SIX CONFERRENCES Concerning The Eucharist Novemb. 5. 1678. MR. A. Pulton Jesuit having in his Remarks published Novemb. 4. declared in efféct in P. 29 30. that the Principles of Philosophy which contradict the Doctrine of Transubstantiation are to be renounc'd and that Christians have the same ground to believe Transubstantiation as the Blessed Trinity and demanding How great the Confusion of Dr. T. will be at the Day of Judgment when he shall find that Teâ—â— true The sid Dr. Tenison the Publisher of THIS BOOK does so far as concerns these Particulars refer Mr. Pulton to IT and for the rest of his Remarks he will in due time give a very just Answer to them Books lately printed for Richard Chiswell A Dissertation concerning the Government of the Ancient Church more particularly of the Encroachments of the Bishops of Rome upon other Sus. By WILLIAM CAVE D. D. Octavo An Answer to Mr. Serjeant's Sure Footing in Christianity concerning the Rule of Faith With some other Discourses By WILLIAM FALKNER D. D. 40. A Vindication of the Ordinations of the Church of England in Answer to a Paper written by one of the Church of Rome to prove the Nullity of our Orders By GILBERT BVRNET D. D. Octavo An Abridgment of the History of the Reformation of the Church of England By GILB BVRNET D. D. Octavo The APOLOGY of the Church of England and an Epistle to one Signior Scipio a Venetian Gentleman concerning the Council of Trent Written both in Latin by the Right Reverend Father in God JOHN JEWEL Lord Bishop of Salisbury Made English by a Person of Quality To which is added The Life of the said Bishop Collected and written by the same Hand Octavo The Life of WILLIAM BEDEL D. D. Bishop of Kilmore in Ireland Together with Certain Letters which passed betwixt him and James Waddesworth a late Pensioner of the Holy Inquisition of Sevil in Matter of Religion concerning the General Motives to the Roman Obedience Octavo The Decree made at ROME the Second of March 1679. condemning some Opinions of the Jesuits and other Casuists Quarto A Discourse concerning the Necessity of Reformation with respect to the Errors and Corruptions of the Church of Rome Quarto First and Second Parts A Discourse concerning the Celebration of Divine Service in an Unknown Tongue Quarto A Papist nor Misrepresented by Protestants Being a Reply to the Reflections upon the Answer to A Papist Misrepresented and Represented Quarto An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England in the several Articles proposed by the late BISHOP of CONDOM in his Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church Quarto A Defence of the Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England against the Exceptions of Monsieur de Mâ—aâ—â— late Bishop of Condon and his Vindicator 40. A CATECHISM explaining the Doctrine and Practices of the Church of Rome With an Answer thereunto By a Protestant of the Church of England 80. A Papist Represented and not Misrepresented being an Answer to the First Second Fifth and Sixth Sheets of the Second Part of the Papist Misrepresented and Represented and for a further Vindication of the GATEGHISM truly representing the Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome Quarto The Lay-Christian's Obligation to read the Holy Scriptures Quarto The Plain Man's Reply to the Catholick Missionaries 240. An Answer to THREE PAPERS lately printed concerning the Authority of the Catholick Church in Matters of Faith and the Reformation of the Church of England Quarto A Vindication of the Answer to THREE PAPERS concerning the Unity and Authority of the Catholick Church and the Reformation of the Church of England Quarto THE Pillar and Ground of Truth A Treatise shewing that the Roman Church falsly claims to be That Church and the Pillar of That Truth mentioned by S. Paul in his first Epistle to Timothy Chap. 3. Vers 15. 4o. The Peoples Right to read the Holy Scripture Asserted 4o. A Short Summary of the principal Controversies between the Church of England and the Church of Rome being a Vindication of several Protestant Doctrines in Answer to a Late Pamphlet Intituled Protestancy destitute of Scripture Proofs 4o. Two Discourses Of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead An Answer to a Lato Pamphlet Intituled The Judgment and Doctrine of the Clergy of the Church of England concerning one Special Branch of the King's Prerogative viz. In dispensing with the Penal Laws 4o. The Notes of the Church as laid down by Cardinal Bellarmin examined and confuted 4o. Preparation for Death Being a Letter sent to a young Gentlewoman in France in a dangerous Distemper of which she died The Difference between the Church of England and the Church of Rome in opposition to a late Book Intituled An Agreement between the Church of England and Church of Rome A PRIVATE FRATER to be used in Difficult Times A True Account of a Conference held about Religion at London Sept. 29 1687 between A. Pulton Jesuit and Tho. Tennison D. D. as also of that which led to it and followed after it 4o. The Vindication of A. Cressener Schoolmaster in Long-Acre from the Aspersions of A. Pulton Jesuit Schoolmaster in the Savoy together with some Account of his Discourse with Mr. Meredith A Discourse shewing that Protestants are on the safer Side notwithstanding the uncharitable Judgment of their Adversaries and that Their Religion is the surest Way to Heaven 4o. Six Conferences concerning the Eucharist wherein is shewed that the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion A Discourse concerning the pretended Sacrament of Extreme Vnction with an account of the Occasions and Beginnings of it in the Western Church In Three Parts With a Letter to the Vindicator of the Bishop of Condom SIX CONFERENCES CONCERNING The Eucharist Wherein is shewed That the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion Imprimatur Septemb. 12. 1687. Jo. BATTELY LONDON Printed for Richard Chiswell at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Church-yard MDCLXXXVII The CONTENTS Of the Six Conferences concerning the EUCHARIST CONFERENCE I. THe First Proof That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity CONF. II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion CONF. III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses CONF. IV. The Third Proof That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration CONF. V. Wherein is finally shew'd That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism and absolutely destroys the certainty of First Principles CONF. VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine fo the Trinity is demonstrated SIX CONFERENCES Concerning the EUCHARIST CONFERENCE I. That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of
you will not deny but every time when this happens it 's the duty of a wise Man and of such a one who will not be mistaken to take the Ballance if I may so speak and exactly weigh these Reasons to give the preference to those which appear to him of greatest weight I do not know whether any Body uses to do otherwise One may I confess prefer Reasons which in truth and reality are of less force than the contrary ones But this is when a Man deceives himself Ex duobus credibilibus non tenetur homo credere alterum quod est minus vel equaliter credibile Bannez 22. Quast 10. Art. 1. Concl. 3. Non est prudentis hominis alteram partem assentire prae alterâ si pari vel sere pari momento rationes utrinque urgeant Censeo ad haec neque fieri omnino posse ut eam partem quis approbet assensu suo in quam nihil inclinat majoris ponderis quam in adversam Rationis utrinque pares rationes sunt nullae Multo minus fieri potest ut alteram partem quis approbet si in alteram inclinet pondus majus Est Dilucid Communis doctrinae Theol. n. 22 23. by taking the weakest Arguments for the strongest For in fine I am persuaded That a Man convinced of the weakness of a Reason will never after value that as he do's another which appears stronger to him seeing to yield to a Reason is to judg it stronger than that which opposes it It 's the same with Reasons or Arguments as 't is with Weights put two Weights in a pair of Scales and if they be equal the Scales shall stand at an equal ballance if they be unequal the Scale will immediately incline downwards wherein is the greatest weight In the same manner offer a rational Man Arguments which maintain an Opinion and others which oppose it If after all things well considered he finds these Opinions of equal force he will encline to neither side But for the smallest advantage which those of one side have over those of the other the Mind determines it self for the strongest Or at least it do's not determine it self for the weakest and it is every whit as impossible it should do it as 't is impossible a lesser Weight should weigh down a greater But whether this be so or not you will at least allow me this That it ought not to be and that 't is contrary to good sense to determine ones self in favour of an Opinion which we see grounded on Reasons less strong than those which oppose it And this is what your Authors do acknowledg (h) Martinon de fide Disp 5. Sect. 7. n. 42. and in effect were it otherwise one might innocently leave a good Religion and take up a bad one although we saw the Religion we leave more firmly grounded than that we take up But this being ridiculous it must be acknowledged that good Sense will not let a Man embrace an Opinion which he sees is more strongly opposed than maintained This being granted Sir Let 's suppose an Infidel to whom is offered Mr. Huet's Arguments if he be wise he will not yield to them till he has seen whether there be any thing which opposes these Arguments which counterballances them or dissipates them Imagine we afterwards the Christian Doctrine to be proposed to him discharged of Transubstantiation 'T is clear he will find nothing which shall counterpoise these Reasons So that these Reasons being good and nothing being able to diminish the solidity of them if he be wise he will embrace them Let us on the contrary imagine that by an Illusion of which we have seen a thousand Examples he is made believe That Transubstantiation is inseparable from Christianity What will he do If he be rational he will take the Ballance and weigh on one hand Mr. Huet's Arguments and on the other those which combat Transubstantiation and consequently Christianity in the supposition he is in that they are inseparable If he holds the Ballance even he will find That the Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation weigh more than those which favour Christianity He will find that the first weigh two and the second but one In effect the weight of Reasons is their Evidence The Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation have all the evidence of Sense those of Mr. Huet have only a moral Evidence which at most have but half of that of Sense The first then weigh as much again as the second This being so how can you expect the Infidel should give the preference to the second over the first and whom will you perswade that if he does do it he will act regularly Do you know what right Reason will suggest to him That Transubstantiation is not one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches He will say it is impossible Mr. Huet's Reasons should be valid if Christianity comprehends Transubstantiation and it must necessarily be either that this Doctrine has been added to the Christian Religion contrary to the intention of its Founder or that these Reasons be false Yet it 's apparent these Reasons are not false seeing they are evident and that the more they are considered the greater impression they make We must then believe that Transubstantiation which would destroy them should it take place is not one of the Christian Doctrines He will confirm himself in this Opinion by this Consideration That the Author of Christianity whoever he was having form'd his Religion with a design to make it be embraced by all Men and being able to make it very fit to be universally received by not burdening it with Transubstantiation it is not to be supposed he introduced this Doctrine which is likely only to make it be rejected by judicious Men. This will more especially appear to him inconceivable in respect of God whom he will acknowledg for the true Author of this Holy Religion if he well comprehends the force of Mr. Huet's Reasons So good and wise a God could nto on one hand require Men should embrace the Revelation he offered them and on the other lay an invincible opposition between this Revelation and the purest notices of Reason which he himself had given them to be their Rule in all Cases he could not on one hand oblige them to be Christians under pain of eternal damnation and on the other so order things that they could not be such without violating all the Maxims of good Sense and all the Rules of Prudence And this is Sir what the Insidel will say if he be a rational Person But if he has not understanding enough to perceive all this yet at least he will see That right Reason will not let him embrace the Christian Religion such as it is offered him I add in the Third place That not only he ought not to embrace it but that it is impossible he should Which is easy to be proved from the principles of your own Divines All of
bereaved of all his five Senses or only of the two principal ones Sight and Hearing suppose him at the same time both Deaf and Blind how will you make him understand the solidity of these Proofs You may speak to him long enough of the Prophecies of the Old Testament of our Saviour's and Moses his Miracles and other things which establish the Truth of Christian Religion This will be just the same as if you discoursed to a Stone It 's only our Senses then which make us receive these Proofs So that should we know That those of the Apostles and other Witnesses of the Truth could not deceive them this would signify nothing to us should we have just reason to believe we might be deceived by ours By consequence the certainty of Sense is doubly necessary to establish the solidity of the Proofs of Christianity and these Proofs will be two ways uncertain if the report of our Senses be not to be trusted See now Sir if there be any thing more true than what I told you a while ago That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys these Proofs and takes from them all their Validity See whether in supposing this Doctrine one may hinder Libertines from using this arguing It 's contrary to good Sense to receive this Revelation which destroys it self which overthrows its own Foundations which annuls and discredit's the means by which it endeavours to establish it self and whose Proofs cannot be true without being false nor assured without being uncertain This is what may be said of Christianity if it be true it teaches things contrary to the relation of our Senses For in fine Christianity has hitherto establish'd it self only on the depositions of these Faculties Hereby it has met with belief in the Minds of Men. If then one of its Maxims be we must not trust any of our Senses it 's evident and unquestionable we may say of it what we now affirmed It 's evident it is self-contradictory enjoining us on one hand to believe the report of our Senses when they instruct us in what should induce us to receive it and forbidding us at the same time to hearken to them in one of its chiefest Doctrines It overthrows its own Foundations seeing it destroys the faithfulness of our Senses on which the persuasion which we have of its truth is grounded Hereby it annuls and discredits the means by which it endeavours to set up it self and this is so visible that we need not undertake to shew it In a word its Proofs cannot be true without being false nor certain without being uncertain In effect if the Proofs of Christianity be good whatever it say's is true and if whatever it says be true these Proofs be nothing worth seeing one of the things which it affirms is That the report of our Senses whence these Proofs be taken is uncertain Is it not true Sir That setting up Transubstantiation the Infidels would on very good grounds use this Arguing In particular would they not have reason to complain that they are not sincerely dealt with seeing we pretend to convince them by the Depositions of Witnesses which we do not produce till we have strip'd them of all their Authority and declared them unfaithful and deceivers After this great Interest I see nothing which is worth contending for and if our Faith loses the means of establishing it self in the World as she do's lose it in losing her Proofs It 's not worth the while to demonstrate the other Consequences of your Doctrine nor particularly the Disorders which the uncertainty of our Senses once establish'd would infallibly bring forth into the World. They are both infinite and inexplicable because that in effect our Senses are almost the only Guides which we follow and their Fidelity is the chief Foundation of all the certainty we can have therein Your abstracted Truths which are perceivable only to the Understanding and which are so useful in Sciences are of little use in the Commerce of the World wherein Men apply themselves to things which be singular which are not known but by the interposition of the Senses So that to ruin the certainty of our Senses is to turn all into confusion and reduce Men to such a condition that they shall not take a step without being troubled with some Scruple But as I have already observ'd this is not the Point 'T is sufficient I have shew'd That the solidity of the Proofs which establish the Truth of Christian Religion depends on the certainty of our Senses so that Transubstantiation absolutely destroying this certainty invalidates these Proofs and stops the Mouths of those who undertake the Conversion of the Infidels This single Consequence is dreadful enough and we need not draw any other to shew the falsity of the Principle whence it flows It 's better to pass to my third Proof which is to shew That your Doctrine overthrows the certainty of our Reason as well as that of our Senses and gives such an establishment to Scepticism as bereaves us of all means of finding out the Truth And this is what I intend to make clear to you if I have not already tired your patience I shall hear you with all my Heart answer'd he but I must tell you That before I hear your third Argument I should be very glad to examine the two you have already offered me for I see abundance of things which I might oppose against what you have said but they lying something obscurely and confusedly in my Mind I must beg time of you to bring them into some clearness and order which as soon as I have done I shall not fail to wait on you with an account of them I easily consented to what he desired telling him I wish'd every Body would as maturely examine these great Points before they determin'd themselves I blam'd the rashness of those whose Eyes are dazl'd with the first glance of an Argument whereby they fall into a ridiculous lightness or an insupportable obstinacy Mr. N. spake to the same purpose and our conversation having for some time been on this Point I took my leave of him and departed CONFERENCE III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses THE next Day Mr. N. took the pains to come to me and immediately told me he had carefully appli'd himself to examine my Reasons and believed he had found a solution of them I have observed said he to me that both your Propositions depend on the same Supposition to wit That Transubstantiation is directly contrary to the reports of our Senses and that whereas this Doctrine tells us the Eucharist is no longer Bread nor Wine but the proper Body and Blood of our Saviour our Senses on the contrary tell us That this Sacrament is not the Body and Blood of our Saviour but real Bread and Wine This has inclined me to think That tho our Divines have not considered your Proofs in the same manner you have proposed them
the Functions of the natural Faculty which discovers to us the difference of Substances If I do this Sir will you not be satisfied I shall be fully so answered he and I promise you that if you prove it me clearly I shall not trouble my self nor you with a Reply I can easily do it said I For is it not true that when any one would make us conceive a moral Certainty in the highest Point of its Perfection the commonest Examples which are produced are those of the Existence of the City of Rome to those who have never been there that of the Pope Grand Signior or Emperor to those that have never feen them and as to the past that of Alexander the Great Cesar Pompey and other Hero's of Antiquity Scarcely any Author that treats of this Suject but alledges one or the other of these Instances Yet the City of Rome is a Substance or to speak more exactly an heap of Substances of several kinds Alexander Caesar Pompey and all the rest of the ancient Hero's were something more than Accidents And consequently had not God given us a Faculty capable of discerning the Substances with certainty there would be no assurance from the Testimony of those who have seen this and instead of a moral Certainty the greatest which can be imagin'd we should only have a slight Opinion and without Foundation Is it not true Sir that we are morally assured there was heretofore at Rhodes a great Colossus of Brass that there was a stately Temple at Ephesus consecrated to Diana and at Rome another dedicated to Jupiter Have we not the like certainty that there are still Pyramids of Stone in Egypt of excessive heights that there 's a Mount in Sicily which vomits Fire that there are Elephants in the Indies Lions in Africk Crocodiles in the Nile Yet this Colossus these Temples Pyramids Mountain Lions and Crocodils what are these but Substances whose Existence is not known to us but by the Testimony of those who have seen them with their own Eyes or to say nothing which may move you who perceived them by means of the Faculty which God has given us to know these kind of Objects But not to go so far I now shew'd you that the Truth of the Facts whence are taken the Proofs which establish the Divinity of the Christian Religion and even of the Jewish depends on the faithfulness of the Report which this natural Faculty has made of several Substances and that if this Faculty may be herein mistaken these Proofs are in no wise convincing It being then certain that we are morally assured of the Truth of these Facts it cannot be denied we have a moral Certainty of several Substances and that those who were inform'd of them by themselves have a greater certainty than we Can you Sir now doubt I have not made good my word Will you not grant me that the discerning of Substances whatever the Faculty is whereby this is done is attended with a greater certainty that the moral one Thus this Faculty telling me the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and telling it me with all the force and constancy it is able is it not apparent there 's a clearness in its Evidence far greater than that in the Proofs of Christianity Do's not my Proof then return with its full strength and convictions May I not always say That Transubstantiation is opposed with greater strength of Argument than the Christian Religion is defended with We are agreed that the Proofs for Christianity have only a moral Evidence and I now shewed you That that which perswades us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is far more certain than what is morally so Can you after this deny that there is not greater certainty in what combats Transubstantiation than in what establishes the Truth of Christian Religion Can you deny that that which is more than sufficient to establish the Truth of Christian Religion discharged of Transubstantiation is too weak to maintain it granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Doctrines which she requires to be believed You see then Sir the fruitlessness of your Answer you see it lets my two Proofs subsist in their full strength you see that whether it be the Senses or Reason which make us know and discern the Substances we have still cause to believe the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and that this Perswasion cannot be rendred doubtful and uncertain without shaking the whole Foundation of Christianity and without giving the Infidels an infallible means of triumphing over this Holy Religion Mr. N. was about forming an Answer when he was hindred by the arrival of one of my Friends who came from a long Voyage and whose return was a surprize to me I was much joyed to see him But Mr. N. to whom he was a Stranger took hence an occasion to be gone without informing me of his thoughts on what I told him CONFERENCE IV. The Third Proof That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration I Was very desirous to know what effect my last conference had on Mr. N. I was moreover willing to shew him my third Proof Whereupon I went to his House where he received me with his usual civility and our Discourse having insensibly led us to Matters of Religion I took the liberty to ask him Whether he had throughly considered what had past in our foregoing Debates He hereupon ingenuously acknowledg'd He could find no means to defend against my Instances the Answer he had made me nor how to offer me better Yet he added he was so perswaded of the truth of his Belief That he would rather yield up to me Mr. Huet's Proofs than to imagin the whole Church could be deceived in so important a Matter as that of the Sacrament In effect said he to me What hurt can there be in saying this Author has ill defended a good Cause and made use of false reasonings for the maintaining of the Truth What do you say Sir said I you ask me What hurt there can be in what you say I affirm to you that nothing can be worse For Sir I would not have you mistaken Mr. Huet's Proofs are not of his invention he only digested them into order strengthened and illustrated them with curious Remarks and pressing Considerations and as to the main of them he has taken them out of Authors that have wrote on that Subject before him and indeed he has also commendably taken them from the discourses of the Prophets and the Son of God himself and his Apostles Christ himself is the first that has used these Proofs He several times alledg'd the Predictions of the Prophets and as oft did cite his Miracles He alledg'd his Resurrection and these were his strongest Arms his greatest Arguments He made use of them to stop the mouths of the Scribes and Pharisees whom he look'd upon as his profest Enemies He used them to perswade the multitudes
Consult all the Sects of the Philosophers all the people in the Universe to know whether it be now day or whether an Horse be greater than an Ant you will find I do not say not a Sect or Nation but not any one particular person that denies this The light of Sense has moreover this advantage over that of Reason that it 's less liable to be disordered by prejudices Prejudices make people doubt who are strongly possessed by them of Truths which a free Reason and a disengaged mind clearly perceives What is there for example which my reason perceives more distinctly than the impossibility of a Body's being in two places without division Yet your Reason imagines to see the contrary Whence comes this but from the prejudice wherewith one of us is possess'd But 't is not the same with the Senses There 's no prejudice which hinders them from seeing Objects such as they are which we must always understand of the most apparent and grossest Objects There are two sorts of clearness says an Author much esteem'd among you * Lawful Prejudices chap. 14. the one so lively and piercing that it 's impossible for men not to see it and which is such as cannot be darkned by any cloud of Prejudices or Passions whereby it shews it self uniformly to all men of this kind adds he are things exposed to the Senses In a word It 's a thousand times easier to deceive our Reason than our Senses There 's no truth so certain which a Sophister will not render doubtful by his Subtilties and Artifices Even the most learned People are sometimes deceived and we have seen but too many Examples of this in all Ages But deceive my Senses if you can on Objects as familiar as those we now spake of Go and inform any one That the food he commonly uses is not Bread and Beer The evidence of Sense then has great advantages over that which is perceiv'd only by Reason whence appears the Possibility of my Proofs being good and your two first objections being not so Nay the thing is not only possible but true and I hope to convince you of it with little trouble Whatever you have hitherto said to me turns on these two Suppositions The first That Reason sees evidently on one hand the truth of this maxim of the Philosophers That when two Subjects be not distinct from a third they are not so from one another The second That there 's more evidence in this than there is in the Reasons which establish the Truth of Christian Religion But I first affirm to you It 's impossible these two Suppositions can be true And if they were the Arians and Socinians wou'd have good grounds to deny the Mystery of the Trinity For first if our Reason evidently saw the Truth of the Maxim you bring against me we must necessarily say one of these two things Either that in effect this Maxim is true or that Evidence is not a certain mark of Truth Here 's no medium You must of necessity take one of these sides The second differs in nothing from Scepticism you must therefore take the first It must be said that according to you the Maxim of the Philosophers is true That 's my thought says Mr. N. Are you of the same mind repli'd I on the subject of the Opposition which you think you evidently see between this Maxim and the Mystery of the Trinity Do you think this to be a true and real Opposition Or do you believe it to be false altho you evidently see it Should I say it 's false answer'd he you wou'd make me the same Objection you have already made you will tell me there may be error in things most evident seeing I might evidently see Opposition where there is none and that thus Evidence wou'd not be the mark of Truth and consequently That the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing To avoid such dangerous Extremities I had rather tell you that this Opposition is as true as 't is evident You believe then said I to him that effectively and in the Truth of the thing the Mystery of the Trinity is directly against an unquestionable Maxim. You believe there 's a real Contradiction between these two things and that 't is impossible to make them agree This is certainly true answer'd he Then said I the Sceptics must have good grounds seeing Contradiction is not the note of Falsity What is there more unquestionable than this Maxim That if a Proposition be true that which contradicts it must necessarily be false Is not this the Foundation of certainty You now see Sir on what precipices you cast your selves and what are the unavoidable Consequences of your Suppositions Hence you see the necessity of acknowledging there are some false and that in effect if the Philosophers Maxim be true it 's not contrary to the Mystery of the Trinity or if there be any Opposition between this Mystery and this Maxim we must not conclude the Maxim to be false seeing it's impossible the Mystery shou'd be so But this is not all I wish you wou'd explain your self on Mr. Huets Sentiment I lately mention'd to you Which Demonstrations do you believe most certain Physical or Moral ones Or to speak more precisely wherein think you lies most certainty and evidence in the Demonstration you brought against me in the name or the Socinians and Arians or in those Mr. Huet makes use of to prove the Truth of the Christian Religion Take which side you will you cannot escape me If you say the advantage lies on the side of Mr. Huets Proofs you deliver up to me your Objection In this Supposition right Reason will have us believe the Trinity notwithstanding the difficulties therein seeing nothing's more conformable to her Maxims than always to prefer that which is more evident before that which is less But if you say on the contrary That the Arians and Socinians Objection has more strength than Mr. Huets Proofs You hereby acknowledg That the Doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to good Sence and ought therefore to be rejected whether by retrenching of it from the number of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches supposing it can be separated from it or by rejecting the whole of Christianity supposing this Doctrine be inseparable from the rest In effect were these Proofs and this Objection of an equal force they wou'd bring the mind into suspence whence right Reason cou'd not draw it out She wou'd not know on which side to determine her self and finding at bottom of this Religion things which will appear to her evidently false She wou'd carry us as far off from it as She wou'd bring us near it in making us comprehend the force of the Proofs which authorize it Moreover making two contrary Judgments on the Subject of Religion one that it is true because the Proofs produced in its favour are good the other that it is false because it teaches
Absurdities She must therefore be deceived in the one or the other of these Judgments and thus neither the one nor the other of these wou'd be certain How wou'd it be then supposing all the advantage lay on one side as it wou'd plainly if what might be offered against Christianity has more evidence and certainty than what is used to establish the Divinity of it where shall we find that in this Supposition we must prefer what is less certain before what is more And who thinks if a man does this he deserves to be eternally miserable How then says Mr. N. Shall Reason prescribe us what we are to believe Shall she become the Rule yea and Judg of our Faith And do we not know that the truths of Christianity are infinitely above the Comprehension of human Reason You confound abundance of things which you shou'd distinguish repli'd I. First there 's a great deal of difference between discovering to us what we must believe as revealed of God and what we must reject as invented by Men. The first of these Duties contains two parts In effect One may make two sorts of enquiry after what one is to believe First In examining the Doctrine offered us and comparing it with the Maxims of Reason just as we do when we wou'd determine our selves on a question of Philosophy The second in examining purely whether this Doctrine has been revealed by God either by enquiring wherher it makes a part of a Religion supposed Divine or by enquiring whether the Religion of which we do not doubt but this Doctrine makes up a part has been revealed of God. It 's certain it cannot be expected from Reason to enquire in this first manner what we ought to believe and this for two Considerations First whatever attempts she may make she will never get the mastery the clearest wit and most piercing judgment not being in a capacity of raising it self of it self to the discovery of these sublime Truths which Faith comprehends And shou'd Reason discover some one the perswasion she could give us of it would not be a Divine Faith. It would be perhaps a Science an Opinion according as the proofs whereon this is grounded are probable or demonstrative But this wou'd never be a Divine Faith it being not possible for Divine Faith to have any other foundation than the authority of God. When we wou'd know whether a Doctrine makes part of a Religion of whose Divinity we are otherwise satisfied as when we wou'd enquire whether Christianity teaches Transubstantiation or the Real Presence this is certainly to be examin'd by Reason For how can we know this if we have lost our Reason Yet in this enquiry she does not so much keep the quality of a Rule as that of an Organ I would say we make this enquiry by means of this faculty call'd Reason yet this faculty does not then consult its own proper light and does not compare the Doctrine offered with its Notions She only compares it with the Rule which God has given her the Scripture alone according to us and the Scripture Tradition and Councils according to you It 's not the same when the question is to know whether a Religion be Divine for example when one deliberates whether one shall be a Christian Pagan or Mahometan In this enquiry Reason alone must be our guide and the best method it can take is to examine which of these different Religions which challenges our preference has the most visible Characters of Divinity which is it which appears most likely to have been revealed from God and which on the contrary is that which we have cause to think is a humane invention As to the rejecting of a Doctrine we have several different means If it be not conformable to the Rule we ought not to receive it we ought to refuse believing it with a Divine Faith. If it be contrary to the Rule we ought to do more we ought positively to reject it and believe it to be false In a word if our Senses or Reason expresly attest this Doctrine is not true we ought to perswade our selves not only that it is not true but that it has never been revealed of God. This last duty draws its Original from two different springs The first is the force of this great Maxim which is the foundation of Divine Faith to wit That whatever God has said is true Hence properly comes the obligation which we have to believe whatever God has revealed to us In effect why should we not believe it seeing its equally impossible that God shou'd be deceiv'd himself judging things to be what they are not as that he shou'd deceive others by telling them they be not what he knows they are And this is the true foundation of Divine Faith and the original of that right which our Reason has not to believe what is evidently false Divine Faith does thus Reason Whatever God has reveal'd is true God has reveal'd such and such a Doctrine Then this or that Doctrine is true Reason says for her part Whatever God has revealed is true Such or such a Doctrine is not true Therefore 't was not revealed by God. Shou'd it happen as you suppose that God shou'd reveal a Doctrine which appeared plainly false to Reason we shou'd find our selves in a dreadful difficulty or rather in the condition which Divines call a state of perplexity and which wou'd bring along with it shou'd it ever happen an absolute impossibility of knowing what we ought to do On one hand we should be bound to believe this Doctrine on the supposition God had revealed it and on the other we shou'd perswade our selves that God would not have revealed it because it appears evidently false and consequently is not to be believed So that were it only to hinder this from hapning we shou'd believe that God never reveals any thing which is apparently false to Reason at least to Reason rectifi'd and which uses all necessary precautions not to be deceiv'd for 't is of that alone whereof I speak Moreover were it possible for God to reveal a Doctrine evidently false evidence would be no longer the infallible note of Truth seeing in this supposition the evidence wou'd accompany this act of our Reason which wou'd judg this Doctrine to be false and which wou'd be false it self seeing this Doctrine being reveal'd of God wou'd hereby be necessarily true So that we ought no longer to reckon on the evidence of things and the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing You see then Sir That this right of our Reason has most solid foundations And it is certain that it has been ever acknowledged and that all sorts of Authors both Ancient and Modern have always believed they might justly conclude a Doctrine was not revealed from God when they saw it contrary to the purest notices of Reason And thus on one hand the Fathers have done who wrote against the Pagans and Hereticks
our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity IT 's not many days since I came to Mr. N. and found him in his Study having his Eyes fix'd on a Book with the reading of which he seem'd to be so taken up as made me think I should do him wrong to interrupt him Intending therefore to withdraw without his seeing me I could not do it without some small disturbance which made him turn his Head towards the place where I was and hastily arise towards me You shall not be gone said he for I prize your Company at another rate than thus to lose it The loss repli'd I would rather be mine and I am afraid lest I should deprive you of the pleasure of some delightful reading as knowing by experience how vexatious it is to be disturb'd at such a time What you say answered he after he had made me sit down is very true I am not a little pleas'd with reading good Books and I doubt not but this which lies before me is of that number But you have wherewith to make me amends for this Interruption for I doubt not but before we part you will increase the Pleasure which this reading afforded me and approving this Book as I dare say you will you 'l not a little confirm me in the good Opinion I have of it and make me read it henceforward with greater earnestness Your esteem of the Book repli'd I is enough to gain my approbation I am not wont to make Appeals from your Judgment having been always so pleas'd in following it that 't is now become a kind of Law which I never violate But perhaps I never saw this Book That can't be answer'd he this Book has been too famous for you not to see it especially considering it's some Years since 't was publish'd In a word 't is the Book which the Ingenious Mr. Huet has written to establish the Truth of Christian Religion (a) P. Dan. Huetii demonstratio Evangelica I do not repent said I of my engagement to approve of it for I have read it with great delight not to mention the Style which is delicate and want's no Ornaments I sind it replenish'd with judicious Observations and such as lie out of the common Road full of great sense and plainness In short 't is a Work worthy its Author who hold's a considerable Place amongst Learned Men. I have only one thing to say against the Book and that with regret because I know you will not herein agree with me Let 's hear it however said he It is repli'd I That this Book was made by one of your Party If that be all the fault answer'd he I am much mistaken if Mr. Huet ever corrects it You may judg what you please of it replied I my Opinion is That this is a capital Fault and spoil's the whole Work. For whereas this would have been an excellent Piece had it been wrote by a Protestant coming from a Person of your Communion it loses all its Force and Conviction and overthrows its own Arguments and should it fall into the hands of a knowing Infidel he could with one word answer it This is very surprising says Mr. N. and you must be a very great Bigot in your Religion to offer such a strange and incredible Paradox Has your Belief the priviledg of making bad Arguments good Ones and is ours so unhappy as to corrupt the best Things and change Demonstrations into Sophisms as oft as they pass through our hands There may be repli'd I some Truth in what you now say and I give an Instance of this from one of your Authors (b) Education of a Prince who shews That the greatest part of Seneca's Maxims are false and ridiculous in the Writings of That Philosopher whereas they would be very proper and excellent in the Writings of a Christian The same may I say of Mr. Huet and the rest of your Authors who undertake this Subject The best Proofs become Paralogisms in their Writings and 't is by passing over into ours that they resume their strength and due efficacy And this is one of the Effects which your Transubstantiation operates destroying the most convincing Arguments you can offer the Infidels and giving them an infallible means to defend themselves and right to maintain That if these Proofs be good Transubstantiation is not a part of the Christian Religion or if Transubstantiation be a part of the Christian Religion these Proofs he of no validity It 's certian if they be Men endued with sense they will lay hold of the first of these Propositions In effect it 's apparent That Mr. Huet's Proof are valid and good in themselves whereas 't is not certain That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches not to say that it ought to be taken for granted that it is not one of them It is so strange and offensive and so little agrees with the whole Body of reveal'd Truths either in general or particular that a Man needs only the use of his Senses free from all prejudices to perceive That this comes not from the same Spring and that the Author of Christianity is a very different Person from the Author of Transubstantiation Such Infidels then that are discerning Men will separate what 's offered to them jointly They will embrace Christianity and reject Transubstantiation They will receive this Holy Religion as coming from the Spirit of God and put from them your Doctrine as a humane Invention However 't is not long of you That they cast not themselves into the other aforementioned extremity I mean the persuading themselves that the Proofs of the Christian Religion be invalid Yet you are for persuading them not only That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which the Gospel teaches but moreover one of its principal ones one of the most essential Points of Christian Religion and that which can be least spared And consequently if these Infidels be simple enough to believe this and after such an Error have any reason left they will only make use of it to perswade themselves That that Religion which teaches such an incredible Doctrine could not have been revealed by the Spirit of Truth and that the Proofs which were made use of to establish the Divinity of it are of no validity I am so strongly possessed with the belief of Transubstantiation said Mr. N. That I believe no Objections in the World are capable to make me doubt one minute of the truth of it Yet I must acknowledg 't would be a terrible Temptation to me could you convince me of what you say It does so highly concern us That the Proofs of Christianity be valid That there are few Things but what ought to be sacrific'd to so great an Interest and I know no greater prejudice against a Doctrine than to shew that it weakens these Proofs and gives advantage to such dangerous Adversaries as those are against whom we
them hold (i) Greg. de Val. Tom. 3. Disp 1. Quest 1. Punct 1. §. 7. Coninte de actib sup disp 13. dub 1. Maerat de fid disp 16. Sect. 3 Goner de fid disp 1. art 8. Rhod. de fid quest 2. Sect. 4. §. 2. That the first Act of Divine Faith is always preceded by a Judgment morally evident which shew's That what one is going to believe is worthy to be believed They affirm That without this Judgment Faith can never be form'd in the Soul. They say moreover That this Judgment is only grounded on what they call Reasons of Belief or Motives of Credibility which are at bottom the Proofs of Christianity They say That the Infidel weighing these Reasons and finding them good and solid he concludes that the Doctrine which they maintain ought to be received I now ask you How the Infidel can form this inward Judgment and pronounce that Christian Religion deserves to be received in the time wherein he sees that the Reasons which induce him to embrace it are opposed by other Reasons stronger and clearer I demand of you if in case this can be Whether such a Judgment would not be apparently false For how in effect can one say a thing is worthy to be believed when one has more reason to think it salfe than to believe it's true Do we call such a thing credible Is' t not rather incredible I might drive on these Consequences father I could shew you that Transubstantiation hath other Consequences which are no less vexatious But this not appearing necessary I shall content my self at this time with asking you Whether these three Consequences which I have taken from your Belief are not very terrible and whether it be not better to renounce the Doctrine which draws them oafter it than to admit them Yet they be necessary and you must receive them unless you 'l deny some of the Propositions which you have granted me Neither will this much help you because that in effect whatever you have granted me is most certain and when you would have this brought into question I 'le not fear the making you grant it again there being nothing in all this but what is highly evident What you now said to me at length answer'd Mr. N. is plausible enough and I must confess I did not believe your Cause could be pleaded so strongly And yet I am perswaded that this is not solid and I hope to answer all you have said when I have thought more of it Pray let me sleep upon it and I 'le give you an account to morrow morning of what has come into my mind I was far from denying so reasonable a request I only told him before I went away That if this Proof appear'd to him stronger than those we are wont to use in this matter this only arose from a certain Air of Novelty which might be in the manner of proposing it and that in the main the common Proofs are no less convincing than those and if they did not appear so this only proceeded from our being insensibly accustomed to believe them false there having been a thousand things invented to clude the force of them It being long since said I that they have been opposed against you your Doctors therefore have left no Stone unturn'd to lessen the value of them To this end they have sorg'd a thousand Distinctions sought a thousand Subterfuges and have wanted no Artifice nor Colour to make them pass in the World. And therefore when we offer them against you we find you always ready to slight them It would have been the same with what I just now offer'd you had you foreseen the course of my Objections and you would have taken care not to say several things with which your Books are full and which should be henceforward left out unless you are minded to shew the World how you condemn your own Principles I hereupon took my leave of him and withdrew praying God from the bottom of my Heart to bless my Endeavours and so to prosper this Seed which was sown as it were unawares that it might one day bring forth Fruit to his Glory CONFERENCE II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion WHEN I parted from Mr. N. there was no mention made of the Place where we were to meet which made me believe knowing his obliging temper he would come the next day to me But being unwilling he should give himself that trouble I was resolved to prevent him by being with him first He told me he was troubled he could not be as diligent as I was for immediately after I had left him a Business came upon him of great Importance which had employed his Thoughts to that very time but having ended that Affair he hoped he should now have an opportunity of acquitting himself of the Engagement he was in Will you said I to him let me impart to you another Thought which has great conformity with that which was the Subject of our Yesterday's Discourse By which means you may examine both these Arguments at a time and perhaps the one will hinder you from stopping at things which will appear to you proper to get rid of the other I am of your mind said he but I desire you would propose this second Proof all at once For in sine there 's oft more artifice than sincerity in discovering what one has to say by pieces He that answers and knows not where his Adversary will lead him takes many times fruitless Precautions and sometimes neglects necessary Ones He le ts pass certain things which strike deepest and amuses himself with others which are of no effect And therefore I think it best That the Respondent should see at once the Difficulty proposed to him and know at first what he is to take care of and therefore I pray you henceforward to deal in this manner with me What you say would be necessary repli'd I had you an Adversary who sought only to surprize and who more regarded Victory than Truth But I must tell you plainly this Artifice appears so inconsiderable and unworthy of an honest Man especially of a Christian that I cannot but be troubled at your suspicion Pray therefore believe this is not my intention for if I have followed in our preceding Discourse such a method as you do not like 't was because I thought it the fittest to lead those insensibly to the Truth who are farthest from it You know the greatest Men among the Ancients have been of this Sentiment and that it was perticularly the Method of Socrates and his famous Disciple Plato Yet seeing you will have me take another course I shall reduce my second Argument to three Propositions all three being so evidently certain that I cannot see how they can be overthrown The first is That if Transubstantiation takes place our
altogether fruitless Wherefore you cannot defend your self but in denying some of the Propositions of which it consists but which of the three can you deny Not the first I suppose For in fine if Transubstantiation has place The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not Bread nor Wine but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. Yet the natural Faculty whereby we discern the Substances from one another whatever that is and whatever name we give it this Faculty tells us that 't is not the Body and Blood of Christ but Bread and Wine If you doubt of this shew this Sacrament to a Man indued only with those Faculties which Nature has given us and who has never received any supernatural assistance to a Jew or to a Mahometan or Pagan Ask him what it is and you 'l see how little he will hesitate to answer you it 's Bread and Wine If you still doubt of this desire a Priest to mix a consecrated Host amongst others unconsecrated Employ then all your natural Faculties to distinguish that which is the Body of Christ from the rest which is mere Bread You 'l find all your care here to no purpose It 's then certain that the natural Faculty whereby we discern Substances affirms plainly the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine and therefore deceives us if your Belief be true Thus my first Proposition labours under no difficulty And the second is no less certain than the first For in fine if the natural Faculty whereby we distinguish one Substance from another may take the Body of Christ for Bread and Wine there will be no deceit of which 't will not be capable there being nothing in the World more discernable and subject to less mistakes than an human Body on one hand and a morsel of Bread and some drops of Wine on the other I have only then to prove my third Proposition which is in effect the only one which appears to have need Yet is it certain I shall have little trouble to make you agree with me in it It saith That the certainty with accompanies the Acts of the natural Faculty and makes us distinguish the Substances That this Certitude I say is the Foundation of the Proofs of Christianity and that we cannot solidly establish the truth of this Holy Religion if the Senses may deceive us in the reports they make of these kind of Objects I conceive nothing more certain than this Proposition In effect we agreed in our first Conference That the Proofs of Christian Religion depends on the Truth of certain Facts which we never saw but which are attested to us by Persons whose Testimony ought not to be suspected by us Yet it will reasonably be so if we be not in a capacity to discern certainly particular Substances And this will clearly appear if we run through the most important of these Facts The most considerable and the most decisive is without difficulty being our Saviour's Resurrection for the whole depends hereon If this Fact be false the Gospel is but a mere Romance and if it be true it cannot be deni'd but God has declar'd himself hereby in the most authentic manner in the World in favour of our Holy Religion And the Apostles were chiefly sent to attest the Truth of this Fact and hence it is That they so often seem to affect as it were the title of Witnesses of their Master's Resurrection But 't is very considerable That the Apostles were not present at our Lord's Resurrection He was not in the Sepulchre when these holy Men arrived there and they found only the Funeral Linen wherewith his Body was wrapped They knew not then our Saviour was risen by seeing him come out of the Tomb and as they beheld Lazarus but they gathered it from two other Facts of which they were certain having already seen the first and seeing then actually the second The one was his Death and the other his Life They were sure our Lord had expired on the Cross That his Side was pierced with a Spear that they might be certain of his Death They knew that he was buried and consequently could not have the least suspicion that he was not really dead They saw him afterwards alive and walking acting and speaking whence they concluded in the clearest manner in the World and the least liable to mistake that he was effectually risen It 's then plain that the Truth of Christ's Resurrection depends on one hand in knowing whether he died and on the other whether he liv'd after his Death But what certainty can there be of either of these two Facts if there be none in the judgment we make of Substances These two Facts are equally contested The Basilidians denied heretofore the first and the Mahometans deny it to this day both affirming 't was not our Saviour Christ but Simon the Cyrenian that was crucified by the Jews The Jews have ever denied the second They say it 's very true our Saviour died on the Cross but that he never rose again and that what the Apostles related of it was a mere Fable If we may be deceived in these kind of Objects what can we oppose to either of these Enemies of the Truth How shall we convince either the Basilidians or Mahometans That it was Jesus and not Simon who expired on the Cross How shall we perswade the Jews the Apostles were not deceived in imagining they saw him alive and risen Will not both one and the other have grounds to tell us we have no certainty for what we affirm The Turks will tell us That seeing we may be so easily deceived in the discerning of Substances it 's very likely the Jews took Simon for Jesus Christ The Jews will answer the Error was not theirs but that the Apostles took some Spirit or living Man for their Master And as to us we have nothing convincing to oppose against one or the other And here Sir let me entreat you to consider the imprudence of Bellarmine Amongst other Reasons he uses to shew the Senses have no certainty when the Question is about discerning the Substances he particularly cites (b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. the Instance of Mary Magdalen who took our Saviour risen for the Gardiner I shall not stand to shew here the weakness of this Argument nor say 't was scarcely then light when Mary came into the Garden where our Saviour was buried Neither shall I use long Discourses to prove That her trouble grief or perhaps modesty would not let her look directly on a Man whom she did not know But that which I would entreat you to consider is the stroak which this Argument of Bellarmine might give to the certainty of our Faith were it as solid as he pretends it to be It proves nothing or it proves one might take our Saviour risen for another Man and consequently that one might take another Man for Jesus Christ risen and so when the Apostles saw our Lord risen they
which follow'd him and who hereby in some sort shew'd their readiness to receive his Doctrine Believe me (a) John xiv for my Works said he to them And in another place (b) St. John v. 36. The Works which I do bear testimony of me He used them to confirm the Faith of his Disciples and opposes this alone to the Temptations which shook them (c) Luke 24.25 26 27. O fools and flow of heart to believe all that the Prophets have spoken Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into his Glory Then says St. Luke beginning at Moses and all the Prophets he expounded to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself And when St. John the Baptist sent to him his Disciples to demand of him whether he was the Messias he gave them for his full answer these words (d) Mat. xi 4 5. Go and tell John what you see and hear The Blind recover their sight the Lame walk the Lepers are cleans'd the Deaf hear the Dead are risen and the Gospel is preached to the Poor The Apostles have herein imitated their Master as well as in other things one of them declaring at the end of his Gospel (e) John x◠That he wrote the Miracles of the Son of God that we might believe that Jesus is the the Christ the Son of God and that believing we might have Life through his Name The Fathers have followed these incomparable Guides The modern Authors have trod in their steps Ask me now Sir then no more what hurt there is in saying Mr. Huet's Proofs be of no weight I dare say they be not only valid but that he can not be a Christian who naturally denies them Your Answer is also attended with this Vexation that 't is equally injurious to the Wisdom of God and to the Memory of those who have hitherto embraced the Profession of the Truth For as to the first if the accomplishment of the ancient Prophecies the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles do prove nothing Wherefore did God take that care to perform them And whom will you perswade that he rais'd up such a long train of Prophets so many times forced Nature and overthrew the ancientest and firmest of its Laws and that he did all this I say for nothing without any Necessity any Reaor Profit Is this the Character of the Divine Wisdom which commonly arriving at the greatest Ends by the smallest and most contemptible Means in appearance must needs be far from using such great ones and setting at work such Machins to do nothing I say moreover that your Answer is injurious to an infinite number of Christians How many have there been since the Birth of Christianity who have embraced this Holy Religion by being convinc'd of its truth by proofs of the same nature of Mr. Huet's I mean by the consideration of the Prophecies of the Old and New Testament and the Miracles of Christ and his Apostles If what you say be true they have been simple and foolish People who have yielded to such things as they ought to have despised Their Faith was not a solid Perswasion but a fond Belief more worthy of blame than praise and thus lightly believing they have shew'd themselves of the number of those mention'd by the Son of Sirach Qui citò credunt leves sunt corde And further If Miracles be of no value why do you require them of us Why will you have our first Reformers rejected for this very Reason Why do you reject People and reject them without hearing them as they think they ought to be and that for this only reason that they wanted an unnecessary thing and a Proof which concludes nothing Is not this I appeal to your self very strange In a word Sir if Mr. Huet's Proofs be not good where shall we find better What can we say to the Insidels to bring them to the knowledg of the Truth And with what success shall we labour for their conversion We shall not want Prooss nor Means said Mr. N. we shall have the Proofs of Reason taken from the nature of the Christian Doctrine it self the Truth Sublimity and Purity of its Precepts and from the conformity it has with the common notions which the corruption of our Nature has left us and some other such like Considerations which do not depend on Arguments of Sense Who has told you Sir replied I that these kind of Proofs are proper to convert all sorts of Infidels without exception Can you deny what even those who would make the best of them have expresly remark'd (f) Cloistian Convers That they are a little abstracted and require not only some application of Mind but morcover greater light and penetration of thought than the Vulgar is commonly endued with Yet we must convert the Laplanders the wild Irish and Cannibals which is to say brutish People and such about whom it has been disputed in the Schools of Spain whether they have the use of Reason and whether they be of the same kind with other Men. What way then have you for the instructing them in things which surpass the Capacity of our Tradesinen and Peasants But what will you say if I shew you That your Transubstantiation destroys these kind of Proofs as well as Mr. Huet's Will you not grant me after this that this is a very dangerous Doctrine and that you cannot soon enough retrench it from the number of those Truths which are taught by Christianity Yet I can establish more than this For I can shew that your Belief banishes Certainty from the Acts of Reason as well as from those of Sense I can shew you it sets open a large Door to Pyrrhonism whereby it may absolutely reign in the World there being nothing which can be reasonably opposed against it You see Sir 't is impossible to say any thing of greater force against your Doctrine For Scepticism is the last and greatest irregularity whereinto Reason can throw it self All others appear to me slight in comparison of this And so much the rather because all others may be cured whereas this is without remedy In effect the Sceptics doubting of every thing and agreeing in nothing they give no hold to those whose who would reduce them So that 't is impossible to dispute regularly with them For as Motion cannot be made but upon something that 's immovable so a Dispute must turn on something which is indisputable What way is there then to dispute against a Man who doubts of all and not only doubts whether what you tell him be true but doubts moreover whether you do tell him of it whether he hears it yea whether he doubts of it As for my part I regard all the reasonings of those who undertake to convince Sceptics as a perpetual begging of the Question For in fine 't is impossible to reason against them without laying down something which they will not grant because that in
is the Connection of Propertie's with one another and of all of 'em together with the Essence For might one separate all this and the Essence could be without the Properties or the Properties without the Essence or each of these Properties without any one of the others there could be no Demonstration made on this Subject and the Reasonings which shall be used to prove one of these things by the other would amount to no more than probable Arguments like those drawn from what they call common Accidents And therefore the Jesuits of Conimbre affirm * Conimb in lib. 1. post Anal. cap. 7. quaest 2. Art. 2. That the Connection of Properties with their Subjects is the true object of Sciences They say this Connection is indissoluble even in reference to the power of God and they prove it by this Reason That if God could separate these things Science might happen to be false which appear'd to them absurd and contradictory If then Transubstantiation do's actually separate the Properties from one another and altogether from the Essence if it grants some of these Properties without the others if it grants some one of 'em or all of 'em together without the Essence in sine if it grants the Essence without the Properties its clear it saps the Foundations of most Demonstrations and brings it to pass that nothing shall be more easie than to make great numbers of them according to all the Forms and Conditions which the Logicians do require yet which shall be all Fallacies and Deceits It 's certain your belief makes this great separation and your Doctors themselves do not deny it * Vasq in 3. disput 187. c. 2. n. 13. For example it 's commonly believ'd that the natural properties of a Body are Extension Division Motion Impenetration taking up a place c. All the Philosophers Books are full of this kind of stuff And therefore the knowledg of Physics which ought chiefly to endeavour at the discovery of the Properties of the Natural Body which is its Object makes of this very thing one of the considerable of its Treatises and never fails to bring it after that of its Principles which is the first We believe 't is the very essence of Accidents to be actually in their Subject You do not grant this yet you grant if this be not the essence of Accidents yet 't is at least a Property of them You believe it the Properties of Quantity to be measured to be equal and proportionable to the place it possesses Here are several Properties yet Sir you separate them all from their Subjects and consequently from the essence whence they flow Supposing as you do the existence of the Accidents of the Bread without a Subject you maintain something that has extent that is divisible moveable figured impenetrable and which possesses a place and yet this must not be Body all this while Which is to say you shall grant at once six different Properties of a Natural Body separated from this Body and consequently from its essence which is yet the only spring from whence they flow Establishing the Body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist after the manner of Spirits you strip it of its divisibility its impenetrability and its locality which is to say you hereby affirm the Essence to be separated from three of its most Essential Properties Leaving to this Body its Quantity you separate this Quantity from the several Properties which accompany it every where else the divisibility impenetrability the aptitude to be measured to possess a place c. Supposing the Accidents of Bread and Wine without a Subject you do moreover suppose the Essence of these kind of Beings without the most Essential of their Properties You will have Christs Body in the Eucharist to retain some of the Properties of the Natural Body as Quantity Figure c. And lose others as Divisibility Impenetrability the manner of being circumscriptively in a place c. which is to say you separate the Properties from one another Hereby then you destroy the connexion of Properties between one another and with their Essence which as I said just now is the foundation of most Demonstrations So that all those which may be made on this Principle and which Aristotle would have lookt upon as convincing and unanswerable proofs are in our hands but trivial Conjectures and bare Probabilities Will you have besides this Examples which justifie this truth Shall I give you Demonstrations which all Philosophers even your own have ever respected as very solid ones which yet are but meer Sophisms granting Transubstantiation Is it not true that your Suarez * Suarez Met. disp 1. n. 4. proves there are Substances because there are Accidents There are Accidents says he there must then be Substances He says this is a necessary consequence and shews it to be so in the sequel by Considerations which perhaps I may hereafter mention But what can be falser than this if there can be Accidents without a Subject as your Transubstantiation supposes All Philosophers both Ancient and Modern Aristotelians and Cartesians * Arist Met. Lib 8 cap 1. Perer. Phys lib 5 cap 4. Suar. Met Disp 13. Sect. 1. Conimb in 1. Phys cap 9. Quaest 1. Ar. 1. Masius ibidem Quaest 1. Petit de raref Cond pag. 172. Rohauz Phys part 1. cap 6. intending to advance surther and prove the existence of Matter or Corporal Substance propose three things observable in nature The first that there happens in it Accidental changes that that which was black becomes white what was cold becomes hot and the second that there happen Substantial changes there being of wood made fire and that from a Seed springs up a Tree and the third That all this is done by Natural Agents whose forces are limited Whence they conclude There must be necessarily some matter which is the Subject of all these several changes and on which the Natural causes may act They pretend this proof is demonstrative and that nothing can be offered against it But all this having place in the Eucharist it 's clear there must be said one of these two things Either that this proof is not good or that the Substance of the Bread and Wine remains in the Sacrament The Cartesians pretend to demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul by shewing it to be distinct from the Body and they imagine to prove this distinction by saying that Thought which is a modification of the Soul is no Material thing Which they afterwards prove by this reason That one may deny Thought whatever appertains to the Body as to be long large and deep to be of such and such a figure to be divisible c. yet without destroying for this the notion we have of Thought But can we not deny all this of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist though it be Material and not a Spirit Here 's then another deceitful Demonstration if your Transubstantiation has place
Joan. tract 36. pronunciatur the body of Jesus Christ risen must be in one only place But why must it be so and why may he not be in several places at a time if he be there in effect as your Creed bears The most famous among the Fathers have used the same Arguments against the Macedonians These Hereticks affirmed the Holy Spirit to be but a Creature of a like nature to that of Angels The Holy Fathers to refute them alledge That an Angel cannot be in several places at a time whereas the Holy Spirit was in the same time in several places extream distant from one another seeing he never forsook the Apostles although for the Preaching of the Gospel they were dispersed over all the Earth Thus does St. Athanasius argue or one under his name in the dispute he is said to have against Arius (a) Apud Athan Didymus of Alexandria (b) Didym de Sp S. St. Basil (c) Basil de Sp. S. cap 2. St. Greg. Naz. (d) Naz. Orat. 3.7 St. Ambrose (e) Amb. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 7. Pascasius Deacon of Rome (f) Pasc Rom. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 12. Anastasius Sinait (g) Anast Sin. lib. 1. de dogm fid Rupert (h) Rup lib. 10. cap. 22. and others very ill as you see were it not supposed impossible for the same Body to be in several Places at a time Were not this held then for undeniable they would without doubt have been answered That there 's no more difficulty in supposing a Spirit in several Places than a material Body as that of our Saviour was But in effect it appears the Fathers have ever believed this could not be seeing hereby he refuted the exravagant Opinions of both Hereticks and Pagans Moreover your great evasion which consists in distinguishing what may naturally be and what may happen by an effect of the Almighty Power of God this evasion I say will not serve in this occasion for in fine the Question was not in these Disputes what might or what might not naturally be but what might absolutely be The Pagans did not pretend That by means of natural Causes the Gods were placed in Statues consecrated to them The Manichees did not subject our Saviour to the Laws of Nature The Macedonians did not believe the Holy Spirit was sent by some created Cause All these People made the Divine Power intervene in these occasions and consequently the Fathers affirming that what these extravagant People said was impossible they meant 't was so in all senses and that 't was a mere contradiction It appears then from all I have now said That according to the truest and best Reason according to your own Authors and according to the Fathers it 's a pure contradiction to suppose Christs Body in several places at a time But the contradiction will be still more manifest if we add That supposing this Divine Body in several places one may say of it things directly opposite to one another Considering it such as it is in Heaven you believe it has its three dimensions each of which you believe may be measured and compared with those of other Bodies which are greater or lesser You believe it has its parts one out of another That it possesses a place whose parts answer those of this sacred Body That he is therein visible and palpable acts c. You say the direct contrary of this same Body such as you suppose it in the Eucharist You believe it there exists after the manner of Spirits that it is therein reduced to one point that it has its parts one in another that 't is therein invisible and without action You also believe that to consider it only as 't is in the Eucharist it 's removed out of one place and let to rest in another here he is lifted up and there he is let down Are not these Sir so many contradictions Is not this to affirm and deny the same thing of the same Subject in relation to the same parts and time and what do you call contradictory if this be not so A Body in two places says Mr. N. is equivalent to two Bodies and one may say of it the most opposite things without contradiction I must acknowledge one cannot do it when we speak of a Body existing only in one place But when we speak of a Body or generally of a Subject which exists in diverse places at a time there 's no contradiction in affirming and denying the same things of it This is no new answer and I suppose you have read it in our Authors Your Authors I confess have made use of it repli'd I but I affirm their answer was insincere it being not what they thought but what the interest of their cause required And for a proof of what I say is it not true That when the Question was of things wherein they were not interessed and which they regarded as absolutely independent from the Eucharist they have not stuck to maintain 't was a contradiction to say things opposite of a Body in two places For example because it 's held among you that Christs Body is not circumscriptively that is to say after the manner of Bodies in such a manner that each of its parts answers to that of the place which it possesses because say I 't is believ'd that the Body of Jesus Christ is not in this manner but in Heaven and that 't is supposed in the Eucharist only Sacramentally which is to say after the manner of Spirits totum in toto totum in qualibet parte The Thomists * See Masius Phys lib. 4. cap. 5. quest 5. assert 3. have imagined That it mattered not as to the Eucharist to know whether a Body may be circumscriptively in two places They thought they might freely explain themselves on this Question without fearing the judgment they might make of it should prove of dangerous Consequence to the Doctrine of the Real Presence Being in this manner withheld by no consideration and applying themselves to nothing but what appeared to them to be true they pronounced it impossible for one Body to be circumscriptively in two places and their strongest reason is that hereby it might happen that this Body might be in motion in one of these places and at rest in another here it might be cold and there hot and so of the rest It 's according to them a pure contradiction to say That a Body which shall be circumscriptively in two places shall be at the same time at rest and in motion but if this be a contradiction why is it not as considerable a one to say these same things of a Body which is Sacramentally in two places or Sacramentally in one and circumscriptively in the other For in fine are not rest and motion as opposite and inconsistent when the Bodies which they affect are Sacramentally in two places as when they be therein circumscriptively Moreover
things if it may deceive us in all things the proofs of Christianity are of no validity Even your third proof cannot escape the being appli'd to the Mystery of the Trinity In effect its observable That the Maxim I now alledg'd to you is not only a Metaphysical principle but the foundation of all affirmatory Syllogisms which prove one cannot joyn two terms by the affirmation but by shewing one may joyn them both to a third term'd a mean. By consequence if this Maxim be false as it must of necessity be if the Mystery of the Trinity be true we must no longer think of arguing but yield up the certainty of this sort of knowledg to the Sceptics And here 's Sir the natural use of your Method if it be follow'd we must retrench from our Religion whatever our reason will not suffer and as soon as ever she shall see any opposition to arise between her Maxims and our Mysteries we have no other party to betake our selves to but that of disowning these Mysteries and rejecting them as so many Errors Thus Faith shall depend on our Capricio and we shall henceforward believe not what it shall please God to reveal to us but whatever it shall please us to imagin Would you have me to take this course or to become an Arian or Socinian and do you think we ought to yield up every Article of our Faith as soon as ever we shall find any repugnance in them to the deceitful Maxims of our wretched reason which oftner serves to lead us out than in the way and to blind us than to enlighten us Far am I repli'd I from this and tho I am perswaded of the innocency of my Method I should be the first to condemn it did I believe 't would produce such pernicious effects But it s certainly an offering of great violence to make it serve for the drawing from it such dangerous Conclusions Pray let me justifie it and for this purpose give me your attention for some minutes It 's first very strange you should reject Arguments wherein you cannot remark the least defect They consist of sundry Propositions amongst which there 's not one but what is not only true but moreover evident Moreover they be strictly alli'd and their Conclusions are drawn in the most natural manner in the world Ought they then to be rejected on vain suspicions and uncertain apprehensions Is not this proceeding injurious to faith For what would she be might her Doctrines be combated by Reasons which suffer no reply and from which there 's no defence but by saying We wont examine them Is not this formally to accuse her That she will not endure the light Should all the world follow your example what shall we answer to the Libertins of the Age how would they triumph over our Religion Moreover let me entreat you to consider there 's great difference between your two first proofs and my two first yours are drawn from Reason and mine from Sense You say 't is evident to Reason there are three Essences in the Trinity or that there 's only one Person Whereas I say it 's evident not only to Reason but to Sense That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine What matter is it said Mr. N. that the Evidence which you oppose to that of the Proofs of Christianity is that which is perceiv'd by Reason or that which strikes the Senses seeing the first is no less than the second or to speak better seeing that is far greater than this It 's of great concern answer'd I and that on divers accounts First because the Supposition you make is not certain You suppose That the certainty of the acts of reason such as that is which springs from Demonstration is greater than that which arises from the report of the Senses I confess this is the Cartesians opinion But you know the Gassendists hold the contrary These last which are certainly not to be contemn'd hold there 's no greater certainty than that of the Senses They tell us They are the Senses which perswade us of the truth of the first Principles and that we know not for example The whole is greater than a part but by observing in all the Objects which have struck our Senses that the part was always lesser than the whole They are not only the Gassendists which are of this opinion The Vulgar and generally all those who are not Philosophers are herein of their opinion and if you will have them comprehend there are certain things of which they ought to be more strongly perswaded than of what they see they will presently believe you are not in earnest with them This appears considerable to me for you know neither Faith nor Salvation are the portion only of Philosophers the ordinary people having as great a right to them as the most Learned So that my Proofs have this advantage That they be convincing according to the Hypothesis of all the world whereas yours suppose things which few know and concerning which all those who are capacitated to judg are not agreed Especially the first of yours supposes a thing which Mr. Huet opposes with all his strength * Huetii Demonst Evang. pag. 3 4. That Physical Demonstrations have greater evidence and certitude than Moral ones He affirms on the contrary That Moral Demonstrations are the most convincing of all and that neither Physics nor Metaphysics nor Geometry has one to be parallel'd with them whether in general with those which perswade us of most matters of fact or in particular with those which he makes use of to establish the truth of Christian Religion He hereupon sufficiently enlarges himself and I doubt not but you have remarkt that place as well as I. I may then deny your Supposition which if I should I shall have very able persons for my Abettors But I 'le grant what you say to be true and suppose all the world of your opinion I know another way to solve your Objection which is Sir That should I agree with you That considering things in general the evidence of Reason is greater than that which offers it self to the Senses this will not hinder me from maintaining That in particularising things we shall find incomparably fewer things evident to Reason than of such as are perceived by the Senses In effect how few are the Truths which are perceiv'd by reason alone * Dogmatists such as maintain against the Sceptics the certainty of Sciences wherein not only the Sceptics but the Dogmatists do agree Scarcely is there one which has not been debated Pro Con. It 's not the same of those which are perceiv'd by the Senses For excepting the Sceptics whom you cannot bring in against the Senses seeing they are as bad friends to Reason Scarce will you find one who will not allow what the Senses discover to us at least in gross and popular Objects if I may say so and which are the only ones we now speak of
and on the other all Authors of your Communion who have Treated on the Controversies which separates us For as to the First did not Justin Martyr Tertullian Minutius Felix Theophilus of Antioch Origen Arnobius Lactantius St. Augustin St. Cyril and a great many others oppose Paganism with the absurdities and extravagancies of its mysteries Did not the same Fathers writing against Hereticks use this very argument affirming the Chimera's and extravagancies which these people believ'd cou'd in no sort come from God being apparently false and contrary to all the lights of Reason Have not in sine all your Authors who write against us followed the same method tho with different success See Bellarmin Gregory de Valentia Richlieu the Author of Prejudices and generally all your Controvertists There 's not one of them but has pretended to shew our Doctrine is not of God because of the absurdities therein contained All these Authors argue on two Principles The one That God has revealed nothing which is false The other That whatever is contrary to Reason is thereby contrary to Truth Take away which of these Principles you will and all the Arguments of these Writers will be meer Sophisms St. Augustin proceeds farther He says we ought to forsake the Communion of the Orthodox Church and pass over into that of the Hereticks and despise whatever you respect as the foundations of your Faith cou'd it be made appear the most dangerous Hereticks such as were then the Manichees taught the Truth * Aug. cont Epist fund cap. 4. and this is what he teaches us in this famous passage which your Doctors have ever in their mouths and wherein he declares that several things retain him in the bosom of the Catholick Church The consent of all people The authority grounded on Miracles and confirm'd by Antiquity Succession and even the name of Catholick You affirm these are the props and foundations of the true Faith and I will not now set on shewing you the contrary We may do this another time if you think fitting At present I am willing to suppose what you say I pray then consider what Saint Augustin adds Amongst you says he where I see nothing like this we hear nothing on all hands but promises of Truth and I confess adds he That could you shew it me so clearly that I could not doubt of it I must prefer it before whatever withholds me in the Catholick Church You see here how St. Augustin acknowledges That the evidence which excludes doubtings is to be preferred before the motives of Faith. He does not say that if the Manichees had this evidence on their side we shou'd despise it and offer against it the certainty of Faith as you pretend He says the contrary He says we shou'd yield and that which hinder'd him from doing it was That whatever the Manichees said They had not this evidence which they vaunted of That they promised great matters but cou'd not shew them Bellarmin does something like this * Bell. de Motis Eccles l. 4. cap. 11. He reckons amongst the Notes of the Church the holiness of its Doctrine and makes this holiness consist in her teaching nothing which is false and imposing nothing which is unjust and will have us judg of this by the lights of Reason He afterwards makes the application of this to the Pagans Jews Mahometans ancient Hereticks and lastly to us He shews as to the first That they have taught things absurd and abominable and attempting afterwards to shew this on our Subject he thence concludes none of these Societies is the true Church By this way of disputing he plainly subjects your Church to this examination and tacitly implies she may be rejected provided she can be convinced of all which he accuses the others For besides that he cannot take it ill That the Infidels and Hereticks should treat him in the same manner as he uses them besides this his greatest pretension is That the Church must be known by his marks seeing then one of his marks is That she teaches nothing which is false he hereby consents to the rejection of your Church if it can be shew'd from Reason That she teaches things false and absurd It cannot be deny'd but Bellarmine has had some Reason to deal thus For 't wou'd certainly be a great scandal to the Faithful and much more to Infidels cou'd it be clearly and plainly shew'd That Christian Religion teaches things directly contrary to Reason In effect seeing we embrace this Religion only on the account of the proofs which authorize it and of whose goodness we cannot judg but by Reason shou'd this Reason meet with things evidently false in this Religion she wou'd hereby carry us off as far from it as she cou'd bring us near it by making us comprehend these proofs Moreover making two contrary judgments on the subject of Religion the one That it is true because the proofs which authorize it are good the other that it is false because it teaches things absurd she must of necessity be deceived in the one or the other and so neither is certain The Author of the Art of Thinking was not of this mind says Mr. N. It 's certain says he * Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That Divine Faith should have more force on our minds than our own Reason and this from Reason it self which shews us we should always prefer what is more certain to what is less It being more certain that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us because 't is more impossible God shou'd deceive us than our Reason All this said I appears to me false and ill digested and 't is easie to observe herein such a slight of hand as shews little love to truth To see this more distinctly be pleas'd to consider That the certainty of every act of Faith depends on the perswasion which we have of two Truths which are in some sort their props and foundations The first That whatever God attests is true The second That God has attested the Doctrine which we believe You see that if we doubt of either of these two Truths it 's impossible our Faith can be firm To what purpose is it to know that God does not lye if we doubt God has not said a thing And granting he has said something if we doubt he has said in particular what 's proposed to us to believe And further what signifies it for us to know That God has reveal'd what 's offer'd us if we doubt whether all which God says be true It 's then equally necessary to know these two Truths but they be not always equally evident The first is ever incomparably more than the second It 's always highly evident That whatever God says is true and therefore no body differs about it no not the Athiests For tho the Atheists hold there 's no God yet they acknowledg if there were one he would never speak any thing but what
is true But it 's commonly far less evident That God has reveal'd what he has in effect reveal'd Whence it happens men are so divided about the things which are pretended to be revealed from God. Yet this Author says nothing of this second perswasion He speaks only of the first He conceals the weak side and shews only the strongest It 's certainer says he that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us Be it so But is it certainer that God has revealed such and such a Doctrine than 't is certain one and two are three and that if I think I am This he will not say Yet if he does not say it he must acknowledg he has ill reasoned For if what Reason says be more certain than it 's certain God has reveal'd the Doctrine of which one is perswaded he shall have far less certainty of the Truth of this Doctrine than of what Reason sees distinctly But let us stop a while at what this Author has chosen and which he has made his strong hold It 's certainer says he That what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us He makes Reason to say this and consequently his sense is that this act of Reason which perswades us That what God says is true is more certain than what our Reason perswades us But what does he mean Does he mean that this act is more certain than any act of Reason whatever If this be so he contradicts himself For this very act being an act of Reason if it has more certainty than any act of Reason 't will be more certain than it self Does he mean that this act is the certainest of all and that there 's no other which equals the certainty of this If this be his sense 't is easie to shew him his mistake First is this act more certain than that which perswades us of the existence of God Let him say which he will he cannot escape me For to what purpose is it to know That Truth is essential to God supposing he exists if it be less certain that he does exist If on the contrary these two acts be equally certain and if the actual existence be as clearly comprehended in the Idea we have of God as the unquestionable truth of what he attests the perswasion we have of this second Truth is not the certainest of all those perceived by Reason seeing the perswasion of Gods existence is no less certain Is it more certain That whatever God says is true than it 's certain That nothing of what appears to us is false This no man will say seeing we judg neither that God exists nor that whatever he says is true nor that we can affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it but because all this appears evident So that here we have a third perswasion which is no less certain than that which we were to think to be the most infallible But says this Author God is more uncapable of deceiving us than our Reason is of being deceived I grant it But how do we know this but by our Reason and consequently we have only a certitude of Reason and we are not more certain of it than that we are certain That our Reason does not deceive us whether in this or other things which be as evident as this This little subtilty might pass did we not fear being mistaken in matters of Faith without accusing even God himself of deceiving us But a man must be a fool that has such an irrational thought When we do doubt of matters of Faith this doubt does never tend to perswade us God has deceiv'd us in revealing to us what is hard to be believ'd but rather perswades us we are mistaken in taking that for a Divine Revelation which is only a Doctrine of men So those who doubt do never compare the certitude of their Reason with the certainty of Gods Testimony Neither have they ever the least temptation to imagin the first greater than the second But they always compare this act of their Reason which has perswaded them God has revealed to 'em what appears to them incredible with this other act of their Reason which makes them find incredible what they believ'd God had revealed to them And therefore we may cease to believe without imagining God has deceiv'd us or that our Reason is more incapable of being deceiv'd than God of deceiving us And consequently from Gods being more incapable of deceiving us than our Reason of being deceiv'd does in no wise follow That Faith has greater certainty than Reason Let this Author then pardon me if I say ' Twou'd be a grievous scandal to Infidels were it so That Christian Religion taught things directly contrary to Reason and which shou'd appear such not at first sight but on mature deliberation after all possible care to prevent being deceived and after long and serious reflexions which will not at all permit doubtings of the matter 's being what it appears But it is also true Christian Religion has not a Doctrine which is in this sort contrary to the lights of Reason and this cannot be denied without contradicting all your School-Divines For first if it be true Christianity teaches things contrary to Reason what will become of what Cardinal Richlieu and the Author of the Art of Thinking say The first affirms (a) Richl method Book 1. ch 1. That natural light deceives no body and the other says (b) Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That things exactly consider'd what we see evidently and from Reason or from the faithful report of our Senses is never contrary to what is taught us by Divine Faith. What will become of what all your Divines say (c) Vasq in 1. disp 123. cap. 1 Valent Tom. 3. disp 1 quaest 1 Punct 4 Bell. de Not. Eccles cap. 11. Maerat de fid disp 16 Sect. 5. That the Mystery of the Trinity is far above Reason but not contrary to it Wou'd it not be contrary to Reason if being true it shou'd appear to it evidently false What will you think of what these same Divines teach after your Angelical Doctor (d) Tho. Aqu. part 1. quaest 1. art 8. That 't is impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Salvation As Faith says he is grounded on infallible Truth and it being impossible to shew that which is contrary to Truth so it is clear that the proofs made use of against Faith are not Demonstrations but Objections which are solvible What will become of what passes for unquestionable in your Schools (e) Cajet in 1 quaest 1 art 8 Vasq in 1 disp 11 cap. 2 3. Valent. ubi seq Conint de act sup disp ii dub ii Rhod. Tom. 1 disp 6 quaest 1. Sect. 3. Mart. de fid disp 5 Sect. 4. That one may Demonstratively prove not in truth That the Mystery of the Trinity and all the others are