the Witness I must acknowledg to you there 's no more in all this but an Humane Faith Opinion and Probability and I must moreover acknowledg that this is not a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith. But it oft happens That besides this Persuasion which we have of ther Probity and Sincerity of the Witness or from other Reasons which we have to believe his Veracity even these Reasons may be so strong as to drive away all Doubts and inspire us with an entire certainty For Example You and I have never been at Rome we cannot know there 's a City bears that Name but from the Testimony of those that have seen it Yet this Testimony is so circumstanc'd that a Man must be a Fool or believe others are such to reject it In effect there are so many People which assure us of it those that affirm it have so little interest to deceive us we see so many things happen which shew that all the World is persuaded of it That there are few Truths we less doubt of than this And this is that we call Moral Certitude which excludes all Doubt and which according to Mr. Huet is no less than that of Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations And this comes very near what one may say of the Testimony of those who witness the Matters of Fact above mentioned This Testimony was not given by one or two Persons but by several at divers times and in different places All these Witnesses may have been perfectly instructed in the Facts which they attest seeing they might have seen them with their own Eyes They had no worldly Interest in saying what they did It was on the contrary much their interest to conceal or deny it A thousand such-like Circumstances do shew that they spake what they thought all which added together will not permit a Man to doubt of the truth of their Testimony So that we have something more than a bare Opinion for we have a perfect Certitude By what I can perceive said I you are not of the Humour of a great number of your Divines who seem to delight themselves in extenuating the force nad clearness of these Proofs You know there are some (d) Durand in 3 dist 24. quest 3. who affirm they are only probalbe Others assure us (e) Du Val in 22. pag. 41. That their Evidence is not so great but that there are other things which have as full conviction and yet are false Some say they be obscure Reasons and which do not convince the Mind that they constrain not an assent and therefore the Will must determine the Mind which these Arguments leave at full liberty I do not only said he to me not approve all this but I do not think 't is sufferable You are in the right said I and I am glad to find you of this Opinion Not but that what your Divines affirm gives me great advantage against your Proofs But besides that I can acquit my self without them I am far from preferring so small an Interest to that of the Glory of Christianity which partly consists in the force and validity of the Arguguments which establish the Divinity of it Let us then esteem these Reasons more than probable and as having that degree of evidence which begets a moral Certainty excluding all doubtfulness and which perswadeth not only that the Matter is as we believe it but moreover that it cannot be otherwise and that 't is morally impossible it should not be This being supposed do you believe these Proofs have the highest degree of this Evidence I in effect suppose That the moral Evidence consists not in an indivisible Point It receives several degrees yea insinite ones It arises from the concourse of Circumstances which give weight to the Testimony on which it is grounded and as these Circumstnaces may be compacted and diversified into a thousand different shapes there may be in them a thousand different degrees of this Evidence So that though it be morally evident there be two Cities in Italy one of which is called Rome and the other Viterbe yet we are more certain of the existence of the first than of that of the second because we have more Relations of the one than of the other It 's morally evident that Alexander Cesar and Henry IV have been than that the first conquer'd Darius and the second the Gauls and that the third dissipated the League Yet we are more certain of the latter of these Facts than of the second and of the second more than of the first Believe then that the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity are as evident as that there is a City called Rome First of all said he to me I think we are not obliged to make the same judgment of all these Facts some of them being more evident than others and consequently one cannot say of all of them without exception that they are as unquestionable as the Existence of Rome but yet I think we may say it of some of them Supposing said I one might say it of all of them You will at least grant that is as much as can be said of them and that it is more evident that whatever you have offered is true than it is That there 's in Italy a City known under the name of Rome This is said he a thing which I am far from denying and which no Body ever did or will deny There is even one of our Divines who has said the same in so many words (g) Martinon de side Disp 10. Sect. 8. Num. 60. and I am perswaded that all the rest would have said the same had they the occasion Let me said I offer you another Question and then I will conclude Do you think that the highest degree of moral Evidence is higher than the highest degree of the Evidence of Sense Do you believe for Example that 't is more evident to you and I that there 's a City called Rome than 't is at present evident to us that it's day I am far from thinking so repli'd he The moral Evidence is grounded on the certainty of Sense and if our Senses may deceive us the moral Evidence is a mere Chimera How for Example can I know there is such a Town called Rome if those who have seen it and on whose Word I rely may be deceived themselves It must then be granted That the moral Evidence is never greater than that of Sense I add 't is far less the Reason is That if we will build on the Deposition of a Witness we should not only be sure he knows what he says we should also know that he says what he thinks and disguises not his Sentiments Seeing then we are never so sure of what others think as of what we think our selves so we are never so certain that others have seen what they affirm as we are certain we see what we behold It 's then plain That I am more assured of
them hold (i) Greg. de Val. Tom. 3. Disp 1. Quest 1. Punct 1. §. 7. Coninte de actib sup disp 13. dub 1. Maerat de fid disp 16. Sect. 3 Goner de fid disp 1. art 8. Rhod. de fid quest 2. Sect. 4. §. 2. That the first Act of Divine Faith is always preceded by a Judgment morally evident which shew's That what one is going to believe is worthy to be believed They affirm That without this Judgment Faith can never be form'd in the Soul. They say moreover That this Judgment is only grounded on what they call Reasons of Belief or Motives of Credibility which are at bottom the Proofs of Christianity They say That the Infidel weighing these Reasons and finding them good and solid he concludes that the Doctrine which they maintain ought to be received I now ask you How the Infidel can form this inward Judgment and pronounce that Christian Religion deserves to be received in the time wherein he sees that the Reasons which induce him to embrace it are opposed by other Reasons stronger and clearer I demand of you if in case this can be Whether such a Judgment would not be apparently false For how in effect can one say a thing is worthy to be believed when one has more reason to think it salfe than to believe it's true Do we call such a thing credible Is' t not rather incredible I might drive on these Consequences father I could shew you that Transubstantiation hath other Consequences which are no less vexatious But this not appearing necessary I shall content my self at this time with asking you Whether these three Consequences which I have taken from your Belief are not very terrible and whether it be not better to renounce the Doctrine which draws them oafter it than to admit them Yet they be necessary and you must receive them unless you 'l deny some of the Propositions which you have granted me Neither will this much help you because that in effect whatever you have granted me is most certain and when you would have this brought into question I 'le not fear the making you grant it again there being nothing in all this but what is highly evident What you now said to me at length answer'd Mr. N. is plausible enough and I must confess I did not believe your Cause could be pleaded so strongly And yet I am perswaded that this is not solid and I hope to answer all you have said when I have thought more of it Pray let me sleep upon it and I 'le give you an account to morrow morning of what has come into my mind I was far from denying so reasonable a request I only told him before I went away That if this Proof appear'd to him stronger than those we are wont to use in this matter this only arose from a certain Air of Novelty which might be in the manner of proposing it and that in the main the common Proofs are no less convincing than those and if they did not appear so this only proceeded from our being insensibly accustomed to believe them false there having been a thousand things invented to clude the force of them It being long since said I that they have been opposed against you your Doctors therefore have left no Stone unturn'd to lessen the value of them To this end they have sorg'd a thousand Distinctions sought a thousand Subterfuges and have wanted no Artifice nor Colour to make them pass in the World. And therefore when we offer them against you we find you always ready to slight them It would have been the same with what I just now offer'd you had you foreseen the course of my Objections and you would have taken care not to say several things with which your Books are full and which should be henceforward left out unless you are minded to shew the World how you condemn your own Principles I hereupon took my leave of him and withdrew praying God from the bottom of my Heart to bless my Endeavours and so to prosper this Seed which was sown as it were unawares that it might one day bring forth Fruit to his Glory CONFERENCE II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion WHEN I parted from Mr. N. there was no mention made of the Place where we were to meet which made me believe knowing his obliging temper he would come the next day to me But being unwilling he should give himself that trouble I was resolved to prevent him by being with him first He told me he was troubled he could not be as diligent as I was for immediately after I had left him a Business came upon him of great Importance which had employed his Thoughts to that very time but having ended that Affair he hoped he should now have an opportunity of acquitting himself of the Engagement he was in Will you said I to him let me impart to you another Thought which has great conformity with that which was the Subject of our Yesterday's Discourse By which means you may examine both these Arguments at a time and perhaps the one will hinder you from stopping at things which will appear to you proper to get rid of the other I am of your mind said he but I desire you would propose this second Proof all at once For in sine there 's oft more artifice than sincerity in discovering what one has to say by pieces He that answers and knows not where his Adversary will lead him takes many times fruitless Precautions and sometimes neglects necessary Ones He le ts pass certain things which strike deepest and amuses himself with others which are of no effect And therefore I think it best That the Respondent should see at once the Difficulty proposed to him and know at first what he is to take care of and therefore I pray you henceforward to deal in this manner with me What you say would be necessary repli'd I had you an Adversary who sought only to surprize and who more regarded Victory than Truth But I must tell you plainly this Artifice appears so inconsiderable and unworthy of an honest Man especially of a Christian that I cannot but be troubled at your suspicion Pray therefore believe this is not my intention for if I have followed in our preceding Discourse such a method as you do not like 't was because I thought it the fittest to lead those insensibly to the Truth who are farthest from it You know the greatest Men among the Ancients have been of this Sentiment and that it was perticularly the Method of Socrates and his famous Disciple Plato Yet seeing you will have me take another course I shall reduce my second Argument to three Propositions all three being so evidently certain that I cannot see how they can be overthrown The first is That if Transubstantiation takes place our
Absurdities She must therefore be deceived in the one or the other of these Judgments and thus neither the one nor the other of these wou'd be certain How wou'd it be then supposing all the advantage lay on one side as it wou'd plainly if what might be offered against Christianity has more evidence and certainty than what is used to establish the Divinity of it where shall we find that in this Supposition we must prefer what is less certain before what is more And who thinks if a man does this he deserves to be eternally miserable How then says Mr. N. Shall Reason prescribe us what we are to believe Shall she become the Rule yea and Judg of our Faith And do we not know that the truths of Christianity are infinitely above the Comprehension of human Reason You confound abundance of things which you shou'd distinguish repli'd I. First there 's a great deal of difference between discovering to us what we must believe as revealed of God and what we must reject as invented by Men. The first of these Duties contains two parts In effect One may make two sorts of enquiry after what one is to believe First In examining the Doctrine offered us and comparing it with the Maxims of Reason just as we do when we wou'd determine our selves on a question of Philosophy The second in examining purely whether this Doctrine has been revealed by God either by enquiring wherher it makes a part of a Religion supposed Divine or by enquiring whether the Religion of which we do not doubt but this Doctrine makes up a part has been revealed of God. It 's certain it cannot be expected from Reason to enquire in this first manner what we ought to believe and this for two Considerations First whatever attempts she may make she will never get the mastery the clearest wit and most piercing judgment not being in a capacity of raising it self of it self to the discovery of these sublime Truths which Faith comprehends And shou'd Reason discover some one the perswasion she could give us of it would not be a Divine Faith. It would be perhaps a Science an Opinion according as the proofs whereon this is grounded are probable or demonstrative But this wou'd never be a Divine Faith it being not possible for Divine Faith to have any other foundation than the authority of God. When we wou'd know whether a Doctrine makes part of a Religion of whose Divinity we are otherwise satisfied as when we wou'd enquire whether Christianity teaches Transubstantiation or the Real Presence this is certainly to be examin'd by Reason For how can we know this if we have lost our Reason Yet in this enquiry she does not so much keep the quality of a Rule as that of an Organ I would say we make this enquiry by means of this faculty call'd Reason yet this faculty does not then consult its own proper light and does not compare the Doctrine offered with its Notions She only compares it with the Rule which God has given her the Scripture alone according to us and the Scripture Tradition and Councils according to you It 's not the same when the question is to know whether a Religion be Divine for example when one deliberates whether one shall be a Christian Pagan or Mahometan In this enquiry Reason alone must be our guide and the best method it can take is to examine which of these different Religions which challenges our preference has the most visible Characters of Divinity which is it which appears most likely to have been revealed from God and which on the contrary is that which we have cause to think is a humane invention As to the rejecting of a Doctrine we have several different means If it be not conformable to the Rule we ought not to receive it we ought to refuse believing it with a Divine Faith. If it be contrary to the Rule we ought to do more we ought positively to reject it and believe it to be false In a word if our Senses or Reason expresly attest this Doctrine is not true we ought to perswade our selves not only that it is not true but that it has never been revealed of God. This last duty draws its Original from two different springs The first is the force of this great Maxim which is the foundation of Divine Faith to wit That whatever God has said is true Hence properly comes the obligation which we have to believe whatever God has revealed to us In effect why should we not believe it seeing its equally impossible that God shou'd be deceiv'd himself judging things to be what they are not as that he shou'd deceive others by telling them they be not what he knows they are And this is the true foundation of Divine Faith and the original of that right which our Reason has not to believe what is evidently false Divine Faith does thus Reason Whatever God has reveal'd is true God has reveal'd such and such a Doctrine Then this or that Doctrine is true Reason says for her part Whatever God has revealed is true Such or such a Doctrine is not true Therefore 't was not revealed by God. Shou'd it happen as you suppose that God shou'd reveal a Doctrine which appeared plainly false to Reason we shou'd find our selves in a dreadful difficulty or rather in the condition which Divines call a state of perplexity and which wou'd bring along with it shou'd it ever happen an absolute impossibility of knowing what we ought to do On one hand we should be bound to believe this Doctrine on the supposition God had revealed it and on the other we shou'd perswade our selves that God would not have revealed it because it appears evidently false and consequently is not to be believed So that were it only to hinder this from hapning we shou'd believe that God never reveals any thing which is apparently false to Reason at least to Reason rectifi'd and which uses all necessary precautions not to be deceiv'd for 't is of that alone whereof I speak Moreover were it possible for God to reveal a Doctrine evidently false evidence would be no longer the infallible note of Truth seeing in this supposition the evidence wou'd accompany this act of our Reason which wou'd judg this Doctrine to be false and which wou'd be false it self seeing this Doctrine being reveal'd of God wou'd hereby be necessarily true So that we ought no longer to reckon on the evidence of things and the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing You see then Sir That this right of our Reason has most solid foundations And it is certain that it has been ever acknowledged and that all sorts of Authors both Ancient and Modern have always believed they might justly conclude a Doctrine was not revealed from God when they saw it contrary to the purest notices of Reason And thus on one hand the Fathers have done who wrote against the Pagans and Hereticks
and on the other all Authors of your Communion who have Treated on the Controversies which separates us For as to the First did not Justin Martyr Tertullian Minutius Felix Theophilus of Antioch Origen Arnobius Lactantius St. Augustin St. Cyril and a great many others oppose Paganism with the absurdities and extravagancies of its mysteries Did not the same Fathers writing against Hereticks use this very argument affirming the Chimera's and extravagancies which these people believ'd cou'd in no sort come from God being apparently false and contrary to all the lights of Reason Have not in sine all your Authors who write against us followed the same method tho with different success See Bellarmin Gregory de Valentia Richlieu the Author of Prejudices and generally all your Controvertists There 's not one of them but has pretended to shew our Doctrine is not of God because of the absurdities therein contained All these Authors argue on two Principles The one That God has revealed nothing which is false The other That whatever is contrary to Reason is thereby contrary to Truth Take away which of these Principles you will and all the Arguments of these Writers will be meer Sophisms St. Augustin proceeds farther He says we ought to forsake the Communion of the Orthodox Church and pass over into that of the Hereticks and despise whatever you respect as the foundations of your Faith cou'd it be made appear the most dangerous Hereticks such as were then the Manichees taught the Truth * Aug. cont Epist fund cap. 4. and this is what he teaches us in this famous passage which your Doctors have ever in their mouths and wherein he declares that several things retain him in the bosom of the Catholick Church The consent of all people The authority grounded on Miracles and confirm'd by Antiquity Succession and even the name of Catholick You affirm these are the props and foundations of the true Faith and I will not now set on shewing you the contrary We may do this another time if you think fitting At present I am willing to suppose what you say I pray then consider what Saint Augustin adds Amongst you says he where I see nothing like this we hear nothing on all hands but promises of Truth and I confess adds he That could you shew it me so clearly that I could not doubt of it I must prefer it before whatever withholds me in the Catholick Church You see here how St. Augustin acknowledges That the evidence which excludes doubtings is to be preferred before the motives of Faith. He does not say that if the Manichees had this evidence on their side we shou'd despise it and offer against it the certainty of Faith as you pretend He says the contrary He says we shou'd yield and that which hinder'd him from doing it was That whatever the Manichees said They had not this evidence which they vaunted of That they promised great matters but cou'd not shew them Bellarmin does something like this * Bell. de Motis Eccles l. 4. cap. 11. He reckons amongst the Notes of the Church the holiness of its Doctrine and makes this holiness consist in her teaching nothing which is false and imposing nothing which is unjust and will have us judg of this by the lights of Reason He afterwards makes the application of this to the Pagans Jews Mahometans ancient Hereticks and lastly to us He shews as to the first That they have taught things absurd and abominable and attempting afterwards to shew this on our Subject he thence concludes none of these Societies is the true Church By this way of disputing he plainly subjects your Church to this examination and tacitly implies she may be rejected provided she can be convinced of all which he accuses the others For besides that he cannot take it ill That the Infidels and Hereticks should treat him in the same manner as he uses them besides this his greatest pretension is That the Church must be known by his marks seeing then one of his marks is That she teaches nothing which is false he hereby consents to the rejection of your Church if it can be shew'd from Reason That she teaches things false and absurd It cannot be deny'd but Bellarmine has had some Reason to deal thus For 't wou'd certainly be a great scandal to the Faithful and much more to Infidels cou'd it be clearly and plainly shew'd That Christian Religion teaches things directly contrary to Reason In effect seeing we embrace this Religion only on the account of the proofs which authorize it and of whose goodness we cannot judg but by Reason shou'd this Reason meet with things evidently false in this Religion she wou'd hereby carry us off as far from it as she cou'd bring us near it by making us comprehend these proofs Moreover making two contrary judgments on the subject of Religion the one That it is true because the proofs which authorize it are good the other that it is false because it teaches things absurd she must of necessity be deceived in the one or the other and so neither is certain The Author of the Art of Thinking was not of this mind says Mr. N. It 's certain says he * Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That Divine Faith should have more force on our minds than our own Reason and this from Reason it self which shews us we should always prefer what is more certain to what is less It being more certain that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us because 't is more impossible God shou'd deceive us than our Reason All this said I appears to me false and ill digested and 't is easie to observe herein such a slight of hand as shews little love to truth To see this more distinctly be pleas'd to consider That the certainty of every act of Faith depends on the perswasion which we have of two Truths which are in some sort their props and foundations The first That whatever God attests is true The second That God has attested the Doctrine which we believe You see that if we doubt of either of these two Truths it 's impossible our Faith can be firm To what purpose is it to know that God does not lye if we doubt God has not said a thing And granting he has said something if we doubt he has said in particular what 's proposed to us to believe And further what signifies it for us to know That God has reveal'd what 's offer'd us if we doubt whether all which God says be true It 's then equally necessary to know these two Truths but they be not always equally evident The first is ever incomparably more than the second It 's always highly evident That whatever God says is true and therefore no body differs about it no not the Athiests For tho the Atheists hold there 's no God yet they acknowledg if there were one he would never speak any thing but what
you will not deny but every time when this happens it 's the duty of a wise Man and of such a one who will not be mistaken to take the Ballance if I may so speak and exactly weigh these Reasons to give the preference to those which appear to him of greatest weight I do not know whether any Body uses to do otherwise One may I confess prefer Reasons which in truth and reality are of less force than the contrary ones But this is when a Man deceives himself Ex duobus credibilibus non tenetur homo credere alterum quod est minus vel equaliter credibile Bannez 22. Quast 10. Art. 1. Concl. 3. Non est prudentis hominis alteram partem assentire prae alterâ si pari vel sere pari momento rationes utrinque urgeant Censeo ad haec neque fieri omnino posse ut eam partem quis approbet assensu suo in quam nihil inclinat majoris ponderis quam in adversam Rationis utrinque pares rationes sunt nullae Multo minus fieri potest ut alteram partem quis approbet si in alteram inclinet pondus majus Est Dilucid Communis doctrinae Theol. n. 22 23. by taking the weakest Arguments for the strongest For in fine I am persuaded That a Man convinced of the weakness of a Reason will never after value that as he do's another which appears stronger to him seeing to yield to a Reason is to judg it stronger than that which opposes it It 's the same with Reasons or Arguments as 't is with Weights put two Weights in a pair of Scales and if they be equal the Scales shall stand at an equal ballance if they be unequal the Scale will immediately incline downwards wherein is the greatest weight In the same manner offer a rational Man Arguments which maintain an Opinion and others which oppose it If after all things well considered he finds these Opinions of equal force he will encline to neither side But for the smallest advantage which those of one side have over those of the other the Mind determines it self for the strongest Or at least it do's not determine it self for the weakest and it is every whit as impossible it should do it as 't is impossible a lesser Weight should weigh down a greater But whether this be so or not you will at least allow me this That it ought not to be and that 't is contrary to good sense to determine ones self in favour of an Opinion which we see grounded on Reasons less strong than those which oppose it And this is what your Authors do acknowledg (h) Martinon de fide Disp 5. Sect. 7. n. 42. and in effect were it otherwise one might innocently leave a good Religion and take up a bad one although we saw the Religion we leave more firmly grounded than that we take up But this being ridiculous it must be acknowledged that good Sense will not let a Man embrace an Opinion which he sees is more strongly opposed than maintained This being granted Sir Let 's suppose an Infidel to whom is offered Mr. Huet's Arguments if he be wise he will not yield to them till he has seen whether there be any thing which opposes these Arguments which counterballances them or dissipates them Imagine we afterwards the Christian Doctrine to be proposed to him discharged of Transubstantiation 'T is clear he will find nothing which shall counterpoise these Reasons So that these Reasons being good and nothing being able to diminish the solidity of them if he be wise he will embrace them Let us on the contrary imagine that by an Illusion of which we have seen a thousand Examples he is made believe That Transubstantiation is inseparable from Christianity What will he do If he be rational he will take the Ballance and weigh on one hand Mr. Huet's Arguments and on the other those which combat Transubstantiation and consequently Christianity in the supposition he is in that they are inseparable If he holds the Ballance even he will find That the Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation weigh more than those which favour Christianity He will find that the first weigh two and the second but one In effect the weight of Reasons is their Evidence The Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation have all the evidence of Sense those of Mr. Huet have only a moral Evidence which at most have but half of that of Sense The first then weigh as much again as the second This being so how can you expect the Infidel should give the preference to the second over the first and whom will you perswade that if he does do it he will act regularly Do you know what right Reason will suggest to him That Transubstantiation is not one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches He will say it is impossible Mr. Huet's Reasons should be valid if Christianity comprehends Transubstantiation and it must necessarily be either that this Doctrine has been added to the Christian Religion contrary to the intention of its Founder or that these Reasons be false Yet it 's apparent these Reasons are not false seeing they are evident and that the more they are considered the greater impression they make We must then believe that Transubstantiation which would destroy them should it take place is not one of the Christian Doctrines He will confirm himself in this Opinion by this Consideration That the Author of Christianity whoever he was having form'd his Religion with a design to make it be embraced by all Men and being able to make it very fit to be universally received by not burdening it with Transubstantiation it is not to be supposed he introduced this Doctrine which is likely only to make it be rejected by judicious Men. This will more especially appear to him inconceivable in respect of God whom he will acknowledg for the true Author of this Holy Religion if he well comprehends the force of Mr. Huet's Reasons So good and wise a God could nto on one hand require Men should embrace the Revelation he offered them and on the other lay an invincible opposition between this Revelation and the purest notices of Reason which he himself had given them to be their Rule in all Cases he could not on one hand oblige them to be Christians under pain of eternal damnation and on the other so order things that they could not be such without violating all the Maxims of good Sense and all the Rules of Prudence And this is Sir what the Insidel will say if he be a rational Person But if he has not understanding enough to perceive all this yet at least he will see That right Reason will not let him embrace the Christian Religion such as it is offered him I add in the Third place That not only he ought not to embrace it but that it is impossible he should Which is easy to be proved from the principles of your own Divines All of
Joan. tract 36. pronunciatur the body of Jesus Christ risen must be in one only place But why must it be so and why may he not be in several places at a time if he be there in effect as your Creed bears The most famous among the Fathers have used the same Arguments against the Macedonians These Hereticks affirmed the Holy Spirit to be but a Creature of a like nature to that of Angels The Holy Fathers to refute them alledge That an Angel cannot be in several places at a time whereas the Holy Spirit was in the same time in several places extream distant from one another seeing he never forsook the Apostles although for the Preaching of the Gospel they were dispersed over all the Earth Thus does St. Athanasius argue or one under his name in the dispute he is said to have against Arius (a) Apud Athan Didymus of Alexandria (b) Didym de Sp S. St. Basil (c) Basil de Sp. S. cap 2. St. Greg. Naz. (d) Naz. Orat. 3.7 St. Ambrose (e) Amb. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 7. Pascasius Deacon of Rome (f) Pasc Rom. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 12. Anastasius Sinait (g) Anast Sin. lib. 1. de dogm fid Rupert (h) Rup lib. 10. cap. 22. and others very ill as you see were it not supposed impossible for the same Body to be in several Places at a time Were not this held then for undeniable they would without doubt have been answered That there 's no more difficulty in supposing a Spirit in several Places than a material Body as that of our Saviour was But in effect it appears the Fathers have ever believed this could not be seeing hereby he refuted the exravagant Opinions of both Hereticks and Pagans Moreover your great evasion which consists in distinguishing what may naturally be and what may happen by an effect of the Almighty Power of God this evasion I say will not serve in this occasion for in fine the Question was not in these Disputes what might or what might not naturally be but what might absolutely be The Pagans did not pretend That by means of natural Causes the Gods were placed in Statues consecrated to them The Manichees did not subject our Saviour to the Laws of Nature The Macedonians did not believe the Holy Spirit was sent by some created Cause All these People made the Divine Power intervene in these occasions and consequently the Fathers affirming that what these extravagant People said was impossible they meant 't was so in all senses and that 't was a mere contradiction It appears then from all I have now said That according to the truest and best Reason according to your own Authors and according to the Fathers it 's a pure contradiction to suppose Christs Body in several places at a time But the contradiction will be still more manifest if we add That supposing this Divine Body in several places one may say of it things directly opposite to one another Considering it such as it is in Heaven you believe it has its three dimensions each of which you believe may be measured and compared with those of other Bodies which are greater or lesser You believe it has its parts one out of another That it possesses a place whose parts answer those of this sacred Body That he is therein visible and palpable acts c. You say the direct contrary of this same Body such as you suppose it in the Eucharist You believe it there exists after the manner of Spirits that it is therein reduced to one point that it has its parts one in another that 't is therein invisible and without action You also believe that to consider it only as 't is in the Eucharist it 's removed out of one place and let to rest in another here he is lifted up and there he is let down Are not these Sir so many contradictions Is not this to affirm and deny the same thing of the same Subject in relation to the same parts and time and what do you call contradictory if this be not so A Body in two places says Mr. N. is equivalent to two Bodies and one may say of it the most opposite things without contradiction I must acknowledge one cannot do it when we speak of a Body existing only in one place But when we speak of a Body or generally of a Subject which exists in diverse places at a time there 's no contradiction in affirming and denying the same things of it This is no new answer and I suppose you have read it in our Authors Your Authors I confess have made use of it repli'd I but I affirm their answer was insincere it being not what they thought but what the interest of their cause required And for a proof of what I say is it not true That when the Question was of things wherein they were not interessed and which they regarded as absolutely independent from the Eucharist they have not stuck to maintain 't was a contradiction to say things opposite of a Body in two places For example because it 's held among you that Christs Body is not circumscriptively that is to say after the manner of Bodies in such a manner that each of its parts answers to that of the place which it possesses because say I 't is believ'd that the Body of Jesus Christ is not in this manner but in Heaven and that 't is supposed in the Eucharist only Sacramentally which is to say after the manner of Spirits totum in toto totum in qualibet parte The Thomists * See Masius Phys lib. 4. cap. 5. quest 5. assert 3. have imagined That it mattered not as to the Eucharist to know whether a Body may be circumscriptively in two places They thought they might freely explain themselves on this Question without fearing the judgment they might make of it should prove of dangerous Consequence to the Doctrine of the Real Presence Being in this manner withheld by no consideration and applying themselves to nothing but what appeared to them to be true they pronounced it impossible for one Body to be circumscriptively in two places and their strongest reason is that hereby it might happen that this Body might be in motion in one of these places and at rest in another here it might be cold and there hot and so of the rest It 's according to them a pure contradiction to say That a Body which shall be circumscriptively in two places shall be at the same time at rest and in motion but if this be a contradiction why is it not as considerable a one to say these same things of a Body which is Sacramentally in two places or Sacramentally in one and circumscriptively in the other For in fine are not rest and motion as opposite and inconsistent when the Bodies which they affect are Sacramentally in two places as when they be therein circumscriptively Moreover
is true But it 's commonly far less evident That God has reveal'd what he has in effect reveal'd Whence it happens men are so divided about the things which are pretended to be revealed from God. Yet this Author says nothing of this second perswasion He speaks only of the first He conceals the weak side and shews only the strongest It 's certainer says he that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us Be it so But is it certainer that God has revealed such and such a Doctrine than 't is certain one and two are three and that if I think I am This he will not say Yet if he does not say it he must acknowledg he has ill reasoned For if what Reason says be more certain than it 's certain God has reveal'd the Doctrine of which one is perswaded he shall have far less certainty of the Truth of this Doctrine than of what Reason sees distinctly But let us stop a while at what this Author has chosen and which he has made his strong hold It 's certainer says he That what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us He makes Reason to say this and consequently his sense is that this act of Reason which perswades us That what God says is true is more certain than what our Reason perswades us But what does he mean Does he mean that this act is more certain than any act of Reason whatever If this be so he contradicts himself For this very act being an act of Reason if it has more certainty than any act of Reason 't will be more certain than it self Does he mean that this act is the certainest of all and that there 's no other which equals the certainty of this If this be his sense 't is easie to shew him his mistake First is this act more certain than that which perswades us of the existence of God Let him say which he will he cannot escape me For to what purpose is it to know That Truth is essential to God supposing he exists if it be less certain that he does exist If on the contrary these two acts be equally certain and if the actual existence be as clearly comprehended in the Idea we have of God as the unquestionable truth of what he attests the perswasion we have of this second Truth is not the certainest of all those perceived by Reason seeing the perswasion of Gods existence is no less certain Is it more certain That whatever God says is true than it 's certain That nothing of what appears to us is false This no man will say seeing we judg neither that God exists nor that whatever he says is true nor that we can affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it but because all this appears evident So that here we have a third perswasion which is no less certain than that which we were to think to be the most infallible But says this Author God is more uncapable of deceiving us than our Reason is of being deceived I grant it But how do we know this but by our Reason and consequently we have only a certitude of Reason and we are not more certain of it than that we are certain That our Reason does not deceive us whether in this or other things which be as evident as this This little subtilty might pass did we not fear being mistaken in matters of Faith without accusing even God himself of deceiving us But a man must be a fool that has such an irrational thought When we do doubt of matters of Faith this doubt does never tend to perswade us God has deceiv'd us in revealing to us what is hard to be believ'd but rather perswades us we are mistaken in taking that for a Divine Revelation which is only a Doctrine of men So those who doubt do never compare the certitude of their Reason with the certainty of Gods Testimony Neither have they ever the least temptation to imagin the first greater than the second But they always compare this act of their Reason which has perswaded them God has revealed to 'em what appears to them incredible with this other act of their Reason which makes them find incredible what they believ'd God had revealed to them And therefore we may cease to believe without imagining God has deceiv'd us or that our Reason is more incapable of being deceiv'd than God of deceiving us And consequently from Gods being more incapable of deceiving us than our Reason of being deceiv'd does in no wise follow That Faith has greater certainty than Reason Let this Author then pardon me if I say ' Twou'd be a grievous scandal to Infidels were it so That Christian Religion taught things directly contrary to Reason and which shou'd appear such not at first sight but on mature deliberation after all possible care to prevent being deceived and after long and serious reflexions which will not at all permit doubtings of the matter 's being what it appears But it is also true Christian Religion has not a Doctrine which is in this sort contrary to the lights of Reason and this cannot be denied without contradicting all your School-Divines For first if it be true Christianity teaches things contrary to Reason what will become of what Cardinal Richlieu and the Author of the Art of Thinking say The first affirms (a) Richl method Book 1. ch 1. That natural light deceives no body and the other says (b) Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That things exactly consider'd what we see evidently and from Reason or from the faithful report of our Senses is never contrary to what is taught us by Divine Faith. What will become of what all your Divines say (c) Vasq in 1. disp 123. cap. 1 Valent Tom. 3. disp 1 quaest 1 Punct 4 Bell. de Not. Eccles cap. 11. Maerat de fid disp 16 Sect. 5. That the Mystery of the Trinity is far above Reason but not contrary to it Wou'd it not be contrary to Reason if being true it shou'd appear to it evidently false What will you think of what these same Divines teach after your Angelical Doctor (d) Tho. Aqu. part 1. quaest 1. art 8. That 't is impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Salvation As Faith says he is grounded on infallible Truth and it being impossible to shew that which is contrary to Truth so it is clear that the proofs made use of against Faith are not Demonstrations but Objections which are solvible What will become of what passes for unquestionable in your Schools (e) Cajet in 1 quaest 1 art 8 Vasq in 1 disp 11 cap. 2 3. Valent. ubi seq Conint de act sup disp ii dub ii Rhod. Tom. 1 disp 6 quaest 1. Sect. 3. Mart. de fid disp 5 Sect. 4. That one may Demonstratively prove not in truth That the Mystery of the Trinity and all the others are