disposing the Minde unto one object in some unto another according as the impetus and force of their naturall affections carrieth them And therefore Aristotle in his Politiques ascribeth the inequalitie which hee observes betweene the Asiatique and European Wits unto the severall Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they lived according whereunto the Complexions and Constitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd the Soule being in it selfe according to the same Philosopher impassible from any corporeall Agent And to the same purpose againe he saith That if an old man had a young mans eye his sight would be as sharpe and as distinct as a young mans is implying 〈◊〉 diversitie of Perception to be grounded onâ—…ly on the diversitie of bodily instruments by which it is exercised And therefore he elsewhere observes I shall not trouble my selfe to examine upon what ground that men of soft and tender skins have greatest quicknesse of wit and on the contrarie Duri Carne ineptiâ—…mente thereby intimating that there is no more significant and lively expression of a vigorous or heavie Soule than a happie or ill-ordered Body wherein wee may sundry times reade the abilities of the Minde and the inclinations of the Will So then it is manifest that this weakenesse of apprehension in the Soules of men doth not come from any immediate and proper darknesse belonging unto them but onely from the coexistence which they have with a Body ill-disposed for assistance and information For hee who is carried in a Coach as the Body is vehiculum animae though he be of himselfe more nimble and active must yet receive such motion as that affoords and Water which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts though its motion by it selfe would have beene otherwise must yet then be limitted by the posture and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth CHAP. II. In what Cases the dependance of the Soule on the Body is lessened by Faith Custome Education Occasion BVt yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessarie and immutable but that it may admit of variation and the Soule be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the Body And this first in extraordinarie and next in more common actions In actions extraordinarie as those pious and religious operations of the Soule Assent Faith Invocation and many others wherein the Soule is carried beyond the Sphere of Sense and transported unto more raysed operations For to beleeve and know that there are layd up for pious and holy endeavours those joyes which eye hath not seene nor care heard and to have some glimpses and fore-taste of them which Saint Paul calleth the Earnest and first fruits of the Spirit What is this but to leave sense behind us and to out-run our Bodies And therefore it is that Religion I meane chiefely the Principles Foundations Articles and Mysteries Evangelicall were alwayes not to be urged by Disputes of Secular Learning but to be sacredly and secretly infused not so much perswading to the knowledge of apparent Truths as drawing to the beleese of true Mysteries Divine Truths doe as much transcend the Reason as Divine Goodnesse doth the Will of Man That One Nature should be in Three Persons and Two Natures in One Person That the invisible God should be manifested in the flesh and a pure Virgin bring forth a Sonne That Death should be conquered by dying and not be able to digest and consume the Body which it had devoured That dead bones should live and they who dwell in the dust awake and sing These are Mysteries not onely above the reach of Humane but even of Evangelicall disquisition in somuch that even unto Principalities and Powers they were not otherwise made knowne but by Divine Revelation delivered unto the Church Sarah laughed when Abraham beleeved and the Philosophers mocked when Paul disputed and Reason expected that the Apostle should have fallen downe dead when contrarily Faith shooke the Viper into the fire There is a great difference betweene the manner of yeelding our assent unto God and Nature For in Philosophie we never resigne our beleese nor suffer our judgements to be wholly carried to any Conclusion till there be a demonstrative Argument grounded on Induction from the Sense for the enforcement thereof But Divinitie on the other side wheâ—… God speakes unto us worketh Science by Faith making us so much the more assured of thosâ—… Truths which it averreth than of any Naturalâ—… Conclusions notwithstanding they may seemâ—… sometimes to beare opposition to humane Reason by how much Divine Authoritie is more absolute and certaine than any Naturall demonstration And this freedome from bodily restraint have according to the Schoole-men those Raptures and Extasies which rayse and ravish the Soule with the sweetnesse of extraordinarie Contemplations And yet even Religion it selfe hath so much condiscended to the senses of men as to give them manner of roome and service in this great Mysterie And therefore generally the Doctrine of Christ is set forth in Parables and Similitudes and the Faith in Christ confirmed by Sacraments things most agreeable to the perception and capacitie of the Senses Now for the exemption of the more ordinarie actions of the Soule from any predominancie of the Body it is chiefely wrought by these three meanes Education Custome and Occasion For the Rule of Aristotle though in Agents purely Naturall and peremptorie which are not directed by any degree of knowledge inherent it held true yet in Man it is not universall That any thing which comes from Nature is unalterable by Custome For we commonly observe that the Culture of the Minde as of the Earth doth many times deliver it from the barrennesse of its owne Nature Exercetque frequens tellurem atque imperat arvis As frequent Husbandry commands The emptiest and most barren Lands Education then and Custome doe as it were revenge Nature insomuch that though the outward Humours and Complexions doe worke the Mind unto an unhappie temper yet by a continuall grapling with these difficulties it getteth at the last some victorie though not without much reluctancie And for Occasion that alters the naturall inclination of the Will and Affections rather than of the Vnderstanding for so wee see that the byas and force of mens desires are oftentimes turned by reason of some sudden emergent occurrences contrarie to the standing temper and complexion of the Body Thus wee reade some times of men in Warre who notwithstanding of themselves timerous and sluggish yet when the disadvantage of the place had taken away all possibilitie of flight and the crueltie of the Adversarie all hope of mercie if they should be conquered have strangely gayned by their owne despaires and gotten great and prosperous Victories by a forc'd and unnaturall fortitude Vna salus victis nullam sperare salutem The onely weapon which did win the day Was their despaire that they were cast away An example whereof wee have in the
great Booke of Nature without perusing those ordinarie Characters wherein is exprest the greatest power of the Worker and excellencie of the Worke fixing our Admiration onely on those Pictures and unusuall Novelties which though for their rarenesse they are more strange yet for their na ture are lesse worthy Every Comet or burning Meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder than those glorious Lampes of Nature with their admirable Motions and Order in which the Heathen have acknowledged a Divinenesse Let a Child be borne but with six fingers or have a part more than usuall wee rather wonder at One supersâ—…uous than at All naturall Sol spectatorem nisi cum desicit non habet nemo observat Lunam nisi laborantem adeò naturale est magis nova quà m magna mirari None looketh with wondeâ—… on the Sunne but in an Eclipse no eye gazeth on the Moone but in her Travell so naturall it is with men to admire rather things Nâ—…w than Common Whereas indeed things are fit for studie and observation though never so common in regard of the perfection of their nature and usefulnesse of their knowledge In which respect the plaine Counsell of the Oracle was one of the wiâ—…est which was ever given to man To studie and to know himselfe because by reason of his owne neerenesse to himselfe hee is usually of himselfe most unknowne and neglected And yet if wee consider how in him it hath pleased God to stampe a more notable Character of his owne Image and to make him amongst all his Workes one of the most perfect Models of created excellencie wee cannot but acknowledge him to be one though of the least yet of the fittest Volumes in this great varietie of Nature to be acquainted withall Intending therefore according to my weakenesse to take some view of the inside and more noble Characters of this Booke it will not be needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the humane nature or to commend him in his Anatomie though even in that respect the Psalmist tells us that he is fearefully and wonderfully made for wee commonly see that as most kind of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertilitie so many sorts of beasts have a greater activitie and exquisitenesse in their senses than wee And the reason hereof is because Nature aiming at a superiour and more excellent end is in those lower faculties lesse intent and elaborate It shall suffice therefore onely to lay a ground-worke in these lower faculties for the better notice of mans greater perfections which have ever some connexion and dependance on them For whereas the principall acts of mans Soule are either of Reason and Discourse proceeding from his Vnderstanding or of Action and Moralitie from his Will both these in the present condition of mans estate have their dependance on the Organs and faculties of the Body which in the one precede in the other follow To the one they are as Porters to let in and convey to the other as Messengers to performe and execute To the one the whole Body is as an Eye through which it seeth to the other a Hand by which it worketh Concerning the ministrie therefore of the Body unto the Soule wee shall thus resolve That the Reasonable part of Man in that condition of subsistence which now it hath depends in all its ordinarie and naturall operations upon the happie or disordered temperature of those vitall Qualities out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed For though these Ministeriall parts have not any over-ruling yet they have a disturbing power to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soule Whence wee finde that sundry diseases of the Body doe oftentimes weaken yea sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde For as wheresoever there is a locomotive facultie though there be the principall cause of all motion and activitie yet if the subordinate instruments the bones and sinewes be dis-jointed shrunke or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power there can be no actuall motion Or as in the Body Politique the Prince whom Seneca calleth the Soule of the Common-wealth receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad according as is the fidelitie or negligence of those instruments whom Xenophon tearmeth the Eyes and Eares of Kings In like manner the Soule of man being not an absolute independant worker but receiving all her objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments which Cicero calleth the Messengers to the Soule if they out of any indisposition shall be weakened the Soule must continue like a Rasa Tabula without any acquired or introduced habits The Soule hath not immediately from it selfe that strange weakenesse which is observed in many men but onely as it is disabled by Earthie and sluggish Organs which being out of order are more burthensome than serviceable thereunto There are observable in the Soules of men considered in themselves and in reference one to another two defects an imperfection and an inequalitie of operation the former of these I doe not so ascribe to that bodily weakenesse whereby the Soule is any way opprest as if I conceived no internall darknesse in the faculties themselves since the fall of man working in him a generall corruption did amongst the rest infatuate the Mind and as it were smother the Soule with ignorance so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments is onely a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection But for the inequalitie and difference of mens understandings in their severall operations notwithstanding it be questioned in the Schooles Whether the Soules of men have not originally in their Nature degrees of perfection and weakenesse whence these severall degrees of operation may proceed yet neverthelesse that being granted I suppose that principally it proceeds from the varietie tempers and dispositions in the instrumentall faculties of the Body by the helpe whereof the Soule in this estate worketh for I cannot perceive it possible that there should have beene if man had continued in his Innocencie wherein our Bodies should have had an exact constitution free from those distempers to which now by sinne they are lyable such remarkable differences betweene mens apprehensions as wee now see there are for there should have beene in all men a great facilitie to apprehend the mysteries of Nature and to acquire knowledge as wee see in Adam which now wee finde in a large measure granted to some and to others quite denyed And yet in that perfect estate according to the opinion of those who now maintaine it there would have beene found a substantiall and internall inequalitie amongst the Soules of men and therefore principally this varietie comes from the sundry constitutions of mens bodies in some yeelding enablement for quicknesse of Apprehension in others prâ—…ssing downe and intangling the Vnderstanding in some
be in the Will over the Body an Imperium yet in rigour this is not so much to be tearmed Command as Imployment the Body being rather the Instrument than the Servant of the Soule and the power which the Will hath over it is not so much the command of a Master over his Workmen as of the Workman over his Tooles The chiefe subjects to the Will are the Affections in the right governing whereof is manifested its greatest power The strength of every thing is exercised by Opposition We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge and the force of the Wind sheweth it selfe most when it is most resisted So the power of the Will is most seene in repairing the breaches and setling the mutinies wherewith untamed Affections disquiet the peace of mans nature since excesse and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment not extirpation and we make straight a crooked thing we doe not breake it And therefore as he in Tacitus spake well to Otho when he was about to kill himselfe Majore animo tâ—…lerari adversaquam relinqui That it was more valour to beare than put off afflictions with courage so there is more honour in the having Affections subdued than in having none at all the businesse of a wise man is not to be without them but to be above them And therefore our Saviour himselfe sometimes loved sometimes rejoyced sometimes wept sometimes desired sometimes mourned and grieved but these were not Passions that violently and immoderately troubled him but he as he saw fit did with them trouble himselfe His Reason excited directed moderated repressed them according to the rule of perfect cleare and undisturbed judgement In which respect the Passions of Christ are by Divines called rather Propassions that is to say Beginnings of Passions than Passions themselves in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure nor transported the Mind to undecencie or excesse but had both their rising and originall from Reason and also their measure bounds continuance limited by Reason The Passions of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea which bringeth up mire and durt but the Passions of Christ were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell which though it be thereby troubled yet is it not fouled at all The Stoicks themselves confessed that wise men might be affected with sudden perturbations of Feare or Sorrow but did not like weak men yeeld unto them nor sinke under them but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgements like Aeneas in Virgil Mens immotamanâ—…t lacryma volvuntur inanes He wept indeed but in his stable mind You could no shakings or distempers find And therefore indeed this Controversie betweene the Peripateticks and Stoicks was rather a strife of Words than a difference of Iudgements because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question the one making Passions to be Naturall the other Praeternaturall and disorderly motions For the Peripateticks confessed That wise men ought to be fix'd immovable in their vertuous resolutions and not to be at all by hopes or feares deterred or diverted from them but as a Dye to be foure-square and which way ever they be cast to fall upon a sure firme bottome Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue in defence whereof the Stoicks banished Affections from wise men not intending thereby to make men like Caeneus in the Poet such as could not be violated with any sorce for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion but onely to shew that they wisdome of Vertue should so compose consolidate the Mind and settle it in such stabilitie that it should not all be bended from the Right by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto Temples doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still which are continued to the Temple so in the demolishing of inordinate Passions we must take heed that we offer not violence to so much of them as is contiguous unto Right Reason whereunto so long as they are conformable they are the most vigorous instruments both for the expression and improvement and derivation of Vertue on others of any in Mans Nature Now concerning the Accidents or manner of these Acts which are from Passion it may be considered either in regard of the Quantitie Extension or of the Qualitie Intention of the Act. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes for the Quantitie of Passions we may consider that as the Quantitie of Bodies which is either Continued or Severed by Quantitie Continued I understand the manner of a Passions permanencie and durance by Severed I meane the manner of its multiplicitie and reiteration from both which it hath the denomination of good or bad as the object whereunto it is carryed hath a greater or lesse relation to the Facultie For some objects are simply and without any limitation convenient or noxious and towards these may be allowed both a more durable and a more multiplyed Passion others are good or evill only with some circumstances of Time Place Person Occasion or the like which therfore require both fewer and lesse habituall motions The same maybe said of the Qualitie of them wherein they are sometimes too remisse sometimes againe too excessive and exorbitant according to varietie of conditions Concerning all these I shall observe this one generall Rule the permanencie or vanishing the multiplicitie or rarenesse the excesse or defect of any Passion is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its object as it beares reference to such or such a person but never by the private humour prejudice complexion habit custome or other like qualifications of the Mind it selfe To see a man of a soft and gentle nature over-passe some small indignitie without notice or feeling or to see a man of an hot and eager temper transported with an extreamer and more during Passion upon the sense of some greater injurie more notably touching him in his honestie or good Name is not in either of these any great matter of commendation because though the nature of the object did in both warrant the qualitie of the Passion yet in those persons they both proceeded out of humour and complexion and not out of serious consideration of the injuries themselves by which onely the Passion is to be regulated Of these two extreames the defect is not so commonly seene as that which is in the excesse And therefore we wil here a little observe what course may be taken for the allaying of this vehemencie of our Affections whereby they disturbe the quiet and darken the serenitie of mans Mind And this is done either by opposing contrary Passions to contrary which is Aristotles rule who adviseth in the bringing of Passions from an extreame to a
who was Vnigenitus and Dilectus from everlasting I doe not then by the way condemne all strong and united Passions but only I observe how those which hereby grow exorbitant work prejudice to the Soule may by a seasonable distracting of them be reduced unto a wholsome temper for as it is noted that amongst men those who have bodies most obnoxious to dayly maladies are commonly more secure from any mortall danger than those who though free from any generall distempers doe yet find the surprize of one more violent so is it with mens Passions Those who have a nature readie upon sundry occasions to break forth into them doe commonly finde them lesse virulent and morose than those who have not their Passions so voluble and readie to spread themselves on divers objects but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one CHAP. VIII Of the effects of Passions how they sharpen Vertue Of vitious Concupiscence of their blinding diverting distracting and precipitating of Reason and of their distempering the Body THe last consideration of Passions was according to the Consequents of their Act which are the ends and effects thereof both which I include in one because the naturall end of all operative qualities is the effects which they are appointed by their owne or a superiour Vertue to produce Now though in the particulars there be severall perfections confer'd both on the operations oâ—… the Will and of the Vnderstanding from Passions yet I cannot thinke on any other generall effect which belongeth equally unto them all but that onely which Tully hath observed out of the Peripateticks of Anger that they are the sharpners and to keepe his phrase the Whetstoneâ—… of Vertue which make it more operative and fruitfull for Passion stirring up the Spirits and quickening the Fancie hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Mind which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination produceth them with the same clearenesse and vigour as they are there represented And therefore Aristotle speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion Pleasure and Griese one of which all others whatsoever partake of makes them the Rules of all our Actions by which they are all governed and according to the measure whereof they retaine their severall portions of Goodnesse Thus Anger Zeale Shame Griese Love are in their severall orderâ—… the Whetstones whereon true Fortitude sharpneth its Sword for men are never more neglect full and prodigall of their bloud than when they are throughly pierced with a sense of injuries or grieved with a losse of their owne or their Countreyes honour So the Poet sayth of Mezentius when Aeneaâ—… had slaine Lausus his sonne Aestuat ingens Imo in corde pudor mixâ—…oque insania luctu Et furiis agitatus Amor conscia virtus A noble shame boyl'd in his lowest brest Rage mixt with griefe suffer'd him not to rest Love and a conscious Valour sâ—…t him on And kindled furious Resolution So Love and Compassion are the inciters of Bountie Hope the stay and anchor of Patience keeping the Mind amidst perils and casualties from floating and sinking Feare the sharpener of Industrie and Caution an antidote in all our actions against Violence Rashnesse and Indiscretion as Latinus said unto Turnus when in rage he hastned to a combat with Aeneas quantum ipse ferocâ—… Virtute exuper as tanto me impensius â—…quum est Consulere atque omnes meâ—…uentem expendere casus The more undaunted Courage doth you move 'T is fit my serious Feares shew the more Love In mature counsels and in weighing all The various dangers and events may fall Those imputations therefore which Tully and Seneca and other Stoicall Philosophers make against Passions are but light and emptie when they call them diseases and perturbations of the Mind which requireth in all its actions both health and serenitie a strong and a cleare judgement both which properties they say are impaired by the distempers of Passion For it is absurd to thinke that all manner of rest is either healthfull or cleare or on the other side all motion diseased and troublesome for what water more sweet than that of a Spring or what more thick or lothsome than that which standeth in a puddle corrupting it selfe As in the Wind oâ—… Seas to which two Passions are commonly compar'd a middle temper betweene a quiet Calme and a violent Tempest is most serviceable for the passage betweene Countreyes so the agitations of Passion as long as they serve onely to drive forward but not to drowne Vertue as long as they keepe their dependance on Reason and run onely in that Channell wherewith they are thereby bounded are of excellent service in all the travaile of mans life and such as without which the growth successe and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired For the corrupt effects of Passion in generall they are many more because there may be a multiplicitie as well of Evill as of Error when there is but a unitie of Goodnesse or of Truth And those effects may be either in respect to themselves one amongst another or in reference to the Vnderstanding Will or Body The effects of them amongst themselves is in their mutuall generating and nourishing of each other as Feare is wrought by Love and Anger by Griefe Dolâ—… excitat iras as a Lyon when wounded is most raging fixumque latronis Impavidus frangit telum fremit ore cruento With bloudie mouth and an undaunted heart Breaks teares from his wound the fastned dart Which effect of Passions I have before toucht upon neither is it alwayes a corrupt effect but onely then when there is in the Passion generative some distemper In which respect of the Vnderstanding and Will both which I comprise under one Name of Reason I conceive the corruption to be principally these foure Imposture or seduction Alienation or withdrawing Distraction or consounding and Precipitancie or a headlong transporting of Reason Now concerning these we are first to remember that there is in every man a native and originall strugling betweene Apperite and Reason which yet proceedeth from Corruption and the Fall of Man not from Nature entire as the Papists contend who affirme That the strife and reluctancie betweene Sense and Vnderstanding ariseth from Physicall and created constitution and that therefore that sweet harmonie which was betweene all the Faculties of Man Animall and Rationall in his Creation proceeded from the government of a super-naturall Grace added thereunto because it being naturall for Sense to desire sensible and Spirit spirituall good things and things sensitive and spirituall being amongst themselves opposite those desites which are carryed unto them must needs be opposite likewise An Argument as weake as the Opinion which it defends is dangerous and prejudiciall to the honour of Mans Creation as tending to prove that the first risings and rebellions of Appetite against Reason and all inordinate
Summer and Roses in Winter the Birds of this Countrey and the Roots of anothor daiâ—…ties hardly procured without the shipwracks of men to feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly these are the delights of the curiosities of men The same fruits when they are worse but rarer have a farre greater value set upon them then when expos'd by their commones unto every mans purchase And it was a wise complaint of old Cato That it went ill with the City when a Fish was sold for more then an Oxe We see Desires doe not put forth themselves more freely in any then in children I thinke the chiefe Reason of it is the same which the Philosopher giveth of their memories because every thing to them is new and strange for stâ—…ange things as they make stronger impressions upon the Retentive so they doe upon the Appetiâ—…ive saculties And therefore we find Herod who cared nothing at all â—…or the Doctrine of Christ because it was holy and divine had yet a great Desire to have seene his miracles because they were wonderfull And Men have travelled farre to see those persons and things the fame whereof they have before admired strange Learning strange Birds and Beasts strange Floures and Roots strange Fashions yea strange Sinnes too which is the curiositie and corruption of Nature are marvellous attractive and beget emulation amongst Men. Nero gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even Solomons Ships besides substantiall Treasure did bring home Apes and Peacockes Athens which was the eye the floure and Epitome of Greece to shew that this curiosity is the disease as well of Wits as of Childehood spent all their time and study in inquiring after new things And for this cause it is as I conceive That wise Men have made Lawes to interdict the transporting of their countrey fruits into other places lest the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to bee Masters of the Countries where they grew as we see the Grapes and Figges of Canaan were used as Incentives unto the expedition of Israelâ—… and hence Plutarch telleth us that the Word Sycophant is derived to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figgeâ—… into other Countries As on the other side wee read that the Athenians set up a Pillar wherein they published him to bee an Enemy of the City who should bring Gold out of Media as an Instrument to corrupt them And the Romane Governour commanded hiâ—… souldiers that they should not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them lest there by they should bee looked on by the Advâ—…rsary as the Persians by Alexander rather as a prey than a foe A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires is height and greatnesse of minde which cannot well set bounds of measure unto it selfe as Seneca said in another sense Magnitudâ—… non habet certum modum Great minds have great ends and those can never be advanced but with vast and various Desires A great Ship will not be carried with the Sayle of a Lyter Nor can an Eagle fly with the wings of a Sparrow Alexander was not so great in his Victories as in his Desires whom one World could not satisfie nor Pompey in his Triumphs as in his Ambition to whom it was not enough to be Great except he might be the Greatest Another cause of Desires may be Curiositie which is nothing else but a desire of prying into and listning after the businesses of other Men which is called by Solomon Ambulatio Animâ—… The walking up and downe of the Soule as he elsewhere telleth us that the Eyes of a Foole are in the Ends of the Earth Such a Man being like the witches which Plutarch speaks of that weare Eyes when they went abroad but put them in a box when they came home â—… Or like the Falckoners Hawkes that are hooded in the House and never suffered to use their Eyes but to the hurt of other Birds like a man in a Dungeon that sees nothing where hee is but can see a great deale of light abroad at a little passage So these kind of Men have vast desires of forreine Knowledge but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves As they say of a Swine that hee looks every way but upward so we may of Pragma tists that their eyes looke alwaies save onely inward Whereas the Minds of prudent Men are like the Windowes of Solomons Temple broader inward than outward As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea whose light side was towards Israel but the darke towards Pharaoh Or as the Sunne in an Eclipse whose light is perfect inwards though towards us it bee darkened A wise Mans eyes are in his head whereas a Foole hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Proverbs his minde in his heeles only to wander and gâ—…d abroad CHAP. XVII Of other causes of Desire Infirmity Temerity Mutability of Minde Knowledge Repentance Hope Of the effects of it in Generall Labour Languor In speciall of Rationall Desires Bounty Griefe Wearinesse Indignation against that which withstands it Of Vitious Desires Deception Ingratitude Envy Greedinesse Basenesse of Resolution Other causes of Desires are Infirmity Rashnesse and Mutability of Mind Which three I put in one as having a neer Relation and dependance within themselves For commonly impotent Appetions as those of Children of sick of incontinent Persons are both Temerarious in â—…recipitating the Minde and anticipating the â—…ictates of Reason which should regulate or reâ—…raine them as also mutable and wandring like â—…e Bee from one Floure unto another Infirmity 〈◊〉 suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees and â—…rity not suffering him to resolve on any and â—…stly Mutabilitie making him weary of those â—…ings which weaknesse and rashnesse had unadvisedly transported him unto Omnium Imperitorum animus in lubricâ—… est Weake minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions Like fickle and nauseating stomacks which long for many things and can eat none Like sicke bodies quâ—… mutationi â—…us ut remedys utuntur as Seneca speakes which tosse from side to side and thinke by changing of their place they can leave their paine behind them Like Achilles in the Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now he leans on his side now supine lyes Then grov'leth on his face and strait doth rise This Sicknesse and Inconstancy of Desires is thus elegantly described by the old Poet Lâ—…cretius Vt nunc plerumque videmus Quid sibi quisque velit nescire quarere semper Commutare locum quasi onus deponere possit Exit sape foras magnis ex adibus ille Esse domi quam pertasum est subitâ—… reverâ—… Currit agens mannâ—…s advillam praciâ—…itanter Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instet Oscitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villae Aut abit in somnum gravis atque oblivia quarit Aut etiam
â—…vill which the mind in vaine strugleth with as finding it selfe alone too impotent for the conflict Evill I say either formally as in sinne or paine present or feared or privatively such as is any good thing which we have lost or whereof we doe despaire or have beene disappointed And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion either Sensitive or Intellectuall Sensitive is that anguish and distresse of Nature which lyetâ—… upon the body A Passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature being allwaies joyned with some measure of its decay but onely as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils it being the condition as of corporeall delights by custome to grow burdensome and distastefull so of paines to become easie and familiar The other and greater Griefe is Intellectuall which in Solomâ—…us phraise is A wounded spirit so much certainely the more quicke and piercing by how much a spirit is more vitall then a body besides the anguish of the soule findes alwayes or workes the same sympathy in the body but outward sorrowes reach not ever so farre as the spirituall and higher part of the soule And therefore we see many men out of a mistake that the distresse of their soules hath beene wrought by a union to their bodies have voluntarily spoiled this to deliver and quiet that The causes of this Passion are as in the former whatsoever hath in it power to disturbe the mind by it's union thereunto There are then two Conditions in respect of the Object that it be Evill and Present Evill first and that not onely formally in it selfe but apprehensively to the understanding And therefore wee see that many things which are in their Nature Evill yet out of the particular distemper of the Mind and deceitfulnesse in them may prove pleasant thereunto And this is the chiefe Corruption of this Passion I meane the misplacing or the undue suspending of it For although strictly in its owne property it be not an advancement of Nature nor addes any perfection but rather weakens it yet in regard of the reference which it beares either to a superior Law as testifying our Love unto the Obedience by our griefe for the breach thereof or to our consequent Carriage and Actions as governing them with greater Wisedome and Providence it may bee said to adde much perfection to the mind of man because it serves as an inducement to more cautelous living The next Condition in respect of the Object is that it be Present which may fall out either by Memory and then our Griefe is called Repentance or Fancy and Suspition and so it may be called Anxâ—… of Mind or by Sense and present union which is the principall kind and so I call it Anguish For the first nothing can properly and truly worke Griefe by ministry of Memory when the Object or Evill is long since past but those things which doe withall staine our Nature and worke impressions of permanent deformity For as it falleth out that many things in their exercise pleasant prove after in their operations offensive and burden some so on the other side many things which for the time of their continuance are irkesome and heavy prove yet after occasions of greater Ioy. Whether they be means used for the procuring of further good Per varios casus per tot discrimina rerum 〈◊〉 in Latium sedes ubi c. Through various great mishaps dangers store We hasten to our home and wished 〈◊〉 Where fates do promise rest where Troy revives Only reserve your selves for better lives Or whether they bâ—… Evils which by our Wisedome we have broken thâ—…ough and avoided sed 〈◊〉 olim 〈◊〉 iâ—…vabit When we are arrived at ease Remembrance of a strome doth please The Objects then of Repentance are not our passive but our active Evils not the Evils of suffering but the Evils of doing for the memory of afflictions past representâ—… unto us Nature loosed and delivered and should so much the more increase our Ioy by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity but the memory of sinnes past represents Nature obliged guilty and imprisoned And so leaves a double ground for Griefe â—…he staine or pollution and the guilt or malediction a deformity to the Law and a curse from it It would be improper here to wander into a digression touching Repentance only in a word it is then a Godly Sorrow when it proceeds from the memory of Evill not so much in respect of the punishment as of the staine When we grieve more because our sin hath made us unholy then because it hath made us unhappy and not only because we are runne into the danger of the Law but because we are run out of the way of the Law When it teacheth us to cry not only with Pharaoh take away this Plague but with Israel in the Prophet take away Iniquity Concerning Griefe of Preoccupation arising out of a suspitious Feare and expectation of Evill I know not what worth it can have in it unlesse haply thus that by fore-accustoming the Mind to Evill it is the better strengthned to stand under it For Evils by praemeditation are either prevented or mitigated the Mind gathering strength and wisedome together to meet it And therefore it is prudent advise of Plutarch that wee should have a prepared Minde which when any Evill falleth out might not be surprised by it To say as Anaxagoras did when he heard of the death of his Sonne sciome genuisse mortalem I know that I be gat a mortall Sonne I know that my riches had wings and that my comforts were mutable Preparednesse composeth the Minde to patience Vlysses wept when he saw his Dogge which he did not when he saw his Wife he came prepared for the one but was surprised by the other Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem Et perferre soror potero Had I foreseene this Griefe or could but feare it I then should have compos'd my selfe to beare it Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of a Mans Life to be only a meditation upon Death because that being so great an Evill in it selfe and so sure to us it ought to be so expected as that it may not come sudden and find us unprepared to meet the King of Terrour For it is in the property of custome and acquaintance not only to alleviate and asswage evils to which purpose Seneca speakes perdidisti tot mala si nondum misera esse didicisti thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable but further as Aristotle notes to work some manner of delight in things at first troublesome and tedious and therefore hee reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things and teares are by Nature made the witnesses as well of Ioy as of Griefe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
and as in Massie bodies though violent motions be in the weakest as being furthest from the strength that impelled them yet naturall are ever swiftest towards the Center as nearest approaching unto the place that drawes them so in the Hopeâ—… of men though such as are violent and groundleâ—…sse proove weaker and weaker and so breake out at last into emptinesse and vapour In which respect * Philosophers have called Hope the dreames of waking men like that of the Musitian whom Dionissiuâ—… deceived with an empty promise of which I spake before yet those that are stayed and naturall are evermore strong when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their Object Quâ—… propius accedimus ad spem fruendi eò impatientius caremus The nearer we come to the fruition of a good the more impatient we are to want it And the reason is because Goodnesse is better knowne when it is in an nearer view of the understanding and more unite thereunto And the more we have of the knowledge of goodnesse the more we have of the Desire of it if any part be absent Besides all greedinesse is attractive and therefore the more we know of it the faster we hasten to it And it is the nature of good to encrease the sense of the remainders of evill So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good we have obtained unto yet the burthen and molestation of them is increased and therefore the more possession we have of good the greater is our wearineâ—… of evill and the more Nature sceleth her defects the more doth she desire her restauration The next condition in the Object of our Hope is possibility for though the will sometimes being inordinate may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities under an implicitâ—… condition if they were not so yet no hope whither regular or corrupt can respect it's object under that apprehension It worketh two passions most repugnant to this hatred and despaire the one being a proud opposition the other a dreadfull flight from that good in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion betweene the true meanes unto an end hoped and the strength of those powers which are to worke or bestow them or if they be such ends as are wrought without any such meanes by the bare and immediate hand of the worker ' it is an apprehension of convenience betwixt the will and power of him that bestoweth it Here then because I finde not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion unlesse we would passe sró natural or morall unto Theologicall handling thereof we may observe what manner of despair is only regular allowable I mèan that which in matters of importance drives us out of our selves or any presumption and opinion of our own sufficiency But that despaire which riseth out of a groundlesse unbeliefe of the Power or distrust of the Goodnesse of a superiour Agent especially in those things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God hath a double corruption in it both in that it defiles and in that it ruines Nature defiles in that it conceives basely of God himself in making our guilt more omnipotent than his Power and sinne more hurtfull than he is good ruines in that the minde is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery Of this kind of Despaire there are three sorts The one Sensual arising out of an excessive love of Good Carnal and Present and out of a secure contempt of Good Spiritual and Future Like that of the Epicures Let us eat and drink while we may To morrow we shall die The other Sluggish which dis-hearteneth and indisposeth for Action causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherin they conclude before hand that they shall not succeed The third Sorrowfull arising from deep and strong apprehensions of Feare which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which Hope should be sustained as in the great Tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwrack when the Sunne and Starres were hid and nothing but Terrour to be scene All Hope that they should be saved was taken away The last condition in the object of Hope was Difficulty I mean in respect of our own abilities for the procuring of the Good we hope for and therefore Hope hath not only an eye to Bonuâ—… the good desired but to Auxilium too the help which conferres it No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow upon himselfe Omnis expectatiâ—… est ab extrinseco all Hope is an attendant Passion and doth ever rely upon the Will and Power of some superiour causes by dependance whereupon it hath some good warrant to attaine its desires And thus in Divine Hope God is in both respects the Object of it both per modum Boni as the Good Desired per modum Auxilii as the Ayde whereby we enjoy him So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt foolish which are grounded either on an error concerning the Power to help in some assistants or coÌ„cerning the Will in others as indeed generally a blinde and mis-led judgement doth nourish Passion Of the former sort are the Hopes of base degenerous minds in their depeÌ„dance upon second and subordinate means without having recourse to the first supreme Cause which is to trust in lying vanities for every man is a lyar either by Impotency whereby he may faile us or by Imposture whereby he may delude us Of the other sort are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wils of others without ground warrant of such a confidence whence ariseth a sluggish and carelesse security blindly reposing it selfe upon such helps without endeavouring to procure them unto our selves And this is the difference betweene Despaire and Presumption Hope looketh on a good future aâ—… possible indeed in it selfe but with all as difficult to us and not to be procured but by Industry and labour Now Despaire leaveth out the apprehension of possibility and looketh onely on the hardnesse on the other side Presumption neveâ—… regardeth the hardnesse but buildeth onely upon the possibility And this is spes mâ—…rtua that dead Hope which by the rule of opposition wee may gather from the life of Hope spoken of by S. Peter For a lifely Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge it is 〈◊〉 Luminosa a Peace springing out of Light but dead Hope worketh a rest grounded onely on ignorance such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner which is rather sencelesnesse than Peaceâ—… and this is Tenâ—…brosa â—…ax a Peace springing out of Darknesse for a true Peace is quiet ex fide a beleeving rest but counterfeit is only quies ex somno a sleeping or dreaming
times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience not only in the civill government of men but in the naturall government of creatures by men to whom by the law of Creation they were all made subject yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to ferget their originall Subjection and in stead of Fearing to terrifie man their lord and when ever we tame any of them and reduce them to their first condition this is not so much an act of our Dominion wherby we awe them as of our Reason whereby we deceive them and we are beholding more therein to the working of our Wit than to the prerogative of our Nature and usually every thing which hath knowledg enough to measure its owne abilities the more it hath of Strength the lesse it hath of Feare that which Solomon makes the strongest the Apostle makes the fittest to expell Peare to wit Love So likewise on the other side Immunity from Subjection in the midst of Weaknesse removes Feare Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons who notwithstanding their Weaknesse yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary or mercy of their Iudge they are freed from the obligation of the Law though not from the Offence their former Feares doe presently turne into Ioy and Gratulations and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse Confidence and Courage that they can bid defiance unto Death because though they be not quite delivered from the Corruption yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sinne though by reason of their Weaknesse they are not delivered from the mouth yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death though not from the Earth of the Grave yet from the Hell of the Grave though not from Sinne yeâ—… from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne the Law ouâ—… Adversary must be strong as well as our selves weake if he looke for Feare The Corruption then of this Passion as it depenâ—…eth upon these Causes is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our owne or too high of anothers strength the one proceeding from an errour of Humility in undervaluing our selves the other from an errour of Iudgement or Suspition in mistaking of others There are some men who as the Orâ—…our speaks of despairing Wits De 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…rentur who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a slâ—…ight esteeme of the abilities shee â—…ath given them and deserve that Weakenesse which they unjustly complaine of The sight of whose Iudgment is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses the two ends whereof have a double representation the one fuller and neerer the truth the other smaller and at a farre greater distance So it is with men of this temper they looke on themselves and others with a double prejudice on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Iudgement which presents every thing remote and small on Others with on Overvaluing and Admiring Iudgement which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect And by this means between a selfe-dislike and a too high estimation of others truth ever fals to the ground and for revenge of her selfe leaves the party thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Timorous For as Errour hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about so principally this present Passion because Errour it selfe is a kinde of Formido Intellectus a Feare of the Vnderstanding and it is no great wonder for one Feare to beget another And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples he first removes their prejudice Feare not those that can kill the Body onely and can doe no more Where the overflowing of their Feares seemes to have been grounded on the overiudging of an adverse power Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Feare these which follow are more casuall and upon occasion Whereof the first may be the Suddennesse of aâ—… Evill when it ceiseth upon as it were in the Dark for all Darknesse is comfortlesse and therefore the last terrible Iudgement is described unto us by the Blacknesse and Vnexpectednesse of it by the Darknesse of Night and the Suddennesse of Lightning All Vnacquaintaince then and Igno rance of an approaching Evill must needs worke Amazement and Terrour as contrarily a foresight theâ—… of worketh Patience to undergoe and Boldnesse to encounter it as Tacitus speaks of Caecina Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoque intrepidus that hee was acquainted with difficulties and therefore not fearfull of them And there is good reason for this because in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evill the spirits which were before orderly carried by their severall due motions unto their naturall works are upon this strange appearance and instant Oppression of danger so disordered mixed and stiâ—…lled that there is no power left either in the Soule for Counsell or in the Body for Execution For as it is in the warres of men so of Passions those are more terrible which are by way of Invasion then of Battell which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed then those which find them prepared for resistance and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddennes of the one side and the Ignorance of the other Invadunt urbeâ—… somno vinâ—…que sepultam They do invade a City all at rest Which ryot had with sleep and Wine opprest And this is one reason why men inclinable to this Passion are commonly more fearfull in the Night than at other times because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on when the spirits which should strengthen are more retyred and Reason lesse guarded And yet there are Evils too which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and traine than if they were more contracted and speedy Somâ—… set upon us by sleath affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze others with a train and pomp like a Comet which is ushered in with a streame of fire and like Thunder which hurts not only with its danger but with its noise and therefore Aristotle reckoneth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare Another cause of Feare may be the Neernesse of an Evill when we perceive it to be within the reach of us and now ready to set upon us For aâ—… it is with Objects of Sence in a distance of place so it is with the Objects of Passion in a Distance of Time Remotion in either the greater it is the lesse present it makes the Object and by consequence the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty and this reason Aristotle gives why Death which else where he makes the most terrible evill unto Nature doth not yet with the conceit thereof by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance worke such terrour and amazement nor so stiffe Reason and the Spirits as Objects farre lesse in themselves injurious
swerve into disordered and confused or into idle and vaine motions â—…ut might ever worke towards that fixed end which God hath appointed them to moove â—…nto Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall are those motions of meerely naturall Agents which are guided to their generall or particular ends by the Wisdome and Power of Him that made them And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniforme order observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course never either swarving or desisting there-from so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permitteth them because they are all governed by an immutable most wise and most constant Law proceeding from a Will with which there is no variablenesse nor shadow of changing And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature wherein it swerveth from this Law onely or at least principally in these inferiour things wherein partly from the deficiencie and languishing of secondarie Agents and partly from the excesses defects mutabilitie and the like exigences of matter wee finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends Which whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautifull or whether the originall thereof be divine malâ—…diction which for the sinne of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures which were all created for his comfort and service which Saint Paul calleth the vanitie of the Creature it proceedeth certainely from the Will anâ—… Power of that Law-giver who is onely able sâ—… Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisdome tâ—… dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law which he gave all his creatures to observe So that all the Miracles which ever God hath beene pleased to worke for the conversion of men unto the Faith or confirmation in it were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law But as I said those irregularities and deviations before spoken of are seene principally in inferiour things The Earth being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Manâ—… Fall which made if wee will beleeve that relation though I rather suppose it to be fictitious the Heathen Philosopher upon observation oâ—… that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour to crie out Aut Deus Naturâ—… patitur aut Mundi machina dissolvetur either the God of Nature suffereth or the Frame of Nature dissolveth Either something hindereth that universall Power which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures or he doth at least willingly detaine that vertue and the vigour of that Law without execution whereof there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame which particular I have the rather observ'd to note that the more raysed and heavenly a Nature is the more stable and constant likewise it is to every Divine Law imposed on it Now this naturall Passion which I speake of is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers the Law the Equitie the Weight the Instinct the Bond the Love the Covenant and League of naturall things in order to the conservation of themselves propagation of their kind perfection and order of the Vniverse service of Man and glory of the Creator which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents By all which we are given to understand that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted when any creature forsakes its native motion and falleth into confusion and disorder there is then admitted a breach of a Law or as Aristotle calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an error which Saint Iames telleth us is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an iniquitie of Nature also a certaine levitie unusefulnesse and emptinesse of true worth which I call in Saint Pauls phrase the vanitie of the Creature thirdly loosenesse decay and dissolution and thereupon discord and unserviceablenesse towards the other parts with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole These are the inconveniences that follow Natures how much greater are those which follow Reasons disobedience for all this touching the Passions of Nature I have observed onely to give light unto those of Reason there being the same proportion of government in them all saving that what in things destitute of all knowledge is guided by the Law-giver himselfe is in the rest performed by a knowledge conjoyn'd and intrinsecall to the Worker and this is either Mentall or Sensitive or Rationall from all which arise sundry degrees of Motions or Passions Mentall Passions are those high pure and abstracted delights or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the Vnderstanding which Aristotle calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Latines Mens or Apex animi which are the most simple actions of the Mind wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy saculties Which Motions are grounded first on an extraordinarie Knowledge either of Vision and Revelation or of an exquisite naturall Apprehension both which are beyond the compasse of usuall Industrie here to attaine unto The former of these I call with the Schoole-men Extasie and Rapture such as Saint Pauls was for so himselfe calleth it Novi hominem raptum and such as was the Passions of the Mind in the Prophets and holy men of God when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight And such no doubt is that joy unspeakable and Peace past understanding which the Apostle makes to be the fruits of the Spirit of God in those hearts wherein he lodgeth whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soule the Mind is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory which in Heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light And for the later Branch Aristotle hath placed his greatest felicitie in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the Soule And it was the speech of the Philosopher Heraclâ—…tus to the same purpose that Animae sicca est sapientissima which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle That Melancholy complexions are usually the wisest for that Temper is the dryest of all the rest That a Mind not steeped in the humours of carnall and grosse affections nor drench'd in the waves of a disquiet Fancie but more raysed and soaring to its originally by divine contemplations is alwayes endued with the greater wisdome Another Knowledge from whence the Passions of this Facultie are raysed in Man is that light of Naturall Principles which the Schooles call Synteresis unto which the custodie of all practicall Truths being committed they there-hence worke in the Conscience motions of Ioy Love Peace Feare Horror Despaire and the like spirituall Passions according as the Soule out of those generall Principles shall gather unto its owne particulars any
either delightfull or disquieting Conclusions Sensitive Passions are those motions of prosecution or flight which are grounded on the Fancie Mentorie and Apprehensions of the common Sense which we see in brute beasts as in the feare of Hares or Sheepe the fiercenesse of Wolves the anger or slatterie of Dogs and the like So Homer describeth the joy of Vlysses his Dog which after his so long absence remembred him at his returne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For wanton joy to see his Master neare He wav'd his flattering tayle and toss'd each eare Now these motions in brute creatures if we will beleeve Seneca are not affections but certaine characters and impressions ad similitudinem passionum like unto Passions in men which he calleth Impetus the risings forces and impulsions of Nature upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it I come therefore to those middle Passions which I call'd Rationall not formally as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason or barely immateriall motions of the Soule but by way of participation and dependance by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the Will and Vnderstanding and not barely of the Fancie as in other creatures And for calling Passion thus govern'd Reasonable I have the warrant of Aristotle who though the sensitive Appetite in man be of it selfe unreasonable and therefore by him contradivided to the Rationall powers of the Soule yet by reason of that obedience which it oweth to the Dictates of the Vnderstanding whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable though Corruption have much slackned and unknit that Bond hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie not intrinsecally in it selfe but by way of participation and influence from Reason Now Passion thus considered is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object which is principally the Good and secondarily the Evill of things and either considered after a sundry manner for they may be taken either barely and alone or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject for all objects offend or delight the Facultie in vertue of their union thereunto and therefore according as things are united or distant so doe they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind The object then may be considered simply in its owne nature as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie and so the Passions are in respect of Good Love in respect of Evill Hatred which are the two radicall fundamentall and most transcendent Passions of all the rest and therefore well called Pondera and Impetus animi the weight and force and as I may so speake the first springings and out goings of the Soule Secondly the object may be considered as absent from the subject in regard of reall union though never without that which the Schooles call vnio objectiva union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding without which there can be no Passion and the object thus considered worketh if it be Good Desire if Evill â—…light and Abomination Thirdly it may be considered as present by a reall contract or union with the Facultie and so it worketh if Good Delight and Pleasure if Evill Griefe and Sorrow Againe as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger it may be considered either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power which implyeth in respect of Good an Impossibilitie to be attained and so it worketh Despaire and in respect of Evill an Improbabilitie of being avoided and so it worketh Feare or secondly as not exceeding the strength of the power or at least those aides which it calleth in in which regard Good is presented as Attainable and so it worketh Hope and Evill is presented either as Avoidable if it be future and it worketh Boldnesse to breake through it or as Requitable if it be past and so it worketh Anger to revenge it Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after of all which or at least those which are most naturall and least coincident with one another I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse observe some things wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature But first I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions and what dignities are therein most notable and the most notable defects CHAP. VI. Of Humane Passions in generall their use Naturall Morall Civill their subordination unto or rebellion against right Reason NOW Passions may be the subject of a three-fold discourse Naturall Morall and Civill In their Naturall consideration we should observe in them their essentiall Properties their Ebbes and Flowes their Springings and Decayes the manner of their severall Impressions the Physicall Effects which are wrought by them and the like In their Morall consideration we might likewise search how the indifferencie of them is altered into Good or Evill by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason or of the violence of their owne motions what their Ministry is in Vertuous and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions how they are raysed suppressed slackned and govern'd according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion In their Civill respects we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and impressed and how and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie or to slack and remit them how to discover or suppresse or nourish oâ—… alter or mix them as may be most advantagious what use may be made of each mans particular Age Nature Pâ—…opension how to advance and promote our just ends upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of these whom we are to deale withall And this Civill use of Passion is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle in the second Booke of his Rhetoricks unto which profession in this respect it properly belongeth because in matter of Action and of Iâ—…dicature Affection in some sort is an Auditor or Iudge as he speakes But it seemeth strange that a man of so vast sufficiencie and judgement and who had as we may well conjecture an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body which in other mens Labours lay broken and seattered should yet in his Bookes De Animâ over-passe the discoverie of their Nature Essence Operatioâ—… aâ—…d Properties and in his Bookes of Morall Philosophie should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie Irregularitie Subordination Rebellion Conspiracie Discords Causes Effects consequences of each particular of them being circumstances of obvious and dayly use in our Life and of necessarie and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason