also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should which may consist with Evidence though it proceeds not upon it and has no regard to it as a Motive So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear as it happens according as the Nature of the thing is but as Believ'd or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence even when it has any but wholy upon another Account already sufficiently represented 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent I cannot forbear Observing by the way though a little of the soonest of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason For what though it be above Reason is it therefore above Faith Has Faith any regard to Evidence Or is it determin'd by any Rational Motive I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object Even when a thing is evident Faith is not supposed to assent to it because of its Evidence and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly consist together and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd but whatever is believ'd must be inevident But this I look upon and have already shewn to be a Mistake And 't is a Mistake in the Extremity too For I take it to be every whit as much an Extreme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident as to say that it is always evident However it is always inevident so far as Believ'd which is the Middle Point between the two extremes The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object whatever it be in its own Nature and we need no More For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevident For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence if the Principle it proceeds upon be right The Principle is and a very moderate one sure the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd The Consequence is that therefore a thing may be believ'd though inevident 'T is true indeed one of these is an Absolute and the other only a Relative inevidence But this signifies Nothing to the Argument For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd when even that which is Evident is Consider'd by Faith as inevident Why then 't is all one as to Faith as if it were so indeed For what does the Evidence signify or what real alteration does it make if Faith has no regard to it nor Consideration of it And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd especially if reveal'd by God himself and concerning himself The short is Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence I mean that of the thing and Faith as Divine has no need of it and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not understand and would be glad to Learn 24. But to return for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pursued after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine with proper Considerations upon each of them it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit Then we are said to believe Explicitly when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular distinctly knowing what that Particular thing is And then Implicitly when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority not knowing what in particular is proposed or what it is we Believe Which though it seems to carry the Appearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Reasonable Creature may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit and has Implicit Faith in it 25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider what has been already intimated that Faith proceeds upon Premisses as well as Science and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism And I further Note what perhaps may not be unworthy the Observation of the Curious that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit as may be seen in the Syllogism before set down Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Major Proposition here whatever is reveal'd by God is true is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit borrows from it its Conclusion for its Principle and begins where the other leaves off Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other so 't is here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths whereof that which is Explicit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Implicit Faith as a blind and irrational Assent since it lays a ground for Explicit which serves it self of it using its Conclusion as a Principle even as what is a Conclusion in Geometry is a Principle in Perspective And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superiour Science so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds and which it self proceeds thus Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true God is Infallible Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true Here besides that 't is plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syllogism is the Principle of the precedent One and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit it may be further noted that Implicit Faith as being the highest degree of Faith is due only to the highest that is to an Infallible Authority the reason why whatever is reveal'd by God is here Concluded to be true being
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
and the believing what is Above Reason And this it may be is that which imposes upon the Minds or the Ears shall I say of them that urge it as an Objection I cannot imagine what else should for I 'm sure there is no Contradiction in the Sense 'T is true indeed Evidence in the Act and not Evidence in the Act are Contradictories because ad Idem and so are Not Evidence in the Object and Evidence in the Object for the same reason But there is no Contradiction between Evidence in the Act and No Evidence in the Object and therefore these may stand together though the other cannot 10. But to lay open the Fallacy of this great and very popular Objection yet a little more to the Eye though it must be a very blind one that does not see it already I will put it into Form and give it a Formal Answer If Faith be a Rational Act then what is Above Reason cannot rationally be Believ'd But Faith is a Rational Act Ergo. For Answer to this I distinguish If by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon Internal Evidence or the Evidence of the Object then I deny the Minor Faith is not so a Rational Act. But if by Rational Act be meant an Act founded upon External Evidence or the Evidence of its Formal Reason or Motive then indeed I grant the Minor but deny the Consequence which is none at all for it does not at all follow because Faith is a Rational Act meaning by it that it proceeds upon External Evidence and that there is a clear Reason for Believing that therefore the thing Believâ—d may not from within and in its own Nature be altogether inevident and so above the Comprehension of Reason For though Evidence be Contradictory to Not Evidence in the â—ame yet Evidence in the Act is no way Contradictory to inevidence in the Object and Consequently does not at all exclude it They may therefore both stand together and Consequently what is above Reason may be believ'd for any thing that this Celebrated Objection from Faith's being a Rational Act makes to the Contrary which truly is so gross and palpable a Sophism that I cannot but wonder how it could ever impose upon so many Learned Men as it has done and some of them very acute and nice Considerers of things But I hope the Fallaciousness of it is by this so plainly and fully detected that I shall not think those Heads worth much informing that shall be further imposed on by it 11. But what then shall we say to that Great and Fundamental Maxim so pressingly inculcated by Des Castes and his Followers and not disallow'd of by others that we are to assent to notâ—ing but what is Clear and Evident If to nothing but what is Clear and Evident how then to what is Obscure and Inevident Or if to what is Obscure and Inevident how then to nothing but what is Clear and Evident Do not these seem flat Contradictions one to the other and how then shall we adjust the Matter between them It must be either by denying that Cartesian Maxim to be true or by shewing that though it be true it does not Contradict the Assertion here maintain'd but is Consistent with it The First way I shall not take I allow the Maxim to be true and not only so but to be withal of the greatest importance of any that can be given for the direction of the Mind of Man in order to the avoiding of Errour The only Remedy and Caution against which is never to let our Judgments prevent our Conceptions or to Assent to any thing that we have only a Confuse Notion of and where we see only by halves and with an imperfect Light or perhaps do not see at all but to have a Clear Understanding of the Matter before we adventure to judge of it and to Maintain an Evidence in all our Reasonings Which accordingly is made by M. Malebranche the First of those Rules which in his Treatise of Method he lays down to be observ'd in the inquiry after Truth And indeed to do otherwise is to make a wrong use of our Intellectual Powers particularly of that Liberty we have to suspend Judgment till the fulness of Evidence requires it and the want of Observing this Rule is also the Occasion of most of our Errours and Wrong Assents as the same Excellent Person shews it to have been in particular to the Authors of the Scholastic Philosophy 12. I shall not therefore go about to salve my own Assertion by denying Des Cartes's Maxim but rather by shewing that according to the true Sense and intendment of it it does not Contradict it But first we must see what the true Sense of it is or rather in what Sense it is true though this may be without much difficulty Collected by any attentive Reader from what has been already said in several places of this Chapter wherein I have in great Measure prevented this Objection But to Consider it more directly To verifie this Maxim that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident the usual way has been to distinguish between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason In Matters of Faith say they we are to believe many things which we cannot Comprehend And here then it seems this Rule must be laid aside But in Matters of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident And here then it seems it holds Accordingly when 't is Objected against certain Articles of Faith that they are not to be comprehended by Reason 't is usual to reply that these things do not belong to Reason c. implying that if they did then indeed the Objection would be good and the incomprehensibility of such things would be an Argument against assenting to them which implies again that in Matters of Reason we must not Assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident though in Matters of Faith we may But we have remarqu'd already that even in Matters of Pure Reason we are forc'd to Assent to many things which we cannot comprehend and that even in Matters of Faith we do in a Certain Sense Assent upon Clear Evidence This Distinction therefore will not do 13. In stead therefore of distinguishing between Matters of Faith and Matters of Reason I think it will be better to distinguish of Evidence We are to Assent to Nothing save what is Clear and Evident says our Maxim Very Good Now if by Evidence here be meant internal Evidence and the Sense be that are to assent to nothing but what in its own Nature and by a Light intrinsic to it is Evident then the Maxim is False and that not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason too wherein we find our selves often Constrain'd to assent to things that have not this internal Evidence but are as to what respects the Nature of the things themselves altogether Obscure and
that of the Subject or to word it more Intelligibly though perhaps not altogether so Scholastically into that of the Thing and that of the Understanding Reason objective or of the Thing is again very various Sometimes it is taken for Truth and that both for Truth of the Thing namely the Essential relations that are between Ideas and for Truth of the Proposition which is its conformity to those Ideal Relations Thus it is taken the first way for the Ideal Relations themselves when we inquire whether the Reasons of Good and Evil are ab Eterno meaning by Reasons the Essential Relations or Differences Thus again it is taken the second way for the agreement or conformity of a Proposition with those Essential Relations as when we say This is Sense and Reason meaning that the Proposition is true and conformable to the Nature of things Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium Argument or Principle whereby as Truth is proved as when we say Do you prove this by Reason or by Authority Sometimes again for the Rules and Measures of Reasoning as suppose I should say That Reason is the â—ittest Study for a Rational Creature I should be supposed to mean those Rules and Measures whereby we ought to reason and so to intend a commendation of Logick Sometimes again it is taken for Moderation as when we say There is Reason in all things Sometimes for Right Equity or Justice the observation of which is commonly call'd Doing a Man Reason It is also taken for the End or Motive of an Action as when we say For what Reason do you this or that in which sense it is used by the Poet stat pro Ratione voluntas 4. Come we now to the Consideration of Reason as 't is taken subjectively the other general part of its distinction in which also there is some variety of Acceptation For it is sometimes taken for the Act sometimes for the Habit and sometimes for the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning For the Act as when we say of a Man asleep that he is deprived of his Reason For the Habit as when we say of a Man that he has lost his Reason when his Intellectuals are mightily disorder'd and impair'd by a Disease For the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning as when we say That Man is a Creature indued with Reason Which being a Proposition of Universal Truth and that proceeds of Man as Man must necessarily be verified of every Man and consequently must not be meant of the Act or Habit of Reason for these are not at all times in every Man but of the Natural Power or Faculty of it which is not lyable to be suspended as the Act nor lost as the Habit but is Essential to the Nature of Man that which constitutes him what he is and distinguishes him from other Creatures and consequently is inseparable from him whether asleep or awake whether sick or well 5. Reason thus consider'd as it stands for a Power or Faculty in Human Nature may be taken again either largely or strictly Largely for the Power of Thinking or Perception in general whereby a Man is capable of knowing or understanding any Truth let it be by what means or in what order or method soever Strictly for the same Power proceeding after a certain special manner and according to a peculiar order and method namely from the knowledge of one thing to that of another or to the knowledge of what is as yet obscure and unknown by the knowledge of what is more clear and better known concerning which a fuller account by and by 6. After having thus distinguisht with what exactness of order I could the several Acceptations of the word Reason I shall in the next place define in which of these Senses I now use it By Reason then in this place I intend not Reason of the Object but that of the Subject and that not as to the Act or Habit but as to the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning And that again not as it is taken strictly as it uses a certain particular process in its operation but as it is taken more at large for the power of perceiving or knowing in general According to which Sense Reason is here the same with Vnderstanding And so it is often used as when we say The Reason of a Man teaches him this or that meaning his Understanding at large or the general Power whereby he understands For if Science which strictly taken is that particular kind of Knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration be yet often used more largely for Knowledge in general why may not Reason the great Principle and Faculty of Science which strictly taken signifies a Power of Knowing by such a certain way and in such a certain manner of proceeding be taken as well in a greater latitude for the Power of Knowing or Understanding in general 7. And the Nature of the Subject and Question now under Consideration requires that it should be thus used here For when 't is inquired whether there be any thing in Religion above Reason the meaning certainly can be no other than whether there be any thing which surpasses the Power and Capacity of a Mans Understanding to comprehend or account for And he that says there is nothing in Religion above Reason is supposed to mean that there is nothing in it beyond the comprehension of a Mans Natural Understanding nothing but what he can profound and fathom And so also he that says that there are Mysteries in Christianity or things above our Reason must be presumed to mean that there are Reveal'd Truths that so far exceed the measure of our Intellectual Faculties and are of a size so disproportionate to our Minds that with all the force and penetration of Spirit and the utmost application of Thought we cannot possibly comprehend them be our method of proceeding what it will I do not intend by this to state the Question which shall be done more fully in its due place but only to give an account of one of its Terms and to shew that by Reason I both do and should here mean A Mans Natural Power of Knowing or Understanding in general In which use of the word 't is no 〈◊〉 Authority to me that the Excellent and most Accurate Author of L' Art de Penser defines Logâ—ck to be an Art of well conducting ones Reason in the knowledge of things Where by Reason 't is plain he must mean the same as Vnderstanding 8. What this Power or Principle of Understanding is in its self or in its own Nature and Essence I do not pretend to know as not having any clear Idea of my own Soul and indeed as not knowing my self at all by Idea but only by a confuse Sentiment of internal Consciousness And therefore I shall not go about to examine what it is For the same reason also I shall not set my self to consider whether the Understanding be any Power or Faculty really
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chimeras of Substantial Forms Qualities Sympathys Antipathys c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists striking and filling their Ears with those great but empty Sounds Archeus Seminal Spirit Astral Beings Gas Blas c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light for they are dark as may be mere Philosophic Cant but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse and therefore they fancy there must be somewhat more than Ordinary in them tho they know not nor it may be never Consider'd what And herein as in some other Instances Men love Darkness better than Light 2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Honest Man with a Candle in their hands and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas Full and adequate Perceptions Demonstrative Proofs and Arguments and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend Strange diversity of Conduct Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together I will not say in the same Man but in the same Human Nature and that the very same Creature and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too should proceed by such uncertain Measures and act so inconsistently with it Self sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity and sometimes again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it 3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not For since Truth is the general Object of Faith 't is evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible or not reasonable to be beleiv'd but that which at the same time argues it not to be True For if true then 't is still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith But now we have shewn already that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being true whence it clearly and closely follows that 't is no Argument neither against it's Credibility And if so then we may believe it Notwithstanding it's Incomprehensibility because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Rational Belief or that what is Above our Reason should be therefore above our Faith too 4. It is true indeed that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd and he would be thought to give but an ordinary account of his Faith who being askâ—d why he believ'd such an Incomprehensible thing should answer because it is Incomprehensible which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish much such another as Credo quia impossibile And that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth whether it may be per Accidens may be Consider'd afterwards whose Natural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity but Light and Evidence Not that nothing is True but what has this Character for we have already shewn the Contrary in proving Incomprehensible Truths but that as whatever we clearly perceive is True so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it Incomprehensibility therefore is none but as such abstracts from true and not true and is equally Common to both But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false can no more prove it True than that which may Consist with a thing supposing it True can prove it false according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter The Incomprehensibility therefore of a thing is no proper Argument of the Truth of it and Consequently no Reason of it Self why it should be believ'd and that because it abstracts as such from True and False and is too Common to Both to prove either 5. And because it is so it is also further granted that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall determin the Assent In the mean while it advises to Suspend For the Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it 't is plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it without Reason That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent though to give it one had need have a positive Reason When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief till some prevailing Consideration from without shall over-rule that Suspension by requiring our Assent But when it does so then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contrary and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility as to believe it before for that Reason And that because as the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no reason for Believing it so it is no Absolute Reason against it 6. If it were so it would be in Natural things the objects of Human and Philosophic Science such as belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Reason Here if any where the Incomprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of Incomprehensible things in Religion will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations Clearness and Evidence is to lead the way and we are to proceed with our Light before us assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within we have reason to believe true and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other but then this will equally hold in Matters of Faith too which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture and we know not why and whose Formal Reason as has been already discours'd is always Clear But if their Meaning be that in Matters
against their being so Reveal'd supposing the plain obvious and literal Construction of the Words does naturally and directly lead to such a Sense And that it does so is not I think offer'd to be denied and the thing it self is plain enough to extort an acknowledgement but then 't is pretended that there is a Necessity of having recourse to a different Construction and to understand the words in another Sense because of the unconceivableness and incomprehensibleness of that which their proper and Grammatical Scheme does Exhibit But by the Tenour of this whole Discourse it evidently appears that there is no such Necessity since to admit an incomprehensible Sense has nothing absurd or inconvenient in it and that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it From whence it plainly follows that 't is no more an Objection against its being Reveal'd than 't is an Objection against the Belief of it supposing it were Reveal'd there being nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reasonable Obstruction against either 5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and most Natural Sense and not seek out for Forc'd and Strain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehensibility of that which is apparently Genuin and Natural And if the Revelation be otherwise plain and such as we would accept of in another Case and about matters which we can well Comprehend we ought not to think it the less so because the Sense of it so understood is such as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehensions and Conceptions of things For notwithstanding that it may be true since by this time we may be sufficiently satisfied that there are many Incomprehensible Truths The Incomprehensibility of a thing is therefore no Argument against its being Reveal'd any more than 't is against the Belief of it supposing it were Which opens an immediate Entrance to the Christians Mysteries which I doubt not would be thought sufficiently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehensibility of them the only Objection that can be pretended against their Revelation 6. I have hitherto argued upon the Supposition that the Mysteries of Christianity those Doctrines I mean that are so call'd are above Reason and such as do transcend our Comprehension and have shewn that even upon that Supposition there is no reasonable Objection against the Belief of them that they are never the less Believable for their being Incomprehensible But what if I should recall this Concession and put our Adversaries to the proof that they are indeed above Human Reason and Comprehension They cannot be ignorant that there are those that Contend they are not and with great shew of reason offer to prove it by endeavouring to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account of them If these Men should be in the right which I do not think necessary at present to inquire into it would be a further Advantage to our Cause and such as though I do not now insist upon it I need not lose the Benefit of But if it should prove that they are not in the right the Cause of our Christian Mysteries is not much Concern'd in the loss of that Pillar but can support it self well enough without it as having another that is sufficient to bear its weight since though we should suppose these Sacred Doctrines to be never so Incomprehensible to our Reason it does by no Consequence follow as from the Argument of this whole Discourse is apparent that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith 7. Should any one now be so fond of Objection as to draw one against the Mysteries of Christianity from the use of the Word Mystery in Scripture which knows no other Mysteries but such as before the Revelation of them were undiscover'd not Considering whether they were in themselves Conceivable or no I must tell him that I do not know that ever I met in any Controversie with a less pertinent Objection as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer who heaps together a great many Texts to shew the signification of the Word Mystery in the New Testament that it signifies not things in themselves inconceivable but only such as were not known before they were Reveal'd Well be it so as this Gentleman pretends though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwise yet what is this to the purpose For do we Dispute about Names or Things The Question is not whether the Scripture expresses inconceivable things by the Name of Mysteries but whether there be not things in Scripture above our Conception call them by what Name you will and if there be whether their being so above our Conception be an Argument why they should not be Believ'd Now to these inconceivable things it has been the Common Use of Church-Writers to apply the Name of Mysteries which if the thing be granted he must be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will Contend about it But the Learned Bishop of Worcester has already prevented me in the Consideration of this Objection for which reason together with the Frivolousness of it I shall pursue it no further CHAP. X. The Conclusion of the whole with an Address to the Socinians 1. AND thus I have led my Reader through a long Course of Various Reasoning and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me though I hope his Journey has not been without some Pleasure that may deceive and some Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it I have shewn him what Reason is and what Faith is that so he may see from the Absolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another and how the Darkness and Obscurity of the Latter may Consist with the Light and Evidence of the Former I have also Consider'd the Distinction of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason and shewn it to be real and well-grounded and to have all that is requisite to a good Distinction And for the further Confirmation of it I have also shewn that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth From which Great Principle which I was the more willing to discourse at large and thoroughly to settle and establish because of its Moment and Consequence to the Concern in hand I have deduced that weighty Inference that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument of its not being true which Consequence for the greater Security of it because it is so Considerable in the present Controversie I have also proved Backwards by shewing that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then Human Reason contrary to what was before demonstrated would be the Measure of Truth Whence I infer again ex Absurdo that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true From this last Consequence I infer another of no less Moment and
to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
a desperate Argument when there is nothing else to be said for it 2. Which of these is the Evasion either the denying or the allowing this Distinction will best appear by the Examination of it which besides its Serviceableness to our Clearer proceeding in what we are now upon I am the rather induced to undertake because as Mr. Boyle Observes in a little Treatise upon this Subject there are divers that employ this Distinction few that have attempted to explain it and none that has taken care to justifie it Indeed He himself is the only Person that I know of that has written professedly about it and I cannot but wonder that a thing of such Curiosity and Importance should be so little Consider'd though I think he has not gone to the Bottom of the Subject nor is sufficiently clear even as far as he goes However because he has some Considerable Observations upon it as indeed his Thoughts are generally very good and there is no reason why we should refuse any additional Light in so dark and untrodden a way I shall for the further advantage and illustration of the Matter first draw up into a short view what that Excellent Person has Meditated concerning it with such Occasional Remarques as I shall think necessary and then proceed to state the thing according to my own Conceptions hoping that between us both it will be sufficiently clear'd and that nothing of any Consequence will be overlook'd that belongs to the Consideration of this so little consider'd and almost Virgin Subject 3. To give you then in the first place the Sum of Mr. Boyle's Account He proposes in general two things 1. To declare in what sense the Distinction is to be understood 2. To prove that it is not an Arbitrary or illusory Distinction but grounded upon the Nature of things As to the first he tells you that by things Above Reason he Conceives such Notions and Propositions as Mere Reason that is unassisted by Revelation would never have discover'd to us whether those things be to our Finite Capacities clearly comprehensible or not And that by things Contrary to Reason he understands such Conceptions and Propositions as are not only undiscoverable by mere Reason but such as when we do understand them do evidently appear repugnant to some Principle or to some Conclusion of right Reason 4. Now before I go any further I would here by this great Man's leave and with due deference to his high Character remarque that though things undiscoverable by mere Reason without Revelation may in a Certain sense be said to be above Reason in as much as they surpass the Natural ability of the Understanding to make the first Discovery of them yet this is not what Divines mean by Above Reason as they use the Phrase in this Distinction opposing it to Contrary to Reason For this Distinction was intended against the Socinians who generally reject the Mysteries of Faith as contrary to Sense and Reason to which we reply that they are not Contrary to Reason but only Above it They cry out that this is no Distinction but a mere Shift and Evasion pretending that the I arts of it fall in together and that what is above Reason is also contrary to it and therefore not to be believ'd Now 't is most plain that both they that use this Distinction and they against whom it is used do not Mean by things Above Reason such as are beyond the first invention or Discovery of it For besides that to mean that our Mysteries are only undiscoverable when we say they are above Reason would be too little a thing to oppose to Contrary to Reason it is also too little a thing to intend by Mystery since though the undiscoverableness of them by Reason might be a sufficient ground of their being so call'd before their Revelation it can be none now after they are reveal'd And therefore if we say of these Mysteries now that they are above Reason we cannot be presumed to intend it in respect of their undiscoverableness And 't is as plain that that our Adversaries do not so understand us For they deny that things above Reason are to be believ'd and that because according to them above Reason and contrary to Reason are all one But now no Socinian that understands his own Principle would deny the Credibility of things above Reason as that signifies only undiscoverable by Reason alone much less would he say that what is above Reason in that Sense is also contrary to it No without doubt they will in this sense both allow us the Distinction and the Mysteries if they may be so call'd that are built upon it But then this plainly shews that they do not understand it in this Sense any more than we 5. Instead therefore of saying undiscoverable he should have said incomprehensible by Reason Into which he slips unawares in the account of the other part of the Distinction things Contrary to Reason by saying that they are such as when we do understand them do appear repugnant c. which plainly implies that the former things that were said to be above Reason are such as we do not understand even when discover'd and not such as we are not able only to Discover since otherwise there will be no Antithesis in the Second part in which there is nothing amiss except those words as are not only undiscoverable which in my judgment ought to be expung'd as the Production of the first Mistake 6. Mr. Boyle proceeds to illustrate his Explanation of this Distinction by a Comparison drawn from Sight He supposes a Man to be askt by a Diver what he could see in a deep Sea To which the Man is supposed to reply that he could see into a Sea-green Liquor to the depth of some yards and no further So that if further ask't if he could see what lies at the Bottom of the Sea his Answer no doubt would be in the Negative But then if the Diver should let himself down to the Bottom and bring up thence and shew him Oysters or Muscles with Pearls in them he would easily acknowledge both that they lay beyond the reach of his Sight and that the Pearls were Genuin and Good But if the Diver should further pretend that each of these Pearls was bigger than the Shells they were contain'd in this would be thought not only undiscernible by the Eyes but contrary to their Informations and to admit this would argue the Sight not only to be imperfect but false and delusory and accordingly 'tis presum'd that this he would not admit 7. Now I not only allow this Comparison but even admire it for the singular Aptness and Pertinency of it to illustrate even to the Sense the difference between things above and things contrary to Reason only I think it seems to proceed upon the supposition that by things above Reason are meant such only as are incomprehensible by it which certainly would make the Comparison
much more Apposite and Exact Whereof he himself appears sensible at the end of it where offering to consider the Matter more distinctly he tells you that the things above Reason are not all of one sort but may be distinguish'd into two kinds sufficiently differing from each other which he makes to be these that there are some things that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover And others that when proposed it cannot Comprehend This indeed is true but then he should have said so sooner and have told us withal that by things above Reason as the Phrase is used in this Distinction he meant the Latter Sort only the Former not being to the Purpose 8. However he proceeds upon that part First that is to shew that there are divers Truths in the Christian Religion that Reason left to it self would never have been able to find out Of which he gives several Instances which as not being to the Point I pass over and come to his other Consideration of things above Reason meaning such as when proposed do surpass our Comprehension and that as he well observes upon one or other of these three Accounts either as not clearly Conceivable by our understanding such as the Infiniteness of the Divine Nature or as inexplicable by us such as the Manner how God can Create a Rational Soul or how this being an Immaterial Substance can act upon a Human Body or be acted upon by it c. Or else lastly as Asymmetrical or unsociable that is such as we see not how to reconcile with other things evidently and confessedly true whereof he gives an instance in the Case of Prescience and Contingency 9. He further observes and I think rightly that there may be difference of degree in things above Reason as to their Abstruseness That some things appear to surpass our understandings immediately even before attentively lookt into And other things only when a narrow inspection is made into them being intelligible enough in the 〈◊〉 and as imploy'd in common Discourse Whereof he gives instances in Place Time and Motion And he makes use of this Observation to solve a Difficulty wherein it is pretended that we cannot profess to believe things which we acknowledge to be above our Reason without discovering that we do not well consider what we say and that we then talk like Parrots To which the substance of his Answer is that we may talk of those things according to that Notion of them which is more Obvious and Superficial though not according to that which is Philosophical and Accurate 10. After this Explanation of what is meant by Above Reason and contrary to Reason he comes in the Second place to justify the Distinction by shewing that it is grounded upon the Nature of things And that he does by shewing that there is no Necessity that things above Reason should be also Contrary to Reason This he shews first of things above Reason in the first Sense viz. those that are undiscoverable by Reason alone but this being not the sense of Above Reason as it is used in this Distinction and since things according to this sense above Reason are not affirm'd by our Adversaries to be contrary to it I pass over all that he says upon this part and strike in with him again where he shews the same of things above Reason in the Second sense I cannot meet with any thing directly under that Head but only a few Passages here and there scatter'd up and down As when he says of Galileo that when he first made his Discoveries with the Telescope and said that there were Planets that mov'd about Iupiter He said something that other Astronomers could not discern to be true but nothing that they could prove to be false And again when he says that for a thing to be above Reason is Extrinsecal and Accidental to its being true or false Because to be above our Reason is not an Absolute thing but a Respective One importing a Relation to the Measure of Knowledge that belongs to Human understanding And therefore it may not be above Reason in reference to a more inlightned Intellect c. which indeed is rightly and very judiciously remarqu'd in it self and no less pertinently to the present business And again when he says that there are some things true which yet are liable to Objections not directly answerable and so above Reason He instances in the Controversie of the Divisibility of Quantity where each side of the Contradiction is press'd with unanswerable Objections and yet as parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true And yet take which you will you run into invincible Difficulties Which indeed well concludes that a thing that is above Reason may yet be true and if true then not contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is so should be true Which one Consideration is indeed enough to justifie the Distinction beyond all exception 11. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Observation concerning this Distinction too Considerable to be pass'd over and that is that he looks upon it to be of Importance not only to the defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion but even of some important Articles of Natural Theology in which as he shews by several Instances there are many Doctrins which must be acknowledgâ—d to be true and yet whose Modus is not explainable 12. After this he Considers an Objection wherein it is pretended that the granting this Distinction would be of bad Consequence as affording shelter to any unintelligible stuff that a bold Enthusiast may obtrude under the venerable Title of a Mystery that is above Reason To which he answers very judiciously that he does not deny but that the Distinction is liable to be ill imploy'd but that this is no other than what is common to it with divers other Distinctions which are without Scruple Admitted because useful and not rejected because they have not the Priviledge that they can never be Misapplied And that therefore both in reference to those other Distinctions and that he had been treating of it becomes Men to stand upon their Guard and strictly examine how far the Doctrine proposed as a Mystery is intitled to the benefit of this Distinction Which if it should be employ'd to justifie any thing that though styl'd a Mystery is but a pretended one the Errour as he well observes in the Close of all will lye Not in the Groundlesness of the Distinction but in the Erroneousness of the Application 13. In this you have the Sum and Substance as briefly and as clearly as I could represent it of Mr. Boyle's Thoughts concerning things above Reason and contrary to Reason which like all his are great and strong and allowing only for those inaccuracies taken Notice of just and true And now though what this Excellent Person has offer'd may serve to let in a great deal of Light into the Distinction yet since a thing of such Consequence if true
and so much Contested whether true or no can never be made too Clear and sometimes a different though not better Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustration every Reader having his particular Point of View so as that the very â—ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in another I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority and by the advantage of his Light venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point applying my self chiefly to that part of it wherein I think the other Account Most defective 14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible and to be Contrary to Reason is to appear repugnant to some Principle or Conclusion of Right Reason yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distinction since it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehensible and what repugnant and again disputed whether incomprehensible and repugnant be not the same as well as whether that which is above Reason be not also Contrary to it And then we are but where we were before This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and General to be rested in and we must be therefore more minute and particular in our Explanation of it if we would be more Clear 15. However since Generals are to go before and do also prepare the way for Particulars I shall first propose the general Idea of things above Reason and contrary to Reason and then particularize upon that Idea by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is contain'd in it and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Distinction than only to have the Members of it well explain'd For if the Idea of Above Reason be distinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason as the Explanation of them will shew that it is then the Distinction proceeds upon a real Difference is grounded upon the Nature of things and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction 16. By things above Reason then as the Expression is used in this Distinction I conceive to be Meant Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive such as it can and does actually comprehend and that to be absolutely Impossible Or in other words a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be Thus in the General 17. But to be a little more Particular we are to Consider upon the first Part that when we speak of things above Reason the word Reason here as was shewn in the first Chapter signifies the same as Vnderstanding and there being but one only Operation of that namely Perception by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend 't is the same as to say they are such as the Understanding cannot Perceive But then when we say Cannot Perceive 't is to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Proposition as if the thing said to be Above Reason were perfectly unintelligible but only of the Truth of it as was observ'd before concerning Faith And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Consequences and Relations to other Truths for then almost every thing would be Above Reason but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas or the manner of it is not discernible and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively and partly for want of a due and proper Medium whereby to compare them so as to discern their Union in the way of Science and Demonstration 18. 'T is also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible than such as appear contrary to some Principle or some Conclusion of Right Reason This being the more General and Absolute Idea whereof the two other are but Instances and Specifications For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united Which may be either because of the immediate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with themselâ—â—s so as Mutually to Exclude each other as in a Contradiction or because of their inconsistency with some other Truth with which it cannot Comport Or in other words either because one of the Ideas cannot consist with the other by reason of the immediate opposition that is between them or because the Union of both is inconsistent with some Truth or other which therefore will not suffer them to be United Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas cannot stand together and that either immediately by the very inconsistency of the Ideas themselves or mediately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth whether Principle or Conclusion Which Repugnance I take to consist in this that the supposed Principle or Conclusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusion be true as is supposed then such Ideas are not United and indeed are as uncapable of Union that is as impossible as if there were an immediate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason is in short for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it or that its Ideas cannot stand together which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of those Ideas or Mediately by perceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth
or other whether Principle or Conclusion For the way and method is the same in knowing a thing to be False or impossible as in knowing it to be True and accordingly as the Process of the Understanding is either Immediate or Mediate in the latter so is it also in the Former But though there are these different ways of perceiving the impossiblity of a thing 't is in the General Perception of its Impossibility and not in the several ways of it that its contrariety to Reason must be made Formally to consist Even as it was shewn before of Knowledge which is made to consist in the Perception of the Relation of Ideas and not in this or that determinate manner of perceiving it which indeed serve afterwards to distinguish Knowledge into its kinds as suppose Intuitive and Demonstrative but do not enter into its First and General Idea For which Consideration I think the Perception of a things impossibility does better express its Contrariety to Reason than the Repugnance it appears to have to some Principle or Conclusion of it that being only as I said before an instance and specification and but one single one too of its Impossibility 19. So Now we are arrived to a Clear and Distinct Conception of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason A thing is then above Reason when we do not Perceive or Comprehend how it can be And then Contrary to Reason when we do Perceive that it Cannot be or is Impossible As to give a plain and sensible Instance of each of these That the sides of an Hyperbola should be always approaching to each other and yet never meet though continued to infinity is a Proposition of unquestion'd Certainty in Geometry and yet such as passes the Reason of a Man to Comprehend how it can be and therefore may properly be said to be one of those things that are above Reason But now that a Triangle should have Parallel Sides is not only above Reason but directly Contrary to it For here the Understanding is not only at a loss to Comprehend how it may be but does positively and evidently perceive that it cannot be it being utterly impossible that a Figure of Three Lines should have its sides Parallel to each other 20. Now though by this Explanation of things above Reason and contrary to Reason the Difference between them is already obvious even to the eye and stares a Man in the very Face like things of great inequality whose Disproportion appears at View without Measuring them yet for further Satisfaction 's sake and to make the matter as plain as any thing in Nature to all but those who either have not or will not use their Understandings let us a little Compare these Ideas together thereby the better to illustrate their Difference 21. It is most Evident that the Idea of things above Reason and the Idea of things contrary to Reason are two really distinct Ideas and that One is Not the Other This immediately appears from the very direct View of the Ideas themselves For what can be More plain than that Not to Comprehend how a thing may be and to Comprehend that it cannot be are two different things And what better way have we to know the Distinction of things but only that the Idea of one is not the Idea of another But then besides the Ideas of these things are not only Formally different from each other but have also different Properties and Characters belonging to them and such too as are exclusive of each other and which therefore do manifestly shew the Ideas to which they belong to be distinct For for a thing to be above Reason implies only a Negation the Not Comprehending how a thing can be but for a thing to be Contrary to Reason implies the Position of an Intellectual act the Comprehending that it cannot be Again in things above Reason the Proposition is supposed not to be understood whereas in things Contrary to Reason it is supposed to be well understood and that to be false and impossible Again in things above Reason the Mind determines nothing concerning the Object proposed whether it be true or whether it be false whether it be Possible or whether it be Impossible All that she determines is concerning her own Act that she does not Comprehend how it can be But whether it be or not that she does not affirm but holds herself in a perfect Suspence But now in things Contrary to Reason the Mind is every whit as positive and decisive and does determine as boldly and freely as in those things that are most according to it Whereby it plainly appears that to be Contrary to Reason is something more than to be above it and that the Mind proceeds a great deal further in the former than in the latter the Language of the Soul in things above Reason being only How can these things be But in things Contrary to Reason she is Positive and Dogmatical roundly pronouncing This cannot be So that unless there be no difference between a Negation and a Positive Act between the Ignorance or Non-Perception of a thing and the knowing it to be False between Suspension and a peremptory Determination between a greater and a less 't is most undeniably evident that the Parts of this Distinction are not only really but widely different and that to be above Reason is one thing and to be contrary to Reason is another 22. If it be pretended as some perhaps may be likely to Object that to be Contrary to Reason implies a Negation as well as to be above Reason because it is there supposed to be Comprehended that the thing is False and cannot be and that therefore they agree in one of the Main instances of their Difference to this the Answer is Clear and Full. I grant there is a Negation in one as well as the other but then I distinguish of Negation There is a Negation of the Act and a Negation of the Object Contrary to Reason does indeed imply a Negation of the Object that is it implies a Separation and dis-union of certain Ideas as inconsistent and incompatible one with another But it does not imply a Negation of the Act but the quite Contrary because the understanding is here supposed positively to comprehend the thing and withal the Impossibility of it which is not done in things Above Reason wherein the Negation is that of the Act. So that this first and great difference between them stands firm and good 23. And now having thus far justified the reality of this distinction of things Above Reason and Contrary to Reason both by the Explanation and Collation of the Parts of it which thereby appear to consist of Ideas as different as can well be conceiv'd I might further proceed to do the same by producing some Instances of things confessedly Above Reason that are also notwithstanding as confessedly True For if any one thing that is Above Reason be yet found
Idea of Extension or that Perfection in God which vertually eminently and modo intelligibili answers to Extension and is therefore frequently called by Mr. Malebranch L' ètendue intelligibl◠is of the Substance of God not as it is in it self simply and absolutely but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter or Body and imitable or participable by it according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being and which are represented by this its Idea I know not whether I express my self to the Conception of every Reader but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligible to my self and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics or in Attention cannot I think well miss my Meaning 23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present purpose is this Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it is representative of Creatures must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature Because however truly Divine and of the Essence of God yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self but only as it is in relation to Creatures that is as partially and inadequately consider'd according to certain Abstractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require And accordingly such Ideas are ordinarily said not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite for they do not represent him though Essential to him but to be the Ideas of Creatures who are Finite They are indeed Divine Ideas because Essential to God but they are not Ideas of God because they are of the Divine Essence only as it relates to Creatures and is representative of them Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas and God in seeing them is not properly said to see himself though they are of himself but to see Creatures because though they are of his Divine Essence yet 't is only according to such Precisions Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representative of their Finite Perfections As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Finite too it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite should be representative of what is Finite And as these Ideas are Finite so are they also by Consequence so Proportionate and of a Measure so adjusted to Finite Understandings as to be Intelligible by them and within the Possibility of their Comprehension which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to them And accordingly the Experiment answers the Theory We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things such as matters of Fact Human Events c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independently on their Actual Existence are Comprehensible by us as in Metaphysics and Geometry in the Contemplation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions 24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order nor with their Truths Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representative of Creatures be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Understandings which indeed otherwise would not be capable of any Science yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of are neither Finite nor Comprehensible For these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature and not as it is in relation to Creatures or as representative of any Reality out of it self And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God and that because they are of his Divine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and not as it is in reference to any thing besides or out of it self These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite because the Divine Essence as it is in it self simply and absolutely consider'd is so and consequently Incomprehensible by any Finite and consequently by Human Understanding God only can Comprehend these Ideas and that because he only can Comprehend himself Human Reason indeed has Light enough to discover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God and is withal able to discern enough of them to raise her greatest Wonder and Devotion and to make her despise all other Intelligible Objects in comparison of these Infinite Grandeurs and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty and stand in a better Light are able to see yet more of them but neither the one nor the other can Comprehend them fully any more than they can God himself and that because they are God So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Comprehensible these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the Instances above proposed of each The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are We have a very distinct View of it we Perceive it we Comprehend it Among all Intelligible Objects there is none that is more clear nor whereof we have a more adequate and exact Notion And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences which alone have the happiness to be free from Disputes and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject Extension But now as to the Divine Immensity so far are we from having a Clear Conception of that that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea but we enter into Clouds and Darkness or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes yea hurts and pains them till they can no longer indure to gaze but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids suspense of Thought or by turning their view upon less glorious Objects In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty only now and then meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our progress But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Immensity we are like men that commit themselves to the Main Sea at the very first Plunge out of our depth and ready to be overwhelm'd swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss
Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being True Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True as thus Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True The only Reason why he that denies this latter Consequence upon the Supposition or Concession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself being this because in denying the latter Consequence he Supposes the Former Principle which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true 8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other besides what I have even now said to that purpose need only add this further Remarque That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth or since there are Incomprehensible Truths then it seems the Incomprehensibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together or in other words the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain or more evident Maxim than this That that which is when a thing is or would be supposing it were is no Argument that it is not As for Instance Suppose it should be Objected against the Copernican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Sense since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set and Move round about us It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say That supposing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now since Sailing as we do between the Sun and the Stars as a late Writer expresses it not the Ship in which we are but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move And 't is most Certain that if supposing the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move 9. Why just so it is in the present Case when 't is Objected against the Truth of a thing that 't is Incomprehensible by Human Reason 't is a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing since if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehensible And 't is most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible then the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it And therefore since we have proved that there are Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist together we may now with all Rational assurance Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth since the Former would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter And both by Vertue of this most Evident and incontestable Principle That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing can be no good Argument that it is not True 10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things surpass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full Light to the Men of Art and Learning and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he pretends to if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding or Conclude any thing False or Impossible when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth 1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with very bad Consequences and yet not professedly to hold those Consequences because either they do not attend to them or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soliâ—idian Systemes so on the other hand and for the same Reason there are those who take up and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Professedly holding those Principles from which they truly flow and to which if traced to the Head they will infallibly lead them 2. Of this we have a very particular Instance where I confess one would not expect to find it in those of the Socinian Perswasion The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith is because they are above their Reason they cannot Comprehend them Whereby they plainly imply that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehensible which is also a common Maxim among them who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing And whereas 't is only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith in saying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True and so that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just warrant to conclude it
Incomprehensible But if by Evidence here be Meant Evidence at large abstracting from Internal or External and the Sense be that we are to assent to nothing but what has some Evidence or other either Internal or External or what is some way or other evident to us and what we see plainly to be true by a Light shining from within or from without in short what we have one way or other sufficient ground or Reason to assent to then the Maxim is undoubtedly true and will hold Universally not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith too which as was shewn in the Chapter of Faith is the Conclusion of a Syllogism and so a Rational Act and proceedt upon as Much though not the Same kind of Evidence as any other Conclusion does And that even in the Belief of Incomprehensible things which it would be absurd nay impossible to believe if there were no Reason to believe things above Reason According to a saying as I take it of St. Austin in one of his Letters to this purpose That we could not bring our selves to believe what is Above our Reason if Reason it self did not perswade us that there are things which we should do well to believe although we are not capable of Comprehending them So then in â—hort if this Maxim that we are to assent to nothing but what is Evident be understood of Internal Evidence then 't is False not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason wherein things intrinsecally inevident are assented to But if it be understood of Evidence at large then â—tis true not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith which as has been often noted is reasonable in its Fund and Principle and whose Evidence must be Clear though its Object may be Obscure 14. In this large therefore and indefinite Sense of the Word Evidence the Maxim is to be understood We are to assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident that is we ought to make use of our liberty of Suspension so far as not to give our Assent to any thing but what all things Consider'd and upon the whole appears Evident to us what by some Light or other we see and plainly perceive to be true and what in one word we find sufficient Reason either from within or from without to Assent to According to that well known Sentence wherewith Des Cartes Concludes his wonderful System Nihilque ab ullo Credi velim nisi quod ipsi Evidens invicta ratio persuadebit I would have nothing believ'd by any one but what by evident and irresistible reason he shall be Convinc'd of And certainly he would be very unreasonable that should desire more For to assent without Evidence of one sort or other that the thing assented to is true is to assent without a why or wherefore and to assent so is to assent without Reason which again is to assent not as a Rational Creature and as Man ought not so to be sure God cannot require such an Assent To assent therefore to nothing but what upon some Consideration or other is Clear and Evident to us and what we have good reason to imbrace as true is certainly a Maxim of unquestionable Truth and of universal Extent that holds in all Matters whatsoever whether of Reason or of Faith in the former of which an Assent without Evidence would be the Act and in the latter the Sacrifice of a Fool. 15. And that this is the true Sense wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim as well as the true Sense of the Maxim it self is plain from the Occasion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to or very Negligent Readers of his Books was the bringing in and obtruding so many things in the Vulgar Philosophy whereof the Introducers of them had such Confuse Notions and of whose reality and Existence they had no Firm and Solid Reasons to assure them such as Substantial Forms really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like which served rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature and were the Occasions of a thousand Errours in the Superstructures that were rais'd upon those Imaginary and Chimerical Principles In Opposition to and as a Remedy for which he lays down this Fundamental Maxim to be Carefully observ'd by all the Disciples of Truth in their whole Intellectual Progress never to assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident that is to nothing but of Whose Truth and Reality they are fully assured and have sufficient Reason to assent to This is the true Sense of the Maxim this is the Sense of its Author and in this Sense it is undeniably true And that without any prejudice to our present Conclusion with which as thus explain'd it is very Consistent For 't is now very easie to discern that we may believe an Incomprehensible thing and yet at the same time according to this Cartesian Maxim assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident because the Evidence of Faith is External and that there may be an External Evidence to assent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiction 16. Which by the way may serve to discover as well the Injustice as the Impertinence 1. Of those who make use of this Maxim as an Objection against the Belief of things above Reason 2. Of those who take occasion from hence to traduce the Cartesian Philosophy as favourable to and looking with a very propitious Aspect upon Socinianiâ—â— and indeed as little better than an Introduction to it only because it talks so much of clear and distinct Ideas and Conceptions and of assenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evident But Most of all 3dly Of those who proceed even to traduce the Author himself as a secret Friend to the Cause and no better than a Socinian in Disguise It would have been indeed a Considerable Glory and Advantage to that or any other Interest to have had so great a Master of Reason a Friend to it But he Certainly was not if with his Words he has transmitted to us his real Thoughts which would be great uncharity to question and with a witness to Assent to what is not Evident 17. He was indeed a great Master in the Rational way but no Magnifier or Exalter of Human Reason So far from that that he seems to have had the most inward and feeling Sense of its Infirmities and Defects and the best to have understood what a poor little thing 't is to be a Man of any one in the World As may be abundantly Collected from several passages in his Writings besides that the whole vein of them runs that way particularly those two final Sentences wherewith he shuts up his Principles and his Metaphysics At Nihilominus memor meaetenuitatis nihil affirmo c. and Naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda Which plainly shew what a low debasing Sense he had both of Himself and of
Consideration viz. That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it neither where also I Consider that seemingly Opposite Maxim of Des Cartes that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident and reconcile it to the other Position Whence my next step was to state the true use of Reason in Believing which I shew'd to Consist not in examining the Credibility of the Object but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation which when once resolv'd of we are no longer to Dispute but Believe In fine I have made an Application of these Considerations to the Mysteries of the Christian Faith by shewing that they are never the less to be Believ'd for being Mysteries supposingâ— them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd against which also I have shewn their Incomprehensibility to be no Objection So that every way the Great Argument against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith taken from the Incomprehensibility of them vanishes and sinks into nothing In all which I think I have effectually overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground of Socinianism and truely in great Measure that of Deism too whose best Argument against Reveal'd Religion in general is because the Christian upon all Accounts the most preferable of those that pretend to be Reveal'd Contains so many things in it which transcend the Comprehension of Human Understanding But whether this Best Argument be really a good one or no the whole Procedure of this Discourse may sufficiently shew and whoever knows how to distinguish Sophistry from good Reasoning may easily judge 2. And now you Gentlemen for whose sakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatise give me leave in a few words to Address my self a little more particularly to you and to Expostulate with you Whether it be the good opinion you have of your Cause or the present Opportunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you so freely to Come abroad as you have done of late you have certainly to give your Courage its due taken a very rational and Polite Age for it and I hope the Wise Conduct of Providence may turn this juncture to the Advantage of the Truth and that the Light to which you have adventur'd to expose your Novel Opinions may serve to make you see their Absurdities if you do not too Obstinately shut your Eyes against it Some of you are Considerable Masters of Reason otherwise truly I should not think it worth while to argue with you and you all profess great Devotion to it I wish you do not make it an Idol and to be very Zealous and Affectionate Disciples of it Reason is the great Measure by which you pretend to go and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal Now I accept of your Measure and do not refuse to be tried in the Court of your own Chusing Accordingly you see I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic and in a Rational way being very Confident that Reason alone will discover to you your undue Elevations of it and the Errours you have been misled into by that Occasion if you do but Consult even this Oracle of yours as you ought and make a right use of its Sacred Light 3. But I am afraid you do not Instead of imploying your Reason in the first place to examin the Certainty of the Revelation whether such a thing be truly Reveal'd and if so to believe it notwithstanding its being incomprehensible your Method is to begin with the Quality of the Object to Consider whether it be Comprehensible or no and accordingly to proceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Reveal'd 'T is true indeed you are not so gross as to argue thus this is Comprehensible therefore 't is Reveal'd But you cannot deny but that you argue thus this is Incomprehensible therefore 't is not Reveal'd proceeding upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehensible is not therefore presently Reveal'd yet whatever is Reveal'd must be Comprehensible But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reason the Rule and Measure of Divine Revelation that is that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend or that you are able to Comprehend all that God can possibly Reveal for otherwise how is your not being able to Comprehend any thing an Argument of its not being Revealâ—d I say Consider whether this be not to set up your Reason as the Rule of Revelation and Consider again whether this does not resolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite Perfections or an extravagantly high one you have of your selves and your own Rational indowments 4. And yet as if this were not Presumption enough do you not also make your Reason the Rule of Faith as well as of Revelation To be the Rule of Faith is a very Great thing and yet so far 't is plain that you make your Reason the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believ'd but whose Bottom you can Sound by that Line this being an avow'd Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But hold a little before your Reason can be the Measure of Faith must it not be the Measure of Truth And I pray Consider seriously and tell me truly do you verily think in your Consciences that your Reason is the Measure of Truth Do you think your Rational Faculties proportion'd to every intelligible Object and that you are able to Comprehend all the things that are and that there is nothing in the whole extent of Science too high too difficult or too abstruse for you no one part of this vast Intellectual Sea but what you can wade through If you say yes besides the Blasphemous Presumptions and Luciferian Arrogance of the Assertion and how little it falls on this side of Similis ero Altissimo which banish'd the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven because nothing less would Content his Aspiring Ambition than to be as God there though by the way there is more Sense and Congruity of Reason in pretending to be a God in Heaven than to be a God upon Earth I say besides this I would put it to your more sober thought to Consider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of Rational Speculation to Dogmatize so far as to pretend to Comprehend every thing as to say with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know nothing The latter of which however in regard of its Moral Consequences may be more innocently and safely affirm'd than the Former since in that we only humbly degrade our selves and are Content to sink down into the Level of Brutes whereas in this we aspire to what is infinitely above us and advance our selves into the Seat of God And you know an Excess of Self-dejection is of the two the more tolerable Extreme But if
If not then you must suppose either that there is no Necessity that either of the two parts which yet are Contradictory should be true or that though one of them be true yet that God does not known which is so or that though he does know which is so yet he does not deal faithfully in revealing that which is the Right all which are extravagant Suppositions and such as Men of your Sense and Reason can never allow But then if you say as you must that you would believe it then I pray what becomes of your Maxim of believing nothing but what you can Comprehend and why do you so stiffly plead the incomprehensibility of an Article of Faith against the Belief of it and why must there be no Mysteries in Religion I say in Religion where if any where our Reason might expect to find things above its Measure unreachable Heights and unfathomable Depths and where God is not only the Revealer as in the Case now supposed but also the Object Reveal'd For is it not reasonable to suppose that there are things more incomprehensible in God than in Nature and if you would receive an Incomprehensible Revelation of his concerning his Works how much rather ought you to admit the same concerning Himself 9. And this gives me occasion to say something to you concerning the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity This great Article of the Christian Faith you have a particular Prejudice against and will not believe and that because it so utterly transcends the Force of Reason to Conceive how the same undivided and Numerically One Simple Essence of God should be Communicated to Three really distinct Persons so as that there should be both a Unity in Trinity and a Trinity in Unity This however as inconceivable as it seems some will not yield to be so far Above Reason but that a Rational and Intelligible Account may be given of it which accordingly they have essay'd to do by several Hypotheses But I decline at present all advantage that may be had from them or any other that may be invented to render this an intelligible Article You know I Reason all along upon the Contrary Supposition that those Articles of the Christian Faith which we call Mysteries are really incomprehensible and only go to invalidate the Consequence that is drawn from thence in prejudice of their Belief Well then for once we will give you what you stand for that the Doctrine of the Trinity is indeed utterly above Reason You have our leave to suppose it as incomprehensible as you please But then you are to Consider besides what has hitherto been discours'd concerning the Nullity of the Consequence from the incomprehensibility of a thing to its incredibility that this is a Revelation of God concerning Himself and do you pretend to Comprehend the Nature and Essence of God If you do then your Understanding is as infinite as the Divine But if you do not then the incomprehensibility of this Mysterious Article ought to be no Objection with you against the Belief of it since if it be you must be driven to say that you Comprehend the Nature of God which I hope you have too much Religion as well as Reason to affirm 10. And indeed if we meet with so many insuperable Difficulties in the Search of Nature much more may we in the Contemplation of its Author if the Works of God do so puzzle and baffle our Understandings much more may they Confess their Deficiency when God himself is their Object and if we are not able to explain Creation or give an Account how the Material World issued in time from the great Fountain of Being much less may we be supposed able to explain the Eternal and ineffable Generation of his Divine and Consubstantial World But what then shall we not Believe it Or rather shall we not say upon this Occasion with the Pious and Ingenious Mr. Wesley Ineffable the way for who Th' Almighty to perfection ever knew But He himself has said it and it must be true Nay to go lower yet if there be so many things relating to Extension Motion and Figure of all which we have Clear Ideas which we cannot Comprehend and there result from them Propositions which we know not what to make of with how much greater reason may we expect to find what we cannot Understand in the Nature of an Infinite Being whereof we have no adequate Idea And indeed we meet with so many Incomprehensibles in the School of Nature that one would think we should be too much familiarized to 'em to think them strange in that of Religion and God seems on purpose to exercise and discipline our Understandings with what is above them in Natural things that so we might be the less surprized to find what passes our Conception in his own Infinite Essence Here then at least you may Confess your Ignorance and that without any reproach to your Understandings which were indeed intended for the Contemplation but not for the Comprehension of an Infinite Object You need not therefore here be backward to own that you meet with what you cannot Comprehend it would indeed be a Mistery if you should not nor think it any disgrace to have your Eyes dazzl'd with that Light at the insupportable Glory of which even the Seraphin Veil and Cover theirs 11. You may perceive by this that your Denial of the Doctrine of the Trinity because of the Incomprehensibility of it proceeds upon no good Consequence but you are also further desired to Consider the very Bad one that it Naturally leads to You refuse to receive this Article because you cannot Comprehend it but besides that your Reason for this your refusal is not good unless you could be supposed to Comprehend every thing even the Deep things of God Pray Consider what the Consequence will be if you pursue your Principle to the utmost and Conduct your selves intirely by its Measures Will it not inevitably lead you to the denial of all Religion This perhaps may startle you but think again Will not this necessarily lead you to the denial of God the Foundation of all Religion For if you will not believe the Trinal Distinction of Persons in the Divine Essence because you cannot conceive how such a thing can be then may you not for the same reason refuse as well to believe the Divine Essence it self some of whose incommunicable Attributes such as his Self Existence Eternity Immensity c. are as Incomprehensible as any thing in the Notion of the Trinity can be So that if you will but follow your Measure from the denial of Three you may be quickly brought to deny even One. So directly does your Principle of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend lead to Atheism and that with such swift and wide strides that were it not for the assistance of the same expedient your Friends the Deists would hardly be able to follow you 12. And now Sirs what
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. 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Avis Stir le Tableâ—â— du Socinianisme Traité 1. pag. 14 L' Art de Penser p. 432. Cogit Rational de Deo p. 296. Mr. Malebranche * Veritas immortalis est veritas incommutabilis est veritas illud verbum est de quo dicitur in principio erat verbum verbum erat apud Deum Deus erat verbum S. Austin in Psal. 123. Iob 11. 7. Psal. 97. 2. Rom. 11. 33. * I the rather Instance in the Divine Immensity because the Dâ—vout Psalmist does herein partiâ—ularize his Ignorance making it the Subject of his Astonishment rather than his Curiosity Such Knowledge is too wonderful for me it is high I cannot attain unto it Psal. 139. â—erardi de Vries Prasessoris Vâ—tra◠〈◊〉 exercitationes rationales de Deo Divinisque Perfectoinibus Pag. 248. Psal. 4. Le Clerks Physics Pag. 14. 〈…〉 Recherche de la Verité Tom. 2. p. 165. 〈…〉 Psal. 32. 10. 〈…〉 Christianity not Myâ—ter p. 90. Serm. of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith Life of Christ p. 184. 1 Cor. 2. 9 10. 1 Pet. 1. 12. p. 379.