of any thing may be enhaunced ibid. The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the siege of Samaria 255 When the Arithmetical proportion must be applyed to the value of the thing ibid. V. Argument 2. against it answer'd 256 A Judge or Umpire limited by the rule of Justice ibid. VI. What may be due by both kinds of justice without covenant 257 VII The justice of an Arbitratour different according to the case 259 Mr. Hobbes too nice and singular in his language ibid. His mistake in the division of justice 260 In his measure of commutative ibid. His boldness in confronting all the learned men before him ibid. Bodin's cavil ibid. His aâ—ery conceit of an harmonical proportion 261 VIII Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy ibid. IX His censure of all Philosophers 262 He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good citizen ibid. The foundation of Ethicks Oeconomicks Politicks ibid. X. Personal and relative perfection how taught by Philosophers 263 Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus ibid. With that of Lucretius 265 Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death ibid. Frugality and Temperance 266 Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans 267 XI Wherein the Stoicks placed humane happiness ibid. Wherein Aristotle 268 XII Mr. Hobbes mistake's the Philosopher's discourse of moderating Passions ibid. St. Paul's Philosophy 269 XIII Of Fortitude and Liberality 270 CHAP. XXX I. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial 272 II. No less applicable to a feigned then a true person 273 III. Person not Latine ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum 274 Person differently used in several arts and faculties ibid. IV. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes 275 No man personate's himself ibid. Cicero mis-interpreted ibid. Person how taken by the Criticks 276 V. Boethius's definition of a person ibid. Rich. de sancto Victore object 's against it ibid. His other definition of it more difficult 277 Scotus's Objections against the former ibid. VI. The definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop 278 The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo ibid. Reasonable of what extent 279 The Philosophers and School-men could have rectified Mr. Hobbes's mistake of a person ibid. The Etymology and common acception of Persona 280 VII Not the actor but the acted is the person ibid. VIII No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature 281 With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept ibid. IX The first part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroy's the second 282 God to be obeyed before Man ibid. An instance in the Hebrew Midwives ibid. Whâ— probably had covenanted 283 X. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind 284 XI The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated ibid. Moses though instead of God did not personate him 285 Nor do Kings ibid. Nor Priests ibid. XII How Moses was instead of God to Aaron 186 Hohim used for God what name ibid. How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh ibid. How fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him 287 XIII The Israelites how the people of God how of Moses 288 XIV Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God 289 XV. God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and General ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and them 290 CHAP. XXXI I. Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God 291 Who was really God ibid. II. Proved to be so from Acts 20.17 28. 292 Against Bernardinus Ochinus 293 Refuted by Smiglecius ibid. To whom Smalcius reply's having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus 294 Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ibid. Smalcius attempt's in vain to evacuate the Divinity of Christ. 295 III. Châ—ist's bloud not to be called the bloud of the Father according to Smiglecius 297 Smalcius's answer that argue's how it may ibid. His argument uâ—ged to the farthest by the Bishop 298 Who find's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's ibid. The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word 299 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated ibid. The Text which want's it retorted upon the Socinians 300 IV. How Christ is the Son of God 301 What a Son is ibid. V. The particulars in the definition applyed to our Saviour 302 VI. The mystery of our Saviour's divine and humane generation signifyed Mic. 5.2 303 The Bishop's observation upon that Text ibid. Faustus Socinus answer'd 304 And Valkelius 305 With other of the Socinians 307 VII The Text taken in pieces and vindicated from their Objections 308 One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers 309 Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun 310 VIII How from the beginning may signifie from eternity 311 A two-fold consideration of the word Beginning 312 A or Ab often denote causations ibid. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of Dâ—vid's reign ibid. The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto 313 IX God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of his Attributes 314 Particularly that of his Eternity ibid. X. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop 315 Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arrian 316 CHAP. XXXII I. The next name of our Saviour the Word 318 Socinus answer'd in his exâ—lication of St. John Chap. 1. ibid. The opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed 319 The shifts of the Socinians 322 II. St. John's reason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgeth ibid. Beza's genuine lection 323 Socinus singular in his ibid. But for a little consonance with Tremelius ibid. III. How the Socinians interpret John 1.1 324 With reference to the Baptist's preaching ibid. IV. Their Metaphor And Metonymie 325 V. Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the Text is to be understood ibid. So that of a Vine A Sheepheard A Doore 326 His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection ibid. The Truth and Life may be taken without a figure 327 VI. Christ called the Word according to none of those figures 328 But according to the Catholick sense is the internall word of God 329 How Aaron was Moses's mouth ibid. John Baptist called a Voice ibid. The word taken for Christ in a far different sense 330 VIII Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity 331 Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically ibid. IX Socinus's shift 332 X. A brief Paraphrase on the first words in St. John ibid. A word internall and externall both of God and Man 333 XI The Philosophers of old call'd the Son of God his word 335 XII As well they who writ after as who before St. John 336 XIII Which is yielded by Socinus ibid XIV Their language used by the Primitive Fathers and Saint Paul 337 That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John 338 Plato's description of Heaven parallel'd to that
The severall parts acted by the Understanding and the Will both which faculties are imperfect in this world The certainty of felicity after death resum'd and proved Object 1. Ans. The Objection answer'd toâ—ching man's felicâ—ty in the knowledge c. he hath though â—mperfect Objection 2. Answer A second Objâ—ction answer'd about Eternal felicity being the last Article of our Faith The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason An Argument to confirme this drawn from the H. Martyrs constancy in their sufferings Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design to disparage the foresaid Article of our â—aith Several qualificâ—tions good and bad in the making and breaking Covenants No dammage without injuâ—y The explication of Commutative and Distâ—ibutive justice To which is premised that of common or legal justice Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two Argument 1. against an Arithmeticall proportion in Commutative Justâ—ce examined By what the price of any thing may â—e enhaunsed The Asse's head and kab of Pidgeons dung in the Siege of Samaria When the Arithmeticall proportion must be applied to the value of the thing 2. Argument agaiâ—st it answered A Judge or Umpire 〈◊〉 by the rule of â—ustice What may be due by both kindes of Justice without Covenant The justice of an Arbitrator different according to the Case Mr. Hobbes 〈◊〉 nice and singular in his language His mistake in the division of justice In his measure of commutative His boldnesse in confronting all the learned men before him Bodâ—n's cavill His aieâ—y conceit of an harmonical proportion Mr. Hobbes's restraint of Moral Philosophy His censure of all Philosophers He forget's the distinction of a good man and a good Citizen The foundation of Ethikes Oeconomikes Politikes Personall and relative perfectâ—on how taught by Philosophers Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus With that of Lucretius Epicurus's excellent discourse concerning Death Frugality and Temporance Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans then do the Mahumetans Wherein the Stoicks placed humâ—ne happinesse Wherein Aristotle Mr Hobbes mâ—stake's the Philosophers discouâ—se of moderating assions St. Pauls Philosophy Of Fortitude and liberality Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantial No less applicable to a feigned than a true person Person not Latine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Suppositum Person differently used in severall arts and faculties Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes No man personate's himself Cicero mis-interpreted Person how taken by the Criticks Boethius's definition of a person Rich. de Sancto Vâ—ctore object 's against it His other Definition of it More dâ—fficult Scotus's Objections against the former The Definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop The Distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quâ— Reasonable of what extent The Philosophers â—nd School-men could have râ—ctified Mr Hâ—bbes's mistake of a person The Etymologie and common aâ—ception of Persona Not the Actor but the acted is the person No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature With whomsoever any such is made it must not be kept The fiâ—st part of Mr. Hobbes's answer destroye's the second God to be obeyâ—d before man An instance in the Hebrew Midwives Who probably had covenanted No breach of Covenant which had not a right to biâ—d The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated Moses though instead of God did not personate him Nor doe Kings Nor Priests How Moses was instead of God to Aaron ELOHIM How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh Hoâ— fully soever Moses had represented God he could not personate him The Israelites how the pâ—ople of Gâ—d and how of Mâ—ses Moses's phrase shewe's he personated not God God was King of the Israelites Moses but their Judge and Generall A messenger and Mediatour betwixt God and them Uncomely to say our Saviour personated God Who was really God Pâ—â—ved to be 〈◊〉 from Acts 20.17 28. Against Bernard Ochinus Refuted by Smiglâ—cius To whom Smâ—lcius replies having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus Oâ—hinus deserâ—â—d by the Socinians Smalcius attempt's in vaine to evacuate the divinity of Christ. Christâ—s blood not to be called the blood of the Father according to Smiglecius Smalcius that argue's how it may His argument urged to the farthest by the Bishop Who finde's the passions not the actions of men to be called God's The shifting Genius of the Socinians de luded by a single word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated The text whâ—ch want's it retorted upon the Socinians How Christ is the son of God What a son is The particulars in the definition applyâ—ed to our Saviour The mysterie of our Saviour's divine humane generation signified Mic. 5.2 The Bishop's observation on that Text. Faustus Socinus answâ—â—'d And Valkelius With other Socinians The text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections One in essence plurally expressed when the effects are divers Christs eternal egression compared to the shining of the Sun How from the beginning may signifie from eternity A twofold consideration of the word Beginning A or Ab often denote causationâ— c. From the beginning not to be understood from the beginning of David's reigne The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto God's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes Particularly that of his eternity The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian and the Arian The next name of our Saviour the Word Socinus answerd in his Explication of St. John Ch. 1. The opinâ—on of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed Epiphanius contra haeret tom 2. cap. 28 The shifts of the Socinians St. Iohn's â—eason of his writing not solitary as Socinus alledgâ—th Beza's genuine lection Socinus rigulaâ— in his But for a little consonance with Tremelius How the Socinians interpret Joh. 1.1 With reâ—erence to the Baptist's preaching Their Metaphor And Metonymie Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the text is to be understood So that of a vine A Shepheard A Doore His Metonymies of being the Truth Life and Resurrection c. The Truth and life may be taken without a figure Christ called the Word according to none of those figures But according to the Catholick sense is the internal Word of God How Aaron was Moses's mouth John Baptist call'd a voice The Woâ—d taken for Christ in a farre different sense Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity Neither Metaphorically Nor Metonymically Socinus's shift A brief Paraphraâ—â— Wâ—â—es the first 〈◊〉 in St John A Word internal and external both of God and Man The Philosophers of old callâ—d the Son of God his Word As well they who writ after as who before St. John Which is yielded by Socinus Their language used by the primitive Fathers and St. Paul That of Plato conâ—onant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John Plato's deâ—â—â—lption of heaven parallel'd to
observe a Metonymy he was the way because by his word he direct's us the way because by his life he hath trod it out for us and by his graces he help 's us to walke in it and this is apparent to any man who shall consider how impossible it is for Christ to be a way a trodden path of ground or how impossible it is for any such way to lead to the Journeyes end which he aimed at The second Terme which is mentioned by Socinus is Truth and for this I may say that I doubt whether there be any figure necessary for Christ as God being Truth it self he must needs likewise be verax true speaking as well as verus and if he should deceive or misguide in the way he should go against his nature and deny himselfe as St. Paul phraseth it 2 Tim. 2.13 now I can justly say that here is no figure or if any it is but this which the context exact's I am the way by directing you to it and that an infallible one which no man can be deceived by for I am truth its self which make's good all I have said and the same I may speake of his last Terme Life I may justly affirme that there needs be no figure in it Christ is the life there is an Article to every Terme life its selfe life in the fountaine all other lives are Peters Pauls a horse's or dog's life but he is life its self life in the fountaine like light in the Sun much more glorious then any other therefore thou who seekest life life eternal which is the journeys end of every man must come by the way which I appoint who am Truth and come to me and thou shalt have it I know as he is life in the fountain and so may be understood so he may be a life to us and called our life the life of men of which hereafter both as an efficient and an object as an efficient producing that life as an object that life of ours consisting in the beatificall vision of the most sacred and blessed Trinity but I see no necessity forcing me to this second exposition but if so the context lead's to it I think I may run through Twenty more and certainly there are Twenty more such speeches but we shall find that there is something in the matter of the discourse or in the Circumstances of the Text which induce to it but in that I have in hand nothing to perswade any man that this Term word should be understood according to any of those figures Sect. 6. Socinus saith it is used now here in Scripture but in the writings of this Evangelist so my search need not be farre in this place of the Gospell in his first Epistle Chapter 1. Verse 1. that which was from the beginning which we have heard which we have seen with our eyes which we have looked upon and our hands have handled of the word of Life c. here is no Circumstance inducing us to search a sense that merely a man should be called the word but rather the contrary something divine to which that humanity was united because as here it was from the beginning and because in the second Verse that life of which this is called the word is termed eternall life which was with the Father and was manifested to us was eternall and with him he must therefore be eternally with him this was afterwards manifested to us A third place is Rev. 19.13 his name is called the word of God where I can find againe nothing to that sense but in each place of these this Term word may most aptly be understood according to the Orthodox Catholick sense for the internal word of God nor indeed can they shew me any thing like it in Scrirture Let a man conceive with himselfe what a strange uncouth phrase it is for a man who speake's to be called the word which he speake's yet so must he in their language Sect. 7. Yea but they have just such another fetch Aaron is is sayd Exodus 4.16 to be Moses his mouth the phrase is cleane otherwise and is excellently rendred by our Translators instead of a mouth because Moses had not a clear utterance the second Instance is that Iohn Baptist is called a voyce for my part I think it a reasonable exposition to say that Iohn Baptist was rather he that made the noise and voyce in the Wilderness then the voyce its self to which purpose let us look upon the 40. of Isaiah verse 3. from whence that Text is made use of by three Evangelists we shall find there that the Prophet like a man in a rapture seeme's to heare this noise or voice in the Wilderness and here utter's what he heard he saw in his vision Iohn Baptist in a Wilderness fitting and preparing men for the Gospell but the voice he heard was the vâ—ice of Iohn Baptist who did preach that Doctrine there specifyed I know but one objection of moment can be framed against this which is that Iohn 1.23 when Iohn had been asked who art thou he answered I am the voice c. as saith the Prophet Isaiah to this first it is memorable that in the Originall it is not I am but onely I it is thought by many that this Word I am ought to be understood but if it be not then he doth not affirme himselfe to be the voice but onely leave 's them to apprehend what he is by the Prophet Isaiah but if it be and that we should read it as it is commonly I am yet since he quote's the Prophet I know no reason why it should be understood in a sense dâ—ffering from the Prophets especially since the two other Evangelists which mention this place have not one word of this I am St. Matthew 3.3 for this is he which was spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah the voice of one crying in the Wilderness so likewise St. Luke 3.4 having before delivered how he preached the Baptisme of Repentance adde's as it is written in the Book of the words of Isaiah the Prophet the voice of one c. well then methinke's it is reasonable to conceive that Iohn was rather he that cryed as he did there then the voice which was cryed but I reverence the Antiquity which expound it otherwise and those heavenly Devotions which the Fathers have deduced from that Metaphor and therefore will no further discusse that interpretation that deliver's Iohn to be the voice but grant it and Aaron the mouth of Moses in Exodus the Case is farre differing betwixt these and the word to be taken for Christ who by them was mere man in this sentence In the beginning was the word for consider Reader if in Exodus it had been said the mouth was in the beginning or midle or latter end of a buisinesse would any man living interpret that of Aaron without that Comment which the Spirit of God
of St. John in his Revelation ibid. XV. The words Being with God signifie more then Known to God against Socinus and his followers 340 Eternall life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angels blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers 341 Although not till afterward manifested to others 342 The Philosophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge ibid. XVI Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose 343 XVII The Discourse resumed concerning knowledge of the word before the preaching of St. John Baptist. ibid. XVIII Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said The word was God 345 XIX God with them no proper name but an Appellative c. 346 Contrary to the use of it single throughout the New Testament ibid. XX. How Satan is called the God of this world c. 347 How the Belly God ibid. The Socinians criticisme about the article ibid. Answer'd 348 And Socinus's Instances ibid. How St. Cyrill's rule is to be understood ibid. XXI Socinus answer'd about Tautology 349 As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself 350 Lord and God not both one 351 The Word God with though not of the Father ibid. CHAP. XXXIII I. The Socinians conceit of the Word being with God in the beginning 352 II. Improbable having no Evangelical authority 353 III. That they pretend to prove's it not ibid. The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated ibid. His Ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeall 354 IV. His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed 356 V. How all things we made by him 357 St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation ibid. Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture 358 VI. Christ's interest in the Creation re-inforced against the Socinians gloss 359 Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental cause ibid. Their other slight objection answer'd 360 The use of words ibid. The benefit of Tradition ibid. VII How Life eternal and what else is to be understood ver 4. 361 How both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men ibid. How Christ is called the light according to Socinus 362 How according to the Bishop ibid. VIII What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why render'd was ibid. Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist. 363 IX Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ ibid. Which is evidently affirmative of his Divinity 364 X. Socinus misinterpret's Creation by Recreation or Regeneration 365 And misapplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Eâ—hesians 366 Another violence of his in wresting actuall Regeneration to Regeneration in endeavour 367 XI Smalcius's gloss ibid. His various significations put upon the word World ibid. Whereâ—n he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader 368 The Bishop's Animadversions 369 XII Their sense directly opposite to that evident in the Text. 370 XIII The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object 371 Smalcius's reply to Smiglecius ibid. Little becoming a Socinian 372 The World knew not the Word but by supernaturall grace ibid. What men apprehend of God by naturall abilities ibid. The Objection about St. John's upbraiding the world answer'd 373 The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted 374 XIV The Socinians word could not be made Flesh ibid. Their evasion 375 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell ibid. Their heterodox interpretation of Flesh ibid. Not evident in Scripture cited by Socinus 376 The result of their Comment 177 The summe of ours ibid. XV. The union of the Divinity with the Humanity implyeth no mutation of God into Man 378 Notwithstanding the praedication God is Man ibid. Which is asserted and by a familiar instance illustrated ibid. Their Objection answer'd by the dependance of substances upon God ibid. Another Argument of Smalcius's 379 Answer'd by the manner of existing ibid. Christ a true man though a divine Person 380 Whose Conception and Gestation in the blessed Virgin 's womb conduced nothing to his personality ibid. The Divinity and Humanity united render him neither two Sons nor two Persons ibid. XVI Objection of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost 381 Answer which identity implie's not that they were made flesh with him ibid. As Scotus illustrate's excellently 382 The Bishop's Apology to the Reader ibid. XVII Smalcius's first Quaere c. Rectifyed Answer'd 383 All actions not alwayes necessarily according to the nature of him or that which act's ibid. Smalcius's second Quaere Answered and frustrated 384 His third Quaere Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the Incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost ibid. XVIII Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself 385 Which he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles 386 CHAP. XXXIV I. The Socinians opinion of the holy Ghost 387 Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct Person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity ibid. II. Not the Gospel of Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture 389 III. Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure 390 A defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries 391 CHAP. XXXV I. Carthagena's little lesse then then blasphemous limiting God's power of enlarging the capacity of his Creature 392 II. What of God to be proved by reason and by whom to be attempted 393 III. Aquinas's first Argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity 394 The Bishop's Answer grounded upon Lully's demonstration by aequiparance ibid. IV. Aquinas's second Argument 395 The Bishop's first Answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith ibid. The Bishop's second Answer concerning the after-sight of Reason ibid. His third Argument from scorn and scandal 396 Answered by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture ibid. V. Trigosius and Carthagena passed by ibid. Truth not oppos'd to Truth ibid. The Bishop closeth with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques 397 And Aymericus who make's him an heretick ibid. His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about converting the Saracens 398 His devout enterprize according to it with successe ibid. His like adventure among the Moores ibid. Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance 399 The notable effect of his sufferings ibid. VI. Lully's undertaking according to Vasques ibid. Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's 400 The first prove's a personal plurality by concord ibid. Another from equality distinction ibid. Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposition of a reall effective act in God ibid. The Bishop's reply that Lully not only suppos'd but prov'd iâ— ibid. His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity
or being idle which could not be 401 VII Vasques chargeth Lully with a mistake of a formal cause for an efficient who is mistaken by him 402 And the cause proved no less efficient then formal 403 The discourse drawn into a perfect syllogisme proving the eternal plurality of persons by production 404 The Objection urging that Angels cannot produce the like effect answer'd 405 VIII Vasques's satisfactory answer to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion 406 The Bishop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity ibid. God's infinite Simplicity and Unity ibid. His spiritual faculties Understanding and Will. ibid. Himself the infinite object of his Understanding 407 Which is eternally productive of his internal word ibid. And that word substantial the same with Himself ibid. The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wisemen by a Star 408 IX God's will as fruitful by love as his Understanding by knowledge ibid. And so productive of a third Person which is likewise God 409 X. Misprinted XI ibid. XI These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answer'd 410 XII The objection made by the Assertours of the Greek Church answered according to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost 411 Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it ibid. XIII How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and holy Spirit 412 XIV Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and how long ago debated by St. Augustine 414 The extent or limits of this personal distinction the Bishop reverently forbeare's to determine 415 And dislike's the rash curiosity of the Schoolmen 416 XV. His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason ibid. And seldom quoting the Fathers 417 A digression to the Reader ibid. CHAP. XXXVI I. Select Aphorismes out of which the Author who apologizeth for Mr. Hobbes draw's his discourse 418 A good foundation of his to build upon 419 His noble Quaere ibid. II. Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life ibid. III. His study of it as to his own particular 420 All men may not have like reason to be so intent ibid. The parts and faculties of men not to be levell'd with those of beasts 421 The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private ibid. IV. What right a man hath to the means of preserving life and how he is to use them 422 V. Each particular maâ— cannot pretend a right to the whole world 423 Nor to things conducing only to mediate and particular ends 424 VI. The danger of pretending a right to all and to having a right judgment of it 425 Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time 426 All cannot be useful to one particular person ibid. Nor every thing to every one 427 Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge ibid. The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtfull ibid. VII Other rules by which to institute a right judgment beside Reason 428 How all creatures are granted to man's use limited ibid. His impossible supposition ibid. His fallacy a bene divisis c. 429 VIII The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all 430 The case of necessity implye's no such universal right ibid. IX Nor the dissolution of any Common-wealth 431 X. An Objection fram'd by the Author 432 A second of his not so strong ibid. The first but weakly answered by him without regard to God's end ibid. XI His first argument for universal right returning extreme necessity 433 The Bishop's severall answers to it ibid. His second argument for ancient right in a lawful defence 434 How the force or invalidity of this argument may be understood and how the practice moderated ibid. XII His Objection and Answer 435 The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just defence and unjust invasion and stating the right of possession ibid. Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself 436 Propriety without Covenant ibid. The right to goods gotten by conquest what ibid. Thâ— Bishop's answer from the fallibility of judgment 437 XIII His the Apologist's argument against the right of Occupancy ibid. Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant ibid. What is the right in necessity ibid. Discovery give 's not an equal right with Occupancy 438 The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case ibid. The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society 439 And Trade ibid. The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates ibid. Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed 440 The Texts of Holy Scripture illustrated or cited GEN. Chap. Verse Page 1 28 181 29 4 3 4 126 4 9 184 4 26 125 6 5 129 Â Â 185 9 1 2. 186 3 c. 208 9 26 440 9 27 44 188 10 14 305 12 14 161 15 c. 13 3 156 4 5 13 7 143 8 9 17 6 305 19 4 183 5 c. 20 2 161 3 c. 23 3 162 4 c 32 10 309 40 5 71 41 1 ib. EXOD. 1 15 282 16 c. 4 16 329 4 36 286 7 1 ibib 7 1 330 20 2 288 22 28 286 32 7 288 32 11 290 LEVIT 24 11 289 12 c. NUMB. 15 35 290 36 c. DEUT. 9 12 288 JUDGES 4 17 156 I. SAM 17 36 270 26 7 ibid. I. KINGS 21 9 145 II. KINGS 6 25 255 JOB 10 5 314 19 25 338 26 PSAL. 2 7 334 10 6 ibid. 14 1 92 19 1 115 3 4 36 9 389 78 39 376 90 2 109 94 8 95 94 9 96 102 27 314 113 5 355 115 16 185 142 6 245 PROV 1 20 309 ECCLES 5 3 72 ISAIAH 4 6 376 6 3 344 40 3 329 55 9 306 11 312 JER 17 5 376 DAN 2 1 71 3 16 247 MIC 5 2 303 315 ZACH. 2 8 298 13 7 316 MAL. 3 4 306 312 WISD 11 20 104 13 5 116 II. MACCA 7 2 247 3 c. St. MATTH 1 20 71 3 3 330 3 11 364 3 16 387 390 3 17 334 7 2 146 10 1 386 17 11 358 18 18 298 25 45 ibid. 28 18 386 19 20 St. MARKE 13 23 258 St. LUKE 2 32 344 2 52 343 3 4 330 3 22 383 3 38 105 12 19 239 12 33 ibid. St. JOHN 1 1 318 324 328 408 1 2 352 1 3 357 1 4 361 1 5 362 1 6 ib. 1 7 363 1 9 378 1 10 365 1 11 299 374 1 14 ibid. 1 17 378 1 18 346 1 23 330 1 29 364 3 12 355 3 13 354 355 4 25 358 8 58 111 10 11 326 10 34 346 35 348 12 3 347 13 15 362 14 4 326 6 14 26 358 15 1 326 17 3 338 18 37 385 19 28 358 20 21 385 20 23 385 398 20 29 120
20 31 322 ACTS 2 24 247 2 36 350 11 2 320 15 1 ibid. 2 c. 16 9 71 20 17 292 20 28 ib. 28 2 149 ROM 1 5 136 1 10 87 1 18 128 21 1 19 334 20 2 15 158 334 4 13 369 4 18 136 19 16 29 ibid. I. COR. 2 8 354 2 10 388 2 14 372 6 18 299 6 20 300 8 5 346 348 8 6 ibid. 9 28 269 12 4 390 15 50 372 II. COR. 1 22 390 3 6 389 4 4 347 5 1 242 12 4 242 GAL. 5 24 269 EPHES. 1 14 390 2 10 365 PHIL. 3 19 347 3 20 242 II. TIM 1 10 389 2 13 327 HEB. 1 3 408 1 10 109 11 12 2 5 378 9 12 356 11 1 242 12 1 247 I. PET. 3 20 388 21 II. PET. 3 13 378 I. Epist. St. JOHN 1 2 340 1 1 341 2 REVEL 1 8 114 2 8 320 19 3 329 21 19 338 20 c. 22 13 114 Observations Censures and Confutations Of divers Errours in M R. HOBBES HIS LEVIATHAN Chap. 1. Chap. 2. Of Humane Nature CHAP. I Of Sense its cause c. particularly of Sight Sect. 1. I Let pass his Introduction although very obnoxious to censure and first encounter his first Chapter which seems to be the foundation of what followes but how unfit to support such a heavy building will appear in the examining The Title of this Chapter is Of Sense and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of Man single which he saith are every one representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us called an Object In this observe his first mistake that he makes a mans thought nothing but a representation and he brings no proof for what he affirms nor answers such objâ—ctions as are brought by Philosophers against it but as if his Book were writ by him for the Novices of Pythagoras and his authority were enough he would have it swallowed without chewing but that this is true in no thoughts of men whether intellectual or sensual is most apparent to him who shall consider that when a man sleeps or indeed is attent upon other business waking although both visible and audible objects are presented to him yet he thinks not of them nor discerns them so that a mans thought is more then a representation And to him who shall answer that this is for lack of attention I object he confutes himself for then thought is not onely a representation but something more a cogitation of that man which is an act of the soul and certainly as he himself phraseth it the thought of man is an act of mans but this representation is an act meerly of the object and therefore cannot be the thought of man It is true that in every thought of man there is something appearing but mans thought is not that apparition but the apprehension of that appearance and some way or other some judgment of it the original or first thought is sense concerning which he consents with the stream of Philosophers that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu one way or other But here he cites another Book where he hath written more at large of this matter I shall apply my self to both that is named Humane Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policy chap. 2. But because I find some things in one which are not in the other errours enough in both I shall treat of them apart and first of this piece of Leviathan Sect. 2. Here first he undertakes to set down the cause of Sense as if it had but one as indeed by his Philosophy it might seem to have this cause he makes to be the external object which presseth the Organ proper to each sense c. this pressure he followes to the brain and heart I wonder which way from the eye or ear it gets to the heart there this pressure caused a resistance or counter-passion or endeavour of the heart to deliver it self mark now the brain which doubtless is the fountain of sense is left out which endeavour because outward seemeth to be some matter without consider the strange uncouthness of this language if there be such an endeavour which universally cannot be true yet this endeavour is inward although that which presseth it be put out like a man who thrusteth another out of doors that endeavour to thrust him out is within although the man be thrust out all his endeavour must be within unless he follow him out of doors which I think he will not affirm of the brain or heart Secondly consider that it is impossible that the heart or brain should be so displeased with all apparitions although they press them as to endeavour to be delivered of them for there are some things of this nature as sweet Musick Tast Beauties in visible objects in all senses some objects so grateful to the Organ yea heart or brain yea all that they cannot chuse but delight in them yea hug and embrace them with all kindness if so why should they endeavour to expell them yes he may say because they presse them I ask how do the brain or heart discern that pressure All discerning is either by sense or understanding no understanding before sense it must therefore be discerned by sense and then sense must be before there be any sense for he makes sense not to be untill that which pressed be thrown out These are unheard-of discourses amongst Philosophers but his opinions do confute that saying Nihil dictum quod non fuit dictum prius and therefore I must be excused for producing new objections to such opinions consider then that last clause of the former sentence which endeavour being outward seemeth to be some matter without First I have shewed the endeavour must be inward next let us consider how this endeavour can appear to be somewhat without according to him this endeavour expelled that which pressed the brain or heart but which way can this endeavour look like some matter without I am confident that neither any other nor he himself understands what he writ but he would write somewhat to amuse a Reader if he had said the expelled Species or I know not what he calls it that which pressed did seem to be some matter without it had lookt like reason although but like it but to say the endeavour did seem to be some matter without was a strange kind of unreasonable speech but he goes on and I mean to follow him close Sect. 3. And saith he this seeming or fancy is that which we call sense and consisteth as to the eye in light or colour c. this seeming to what doth it seem that which seems seems to somewhat either the soul or the powers of the soul the organs or heart or brain now if it seem so to any Agent whatsoever that act on which apprehends this seeming must be the sense not the seeming
it self This seeming saith he to the eye consisteth in light or colour figured if so then say I it is true that light or colour figured is sight for when we say a thing consists in any thing we mean to expresse its nature but to say that sight is light or colour figured or that light and colour figured is sight is as much as â—o say the understanding is a horse or a horse the understanding or understanding consists in a horse because it is busied about it It is true understanding of a horse doth require the being of a horse or else it could not understand it and sight doth require light or colour figured but it cannot be said to consist in it but as an object He proceeds All qualities called sensible are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our Organs diversly I will let passe this because I shall have full occasion to speak of it in the second part concerning his Element of Policy He goes on neither in us are they any thing but divers motions for motion produceth nothing but motion but their appearance to us is fancy the same waking or dreaming Here is an Aphorisme as if it were undeniable but without any proof or reason of it to be received by the Reader without examining for his authority the Axiome is That motion begets nothing but motion a speech far from all truth in Philosophy for were it not that there is an aim at quiet there would scarce be any motion Finis belli Pax the end to which and the end for which it is but to say it produceth nothing but motion is against all the experience in the world for although in some and most motions it may be said that the effect is not produced by the power of the motion but the vertue of that Agent which operates by motion and whose instrument that motion is yet that way that motion doth produce any thing all things are produced by motion Substances Men Beasts Trees Accidents Colours Quantities Places all whatsoever but all these things are not motions yea this last which is Place and in which motions and the effects of motions are most sensibly discovered is so far from being motion that in our sublunary places there can be no motion in them but onely motions to them nor can they themselves be locally moved for the place of every thing is the Ambient Superficies Now that with us is either of Aire or Water and if a man stir in any place he acquires a new place and alters the old so that in that place he stirs not and you cannot remove the Ambient Aire or Water but it alters his condition so that unlesse he conceive that all things are motion it cannot be true that motion begets nothing but motion for motion produceth all sublunary things When he writ his Leviathan there was motion but this Leviathan I hope is not motion it may perhaps in needlesse Readers cause motion and commotion but certainly it lies still under my paper at this time and will do all this night This is the strangest Proposition that ever was obtruded upon men but I desist from it at this instant perhaps to enlarge hereafter although I think this abundantly enough Where he addes that their appearance to us is fancy I deny it but that act which discerns the appearance may in some sense be called fancy I grant What he addes afterwards concerning the pressure of the eye c. I refer to another place but mean not to lose it At the latter end he censures all the Philosophy Schooles throughout Christendom but he is not so severe against them as to wish them an utter extirpation he will hereafter reserve a room and office for them in the Commonwealth but he lets us see by the way what things when he is made Visitor General of all Christendom would be amended In the mean time I shall shew this use of Universities that there may be alwayes a certain company of learned men in all Professions by whom as by a Standard all dangerous Doctrines may be tryed whether they be Orthodox or useful to the Commonwealth or no which censure I am confident his Leviathan will never abide And now I will examine this same businesse of Sense as it is set down more at large in the second Chapter of his Humane Nature Chapter 2. censures the 2. Chapter of Humane Nature CHAP. II. Concerning the object of Sight Colour Image or Species c. Sect. 1. UPon which my first observation is that although in the head or contents of this Chapter there is put the definition of sense to the 2. number yet in that 2. number nor elsewhere in that Chapter is there any definition of Sense but in that number onely some little discourse of the outward cause of Sense wrought by the object which is most illogically done and for lack of defining he disputes most perplexedly every where I will not trouble the Reader with censuring every line but because that which is material in this Chapter consists in four propositions which he undertakes to prove I will content my self with an enquiry into them 1. The first is that the subject wherein colour and Image are inherent is not the object of things seen This he proves because numb 5. every man hath so much experience as to have seen the Sun or other visible objects by reflexion in the water and the Glasses and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion that colour and Image may be there where the thing seen is not I stop here and will first examine the proposition it self which is proposed with much deceit for he saith The subject wherein colour and Image are inherent is not the object He should have proved first that colour and Image are the same which he knows is denyed by all his adversaries colour is in the object of Sight but there is no need of the Image where the substance is nor can the Image of colour be in the same subject with the colour Sect. 2. This uniting such things as are in their nature distinct breeds a mighty confusion in the discourse and so dazzles a weak sight that it can hardly discern betwixt them I say then that colour is in the object but Image is not Next I come to his proof the appearance of the Sun by reflexion by which he would have proved that colour and Image are not in the object but it doth not prove that the colour is not in the object but onely the Image for the colour remains in the object when the Image and likeness is gone abroad Sect. 3. But he urgeth again that divers times men see the same object double as two candles for one which may happen by distemper or otherwise without distemper if a man will the organs being either in their right temper or equally distempered Not to
of light and not of motion for although perhaps he may say it is an Image of light in motion yet it is an Image of the light not of the motion which was his proposition to prove Sect. 8. But he proceeds to explaine himself That is to say in the object if we look directly on it and in the glasse or water when we look upon it in the time of reflection which in effect is the third proposition consider first the coherence he said before that the Image was in the line by which the object was last c. mark now that is to say in the object or glasse you cannot say that the object or glasse were in the line but one of the extream termes of the line and indeed not Terminus Initians beginning which in some sense may be said in the line but Terminus à quo the terme from which the line takes its motion which can in no sense be said to be in it Then conceive that he saith the Image is in the object when we look directly upon it which is most unreasonable that the Image and the thing imagined should be in the same subject Then conceive it to be affirmed of the Image of light of which he spoke the Image of that is no where as I have shewed it self indeed as it is propagated is Imago lucis an Image of that light which is inherent in some lucide bodies as I have conceived and if not because I love not to multiply controversies yet it is such a thing which neither is nor can be represented by any image but only as it is incorporated into some body so that a light body may be seen in a glasse or water but not light its self neither in its self or Image terminating our sight Now saith he this in effect is the third proposition but let a man put them together and see which way these can prove that Image and colour is but an apparition of motion there is no appearance of proof But he seems to proceed in proof of this cause numb 8. This number is very long I will therefore take it in pieces Sect. 9. But saith he that from all lucide shining illuminate bodies there is a motion produced to the eye and through the eye to the optick Nerve and so into the brain by which that apparition of light and colour is affected I think it should be effected is not hard to prove This Proposition if proved conduceth not to the confirmation of the conclusion which he intends the conclusion which he aims at is that image and colour are an apparition of motion Now here he sayes he will prove that by this motion which he speaks of the apparition of light and colour is effected his Proposition is that image and colour are apparitions of motion he sets down to be proved that by this motion there is an apparition of light and colour Image and colour are the subject in one of the Propositions and motion the predicate motion the subject in the latter and light and colour the predicate in nothing the same which is a most illogical way of discoursing and extreamly fallacious to any Reader who by this means when he finds any thing proved mistrusts that all is so although he know not why So it seems if this were granted it were not material but let us see his proof Sect. 10. And first saith he it is evident that the fire the only lucide body upon earth worketh by motion equally every way insomuch as the motion of it stopt or enclosed it is presently extinguished and no more fire He is not to be trusted no not for that which he sayes he sees for that which he sayes is evident I am confident to him that hath eyes appeares otherwise that fire doth not work equally every way for a candle any fire that you ever looked on consider whether it move not by its flame upwards for although in a candle it necessarily creep downward for its sustenance yet the motion of the fire is upward more then any other way whether the endeavour it hath to propagate its like which is innate in every thing makes it follow the smoak as a fit matter to be ignified and made fire or a desire to ascend to the place of motion as heavy things downward which I am likely to vindicate from his scorn hereafter whatsoever it is that it is done is evident against that which he sayes is evident that it moves equally every way Sect. 11. Why he should say what follows I understand not that is in so much as the motion of it stopt or inclosed it is presently extinguished and no more fire for this no way proves or illustrates the equal motion of the fire for first the hindering of the operation of the second acts doth not destroy the first and essence of any thing the stoping of the streams doth not presently destroy the Fountain but the taking away the Fountain dries the stream and so it is betwixt the first act which is the form of any thing and the second which are the operations Now the hindering a man from discourse which is a second act doth not destroy his being and nature to hinder or stop the motion of fire is such And that which he saith that it is presently extinguished and no more fire he must take that terme presently in a very large sense for a little time for we see fire raked up in embers keeps its being many hours yea daies without motion but feeding upon its own bowels and consuming away but it is then ruined by enclosure when no ayre is suffered to come to nourish it or else some fumes distilled down upon it doe suffocate it as I say then so I may add therefore not because its motions are stopt or inclosed for which he gives no reason but because it lacks ayr to nourish it or is suffocated as before yet suppose it were this is done when the motion principally aimes upward no whit the more for its distending its self about In my life I never read a reasonable man talke so unreasonably of sense Sect. 12. He goes on And further that that motion whereby the fire worketh is dilation and contraction of it self alternately commonly called Scintillation or glowing is manifest also by experience There was never heard the like did ever any man experimentally find such a motion or was ever contraction called glowing or sparkling the motion of fire is either that which is natural to inflame or ignifie the neighbouring body or what is in way to it to heat and warme what is about it and by that and that effect out of it exsiccation to prepare a matter for a form of fire other motion I acknowledg none in fire that which he calls contraction I conceive to be nothing but when the smoak or ambient ayr supplyes it not with a fit matter for a flame then negatively it cannot
is asleep nor a man a man when he is either asleep or a child I could instance in all things quantities qualities whatsoever This explains and answers this argument although colour cannot actually be seen in the dark yet that concerns not the nature but the operation of colours their second act not their first they have in them a power of being seen upon occasions and opportunities even when they are in the dark darknesse to them is like Winter to vegetals like sleep to beasts like infancy to man and as well may they say that the springing weather which reduceth the tree to grow is the tree that the stroak or blow which wakened the sleepy Lion is the Lion that act which inabled the child first to discourse is the man as this light the colour because of its awaking it to an actual emission of species or being seen Sect. 2. Another main argument which is urged against the distinction betwixt light and colour is thus formed There is the same reason of all colours as colours as of any but we know that some colours are nothing but light reflected therefore we may conclude the same of all The major it self stands upon its own strength by that word as colours for where there is the same being there is the same reason or cause of that being The minor is exemplified in the colours of Pidgeons necks in those colours made by a glasse of Red-wine set upon a white cloth when a great light or the Sun shines upon the Wine it will give an eye of red to the white cloth which is under it as likewise the Sun shining through the coloured glasse these are real colours but are nothing but light variously reflected therefore there are colours which are nothing but light Sect. 3. For answer to this we may say to the major that there is the same reason of all colours as colours which are reall colours and material but that there should be the same reason and nature with them and intentionall apparent or spiritual colours for by these names they are called there being but a nominal and some outward circumstantive convenience only is very illogically spoken as if one should say that a living and painted or dead horse were the same and had the same nature To shew the convenience and difference of these from real colours observe that they both are the object of the sight that when the eye sees that broken light through the red glasse it sees a thing for what is not cannot be the object of sense and because it is seen it is not unjustly called a colour for colour is the object of sight and in that actual relation to the sight they have both one common nature but here is the difference that to the one light gives its being to the other onely its being seen for the light falling thick in with that species and images sent forth in their first and strongest emission when they come immediately from the object it mingles with them and gives them a lustre from it selfe which is a shining colour but in all real colours the light adds nothing but a making of them fit to be actually seen and that they are one real the other intentional colours appeares by this that the real are inherent in the object which is their subject and so the white of this paper I write upon is inherent in it and is moved with the motion of this paper which is the object of my sight at this time but red which falls from the glasse of wine upon a white cloth or these colours on Pidgeons necks move not with the cloth or the Pidgeon for take the Pidgeon out of the flaring light and you shall see onely his reall colours and remove the white cloth and it retaines onely its whiteness which is the inherent colour and the intentionall colour follows the glass and light not its subject so that here we find the perfect nature of a reall absolute inherent accident in the one and but of an intentional relative adherent accident in the other And here appeares a diverse nature in these two sorts of colours they differ in their reall nature although they agree in the relative and you may see it further illustrated thus The same thing cannot at the same time have two real colours red and white but the white cloth though shadowed with red from the wine is white at that time it is so shadowed which appears because remove the shadowing body onely which is the glasse and there is the same whiteness without any alteration or motion in the cloth and therefore it was the same before but onely received an eye of red from the glasse This may serve for the major that there is the same reason of all colours I say all reall not intentionall and reall Secondly to the minor that must prove that these intentional colours doe not differ from the light which I deny for although light is an ingredient in the constitution of them yet it is not the total no not refracted light but as it mixeth with divers colours so it appears diversly and then as you cannot say a book is nothing but paper or paper inked but a paper written or printed as a medicine cannot be said to be Rubarb although Rubarb be in it when there are many other ingredients and perhaps others more predominant So is it with this matter although these intentional colours have light in them yet they are something else besides light And thus superabundantly this latter part concerns not his book nor indeed had he erred in this conclusion onely that light is colour would I have censured him he had learned men in the same cause engaged with him but when he thought this should countenance these other Propositions that there was nothing but an apparition of motion Secondly that colour was no reall thing in the object which was abhorring to all sense and teason that was ever bestowed upon these things finding it in the lump and thinking it a mistake have wasted this paper about it Sect. 4. But I have not yet finished this businesse in the latter end of his first chapter of his Leviathan he saith That the Philosophy Schools throughout christendome grounded upon some Texts of Aristotle teach another doctrine from him and say for the cause of vision the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species in English a visible shew apparition or aspect the receiving whereof is sight c. This I must censure and say that I think that scarce any Philosophie-School teacheth this conclusion that the receiving the species is sight but the judgment of the soul upon the receipt for receipt is a meer passive thing but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb if receipt of the species should make sight then a Looking-glass would see for that receives the species and truly the eye is a kind of animate Looking-glass as a
Looking-glass an inanimate eye but the difference lies in the activity of the soul which animates the eye but not the Looking-glasse But he is angry with the conceit of species and would have men believe that that opinion so universally held is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle but I will tell him it is not so founded upon Texts as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments but the reasons of him and his followers which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered and not have thought that his bare credit with scorning it should prevaile against Christendom But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons and not trouble himself to peruse other books I will set down one or two which may suffice Sect. 5. The first reason of Aristotle is drawn from our experience thus We all observe that when we have discerned things by our senses and the act of sensing pardon that word sensing it is unusuall yet significant is done yet there remains in the sensative memory that image which represented the object at the first now it is impossible that that should be any material corporeal thing for then how could so many huge Towers Castles Towns Kingdoms yea heaven it self if a material heaven remaine crowded in so narrow a compass how could such contraries as black and white hot and cold fire and water high and low remaine in that little Ark of mans memory if they were material and reall things they could not but being spiritual intentional and things as Philosophers speak diminutae entitatis they make a shift with their little entities to creep into such a corner And this confounds likewise another Proposition of his that the reception of these species makes sense for these entities are received and retained and kept fast in that box which received them the memory but are not sense any longer then they are hot and fresh from the object well then there must be such things as these species or else there could be no memory of the object which in a material condition could not exist in the memory A second argument may be drawn from another experiment suppose Aristotle looks upon Plato Aristotle cannot see his own face but in Plato's eyes he can how can that come about but that some intentional species and image of him crept into Plato's eye a material thing could not it must be an intentionall for any material thing would be offensive to Plato's eye nor could it be that Gamboll he talks of so much a stroak from the object for then it must have made Plato see Aristotle not Aristotle himself according to his Philosophy A third argument I can frame thus Every object which is distant from the organ must some way or other make it self reach the organ with its own likeness but for a reall passage of colours or such like objects there can be no imagination there are but two wayes either by the propagation of this image intentionally through the whole medium which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the ayr because the motion is extreamly swift like the passage of light instantaneal and because untill it meets with an eye or glasse or something proper to give it a receipt it hath no pause for a consideration This is the most common way of Philosophers or else it must be by some seminal vertue which it sends abroad which when it finds a womb fit to entertain it there is prolifical and produceth this image and therefore in that regard may be called species because it is such in semine Now if it should be objected that if it were the seed of colours like the seed of plants it would produce a thing of the same nature a reall colour not an intentionall It is answered that second qualities are like equivocal agents they cannot produce their own nature like Mules and the Monsters of Nile the furthest they goe is their image a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature as heat doth heat nor can you make one thing white by putting another white thing to it unlesse you add some of that white body to the other This conceit hath much pleased me and I think would meet with all objections but I am not peremptory in it because I cannot afford my self leasure to spend so much time about such a youthfull study but howsoever one of these wayes I conjecture whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense 〈◊〉 conceive it and therefore these species There are many other arguments used by Philosophers the least of which he hath not touched but controuleth them with only It is otherwise I will now leave this and come to his fourth and last Proposition in his Humane Nature where before numb 9. CHAP. VI. Concerning Echoes production of sounds and external objects c. HIs Proposition is That as in conception of Vision so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses the subject of their inherence is not the subject I think it false printed he means sure the object but the Sentient Sect. 1. This Proposition is delivered in a strange fallacious way for whereas his whole discourse and intent is to prove that sound as well as colour is not in the object but in the sentient as with colour he joyned images So in this Proposition which concerns other senses he leaves out the object and onely names the conception It is undoubtedly true that the conception is in that part which conceives not the conceived but the business which he labours to prove and is in questâ—oâ— betwixt him and me is Whether there be any thing conceived out of the Sentient in the object he sayes no and labours to prove it Nu. 9. Sect. 2. The first argument he proves this by is drawn from sounds and in them from ecchoes A man saith he may heare double or treble by multiplication of ecâ—â—â—es which ecchoes saith he are sounds as well as the oâ—â—ginal and not being in one and the same place cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them This argument receives its answer variously from Philosophers according to their divers conceits of the nature of sounds for such as conceive sounds to be carried in their real nature by the motion of the ayr to the organ of sense these conclude an eccho to be a new sound propagated by the former differing from the first individually not naturally we may call it if you will another of the same as some Psalms of Hopkins and Sternholds Translation So that as we see musical instruments two in the same room one Violl touched the other out of harmony of parts being fitted and prepared for such a motion and sound receives the same and that sound is the first but a little softer which in a whispering place as I have observed at Gloucester Church it would
betwixt the motion of the water which stayes a little while after the stone is stopt and this remaining of the Image that motion of sense is nulled and therein a quiescence of that act but as in all other Causes which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects so here when the cause is gone the effect remains the Image apprehended in sense and then it hath no other convenience with that Motion then any other Cause Sect. 3. I râ—jâ—ct not his Etymologie but deny his Deduction Therâ—fore saith he Imagination is nothing but decaying Sence For although Imagination may be derived from Image yet it is something besides sense in its full notion for sense is the meer judgment upon a present Object but Imagination works upon an absent every Sense judgeth of a particular sensative Object so sight of Colours hearing of Sounds c. and no other but Fancy so here I involve the common sense with it because he excludes it and I will multiply no controversie judgeth of all senses and distinguisheth them This is visible this Audible yea conjoynes them together and makes a Composure sometimes for pleasure sometimes for grief of divers of them which sense cannot do sight cannot judge or act any way upon sounds or the ear upon colours as is evident a deaf man though seeing cannot hear yet if ever he did hear his fancy can imagine sounds So that imagination must needs be somthing besides decaying sense which operates where and when Sense cannot and is an act upon that which is the relick of Sense when Sense hath done its work there remains the Species which the Object sent forth and upon this Species the power of imagination works its proper operations Decaying Sense supposeth Sense to be but imagination works when Sense is not as upon Colours when the man that hath seen is blind afterwards there is not the sense of seeing but there is in that man an imagination of colours which he hath but cannot now see So in the dark men imagine colours but can see none I conclude therefore that imagination is something beside sense which exists when sense faileth Sect. 4. He goes on The decay of sence in man saith he waking is not the decay of the motion made in sence but an obscuring of it This I apprehend most untrue for when the Organ ceaseth to judge that motion which he calleth sence ceaseth and is no longer but those Species lie lockt up in the Memory and there is no act of sensation concerning them no not a decayed one That Philosophy which he delivers concerning the Sun and the Stars to illustrate this by I grant that the Stars do emit and send forth their Light when the Sun shineth but the excess of the Suns Light obscures that of the Stars yet his Application of it to this purpose is utterly vain for there both the Objects work like Natural Agents according to their utmost and the greater by its force masters the lesse but here in our businesse the Object is removed or the Organ and there is no operation of one upon the other at all the species being crept within the Organ the eye cannot judge of it and the object or Organ being diverted or indisposed cannot produce such an act any longer it is as if the Stars were removed out of the Heaven not shining with the Sun so that we fancy colors in the dark when no strength of another Object more powerfull doth work upon our sense and sometimes in the dark we do not imploy our Imaginations about colours and yet in that dark we have no vehement Object to obscure our fancy so that it is not the suppression or weakning of sense by another Object which maketh us not see but the cessation of sense by the removal of either Organ or Object one from another And again we may observe that although the Sun shine and the Objects external move never so powerfully yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit or other things absent which could not be if only the vehement stroakes from the object did produce this act for then that being the fancy should likewise be Sect. 5. After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus From whence it follows that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object the weaker is the imagination This hath some Truth in it but is not absolutely true for many instantly upon sight or hearing of a thing have no apprehension of it as we say it comes in at one eare and goes out at another men carelesly taking notice of it like a thing not heeded or cared for lose it presently we conceiving the memory like a Box which keeps these Images may apprehend attention like a Key to it which locks them up in that Box. Or apprehending the memory like wax we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images into it but without attention any sensitive object though discerned is lost immediately and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out when contrariwise it often happens that a thing long time forgot and not thought on may be reviv'd and quickned again and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth as I remember Seneca speaks of himself and I think most men may find in themselves to be true that the things which he learned when he was a child did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before so that although there may be some truth in this that often it happens out that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing yet because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time therefore this is not universally true as he proposeth it yet should not have been censured by me but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before which was an Errour not to be swallowed down Sect. 6. I let pass what is between and come to the upshot This decaying sense saith he when we would expresse the thing it self I mean fancy its selfe we call Imagination This that he calls decaying sense I confesse we call Imagination but I have shewed it not to be sense therefore not decaying sense But saith he when we would expresse the decay and signifie that the Sense is fading old and past we call it Memory Here are dâ—vers words of most distinct nature hudled together to confound the Reader old and past many things are now past yet not old and those past things although but just now are remembred although not old Then saith he Imagination and Memory are one thing which for divers considerations hath divers Names I deny that they are the same thing and prove it thus Sect. 7. They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other are not the
same thing for powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects but imagination and memory are such therefore they are not the same The major hath its proof and illustration already the minor shall be thus confirmed first imagination is busied about and acts things which come not into the reach of memory as â—oyning two things together a horse and a man it makes a centaure this presently after he applyes to imagination which he calls compounded imagination now these two although in their parts they were discerned by sense before and wrapt up in the memory yet conjoyned together having been never in the sense cannot be in the memory unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory but are the fruits of imagination only so likewise we may say that there are many things in the memory which are not imagined when they are in the memory as thus The memory is like a Book in which those things which are attentively perceived by sense are by that attention ingraved or lockt up as was before exprest or written in it imagination is that internall eye which reads this book and sometimes reads one word somtimes another Now as it happens out that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not yea it cannot see all things at once so it is in the memory it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once and perhaps sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined yet are in the Memory and therefore certainly where there are so distinct acts and Objects the things themselves are distinguished for we never say a man imagineth any thing of which he hath not an actuall conception nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory of which he hath formerly had no sense so that those are as much distinguished in and by their Acts and Objects as any two Faculties can be Sect. 8. What he saith presently after That much memory or memory of many things is called Experience is not true in those general terms which he proposeth for Memory of many things maketh not Experience but Memory of many things alike so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand water washt it that this lump of lead felt heavy teat Bladder of Air Light makes not an Experimentall conclusion from such remembrances of either heat or weight or lightnesse but when he shall find that this Air and all he meets with this Lead and many others are such then he hath Experience and by Experience he knows that it is so with all other if he shall reply and produce common language that we usually say that we had once Experience of such or such a passage and therefore one tryal and sense with remembrance of it makes an experience I answer That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used for a particular apprehension with remembrance but because experience is the mother of knowledge and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer nor doth one Conception give us the certainty of any Science therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature and in that sense he must take it because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things and should have rather said It is the remembrance of any thing And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit which is that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing or many for Memory contains many things at quiet in it which yet are not experiments until applyed to something else either in speculation or practice so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that Storehouse to furnish us with directions in our businesse at hand and when we find things of like nature these are called Experiments But this being but a nominal discourse as much of that which follow I might have saved as I shall do such things and have suffered him to beguile any man with it for it is not material whether true or false only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments and the usefullest I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap. CHAP. X. The origine of Dreams their variety c. WHerein impertinently I think to his maine purpose in that Chap. he entreth into a long discourse of Dreams which because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand I shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory and very erroneous First then he saith there That because the Brain and Nerves are so benummed in the sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external Objects there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a mans body Sect. 1. This I conceive erroneous in that latitude of terms which he useth for no doubt there are many Prophetick Dreams concerning which the Scripture both the Old and New Testament are full of Instance as Gen. 40. the Butler and Baker had Prophetick Dreams so likewise Gen. 41. Pharaoh had a Prophetick Dream such another you may find Dan. 2. of Nebuchadnezzer In the New Testament we may observe in the 1. Chap. of S. Mat. v. 20. How an Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream so likewise S. Paul Acts 16.9 Now these and many more which the Scripture and story furnish us withall and we are bound to believe do shew us that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts there being nothing in them that could prognostick any such thing and therefore this Universal Proposition Thâ—re can be no dream but such was a fault not to be pardoned He spake much better in his Humane Nature Cap. 3. Num. 3. where he saith That the Causes of Dreams if they be natural are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts That Parenthesis if they be natural stopt a great gap for these instances were not natural It was much he should correct the first Copy making it more erroneous error it had before but the rent in his Leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of Humane Nature Sect. 2. Error it had before it was not true to say that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts for as the greatest Philosopher that was meer man Solomon expresseth it Eccles. 5.3 A Dream cometh through the multitude of businesse not onely when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent but even then when they are in the best Composure if a Man have his Fancy disturbed with earnestnesse of thoughts about any businesse in the day in the Night when he takes his rest and both the Outward and Inward Senses are lockt up by Sleep his Fancy being
for the matter or substance of the invisible Agents so fancied they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit but that it was the same with the Soul of man and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame to a man that sleepeth or in a Looking-glasse to one that is awake which men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancy think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines umbrae and thought them Spirits that is thin aeriall bodies and those invisible Agents which they feare to be like them save that they appear and vanish when they please Thus far he In which Period are many strange and forced Expressions without any proof or illustration I will touch them briefly but first I must expound that Phrase used twice by him Invisible Agents by that he must understand the false Gods of the Gentiles for the first Clause that they conceited those false Gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man I yeeld onely more excellent so was every Daemon esteemed and so even those Heroes which were from humanity in the esteeme of Idolatrous men exalted to a coelestial excellency thought of a greater perfection then themselves had in their earthly condition and that they had influence and power over these earthly things and therefore had Prayers and sacrifice offered to them But then let us consider his Philosophy concerning mans soul he saith That these Idolaters who thought their Gods like mans soul thought a mans soul was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame or in a Looking-glasse I am perswaded he dreamt when he writ this he did not so much as see it in any glasse in this world and although it is too much to say he never read it in any book for his Book will witness that many unexpected things are in Books yet I can say that I never heard or read of any Idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the Soul These two things are things of a very little Entity the meanest of Accidents the one a Dreame the work of a sleeping fancie the other the apparition of a Looking-glasse the weak effect of a poor Accident Colour in which it produced it self in a most feeble and weake condition Contrariwise the soul of man is the most excellent and substantial part in the most excellent Creature man the Author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attaine unto and all this affirmed by these Idolaters in their Philosophical Books Sect. 5. But he seems to give a reason for it thus which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancie think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines Umbrae I cannot conceive to what this Relative Which looks by the preceding words it should be referred to the Dreames or Image in a Looking-glasse but by the consequent words it seems to look further to the Invisible Agents for no man was ever so foolish to think that Dreams or the Image in a Looking-glasse are real substances nor yet is it true of one piece of them which is the Image in the Looking-glasse to say it is a Creature of the fancy for the Image is there whether the fancy conceit it so or no. But then to take this word Which as it relates to the invisible Agents which the words following implie and therefore call them Ghosts no man ever called the image in a Looking-glasse a Ghost now then in this Sense although a strange perturbed one he saith that men not knowing these Gods of theirs those invisible Agents to be nothing but Creatures of the fancy called them Ghosts I beleeve if they had known them to be Creatures of the fancy they would not have so called them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines and Umbrae Certainly I am perswaded that the Latines did never call their Gods Imagines or Umbrae This is a most perplexed discourse I know not how to make sense of it nor I beleeve he himself for mark he goes on and thought them Spirits that is thin aerial bodies Consider the relative Them what doth he meane by it Their Gods those Invisible Agents That cannot be for the following words and these Invisible Agents which they feared to be like them Now if by them before he meant these Invisible Agents he could not say that they thought them like themselves but for the other mentioned before the Dreames or Images in a Glasse no man ever thought to be Spirits or aerial bodies But he puts a difference betwixt Spirits and Ghosts or Imagines or Umbrae or I know not what how that they apaear and vanish when they please and it seems the Ghosts did not this I beleeve is not delivered by any I am confident by none of his enemies that are studied in Schoole and Vniversity-Learning but thus he builds Castles in the aire and I was about to say fights against them but he leaves them upon these weak foundations and never casts a Trench or plants a Battery against them with any solid Argument it may be he throwes a stone an ill word somtimes but not the least attempt to prove what he sayes that ever I read Hee proceeds with a discourse from which I withhold my hand till I come to his Treatise of Angels which will administer occasion of fuller censure and here I will leap over to Page 52. CHAP. XIII The opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second causes Devotion to what we feare taking things casual for Prognostiques mistaken for seeds of Religion Of the Sybils and their Oracles IN which he sets down foure things wherein consists the natural seed of Religion Opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second Causes Devotion towards what we feare and taking things Casual for Prognostiques Certainly here is a foundation laid for Atheisme Sect. 1. It is impossible that so goodly a tree as Religion should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these First I observe here that these he cals seeds he puts not for the immediate but remote causes of Religion the immediate Cause to consent what I can with his Phrase or the body of the tree which supports these glorious Acts is the assurance that there is a GOD these foure Seeds as he calls them do but produce that beleefe in us and that very weakly not able to make a man forsake all for God which Religion must do Another observation may be that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false Religion only but even of true for so presently he discourseth that these seeds produced either true or false Religion according to their culture so that the culture of Abraham Moses our blessed Saviour was but
natural Man And this leaves all the world without excuse for not knowing there is a God or knowing there is one but not worshiping him as God or knowing him thus as Nature teacheth him for worshiping Idols or Images which they must needs know not to be the Author of these great effects A PARAENETICAL digression to Mr. HOBBES NOw Mr. Hobbes if this Treatise come to your hand as it is likely it may give me leave to advise you a little with words that may lye by you and so not passe sleightly away You are a man as I observe in this Philosophy-treatise of more then ordinary conceipt you have spent much time in the search of Nature although you are full of Paradoxes and those not strengthened with any greater reason then your own Authority yet they tast of a mighty Acumen ingenii as likewise of a most industrious and working head to contrive and bring those apparent Errors to such ends as you have brought them but good Sir consider why do you so constantly in your Leviathan and upon all occasions so unnecessarily take advantages to speak against the known and most received Truths in Divinity What need had you in this place to dispute the case of the Eternity of the World and to say that the question of the origin of the world should be left to those which are lawfully over us in ordering Divine worship Pag. 237. Sir we know who you meane by that from your Leviathan to wit the Supream Magistrate suppose he should be an Atheist and deny the Creation would you doe so likewise you seem to be ready and invite others to it in scorning those reasons are brought for it and labouring to weary the faith of a Christian man in it It is true Faith is able to support a fainting Soul against the distractions which wicked Reason can object but it is a wicked Reason that troubles and distracts it John 20.20 It is said of the Disciples that they were glad when they saw the Lord after his Resurrection not that they doubted of it before they were not all Didymusses but Faith her self is comforted by Reason and visible experiments as it is tyred and wearied in strugling against Reason Consider with your self what you will answer Almighty God at the last day when he shall say I have assisted thee in the purchase of so much Learning how hast thou used it to my honour why didst thou abuse it to my dishonour in disputing against and disturbing my poore servants from their assents to those Divine truths I prescribed in my word It will not serve your turn to say You did it by Fate for the same Fate will fatalize you to a worse condition then that brought you to this if you do not repent it is not in this one point but twentie more you are guiltie of this fault studying to countenance Atheisticall Wits with shewes of Reason to abet their wickednesses For God's sake if you think there is one and his Son Jesus Christ's sake without whom you cannot be saved if you think there is a Jesus Christ and that there will be a Salvation with your own hand blot out these hand-writings of your own which will lye against you and condemn you it were better done by you with pardon from God for them then by others reasons confuted to nothing and the guilt remaine with you I am perswaded you can object little against this I have writ and although after these Arguments I have discussed Pag. 238. You say concerning the Worlds magnitude and beginning you are content with that doctrine which the Scriptures perswade and the fame of those Miracles which confirme them the Country-custome and the due reverence of the Lawes this you say you are content with but like a discontented man you wrangle against all can any thing be more clearly delivered in Scripture then the Creation of the world hath not the constant custome of your Nation ever since Christianity was planted acknowledg'd it yea I could tell you the custome of this Nation before Christianity was setled even the Druids acknowledged it is it not an act antiently confirmed by our Laws and yet unrepealed you then did but speak this and not doe it but snarle under a colour of reason against that which you professe and certainly ought to repent for doing and though you say this reasoning contemned by learned men yet I can shew you somwhat like this even in one which you your self commend in your Epistle and I am perswaded you cannot satisfactorily answer this I have said laying aside the Scripture but with scornes as you use to doe or with other as weake blasphemies I pray God forgive you and work a repentance in you And now Reader do thou forgive the tediousness of this digression in general let me advise this that if thou meetest with any of these muddy-souled Writers which with Thomas will beleeve nothing but what they see doe then consider our Saviours answer Jo. 20.29 Blessed are they that do not see and yet beleeve Doth God reveale in his Sacred and blessed Word any thing that seems incongruous to thy Reason know it is most agreeing although thou discoverest it not and beleeve what he requires against thine owne reason so shalt thou be blessed by God and thy Faith shall be crowned with happiness which is my prayer and shall be my endeavour in this and all I write CHAP. XV. Concerning the opinion of a Deity Formed Religion what and wherein founded Sect. 1. THus having past a few Observations upon his Seeds of Religion I skip many impertinent discourses of his in the way and come to his Notes upon the dissolution of Religion which are entred upon by him Pag. 58. thus From the propagation of Religion it is not hard to understand the Causes of the resolution of the same into its first Seeds or Principles which are onely an opinion of a Diety and Powers invisible and supernatural Let the Reader at first consider the inconstancy of this Writer how immediately he not only deserts what he had writ in this very Chapter but opposeth it He just before made those four fancies to be the Seeds of Religion now he makes it only One and that not the same with any of the other nay he opposeth himself in this very Sentence for he speaks of the resolution of it into its first Seeds and Principles in the Plurall number and yet saith which are only an opinion of a Diety Thus inconstant is Errour but then that is an intolerable Phrase for him to use to terme the Seeds of Religion an Opinion of a Diety for although this word Opinion may have a large Sense and be taken for whatsoever knowledge any man hath of any thing whether by Faith or Demonstration yet since he hath formerly defined it in a weak manner to be be a poore and faint assurance Pag. 31. it was unworthily and disgracefully done of him to call
there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine for it often happens that there is little paine and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness and so with some impatience I have found complaining of common accidents and such which had no participation of death in them and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death as Aches in particular parts sometimes they were galled and that troubled them sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed c. All which shewed that these paines not those of Death were more sensible then even death its selfe Sect. 9. He proceeds It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him justly and honestly he had said truth but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is that a man to save himself from a little pain should act things prejudiciall to the glory of God the publique good or else some greater good of his own any man who hath sense of any thing but sense and unworthy ease cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse such are those before specified Therefore in such Cases that they for paine or death its self are relinquished is against reason What he adde's And that which is not against reason we call right c. I agree to for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason but his deduction It is therefore a right of Nature that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath This deduction by what is already said cannot be true but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good CHAP. XXIII Of using or misusing meanes in order to their end The regulation of mans judgment in it The preservation of life and estate when necessary Of right and wrong Law c. Sect. 1. 1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus And because where a man hath right to the end and the end cannot be attained without the meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the end it is consequent that it is not against reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body How vile and illogicall is this had he proved that the body were the end of man or instead of body had he said for the preservation of that end his axiome explained thus might have borne him out in it but as it is puâ— there is no connexion for suppose a man hath right to the end his own happiness and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end his application of it to the body is of no force Well I will examine his Aphorisme First he who hath right to the end hath not right to all meanes of getting it is apparent for he who hath right to an estate or an house hath not right to take it by force he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it and so though a man have right to his body or life yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions It is a most just rule of law that a man must so use his owne as he must not hurt another a man hath right to water and a Meadow but he must not so use his water and his meadow as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him for the preservation of that life to hurt others and destroy their lives But once again for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe that it hath no truth but concerning the last end and in that it hath for since all mens actions are for an end that is his summum bonum his happiness every man out of necessity of nature doth what he doth for it and the utmost he can for it but this life or body is not mans happiness and for any second end there being no necessity of the end it self there is much less of any means which conduce to it and therefore of such ends of which nature mans temporall life and body are there is no manner of truth in it no more then if we should say it were right for a man to doe what he can any thing to obtain pleasure or profit upon which he sets his heart Sect. 2. His 8. Numb must be likewise examined which saith Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes and of the greatness of the danger This hath some truth in it and yet not to be so understood that by right of nature a man may judge what he will and accordingly act and what he acts is right as he seems to imply here from hence enforces afterwards for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated and what they act contrary to those rules or Lawes although it may be effected yet it is wicked so it is in those no doubt but every man will in such an impossible state as he supposeth man judge of the meanes and necessity but yet there is a law of nature in every man by which his judgement should be guided and what he judgeth though never so congruent to his will contrary to this law is not right so that as a Judge though what he judgeth must be performed and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge all other judgement is by power but not by right so is it with this man he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe but if not right it is wicked to doe so The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion convinceth not me For saith he if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self then it is reason that another may be Judge c. It is reason say I that in such a Case I am Judge but it is reason likewise that I judge according to Law and make my will be guided by reason not my reason regulated by my will because it is mine it is not therefore right but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason of which he himself afterwards
represent an infinite Excellency infinite in Power infinite in Wisdome c. yea must represent an unspeakable an incommunicable unexpressible an unrepresentable excellency which is impossible If Mr. Hobbes had say'd that some men as Moses were Messengers of God as the Apostles Embassadors of God to deliver or act his will amongst us he had say'd aright but to make them personate him sound 's too high for a finite Creature in his sense Sect. 12. I know Exodus 4.36 it is said by God to Moses That Aaron should be his Spokes-man to the people he should be to him instead of a mouth and Moses should be to him instead of God And again Exodus 7.1 See I have made thee a God to Pharaoh and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet By the understanding these two places I think may be cleared whatsoever can be say'd for Moses his personating God for that which concern's hâ—s being a God to Aaron we may observe that he could be no otherwise a God to Aaron then Aaron was a Mouth to Moses the same words are used to both How was he a mouth but by speaking and delivering those things which Moses directed the same way was he a God to Aaron by directing Aaron such things as God directed so as the people need not doubt but what Aaron spoke was by the Direction of Moses so Aaron need not doubt but what Moses appointed him to doe or speak was the will of God and it is remarkable that in both these places the word used for God is ELOHIM which is a name given often to Kings and Princes to men in Authority so in particular not to multiply the places in the 22 of Exodus 28. Thou shalt not revile the Gods that is the Princes so thou shalt be to him as God or a Prince howsoever the place enforceth no more but that Moses should be so a God as Aaron was his mouth that was to deliver his will this is not to personate or represent him as a person The second place is as cleare where Moses is said in the 7 Chap. 1. to be made a God to Pharaoh The storie is thus Moses had something of man in him and was afraid to goe to Pharaoh be not afraid of him saith God to him as he is above thee without me so thou shall be above him with me I can rule him thou shalt be a God to him thou shalt terrify him with signes and wonders and Aaron thy brother shall be thy Prophet that is deliver thy words as it is expounded in the following verse or else we may take Elohim in the other sense for a Prince or King so I have made thee a King or Prince over Pharaoh thou shalt have power over him as he over his subjects but which way soever he is but enabled by God for certain workes and we may take another observation in neither of these places is he called God or a Representment of God but God to Aaron God to Pharaoh that is to those particular persons in those particular businesses but this come's not up close to Mr. Hobbes who say's the true God may be personated concerning which there is no such expression in these Texts but that Moses was made an Instrument of God's to act some things towards these two persons Pharaoh and Aaron Nay I will adde one note more that from these Texts had Moses represented God never so fully yet could he not be say'd to personate God according to Mr. Hobbes his understanding a person for a person by Mr. Hobbes is such a man as is a Liâ—utenant a representer an Atturney c. according to all these phrases he expresseth him in the preceding page but none of these could Moses be because all those must be notified that they are such to the parties with whom they negotiated but this certainly was onely expressed to Moses he was made acquainted with this power not Aaron not Pharaoh and therefore he was not made one of Mr. Hobbes his persons but if he were which no where appear's yet it is most evident not in that sense which he expressâ—th that is in respect of the people which is his expression who governed the people now he is never sayd to be a God to the people which yet he might have been by the same word which is used in those places signifiing a Râ—ler or Prince he adde's an unadvised Parenthesis that were not his but Gods People Sect. 13. They were God's by adopting them into a more peculiar favour then any other nation in the world guarding them with eminent Miracles of his providence they were Moses his people by being under God the Dispenser of those acts of providence and therefore Exodus 32.7 God called them his people Get thee down for thy people which thou broughtest out of the Land of Egypt have corrupted themselves and Moses repeating in a long Discourse the mercyes of Gods providence towards them rehearseth the same words Deut. 9.12 so that they were the people of God by his especial grace and they were Moses his people by his being under God their Governour the same act is attributed to the first and supreme Cause in a most high and eminent way to the second as an Instrument cooperating with it In the 20 of Genesis it is said that God brought them out of the Land of Egypt in this place it is say'd that Moses brought them both in their several wayes God as the first Moses as the second Cause but let us consider perhaps he gives a reason for what he sâ—ith he affirme's that Moses govern's the people not in his own name with hoc dicit Moyses but in God's with hoc dicit Dominus Sect. 14. If this would serve to make him personate another then he and I should personate God for when we urge Scripture we say God or the Spirit of God saith it nay I may say for Moses whose humility was far from usuâ—ping that excellency which Mr. Hobbes ascribe's unto him if he had personated God in Mr. Hobbeâ— his sense he would not have used that phrase hoc dicit Dominus but Ego hoc dico let a man consider a Player upon the Stage when he personates and act's a King he doth not say the King saith this or the Lord but I command as if he were a King and this is by Mr. Hobbes the original of this word person to which he applie's all Sect. 15. One word more I am of Opinion as Mr. Hobbes in another place speake's rightly and others before him say a much that in the time of Moses Josua and the Judges God was the sole King of the Israelites he gave them Lawes they by Covenant bound themselves to obey those Lawes he to protect them and Moses was so far from being their King that he gave them no Lawes so that he was but as it were a Judge and a Generall to lead them in their
introduce a thing not onely absurd but blasphemous unto Christian religion to say that that one and chiefe God should have blood c. I forgive his passion but grieve to see so much zeal if not fury bestowed upon so ill a Cause for we do not say that God had blood as God but as manhood was united to the divinity in the same person that he taking our nature had it with all its Conditions body and blood I shall insist no farther upon this at this time Sect. 3. Valentinus Smalcius urgeth out of Smiglecius a little further this language is unheard of in Scripture that Christ's blood should be called the blood of the Father or that we should be redeemed by the blood of God the Father nay if at any time our redemption be attributed to God the Father then it is added by Christ or by his blood but not by the blood of God the Father thus farre Smiglecius now let us observe Smalcius his answear thus this argue's onely that the Language is unusuall and rare not that it is impossible and false that which is rare and unusuall may be most true if it agree with the Analogy of Christian Religion and may be excused which saith he I have done above neither doth any thing hindeâ— but that that which is commonly properly used that God by Christ and his blood acquired us may in one place be improperly used that God the Father hath acquired us by his owne blood First that which he affirme's he hath done above I conceive to be no more then that refuted exception he made to Smiglecius that these Speeches might be affirmed of God by reason that Christ was the Lamb of God and therefore his blood God's blood or else what he spake in the preceding Chapter that it must be understood metaphorically as Zacharie 2.8 he that toucheth you toucheth the Apple of mine eye as likewise Math. 25.45 where our Saviour saith in that ye did or did not these things to his little ones ye did or not did them to him the meaning is that as God hold's his servanâ—s so deare to him that he esteeme's the demeanour used to them as done to himself so these actions done by his dear ones in which rank Christ was the chief may be sayd to be done by him when Christ shed his blood then God the Father may be sâ—id to shed his because done by one Deare like himself to him I have pressed this Argument to the height and indeed farther then he hath and now consider how I shall acquit my self of it which will be thus I doe not nor doe I think others can find the actions of men called Gods actions although the passions are often as thus in that you did it to those you did it to me and so he toucheth the Apple of mine eye of any one that toucheth his Servants but actions not so Math. 18.18 as whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in haven here is a double act on earth and in heaven although God interested himself as much in that act of man's as may be yet he call's it not his own but man's act so likewise he expresseth it Iohn 20.23 Whose soever sins ye remit they are remitted where is set down a twofold action or remission now this expression is of an action which he hath purchased with his blood and although there was never such a shifting Genius runne through any sort of men as these Socinians to avoyd the sense of Scripture yet methinke's this place is penned as of purpose to delude their evasions it hath stopp'd all their Mushes and therefore it is put emphatically with his owne blood 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intimateth a peculiar propriety to that thing to which it is applyed appropriating it to God distinct from other things The answer of Smalcius is that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies no more then suus his own and so it is rendred by the vulgar latine John 1.11 thus it is but whether truth or no there is the question our English rendreth it much better He came unto his own and his own received him not and although this word suus doth not enforce this more restrained and peculiar sense yet it doth not deny it but many times is used for it and certainly those in St. John were in a most proper expression called his his friends his kindred his Servants what you please of that kind the same answer may passe to his second instance which is taken out of the 1 Cor. 6.18 he who commits fornication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is by the vulgar Latine translated suum his body but by our English much better his owne body nor indeed can the blood of Christ God be more his owne then a man's body is his own and therefore whatsoever Translators read it is evident that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beare's the same sense every where and it is remarkable that these writers who abhorre that vulgar translation in an hundred places should in this refuse the Original for it upon no ground He give 's another answer that the blood of Christ may be called the blood of God although it doe not naturally flow from the Father we doe not say it is the blood of the Father but of God because saith he chiefly by a miraculous working of the Father Christ had his blood but can he shew me where there is any such example or phrase in Scripture I believe not but he goe's on with an instance out of Socinus Things saith he like blood may be said to be belonging to one which notwithstanding are not his naturally I can grant all this and it hurt 's not this last phrase of being his properly which his Text enforceth but he instanceth 1 Cor. 6 20. glorify God in your body and in your spirit which are Gods but here is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the word enforcing the propriety and consider that the Apostle taught the Corinthians in the beginning of that verse how to understand that language that our Souls and bodies are God's for saith he you are bought with a price because your Soules and bodies are bought with a price therefore they are his his by purchase yours by nature and this distinction in either part is put downe evidently in the Text Glorify God in your Soul and body both which are their own naturally which yet are his by redemption nay I can urge this Text emphatically for the divinity of Christ for if he bought us and payd a price for us then we are hâ—s and he whose we are is God most expresse in the Text him we must glorifie whose we are that is God Christ's we are by redemption therefore Christ is God thus this Text urged in one word to avoyd his divinity proved by the former Text in the words taken together doth most cleerly confirme it and yet you
The Philosophers excell the Socinians in the knowledge of eternal life section 15. p. 342. Place no motion nor can motion be in it chapter 1. section 3. p. 6. The study of self-preservation not alwayes earnest chapter 36. section 3. p. 420. The Promises and Oaths of men by experience very fallacious chap. 28. section 6. p. 231. Particular interest and propriety very sacred among the ancient Jews chapter 21. section 10. p. 162. God by his own Prerogative gave the Children of Israel a title to the Canaanites Land and the goods of the Aegyptians chapter 24. s. 5. p. 187. The first generation of men understood their title of Propriety without God's peremptory command p. 188. Places c. not appropriated become duly his that first seizeth section 6. p. 189. How the owner keep 's his Propriety who intended to renounce it chapter 26. section 3. p. 203. A Propriety where is no coercive power chapter 27. s. 4. page 213. Two persons cannot have a Propriety in the same thing at the same time ch 36. sect 6. page 426. ib. sect 8 page 430. The inequality of men's prudence chapter 18. section 4. p. 14. ib. s. 5. The reasons why men may and do often distrust their own prudence section 6. p. 141. Prudence whence and how it may be said to be but experience chapter 18. section 4. page 140. What some Philosophers thought of prudence chap. 29. sect 13. p. 271. God's punishment in this world not alwayes proportion'd to the sin chapter 16. section 3 p. 128. Q The qualifications of the visible species according to the disposition or indisposition of the Organ chapter 2. section 3. p. 9. The nature of prime qualities as they affect the Organ chapter 6. section 6. p. 45. How second qualities transmit their species ib. Sensible qualities more then mere apparitions section 8. p. 48. Quod ubique semper ab omnibus c. a rule seldom oppos'd by malicious Reason except by that of Mr. Hobbes chapter 14. section 1. p. 92. R The approach or analogy to Reason in the acts of inferiour creatures chapter 8. section 3. p. 59. The same conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason chapter 28. section 12. page 242. Reasonable of what extent chapter 30. section 15. page 247. A godly work to make Reason subservient to Faith chapter 34. section 4. page 391. How it may be so chapter 35. section 4. page 395. Being neither unprofitable nor scandalous to Faith p. 396. What of God may be known by Reason section 2. page 393. Unnaturall for Reason to subject it self to passions and sensual desires chapter 36. section 3. page 421. No rebound of the object from the brain to the Optick nerve chapter 3. section 14. page 22. Mr. Hobbes's subtilty in writing against Rebellion which cannot be by his doctrine chapter 27. section 12. page 225. What Religion is and how it come's to be reckoned a part of Justice chap 12. section 1. p. 79. What is the seed of Religion and why only in man section 2. page 80. chapter 14. section 1. page 91. How far Religion may be abated and abolished in particular men chapter 15. section 2. page 122. Form'd Religion not founded upon Mr. Hobbes's phantastike Faith section 3. page 1â—4 The difference betwixt an occasion and the foundation of Religion explained ib. section 5. How far the opinion of any person that introduceth it should prevail with the people chapter 16. section 5. p. 130. Some difference between the foundation of Religion and formed Religion section 6. p. 132. The want of integrity and prudence in Chuâ—ch-Goveâ—ners render's not the Catholick Christian Religion suspected chapter 17. section 1. 2. p. 133. 134. No eternity of rest in things unmoved whether animal or naturall when extralocall chapter 7. section 1 p. 54. Revelation did first dictate a form of Religion which might afterward be improv'd by Reason chapter 16. section 4. p. 129. God's Revelation of himself by dreams visions c. chapter 28. section 12. p. 242. Trismegistus Socrates Plato and such others probably had Revelations or met with some Prophetike person or writing chapter 33. section 13. p. 373. Râ—ches cannot satisfie man's Will which bring with them an impatient covetousnesse of getting more when men have most chapter 28. section 11. page 239. They are not things absolutely good page 240. He that hath right to the end hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end chapter 23. section 1. page 176. The ultimate end exceâ—ted ib. Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right and distinction of it from Law chapter 23. section 4. p. 179. What Right is â—roperly and what Wrong section 5. p. 180. The necessary consistence of Right with Law ib. A man need 's lay down his right to nothing chapter 25. section 5. page 195. That is not alwayes really good for which a man part 's with his right section 6. p. 196. A man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good page 197. A man may renounce his right pro aris focis section 8. page 200. and for the good of his posterity c. ibid. The usefulnesse of things de futuro give 's a man no present Right to them chapter 36. section 6. page 427. section 12. p. 437. What Right the Law of humanity give 's a man to what is in the possession of another section 8. page 430. The dissolution of a Commonwealth give 's a man no perpetuall right to his neighbours goods section 9. page 431. S The sagacity of severall Animals Elephants Dogs c. chapter 11. section 2. page 77. Which yet do not syllogize though they seem to do it p. 78. Lully's advice to the Pope and Cardinals about converting the Saracens chapter 35. section 5. page 398. Mr Hobbes's censure of all Philosophy-Schools c. chapter 1. section 3. page 6. The School-men condemn'd both for their rashnesse and negligence in the rational search of the holy Trinity ch 35. â— 14. p. 416. Holy Scripture to be believed against Reason chapter 34. section 3. page 390. No sense of objects visible or audible in Sleep or Attention chapter 1. section 1. p. 2. The cause of sense section 2. page 3. Master Hobbes's fancy of it ibid. How it come's to passe that the same object is seen double chapter 2. section 3. p. 9. Mr. Hobbes unconstant in placing the seat of sense chapter 3. section 4. page 12. What required to prevent the deception of sense section 5. page 14. No such deception of sense as Mr. Hobbes fancieth chapter 6. section 9. p. 50. Not sense but Reason judgeth whether colour seen by reflexion be in the object section 10. p. 51. How service in vulgar language is come to be taken for the Common-prayer of the Church chapter 16. section 2. p. 137. How Christ call's himself a Shepheard chapter 32. section 5. page 326. There were Sibylls
that prophesied of our Saviour chapter 13. section 5. page 90. Sight the prae-requisites not wanting judgeth aright of colours but not alwayes of a common object chapter 6. section 10. page 50. nor of objects by accident as Logicians speak page 51. How the Thief would be gratified if the object of sight were but apparition chapter 6. section 8. page 48. The subtilty of an evasion in Mr. Hobbes's power ibid. Smalcius's vain attempt to evacuate the Divinity of Christ chapter 31. section 2. page 295. Smell and Taste are in the men but sensible qualities in the objects chap. 6. section 5. p. 44. The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word section 3. page 299. The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto section 8. p. 313. Their shifts chapter 32. section 1. page 322. The sin of Sodom and some others may be supposed to be under no restraint of a positive Law chapter 24. section 3. p. 183. We ought not beyond the Revelation in holy Scripture to aggravate their sins who perished by the floud chapter 16. section 3. p. 128. How Christ is the Son of God chapter 31. sect 4. page 301. What a Son is ibid. The particulars in the definition applyed to our Saviour section 5. p. 302. How we must believe Christ to be the naturall Son of God chapter 32. section 3. p. 322. Even Idolaters had a better opinion of the soul of Man then to fancy it like the appearance in a dream or Looking-glasse chap. 12. section 4. page 83. The subject of sound chapter 6. section 2. p. 40. Sound dormant before collision section 3. p. 42. Sound no rebound from the brain to the nerves outward section 4. page 43. Nor apparition of motion ibid. Of Spirits and invisible Agents chapter 11. section 5. page 83. Light and fire from the strong emission of species in the dark chapter 3. s. 5. p. 13. Not the receipt of the species but the soul's judgment of it is sight chapter 5. section 4. p. 36. Aristotle's reasons for visible species chapter 5. section 5. page 37. Why the propagation of them through the medium is not discerned ibid. Their name supposed to be taken from some seminal vertue ib. Why reall Colours produce but intentionall species chapter 5. section 5. page 38. Whence the appearance of light or fire after a suddain stroke chapter 3. section 5. p. 13. How substances depend upon God as Accidents upon their subjects chapter 33. section 15 page 378. That succesfull wickednesse obtaine's the name of Vertue argued by the Fool and consonant to Mr. Hobbes's principles though he disowne's it chapter 27. section 7. page 217. Severall difficulties objected against Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy about the Sun chapter 3. section 15. page 23. With what sagacious artifice Swallowes build their nests chapter 8. section 3. page 59. The actions dictated by what the School call's Synderesis chapter 27. section 2. page 212. T Smalcius answer'd about the Tautology is in God and is God chapter 31. section 21. page 349. Man's thought more then a mere representation chapter 1. section 1. page 2. The Catcher's title to scatter'd money chapter 26. section 1. page 202. The benefit of Tradition chap. 33. section 6. page 360. How otherwise then by the effects of God in the Creature we may adventure upon the proof of the holy Trinity chapter 35. section 3. page 395. Lully's undertaking concerning the rationall proof of the holy Trinity ibid. section 6. page 399. Vasques's Answer and the Bishop's reply to his Arguments page 400. An explanation of his sense section 7. page 401. section 8. page 406. The Bishop proceede's in this discourse section 9. page 408. The principall Authors that have attempted the rational discovery of the holy Trinity section 15. page 416. How Christ call's himselfe the Truth chapter 32. section 52. page 327. V What value may be set on things to be sold and how enhaunced chapter 29. section 4. page 254. When the Arithmeticall proportian must be applyed to the value of the thing page 255. How Christ call's himself a Vine chapter 32. section 5. page 326. An untouch'd Viol sounding in harmony with one touch'd chapter 6. section 2. p. 40. How Man understand's simple termes in their proper but Beasts only in their generall notion chapter 11. section 2. p. 77. Man's understanding imperfect in this world chapter 28. section 13. page 243. The Union of the Divinity with the Humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man chapter 33. section 15. page 378. It maketh but one Christ page 380. The use and benefit of Universities chapter 1. section 3. p. 7. How John Baptist was call'd a Voice chapter 32. section 7. page 329. The Bishop discover's no such thing as St. John's unbraiding the World chapter 1.10 chapter 33. section 13. page 373. The use of some things known interdicted chapter 36. section 6. page 427. How a man may know what is not page 428. section 7. page 429. Jus and Utile not the same thing chapter 24. section 6. p. 188. How Tully understood Utile far otherwise then Mr. Hobbes page 189. W How two Walls of different colours equally affect the brain chapter 4. section 1 page 26. Three sorts of men in no condition of War chapter 20. section 1. page 148. What may and what may not be called War in respect of time section 3. page 149. in respect of a disposition to it section 5. page 151. Neither a monastike nor sociable course of life put 's men presently into a posture of defensive War section 6. page 152. No universal War ever enterpriz'd by Mankind chapter 21. section 1. page 153. The mutuall jealousies of Soveraignes put them not presently into a condition of War section 6. page 157. Men have no right to practice inhumanity in War chapter 25. section 4. page 194. What condition prae-requisite to a just engagement in War ibid. War not the only Conservatour of Man's right or Nature's section 5. page 195. How Christ call's himself the Way chapter 32. section 5. page 327. What Weather may be rightly called fair or foul chapter 20. section 1. page 148. The Whispering place in Glocester Church chapter 6. section 2. page 40. Man's Will not to be the rule of his Judgment nor the reason of his actions chapter 24. section 2. page 183. A very Child require's the satisfaction of his Will chapter 28. section 10. page 236. A man's Will is satisfied with no worldly goods whether bodily sensual or intellectual section 13. page 243. nor ought else which is not infinite and that infinite is God section 11. page 238. The Socinians interpret Word St. John 1.1 by a Metaphor and Metonymie chapter 32. section 4. page 325. How he is there call'd the Word section 6. page 328. section 7. page 330. The Word not to be understood of our Saviour's Humanity section 8. page 331. neither Metaphorically nor Metonymically ibid. Socinus's shift that he was decreed to be the
that of St. John in his Revelation The words Being with God signifie more thâ—n Known to God against Socinus and hâ—s â—ollowers Eternal life before Christ's Iâ—carnation knowne to the Angelâ— blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers Although not till afterward manifested to others The Phâ—losophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose The Discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said the Word was God God with them no proper name but an Appellative â— Contrary to the use of it single thâ—oughout the New Testament How Satan is called the God of this World c. How the belly God The Socinian's Criticisme about the Article Answered And Sociâ—uâ—'s Instances How St. Cyrâ—ll's rule is to be understood Smalcius answered about Tautology As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself Loâ—d and God not both one The Word God with though not of the Father The Sociniaâ—s conceit of tâ—e Word being with God in the bâ—ginning Improbable having no Evangelical authority That they pretend to prove's it not The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated His ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeal His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed How all things were made by him St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture Christ's interest in the Câ—eatiâ—n reinforced against the Socinians glosse Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental Cause Their other slight objection answered The use of words The benefit of Tradition How life eternall and what else is to be understood ver 4. Hâ—w both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men How Christ is called the lâ—ght according to Socinus How according to the Bishop What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ. Which is evidently affirmatâ—ve of his Divinity Socinus misinterprets creation by recreation or regeneration And in supplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Ephesians Another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour Smalcius's gâ—oâ—â—e His various significations put upon the word World Wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader The Bishop's Animadversions 〈◊〉 sense â—irectly opposite to that evident in the Text. The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object Smalcius's reply to Smeglecius Little bâ—câ—ming a Socinian The World knew not the Woâ—d but by supernaturall grace What men appâ—ehend of God by naturall abilities The objection about Saint Johâ—'s upbraiding the world answered The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted The Socinians Word couâ—d not be made Flâ—sh Their evasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell Their heterodox interpretation of flesh Not evident in Scripture Cited by Socinus The result of their Comment The summe of ours The union of the Divinâ—ty with the humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man Notwithstanding the predâ—cation God is Man Whâ—ch is asserted â—nd by a familliar instance illustrated Their Objection Answer'd by the dependaâ—â—â— of substances up on God Another Argument of Smalcius's Answer'd by the manner of existing Christ a true man though a divine persâ—n Whose conception and gestation in the blessed Virgin 's wâ—mb conduced nothing to his personality The Divinity an humanity uniâ—ed render him neither two Sons nor two persons Object Of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost Answer Which identity implies not that they were made flâ—sh with him As Scotus illustâ—ate's excellently The Bishop's apology to the Reader Smâ—lcius's fiâ—st Qâ—erie c. Rectifyed Answered All actions not alwayes necessariâ—y according to the nature of him or that which act 's Smalius's second Querie Answeâ—ed and frustrated His third Querie Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authoriâ—y and plenitude of power in himself Whâ—ch he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles The Socinian's opinion of the holy Ghost Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity Noâ— the Gospel oâ— Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure A defiance to them that call for Reason in these mysteries Which notwithstanding may be subservienr to Faith Câ—rthagâ—na's lâ—tle lesse then blasphemous intimating God's power of enlarging the capacâ—ty of his Creature What of God to be proved by Reason and by whom to be attempted Aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity The Bishop's answer grounded upon Lulli's demonstratâ—on by aequiparance Aquinas's second Argum. The Bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith The Bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of Reason His third argument from scorn and scâ—ndal Answer'd by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture Trigosius and Carthagena passed by Truth not oppos'd to Truth The Bishop closeâ—h with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques And Aymericus who make's him an haeretick His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about convertâ—ng the Saracens Hiâ— devout enterprize according to it wâ—th successe His like adventure among the 〈◊〉 Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance The notable effâ—ct of his sufferings Lully's undertaking according to Vâ—sques Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's The first prove's a personal plurality by concord Another from equality distinction Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposiâ—ion of a reall effective act in God The Bishop's Râ—ply that Lulâ—y not only suppâ—sâ—d but proved it His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle which could nâ—t be Vasques chargeth Lully with a mâ—stake of a formal cause for an efficient Who is mâ—staken by him And the cause proved no less efficient then formal The discourse drawn into perfect syllogisme provâ—ng the eternall plurality of persons by production The Objection urging the Angel cannot produce the like effect answer'd Vasquâ—s's satisfactâ—â—y answerâ— to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion The Bâ—shop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity God's infinite Simpliciâ—y and Uniâ—y His spiritual faculties Understandâ—ng and Will Himself the infinite objâ—ct of his Understanding Which is eternally productive of his internal Word And that word substâ—â—tiâ—â— the same with himself The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wise-men by a Sâ—ar God's Will as fruitful by love as hiâ— Understanding by knowledge And so productive of a third person which is likewise God These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answered The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered accordâ—ng to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and Holy Spirit Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and â—ow long ago debated by St. Augustâ—ne The extent or limits of this personal distiâ—ction the Bishâ—p â—eveâ—ently forbear's to determâ—ne And dislâ—ke's the rash curiosity of the School-men His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason And seldom quoting the Fathers A digression to the Reader Select Aphorâ—smes out of which the Author draw's his Discourse A good foundation of his to build upon His noble Quaeâ—e Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life His study of it as to his own particular All men may not have like reason to be so intent The parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private What right a man hath to the mâ—aâ—s of preserviâ—g life and how he is to use them Each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world Nor to things conducing onely to mediate and particular ends The danger of pretending a right to all and so having a right judgment of it Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time All cannot be usefull to one particular perperson Nor every thing to evâ—ry one Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful Oâ—her ruleâ— by which to institâ—te a right judgment beside reason How all creatures are granted to man's usâ— limited Hiâ— impossible supâ—osition His falâ—acy à bâ—ne divisiâ— c. The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all The case of necessity imply's no such universal right Nor dissolution of any Common-wealth An Objection fram'd by the Author A second of his not so strong The first but weakly answer'd by him without regard to God's end His first Argument for universal right returning extreme necessity The Bishop's severall answers to it His second Argument for ancient right in a lawfull defense How the force oâ— invalidity of this argument mâ—y be understood and how the practice moderated His Objection And answer The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion staâ—ing the râ—ght of possâ—ssion Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself Propriety withouâ— Covenant The râ—ght to goodâ— gotten by conquest what His third Argument The Bishâ—p's answer from the fallibiliâ—y of judgmâ—nt His argument against the right of Occupancy Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant What is the râ—ght in necessity Discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with Occupancy The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society and Trade The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed