although we daily see their Effects And that because of the Distance and Remoteness of some and the Minuteness of others and therefore we cannot come to a scientifical Knowledge in Natural Things much less to that of Spiritual Beings of which we have only some few and superficial Ideas 3. Want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have Because the Mechanical Affections of Bodies have no Affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us there being no conceivable Connexion between any Impulse of any sort of Body and any Perception of any Colour or Smell which we find in our Minds And so the Operations of our Minds upon our Bodies are unconceiveable by us And the Coherence and Continuity of Parts of Matter and the original Rules and Communication of Motion are such as we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have 4. Want of finding out such intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or Disagreement they have one with another And this for want of due Application of Mind in acquiring examining and due comparing those Ideas and by ill use of Words which have so much perplexed and confounded Mens understanding 2. You own the many Failings in our Reason By which you understand two Faculties in our Minds viz. Sagacity and Illation the one finding out and the other ordering the intermediate Ideas so as to discover the Connexion between them But Reason you say fails where our Ideas fail us and because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of our Ideas both as to Matter and our own Minds and the Divine Operations and for want of intermediate Ideas and by proceeding upon false Principles and dubious Expressions 3. As to Propositions you own these things 1. Those are according to Reason whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable 2. Those are above Reason whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles 3. Those are contrary to Reason which are inconsistent with or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas 4. As to Faith and Divine Revelation you own 1. That Faith is the Assent to any proposition not thus made out by deductions of Reason but upon the Credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation 2. That things above Reason and not contrary to it are properly Matters of Faith and to be assented to on the Authority of Divine Revelation Thus far I have endeavoured with all possible Brevity and Clearness to lay down your Sense about this matter By which it is sufficiently proved that I had reason to say that your Notions were carried beyond your Intention But you still seem concerned that I quote your Words although I declare that they were used to other purposes than you intended them I do confess to you that the Reason of it was that I found your Notions as to Certainty by Ideas was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon and that he had nothing which look'd like Reason if that Principle were removed which made me so much endeavour to shew that it would not hold And so I suppose the Reason of my mentioning your words so often is no longer a Riddle to you I now proceed to other particulars of your Vindication Among other Arguments against this Principle of Certainty I instanced in the Being of Spiritual Substances within our selves from the Operations of our Minds which we do perceive by Reflection as Thinking Doubting Considering c. This Argument I yielded to be very good but that which I urged from thence was that it could not be from those simple Ideas of the Operations of the Mind because you had affirmed that it is impossible for us by the Contemplation of our Ideas to be certain without Revelation that a material Substance cannot think This is a point in my apprehension of great consequence and therefore I must more strictly examine what you say in answer to it Which is That thinking is inconsistent with the Idea of Self Subsistence and therefore hath a necessary Connexion with a Support or Subject of Inhesion i. e. If there be Thinking there must be something that Thinks But the question is Whether that something be a Material or Immaterial Substance But this Thinking Substance is in your Sense a Spirit The question I put is Whether Matter can think or not If not then the Substance which thinks must be Immaterial if it can think then there can be no evidence from the Idea of Thinking to prove the Substance which thinks to be Immaterial This I take to be plain Reasoning which you must allow because it is about the Agreement or Disagreement of two simple Ideas viz. Matter and Thinking But you say That the general Idea of Substance being the same every-where the Modification of Thinking or the Power of Thinking joyned to it makes it a Spirit without considering what other Modification it has as whether it has the Modification of Solidity or not As on the other side Substance which hath the Modification of Solidity is Matter whether it has the Modification of Thinking or not And therefore if I mean by a Spiritual an Immaterial Substance you grant that you have not proved nor upon your Principles can it be demonstratively proved that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks I have thus set down your own Words that you may not complain I have done you Injury But when you put in demonstratively proved I suppose you mean in the way of Certainty by Ideas for concerning that our dispute is And therefore when you add That you expect that I should conclude it demonstrable from Principles of Philosophy you must give me leave to say this is going off from the business before us which is about your Principles of Certainty from Ideas for it was only to that purpose that I brought this argument to prove that we cannot from our Ideas be certain of one of the points of greatest importance viz. that there is a Spiritual Substance within us and yet the operations of our Mind are made one of the Sources of those simple Ideas which are made by you the Foundation of Knowledge and Certainty So that the point before us is whether this Assertion of yours That the Power of Thinking may belong to modified Matter doth not overthrow your Certainty by Ideas No say you that which you are certain of by the Idea is only That there is in us a Spiritual Substance and that you say implies no more than a Thinking Substance i. e. that by Thinking you can prove you have a Power of Thinking which I believe may be demonstratively proved But I pray Sir consider how this question arose it was from your distinguishing Spiritual and Corporeal Substances from
your own Concessions For if the ground of Certainty be resolved into the Agreement and Disagreement of the Ideas as expressed in any Proposition is it not natural enough from hence to infer that from whencesoever this Proposition comes I must judge of it by the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it You make a Distinction between the Certainty of Truth and the Certainty of Knowledge The former you say Is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for and the latter When we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition But our question about Certainty must relate to what we perceive and the means we have to judge of the Truth and Falshood of Things as they are expressed to us which you tell us Is by the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas in the Proposition And in another place Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is certain Knowledge and when-ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the Reality of Things there is certain real Knowledge and then conclude I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty real Certainty consists which what-ever it was to others was I confess to me heretofore one of those Desiderata which I found great want of So that here is plainly a new Method of Certainty owned and that placed in the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas But the Author already mention'd professes to go upon the same grounds and therefore it was necessary for me to examine them He saith That the simple and distinct Ideas we receive by Sensation and Reflection are the sole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning and that our Knowledge is in Effect nothing else but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas And that where our Perception is not immediate our Certainty comes from the clear and visible Connexion of Ideas For he saith That if the Connexion of all the intermediate Ideas be not indubitable we can have no Certainty Wherein now do his grounds of Certainty differ from yours But he applies them to other Purposes I grant he doth so and that was it which I had said for your Vindication But the question now is whether your general expression had not given him too much occasion for it It is true that Ch 3. he distinguishes the means of Information from the ground of Perswasion and he reckons all Authority Divine as well as Human among the means of Information and the ground of Perswasion he makes to be nothing but Evidence and this Evidence he saith lies in our Ideas Ch. 4. in the Agreement or Disagreement of them p. 19. and he places Certainty in our clear Perceptions of this Agreement or Disagreement which you call clear and visible Connexion of Ideas And wherein then lies the difference as to the grounds of Certainty But his design is to overthrow the Mysteries of Faith This is too true But upon what grounds Is it not upon this Principle that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition Now let the Proposition come to us either by Human or Divine Authority If our Certainty depends upon this we can be no more certain than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it and so he thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions upon your grounds of Certainty But you say you own the infallible Truth of the Scriptures and that where you want the Evidence of Things there is ground enough for you to believe because God hath said it I do verily believe you because I have a far greater Opinion of your Sincerity and Integrity than I see reason for as to the other Person who pretends mightily to own the Authority of Scripture at the same time when he undermines it For his Words are The Authority of God or Divine Revelation is the Manifestation of Truth by Truth it self to whom it is impossible to lye p. 16. But when he comes to state the point how far we are to believe upon Divine Revelation he hath these Words Sect. 2. ch 1. n. 10. The natural Result of what hath been said is That to believe the Divinity of Scripture or the Sense of any Passage thereof without rational Proofs and an evident Consistency is a blameable Credulity and a temerarian Opinion ordinarily grounded upon an ignorant and wilfull Disposition And in the next Chapter he saith That Revelation is not a necessitating Motive but a mean of Information Not the bare Authority of him that speaks but the clear Conception I form of what he says is the ground of my Perswasion And again Whoever reveals any thing his words must be intelligible and the matter possible This rule holds good let God or Man be the Revealer As for unintelligible Relations we can no more believe them from the Revelation of God than from that of Man Sect. 2. ch 2. n. 16. p. 42. But what are all these things to you who own That where you want the Evidence of things the Authority of Revelation is ground enough for you to believe I do not impute them to you but I must say that he alledges no ground for his sayings but your ground of Certainty For in the same Page he saith That the conceived Ideas of things are the only subjects of Believing Denying Approving and every other act of the understanding All the difference we see is that he applies that to Propositions in Scripture which you affirm'd of Propositions in general viz. that our Certainty depends upon the clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in them But I shall do you all the Right I can as to this matter by shewing what Reason I had to say that your Notions were turn'd to other purposes than you intended them and that I shall make appear from several passages in the same Book 1. You own the great Defects of Humane Knowledge notwithstanding the simple Ideas we have by Sensation or Reflection And from these things 1. The Paucity and Imperfection of our Ideas in general because our Sensation and Reflection goes so little a way in respect of the vast extent of the Universe and the infinite Power and Wisdom of the Creator of it So that what we see in the intellectual and sensible World holds no proportion to what we see not and whatever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest 2. The want of Ideas which we are capable of because although we have Ideas in general of Bulk Figure and Motion yet we are to seek as to the particulars of them in the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe
at the same time have Leisure enough to run into other Matters about which there may be more Colour for Cavilling So that this cannot be the true Reason and I leave the Reader to judge what it is The last thing is the point of Reason and here he finds Leisure enough to expatiate But I shall keep to that point upon which he supposes the whole Controversie to turn which is whether the difference between Nature and Person which we observe in Mankind do so far hold with respect to the Divine Nature that it is a Contradiction to say there are three Persons and not three Gods And there are several things I proposed in order to the clearing of this Matter which I shall endeavour to lay down as distinctly as I can and I shall not be Hector'd or Banter'd out of that which I account the most proper Method although it happen to be too obscure for our Men of Wit to understand without Hazard of their Iaws The Principles or Suppositions I lay down are these I. Nature is One and Indivisible in it self whereever it is II. The more perfect any Nature is the more perfect must its Unity be III. Whatever is affirmed of a most perfect Being must be understood in a way agreeable to its Perfection IV. It is repugnant to the Perfection of the divine Nature to be multiplied into such Individuals as are among Men because it argues such a dependence and separation as is inconsistent with the most perfect Unity V. To suppose three distinct Persons in one and the same Indivisible Divine Nature is not repugnant to the Divine Perfections if they be founded on such relative Properties which cannot be confounded with each other and be in themselves agreeable to the Divine Nature VI. Whether there be three such distinct Persons or not is not to be drawn from our own Imaginations or Similitudes in created Beings but only from the Word of God from whom alone the Knowledge of it can be communicated to Mankind Let us now see how he proves that since there is no Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common human Nature it must be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the same divine Nature He offers at no less than demonstrative Reason p. 58. c. 2. but I have always had the most cause to fear the Men that pretend to Infallibility and Demonstration I pass over his Mysterious Boxes as Trifles fit only to entertain his Men of Wit and come immediately to his demonstrative Reason is it be to be met with It comes at last to no more than this that Human Nature and Angelical Nature and Camel Nature have no Existence but only in our Conception and are only Notions of our Minds but the Persons in the same rational Being are not mere Metaphysical Persons or Relative Properties but they are such as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties But in the Trinity the Nature is a really existing Nature 't is a Spiritual Substance and endued with a great number of Divine Attributes not an abstracted or mere notional imaginary Nature and the Divine Persons are not distinct Substances or real Beings but Properties only in a real Being and in an infinite Substance This is the force of the Demonstration But now if I can make it appear that every Nature is not only One and Indivisible in it self but endued with Essential Attributes and Properties belonging to it as such then it will be evident that Nature is not a mere Abstracted Notion of our Minds but something which really exists somewhere and then the Foundation of this demonstrative Reason is taken away And I appeal to any Persons that consider things whether the Human Angelical and Camel Nature as he calls it do not really differ from each other and have such Essential Properties belonging to them as cannot agree to any other Nature For else it must be a mere Notion and Fiction of the Mind to make any real difference between them But if Human Nature and Camel Nature do essentially differ from each other then every Nature hath its Essential Unity and Properties which cannot belong to any other and that without any act of our Minds And if every Nature is really and essentially different from another it must have an Existence somewhere independent on our Notions and Conceptions It may be said That no such Nature doth really exist by it self but only in the several Individuals But that is not the present Question where or how it exists but whether it depend only on our Imaginations or the acts of our Minds and if it doth so then there can be no real and essential Difference in the Natures of Men and Beast which I think none who have the Understanding of a Man can imagine But really existing Natures he saith are in such Persons as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties and if they existed only in a common Nature as the Humanity and had not also distinct Substances they would never make distinct Persons I do allow that in created and dependent Beings there must be distinct Substances to make distinct Persons but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes distinct Persons ' necessarily to suppose distinct Substances For the Nature is One and Indivisible in them all or else every Individual must make a new Species which is an Absurdity I suppose he will not be fond of If there be then one and the same Nature in the Individuals whence comes the difference of Substances to be so necessarily supposed If it be from Diversity Dissimilitude Dependence and separate Existence as I asserted then these Reasons can hold only in created Beings and where they cannot hold as in the Divine Nature why may there not be a distinction of Persons founded on relative Properties without any distinction of Substances which is repugnant to the perfect Unity of the Godhead What demonstrative Reason nay what probable Argument hath he offer'd against this He takes notice p. 60. of what I had said about the distinction of Personality and Person and that Personality is originally only a particular Mode of Subsistence and a Person besides the relative Property takes in the divine Nature together with it And what Demonstration have we against this So far from it that he falls to Tristing again to keep his Men of Wit in good Humour So much for Madam Personality now for Sir Person Is this a decent way of Writing about these Matters to begin with the Talk of demonstrative Reason and to end with Burlesquing and turning them into Ridicule If this be an agreeable Entertainment for his Men of Wit it shews that they deserve that Character as well as he doth that of a Demonstrator But this sportfull Gentleman hath found something else to play with viz. that my Notion of three Subsistences without three Substances is really nothing but Sabellianism But I had already said