he himself is best able to resolve Vid Mr. Becconsall P. 199. 200. c. But I must confess that if I was mistaken in any thing it was in what he tells us immediately after that in that place I there quoted and if so then by consequence in all those other places which in the same Chapter may seem liable to the same exception That he only reported as matter of fact what others call Vertue and Vice c. I shall therefore here briefly lay down the reasons why I did not so apprehend him and then leave it to Mr. Lock 's own candour to pass judgment I shall not need to Premise that it is only the 1 st Edition of his Book that I am concern'd in without taking notice of any alterations or explications he has made in his 2 d. my discourse being writ before his 2 d. Edition was Printed and therefore 1 st Besides what I have already mentionedâ— there are some other passages in that Chapter wherein he seemes to speak his own opinion rather then mere matter of â—act what others call vice or virtue 158. P. § 7. By the relation our actions bear to the Divine Law Wee judge whether they be sins or dutys by the 2d The Civil Law whether they be criminall or innocent By the 3d. By the Philosohhicall Law whether they be Virtues or Vices So P. 160. § 14. There having resolved the complex Idea we signifie by the word Murther into its simple Ideas he proceeds this Collection of simple Ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the Country I have been bred in and to be held by most Men there worthy praise or blame I call the action vertuons or vicious Now I had thought that Wee and I especially being joyned with such Words as these Wee judge and I call together with this expression found by me had included a Mans selfe Chap. of Identity § 20. Vrbem quam dicunt Romam Melibaee putavi Stultus Ego hunc nostroe similem Truly I imagin'd that in things of this nature Men had generally spoken after the same manner all England over About the Year 1284. There were some Grammaticall heresies that is some false Latin and false Grammer condemn'd by Arch Episcopal Authority such as these Ego currit nullum nomen est tertiae personae far be it from me to impute any such Sollaecismes to this Learned Author however I think that I had very good reason to apply these expressions to the 1 st Person rather than to any third 2 ly 'T is observeable that he pleads for this 3 d. Law and that with all the force of reason perhaps that the thing is capable of now when Men relate things as mere matter of fact what others either do or say they usually leave 'em to stand or fall by their own evidence I question whether ever any did so much towards the giving Mens actings according to custome or opinion the formality and grandeur of a Law before and as for the sanction with all the Elaborate circumstances he has annext to it I think it is perfectly his own P. 159. 160. § 12. But I must beg leave here to say that the most Hetrodox writer absit verbo invidia might perhaps thus take upon him only the same character of a Relator after he had used and urged all the Arguments that either reason or Authority could afford him for his particular opinion I do not here say he so far pleaded for this Law of custom or opinion as to make it the standing Rule of Vice or Vertue truly so call'd or of right and wrong as he some times calls 'em but only that he espous'd the cause and pleaded for that Law further than the thing would well bear And these are the reasons that did more especially induce me to think that he did not there take upon him the bare Offâ—ce of a Relator To which I might also add if it was necessary what he says P. 159. § 12. If any one shall imagin that I have forgott my own notion of a Law when I make the Law whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice to be nothing else but consent of private Men c. This is not spoken like one who barely relates matter of fact Others indeed may and that justly too act in obedience to that rule of decency and common repute yet I think he was one of the first that made it a Law especially such where by Men judge of Vertue and Vice I shall only add one or two considerations more upon this Subject before I leave it 1 st It seemes a peculiar way of speaking not yet grown common in the World when he assignes the Names of vice and vertue to such actions as are agreeable or dissagreeable to common reputation and for that reason because they are so whereas it always was and still is the more usual way not only of judging what things are in their own nature but also of denominating actions vertuous or vicious rather from theire agreeableness or disagreeableness to the dictates of reason and the law of Nature rather than from the custom of the Place I grant indeed that what ever is truly vertuous is generally counted laudable but it is not therefore vertuous because laudable but therefore laudable because vertuous Now I think that neither Names nor the grounds and reasons of 'em ought more to be alter'd than the Ancient Landmarks in Publick Fields ought to be remov'd for nothing but disorder confusion and needless disputes will arise from both I cannot pretend to be acquainted with all the perticular Modes of speaking throughout the World yet I much question whether this be the most common and general acceptation of that word Vertue that it is taken most commonly for those actions which according to to the different opinions of several Countrys are accounted laudable pag. 23. § 18. or however not under that formality because they were so counted I do not here dispute concerning the true and proper acceptation of the word Vertue as Mr. Lock has rightly stated it in the very next period but only as to matter of fact even what apprehensions other Nations generally had of it I grant indeed that we shall sometimes find different practices in different places about the same thing and all abounding in their own sense and pleading for the fitness and decency of their own perticular way Thus some thought it the most Decent and Honourable way of burying their Dead by eating of 'em others by Burning others by Enterring and no doubt all thought their own Method the best But these are matters of indifferency and so do not strictly come up to our present case but however it may be further ask'd whether or no these several sorts of People did count themselves only Vertuous herein and all the rest Vicious Quakers are very rude and uncivil in Thouing People as we call it especially those that are not
a discourse of that nature because I looked upon the Doctrine of ideaâ—s as it is now generally mannag'd to be a very intricate and perhaps not altogether such an usefull speculation The old way of reâ—olving knowledge was into these three operations of the mind 1 st Simple apprehension 2 d. Composition and Division 3 d. Discourse from both the former Now if this ideal Scheme with all its various Divisions and Sub-divisions be either the same or do in a great meaâ—ure concidere with the former why should the World be amused either with making new Words or using Old ones in a new Signification I know Mr. Lock tells us P. 73. § 4. That it is unavoidable in Discourses differing from the ordinary received notions either to make new Words or use Old onesâ— in somewhat a new signification But then such Men ought to consider whether theâ—e Notions which appear different from the Ordinary reccieved ones do not in a great measure owe their extrordinarinesse if I may so speak rather to the Authors expressing them in new words or words of a new signification rather than to any newnâ—ss in the notion it self Nor do I see how this way of resolveing knowledge into thâ—se ideas conveyed into our minds by Sensation and Reflexion there upon doth any way more effectually tend to the reall advancement of usefull knowledge than the other for it rather supposes us already to have attain'd to that knowledge which we thus resolve into these idea's than to enable us to make any further advances in it Thus I have a generall notion of a Book for example at the first sight now if I should resolve this notion into its ideall principles into all its simple ideas c. I believe I should at last have no better notion or idea of it than I had before I shall only instance in another of his own P 160. § 14. For example Let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word Murther and when we have taken it asunder and examin'd all the particulars we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple ideas derived from sensation or reflection First from Reflection on the operation of our own minds we â—ave the ideas of willing considering purposing beâ—ore-hand malice or wishing ill to another and also of life or perception and self motion 2ly From Sensation we have the Collection of the simple sensible ideas of a Maâ— and of some action by which we put an end to that perception and motion in the Man all whieh simple ideas are comprehended in the word Murther I suppose he design'd here more particularly to explain to us the nature of Murther according to his ideall way by sensation and reflection Now if we should thus explain the Word or go about to instruct an honest Country-Iury-maâ— in the nature of the thing Viz. Of Murther he would certainly stare at us and perhaps think that we were not much overgrown either with Law or Reason but never understand the nature of Murther one jot the better for it I never yet observ'd that Lushington's Logick which is either a new way of thinking or a new way of expressing old thoughts ever made that improvement of knowledge in the World which the Author at first perhaps promised himself it would do P. 44. § 24. The impressions then that are made upon our selves by outward Objects that are extrinsecall to the mind and its own operations about these impressions reflected on by its self as proper Objects to be contemplated by it are I conceive the original of all knowledge Here t is observeable that the reflection is made upon the operations of the mind as employed and exercised about these outward impressions now one might have thought that the streames would not have risen above the Fountains head and that the reflections upon these outward impressions would not have produc'd idea's of a quite different nature from the rest So that that which Mr. Norris P. 61. Of his remarks upon the Athenian Society puts upon these ideas seemes to be the most naturall and obvious sense and meaning of 'em Viz. That these ideas of reflection are but a secondary sort of ideas that result from the various compositions and modifications of these primary ones of sensation Otherwise this notion of his which he seems to advance with some kind of pompous traine of thought as if something out of the common road of former methods will at last dwindle into this which hath been the common and generall opinion of all the considering part of Mankind herein that all knowledge proceeds either from the senses or from the understanding in its most extensive capacity however qualified and disposed for that purpose But by reflection among other things he includes the power of negation Thus from conception of some thing by negation hereof he forms an idea of nothing But now methinks we are got far aboue the sphere of sensation for nothing cannot be the object of sense nor make any impression upon the outward organs and yet the Soul can frame propositions of as great truth and evidence from this nothing as it can from something Ex. gr bare nothing cannot produce a reall being but to proceed He sayes that I make innate notions conditionall things depending upon the concurrence of severall other circumstances in order to the Souls exerting them and so leave nothing in the stating of the Question contrary to what he had said before But I shall quit the place upon which he grounds this and then leave it to the Reader to judge whether he hath done me right or no P. 78. Of my former discourse I was there complaining of some Men who will put such a sense upon these Words innate or naturall as if a thing could not be thus naturall or innate to the Soul unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the face that they must necessarily assent thereto even before by the common course of nature they are capable of assenting to any thing whereas those who defend this Question make these naturall or innate notions more conditionall things depending on the concurrence of severall other circumstances c. Now I appeal to the Reader whether these notions may not be more conditionall things or not such absolute ones as necessarily to stare Children or Fools in the Face and yet not such as Mr. Loâ—k makes ' â—m and yet not such as owe their origionall to senâ—â—â—ion or reâ—lection upon sensible impreâ—sions But hâ— sâ—ys â—hat all I say for innate notions amounâ—s only to this that there are certain proposâ—tions which tho the Soul from the beginning or when â— Man is born does not know yet by assistance from the outward senâ—es and the help oâ— some previous cultivation it may afterward come certainly to know the truth of 1 st I do not say that Infants have that actuall knowledge of these propositions any more than they have the actuall
imagin'd that the inference from hence would have been either 1 st That then there are no such things as these Native Inscriptions or 2 ly That they are not serviceable in order to supply the defects of reason or 3 ly That they were exempt from the disquisitions of reason but it s none of these but only this Then reason it self will answer all the ends and designes of a reasonable being But if it does this seemes only to extend to the Christian World reason does but very indifferently perform this among the Heathens But he says It does it as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind But how doth he prove that the Heathens may not thank those Native impressions that they are not sunk lower into Barbarisme than indeed they are or supposing that they did enjoy a greater and freer use of reason than I am afraid they do yet how doth he prove that they owe the light of truth and obligation to duty merely to their rationall enquirys in contradistinction to or seperation from these innate notions or not rather to the benign influence that these later however in conjunction with the former have upon them But pa. 76. He says That the Doctrine of innate ideas must be laid aside since we cannot conceive that a wise Creator should establish any ordinance without some special ends and use annex'd to it I mean such as are not served any other way But to this I answer 1 st That what he there supposes is not yet sufficiently demonstrated viz. That Men generally may as well come to the knowledge of their Duty by such rational enquirys as they may by these native inscriptions 2 ly How doth he prove that it is inconsistent with the wisdom of Divine providence to appoint the joint concurrence of two things as in this case naturall inscription and rational deduction as meanes in order to the same end they mutually supporting defending and confirming each other Pa. 77. In a word then tho' the sacred language seems to favour the notion of native inscriptions yet it may be justly râ—solved into metaphor and figure c But it is some advantage to the notion that the sacred Language favours it especially since the assertors thereof are defenders of that Text and found their opinion upon it And therefore 't is not sufficient for him to say that the Sacred Language may be resolved into a Metaphor but he must prove that it must necessarily be so interpreted and here the assertors of these Inscriptions may more justly say that the Text may be understood in the plain obvious and literal sense of the words therefore there is no need no occasion of a Metaphor I do not here speak any thing to derogate from the excellency and usefulness of those powers and facultys that God has endued us with in order to discover a rule of action yet I can scarce be perswaded that the mere exercise of reason in those circumstances of time and place before mentioned will do it as clearly and as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind tho' I do not say that any such digest is thus recorded only some of the primary original and fundamental Laws of Nature or some greater stroaks thereof are originally communicated to the Soul yet in a way suteable to the nature of the things thus communicated and to the nature of the Soul the Subject of ' em But here if I may speak my own private conjecture I think these rational enquirys by the use of our facultys may better serve the designes of truth than they can those of goodness and be more available for the founding of intellectual and notional rather then Moral and practical Principles upon Pa. 75. He says that if it be allow'd that probabilitys may determine our judgments in this matter the doctrine of innate Ideas is rather to be rejected than retain'd But if probabilitys will avail any thing I doubt not but the Doctrine of innate Ideas has its probabilitys too as 1. Since this Doctrine of native Ideas or inscriptions he means the same by both is not matter of mere indifferency but has a very useful influence both upon natural and Reveal'd Religion is it not therefore the more probable to be true And further â—s it probable that the Apostle Ro. 2. 15. would positively and plainly say that this Law of Nature was written upon the hearts of the Gentiles if it really and truly was not â—o 2. Is it probable that God would leave the Gentile World to the guidance of that reason which in their circumstances could not be any tolerable direction to 'em either in the ways of truth or holyness without some other at least more probable means to keep em if possible from sinking too much below themselves 3 d. This is the most that can be said against the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or natural inscription that there is no need they say of having recourse hereunto reason it self sufficiently serving for those purposes without it Now this is such an argument as may perhaps be urg'd with equal force against all the Moral that is no small part of the Gospel for may not nay do not some Men say that there was no need of any such Revelation reason it self they say had done that without it But perhaps it may seem too much a receding from the Divine Authority of Scripture to plead that over again by probabilitys which 't is granted on all hands is favourd by plain expressions of Scripture But Mr. Becconsal in his Chapt. of Parental love and affâ—ction Pa 122. speaking of the lower Order of Creatureâ— says they as well as we must conclude that Parental Love is the effect of some peculiar propension wove in with the Frame and Constitution of our beings and Pa. 126. For a Man to love and cherish his Offspring is certainly the result of an inward Propension Now I do not know that the assertors of Innate Principles do understand any thing more by them then what is here granted 'T is true indeed it follows but the exercise of it from the consideration of the close affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood is a work of reason But is it the less Innate because it is also rational Or may not a Man actually love his Child out of that inward propension so to do thoâ— at the same time he doth not consider that affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood But the ground and reason of the difference betwixt Mr. Becconsal and me in this particular seems to be this Pa. 74. that he thinks the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or practical Principles serves not any real purposes of Religion and I think it does Mr. Lock in his Reply to what I had said concerning Innate Notions imploys the most of his discourse upon that which is least considerable he sâ—irmishes about the outworks but never enters into the
patterns of all truth in the Divine intellect These I say are communicated to the soul in a way and proportion suteable to such a being that is they are either made Naturall propertyes of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its faculties in the right use and exercise of em ' For it is not easie to conceive how either any senfible impressions from without or any reâ—lections of the Soul upon its own operations about those impressions can be connatural causes of morall truths I grant indeed that vertue has a natural tendency to promote both publick and private interest but yet I think the Soul finds as it were an intrinsick sutâ—bleness of these truths to it selfe and of it self to them antecedently to any such external considerations Some Remarks upon Mr. Chauvin de Religione Naturali ONE designe of his Book he tells us was Orthodoxarum Ecclesiarum fratres ad concordiâ—m vocare An excellent design this and worthy to be prosecuted with all the prudence and pious Zeall that the thing is capable of but it is to be wish'd that he had brought a more humble and modest temper of mind to such a work as this it did not become him to reflect unhansomly upon the constitution and government of that Church which both as to Doctrine and Discipline comes the nearest to that of the Primitive of any in the Christian World It is not for private Persons much less for Strangers and Forraigners to prescribe new formes and methods to a Church that has been so long and so well constituted as this has been when this Gentleman has more fully considered and better understood things of this naâ—ure he wâ—ll be better satisfy'd with some of our â—â—cleâ—iastical constitutions than at present he â—eems to be I shall not presume to take notice of any thing in his Epistle Dedicatory because it is to a learned and Reverend Bishop of our own Church tho' withall I believe there are some things in it writ without his knowledge or approbation But least my charge here against him might seem too general and so groundless I shall instance in one particular pa 419. Where he unhansomly and rudely reflects upon our Convocations But these are things above my sphere but under the carefull and watchfull Eye of our Superiours My deâ—ign here is of a lower nature Pa. 131 Nobis jam ostendendumest quâ viâ illa lex quae naturalis dicitur in corda nostra irrepserit utrum nempe naturaliter sit menti nostrae inscripta quod vulgoasseritur nos vero Evidenter asserimus illud esse falsissimum A little more Evidence in the proof tho' less in the assertion might do very well But here it will be very difficult to reconcile this Author either to Scripture or to himself St. Paul tells us Rom. 2. 15. That the Gentiles show the work of the Law that is the Naturall Law written in their hearts Now it must be granted that this Natural inscription even à primo ortu is the most plaine and obvious interpretation of the place and where that may be reâ—tained we ought not to look for another And tho' t is true that the Natural Law is agreeable to the dictates of reason it self when come to perfect maturity yet if this had been all the Apostle designed to express I am apt to believe he would not have thus worded it by being written in their hearts for by thus doing he did almost inevitably and invincibly confirm Men in that false opinion if it be one which was then more generally received in the World Nor can any argument be drawn from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the following part of the Verse in prejudice of this opinion of Natural inscription Dr. Hammond here tells us that these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are practicall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common notions of good and evill which are among the generality of Men even Heathens without any light from the Mosaicall Law c. I shall now see how difficult it is to reconcile him to himself in other places pa. 5. There speaking of the belief of a Deity he tells us Consentanea utique est illis connaturalibus rationis principijs quae nobis insunt paulatim augescunt Pa. 38. quid nobis esse debet antiquius quam religio quae si verum fatearis insculpta fuerat in hominum mentibus Pa. 45. speaking of the belief of the Unity of a God haec opinio demonstrat naturae rudera quae in imis illorum medullis infixa sunt nec ullâ de causa possunt amoveri I might easily tyre my self and Reader too in citing places to this purpose in favour of these natural principles which seem â—ven at first implanted in the minds of Men tho' it cannot be expected they should show themselves before the actual use of reason I shall now briefly examine the reasons he gives of his opinion if says he the Law of Nature be writ by the finger of God upon the hearts of Men à primo ortu then it must be either to direct us to good or to deter us from evil but it cannot serve for either of these Not the first nam ubi omnia sunt turbata c. Where all things are disturb'd and out of order by reason of the tenderness and weakness of Age altogether unfit for prudence there the Voice of the Law cannot be heard But will he argue barely from the Laws not being heard that therefore there is none We commonly say that in war the Laws are silent or howsoever cannot be heard and yet they are Laws even there too If he supposes us in the state of Infancy beforâ— the use of reason what should he talk of the rules of good and evil to such â—s know neither If he supposes us in the State of juvenility tho' our passions be strong and turbulent yet methinks there should be more need at such a time more especially of a Law to direct us Nor 2 dly Says he can it deter us from evil because there is no actual sin in Children before the use of Reason but would it be in vain to have this Law imprinted upon the minds of Children because they cannot yet make use of it May not the the Soul of a Child properly be call'd a rational Soul tho' as yet it cannot form a Syllogism may there not be natural inclinations and dispositions to truth and holyness Some semina vitae moralis tho' these do not show themselves until such prefixt times as Providence and the nature of things have appointed for ' em And till this be prov'd either absâ—lutely impossible or highly irrational the opposers of these natural Principles do prove nothing to their purpose nor gain any strength or credit to their cause 2. Another ground of his Opinion is drawn from a parity of reason betwixt faith and this Law of Nature there being he says the same reason for both quoniam
of their own Club but I wish they had no greater Vices to answer for than this I have heard of a King that was both blind and Lame whereupon it was grown in fashion and a laudable custom in that Court not to appear but with one Eye cover'd and with some counterfeiting at least a lameness These were indeed very complaisant Courtiers but why they should be call'd Vertuous for their dissimulation I know not nor whether they were accounted so even in that Place where the thing was grown so fashionable Thieves live in good Repute and Credit among themselves and no doubt applaud their own Exploits in their own Clubs but yet I much question whether they think violence and rapine to be Vertues or no or do indeed call 'em so They may perhaps employ their wits and fancy's to excuse their way of living but not to justifie it nor to raise it to a degree of Vertue or if we should suppose one among the rest more modest in his apprehensions and not retain such Heroick thoughts of Theft and Murderâ— as the others did yet I fancy his Life would not be so uneasie to him as Mr. Locks Sanction would seem to make it pa. 159. I scarce think that any Christian Nation and the Christian World is a Scene large enough for this dispute doth call that a vertue which either is in it self or by any other Christian Nation is called a vice Whoredome tho' in some Countries permitted and but too much in fashion yet it is not even there call'd a vertue tho' perhaps it may be counted a lesser vice And why should we here in England begin to unhinge and unsettle 〈…〉 whose sense and meaning always was and still ought to be more fix'd and constant 2. this Law of Opinion and Reputation as it is made to Constitute a distinct Law is not well grounded for a Law is always suppos'd to bring men under an obligation now the things in fashion among men if they be contrary to the Law of Nature let mens opinions of 'em be what they will yet they are no Law to any one and if they be agreeable to the Law of Nature then they do so far coincidere with the Divine Law and do not constitute a new Species of Law But I must remember what Mr. Lock reminds me of that he only relates what others say not what he defends But if so then I can mention several other rules which men sometimes make Lawes to themselves viz. their respective tempers and humours and the prejudices of Education which are as much Laws to these men in their respective Clubs as opinion and reputation are to others in theirs But he goes on whatsoever Authority he says I place in my old English Dictionary it no where tells me that the same action is not in credit call'd and reputed a vertue in one place which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another But with submission I must tell him that what ever Authority he places in his new way of speaking yet tho' our English Dictionarys his as well as mine no where say that the same actions are not variously reputed so or so in various places for that is not their business yet they no where say that they are For both our Dictionarys and Moral Philosophers I appeal to both tell us that vice and vertue are much what the same with good and evil sin and duty and by consequence that they did not at least in those times so much as receive their denomination from Custom but if he had instanc'd in one perticular action in the whole Christian World which in one Place was counted a vertue and in another a vice it would have added much light to the whole and better explain'd his meaning The taking notice that Men bestow the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation is all I have done or can be laid to my charge to have done towards the making of vice vertue and vertue vice Here I would only ask whether this of Mens bestowing the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation be in it self a just well grounded and reasonable action if it be why doth he not assert and defend it if it be not why doth he found a Law viz. of opinion and reputation upon the unwarrantable and ill grounded actions of Men. But he seemes to commend me upon what account I know not for taking the alarm as he calls it euen at expressions which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected I know not what he means by expressions standing alone by themselues I hope he will grant that several expressions standing alone by themselves that is at certain distances yet all upon the same account justly exceptionable may be taken notice of and I suppose he now understands that it was not only one single expression dropt as it were by chance from his Pen that I found fault with but with his whole way of arguing upon that perticular 'T is to this zeal allowable in his Function Some think this to be a reflection upon my Function as if its proper business was to be employ'd in impertinencies but I am willing according to my Function to put the most favourable interpretation upon things that they are capable of bearing that I forgive his Citing my words as he there does c. 'T is my happiness that I find that some Men as they are great so they are also merciful I also thank him for the respect he seems to show to the Function but Zeal without knowledge as he must suppose mine to be for otherwise I should never have found fault where there was no ground for it is no more pardonable in my Function than in others pâ—rhaps less But no one they say refuses Gods and the Kings Pardon I will go a little further and not only accept but humbly beg his Pardon too if I be in the wrong but I hope I may contestari litem He blames me for not taking notice of those words immediately preceding those of his The exhortations of inspired Teachers c. But it was not much material to my Purpose nor any way Prejudiâ—ial to his Cause whether I did or no as I hope will appear in the Sequel He also blames me for quoting that Place of St. Paul Phil. 4. 8. Whatsoever things are lovely whatsoever things are of good report if there be any vertue if there be any Praise c. In a sense he us'd it not Truly I am not yet convinced that I quoted it in any other sense than the Apostle spoke it and if he us'd it in any other I cannot tell how to help it he must look to that but he says he brought this passage of St. Paul to show that for reasons he there gives Men in that way of denominating their actions do not for the moâ—t part much vary from the Law of Nature which
is that standing and unalterable rule by which they ought c. I am of his opinion too in this perticular viz. that in so doing they do not for the 〈…〉 c. And yet not for this reason becausâ— St. Paul says watsoever thiâ—gs are of good report if there be any vertue if there be any praise think of these things For indeed St. Paul here supposes some things either in themselves of good report or in their own natures indifferent and by the Innocent and laâ—dable custom of that place made so and then they are the subject matter of a Command think of these things but then by bare mentioning things of good report he does not concern himself in that question how far Men in denominating their actions according to common repute may or may not vary from the Law of Nature Tho' by the way it seems but a very humble commendation of this Law of opinion or reputation which is attended with all these diminutions That it is such as only for the most part doth not much vary from the Law of Nature That is it may sometimes nay frequently too and in some degree vary from it But St. Paul being an inspired Teacher certainly would not appeal to common repute under those Formalitys and disadvantagious circumstances seeing he was there laying down Rules for the guidance of all succeeding Ages of the Church So that the things of good report which the Apostle appeals to 〈…〉 but alwayes agree with the Law of Nature or at least were not contrary to it The Exhortations of Inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute c. By this must be understood such an appeal as refers to Practice think of these things now I durst appeal to Mr Lock himself whether the Apostle would exhort Men to the practice of things of good report without any restriction or limitation since he himself doth acknowledge that Men in denominating their actions according to this Law do only For the most part not much vary from the Law of nature Whereby even in the Corruption of manners the true Boundarys of the Law of nature whiâ—h ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice were prtty well preserved These are the Words upon account of which he blam'd me because I did omit 'em but doth he indeed think that the Apostle in this case would have appealed to such a state of things without exception wherein the true Boundarys of the Law of Nature were only pretty well preserv'd T is granted on all hands that the Law of Nature ought indeed to be the Rule of vertue and vice but it seems it is not always actually so If this be not the meaning of that expression pretty well preserved I know not what is And what advantage is this to his cause I hope Mr. Lock is not one of those who would here tell us that the rule which the Apostle here layes down is not absolutely certain and infallible but only such as for the most part and more generally is true For this would ill comport with the Caracter of an Inspired Teacher Nor do I see what tolerable Sense can be made of these words If there be any vertue If there be any prayse Or why they are introduc'd according to Mr. Lock 's way of interpreting the Place I have insisted the longer upon this Subject and represented my thoughts the more variously that if possible I might the more certainly hit the Authors meaning for I must confess that such is either the obscurity of his Expresâ—ion or of his way of Arguing here or such the dulness of my capacity that I cannot be assured that I fully apprehend his meaning in this perticular But then as to Naturall notions he says we are better agreed than I thought of if so I am glad of it for I can assure him I take no pleasure in having any difference with any one But I am afraid there will upon examination be found some small difference betwixt us in this particular also In stating the Question he says I leave nothing in it contrary to what he had said I shall here first Transcribe my stating of it so far as is necessary in this perticular that so the Reader may be the better able to judge betwixt us P. 52. These Naturall notions are not so Imprinted upon our Soules as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous cultivation for thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some Supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sence connaturall to the Soul as Reason it self is And farther the use of our understanding being First supposed that is our faculties laboring of no naturall defect nor deprived of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary there unto then our Souls have a natural power of finding or framing such principles or propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no wayes depends upon the evidence of sence or observation And now doth Mr. Lock indeed say that these notions are in the same sense Connatural to the Soul as reason it self is Doth he indeed grant to our Souls a native power of finding or frameing such principles or propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the Evidence of sense or Observation and yet methinks he must grant this too if he hold to his intuitiue certainty and if so then we are better agreed than I thought of But then what becomes of that pompous principle that sensation and reflexions upon sensible Impressions are the Originals of all our knowledge but he proceeds All that he says for innate imprinted or inpress'd notions for of innate idea's he says nothing at all amounts only c. Here he seemes to blame me for not speaking of innate ideas But 1 st What reason had I to enter upon any such discourse seeing that neither he believes any suâ—h nor do I Universally assert â—em nor did my subject naturally lead me hereunto For I cannot be convinc'd of the force of his argument P. 27. That if there be innate notions that then there must be innate idea's I doe indeed assert innate notions in the sense before explain'd but yet I do not say that all the respective ideas viz. simple ideas relating to those notions are innate I shall only instance in one or two Cogito ergo sum bare nothing cannot produce any real Being P. 312. Of his Essay of these Mr. Lock says he has an intuitiue knowledge or certainty and yet I do not believe that there are any innate ideas of Cogitation Existence Production nothing c. The respective ideas that these notions are composed of 2. I had no mind to ingage in
many time like that of an ignis fatuus desultory and uncertain Or if sometimes a more then ordinary Heroick Precept dropt as it were from a Pagan penn yet this will not be sufficient to equal Natural Religion with Christianity which is a constant uniform uninterrupted Series and Constellation as it were of Divine Precepts One Excellent Precept is not enough to form an institution especially if we consider that the influence thereof commonly reach'd no further than the particular Sect by which it was deliver'd and many times not so far neither and then the greater quantity of common rubbish and perhaps vicious mixtures did quite sully the beauty of the celebrated Maxime and render the influence of it very ineffectual 3. What ever their notions might be yet they wanted that which is the very life of all Religion and the peculiar happyness of Christianty viz. That inward strength and assistance which might enable 'em to put their knowledge into practise He adds what exaâ—ted thoughts of vertue had Aristotle when he made the very formality of happiness to consist in the exercise of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Happiness is the act of a rational Soul according to the most perfect vertue in a life most perfect I take this says he to be the most Noble and Sublime conception of Vertue that ever was or can be fram'd by the mind of Man 'T is true the Wise Man tells us Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace that is says he they are attended with pleasure aâ—d peace But that the exercise of vertue should not only be attended with but be all one with happiness it self is such a superlative encomium oâ— it that neither the love nor contemplation of a Seraphim can suggest a greater Greater things than these cannot be spoken of Thee O thou City of God! He might as well have gone on and prefer'd this definition of Aristotle above any thing that was ever said either by our Saviour or his Apostles upon this Subject Christ in his Sermon on the Mount if he had a mind to have come up to the Aristotelian Altitudes should have given no other reason of the blessedness of such and such Persons but only because they were such that is Vertuous Blessed are the merciful because they are merciful c. But our Saviour was pleas'd rather to make use of this more humble way and more accommodated to the State of Mankind viz. To place the reason of the happiness in the reward But suppose I should take the same liberty with Aristotle that he doth with Solomon that is insert some words into the deâ—inition to make the sense of it more dilute as Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace That is says he attended with pleasure and peace then Aristotle would have no advantage over Solomon but I think there is no need of this Aristotle has done it to my Hand For â—irst we may observe that in the definition it is not said that the formality of happiness consists in the exercise of vertue but only that happiness is the Act of the rational Soul according to the most perfect vertue c. 2. It is not every vertue in the exercise whereof happiness doth consist but it is the most perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Si plures sint verâ—utes tunc ex vertute perfectissima 3. It must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in vita perfecta And here he tells us that as one Swallow makes not spring 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. One day or a short time is not sufficient to make a Man happy That happiness is founded in vertue or that a Man cannot be happy without it is certainly true but that vertue alone is suffâ—icient to make one so Aristotle himselfe doth not assert It is generlly supposed that in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There must be the concurrence of all outward good things to the consummation of this happiness 1 Cor. 15. 10. If in this World only we have hope in Christ then are we of all Men the most miserable and yet the Apostles were as happy as vertue could make ' em He proceeds next to compare and equall Heathens with Christians as to their practices I do not say that an actuall formal intention of referring all to God is absolutely necessary either in Heathens or Christians but yet this we may assert that the nearer we approach thereto and the more we refer all our actions to the glory of God the better they are and come nearer to perfection I am of his opinion in this that if a Man do what is agreeable to right reason because it is agreeable he does well tho' perhaps he doth not think of God at that present provided he has no contrary intention in it This I believe is true tho' not for the reason there assign'd viz. Because he says to constitute the nature of Sin wâ—ich is contrary t is not required that there be an intention of transgressing the dictates of natural reason much less of offending God But to this it may be replyâ—d 1 st That Vertue and Vice are not in a strict and proper sence contrarys they are only privativè opposita 2 ly Perhaps it is not possible for any one directly and formally to design the transgression of the Law of Nature or the Law of God and yet notwithstanding be guilty of Sin If the action be in its own nature bad or if it want any necessary circumstance to make it morally good it will have the nature and denomination of an evill action let the intention be what it will Bonum ex causa integrà malum ex quolibet defectu But he is not satisfy'd unless he bring the Heathens upon all accounts to an equal level with Christians sheet B. 3 tho' I confess I see no reason why an Heathen may not have this intention as well as a Christian. How far an Heathen may somtimes possibly have such an intention is not my busines to dispute only this I say that there is this reason why an Heathen should not have such an intention as well as a Christian because he has no such plain and possitive Precept in this case 1 Cor. 10. 31. Whether ye eat or drink or whatsoever ye do do all to the glory of God and I think I may further observe from this Chapter that there are not any such plain and positive commands to be met withal in any Heathen Author to teach us to use our liberty in things indifferent so as not to give any just occasion of scandall or offence to others as we have laid down in that Chapter for tho' perhaps there may be something met withal in those which may be Wire drawn as it were to these purposes yet probably this was never either the intent of the Author or ever so generally understood at that time Thus much briefly as to that particular I also