and why not Certainty as well as Assurance I know no reason but that you have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause But you go on and tell us That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds Faith in your own words stands still upon its own Basis and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer when we have throughly examin'd it Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty but to the particular Articles of Faith i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority now these Propositions are of several Kinds 1. Some that are more clearly expressed therein but such as might be attained to by the Light of Reason without Revelation And such are the fundamental Principles of natural Religion viz. The Being of God and Providence and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State These Mankind may attain to a Certainty in without Revelation or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the Scriptures Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of Certainty from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being or the Visions of a Dream make a true History which are your own Expressions And for the Soul he cannot be certain but that Matter may think as you affirm and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality and consequently Immortality from its Operations But for all this say you his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith For before there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty all that is lost and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds when the subserviency of Reason is taken away as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished Is it at all probable that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation For in Matters of Revelation there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it And the first is that there is a God but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Certainty by Ideas and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation when he is made Uncertain by his own Way whether there be a God or no Besides to suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World but here we find that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this because he doth not know but Matter may think and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an Exalted Fancy or the Heats of a disordered Imagination as Spinoza affirmed Again before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times but conveyed down to us by an Universal Tradition But now what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things I do not mean that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact which it were most unreasonable to expect but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain for I think I have proved that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas And I was in the right when I said this Way tended to Scepticism and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith But this is an Imputation you take very ill and say that I have brought no Argument for it but only that my great Prejudice against this Way of Certainty is that it leads to Scepticism Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word This is very strange when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132 to which no Answer at all is given And so I leave it There are other Propositions or Articles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture and we are to enquire whether the Assurance of Faith as you call it be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas can retain their Certainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed And by this which I am now to make out let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove when you say Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please it touches not your Faith the Foundation of that stands as sure as before and cannot be at all shaken by it Of this we shall judge by some important Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas The first shall be that of the Resurrection of the Dead The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Identity which I take to
Ideas to go upon very different Grounds but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed and you doubt about the Sense of it Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas As in the present Case whether there can be three Persons in one Nature or two Natures and one Person what Resolution can you come to upon your Principles but in the Way of Ideas You may possibly say That where Ideas are clear and distinct there you are to judge of Revelation by them and this is what you assert in your Essay That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason there no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation which contradicts them from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once And yet there is a Person who hath lately told the World that there is one certain secret Way how by Divine Power the same Body but not the same Person may be in very distant Places at once but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret which was good friendly Advice But till it be discovered there is no judging of it Here I observe that you require clear and distinct Ideas and yet we find if a Man's Word may be taken these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct You say Your Method of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct And this is your Secret about Certainty which I think had been better kept up too For I pray in the Case now before us Are your Ideas of Nature and Person clear and distinct or not if they are then it is plain from your own Doctrine that if Revelation be pretended you are to reject it How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be preserved firm and immoveable although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed But suppose they are not clear and distinct What is to be done in a Matter of Revelation contrary to your Ideas Are you to submit to the Revelation or not Whatever God hath Revealed is most certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper Object of Faith but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no you say Reason must judge Yes Reason proceeding upon clear and distinct Ideas But suppose you have Ideas sufficient for Certainty in your Way but not clear and distinct what is to be done then In things that are above Reason you say when they are Revealed they are proper Matters of Faith What is here being above Reason Either above the Discovery of Reason as the Fall of Angels the Resurrection of the Body c. and about these you say Reason hath nothing to do What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body Or such as are above the Comprehension of Reason when discovered And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of and then you grant that they are pure Matters of Faith or they are such as you have certain Ideas of but not clear and distinct Now here lies the pinching Difficulty as to your Way of Ideas You say indeed That Revelation must carry it against meer Probabilities to the contrary because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know but is only probably convinced of is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive I pray observe your own Words you here positively say That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know So that it is plain here that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge or in clear and distinct Ideas and yet your great Complaint of Me was that I charged this upon you and now I find it in your own Words which I observed before But let us allow you all you desire viz. That there may be Certainty by Ideas where they are not clear and distinct and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas such as they are Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith when you are already certain by your Ideas of the contrary How is this possible Can you believe that to be true which you are certain is not true Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person the Question is Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith If you had said there had been only Probabilities on the other side I grant that you then say Revelation is to prevail but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true For how can you Believe against Certainty The Evidence is not so great as when the Ideas are clear and distinct but the Bar against Assent is as strong because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter Your Answer is That your Method of Certainty by Ideas shakes not at all nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith Against this I have pleaded 1. That your Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general 2. That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture Because you do not say that we are to believe all that we find there expressed but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it we are to judge that to be the true Sense But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct yet you affirm as your proper Doctrine That we may come to Certainty by Ideas although not in all Respects perfectly clear and distinct From whence I infer That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas you must judge of a Matter of Faith by those Ideas and consequently if the Union of two Natures and one Person or three Persons in one Nature be repugnant to your Ideas as I have shewed that they are you must by virtue of your own Principles reject these from being Matters of Faith And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith But you have this
to have had you explained your self to the general Satisfaction yet since you decline it I do insist upon it that you cannot clear your self from laying that Foundation which the Author of Christianity not mysterious built upon For your Ground of Certainty is the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition Which are your own Words From hence I urged That let the Proposition come to us any way either by Humane or Divine Authority if our Certainty depend upon this we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contained in it And from hence the Author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions upon your Grounds of Certainty By this it evidently appears that although I was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own Sense yet I by no means thought that your Words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that Author but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them as they lie in you Book And what Answer do you give to this Not a word in the proper Place for it But afterwards for I would omit nothing that may seem to help your Cause you offer something towards an Answer For there you distinguish the Certainty of Faith and the Certainty of Knowledge and you humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith if I think fit to call it so hath nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge and to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand So that if I shake never so much the Certainty of Knowledge it doth not at all concern the Assurance of Faith that is quite distinct from it neither stands nor falls with Knowledge Faith stands by it self and upon Grounds of its own nor can be removed from them and placed on those of Knowledge Their Grounds are so far from being the same or having any thing that when it is brought to Certainty Faith is destroyed 't is Knowledge then and Faith no longer So that whether you are or are not mistaken in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas Faith still stands upon its own Basis which is not at all alter'd by it and every Article of that hath just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This is the Substance of what you say about this Matter and is the most considerable Passage in your Book towards clearing this Matter But I was aware of this as appears by these Words Is Faith an unreasonable Act Is it not an Assent to a Proposition Then if all Certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it either there can be no Certainty in the reasonable Act of Faith or the Grounds of Certainty must be laid some other Way But this is a Matter of too great Weight and Consequence to be easily past over because the main strength of your Defence lies in it and therefore I shall more strictly examine what you say and set this Point of the Certainty of Faith in as good a Light as I can and shew the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas with the Articles of the Christian Faith To talk of the Certainty of Faith say you seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing a way of speaking not easie for you to understand But how comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with you Have not all Mankind who have talked of Matters of Faith allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge although upon different Grounds In your former Letter you told us that if we knew the Original of Words we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for Now what is there in the Original of the word Certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to Faith I had thought that our Word was taken from the Latin and that among the Romans it was opposed to doubting Nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum And therefore where the Mind upon examination of the Grounds of Assent saw no Reason for doubting it might properly be said to be certain If it sees no Cause to doubt from the Evidence of the Thing it self or the clear Deduction of Consequences that is Certainty of Knowledge but where it sees no Reason to doubt from the Authority of him that speaks that is Certainty of Believing and the greater the Authority of him that speaks the less Reason there is to doubt and therefore the greater Certainty of Faith And this I think is very easie to be understood and so have the Generality of Mankind thought to this Day But it seems our old Words must not now pass in the current Sense but then it is fit they be called in and new stampt that we may have none but New milled Words to talk with but in common Justice a competent Time ought to be allow'd for it that none be surprized and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current Sense and that is all the Favour I desire in this Matter But I am utterly against any Private Mints of Words and think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general Acceptation but will set such Bounds and Limits to the Sense of them as suit best with their own Speculations But is not this all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing For what Reason Knowledge and Faith are too distinct things the one relates to Evidence and the other to Testimony but Certainty is common to them both unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever You tell us in your Postscript which I hope may be brought hither without Offence that it is a shame among Christians to raise such a Doubt of this Whether an infinitely powerfull and wise Being be veracious or no. Then I suppose the Veracity of God is a certain and undoubted Principle and if there be sufficient Means to assure us of Divine Revelation as I doubt not but you yield there are what should hinder one that believes upon such Grounds as are sufficient to convince him from attaining to a Certainty of Faith But you take Certainty as belonging only to Knowledge So do the Papists as belonging only to Infallibility and say there can be no Certainty of Faith where there is not an Infallible Proponent but neither you nor they are to impose upon the Understandings of Mankind who know how to distinguish the Grounds of Certainty both from Knowledge and Infallibility You allow such a thing as Assurance of Faith
Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united and not to those Individual Particles So St. Paul For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance but that Body in which these things were done How could it be said if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection as its Body that they were the things done in or by the Body Curcellaeus his Copy reads it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Fathers so took it either way it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended if there were no necessity of the same Body If there be no Resurrection of the Dead then is not Christ raised It seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before And the Apostle lays so much weight upon it that he saith if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain doth he mean if there were not the same personal Identity as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection That cannot be his meaning for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul He saith He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once What He was this It was Christ that died Yes the Person of Christ but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance but the same Consciousness and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance there was no necessity of the same Body And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body But Thomas said Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails and put my Finger into the print of the Nails and thrust my Hand into his side I will not believe The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body but there will be no such proof at the great Day And there is no Reason there should since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours but of the Certainty of it because he rose as the first Fruits Christ the first Fruits afterwards they that are Christs at his coming St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body and it is of great Consequence as to this Article to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds But some Man will say How are the Dead raised up and with what Body do they come First he shews that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation They sow bare Grain of Wheat or of some other Grain but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him and to every Seed his own Body Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that proper Body which belongs to it every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards so much inlarged and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination but it hath its proper Organical Parts which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are yet it hath been found by the most Accurate Observations that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith that we sow not that Body that shall be but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root Stalk Blade and Ear that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove that a Man is not the same because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states yet that Man would be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man And you grant that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants alters not the Identity and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant so that in things capable of any sort of Life the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity if its Organization and Life be the same and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness From whence it follows that to make the same Body no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it And you grant likewise That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body if Life were continued and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body Not from the Consciousness of the Soul but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united For saith he It is sown in Corruption it is raised in Incorruption It is sown in Dishonour it is raised in Glory It is sown in Weakness it is raised in Power It is sown a Natural Body it is raised a Spiritual Body Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be
with Substance He must understand this only of the Properties which belong to God But these Properties must be somewhere and so a Substance must be supposed as the Subject of them and what Reason can there be to exclude that which is the Subject of those Properties For there must be a Divine Being as well as Properties and that Being must have Essential Properties belonging to it and what imaginable Reason can there be why that should not be called the Divine Nature And if it be then Substance and Nature are the same I might easily pursue this farther but I design to bring things into as little a compass as I can But it may be there is something in our own Language which hinders Nature from being taken for a Substance and for this I appeal to a late Ingenious and Honourable Person and Philosopher of our own I mean Mr. Boyle who hath written a Philosophical Enquiry into the Notion of Nature and he tells us of the various Acceptations of it 1. For the Author of Nature 2. For the Essence of a Thing 3. For what comes to Men by Birth as a Man is Noble by Nature 4. For an Internal Principle of Motion as that a Stone is carried downwards by Nature 5. For the established course of things as that Nature makes the Night to succeed the Day 6. For an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Living Body as that Nature is strong or weak 7. For the System of the Universe as when we say of a Chimaera there is no such thing in Nature 8. For a Semi-Deity which is the Notion he opposes But we may observe that he allows God and all the real Beings of the Vniverse to have Nature belonging to them and he saith The Word Essence is of great Affinity to it if not of an adequate Import But the Real Essence of a thing is a Substance and therefore Nature and Substance are of the like Importance The next thing fit to be considered is How far your Certainty by Ideas and the Certainty by Reason differ from each other The occasion of this Debate stands thus I had said in my Book That I granted that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas In answer to this you said That you can find no Opposition between Ideas and Reason but Ideas are the Objects of the Vnderstanding and Vnderstanding is one of the Faculties imployed about them To which I replied No doubt of it But you might easily see that by Reason I understood Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind which I think are very different from Ideas But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of or one as obscure as that of Substance If there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the Manner of Expression I do not go about to defend it but the worst of it is That your Idea of Reason is as obscure as that of Substance And whether there were not a just Occasion for it the Reader must judge when the Faculty was put for the Principles of Reason Could any Man judge otherwise but that you had a very obscure Idea of Reason who could mistake the Vnderstanding for it But Reason you say taken for the Faculty is as different from Ideas in your Apprehension But what is that to the Point in Dispute whether the Notion of Nature be to be taken from Ideas or from Reason You say the Vnderstanding is imploy'd about them And what then I shewed that the Nature of things belongs to Reason and not to bare Ideas because Ideas come in by Sensation and Reflection by which we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but we cannot come to know the Notion of Nature as the Subject of them but by this Reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves And is this no more than to say the Vnderstanding is imployed about Ideas But now you answer farther That if Reason be taken for the Faculty or the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind Reason and Ideas may consist together This leads me to the Examination of that which may be of some use viz. To shew the Difference of your Method of Certainty by Ideas and the Method of Certainty by Reason And the Way of Certainty by Reason lies in two things 1. The Certainty of Principles 2. The Certainty of Deductions As to the former the Gentleman your Defender in your Book saith That in your Essay in more places than one you have spoken and that pretty largely of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims so that if I have ever read them I cannot doubt but you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason What Ideas you have of them must appear from your Book And I do there find a Chapter of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims which I cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it which is thus summed up in the Conclusion viz. That it was to shew That these Maxims as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are not clear and distinct And is not this a fair way to convince me that your Way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason when the Way of Reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon General Principles and you assert them to be Vseless and Dangerous Your first Design you say is to prove that the Consideration of these General Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge which overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonstration and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason To make this plain I shall put a Case grounded upon your Words which are that you have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. These Words I. S. understands as spoken of themselves and charges them with very ill Consequences but I think they are capable of another meaning However let us put the Case that Men did in earnest question whether they were Men or not and then I do not see if you set aside general Maxims how you can convince them that they are Men. For the way I look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason As in the first place that Nothing can have no Properties which I take to be the Fundamental Principle of Certainty as to real Beings For all our inward Perceptions are only of some Acts or Properties as of Thinking Doubting Reasoning c. and if a Man