simplicity in the very strictest sense that can be conceiv'd is not in your account to be ascribed to God either according to his own word or the reason of things It may here be urged how can we conceive this Natural Union as I have adventur'd to Phrase it of the three Persons supposing them distinct things substances or Spirits Is such an Union conceivable as shall make them be but one God and not be such as shall make them cease to be three distinct things substances or Spirits We find indeed the mentioned unions of Soul and Body in our selves and of the two Natures in Christ consistent enough with manifest distinction but then the things united are in themselves of most different Natures But if things of so congenerous a Nature be united will not their distinction be lost in their union I answer 1. That a Spirit and a Spirit are numerically as distinct as a Body and a Spirit And 2. That we may certainly conceive it as possible to God to have united two or three created Spirits and by as strict union as is between our Souls and Bodies without confounding them and I reckon the union between our Souls and Bodies much more wonderful than that would have been Why then is an unmade uncreated union of three Spirits less conceivable as that which is to be presupposed to their mutual consciousness I shall not move or meddle with any Controversie about the Infinity of these three supposed Substances or Spirits it being acknowledged on all hands that Contemplations of that kind cannot but be above our measure And well knowing how much easier it is to puzzle oneself upon that Question An possit dari infinitum infinito infinitius than to speak satisfyingly and unexceptionably about it to another And tho' I will not use the expressions as signifying my formed judgment that there are three things substances or Spirits in the Godhead as you that there are three somewhats yet as I have many Years thought I do still think that what the learned W. J. doth but more lightly touch of the Son and the Holy Ghost being produced which term I use but reciting it as he doth not by a voluntary external but by an internal necessary and emanative Act hath great weight in it In short my sense hath long lain thus and I submit it to your searching and candid Judgment viz. That tho' we need not have determinate thoughts how far the Father Son and Holy Ghost are distinguished yet we must conceive them in the general to be so far distinguished as is really necessary to the founding the distinct attributions which the Scriptures do distinctly give them And that whatever distinction is truly necessary to that purpose will yet not hinder the two latters participation with the first in the Godhead which can be but one because that tho' we are led by plain Scripture and the very import of that word to conceive of the Father as the Fountain yet the Son being from him and the Holy Ghost from them both not contingently or dependently on will and pleasure but by eternal natural necessary promanation these two latter are infinitely distinguisht from the whole Creation Inasmuch as all Creatures are contingent beings or dependent upon will and pleasure as the Character is given us of created things Rev. 4. 11. Thou hast made all things and for thy pleasure they are and were created But that whatever is what it is necessarily is God For I have no doubt but the Dreams of some more anciently and of late concerning necessary matter and the Sophisms of Spinosa and some others tending to prove the necessity and identity of all substance are with what they aim to evince demonstrably false The Summe of all will be this 1. That we can be more certain of nothing than that there is but one God 2. We are most sure the Father Son and Holy Ghost are sufficiently distinguished to give a just ground to the distinct attributions which are in Scripture severally given to them 3. We are not sure what that sufficient distinction is
possibly admit to be interpreted otherwise than they usually were by such as alledged them for the Trinity or the disputed Deity of the Son or Sipirit or that the cause must be lost upon his deserting it or that he was still to be reckoned of the opposite party as this Author calls it and that such texts as we most rely'd upon were therefore given up by some of our own And it is really a great assuming when a man shall adventure to pronounce so peremptorily against the so common judgment of the Christian Church without any colour of proof that our copies are false copies our translations our explications false and the generality of the wisest the most inquisitive most pious and most judicious assertors of the Christian cause for so many continued ages fools or cheats for owning and avowing them for no other imaginanable reason but only because they make against him How will he prove any Copies we rely upon to be false Is it because he is pleased to suspect them And is an interpretation false because the words can possibly be tortur'd unto some other sense Let him name me the Text wherein any Doctrine is supposed to be delivered that is of meerly supernatural revelation of which it is not possible to to devise some other meaning not more remote alien or unimaginable than theirs of most of the disputed Texts Nor indeed do we need to except that natural sentiment it self that there is but one God which this Author takes such Pains to prove as if he thought or would make other men think we deny'd it For tho' it is so generally acknowledged doth he not know it is not so generally understood in the same sense Against whom doth he write Doth he not know they understand this Oneness in one sense he in another They in such a sense as admits a Trinity he in a sense that excludes it But for such things as did need a superadded verbal revelation how easie is it to an inventive pervicacious Wit to wrest words this way or that XXVI The Scriptures were writ for the instruction of sober learners not for the pastime of contentious wits that affect only to play tricks upon them At their rate of interpreting among whom he ranks himself 't is impossible any Doctrine can with certainty be founded upon them Take the first Chapter of St. John's Gospel for instance and what Doctrine can be asserted in plainer words than the Deity of Christ in the three first Verses of that Chapter Set any man of an ordinary unprepossest understanding to read them and when he finds that by the Word is meant Jesus Christ which themselves admit see if he will not judge it plainly taught that Jesus Christ is God in the most eminent known sense Especially when he shall take notice of so many other Texts that according to their most obvious appearance carry the same sense But it is first thorough meer shortness of discourse taken for granted and rashly concluded on that it is absolutely impossible if the Father be God the Son can be God too or the Holy Ghost upon a presumption that we can know every thing that belongs to the Divine Nature and what is possible to be in it and what not and next there is hereupon not only a license imagined but an obligation and necessity to shake Heaven and Earth or tear that divine Word that is more stable into a thousand pieces or expound it to nothing to make it comply with that forelaid presumptuous determination Whereas if we could but bend our Minds so far to comply with the plain ducture of that revelation God hath made unto us of himself as to apprehend that in the most only Godhead there may be distinctions which we particularly understand not sufficient to found the Doctrine of a Trinity therein and very consistent with the unity of it we should save the divine Word and our own Minds from unjust torture both at once And our task herein will be the easier that we are neither concerned nor allowed to determine that things are precisely so or so but only to suppose it possible that so they may be for ought that we know Which will I am certain not be so hard nor so bold an undertaking as his who shall take upon him to prove that any thing here supposed is impossible Indeed if any one would run the discourse into the abyss of Infinity he may soon create such difficulties to himself as it ought not to be thought strange if they be greater than any humane understanding can expedite But not greater than any man will be intangled in that shall set himself to consider Infinity upon other accounts which yet he will find it impos'd upon him unavoidably to admit whether he will or no. Not greater than this Author will be equally concern'd in upon his doing that right to Truth in opposition to the former leaders of his own Party as to acknowledge the Omnipresence of the Divine essence p. 32. which he will find let him try it when he will Nor yet so great nor accompanyed with so gross so palpable and horrid absurdities as he will soon be encountred with should he retract his grant or entertain the monstrously maimed and most deformed impious conceit of a finite or limited Deity XXVII Yet also in this present case the impossibility to our narrow Minds of comprehending Infinity is most rationally improveable to our very just advantage It ought to be upbraided to none as a pretext or a cover to sloth or dulness 'T is no reproach to us that we are creatures and have not infinite capacities And it ought to quiet our minds that they may so certainly know they have limits within which we are to content our selves with such notions about indemonstrable and unrevealed things as they can with greatest ease to themselves find room for I can reflect upon nothing in what is here proposed but what is intelligible without much toil or much Metaphysicks As matters of so common concernment ought to our uttermost to be represented in such a way that they may be so We need not be concern'd in Scholastick Disquisitions about Union or by what peculiar Name to call that which is here supposed It 's enough for us to know there may be a real natural vital and very intimate union of things that shall notwithstanding it continue distinct and that shall by it be truly one Nor do we need to be anxiously curious in stating the Notions of Person and Personality of suppositum and suppositality tho' I think not the term Person disallowable in the present Case Nor will say what that noted Man so noted that I need not Name him and who was as much acquainted with Metaphysicks as most in his Age published to the World above twenty Years ago that he counted the Notion of the Schools about Suppositum a Foolery For I do well know the thing it self which our Christian Metaphysicians
please you by doing a thing in it self so inept and so insignificant to you I shall better do both if I shall offer any thing to you concerning this mentioned Subject your further consideration whereof may prove a further benefit to the World In what you have already said concerning it you have used that great Caution and so well guarded your self as not so far as I can apprehend to give an adversary in this single point the least advantage That which I would in the general humbly offer is whether you have said so much as with safety might be said and as the Case may require for the gaining of a just advantage to the common Christian Cause We design in fight not only to keep our selves safe but to overcome and not in praelio only but in bello In Wars indeed of this sort both our own safety and victory are less to be valued than truth Which being of a piece can be injured in no part without some dammage to the whole frame of congenerous Truth And as it is very possible while an Enemy is withstood attacking some one Fort a greater loss may not be provided against elsewhere it may so fall out in Affairs of this kind too that the Care of defending some one Truth may be accompany'd with a present not attending to the jeopardy of divers others The nearer we approach an Adversary within just limits in these rational decertations the less he can have to say against us But being well resolved our selves about the main point of disagreement we then take Care not to come so near as to fall in with him pass into his Tents and give away our main Cause I am worthiest Sir far from assuming so much to my self or detracting so much from you as to give a judgment that this really is done in your Discourses about the Trinity I only submit it to your own most penetrating judgment what may be further requisite and possible in this matter to take away any appearances hereof and prevent ill consequences that may too easily ensue I have for my own part long impos'd it upon my self to abstain from any positive Conceptions concerning the Godhead beyond what I find expresly contain'd in the divine revelation or what the reason of things either antecedently thereto or consequentially thereupon doth most evidently perswade and require and do greatly approve the same caution which I cannot but observe with you But desire it may be weigh'd whether such measures may not and must not lead us further As for the word person you prudently profess not to be fond of it the thing being agreed thô you also truly judge it a good word and sufficiently warranted For the Notion signify'd by it you all along seem to decline that of the Schools or the Metaphysical one which you know makes it to be a rational or intelligent suppositum and to take up with what I think I may wanting a fitter i. e. a more comprehensive word call the Civil Notion of it which will allow the same man to be capable of sustaining three or more persons supposing his circumstances or qualifications to be such or such as to that purpose you speak both in your Letters and Sermons Now whereas you have also told us Letter 1. that by personality you mean that distinction whatever it be by which the three persons are distinguished each from other that which with great submission and most profound respect to you I propose to your further Consideration will be capable of being resolved into these two Enquiries 1. Whether only such a distinction of the Divine Persons as this amounts to will be sufficient to found the several attributions which the Holy Scriptures give distinctly and severally to them and to preserve the Scheme of Christian Religion entire which is wont to be deduced from these Sacred Writings 2. Whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible consistently with the salved unity of the Godhead As to the former 1. Whereas you think the word Person to be a good word and sufficiently warranted by Scripture Heb. 1. 3. where the Son is called the express Image of his Father's Person alledging that so we render the word Hypostasis which is there used and do mean by it what you think to be there meant I desire you would please to consider whether the word Hypostasis according to the common use of it will admit to be so taken as you explain your self to mean by the word Person For thô the Latine word persona as you say according to the true and ancient sense may well enough admit to be so taken as that the same Man might sustain three persons I offer it to your re-consideration whether ever you have observ'd the word Hypostasis in any sort of Authors when it signifies any Person at all for I know that it frequently signifies somewhat else than a Person to be taken in that sense And whether one Hypostasis so taken as it uses to be when it signifies a Person may not be capable of sustaining three of those Persons which you here describe And whether according to this sense you mean not God to be only one such Hypostasis 2. Be pleas'd further hereupon to consider how well it agrees with this supposition of God's Being but one Hypostasis or intelligent suppositum so frequently to speak as the Holy Scriptures do of the Father Son or Word the Spirit or Holy Ghost as three distinct I's or He 's The Lord possessed me as the Divine Word or Wisdom is brought in speaking in the beginning of his way I was set up from everlasting Prov. 8. 22 23. When he prepared the Heavens I was there vers 27. Then was I by him vers 30 c. The Word was with God Joh. 1. 1. He was in the World vers 10. We beheld his glory vers 14. And of the Spirit He dwelleth with you Joh. 14. 17. The Holy Ghost whom the Father will send in my name He shall teach you all things vers 26. And whom I will send you from the Father he shall testifie of me Chap. 15. 26. And when he is come he will reprove the World Ch. 16. 8. And the observation seems to me as weighty as it is usual that in some of the mentioned Chapters the somewhat hard Synthesis of construing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 even where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not the nearer Suppositum but in one place a very remote one and one would think too remote to be referr'd to ch vers 13 14. is rather chosen to be used than that the Spirit should not be spoken of as a distinct he or rather than he should be called it which could not so fitly notifie a Person If the same man were a King a General and a Father I doubt whether that would give sufficient ground to his being called He and He and He. 2. But the distinct Predicates spoken
A Calm and Sober ENQUIRY Concerning The Possibility OF A TRINITY in the Godhead IN A LETTER to a Person of Worth Occasioned By the lately Published Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity By Dr. Wallis Dr. Sherlock Dr. S th Dr. Cudworth c. Together with Certain Letters hitherto unpublished formerly Written to the Reverend Dr. Wallis on the same Subject LONDON Printed by J. Astwood for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and 3 Crowns at the lower End of Cheapside near Mercers Chappel 1694. A CALM DISCOURSE OF THE Trinity in the Godhead c. SIR I Intend not this Discourse shall be concern'd in what this Author hath said of the several Explications given by the Persons named on his Title-page The only thing it is design'd for is the Discoursing with him that single Point which he refers to in his 29th and 30th pages and which in this Controversie is on all hands confessed to be the Cardinal one viz. Whether a Trinity in the Godhead be possible or no I put not the Question about three Persons both because I will not in so short a Discourse as I intend to make this be engaged in discussing the unagreed Notion of a Person and because the Scripture lays not that Necessity upon me tho' I do not think the use of that term in this affair either blameable or indefensible But I shall enquire whether the Father the Son or Word and the Holy Ghost cannot possibly admit of sufficient distinction from one another to answer the parts and purposes severally assigned them by the Scripture in the Christian Oeconomy and yet be each of them God consistently with this most inviolable and indubitable truth that there can be but one God This Author concludes it to be impossible in the mentioned Pages of his Discourse and thereupon seems to judg it Necessary that two of them be excluded the Godhead as many others some going the Arian some the Photinian more lately called the Socinian way have done before him He acknowledges pag. 30. col 1. there may be some Secret revealed by God because it was above Humane Capacicity to discover it and sometimes also to comprehend how it can be But adds there is a vast difference between my not being able to conceive how a thing should be and a clear apprehension and sight that it cannot be What he says thus far is unexceptionable and I heartily concur with him in it But for what he subjoyns wherein he might have spoken his Mind of the Matter in Controversie with as much Advantage to his Cause without reflecting upon his Adversaries as if they considered these things either with no intention or with no sincerity not allowing them even the never so little of the one or the other that three distinct almighty and alknowing Persons should be but one Almighty or but One All-knowing or but one God a Man who considers with never so little intention and sincerity clearly sees that it cannot be In short that it is not a Mystery but as Dr. South speaks an absurdity and a contradiction This is that I would consider with him if he will affix these words of his a Man who considers c. clearly sees it cannot be and it is an absurdity and a contradiction to the Question as I have set it down above In the mean time he cannot be ignorant that as he hath represented the matter he hath here either not truly or at least not fairly given the sense of any of them whom he pretended to oppose For when by those words But that three Divine Persons or that three distinct almighty and allknowing Persons should be but one Almighty but one Allknowing or but One God he would slily insinuate to his unwary and less attentive Reader that the same Men held three Almighties and but One He well knows and elsewhere confesses tho' he might suppose that some Readers would not be at leisure to compare one place of his Writings with another but hastily run away with the apprehension that such as were not of his mind spake nothing but Nonsense and Contradictions that not only his later Opposers since P. Lumbard as he speaks but divers much more ancient as Athanasius and the rest of the Nicene Fathers c. deny'd three Almighties tho' they affirmed each of the Persons to be Almighty understanding Omnipotency as they do Omnisciency to be an attribute not of the person as such but of the essence as such which they affirm to be but One i. e. that they are each of them almighty by communication in one and the same almighty essence And if their Sentiment be so very absurd he needed the less to fear representing it as it is And the other who seems to grant three Almighties doth never say there is but one Almighty tho' such say too there is but One God placing the Unity of the Godhead in somewhat else as he hath himself taken Notice which is remote from express Self-contradiction also But I shall concern my self no further about the one or the other of these ways of explaining the Doctrine of the three Persons Only shall enquire concerning the possibility of such a Trinity in the Godhead as was above expressed requiting the uncharitableness of this Author in imputing carelesness or insincerity to all that think it possible with so much Charity as to believe he would not against the plain tenour of Scripture have rejected the Doctrine of the Trinity as he professes to do that of the Incarnation if he had not thought it every way impossible And here I premise 1. That the present Undertaking is not to shew that the Father Son and Holy Ghost are three and but One in the same respect which I would adventure in this Authors words to say no Man that considers with never so little Intention and Sincerity would offer at But when they are supposed to be but One in respect of Deity they are thought to be three in some other respect 2. That what I now design is only to represent this matter as possible to be some way and in the way here proposed for ought we know not as definitely certain to be this way or that The former is enough to our present purpose i. e. if any way it can be conceived without absurdity or contradiction that these may be three with sufficient distinction to found the distinct Attributes which the Scriptures do severally give them so as some things may be affirmed of some one and not be affirmed of the other of them and yet their Unity in Godhead be conserved our Point is gained and the clamour of this and every other Opposer ought to cease for our asserting what every one that considers clearly sees cannot be Now so much being forelaid that we may proceed with clearness and satisfaction of mind If we would understand whether it be possible that these three may be sufficiently distinguished for the mentioned purpose and yet
intended to be of no small importance in our Religion and specially to the Doctrine of Redemption and of our Redeemer XXVIII But I reckon they that go the more Metaphysical way and content themselves with the modal distinction of three Persons in the Godhead say nothing herein that can be proved absurd or contradictious As to what is commonly urged that if there be three Persons in the Deity each Person must have its distinct individual Essence as well as its distinct personality I would deny the consequence and say that tho' this be true in created Persons taking Person in the strict Metaphysical sense it is not necessary to be so in uncreated That the reason is not the same betvveen finite things and infinite and would put them to prove if they can that the same infinite Essence cannot be whole and undivided in three several Persons knowing there can be nothing more difficult urged in the Case than may against the Divine Omnipresence which irrefragable reasons as well as the plainest testimony of Scripture will oblige us to acknowledge But I think tho' this Hypothesis abstractly considered and by it self is not indefensible it doth not altogether so well square with the Christian Oeconomy nor so easily allow that distinction to the Father Son and Holy Spirit which seems requisite to found the distinct attributions that are severally given them in the Holy Scriptures XXIX To conclude I only wish these things might be considered and discoursed with less confidence and peremptory determination with a greater awe of what is divine and sacred and that we may more confine our selves to the plain words of Scripture in this matter and be content therewith I generally blame it in the Socinians who appear otherwise rational and considering men that they seem to have formed their belief of things not possible to be known but by the Scriptures without them and then think they are by all imaginable Arts and they care not what violence as Socinus himself hath in effect confessed to mold and form them according to their preconceived sense Common Modesty and Civility one would have thought should have made Schlictingius abstain from prefixing and continuing that as a running Title to a long Chapter Articulus Evangelicorum de Trinitate cum sensu communi pugnat engrossing common sense to himself and his Party and reproaching the generality of Christians as not understanding common sense They should take upon them less and not vaunt as if they were the Men and Wisdom must dye with them For this Author I Congratulate his nearer approach to us from those who were formerly Leaders of his Party in the Doctrines of Gods Omnipresence and the perceptiveness and activity of separate Souls He writes with sprightliness and vigour And I doubt not believes really what he writes with so little seeming doubt And because his Spirit appears to be of a more generous exalted pitch than to comport with any thing against his Judgment for secular interest and advantage I reckon it the greater pity it should want the addition of what would be very ornamental to it and which he wishes to two of the Persons to whom he makes himself an Antagonist more of the tenderness and Catholick Charity of genuine Christianity p. 19. col 2. to accompany those his abilities and learning which would not thereby be the lesser as he speaks nor the less conspicuous I believe few would have thought him to see the less clearly if he had been content to see for himself not for mankind And if he had not talkt at that rate as if he carried the Eyes of all the World in his Pocket they would have been less apt to think he carried his own there Nor had his Performance in this Writing of his lost any thing of real value if in a Discourse upon so grave a subject some lepidities had been left out as that of Dulcinea del Toboso c. And to allude to what he says of Dr. Cudworth his displeasure will not hurt so rough an Author as Arnobius so many Ages after he is dead if he should happen to offend him by having once said Dissoluti est pectoris in rebus serijs quaerere voluptatem c. But for all of us I hope we may say without offence to any common humane frailty should be more considered and that we know but in part and in how small a part We should hereupon be more equal to one another And when it is obvious to every one how we are straitned in this matter and that we ought to suppose one another intently aiming to reconcile the Scripture-discovery with natural Sentiments should not uncharitably censure or labour to expose one another that any seem more satisfi'd with their own Method than with ours What an odd and almost ludicrous Spectacle do we give to the blessed Angels that supervise us if their benignity did not more prompt them to compassion when they behold us fighting in the dark about things we so little understand or when we all labour under a gradual blindness objecting it to one another and one accusing another that he abandons not his own too weak sight to see only by his perhaps blinder Eye Thus Sir you have my sense what I think safe and enough to be said in this weighty matter To you these thoughts are not new with whom they have been communicated and discoursed heretofore long ago And I believe you may so far recollect your self as to remember the principal ground was suggested to you upon which this Discourse now rests viz. necessity of Existence and Contingencie emanations absolutely independent upon any will at all and the arbitrary productions of the Divine Will as the sufficient and most fundamental difference between what is uncreated and what is created and upon this very account as that which might give scope and room to our thoughts to conceive the Doctrine of the Trinity consistently with the Unity of the Godhead and so as that the Son tho truly from the Father and the Holy Ghost tho' truly from both shall yet appear infinitely distinguished from all created Beings whatsoever So much you know was under consideration with us above twenty years ago and was afterwards imparted to many more long before there was any mention or forethought within our notice of such a revival of former controversies upon this Subject as we have lately seen This occasion now given hath put me upon revolving anew these former thoughts and upon digesting them into some order such as it is for publick view If they shall prove to be of any use it appears they will not be out of season and it will he gratefull to me to be any way serviceable to so worthy a Cause If they shall be found altogether useless being evicted either of impertinency or untruth it shall not be ungratefull For I thank God I find not a disposition in my mind to be fond of any Notions of mine as they are
of the three Sacred Persons in the Godhead seem much more to challenge a greater distinction of the Persons than your Notion of a Person doth seem to admit That of sending and being sent spoken so often of the first in reference to the second and of the first and second in reference to the third as not to need the quoting of places If the same man were a King a General and a Judge methinks it would not well square with the usual forms of speaking among Men and God speaks to Men as Men to say that as the first he sends the two latter that is himself And one would think our being required to be Baptized in the distinct Names of the Father Son and Holy Ghost should signifie some greater distinction As also that three are said to bear witness in Heaven I doubt that in a Cause wherein our Law requires two or more Witnesses the same Man that should be a Father a Brother and a Son would scarce thereupon be admitted for three Witnesses And how the Incarnation of the Son can be understood according to your Notion of Person without the Fathers and Holy Ghosts Incarnation also I confess I cannot apprehend Your Notion of a Person contradistinct to the Scholastick Notion as was said before seems to leave the Godhead to be but one hypostasis or Person in the latter sense How then are we to conceive of the hypostatical union The assumed Nature will be as much hypostatically united with the Father or the Spirit as with the Son 3. And doth not this civil or meerly respective Notion of a Person the other being left fall in with the Antitrinitarian Will it not make us Unitarians only as they affect to call themselves Would any of them who as you are pleas'd to take notice Letter 6. p. 1 2. say none but a Mad-man would deny there may be three Persons in God have been so mad not yet professing themselves Converts as to say so if they had not suppos'd their Cause not hurt by this Notion of a Person For as you well say Letter 1. we need not be fond of words so the thing be agreed so have they equal reason to say we need not be afraid of words if in the sense you agree with us And with one sort of them I only desire you to consider how great an appearance the asserting only of three Persons in the one sense quitting the other will carry off an agreement And have they not all the advantage left them which they seek in arguing against the satisfaction made by our Saviour from the necessity of an alterity that in the business of making satisfaction there must be alter atque alter One who satisfies and another who is satisfy'd I do very well know what Instances are brought of humane Rulers making satisfaction for Delinquents but there is no parity in the Cases They being themselves Debtors to the governed Community as God is not who hath with most undoubted righteousness made all things for himself 4. And consider whether by your Notion of a Person you forsake not the generality of them who have gone as to this point under the repute of Orthodox Who no doubt have understood by three Persons three intelligent Hypostases tho' they have differ'd in thinking some of them that only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was the genitum or spiratum as to the two latter a notion that is either too fine or too little solid for some Minds to grasp or take any hold of Others that the divine Nature might it self be some way said to be communicated to them But I pass to the II d Enquiry Whether some further distinction may not be admitted as possible The only thing that straitens us here is the most unquestionable unity or unicity as we may call it of the Godhead Which if it cannot be otherwise defended I must yet for my part notwithstanding these hardships and I know no man with whom I could do it with more inclination fall in with you But I must crave it of you so far to fall in with you know not who as to apply your clearer mind as I do my more cloudy one to consider whether it can or no You will here say further than what and what would I have further To the former of these I only say further than the asserting in very deed but one Hypostasis in the Godhead distinguished no otherwise into three than by certain relative capacities like those which may among men be sustain'd by one and the same man and which distinction as you after add is analogous to what in created beings is called distinctio modalis To the latter I desire you to observe what I generally propose not that we may positively assert any further determinate distinction as certain and known but only whether we may not admit some further distinction to be possible in consistency with the Unity of the Godhead I do equally detest and dread to speak with rash and peremptory confidence about things both so Mysterious and so Sacred But may we not modestly say that if to that Oeconomy which God hath represented himself in his Word to bear and keep afoot towards his Creatures any further distinction than hath been assigned is necessary it is also possible and may be for ought we know if indeed we know nothing to the contrary What is impossible we are sure cannot be necessary But God himself best and only knows his own nature and what his own meaning is in the representation he hath made to us If we sincerely aim to understand his meaning that we may bear our selves towards him accordingly he will vvith mercifull indulgence consider our shortor mis-apprehensions But vve need not say there is not this or that distinction if really vve do not knovv there is not While vve knovv so little of natures inferiour to our ovvn and even of our ovvn nature and hovv things are distinguished that belong to our selves vve have little reason to be shy of confessing ignorance about the Nature of God Therefore I most intirely agree to the tvvo Conclusions of the Ingenious W. J. vvherevvith he concludes his Letter But in the mean time and pursuantly enough thereto cannot but doubt the concludingness of his very acute reasonings against at least some of the expressions of that learned Person Dr. Sherl vvhich he animadverts upon as I perceive you also do p. 16. of your 7 th Letter And even W. J. himself for vvith a pious modesty he tells us concerning infinite Natures he presumes not to determine Letter p. 8. What he objects against that Authors having said the divine Persons are three beings really distinct vvherein I instance not intending to run thorough that elaborate Letter that then there must be three distinct Essences seems to me a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I doubt not the Author vvill easily admit it But what will be the consequence That therefore there are three Deities