with diuine excellency as the minde The other is yoked to the body as apâ—etite or desier and anger The higher â—s a receauer of Reason The lower is â—gnorant it is hir parte to rule and it â—elonges vnto this to obey But this oftentimes as an Horse waryng fierse not regarding the will of the Carter is whirled with a violent brayde vnto those thinges which him liketh whether they be honest or filthy yeldyng a deafe eare to reason and not hearyng the mynde and intelligence whiche is a copartner of those knowledges whiche by nature are planted in vs or rather ingendred of God and at all times incourageth vnto honest mattiers whether they be pleasant or lamentable For there is a triple good Honest profitable and pleasaunt Honest is which agreeth with the streight sentence of Reason Profitable is which succoureth nature and lyfe Pleasaunt is which deliteth naturall appetite as the drynke the thyrsty And out of these Fountaynes procede all actions It is the duety of the minde and Intelligence to determyne but to the other parte it belongeth to execute the commaundement of the minde and to labour The minde hath two principall Intelligences entalied of nature the one of debatinge truth and falshoode the other of discerning good and euill For al men through a certaine secret sence do discerne what thinges are iust and wrongfull so that this light of nature be not pesterd for nature hath geueÌ„ to vs as it were litle sparkes and seedes and a certayne procliuitie of minde and facultie to labour This affection doth stirre Operacion succeedeth the affection and by often operacions there is gotten a perfectnes either of vertue if it be trayned vnto a â—ood end or els of vice if vnto an euill â—nd this is the grounde of all humaine â—ctions Of Affections Cap. iij. SIth perdie euery fourme of vertues and vices doth spring as it were out â—f these Fountaines hability affection operation and perfection we wil compendiously manifest these And certes those few things which are said concerning faculty shall suffice And let that difference be obserued betwixt the natiue readines of the minde the braide or affection of this procliuity As choler doth moue the nature of an ireful man so dooth the coueting of glory force the couetous of honour Henceforth then we haue to breake our minde of affections Affection is a commocion of the minde disquieting the tranquility therof which in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and of Cicero Perturbatio a Perturbation and it is defined a troublesom and a violeÌ„t moode of the soule bended from reason an enemye to the minde and quiet life The Stoikes when as they saw a man to be turmoyled hither and thither with many and wicked desires and falsly supposed the very nature of man to be vncorrupted and not defloure dthey gainsaid affections to be naturall but graunted them to be only opinions eyther of good or yll and in theyr kinde euery one to be vicious and to be rooted out of the nature of menne from which they would a wise man to be fre yet they are easily conuicted of errour For first of al that they are Natiue and ingendred by that it is lightly confirmed because motions and certayne inclinations are ingraffed in liuyng creatures by nature as the Zeale of parentes towardes theyr Children And who seeth not som men to be more enclined to anger or loue to ioyfulnesse or heauinesse than other som Farthermore that all are not faultye thereby it is apparant inough by reason the very law of God geueth vs in charge to beare loue towarde him towarde all men towardes our wife children and parentes And enioyneth vs mercy hope confidence ioye and some other affections very profitable and expedient to encourage the minde For what is more commodious for the life of man than the hope of glory and rewardes and the feare of rebuke and punishments And so doubtles affctions may be handsomly diuided that som may be called good by nature which agre with reason or els with the prescript of nature as good will compassion Some euill which do disagrée as Hatred Enuy Pride Dispere Som betwixt bothe as anger hope boldnes feare desire loue merinesse sorow which that they may not swarue from â—ertue they are to be ruled by the briâ—ell of reason and to be Iudged by mediocrity But neither is that to be commended which som construed that affections are naturall not also voluntary For whereas our will onely subiect to God may apppeare to haue a free Originall to worke it is to be thought the very redinesse perdie vnto these or them and likewise the first motion to be naturall but theyr vexacions to be voluntary and able to be chastised by th' authority of reason lesse they should run headling and be plucked with violence eake inforce a man immediatly welny vnwillyng vnto naughtinesse Albeit truly at that time the will coueting doth range at liberty and by some meanes may reteine it if so she woulde inuocate God the helper For put case it be feeble yet there is some libertie whiche when shame feare are set out to the show may be of power to bridle the affections And that they can be corrected by discipline those wordes deliuered of God do manifestlie denounce Sub te erit appetitus tuus tu Dominaberis illi Vnder thee shal be thine apetite thou shalt beare rule ouer it Wheras also a man consisteth of two partes a Soule and a bodie and there is a double force of the soule one a copartner of reason the other void she is stedfast and quiet this wandring and tormented with affections whiche moste commonly doth disquiet her where by it insueth that a man if he doth pursue the aduise of reason and intelligence he may want perturbacion But if he had rather to become Subiecte vnto the concupiscence of the body he may be diuerslie prouoked The Fountaine then of affections is that part of the Soule voide of reason and that is double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 waryng angry and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 very desirous of a thinge The which if refusinge the Empire and Yoke of the minde and reason it be caried with his proper vehemencie it is needefull that forthwith one or other of the perturbations bee incensed and plucked throughe the opinion or similytude of good or yll sometimes bither and somtimes thither eke nowe and then be broughte all oute of frame with pleasure or luste and one while with timidity or hatred For vnto these twoo sortes it appeareth that any one of the affections may be referred because all mocions proceede from a suspicion of good or euill whether it be present or absent Out of the Iudgement of good floweth pleasure and out of the conceit of euill commeth sorow Vnto pleasure are referred loue desire gladnesse whiche succoure nature and among these especiallie ioy Vnto sorow appertaine anger hatred feare sadnesse which discommoditie Nature most painfully
arrogant but a modest and keepinge vnder foote insolencye very noble and contemninge worldely vanities For this vertue is principallye tryed in the contempte both of those great matters whiche the gréedy common people hath in wonderfull admiration and also in the repressing of perturbations that all ambicion niggardlinesse and concupiscence may be resisted with a triūphing courage that al aduersities may be constantely endured Cicero in his firste booke of duties doth teache that there are two partes of the greatnesse of courage of the whiche one is tried in prosperity the other in aduersity because neither tribulation is of strength to discourage a noble stomack nor the riches of fortune of power to make him presūtuous Contrary vnto Magnanimitie be two vices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superfluous hautines either a proud and swelling mind and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a want or defect of courage In the first vice is conteyned an auaunting extolling it selfe insolentely and foolyshly and a minde strouting out vnwisely what one is of Thraso in Terence a vaine and peeuish personne and blind with ouermuch loue of him selfe than which nothing can be excogitated more foolish whome no good and modest man may be able to abide This sect of companions is odious vnto all sortes saue only vnto parasites Repugnant to this vice is that other which is called Demissio animi lacke of corage vsually tearmed Pusillanimitas cowardise that is to say a foule and an vnseemely faintnes of courage fléeing imminent daunger and vilainously languishing in large and wonderful exploits what one hath béene of Effemynate personnes as of Sardanapalus who verelye not resistinge bannished from his Empire concluded hs owne destruction through a preuented despeire as of Heliogabalus as of others who beinge enfeebled with pleasures haue led a slouthfull and a beastly life To them which wente afore may be adioyned a desire of good estimacion of which in like manner theare are two vices the one inordinate sute the other a contempt of Fame and reputacion Of Pacience and Perseueraunce Cap. xxxi PAcience Cicero defineth a voluntary and a longe permission of hard and difficulte matters for honesties sake or profite that is to witte a stable and a constante sufferaunce of humian thynges through which wée sustaine what euer aduersity shall chaunce vnto vs with a pacient minde He called it voluntary because this vertue as also Magnanimity is situated in will which that angry faculty of the Soule doth helpe That it is added of him for honesties sake hee propoundeth the ende of this vertue which also is apperteining vnto all the rest For if laboures be susteyned not for Vertue but either by reasō of hatred or riches or honoures he termeth it an horrible asperity which imitateth pacience But of vs at al seasons the marke is to be appointed that our doing please God vnto whom vertue is acceptable The charge of pacience is double One in abidyng Iniuries receiued The other in suffringe all casualities of Fortune with an vpright minde Hee ouercommeth who beareth Iniury by reason bothe he vanquisheth him selfe and his aduersary sithe he repelleth the affection Hee is broughte in bondage who doth iniury because he yeeldeth vnto affections and is surmounted of anger and gréedinesse He is iust this fellowe vniuste It is the parte then of a paciēt man both to conquere iniury by contemninge and not to take reuengement of it to him selfe but to commit it vnto God vnto whom it belongeth to chastice Iniquities and to receiue all chaunce with an egall minde to endure pouerty bannishment barrennes wéeping and wailing reproche despite seruitude gréeuous diseases blindnes and if any thing also be more wretched neuer to despeire neuer to be discouraged through calamities For whereas the life of man is ful of miseries and distresses who had not some whiles rather to leaue his life as certaine cursed Imphs dastardes haue dun eake at one time to close vp all his cares then alwaies to leade a peineful life except he being Haruaised with the brest plate of pacience would valiauntly gaineset a redy and an vnuincible courage to abide all thinges to the ende and would recken any life well to be passed ouer vertue being his guide Som haue falsly supposed them to be strong who in desperate cases haue wilfully murthered them selues eschewing either beggery or ignominy or captiuity or bondage or not sustaining loue or els auoydinge any other calamity whome Aristotle more rightfully iudged to be nise and womannish sithens it is the guise of a stedfast and a valiaunt person to take any Fortune in good worth but the property of a timorous and a sluggish to mistruste and to be dismaide with laboures and shamefully to faint in courage Impacience may be saide a vice repugnaunt to pacience an eschewinge of an honest peine and sorrowe whose nature it is not a perplexed matter to vnderstande by those things which presently are declared There are some vnsufferable who feare trauels others who flee wofullnesse and thinke them intollerable which paciēce learneth to be sustained They do yeelde vnto turmoiles these are crucified with passions and cares do abide iniury hardly and gréeuously There be some likewise who are not able moderatly inough to vse their prosperity whose mindes are to much puffed vp with the insolencie of their good estate as muche to be discommended as they because it is a thing no lesse vnséemely to be discomfited then péeuishly to triumphe Perseueraunce is defined of Cicero a stable and a perpetuall abode in reason vprightly examined This is a faithfull companion for pacience and an ayde in bearing aduersity and in moderatinge prosperity with equalitie and in brideling all the surges of the mind and bringing them in subiection to the discourse of reason For a puissaunt stomacke as he saieth without constancie and honest moderacion of minde is nothing worth waueringe or lightnesse and an vnstable gouermēt of humaine affaires is a Vice contrary vnto perseueraunce which either for a womanlines of mind doth vnaduisedly geue place vnto difficulties nor is of efficacie to endure vexacions or elles by reason of an obstinacie continueth in his opinion arrogantely and stubburnely which reason cōmaundeth to chaunge Of the Vyces betvveene vvhich Fortitude is placed Cap. xxxij FOrtitude is the meane betwixt two vices boldnes and timidity Boldnesse is an vnaduised enterprise of perils or els a rashe confidence by which any man not paysing his hability dothe aduenture daunger with a blinde inuasion either through the ignoraunce of the difficulty or through the loftines of stomacke and desire of renowne or through dispaire or els doutles through a dastardlinesse and madnes ransacking the mind This vice is farre dissonant from Fortitude because it geueth not reason and counsell This also is reposed aboue among the affections by reason it stirreth vp the rage of the minde to worke Hairebrainely and aduenturously To this mischiefe the repugnaunt vice is Timidity through which any one without occasiō is perced with
terrour and feared with any creaking and dreadeth those thinges which are valiantly to be enterprised for vertue A dastarde an effeminate person and one not able to abide honest toyle who whiles he is ouer carefull for his life he shunneth not shame and disworshippe which especially is to be auoided Of either vice otherwise it is debated in the explicacion of affectioÌ„s thaÌ„ in this place in which not the affection but a vicious property contrarious to manlinesse is to be vnderstanded Of Temperaunce Cap. xxxiii TEmperaunce is a vertue which subdueth plesures vnto the dominioÌ„ of reason The same is defined of Cicero a firme and a temperate rule of reason ouer luste and other euil braides of the minde It is also termed a moderation of desires obedient to reason and in another place the gouernesse of all commocions it is conuersaunt in refusing of pleasures as the same Aucthor agreeth with Plato and Aristotle In Gréeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whiche our countryman calleth both Temperaunce and Modestie and also Frugalitie For it is occupied in refraynynge delices and desiers as in the matter whereof it intreateth And because some pleasures are naturall and common to all liuynge creatures others consisting in opinion and they bothe either of the minde or of the body of which some are good whiche are referred vnto a good ende others vicious whiche are directed to an ill this vertu is familiar with good and honest men it absteyneth froÌ„ the contrarie verely it bridleth al concupiscencies with the iudgement of reason whiche Seneca confirmeth in these wordes Temperance ruleth pleasures some it hateth and driueth away with others it dispenseth trayneth to an holsom fashion By whiche wordes it is to be vnderstanded that this is a vertue very well acquainted with Prudencie Sith than Temperaunce is busied in measurynge of appetites her first charge is to contemplate what the necessitie of nature may postulate for to passe the life commodiously that she may satisfie her who is contented with few thynges whereby the superfluous vse of thinges naturall may be eschewed and may be reteined within the bounde of Nature The other is that when as now she â—ath vnquisshed the delightes of the bodie she conquere also the passions of the minde strugling agaynst reason that she keepe vnder arrogancie that she know her selfe that she stifely repine sensualitie and indeuour by little and little to brynge it in seruitude to Reason Thrée partes are annected of Cicero vnto Temperance Continence Clemencie and Modestie Of whiche the first doth gouerne Lust through the rule of Counsell The other remitteth Hatred The thirde preserueth honest shamefastnesse and demurenesse without whiche nothinge can be accompted â—ight Of Continence and Abstinence Cap. xxxiiij BEtwixt Continence and abstinence that appeareth properly to bee the difference that Continence doeth guide affections and kepeth a meane in al order of liuing and trimming and especially as Cicero beareth witnesse in ouerslippinge of pleasures vnto whom Incontinence is repugnant Abstinence represseth the handes from other mens goods vnto whom Rauenie is apposite This is in an innocent man the in a teÌ„perate Continence is defined of him a vertue by which the greedinesse is ruled through the gouerment of counsell It is coÌ„trary to desire to pleasure to lust For the charge hereof is to moderate all appetites lust riotte drunkennesse gluttuous deuouringe of meates and to cause all sences and delices obedient to reason This vertu not only maketh men commendable rulers of desires but also vncorrupted and iocant and also neate to conclude verye excellentâ— matters But contrarywise of intemperancie growe many kindes of diseases the paunche burdened with ouermuch meate and drinke doth both pester the minde and darken the reason But yet that scope euermore oughte to bee proposed vnto all men that they restraine them selues therfore because they ought to know by so doing to please God whom they must serue not by reason it aduauntageth the healthe For if any man dothe auoyde incontinencie only for health or els for vtilities sake be meriteth not guardon vnto contineÌ„ce may be referred al those vertues whatsoeuer appellatioÌ„ they may haue which do moderate pleasures apparel liuing meate drinke which make chaste modest and sober personnes which bridle those abhominable destructions superfluity vnleyfull appetite greedynesse drunckennesse and suche like throughe which voluptuous Lecherous effeminate gourmanders drunken men and worse than beasts are made Through Continence we come vnto the praise of Temperaunce She is perdie rather an vnperfecte vertue than an absolute as liketh Aristotle yet very necessary for the duty of Temperaunce a vertue fully accomplished Celius Calcaguinus hath intituled in his inquisicions that Aristotle doth declare in his Ethikes and Plutarchus in his Commentarie of Morall Vertu what difference there is betwixt the continent man and vncontynent Temperate and vntemperate For the Continent person contendeth with affections and vanquisheth them the vncontinent perdie doth repine but beyng ouercommed doth lament Contrarywise the temperate hath no struglyng but vseth appeased affections as the calme Sea whiche is tossed with no wynde But the vntemperate without resistynge graunteth vnto perturbacions take professeth himselfe willingly consenting to all delices The contrary vice vnto Continence is incontinence spreadyng abrode her braunches egally She may be defined An immoderate desier of pleasures which is not gouerned with the Empyre of Reason either it is a superfluous vse and repugnant to reason of lust gluttony drunknesse and other vnseemely pleasures Nothynge is more filthy and vile than this vice which maketh a man a bounde seruante and despoyleth him of al libertie whom it deliuereth in bondage to moste wanton rulers as to Desiers Lustes Fleshfondynges Wrathe auarice and suche other stewardes of reproche deformitie as elegantly it is disputed of Cicero in his first Paradox Of Clemencie Cap. xxxv EVen as Continence is tried in the restreigninge and moderating of desiers so is Clemencie in the bridlyng of anâ—er For there are two partes of the Soule as before it is declared the desiâ—ing and the angry out of which all afâ—ections do proceede Clemencie is defiâ—ed of Cicero through which the minds â—naduisedly enforced to hate one are â—epressed with gentlenesse Seneca alledging sundry definitions of the same Vertue sayeth Clemencie is a temperance of the mind in power to reuenge either a gentlenesse of the superiour towardes the inferiour in ordering of punishementes either a bendinge of the minde vnto fauourablenesse in exaction of punishment For it is called the same pleasantnesse or méekenesse and Clemencie by which the braide of anger is repelled with reason and a modesty is shewed in reuenginge and chastising But wisdom doth so rule her that neyther all should be pardoned nor any maÌ„ corrected For both of them rather doth answere vnto cruelty than Clemencie yet notwithstaÌ„ding it is better to offend in the more fréendly poynte than in the contrary vnlesse perhappes they who beare office in the common wealth shal suppose an
ouer muche industrious labour is worthely dispraysed so is negligence and the contempte of Science whiche is apperteyninge to blockish and dull persons who appeare more like vnto bruite creatures then to men The third braunche of Modestie is Merinesse or Pleasantnesse and delectablenesse and also Humanitie and courtesie of talke whiche who that shall vse prudently he shal be pleasant to all men and for that also the better accepted Merinesse is which ascribeth a certaine meane to sportes and pastimes and vseth these same in time and place with them vnto whom they are thankefull to stur vp honest mirth and to wipe away the anguishes of the minde with a certayne delight This also is a meane betwixt two vices as Aristotle beareth witnesse in his second booke Ad Nicomachum vnhonest skoffing and carterlike vnsauournesse He that keepeth a meane of pleasantnesse applied to sporte is reckened mery and ciuill He that passeth degree is compted a rayler what maner of felowes are the Parasites and stage Players and other light and foolish men But he which altogether abhorreth Maygames is iudged beastly and vplandishe But wée must diligently take heede lesse through our bourdyng wee offende any man that there be not immoderate coÌ„ceites not filthy not foolish The work of Apothegmes collected of Erasmus shall minister many mery toyes And as concernyng that pleasantnesse of life whiche is remnant who that shewes himself delectable in suche sorte as reason requireth he is called easie gentell courtise and Facilitie is reckened Mediocritie He whiche passeth the meane if he be ledde with no occasion is to be compted ouer easie and pliant but if for his owne profit he is to be esteemed a flatterer But he whiche altogether dissenteth and departeth from meane and reason and sheweth himselfe sadde in all respects he is to be thought testif and churlish and worthie of al mennes hatred with that vncourteise sadnesse and rude grauitie and vnthankefull to wise men A certayne sadde sagenesse in countenance séemeth to be ingraffed in certayne what one is geuen to that Crito of Terence which if it be naturall surely it can neither be called properly good nor euill It shal be reckened good if it agree to right reason But there is a certaine secte of menne which cloke foolishnesse in their face and countenaunce and also in their iesture ietting and communication Whose affectate grauity ratified by lewd custom is wonte to appeare very foolishe vnto witty men and more rightlie informed vnto humanity The last member of sober moode doth teache that the paumpering and apparelling of the carcase is to be moderated and seemelinesse to be kepte in it as in other matters lesse either ouer curious care and riotte or els carterlye and vnnaturall slouenry and vncleanlinesse be reproued For this vertue which consisteth of adourning agreeable for the commodity of the body necessity of nature is a meane betwixt superfluity and filth Let the apparell than be moderate cleane fit for the body and conueniente for vse not for foolishnesse and rediculous ostentacion what one the barbarous and outlandish is wont to be let it be applied to the persons accordyng to their dignitie and riches and to kinde to age to place to time and to honest custome One beâ—eemeth noble and riche men another the base and poore one men another women one olde fathers another the galant youthe Of Intemperance and her two partes Cap. xxxvij INtemperancie is a redinesse conseting to desiers againste reason which Cicero in his fourth boke TusculanaruÌ„ questionum doth define a swaruing from al vnderstanding and from righte reason so bended from the â—rescript of reason that by no meanes the appetites sensual neither can be ruled nor yet repressed The parts of this vice are two One which verily addicteth her selfe vnto pleasures the other which doth nothing at all Throughe her men do rush hedlong after the vsage of beasts into al delices the Empire of Reason throwen away Through this by the rudenesse of minde some as it were with a certaine abashmente are made dull vnto all pastaunces and also do reiect and contempne honest and necessary delighte without occasion But these I iudge a man may séeke and find a fewe which through a certayne Brutishnesse would so abhorre all pastime wherewith Nature is cheefely delited that they may be intreated with no delectation The better sort by a greate deale are wont to go astray in the other parte and to géeue to muche scope vnto pleasure which temperaunce doth bridel by the Squire of reason who being collocated betweene those two vices dothe alwaies laye claime to that precious peculier Mediocritie of Vertue Of the coniunction of Vertues amonge them selues the difference and excellencie Cap. xxxviij ALl Vertues which nowe are absolute and brought vnto the perfection of reason are so connected together amonge them selues with a certayne mutuall copulation as the members of our bodie they do so agrée in amible concord as musical Harmonie This is that manifold order of Ringes whiche Plato writeth to be drawen vnto of the Lodestone For you shal not cal him perfectly and truly a prudent man which same is not both iust and valiaunt and temperate neither iust who wanteth the rest nor valiaunte nor Temperate who is not â—urnished with the felowship of the residue although he be conuersaunt more commonly in one Vertue than in another But the vnperfecte vertues are not so yoked together that they may make as it weare a consente and agreement Wee haue heard that Socrates was Temperate and Modest yet that bourding whiche is sayde to haue béene peculiar vnto him when as he woulde reprehende the vnskilfulnesse of others so greedely can not escape the checke of arrogancie But truly that great pacience and Temperaunce of Iob published in holy Scriptures was most perfet of all others But not so many examples are alledged of this absolute Vertue yet many maye be disclosed of the vnperfect Som vertues excell others in excellencie and operation as Prudencie whose Harboroughe is placed in the minde and is occupied in the out findinge of trouthe she is preferred before Temperaunce whiche moderateth delices and appoynteth a meane vnto all thinges vnto whom a place is assigned in the desiringe facultye of the soule Iustice passeth Fortitude because she preserueth the equality of humayne society and hath no certaine habitation but is indifferently spred abrode vnto all partes of the Soule this ought to be busied in despising of perils and oughte to bee situated in the Vertue of the angrie Soule what soeuer verily be subiect vnto these cheefe Vertues as they are lower in order so be they in statelinesse by reason that some of them are vnder others neither forthwith should bee referred vnto the greateste good whiche those principall Fountaynes do nexte consider but euery one to their proper beginninges and shoulde haue regard of vs rather then of felicity sith not they of their owne power but by those foure Capitalles may be straightned vnto God him selfe who is the end of all good thinges To this wished marke and eternal felicitie we attaine by the operation of Vertue verily as in the beginning it is expressed yet the which God him selfe may make prosperous vnto vs through his Clemencie to whom be due all praise honoure and glory for euer and euer Amen FINIS 〈◊〉 1. â—…d VVâ—… Philâ—…phy iâ—… be mâ—…tated chrisâ—… men â—… The â—…raynâ—… for mâ—… God 〈◊〉 throâ—… him 〈◊〉 lastinâ—… True veâ—… is the bâ—…fite of 〈◊〉 This booke translated by Iohn Charlton late felow of Exetre Colledge in Oxford now Schole maister of Wyrksop in the countie of Nottingham Mors vltima Linea rerum The Table OF the ende and partes of Morall Science Cap. i. Of the end of man and the Soueraigne good Cap. ii Of Affections Cap. iii Of loue Cap. iiii Of desire and hope Cap. v. Of Gladnesse Cap. vi Of hatred and anger and like affectioÌ„s Cap. vii Of Sadnesse Cap. viii Of Feare Cap. ix Of Boldnesse Cap. x. Of Vertue and her diuision and Originall Cap. xi Of Prudencie Cap. xii Of Domesticall gouernaunce Cap. xiii Of Politike gouernaunce Cap. xiiii O Vices contrary to vvisdom Cap xv Of Iustice Cap xvi Of the partes of Iustice Cap xvii Of the six partes of Iustice constituted of Cicero and theyr Vices and of some other vvhich be vvelnie of the same nature cap xviii Of Godlinesse cap. xix Of Reuerence Cap. xx Of Trouth cap. xxi Of Reuengement Cap. xxii Of Thanke cap. xxiii Of compassion Cap. xxiiii Of Liberality and vices contrary to this Auarice and Prodigalitie cap. xxv Of Magnificence Cap. xxvi Of Frendship cap. xxvii Of Iniustice Cap. xxviii Of Fortitude cap. xxix Of Confidence and Magnanimitie Cap. xxx Of pacience and perseuerance cap xxxi Of the Vices betvveene vvhiche Fortitude is placed cap. xxxii Of Temperaunce cap. xxxiii Of Continence and abstinence cap. xxxiiii Of Clemencie Cap. xxxv Of Modestie Cap. xxxvi Of Intemperaunce and her tvvo partes cap. xxxvii Of the coniunction of Vertues amonge â—hem selues the difference and excelâ—encie Cap. xxxviii FINIS ¶ These are to be solde at the Southwest doore of Poules Churche