absolute creative art subsisting by it self that the art may be the workman and the mastery the master this art hath in its essence necessarily omnipotence that nothing can resist it wisdome to know what it doth and the connexion of omnipotence with wisdom that what it willeth may be done That connexion having in it self wisdome and omnipotence is the spirit as it were will or desire for of things impossible and utterly unkown there is neither will nor desire So in the most perfect will there is wisdome and power and by a certain similitude it is called a spirit because motion is not without spirit insomuch that whatsoever causeth motion in the mind and all things else we call a spirit And by motion all men do what they will do Therefore the power of a creative art which is an absolute and infinite art or the blesshed God doth all things in his spirit or will in the which is the wisdome of the Son and the omnipotence of the Father that his worke may be of one individed Trinity Of this connexin spirit or will the Platonists were ignorant which did not see this spirit to be God but thought it to be principiated by God and to be the soul of the world as our understanding soul animates our body Nor did the Peripateticks see this spirit which thought this power to be nature hidden in all things from which is motion and rest when indeed it is God absolute blessed for evermore Orat. How it rejoyceth me to hear so plain an exposition but I pray thee help us againe with some example to conceive the creation of our mind in this our body Id. Thou hast already heard of this matter but because variety of examples makes that which in it self is unexpressible somewhat more clear I will obey thee Behold thou knowest that our mind is a certaine power having the image of that Divine art we spake of Therefore all things which are most truly in the Divine art are truly in our mind as the image thereof Therefore our mind is created by that creating art as if that art would create it self And because that infinite art is un-multiplyable it behooveth that there arise an image thereof even as if a painter would paint himself and himself being not multiplyable by painting himself there should rise his image And because an image how perfect soever if it cannot become more and more perfect and conformable to the samplar is never so perfect as any imperfect image which hath power to conform it self more and more without limitation to the unapproachable samplar for in this the image after the best manner it may doth imitate infinity As if a painter should make two pictures of himself whereof the one being dead should seem actually more like him but the other should be alive and though for the present lesse like yet such a one as being by its object stirred up to motion could alwayes make it self more and more conformable to the samplar no man would doubt that this second picture were more perfect and more expressing the art of the painter So every mind yea even ours though created beneath all others hath from God that as well as it can it is a perfect and living image of the infinite art Therefore it is three and one having power wisdome and the connexion of both after such a manner that as a perfect image of the art being stirred up it can more and more conforme its self to its samplar So that our mind though in the beginning of its creation it have no actuall resplendence of the creating art in Trinity and unity yet it hath that concreated power that being stirred up it can make it self more and more conformable to the actuality of the Divine art And therefore in the unity of its essence is power wisdome and will And in-its essence do coinside the master and the mastery as in a living image ot the infinite art which being stirred up can all wayes without end make it self more and more conformable to the Divine actuality the inaccessible precision of the infinite art alwayes remaining Orat. Most wonderfully and plainly but I pray thee how it the mind infused by creation Id. Then haft heretofore heard me of this argument Now take the same thing againe by another example Ath. Then the Idiot taking a glasse and letting it hang down between his finger and thumb he touched the glasse and it gave a found and after a little while the glasse was crack'd and the sound ceaseth Then said the Id. In this fame hanging glasse by my power there arose a certaine power which moved the glasse whence came sound and when that proportion of the glasse in the which the sound was and by consequence the motion resided was dissolved the motion there ceased and likewise upon the ceasing of the motion the sound But it that power had not depended upon the glasse and therefore would not have ceased upon the cracking of the glasse but have subsisted without the glasse thou should'st have an example how that power is created in us which makes motion and harmony and then ceaseth to make it when the proportion is dissolved though for all that it doth not cease to be As if I in giving thee a Lute should in and with the Lute give thee the skill cunning to play upon a Lute if the art and skill did not depend upon the given Lute though given in and with the Lute then although the Lute were broken yet the art and skill for all that would not be dissipated though there were never a Lute found in the whole world that were fit for thee CHAP. XIV How the mind is said to come down from the milky way through the planets to the body and so to returne and how the notions of separated spirits are indelible and ours delible Phil. THou bringest fit and faire examples for things so strange and remote from sense and because the Sun is ready to set and so we can stay no longer together tell us I pray the what the Philosophers mean in saying that the souls came down from the milky way through the Planets into bodies and so return to the milky way againe and why Aristotle willing to expresse the power of the soul begins at Reason saying that the soul from Reason ascends to doctrine from doctrine to intellectibility but Plato contrarywise makes intellectibility the beginning and saith that by degenerating intellectibility is made doctrine or intelligence and intelligence by degenerating becomes Reason Id. I know not their writings But peradventure the first that spoke of the assent and discent of souls meant the same that Plato and Aristotle did For Plato looking to the image of the Creator which is chiefly in intelectibility where the mind conforms it self to the Divine simplicity there placed the beginning and made it the subfstance of the mind which he will have remaine after death that by the order of
by another and for another reason and one tongue hath proper names and another more barbarous and remote therefore I see that where the propriety of names is capable of more or lesse there the precise name is not known Phil. Thou makest haste to high matters Idiot for according to what thou seemest to say therefore are names â—esse proper because they are imposed at pleasure as seemed good to every one that imposed them by the motion of reason Id. I would have thee understand me more profoundly than so for although I confesse that every name is by the comming of the form unto the matter united to the thing it being true that the form gives the name that so names are not from the giver but from Eternall and the imposition is free yet I do not think that there is any other than a congruous name imposed although it be not a precise one Phil. Explain thy self I pray thee that I may know what thou meanest Id. Very willingly and now I turn my self to this art of spoon-making And first I would have thee know that I do without any haessitation affirm that al human arts are certain images of the infinite divine art I know not whether it seem so to thee or no. Phil. Thou requirest high matters and I think it not fit to answer them publickly Id. I wonder if ever thou readest any Philosopher that is ignorant of this that appears so plainly of it self For it is manifest that no humane art ever reached the precision of perfection and that every humane art is finite and bounded for one art is bounded or limited in its bounds and another in anothers and every one is different from the rest and no one doth complicate all Phil. What doest thou infer from this Id. That every humane art is finite Phil. Who doubts it Id. And it is impossible there should be many infinite things really distinct Phil. I confesse that likewise for the one of them would be bounded or determined by the other Id. If then this be so is not the onely absolute beginning infinite For before a beginning there is no beginning as appears by it self lest the beginning should be principiated Therefore Eternity is onely infinity it self or the absolute beginning Phil. I admit it Id. Therefore the one and onely absolute Eternity is infinity it self which is without beginning wherefore every finite principiated thing is from the infinite beginning Phil. I cannot deny it Id. Therefore every finite Art is from an infinite Art And so it must needs be that an infinite Art is the samplar beginning middle end measure standard truth precision and perfection of all Arts. Phil. Proceed to that which thou makest haste unto for no man can dissent from thee in these Id. I will therefore out of this Art of Spoon-making apply symbolical examples that the things I shall say may be made more sensible Phil. I pray thee do so for I see thou holdest the way to those things after which I labour Ant. Then the Idiot taking a Spoon in his hand thus proceeded Id. A Spoon befides the Idea of our mind hath no other samplar For although a Carver as a painter do draw examples from things which he goeth about to figure yet so do not I that of wood make Spoons and of clay little dishes and pots For I do not in these imitate the figure or shape of any naturall thing whatsoever for such forms of Spoons dishes and pots are perfected by mans art alone and therefore my art is rather perfecting than imitating created figures and in this liker unto infinite Art Phil. This pleaseth well enough Id. Suppose then that I would explicate my art and make sensible the form of Spoonnesse by which the Spoon is constituted which though in its own nature it be by no sense attingible as being neither white nor black nor of any other colour sound smell taste or touch yet if I will labour to make it sensible in that manner that it may be done Whereupon by the divers motions of the instruments which I use I do bore and make hollow the matter that is wood untill in it the due proportion arise wherein the form of spoonnesse doth conveniently appear Whereupon the truth and precision of spoonnesse which is unmultipliable and incommunicable cannot by any instrument or any man be made perfectly sensible And in all spoons nothing but the simple form it self after a divers manner more in one and in another lesse but in none precisely And although the wood it self takes the name from the comming of the form that as soon as that proportion ariseth in which spoonnesse appeareth it is called a spoon that so the name may be united to the form yet the imposition of the name was at pleasure because another might have been imposed And though it be at pleasure yet it is not another and quite divers from the natural name united to the form but the naturall name shines after the comming of the form in all the divers names by whatsoever divers nations imposed The imposition of the name therefore is done by the motion of reason for the motion of reason is about things which fall under sense whose discretion concordance and difference reason makes So that there can be nothing in reason which was not first in sense So therefore reason imposeth names and is moved to give one name to one thing and another to another But because the form in its truth is not found among those things about which reason is conversant therefore reason ends it self and determines in conjecture and opinion Whereupon generals and particulars genera species as they fall under names are Entia rationis beings of reason which reason made to it self out of the concordance and difference of sensible things in that respect being by nature after the sensible things whereof they are the similitudes the sensible things being destroyed those cannot remain Whosoever therefore thinks that nothing can fall into the understanding that falls not into reason he also thinks that there can be nothing in the understanding that was not first in the sense and consequently he must necessarily say that the thing is nothing but as it falls under a name and his study is in every inquisition deeply to search after the quid nominis quiddity of the name And this enquiry is very pleasing unto man because it discourseth by the motion of reason This man would deny that forms in themselvs in their truth separated are otherwise thaÌ„ as they are beings of reasoÌ„ would make no account of samplars and Ideas But they that admit something to be in the intelligence of the mind which was not either in sense or reason as for example The exemplar and incommunicable truth of forms which shineth in the sensible things they say that the samplars or Ideas do by nature go before the sensible things as the truth goes before the image
prove that the mind is that power which though it want all notionall form yet being stired up can assimilate it self to every form and make notions of all things like after a manner to a sound eye which is in darkness and never saw the light for it wanteth all actuall notion of visible things yet comming into light and being stirred up it assimilates it selfe to the thing visible that it may make a notion Ora. Plato saith that judgement is then required when the sence ministers contrary things at once Id. He spake subtilly for when the touch confusedly finds hard and so ft or heavy and light one contrary in another then there is recourse to the understanding that it may judge of the quiddity of both so confusedly perceived that there are many things discreet So when the sight confusedly sees great and little is there not need of the discretive judgement of the understanding what is great and what little but if the sence were of it self sufficient there would no recourse be had to the judgements of the understanding as in the sight of that which is light when there is nothing presented which is contrary to it CHAP. V. How the minde is a living substance created in the body and of the manner how whether ther reason be in bruit beast and how the living minde is the description of the eternall wisdome Phil. ALmost all the Peripateticks say that the understanding which thou seemest to call the minde is a certain power of the Soul and that to understand is an accident what sayest thou to it Id. The minde is a living substance which we finde by experience doth inwardly speak and judge in us and which of all spirituall powers that we finde in our selves is more then any other power assimulated and made like to the infinite substance an absolute forme The office of the mind in this body to quicken it and from hence it is called the soul wherefore the minde is a substantiall forme or a power that after its fastion complicates in it selfe all things and by quickning the living soul whereby it animates the body complicates the vegetative and sensitive life and the power discoursive and intellectual and intelligible Phil. Wilt thou have the minde which thou confest to be also the intellectuall soul to have been before the body and afterwards incorporated as Pythagoras and the Platonists meane Id. In nature not in time for I compared it as thou hardest to the sight in darknesse now the sight was not actually before the eye but onely in nature wherefore because the minde is a certaine divine seed that by its own power doth notionally complicate the Samplers of all things therefore is it by God from whom it hath this power in asmuch as it received its being at the same time placed and in a convenient earth where it may bring forth fruit and of it selfe notionally explicate the university of things otherwise this seminall power had been given it in vaine if there had not been given withall oppertunity to break into act Phil. Thou speakest weightily But I much desire to heare how this is done in us Id. The divine manners or waies are never to be reached precisely yet wee make guesses and conjectures of them some more cleare and some more darke ones I thinke this similitude which I will tell thee sufficient For thou knowest that the fight by its owne proper nature doth not discern but in a certaine Globe and confusedly perceives the obectacle meeting it within the speare of its motion the eye which objectacle is generated by the multiplication of the species of the object into the eye Therefore if the sight be present in the eye with out discretion as in infants where the use of discretion is wanting then the minde comes so to the sensible soul as discretion to the sight by which it judgeth between colours And as this visive disc etion is found in perfect brute living wights as in Dogs that know their owne masters by sight and is by God given unto the sight as the perfection and forme of seeing so unto mans nature besides that discretion which is found in bruits there is given a higher power that is unto annimall discretion ust as that is to the sensible power so that the minde is the forme of the annimall discretion and the perfection thereof Phi. Exceedingly well and sweetly but me thinks thou drawest somewhat near the oppinion of the wise Philo that said there was reason in beasts Id. We finde by experience that there is in brute beasts a descretive discourse without which their nature could not well subsist Whereupon their discourse because it wants the forme namely the understanding or minde is confused for it wants judgement and knowledge and because all discretion is from reason therefore Philo seemes to have said as he did not without reason or absurdly Phil. Declare I pray thee how the minde is the forme of the discoursing reason Id. I have already told thee that as the sight seeth and knoweth not what it seeth without discretion to informe enlighten and perfect it so reason syllogyzeth and knoweth not what it syllogizeth without the minde but the mind enforms enlightens and perfects raciocination or discourse that may know what it syllogizeth as if an Idiot not knowing the power of words should read some booke reading proceeds from the force of reason for he readeth by running through the difference of letters which he compounds and devideth and this is the worke of reason and yet bee knoweth not what he reads and let there be another which reads and knowes and understands what hee reads This is a certaine similitude of reason confused and reason formed by the minde for the minde hath the descretive judgement of the reasons which reason is good and which is sophisticall so that the minde is the discretive forme of reasons as reason is the discretive forme of sences and imaginations Phil. From whence hath the minde this judgement for she seeme to give judgement of all things Id. It hath it from hence because it is the image of the Samplar of all things for God is the Samplar of all things Therefore whereas the Smplar of all things shineth in the minde as the truth in the image it hath in it selfe that where it looketh and according to which it giveth judgement of outward things as if there were a living Law written that Law because living would read in it self the things that are to be judged Right so the minde is a living description of the eternall and infinite wisdome but in cur minds from the beginning that life is like unto one that is a sleepe untill it be stirred up by admiration proceeding from sensible things to be moved then by the motion of its intellectual life it finds described in it self that which it seeketh But thou must understand that this description is a resplendance or shining of the Samplar of all things after
nature precedes the intelligence but degenerates into intelligence when it goes back from the divine simplicity in which all things are one and will behold all things in it self as every thing hath a proper being distinct from another afterwards the mind doth more degenerate when by the motion of reafon it comprehends things not in it self but as the forme is invariable matter where it cannot hold the truth but declines into an image Now Aristototle who considered all things as they fall under names imposed by the motion of Reason makes Reason the Elenment or beginning and peradventure he saith that Reason by discipline which is done by names ascends unto intelligence afterwards higher unto intelletibility And therefore he makes reason the Element to the ascent of the intellest as Plato made intellectibility to the ascent thereof And so there seem to be no difference between them save in the manner of considering Phil. Be this so But tell me why all the Philosopers say that every understanding is of substance and accident how is this true of God and the first matter Id. The understending concerning God is an inflexion from the understanding of this name Ens or being because the being of not being that is being imparticipably understood is God And this understanding is the same with that which is of substance and accident but another way that is inflexly considered Wherefore the understanding conserning God comprehends all understandings of substance and accidents but is simple and one but the understanding which had ot the first matter is a certain bending from that which is had of a body for if thou understand abody un-bodily that is without all corporeal formes thou understandest the same thing which signifies a body but after another manne because un-bodily which is without doubt the understanding of the matter Phil. Doest thinke that the celestiall mind 's created according to their intellectuall dgrees have also indelible notions Id. I thinke some Angells intellectible as those of the highest orders some intelligentiall as of the second some rationall as of the third and that in every order there are likewise so many degrees that there are in the whole nine degrees or quires and that our mindes are so beneath the lowest degrees of such spirits and above every degrees of corporall nature that they are as it were the connexion of the university of things the terme of perfection of the lower nature and the beginning of the higher For I thinke that the mindes of the blessed spirits that are without bodies doe in rest possesse invariable notions and such as are not by any oblivion to be defaced because of the presence of the truth which incessantly offers it self by way of object And this is the happinesse of those spirits that have attained the fruition of the Samplar of things But our minds because of their informitie doe often forget the things they knew though there remaine the concreated aptitude to know them again For although they cannot without a body be stirred up to an intellectuall progresse yet because of their carelessenesse aversions from the object and distractions to divers and sundry things and because of the bodily troubles they lose their notions For the notions that we get here in this variable and unstable world according to the conditions thereof are not confirmed For they are as the notions of Schollers and learners that begin to profit but are not yet brought to the Mastery But the notions here acquired when the minde proceedeth from the variable world to the unyariable are likewise translated to the invariable mastery For when particular notions pass into the perfect mastery they cease to be variable in the universall mastery which before were particularly fluid and unfrable So we are in this world docible or to betaught in the other we are Masters CHAP. XV. How our minde is immortally and imorruptible Phil. IT now remaines that thou speak what thou thinkest of the immortality of our minde that being instructed concerning it asmuch as may be in one day I may rejoyce that I have profited in so many things Id. They that make the intellectabilitie the element or beginning of the descent of the understanding doe not think that the minde depends of the body And they that make reason the beginning of the ascent of the understanding and intellectability the end doe not admit that the mind dies with the body But I cannot imagine that they who have any taste of wisdome would ever deny the immortality of the mind as I have already as things came then into my mind made it plaine to the Orator So he which considers that the beholding of the mind reacheth to that which is invariable and that by the mind forms are abstracted from variability and are translated into the invariable region of the necessity of complexion he cannot doubt but the nature of the minde is free from all variability For it attracts to it selfe what it abstracts from variability for the invariable touch of Geometricall figures is found not in pavements but in the minde And as long as the soul enquires and seekes through Organs that which it finds is variable but that which it finds when it seekes by it selfe is stable cleare bright and fixed and consequently not of the nature of things variable which it reacheth by sense but of things invariable which it findeth by it selfe Moreover the demonstration of the immortality of the minde may be hunted out by number for being a living number that is a number numbering and every number incorruptible in it selfe although considered in variable matter it seeme variable the number of our minde cannot be conceived corruptible how then can the Author of an incorruptible numbe seeme corruptible Nor can any number evacuate the power of the mindes numbering Therefore whereas the motion of Heaven is numbered by the minde and time is the measure of motion time it selfe shall never evacuate the power of the mind but that it shall abide as the terme measure and determination of all things measureable The instruments of the heavenly motions proceeding from the minde of man doe plainly shew that motion doth not so much measure the minde as the minde measures motion so that the minde by its intellective motions seemes to complicate all successive motion the mind puts forth of it self the discursive motion so it is the form of moving seeing then whatsoever is dissolved is dissolved by motion how should then the forme of moving be dissolved by motion The minde being the intelluali life moving it selfe that is putting forth its life that is its understanding how can it chuse but live alwaies A motion moving it self how can it ever faile for it hath life intimately conjoyned by which it is alwayes living even as asphear which is alwaies round by a circle compact unto it If the composition of the minde bee the same with a number compounded of it selfe how is it possible to