a total annihilation there still remaining some part of the thing thus a man saith his eye is out when he can see but a little It is possible for a man to be in either of these conditions if he is in the first questionlesse he is in a lost condition and is uncapable of recovery for the objected reason The continual acting of evil produceth a total habit of evil wherein if a man be habituated that small portion of the remaining good is totally extirpated As in an Atheist who is one wherein the habit of Good is totally extinct which maketh him affectately and perversly ignorant of God and in whom the habit of evil is radicated whereby he becometh a blasphemer against God in denying his being III. An Atheist hath not so much virtue or power in him as thereby to do one good action A good action is which doth resemble its pattern Bona censetur actio quae suae ideae fuerit conformis and therefore must 1. Proceed from a good principle 2. Be imployed about a good object 3. Be intended to a good end A good action here taken in a moral not physical signification whose principle and object is right Reason and moral good Its end is to be agreeing with a good will So that an Atheist cannot work a good work his principle of Good to wit right Reason being totally depraved and corrupted for he in denying God denieth his right Reason when as I have proved in the Doctrine of Souls right Reason cannot but must necessarily retain an impression of God's existence goodnesse and omnipotence from whom she received her production or he in denying God denieth his own being his being consisting in a resemblance to the Image of God the perfect pattern of his once perfect essence which doth argue that his right Reason is totally extinct and that there remaineth a plenar possession of corruption and depravation in his understanding and will through which he judgeth of all things otherwise than they are And this is farther evident because our understanding judgeth of all things in ordination to action all our actions are performed in ordination to our last end which being positively denied by him proveth the truth of the fore-stated Conclusion The second Qualification of a good action is That its object must be good A mans will is carried forth to a triple object whereof two have respect to the body the other to the soul. Of the two respecting the body one is desired for the conservation of the body the other for conservation of the species or kind These as being Physical objects are Physically good to all natural Bodies for Ens bonum convertuntur a Being and Good are convertible Wherefore this maxime Omnia appetunt Bonum All Beings covet good and cannot covet evil is onely to be understood of Physical good objects The third Object relating to the soul is moral good whose objectivenesse is only proper to rational essences The last condition required in a good action is its direction to a good end which is to God's glory and praise to the admiration of his Wisdom Omnipotence and all others of his Attributes If we compare the actions of an Atheist with these three qualifications we shall find them infinitely different and deffective from them they proceeding from the worst of principles and being imployed about improportionate and bruitish objects and directed to a wicked malicious and hellish end namely to Gods greatest dishonour IV. Summarily to give you a Character of an Atheist An Atheist is a most horrid monster once a man now worse than a Brute a Devil in the shape of a man ungratefull beyond the expression of a tongue rigidly injurious to God and man a sinner beyond the worst of sinners a fit object for God's vengeance and the greatest torment that the depth of Hell and envy of Devils are able to spue out Is there a sinne which God although he is infinitely mercifull hath resolved not to pardon it is confirmed Atheisme this is the only treason which man can commit against God The injury which he doeth unto God is in Blaspheming his sacred Name robbing him of his Honour and of all his Attributes and that which doth infinitely augment his sinne is his persistence in it after such an unexpressible indulgence It is impossible that all vices should lodge and center in one man for I could never hear that any natural man was so vicious but he had some good I mean good as the vulgar calleth it quality in him Many have accused such a one for being a Drunkard another for a Robber or a Cheat yet some there will be still who you may hear say although such a one is a Drunkard yet he is honest or kind or civil c. or of another although he is a Robber yet he is no Murderer although a Cheat yet he is no Drunkard so that I say there is no natural man so vicious but there is something in him which people will say is good But an Atheist hath a nest of all vice in him there is not a vice so detestable or deform'd although it be against nature but he dares make tryal of it because he dreads neither God or his Law An Atheist will wrong cheat revile his own parents he will murder his own relations friends or others if it be for his interest or pleasure he will Rob steal defame blaspheme and what not 't is true he doth not alwayes do these acts because he fears the Law of man nevertheless his will is not backward but prone to all manner of wickedness what should hinder him his conscience will not because that is deaded but it quickneth again a little before his death and then beginneth his rage and torment then the Devils come about him each busied in increasing his woe and misery then Hell and Eternity is at hand There are many who seeming to judge charitably of all men cannot be perswaded there are Atheists In these I shall soon correct their tendernesse There was never a subversion of a legall government but there appeared hundreds of Atheists They at such times are called subtil Politicians who finding such successe by making Scripture and Religion or rather hypocrisie a cloak for to cover all their wicked designs imagin thence that Religion and Scripture were invented for that same purpose because it hath so well served their turns Pray what is this but absolute atheism yea more than this if they see it is for their interest to murder an innocent person or persons yea were it a whole Nation they will not stick to do it out of hand if they stand in want of treasures they will steal and rob it from the people and tell them it is for the good of the Commonwealth in general although their intent is to make it good to themselves alone in particular What crime is so great but is committed at such times There is no History that treats of
else but where we are at present The falshood of this Theorem is evident because that greatest happinesse which we enjoy in this world is like but in an inferious degree to that which we expect in the other Neither is any happinesse to be parallel'd to the greatest but which is a true Theologick happinesse If so then a Theologick happinesse must be our Summum Bonum No wonder therefore if Philosophers being destitute of this Theologick habit were false Philosophers This is the reason why Aristotle and other supposed Philosophers never arrived to the possession of the greatest happinesse because they were ignorant of God And is it not therefore unworthy of a Philosopher to be a slave to their Dictates which affected slavery hath proved an obvious cause of the greatest errours in Church and State How full of Anguish fear jealousle and uncertainties were their souls through their not knowing the true God They could never enjoy any durable happinesse as long as their minds were perplexed with them doubts In what perplexity did Aristotle die even when his languishing soul pressed out these words In doubts have I lived and in more anguish do I die whither I shall go I know not wherefore thou Being of Beings have mercy upon me What did the joys and pleasures of Epicure amount unto when he was tormented with such miserable pains of the strangury as chased his soul out of his body II. The greatest happinesse is which of all things makes a man most happy Happinesse is a concomitant of a joyfull thing or an effect wrought by a joyfull object upon man the reception of which makes him truly happy Here we will first enquire Whether the greatest happinesse is the neerest End of Natural Theology 2. How it is otherwise called 3. What it is 4. Which is the subject of this habit 5. How it is to be procured In answer to the first I say that the greatest happinesse is not the neerest and principal end of Theology I prove it That which doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology is not the neerest and principal end but the greatest happinesse doth not chiefly and immediately move a man in Theology Therefore it is not the neerest and principal end of Theology 2. It is the next end to the neerest and an inseparable concomitant of the neerest end I prove it That which we do enjoy next after the possession of the habit of Natural Theology and of the Summum Bonum is the next end to the neerest But we do chiefly enjoy the greatest happinesse next after the possession of the habit of Theology and of the Summum Bonum Therefore it is the next end to the neerest There is none which ever did possesse the habit of Theology but confirms the truth and assurance of the Minor 4. The greatest happinesse is sometime called Summum Bonum or the greatest good from its causality because it doth through its presence confer the greatest happinesse upon that Subject which it doth irradiate Hence Austin de Civ Dei lib. 8. cap. 3. Finis autem boni appellatur quo quisque cum pervenerit beatus est That is called the end of good which maketh every man happy that doth attain to it Note that the greatest happinesse is only tropically named Summum Bonum from a Metonomia causae pro effectu CHAP. III. Of GOOD 1. What Good is 2. That Aristotle 's Definition of Good is erroneous 3. Diogenes his Definition of Good 4. The Explanation of the Definition of Good How the several kinds of Good differ from one another 5. What Moral Good is what moral evil is 6. What Theologick Good and evil is BOnum Good is that which doth make the subject which doth possesse it perfect Or Good is that which all Beings do incline unto for to perfect themselves The highest and greatest Good must then be that which makes a man most perfect and happy or that which all men need to perfect themselves with the same perfection which man had when he was first created I said need and not desire or incline into because all men do not desire the Summum Bonum for all men do not come to the knowledge of it yet all men need it for to perfect themselves II. There are many definitions of Good spread among Philophers whereof some are false either in not adequating the whole definitum or else in attributing falsities by it to the definitum or subject defined Among these that of Aristotle is counted most authentick* Good is that which all things do incline unto or covet This definition must either agree with Good as it is proper to all Beings and Transcendent or as it is restricted to rationals and animals in which only there is an appetite and coveting or as it is most limited to rationals only If we take it according to the first acception the definition is not formal but only accidental for it is accidental to beings as they are Good to be coveted or be desired from another being Neither doth it hold true in the last acception because we desire many things which are evil and hurtfull to us To this may be answered that a being so far as it is desired is good although it prove accidentally hurtfull This answer is not satisfactory for we do oftentimes desire things knowing them to be evil and therefore we do desire them as evil for the will doth covet things as they are understood if then the understanding doth understand them to be evil the will must consequently will them as evil Possibly some do reply that the understanding doth conceive them very things which a man afterwards doth covet To be good otherwise he could not desire them For Did he desire them as evil then he would desire his own destruction and be inferiour to all other creatures which are onely bent to that which doth perfect their nature or you may return your answer thus that good is either apparent or real and truly good and that the understanding doth understand all beings to be good apparently or really or otherwise you may distinguish good in good which is honest or profitable and usefull or pleasant and state that the understanding doth conceive all things either as they are honest useful or pleasant This doth not remove all objections as to the first The will of man is not restrained to a certain object as Naturals are but is also extended to contrary objects to wit to good and evil Neither is it singly limited to contradictories as to will evil and to leave it because to desist from an action is no action and for that reason we cannot properly say that the actions of the will are free quoad contradicentia tantum only in willing evil and ceasing from it Secondly Should God punish us for doing evil when we cannot act any thing but evil it would appear somewhat severe for punishment is to punish a delict and sinne in doing that which
he is cut off from not willing which implyes a contradiction in the will of not to be the will VI. Fifthly The will acteth upon the evil of an object in that it can refuse or imbrace it as it is evil and as it knoweth it to be evil without having an apprehension of any goodnesse in it A man can hang himself or kill another without apprehending any thing good in it and he can also refuse it Since that all beings act for an end and purpose it may be demanded What end and purpose can a man have in coveting an evil object as it is evil I answer an evil end The Devils covet evil as it is evil for none can imagine the least good in Devils if so why may not men covet evil as evil many among them being worse than Devils It is worse to persevere in evil and wickednesse in the midst of the enjoyments of good things than to affect evil without the least enjoyment of good but Atheists persevere in the greatest evil in the midst of good things wherefore they are to be accounted worse than Devils who affect evil without the least enjoyment of good VII Lastly A man may will either a good object or an evil one This is an action of will as it is free to contraries and is called among Philosophers Libertas quoad specificationem actus a freedom of will in specifying an act that is an affecting an object in particular as it is opposite to another appetible object in contrariety which is to will an object as it is good or as it is evil pleasant or sorrowfull c. The preceding distinctions of the acts of will proceed from her as she is free Quoad contradictoria or quoad exercitium actus VIII Hence you may know that free-will Liberum arbitrium in reference to its faculty is an indetermination or indifference in the will of man of acting or not acting and of acting upon good or evil Neverthelesse it is a controversie among Moralists 1. Whether the will be indifferent to each opposite which opposites are either between contradictories as between acting and not acting or between contraries as between acts upon good or evil 2. Whether the will is free in all its acts Vilsten Cent. 1. Dec. 4. q. 6. states two conclusions for the resolving of these doubts 1. Saith he The will is not indifferent to each contrary to wit to good and evil His reason is because the will cannot covet evil as evil but when the will doth covet evil it is rather forced than free because it is an evil disposition doth compell her to it wherfore that being against nature it is rather to be accounted violent than free First He saith The will cannot covet evil as evil Next he affirms That the will can covet evil but then she is forced This is a manifest contradiction that the will can covet evil and cannot covet evil Again That the will should covet evil by coaction from within is to contradict most Philosophers whose tenent is That the will cannot be forced from within Besides to grant this would be to suppose that man did act necessarily like unto naturals Further it would be very severe should God punish us for doing an act when we cannot do otherwise IX His second Conclusion is That the will of man is indifferent to each contradictory opposite because she can act upon a good object in particular and forbear Herein he speaks the truth but this is no more truly concluded but it is as fallaciously opposed by others Their Argument is because souls in Heaven cannot but love God and the damned cannot but hate him both these acting freely it followeth that the will is not indifferent to contradictories This infers nothing to the present dispute of man's will only of souls in Heaven and Devils But I passe to the second Doubt proposed Whether the will of man is free in all her acts Inorder to the clearing of this doubt you are to observe it 1. That the acts of the will are of acting or not acting or of acting upon a particular object so as to covet it or to reject it 2. That the act of the will after its whole assent or conclusion is not the will it self and therefore freedom is not to be attributed to the act but to the power or faculty This premised I poâ—â— X. 1. That the will is free to act or not to act If man is free to think or not to think he is free to will or not to will because a man's thought is alwayes concomitant to his will But a man is free to think or not to think Ergo He is free to will or not to will The Assumtion is confirmed in the second Paragraph XI 2. The will is free to act upon particular objects as they are good or evil By will I mean the will of man as he is in a natural and corrupt state not as he is in a supernatural or preternatural estate for in the first he cannot covet evil in the last he cannot covet good Neither is it to be understood of man as he was in an incorrupt state most granting that he could covet good and evil But the Question is Whether man as he is in a corrupt condition and prone to evil cannot do a good act as much as the first man being prone to good did an evil act Observe also that good is either theologick good or moral good and so is evil The Question here is concerning moral good and evil Lastly you are to understand here the freedom of man's will as he acteth with the ordinary concurrence of God and not as he acteth with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him XII Man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good act or a moral evil act What moral good and evil and theologick good and evil is I have already set down in the 3d 4th and 5th Chapters I prove this position What ever a man doth act with the fore-knowledge of his understanding doth proceed from his free-will But man acteth moral evil and moral good with the fore-knowledge of his understanding Ergo Man doth act moral evil and moral good through his free-will I confirm the Minor There are none that deny that man doth moral evil with the fore-knowledge of his understanding That man doth act a moral good act from himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him it appeareth In that he can and doth covet meat and drink in moderation and in that he can and doth help the poor and needy and in that he can moderate his passions all these are moral good acts They are good acts in that they do perfectionate man in his Essence They are moral in that they proceed from man's free-will and foreknowledge XIII Man hath not a free-will of doing a Theologick good act immediately through himself and without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him
the Peripateticks touching the Souls action That according to the same Opinion a Substance is said not to act immediately through it self but through superadded Powers p. 85. 2. That a Substance acteth through as many different Powers as it produceth different Acts. p. 86. 3. That the said Powers are really and formally distinct from the essence of the Soul ib. 4. That Powers are concreated with the Soul and do immediately emanate from her Essence p. 87. 5. That immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their Agent Material ones in the Matter as in their Subject ib. 6. That Powers are distinguisht by their Acts and Objects The Authors Intent in treating of the Faculties of the Soul ib. CHAP. II. Of all the usual Acceptions of power 1. The Etymology of Power The Synonyma's of Power p. 88. 2. The various Acceptions of power ib. 3. What a Passive Natural Power and a Supernatural Passive or Obediential Power is ib. 4. Various Divisions of Power p. 89. CHAP. III. Of the Nature of Power according to the Author 1. The Analogal Concept of Power as it is common to all its Analogata p. 90. 2. Whether there be Real Powers 91. 3. Certain Conclusions touching Powers p. 93. 4. That all Substances act immediately through themselves p. 95. 5. That a Peripatetick Power is a Non Ens Physicum p. 97. 6. That all Powers are really Identificated with their Subject ib. 7. That Powers are distinguisht modully from their Subject p. 98. 8. How Powers are taken in the Abstract ib. 9. The Manner of the Remission and Intention of Powers p. 99. 10. The Number of the Formal Acts caused by a singular Substance ib. 11. The Number of the Formal Acts caused by an Organical Substance p. 101. 12. The Solutions of several Doubts touching Powers ib. 13. That all Creatures have an absolute Power secundum quid of acting p. 102. 14. In what sense Hippocrates and Galen apprehended Powers ib. The FIRST PART The Fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is p. 1. 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers p. 2. 3. What a Habit is ib. 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery p. 3. 5. How Theology is divided ib. 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a Natural man ib. 7. The Dignity of Theology p. 4. CHAP. II. Of the end of Natural Theology 1. Wherein Moral Philosopy differeth from Natural Theology and wherein it agreeth with it That the Heathen Philosophers were no true Philosophers Aristotle his dying words Epicure his miserable death after so pleasant a life p. 5. 2. A Description of the greatest Happiness Queries touching the greatest Happiness p. 6. 3. Whether the greatest Happiness is the neerest and principal end of Theology ib. 4. How the greatest Happeness is otherwise called p. 7. CHAP. III. Of GOOD 1. What Good is p. 7. 2. That Aristotle 's Definition of Good is erroneous ib. p. 8. 3. Diogenes his Definition of Good 9. 4. The Explanation of the Definition of Good How the several kinds of Good differ from one another ib. 5. What Moral Good is what moral evil is p. 10. 6. What Theologick Good and evil is ib. CHAP. IV. Of Moral Good and Moral Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Good What is understood by a Natural State The ambiguity of the word Natural p. 10. 2. What Moral Good it is which doth respect the Body What Moral Good it is which respecteth the Soul p. 11 3. An Explanation of the Definition of Moral Evil. That God doth not properly bend to his creatures p. 12. 4. The Distinction between these two predicates to be Good and to do Good ib. 5. How Moral Good turns to Moral Evil. p. 13. 6. That Man as he is in a neutral state is in a middle state between supernatural and preternatural ib. CHAP. V. Of Theologick Good and Theologick Evil. 1. An Explanation of the Definition of Theologick Good p. 14. 2. An Explication of the Definition of Theologick Evil. ib. 3. What honest usefull and pleasant Good is p. 15. 4. What Natural Sensible and Moral Good is ib. CHAP. VI. Of the greatest and highest Good 1. A further illustration of the greatest Good p. 16. 2. That the highest Good is the neerest end of Natural Theology ib. 3. What the Summum Bonum is otherwise called That the greatest Good is our last end p. 17. 4. The inexpressible Joy which the soul obtains in possessing the greatest Good ib. 5. Two great benefits which the soul receiveth from the Summum Bonum p. 18. CHAP. VII Of the false Summum Bonum 1. The Summum Bonum of the Epicureans unfolded and rejected p. 19. 2. That Wealth is a greater terment than a Summum Bonum The Riches of Seneca That we ought to follow his example p. 20. 3. That to be taken up in merry discourses is not the greatest happiness ib. p. 21. 4. That it is not the greatest happiness to be merry twice or thrice a week at a mans country house p. 22. 5. That honour is not the greatest good ib. 6. That swearing is no happiness ib. 7. The Author's ground why he was compelled to make use of so light a style in this Chapter p. 23. 8. That all these enumerated instances are highly to be embraced as good but not as the greatest Good That meat and drink are to be taken with temperance ib. 9. That Riches are not absolutely to be rejected p. 24. 10. That mutual converse is commendable ib. 11. That a constant society is necessary to man ib. 12. That we ought to give honour to whom honour is due p. 25. 13. That we ought not to refuse an Oath tendred by the Magistrate ib. CHAP. VIII Of the Subject of Natural Theology 1. Man consisting of Body and Soul is the adequate subject of Natural Theology p. 26. 2. Reasons proving the Soul to be the original and principal subject of Theology ib. 3. That the Understanding and Will are really and formally one The confutation of the vulgar definition of will A full explication of the will and the manner of its acting What speculative and practical signifie p. 27 c. 4. What the will is in a large sense p. 34 5. What the will is in a strict sense ib. 6. An explanation upon the first description of will p. 35. 7. The effects of the will Whether appetibility doth not equally imply volibility and appetibility in a strict sense p. 36. 8. Whether mans appetite is distinct from his will ib. CHAP. XIX Of Free-will by reason 1. Wherein man doth most differ from Animals or Naturals p. 38. 2. To what acts the freedom of man's will in reference to its acting doth extend What the
adorned with that variety of Accidents it is probable that Nature hath bestowed them for Action say they and not for nought They do not only allow one power to a Substance which might suffice but a multitude yea as many as there are varieties of acts specifically differing from one another effected through a Substance This leaneth upon an Argument of theirs thus framed The Soul being indifferent to divers Acts there must be somthing superadded by which it is determined to produce certain Acts. Neither is this Opinion deficient in Authorities of Learned Philosophers Averrhoes Thomas Aq. Albertus magn Hervaeus Apollinaris and others consenting thereunto Dionysius also in his Book concerning divine Names teacheth that Celestial Spirits are divisible into their Essence Vertue or Power and Operation III. The said powers are not only affixt to the Souls Essence but are also formally and really distinct from it They are perswaded to a formal distinction because else we might justly be supposed to will when we understand and to understand when we will or to tall when we smell and so in all others They are moved to a real distinction by reason that all powers in a Substance are really distinct from its Matter and Form Weight and Lightness which are Powers inherent in the Elements whereby they encline to the Center or decline from it are not the Matter of Earth and Fire nor their forms and therefore they are really distinct from their Essence IV. These Powers are concreated with the soul and do immediately flow from her Essence An Argument whereby to prove this is set down by Thom. Aq. among his Quaest. Powers are accidentary forms or Accidents properly belonging to their Subject and concreated with it giving it also a kind of a being It is therefore necessary that they do arise as Concomitants of its Essence from that which giveth a substantial and first being to a Subject Zabarel de Facult an Lib. 1. Cap. 4. sheweth the dependance of the powers from the Soul to be as from their efficient cause from which they do immediately flow not by means of a transmutation or Physical Action which is alwaies produced by motion Others add that the Soul in respect to its faculties may be also counted a Material Cause because it containeth her faculties in her self and a final Cause the faculties being allotted to her as to their End V. Immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their agent or fountain Material Faculties as the Senses Nourishing Faculty and the like are inserted in the Matter yet so far only as it is animated Hence doth Aristotle call the latter Organical Powers from their inherence in the Organs VI. Powers are distinguisht through their Acts and Objects to which they tend and by which they are moved to act For example Any thing that is visible moveth the fight and is its proper Object which doth distinguish it from the other Senses and Powers which are moved by other Objects Thus far extends the Doctrine of Aristotle touching Powers which although consisting more in Subtilities and Appearances then Evidences and Realities notwithstanding I thought meet to expose to your view since most Modern Authors do persist in the same and thence to take occasion to examine the Contents thereof in these brief subsequent Positions By the way I must desire the Reader to remember that the distinction of Powers from their Subject is commonly treated of in the Doctrine of the Soul and solely applied to it there being not the least doubt made of it elsewhere Wherefore I have also proposed the same as appliable to the Soul but nevertheless shall make further enquiry into it so far as it doth concern all Matters in general CHAP. II. Of all the usual Acceptions of Power 1. The Etymology of Power The Synonima's of Power 2. The various Acceptions of Power 3. What a Passive Natural Power and a Supernatural Passive or Obediential Power is 4. Various Divisions of Power I. THe unfolding the name is an Introduction to the knowledge of the thing it self and therefore it will not be amiss to give you the Etymology of Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I can or have in my power So Potentia from Possum signifying the same Power in English hath its original from Pouvoir in French noting the like viz. to can or be able Power Vertue Might Strength and Faculty are Synonima's or words of one Interpretation Thus of â—ntimes we make enquiry what Vertue Strength Power or Faculty hath such or such an Herb that is what can it effect II. The Acception of the word Power is very ambiguous 1. Sometime it is understood passively for a disposition whereby a Substance is apt to receive the strength of an Agent 2. Actively for that through which a being can act 3. It s signification doth vary much according to the Subject which it doth respect as when we say a being in power that is a being which is not actually but yet may or can be So likewise a Cause in power is which doth not actually produce an effect but which can produce one Zabarel remarketh a double Acception of Power 1. Improperly it is taken for a Power which is joyned to its Act Thus we say of a man who actually walketh that he can walk 2. Properly it is attributed only to a Power which doth precede its Act Thus we say a man is a Logician when he can be one III. A Passive Power as it is capable to receive a Natural Act is called a disposition As it may receive a Supernatural Act that is an Act from a Supernatural Cause it is then named an Obediential Power The Power which was inherent in Lots Wife of receiving the Form of a Pillar of Salt was an Obediential Power IV. Again those Powers are either Natural Violent or Neutral A Natural Power is such which is agreeable to its Nature as the power in Fire of ascending is Natural to it A violent power is which is disagreeing to the Nature of its Subject as in fire there is a violent Power of moving downward A Neutral power is which is neither the one or the other but participates of both Such is the power in fire of moving circularly A Power may be understood either for a Logical power which is nothing else but a non-repugnance or for a Physical power which is the same with a Natural disposition or for a Moral Power which is nothing else but the Will Lastly in Metaphysicks it is that which is presupposed to be in an actus entitativus There is also mention made in Philosophy of an Objective Power which is not much different from a Non-repugnance or a Logical Power but expresly it is a Possibility of existing in a being which the understanding doth give it before its Existence Many more Additions of Power might be proffered as that a Power is either Created or Increated Accidental or Substantial
because the one can be existent without the other In answer to this I say that these are not properly appetites to which namely appetites a knowledge doth necessarily concur but they are only improperly and analogically termed appetites because they agree with a proper appetite in having an inclination to a thing Wherefore a proper appetite being alwayes concomitated by a knowledge these fore-mentioned instances cannot be denominated appetites but natural inclinations and propensities for if a man is predicated to have an appetite for any thing it is equivalent as if he were predicated to have a will to a thing Wherefore there is only one proper appetite in man as he is man which is his will CHAP. IX Of Free-will by Reason 1. Wherein man doth most differ from Animals or Naturals 2. To what acts the freedom of man's will in reference to its acting doth extend What the freedom of will is quoad exercitium actus and what Libertas contradictionis is 3. What the second kind of freedom of will importeth 4. That the speculative understanding in the act of speculation is practick 5. That the will is not constrained to will a good thing although present but hath a power of rejecting it 6. That the will willeth evil for an evil end That some men are worse than Devils 7. What the will 's freedom is in specifying its acts 8. What free-will is in reference to its faculty 9. Velten rejected for asserting that the will is not indifferent to each contrary That the will is indifferent to each contradictory opposite 10. That the will is free to act or not to act 11. That the will is free to act upon particular objects whether good or evil The state of the controversie 12. That man as he is in a natural and corrupt state hath a free-will of doing a moral good or a moral evil act 13. That man hath not a free-will of doing a theologick good act immediately through himself without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him 14. Man hath a free-will of doing a theologick good act with an extraordinary concurrence of God with him That he hath a free-will of election 15. That man as he is in a natural state hath a free-will through himself and without Gods extraordinary concurrence to procure Gods extraordinary concurrence and assistance to him in his actions That our being and conservation in it and all our actions depend from the ordinary concurrence of God Reasons why God did not conferre upon him an absolute power of acting without his ordinary concourse The cause of man's fall That that which is only morally good will prove theologick evil at last 16. Arguments to prove a free-will in man A reconciliation of the Calvinists with the Arminians That man hath a remnant of theologick good surviving in him The state of the controversie The division of it I. THe chief respect through which a man doth differ from Animals or Naturals is his will which is a free principle through which he acteth freely that is without any irresistable impulse for there is no object whether good or evil pleasant or sorrowfull but it is left to the wils freedom whether it will imbrace it or reject it II. The freedom of man's will in reference to its act is either a determination or assent of man to act or not to act or else it is an assent to act upon a certain object or not to act upon that certain object oâ—to act upon a certain mode of an object or not to act upon that certain mode or to act upon the goodnesse of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the goodnesse of such objects or to act upon the evil of an object in common or particular or not to act upon the evil of rhat object or to act upon good or upon evil These are the particulars whereunto the freedome of man's will doth extend And first A man hath freedom of acting or of not acting through his will A man in willing to sleep he willeth to will no more before he hath refreshed himself by sleep So that herein a man hath a will of acting or not acting indeterminately which sort of willing freedome is termed Libertas quoad exercitium actus Such a freedom of will there is in man for a man in willing to sleep willeth not to will that is not to act through his will A man in willing not to sleep may will to will or to continue in action of willing or understanding This is a plain Libertas contradiction is ad actionem non actionem sive ad agendum non agendum for it is between an ens and a non ens III. The second kind of freedom in the will is to act upon an object I mean a whole essence or object as it doth consist of all its modes united as for instance a man may covet a whole Tree or only a branch of it a whole house or only a room Now in coveting a whole Tree or a whole house he coveteth an entire essence with all its modes or else a man may also reject a whole Tree or house and so rejecteth a whole essence IV. Thirdly The will may choose to act upon a particular mode as the truth or quantity of an essence c. For it makes choice to act that is to apprehend or contemplate upon these modes particularly Neither let it seem strange to you that the understanding or will in contemplation should be termed willing or practick for in that very contemplation the understanding is practick for it doth both act and will that action V. Fourthly The will may act upon the goodnesse of an object in particular or it may refuse it Herein I do thwart some Authours who strive to prove the contrary to wit that the will when it doth act upon a good object it cannot refuse it but doth alwayes covet it Others do with more caution assert That the will of man cannot reject or refuse the most universal good for which purpose they quote Austin 10. B. 20. Chap. of Confes. Were it possible saith he to ask all men at once whether they would be happy they would answer without any further paâ—sing upon it they would But suppose this were granted as really it is disputable there being many in the world so wicked that if they were invited to imbrace the true Summum Bonum either for to bid adieu to their own spurious happinesse or to wave their obstinate opinions they would rather excuse themselves as I once heard a Jesuite cry out in a dispute That he would sooner choose to be damned with St. Austin then go to Heaven with a Protestant Yet they need arguments to prove that a particular good may not be waved although perceived by the understanding How many are there who neglect and revile many good things such as are convenient for their souls and bodies Besides this granted infers a necessity upon man's will whereby
free-will might be allowed and yet not be repugnant to Gods fore-knowledge for thought he doth God fore-know our actions then man must act necessarily and consequently infers the truth of Fate but since he could not grant a Fate over men because he saw they acted contingently therefore he did impiously rob God of his fore-knowledge Hence saith Austin de Civ D. Lib. 5. cap. 9. Atque it a dum vult facere liberos fecit sacrilegos and so since he endeavoureth to make men free-willers he makes them commit sacriledge As for this doubt it is little touched upon by Christians who certainly know that God fore-knoweth contingent things as contingent and to fall out contingently Necessary things as necessary and to fall out necessarily Psalm 33. 14. 1 Sam. 10. 9 26. Prov. 21. 1. Exod. 12. 13. Prov. 16. 33. Matth. 10. This subject is very well treated of by Anselmus in his Book of God's fore-knowledge and predestination This by the way And now I return to prove that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive upon the will of man for then the will of man would be a not willing Voluntas esset noluntas God is most just in predestinating man through Election and of his grace and mercy to salvation Eph 1. 5 6. and in predestinating others through reprobation and of his justice to damnation 2 Cor. 13. 5. Because his predestination is founded upon his fore-knowledge God therefore fore-knowing the evil wherein man is enhardened doth predestinate him to damnation This I prove God damneth man of his justice and God's justice hath a particular respect to man's evil actions Wherefore it is of God's justice and for man's sinne or evil actions that he is damned That God's justice hath a particular respect to judge and punish man with damnation for his sins the Scripture doth evidently testifie Luc. 12. 47 48. Aud that servant which knew his Lords will and prepared not himself neither did according to his will shall be beaten with many stripes Ergo Man is punished for not doing the Lord's will and not because he was predestinated without God's fore-knowledge of his evil and unbelief Matth. 11. 21. Mat. 25. 41 42. Here Christ pronounceth the sentence of everlasting damnation against the wicked because they had not done his will in feeding the hungry and cloathing the naked Gen. 2. 17. Deut. 7. 26. Exod. 32. 33. So then if God doth damn man onely for his trespasses and sinnes he doth also for the same reason predestinate him to damnation Again Were God's predestination the sole and first moving cause of mans reprobation then Adam could have had no free-will of remaining in the state of innocency or of deflecting to the state of sinne but must necessarily and coactively have deflected to the state of depravation because God had predestinate him to it This assertion is impious Ergo God's predestination is not the first moving cause of man's reprobation What should God predestinate man to damnation without fore-knowing his guilt or without being thereunto moved through the fore-knowledge of his sinne then these Texts would be written to no purpose Hos. 6. 6. Ephes. 4. 22 23 24 c. John 3. 16 17 18. John 3. 36. Rom. 9. 22 23. Ezek. 33. 11. As I live saith the Lord God I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked but that the wicked turn from his way and live Turn ye turn ye from your evil wayes for why will ye die O house of Israel Wherefore it is not of God's purpose to damn any unlesse being moved to it of his justice through their unbelief Likewise the Scripture doth reveal that predestination to life eternal is of God's grace and justice being thereunto moved by the saith of the righteous Mat. 9. 22. Rom. 4. 20 21. Ephes. 3. 12. Mat. 9. 2. Gal. 2. 20. Ephes. 2. 8 9. First Summarily I say that God's Will Decree and Predestination is the efficient cause of Reprobation and Election his grace mercy and justice are the moving causes Man's unbelief and belief are the objects of this motion in which or upon which and by which the fore-mentioned moving causes are moved which objects God fore-knowing determinates mans salvation or damnation from all eternity Wherefore we may observe that in many places of Scripture where predestination is held forth that God's fore-knowledge of mans belief or unbelief doth precede Rom. 8. 29. For whom he did fore-know he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son What can be more evident Secondly Faith or good works for saith it self is the best of works and the fountain of all good works are the means whereby we are saved yet it is not faith or good works which dâ— meritoriously or efficiently save us but God is the efficient cause of our salvation Rom. 4. 6. So likewise unbelief which is the worst of works and the original of all evil works and sins or Atheismis the means through which we are damned yet it is not that which is the principal moving cause of our damnation but God's justice which doth reject and predestinate man to damnation Rom. â— 8. Thirdly God's will is either absolute whereby he can will all things and this is concomitant to Gods absolute power whereby he can do all things although they never are effected for if he can do them he hath also a power of willing them although he doth not will all them things which he can will or his ordained will whereby he willeth that which he doth will This ordained will is unchangeable hence God is said to have loved because he loved that is when God willeth to love he cannot but love because he willeth it and therefore his will is unchangeable God's ordained will is that man shall be saved through his belief and therefore cannot but save a believer because his will endureth for ever and is unchangeable Wherefore I said in the first Assertion That man's belief moved God's mercy because God hath willed it through his ordained will otherwise were it not for this what could man's belief avail in meriting salvation for at the best we are but unprofitable servants Luc. 17. 10. and so man's unbelief moveth God's justice to damne him because God willeth justice Wherfore I conceive that belief and unbelief are remote moving causes as from us by which we move God's mercy and justice And that God's mercy and justice are moving causes as from himself Fourthly Man hath then a power of disposing and preparing himself partially to and for the admission of God's extraordinary concurss and to a conversion from the state of sinne to the state of grace for to what effect or end would all the reachings of Ministers serve All their exhortations their labour and pains would be to no purpose 1. They strive to bend men into a care for their salvation by working that carnal security out of them according to that of Acts 2. 37. 16. 33. 2. They lay the Law
of God open to men in quickning the print of it in their hearts which was almost deaded and exing them to examine the course of their lives James 1. 23 24 25. 3. The immediate effect of this search is the conviction of a mans conscience Rom. 1. 20. 2. 1. Rom. 11. 32. 4. This conviction of conscience bringeth them to a desperation of their salvation they finding that â—mpâ—â—nesse and unablenesse in themselves Rom. 7. 9 11 13. 5. This begetteth a humiliation in their hearts grieving for their sins fearing the guilt and dreading the punishment and so they are brought to a confession of their sins Mat. 9. 12. All these effects are produced through the insight of man into his own heart where all men contain the moral Law and may through the light of Nature and God's ordinary Grace or ordinary Call unfold it in the same sense which the quoted Texts do expresse CHAP. XI Of the Command of the Will 1. Whether the Will can be forced 2. What elicited and imperated acts are 3. What command the Will exerciseth over the inferiour facultin What a politick and despotick command is 4. That the irascible and appetitive faculty are under a politick obedience to the Will 5. That the locomotive faculty is not alwayes under a servile obedience to the will 6. That the Will doth not command over the practick understanding I. I Have digressed somewhat beyond my bounds in the last Chapter in alledging Scripture to prove many fundamental assertions of this Treatise the which although I ought to have performed by reason onely neverthelesse to gratifie some whose education teacheth them not to give credit to any reason unlesse confirmed by Scripture I contracted the fore-mentioned quotations in one little space And now to keep on my road There remains one Question more relating to the freedome of will which I shall first endeavour to answer and then go on in adding what is requisite The Question is Whethen the will can be forced This is a strange kind of doubt Whether the will when it doth not will for when it is forced it doth act against its will be a will However this seemeth an absurd query if understood in so many plain words yet supposing that act to be forced or against the will which is willed through the will but with a reluctancy and fore-knowledge of inconvenience thereon ensuing the Question may be conceived in a safe meaning The will is termed forced when it doth will through compulsion or impulsion or through a positive or privative violence as others explain it without which it would not have willed that which otherwayes it willed The Question might rather be proposed thus Whether the will when it is forced is free or acteth freely for no doubt the will of man can be forced in all her acts whatever Authors say to the contrary I prove it Man can be forced in his imperated acts Ergo A man can also be forced in his elicited acts because there is no imperated act but it derives from an elicited act for it is the elicited act which commandeth the other act Here may then be enquired Wherein a forced elicited act differeth from an absolute free act I answer That both these acts proceed from the will with a consent but that which the will acteth with an absolute freedom it acteth without any remorse and with an entire consent That which the will acteth when she is forced she acts with a remorse and partial reluctancy for to avoid a greater inconvenience or evil and were it not for that she would not have acted it The will cannot properly be said to be forced through a privative violence because the will doth not act at all when she is hindred II. The acts of the will according to Moralists are either elicited or imperated An elicited act of the will is when she doth act within her self by proposing the goodnesse of an object and consenteth to the covering or rejecting of it The imperated act of the will is whereby she doth execute that which she had concluded and agreed to by the elicited act in commanding the inferiour faculties III. The command which the will exerciseth over the obeying faculties is politick or controlable The obeying faculties are the internal and external senses the locomotive faculty the irascible and appetible faculty I prove it The internal senses obey the will from a politick obedience for a man willeth oft-times not to think or to remember this or that thing which neverthelesse doth force into his mind Besides the phansie worketh in a dream without being commanded by the will Wherefore the wils command is not despotick but politick The external senses do not obey the will from a despotick obedience because the will frequently cannot per se hinder them in their functions as for instance she cannot at all times hinder the hearing from perceiving a noise or the sent from smelling a bad sent c. IV. The irascible and appetitive faculty obey the will politickly because our natures are ofttimes prone to envy anger or revenge when we would not be so So our natures are as oft propense to covet evil objects which our will doth contradict V. The locomotive faculty doth frequently refuse a servil obedience to the will for in wearinesses and convulsions she is rebellious and unable Besides the locomotive faculty being in some cases more obedient to the sensitive appetite she obeyeth it before she obeyeth the will Lastly The locomotive faculty is oftentimes at work in a dream and at other times when the will doth not command her and thence it is evident that the locomotive faculty doth not obey the will from a despotick obedience VI. It is absurd to affirm That the will commandeth the practick understanding for it is the same thing as if you said That the will commanded her self the will and practick understanding being one and the same CHAP. XII Of Voluntary and Involuntary 1. That the Understanding as it is speculative and practick is the internal principle of the ultimate and intermediate actions That God or Angels are improperly said to be external principles That God is the coefficient of man's actions How Angels whether good or evil Wizards and Witches concur to the specification of man's actions 2. What a humane action is 3. That it is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly 4. Whether evils of omission through ignorance are to be termed involuntary 5. How humane actions are divided I. HItherto we have declared the internal principle of man namely the understanding as it is speculative and practick through which he acteth in order to the attaining the Summum Bonum and arriving to his last and ultimate action the immediate fruits of which is the greatest happinesse Furthermore we are not only to state the understanding to be the internal principle of our last and ultimate action but also of all intermediate actions and of such as are called humane
to the owner which is only possible in unfixt and untied matters V. I have briefly enumerated the contents of the Moral Law according as it is engraffed upon all mens hearts This Law is perfect and compleat because there is no moral precept belonging to any moral virtue but is contained herein neither is there any vice but is hereby checked and condemned Wherefore I shall compare them together to wit moral Virtues with the moral Law A virtue is a habit of acting good on the other side vice is a habit of acting evil Virtue or vice may be termed moral or theologick according to the act which it produceth which is either moral good or evil or theologick good or evil So holinesse is a habit of acting according to the Law of God Sin is a habit of acting contrary to the Law of God according it is written in all mens hearts That this Law is known to all men it appears hence because all men are checked by their conscience at one time or another for their sins There are four cardinal or principal Virtues Prudence Justice Temperance and Fortitude Prudence is a habit through which a man is directed in exercising particular virtues It s integrant parts are three 1. The remembrance of things past 2. The knowledge of things present 3. The fore-sight of things to come Thomas Aquinas counteth eight 1. Memory 2. Knowledge 3. Aptnesse to learn 4. Cunningnesse 5. Reason 6. Fore-sight 7. Circumspection 8. Caution The subjected parts of Prudence are four 1. Kingly prudence in governing his Subjects 2. Politick prudence of the People in obeying the Magistrate 3. Oeconomical prudence in governing a family 4. Military prudence in ruling an Army The potential parts of prudence are three 1. Inquiry for means 2. Judgement concerning the means invented 3. Command that them things be effected upon which judgement is past Justice is a virtue of giving every one what is his It s integral parts are three 1. To live honestly 2. To give every one what is his 3. To wrong no man The subjected parts of Justice are two 1. General Justice through which a man deals justly with the Commonwealth 2. Special or particular Justice through which a man deals justly with every particular person Special Justice is two-fold 1. Commutative Justice through which a man is just in his trading with others 2. Distributive Justice which is either recompencing every one for his good deserts or punishing every one for his crimes in which there is observed a Geometrical proportion and in commutative Justice an Arithmetical proportion Right is that which agreeth with the Law or Justice It is either natural or positive humane or divine Ecclesiastick or civil written or not written A Law is a rule command or precept of Justice containing in it what is just and what ought to be done There are three conditions required to the constitution of a Law 1. Equity 2. Authority 3. Promulgation or the publishing of it A Law is either external or participated The participated Law is divided in Natural Humane and Divine The Humane Law is either Civil or Canonical The Divine Law is divided into the old and new Law Temperance is a habit of moderating the senses particularly the senses of feeling and tasting The integral parts are two 1. Bashfulnesse 2. Honesty The potential parts are four Continence Clemency Humility and Modesty The subjected parts are Abstinence Sobriety Chastity and Shamefac'dnesse Fortitude is a virtue in attempting terrible matters Its acts are two 1. To uphold 2. To go on The integral parts of Fortitude are Magnanimity Magnificence Patience and Perseverance A man must not only have a bare knowledge of God's Law or of the moral Virtues but also a practick knowledge that is to know them in himself so as to practise them CHAP. XIV Of Man's Fall and of Atheism 1. A rational enquiry into man's primitive estate The maenner of man's fall 2. Grounds whence a man may rationally collect hopes for his restoration 3. That Atheism is the worst of sins and that an Atheist is unable of performing the least good act Wherein the goodnesse of an action doth consist 4. A Character of an Atheist That confirmed Atheism is the onely sinne against the holy Ghost A full Discovery of an Atheist THe other part of the object of Faith is Gods mercy and goodnesse how a natural man comes to find out God's mercy I shall instantly demonstrate Man having compared the difficulty of the Law with his unablenesse of performing obedience to it cannot rest satisfied or assured unlesse relieved and assisted by these two Attributes of God for he being conscious of his pravity and corrupt state of nature must imagine that he was not so created but good and blessed because the Creator is good and blessed and being left to his free-will knowing what was good and what might be evil he through a wanton curiosity and alurement of an evil spirit which spirits were created before man and whose nature it hath alwayes been to tempt man and draw him into evil as shall be proved by reason elsewhere was overswayed to try evil one act of which had not God through his grace prevented it might have been valid enough to corrupt his nature in such a manner that he would have been rendred uncapable of ever recovering his former state or of acting a good act By reason that the commission of one evil act must needs have effected a privation of that habit which he once had of working good for they being acts proceeding from two contrary habits the latter must have expelled the former which would have remained unrecoverable because à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus After a privation a habit cannot return Put out your sight once and you will never recover it Wherefore it must have followed that man being arrived to this depraved state of nature must have become a meer alien from God in whose former resemblance his happinesse did consist Furthermore the immortal spirit expiring out of the body in that condition abideth eternally in absence and dissemblance from God which two cases makes its state most wofull and dismal Thus you may remark that it is possible to a natural man by way of a Sorites to collect his first beatitude deficience guilt and punishment II. Is it not then a man's greatest concernment to bestir himself in this need and defect for a means of restoration Here may be demanded How can a man hope for restoration if the habit of acting good is quite extirpated and that from a privation to a habit there is no returning 2. Why may not a man have the same hopes of restoration here in this world as well as out of it as the Papists hold To the first I answer That extirpation may be understood in a two-fold representation 1. As it represents a total extinction and annihilation Nihil remanente sui 2. As it doth represent not a total yet almost