the Witness I must acknowledg to you there 's no more in all this but an Humane Faith Opinion and Probability and I must moreover acknowledg that this is not a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith. But it oft happens That besides this Persuasion which we have of ther Probity and Sincerity of the Witness or from other Reasons which we have to believe his Veracity even these Reasons may be so strong as to drive away all Doubts and inspire us with an entire certainty For Example You and I have never been at Rome we cannot know there 's a City bears that Name but from the Testimony of those that have seen it Yet this Testimony is so circumstanc'd that a Man must be a Fool or believe others are such to reject it In effect there are so many People which assure us of it those that affirm it have so little interest to deceive us we see so many things happen which shew that all the World is persuaded of it That there are few Truths we less doubt of than this And this is that we call Moral Certitude which excludes all Doubt and which according to Mr. Huet is no less than that of Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations And this comes very near what one may say of the Testimony of those who witness the Matters of Fact above mentioned This Testimony was not given by one or two Persons but by several at divers times and in different places All these Witnesses may have been perfectly instructed in the Facts which they attest seeing they might have seen them with their own Eyes They had no worldly Interest in saying what they did It was on the contrary much their interest to conceal or deny it A thousand such-like Circumstances do shew that they spake what they thought all which added together will not permit a Man to doubt of the truth of their Testimony So that we have something more than a bare Opinion for we have a perfect Certitude By what I can perceive said I you are not of the Humour of a great number of your Divines who seem to delight themselves in extenuating the force nad clearness of these Proofs You know there are some (d) Durand in 3 dist 24. quest 3. who affirm they are only probalbe Others assure us (e) Du Val in 22. pag. 41. That their Evidence is not so great but that there are other things which have as full conviction and yet are false Some say they be obscure Reasons and which do not convince the Mind that they constrain not an assent and therefore the Will must determine the Mind which these Arguments leave at full liberty I do not only said he to me not approve all this but I do not think 't is sufferable You are in the right said I and I am glad to find you of this Opinion Not but that what your Divines affirm gives me great advantage against your Proofs But besides that I can acquit my self without them I am far from preferring so small an Interest to that of the Glory of Christianity which partly consists in the force and validity of the Arguguments which establish the Divinity of it Let us then esteem these Reasons more than probable and as having that degree of evidence which begets a moral Certainty excluding all doubtfulness and which perswadeth not only that the Matter is as we believe it but moreover that it cannot be otherwise and that 't is morally impossible it should not be This being supposed do you believe these Proofs have the highest degree of this Evidence I in effect suppose That the moral Evidence consists not in an indivisible Point It receives several degrees yea insinite ones It arises from the concourse of Circumstances which give weight to the Testimony on which it is grounded and as these Circumstnaces may be compacted and diversified into a thousand different shapes there may be in them a thousand different degrees of this Evidence So that though it be morally evident there be two Cities in Italy one of which is called Rome and the other Viterbe yet we are more certain of the existence of the first than of that of the second because we have more Relations of the one than of the other It 's morally evident that Alexander Cesar and Henry IV have been than that the first conquer'd Darius and the second the Gauls and that the third dissipated the League Yet we are more certain of the latter of these Facts than of the second and of the second more than of the first Believe then that the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity are as evident as that there is a City called Rome First of all said he to me I think we are not obliged to make the same judgment of all these Facts some of them being more evident than others and consequently one cannot say of all of them without exception that they are as unquestionable as the Existence of Rome but yet I think we may say it of some of them Supposing said I one might say it of all of them You will at least grant that is as much as can be said of them and that it is more evident that whatever you have offered is true than it is That there 's in Italy a City known under the name of Rome This is said he a thing which I am far from denying and which no Body ever did or will deny There is even one of our Divines who has said the same in so many words (g) Martinon de side Disp 10. Sect. 8. Num. 60. and I am perswaded that all the rest would have said the same had they the occasion Let me said I offer you another Question and then I will conclude Do you think that the highest degree of moral Evidence is higher than the highest degree of the Evidence of Sense Do you believe for Example that 't is more evident to you and I that there 's a City called Rome than 't is at present evident to us that it's day I am far from thinking so repli'd he The moral Evidence is grounded on the certainty of Sense and if our Senses may deceive us the moral Evidence is a mere Chimera How for Example can I know there is such a Town called Rome if those who have seen it and on whose Word I rely may be deceived themselves It must then be granted That the moral Evidence is never greater than that of Sense I add 't is far less the Reason is That if we will build on the Deposition of a Witness we should not only be sure he knows what he says we should also know that he says what he thinks and disguises not his Sentiments Seeing then we are never so sure of what others think as of what we think our selves so we are never so certain that others have seen what they affirm as we are certain we see what we behold It 's then plain That I am more assured of
them hold (i) Greg. de Val. Tom. 3. Disp 1. Quest 1. Punct 1. §. 7. Coninte de actib sup disp 13. dub 1. Maerat de fid disp 16. Sect. 3 Goner de fid disp 1. art 8. Rhod. de fid quest 2. Sect. 4. §. 2. That the first Act of Divine Faith is always preceded by a Judgment morally evident which shew's That what one is going to believe is worthy to be believed They affirm That without this Judgment Faith can never be form'd in the Soul. They say moreover That this Judgment is only grounded on what they call Reasons of Belief or Motives of Credibility which are at bottom the Proofs of Christianity They say That the Infidel weighing these Reasons and finding them good and solid he concludes that the Doctrine which they maintain ought to be received I now ask you How the Infidel can form this inward Judgment and pronounce that Christian Religion deserves to be received in the time wherein he sees that the Reasons which induce him to embrace it are opposed by other Reasons stronger and clearer I demand of you if in case this can be Whether such a Judgment would not be apparently false For how in effect can one say a thing is worthy to be believed when one has more reason to think it salfe than to believe it's true Do we call such a thing credible Is' t not rather incredible I might drive on these Consequences father I could shew you that Transubstantiation hath other Consequences which are no less vexatious But this not appearing necessary I shall content my self at this time with asking you Whether these three Consequences which I have taken from your Belief are not very terrible and whether it be not better to renounce the Doctrine which draws them oafter it than to admit them Yet they be necessary and you must receive them unless you 'l deny some of the Propositions which you have granted me Neither will this much help you because that in effect whatever you have granted me is most certain and when you would have this brought into question I 'le not fear the making you grant it again there being nothing in all this but what is highly evident What you now said to me at length answer'd Mr. N. is plausible enough and I must confess I did not believe your Cause could be pleaded so strongly And yet I am perswaded that this is not solid and I hope to answer all you have said when I have thought more of it Pray let me sleep upon it and I 'le give you an account to morrow morning of what has come into my mind I was far from denying so reasonable a request I only told him before I went away That if this Proof appear'd to him stronger than those we are wont to use in this matter this only arose from a certain Air of Novelty which might be in the manner of proposing it and that in the main the common Proofs are no less convincing than those and if they did not appear so this only proceeded from our being insensibly accustomed to believe them false there having been a thousand things invented to clude the force of them It being long since said I that they have been opposed against you your Doctors therefore have left no Stone unturn'd to lessen the value of them To this end they have sorg'd a thousand Distinctions sought a thousand Subterfuges and have wanted no Artifice nor Colour to make them pass in the World. And therefore when we offer them against you we find you always ready to slight them It would have been the same with what I just now offer'd you had you foreseen the course of my Objections and you would have taken care not to say several things with which your Books are full and which should be henceforward left out unless you are minded to shew the World how you condemn your own Principles I hereupon took my leave of him and withdrew praying God from the bottom of my Heart to bless my Endeavours and so to prosper this Seed which was sown as it were unawares that it might one day bring forth Fruit to his Glory CONFERENCE II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion WHEN I parted from Mr. N. there was no mention made of the Place where we were to meet which made me believe knowing his obliging temper he would come the next day to me But being unwilling he should give himself that trouble I was resolved to prevent him by being with him first He told me he was troubled he could not be as diligent as I was for immediately after I had left him a Business came upon him of great Importance which had employed his Thoughts to that very time but having ended that Affair he hoped he should now have an opportunity of acquitting himself of the Engagement he was in Will you said I to him let me impart to you another Thought which has great conformity with that which was the Subject of our Yesterday's Discourse By which means you may examine both these Arguments at a time and perhaps the one will hinder you from stopping at things which will appear to you proper to get rid of the other I am of your mind said he but I desire you would propose this second Proof all at once For in sine there 's oft more artifice than sincerity in discovering what one has to say by pieces He that answers and knows not where his Adversary will lead him takes many times fruitless Precautions and sometimes neglects necessary Ones He le ts pass certain things which strike deepest and amuses himself with others which are of no effect And therefore I think it best That the Respondent should see at once the Difficulty proposed to him and know at first what he is to take care of and therefore I pray you henceforward to deal in this manner with me What you say would be necessary repli'd I had you an Adversary who sought only to surprize and who more regarded Victory than Truth But I must tell you plainly this Artifice appears so inconsiderable and unworthy of an honest Man especially of a Christian that I cannot but be troubled at your suspicion Pray therefore believe this is not my intention for if I have followed in our preceding Discourse such a method as you do not like 't was because I thought it the fittest to lead those insensibly to the Truth who are farthest from it You know the greatest Men among the Ancients have been of this Sentiment and that it was perticularly the Method of Socrates and his famous Disciple Plato Yet seeing you will have me take another course I shall reduce my second Argument to three Propositions all three being so evidently certain that I cannot see how they can be overthrown The first is That if Transubstantiation takes place our
Absurdities She must therefore be deceived in the one or the other of these Judgments and thus neither the one nor the other of these wou'd be certain How wou'd it be then supposing all the advantage lay on one side as it wou'd plainly if what might be offered against Christianity has more evidence and certainty than what is used to establish the Divinity of it where shall we find that in this Supposition we must prefer what is less certain before what is more And who thinks if a man does this he deserves to be eternally miserable How then says Mr. N. Shall Reason prescribe us what we are to believe Shall she become the Rule yea and Judg of our Faith And do we not know that the truths of Christianity are infinitely above the Comprehension of human Reason You confound abundance of things which you shou'd distinguish repli'd I. First there 's a great deal of difference between discovering to us what we must believe as revealed of God and what we must reject as invented by Men. The first of these Duties contains two parts In effect One may make two sorts of enquiry after what one is to believe First In examining the Doctrine offered us and comparing it with the Maxims of Reason just as we do when we wou'd determine our selves on a question of Philosophy The second in examining purely whether this Doctrine has been revealed by God either by enquiring wherher it makes a part of a Religion supposed Divine or by enquiring whether the Religion of which we do not doubt but this Doctrine makes up a part has been revealed of God. It 's certain it cannot be expected from Reason to enquire in this first manner what we ought to believe and this for two Considerations First whatever attempts she may make she will never get the mastery the clearest wit and most piercing judgment not being in a capacity of raising it self of it self to the discovery of these sublime Truths which Faith comprehends And shou'd Reason discover some one the perswasion she could give us of it would not be a Divine Faith. It would be perhaps a Science an Opinion according as the proofs whereon this is grounded are probable or demonstrative But this wou'd never be a Divine Faith it being not possible for Divine Faith to have any other foundation than the authority of God. When we wou'd know whether a Doctrine makes part of a Religion of whose Divinity we are otherwise satisfied as when we wou'd enquire whether Christianity teaches Transubstantiation or the Real Presence this is certainly to be examin'd by Reason For how can we know this if we have lost our Reason Yet in this enquiry she does not so much keep the quality of a Rule as that of an Organ I would say we make this enquiry by means of this faculty call'd Reason yet this faculty does not then consult its own proper light and does not compare the Doctrine offered with its Notions She only compares it with the Rule which God has given her the Scripture alone according to us and the Scripture Tradition and Councils according to you It 's not the same when the question is to know whether a Religion be Divine for example when one deliberates whether one shall be a Christian Pagan or Mahometan In this enquiry Reason alone must be our guide and the best method it can take is to examine which of these different Religions which challenges our preference has the most visible Characters of Divinity which is it which appears most likely to have been revealed from God and which on the contrary is that which we have cause to think is a humane invention As to the rejecting of a Doctrine we have several different means If it be not conformable to the Rule we ought not to receive it we ought to refuse believing it with a Divine Faith. If it be contrary to the Rule we ought to do more we ought positively to reject it and believe it to be false In a word if our Senses or Reason expresly attest this Doctrine is not true we ought to perswade our selves not only that it is not true but that it has never been revealed of God. This last duty draws its Original from two different springs The first is the force of this great Maxim which is the foundation of Divine Faith to wit That whatever God has said is true Hence properly comes the obligation which we have to believe whatever God has revealed to us In effect why should we not believe it seeing its equally impossible that God shou'd be deceiv'd himself judging things to be what they are not as that he shou'd deceive others by telling them they be not what he knows they are And this is the true foundation of Divine Faith and the original of that right which our Reason has not to believe what is evidently false Divine Faith does thus Reason Whatever God has reveal'd is true God has reveal'd such and such a Doctrine Then this or that Doctrine is true Reason says for her part Whatever God has revealed is true Such or such a Doctrine is not true Therefore 't was not revealed by God. Shou'd it happen as you suppose that God shou'd reveal a Doctrine which appeared plainly false to Reason we shou'd find our selves in a dreadful difficulty or rather in the condition which Divines call a state of perplexity and which wou'd bring along with it shou'd it ever happen an absolute impossibility of knowing what we ought to do On one hand we should be bound to believe this Doctrine on the supposition God had revealed it and on the other we shou'd perswade our selves that God would not have revealed it because it appears evidently false and consequently is not to be believed So that were it only to hinder this from hapning we shou'd believe that God never reveals any thing which is apparently false to Reason at least to Reason rectifi'd and which uses all necessary precautions not to be deceiv'd for 't is of that alone whereof I speak Moreover were it possible for God to reveal a Doctrine evidently false evidence would be no longer the infallible note of Truth seeing in this supposition the evidence wou'd accompany this act of our Reason which wou'd judg this Doctrine to be false and which wou'd be false it self seeing this Doctrine being reveal'd of God wou'd hereby be necessarily true So that we ought no longer to reckon on the evidence of things and the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing You see then Sir That this right of our Reason has most solid foundations And it is certain that it has been ever acknowledged and that all sorts of Authors both Ancient and Modern have always believed they might justly conclude a Doctrine was not revealed from God when they saw it contrary to the purest notices of Reason And thus on one hand the Fathers have done who wrote against the Pagans and Hereticks
is true But it 's commonly far less evident That God has reveal'd what he has in effect reveal'd Whence it happens men are so divided about the things which are pretended to be revealed from God. Yet this Author says nothing of this second perswasion He speaks only of the first He conceals the weak side and shews only the strongest It 's certainer says he that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us Be it so But is it certainer that God has revealed such and such a Doctrine than 't is certain one and two are three and that if I think I am This he will not say Yet if he does not say it he must acknowledg he has ill reasoned For if what Reason says be more certain than it 's certain God has reveal'd the Doctrine of which one is perswaded he shall have far less certainty of the Truth of this Doctrine than of what Reason sees distinctly But let us stop a while at what this Author has chosen and which he has made his strong hold It 's certainer says he That what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us He makes Reason to say this and consequently his sense is that this act of Reason which perswades us That what God says is true is more certain than what our Reason perswades us But what does he mean Does he mean that this act is more certain than any act of Reason whatever If this be so he contradicts himself For this very act being an act of Reason if it has more certainty than any act of Reason 't will be more certain than it self Does he mean that this act is the certainest of all and that there 's no other which equals the certainty of this If this be his sense 't is easie to shew him his mistake First is this act more certain than that which perswades us of the existence of God Let him say which he will he cannot escape me For to what purpose is it to know That Truth is essential to God supposing he exists if it be less certain that he does exist If on the contrary these two acts be equally certain and if the actual existence be as clearly comprehended in the Idea we have of God as the unquestionable truth of what he attests the perswasion we have of this second Truth is not the certainest of all those perceived by Reason seeing the perswasion of Gods existence is no less certain Is it more certain That whatever God says is true than it 's certain That nothing of what appears to us is false This no man will say seeing we judg neither that God exists nor that whatever he says is true nor that we can affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it but because all this appears evident So that here we have a third perswasion which is no less certain than that which we were to think to be the most infallible But says this Author God is more uncapable of deceiving us than our Reason is of being deceived I grant it But how do we know this but by our Reason and consequently we have only a certitude of Reason and we are not more certain of it than that we are certain That our Reason does not deceive us whether in this or other things which be as evident as this This little subtilty might pass did we not fear being mistaken in matters of Faith without accusing even God himself of deceiving us But a man must be a fool that has such an irrational thought When we do doubt of matters of Faith this doubt does never tend to perswade us God has deceiv'd us in revealing to us what is hard to be believ'd but rather perswades us we are mistaken in taking that for a Divine Revelation which is only a Doctrine of men So those who doubt do never compare the certitude of their Reason with the certainty of Gods Testimony Neither have they ever the least temptation to imagin the first greater than the second But they always compare this act of their Reason which has perswaded them God has revealed to 'em what appears to them incredible with this other act of their Reason which makes them find incredible what they believ'd God had revealed to them And therefore we may cease to believe without imagining God has deceiv'd us or that our Reason is more incapable of being deceiv'd than God of deceiving us And consequently from Gods being more incapable of deceiving us than our Reason of being deceiv'd does in no wise follow That Faith has greater certainty than Reason Let this Author then pardon me if I say ' Twou'd be a grievous scandal to Infidels were it so That Christian Religion taught things directly contrary to Reason and which shou'd appear such not at first sight but on mature deliberation after all possible care to prevent being deceived and after long and serious reflexions which will not at all permit doubtings of the matter 's being what it appears But it is also true Christian Religion has not a Doctrine which is in this sort contrary to the lights of Reason and this cannot be denied without contradicting all your School-Divines For first if it be true Christianity teaches things contrary to Reason what will become of what Cardinal Richlieu and the Author of the Art of Thinking say The first affirms (a) Richl method Book 1. ch 1. That natural light deceives no body and the other says (b) Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That things exactly consider'd what we see evidently and from Reason or from the faithful report of our Senses is never contrary to what is taught us by Divine Faith. What will become of what all your Divines say (c) Vasq in 1. disp 123. cap. 1 Valent Tom. 3. disp 1 quaest 1 Punct 4 Bell. de Not. Eccles cap. 11. Maerat de fid disp 16 Sect. 5. That the Mystery of the Trinity is far above Reason but not contrary to it Wou'd it not be contrary to Reason if being true it shou'd appear to it evidently false What will you think of what these same Divines teach after your Angelical Doctor (d) Tho. Aqu. part 1. quaest 1. art 8. That 't is impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Salvation As Faith says he is grounded on infallible Truth and it being impossible to shew that which is contrary to Truth so it is clear that the proofs made use of against Faith are not Demonstrations but Objections which are solvible What will become of what passes for unquestionable in your Schools (e) Cajet in 1 quaest 1 art 8 Vasq in 1 disp 11 cap. 2 3. Valent. ubi seq Conint de act sup disp ii dub ii Rhod. Tom. 1 disp 6 quaest 1. Sect. 3. Mart. de fid disp 5 Sect. 4. That one may Demonstratively prove not in truth That the Mystery of the Trinity and all the others are
our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity IT 's not many days since I came to Mr. N. and found him in his Study having his Eyes fix'd on a Book with the reading of which he seem'd to be so taken up as made me think I should do him wrong to interrupt him Intending therefore to withdraw without his seeing me I could not do it without some small disturbance which made him turn his Head towards the place where I was and hastily arise towards me You shall not be gone said he for I prize your Company at another rate than thus to lose it The loss repli'd I would rather be mine and I am afraid lest I should deprive you of the pleasure of some delightful reading as knowing by experience how vexatious it is to be disturb'd at such a time What you say answered he after he had made me sit down is very true I am not a little pleas'd with reading good Books and I doubt not but this which lies before me is of that number But you have wherewith to make me amends for this Interruption for I doubt not but before we part you will increase the Pleasure which this reading afforded me and approving this Book as I dare say you will you 'l not a little confirm me in the good Opinion I have of it and make me read it henceforward with greater earnestness Your esteem of the Book repli'd I is enough to gain my approbation I am not wont to make Appeals from your Judgment having been always so pleas'd in following it that 't is now become a kind of Law which I never violate But perhaps I never saw this Book That can't be answer'd he this Book has been too famous for you not to see it especially considering it's some Years since 't was publish'd In a word 't is the Book which the Ingenious Mr. Huet has written to establish the Truth of Christian Religion (a) P. Dan. Huetii demonstratio Evangelica I do not repent said I of my engagement to approve of it for I have read it with great delight not to mention the Style which is delicate and want's no Ornaments I sind it replenish'd with judicious Observations and such as lie out of the common Road full of great sense and plainness In short 't is a Work worthy its Author who hold's a considerable Place amongst Learned Men. I have only one thing to say against the Book and that with regret because I know you will not herein agree with me Let 's hear it however said he It is repli'd I That this Book was made by one of your Party If that be all the fault answer'd he I am much mistaken if Mr. Huet ever corrects it You may judg what you please of it replied I my Opinion is That this is a capital Fault and spoil's the whole Work. For whereas this would have been an excellent Piece had it been wrote by a Protestant coming from a Person of your Communion it loses all its Force and Conviction and overthrows its own Arguments and should it fall into the hands of a knowing Infidel he could with one word answer it This is very surprising says Mr. N. and you must be a very great Bigot in your Religion to offer such a strange and incredible Paradox Has your Belief the priviledg of making bad Arguments good Ones and is ours so unhappy as to corrupt the best Things and change Demonstrations into Sophisms as oft as they pass through our hands There may be repli'd I some Truth in what you now say and I give an Instance of this from one of your Authors (b) Education of a Prince who shews That the greatest part of Seneca's Maxims are false and ridiculous in the Writings of That Philosopher whereas they would be very proper and excellent in the Writings of a Christian The same may I say of Mr. Huet and the rest of your Authors who undertake this Subject The best Proofs become Paralogisms in their Writings and 't is by passing over into ours that they resume their strength and due efficacy And this is one of the Effects which your Transubstantiation operates destroying the most convincing Arguments you can offer the Infidels and giving them an infallible means to defend themselves and right to maintain That if these Proofs be good Transubstantiation is not a part of the Christian Religion or if Transubstantiation be a part of the Christian Religion these Proofs he of no validity It 's certian if they be Men endued with sense they will lay hold of the first of these Propositions In effect it 's apparent That Mr. Huet's Proof are valid and good in themselves whereas 't is not certain That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches not to say that it ought to be taken for granted that it is not one of them It is so strange and offensive and so little agrees with the whole Body of reveal'd Truths either in general or particular that a Man needs only the use of his Senses free from all prejudices to perceive That this comes not from the same Spring and that the Author of Christianity is a very different Person from the Author of Transubstantiation Such Infidels then that are discerning Men will separate what 's offered to them jointly They will embrace Christianity and reject Transubstantiation They will receive this Holy Religion as coming from the Spirit of God and put from them your Doctrine as a humane Invention However 't is not long of you That they cast not themselves into the other aforementioned extremity I mean the persuading themselves that the Proofs of the Christian Religion be invalid Yet you are for persuading them not only That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which the Gospel teaches but moreover one of its principal ones one of the most essential Points of Christian Religion and that which can be least spared And consequently if these Infidels be simple enough to believe this and after such an Error have any reason left they will only make use of it to perswade themselves That that Religion which teaches such an incredible Doctrine could not have been revealed by the Spirit of Truth and that the Proofs which were made use of to establish the Divinity of it are of no validity I am so strongly possessed with the belief of Transubstantiation said Mr. N. That I believe no Objections in the World are capable to make me doubt one minute of the truth of it Yet I must acknowledg 't would be a terrible Temptation to me could you convince me of what you say It does so highly concern us That the Proofs of Christianity be valid That there are few Things but what ought to be sacrific'd to so great an Interest and I know no greater prejudice against a Doctrine than to shew that it weakens these Proofs and gives advantage to such dangerous Adversaries as those are against whom we
what I do not know but by the relation of my Senses than of that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence But this is not all for I say but one half of what may be alledg'd The Example which you have made use of gives me occasion to add something stronger You ask me if it be more evident there 's a City called Rome than 't is evident that it 's now Day You do not consider That I do not only know by myown Senses it is Day but by those of others For were I in fine blind yet I might know this with certainty I need only to be led to the Exchange to Church to Dinner c. for this purpose And therefore I take it for granted That the blind Men about our Streets are as certain 't is Day as that there is such a place as Rome I believe then That the Evidence which arises from the relations of Sense considered alone is not greater than the moral Evidence being impossible to be less as I now proved I affirm That in this Supposition to demand whether 't is more evident it is Day than whether there be such a City as Rome is just as if you should ask whether two be more than one The Existence of Rome as to us has but one only Evidence and that a moral one Whereas it is now Day has two the Moral Evidence and the Evidence of Sense Each of these two is at least equal to that of the Existence of Rome It is at least then as much again evident it is Day as that there 's a City called Rome Yet is it true said I it 's more evident the Eucharist is Bread and Wine than that it is Day Only the Senses of those who live and are awake at present attest the latter whereas the Senses of all Men who live or have lived since the planting of the Gospel have affirm'd the former All our Senses do not attest it 's now Day only our Sight tells us so whereas all our Senses tell us That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine In effect take a consecrated Host take consesecrated Wine Ask your Eyes what they are Ask your Nose your Palat and your Hands Ask them ten thousand times the same Question they will ever answer you what they have always answer'd those who have consulted them on this Matter They will tell you 't is Bread and Wine In a word the Senses never attested any thing in a more clear expressive and authentic manner than what they depose on the Subject of the Eucharist And if they deceive us herein they are not to be believed in any thing whatever Grant we then the Proofs of Christianity do use the highest degree of Moral Evidence seeing the Testimony of our Senses circumstanc'd in the manner as that is which shew's us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine hath at least twice as much evidence as that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence it 's beyond all question that this Testimony is twice again as evident as the Proofs of Christianity This is clear and I doe not believe you either will or can deny it Here then are three grand Conclusions which I draw from this Principle The first That if Transubstantiation were one of the Doctrins of Christianity as you pretend Christian Religion would be opposed with greater strength than Mr. Huet could bring forth to maintain it In effect did Transubstantiation make a part of Christian Religion one might oppose against it whatever is offered against Transubstantiation I have now shew'd you one may oppose against Transubstantiation all the evidence of Sense One might offer all this same Evidence against Christianity were it true that Christianity comprehended Transubstantiation This is that which opposes Christianity in your Principles Let 's see now what Mr. Huet do's to maintain it He brings Arguments which as we have already observ'd are only grounded on moral Evidence which is never half so great as that of sense If then two be more than one it 's clear That granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Christian Doctrins Christianity is attack'd with greater strength than Mr. Huet can defend it with It is clear according to this Supposition an Infidel will more strongly prove That Christian Religion is false than Mr. Huet can prove it is true All which would never be were Transubstantiation put out of the number of Christian Doctrins By which means the Proofs of this Holy Religion would conserve all their strength and the Infidels would have nothing that 's rational to oppose against them These Proofs are most solid in themselves and capable of convincing every reasonable Body who searches the Truth and is disposed to follow it through all parts where he finds it There 's nothing but Transubstantiation which weakens them Granting Transubstantiation these Proofs will be of no validity Take away this Doctrine our Proofs subsist and have their effect It do's not belong then to your Doctors who hold Transubstantiation to defend Christianity The best Arguments will never be good ones in their Mouths Only we can propose them without weakning them So that I told you nothing but what you find true when I affirmed a while ago That Mr. Huet's Book which would be an excellent Work were it writ by a Protestant is without conviction coming from a Man of your Party And this is Sir my first Conclusion The second follows which is That whereas an Infidel to whom was offered Mr. Huet's Arguments without any mention of Transubstantiation or who should suppose that Christianity do's not oblige us to believe it would be irrational should he not embrace a Religion so well grounded so in like manner he would fall in to as great a fault and act as much against Reason if supposing the contrary and letting himself be perswaded one cannot be a Christian without believing Transubstantiation he should receive both Transubstantiation and Christian Religion What I have now been saying to you does necessarily draw along with it this Consequence But to remark more clearly the necessity of it be pleased to observe That what makes an Infidel a Christian are the Reasons which perswade him That the Christian Religion was revealed by God. In effect that which induces us to believe Things are the Reasons good or bad which seem to us to uphold the Opinion which we embrace So that should one Persuade ones self of any thing without Ground or Reason that Man will act foolishly and sottishly though the thing it self should be true So the Infidel who shall make himself a Christian without Reason would apparently offend against good Sense And this is the general Notion of your Divines which I need not alledg to you for having read them you must needs remember them A Man then never believes without Reason if he believes wisely and judiciously But it seldom hapning that the Reasons are all on one side there being commonly some for and some against
you will not deny but every time when this happens it 's the duty of a wise Man and of such a one who will not be mistaken to take the Ballance if I may so speak and exactly weigh these Reasons to give the preference to those which appear to him of greatest weight I do not know whether any Body uses to do otherwise One may I confess prefer Reasons which in truth and reality are of less force than the contrary ones But this is when a Man deceives himself Ex duobus credibilibus non tenetur homo credere alterum quod est minus vel equaliter credibile Bannez 22. Quast 10. Art. 1. Concl. 3. Non est prudentis hominis alteram partem assentire prae alterâ si pari vel sere pari momento rationes utrinque urgeant Censeo ad haec neque fieri omnino posse ut eam partem quis approbet assensu suo in quam nihil inclinat majoris ponderis quam in adversam Rationis utrinque pares rationes sunt nullae Multo minus fieri potest ut alteram partem quis approbet si in alteram inclinet pondus majus Est Dilucid Communis doctrinae Theol. n. 22 23. by taking the weakest Arguments for the strongest For in fine I am persuaded That a Man convinced of the weakness of a Reason will never after value that as he do's another which appears stronger to him seeing to yield to a Reason is to judg it stronger than that which opposes it It 's the same with Reasons or Arguments as 't is with Weights put two Weights in a pair of Scales and if they be equal the Scales shall stand at an equal ballance if they be unequal the Scale will immediately incline downwards wherein is the greatest weight In the same manner offer a rational Man Arguments which maintain an Opinion and others which oppose it If after all things well considered he finds these Opinions of equal force he will encline to neither side But for the smallest advantage which those of one side have over those of the other the Mind determines it self for the strongest Or at least it do's not determine it self for the weakest and it is every whit as impossible it should do it as 't is impossible a lesser Weight should weigh down a greater But whether this be so or not you will at least allow me this That it ought not to be and that 't is contrary to good sense to determine ones self in favour of an Opinion which we see grounded on Reasons less strong than those which oppose it And this is what your Authors do acknowledg (h) Martinon de fide Disp 5. Sect. 7. n. 42. and in effect were it otherwise one might innocently leave a good Religion and take up a bad one although we saw the Religion we leave more firmly grounded than that we take up But this being ridiculous it must be acknowledged that good Sense will not let a Man embrace an Opinion which he sees is more strongly opposed than maintained This being granted Sir Let 's suppose an Infidel to whom is offered Mr. Huet's Arguments if he be wise he will not yield to them till he has seen whether there be any thing which opposes these Arguments which counterballances them or dissipates them Imagine we afterwards the Christian Doctrine to be proposed to him discharged of Transubstantiation 'T is clear he will find nothing which shall counterpoise these Reasons So that these Reasons being good and nothing being able to diminish the solidity of them if he be wise he will embrace them Let us on the contrary imagine that by an Illusion of which we have seen a thousand Examples he is made believe That Transubstantiation is inseparable from Christianity What will he do If he be rational he will take the Ballance and weigh on one hand Mr. Huet's Arguments and on the other those which combat Transubstantiation and consequently Christianity in the supposition he is in that they are inseparable If he holds the Ballance even he will find That the Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation weigh more than those which favour Christianity He will find that the first weigh two and the second but one In effect the weight of Reasons is their Evidence The Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation have all the evidence of Sense those of Mr. Huet have only a moral Evidence which at most have but half of that of Sense The first then weigh as much again as the second This being so how can you expect the Infidel should give the preference to the second over the first and whom will you perswade that if he does do it he will act regularly Do you know what right Reason will suggest to him That Transubstantiation is not one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches He will say it is impossible Mr. Huet's Reasons should be valid if Christianity comprehends Transubstantiation and it must necessarily be either that this Doctrine has been added to the Christian Religion contrary to the intention of its Founder or that these Reasons be false Yet it 's apparent these Reasons are not false seeing they are evident and that the more they are considered the greater impression they make We must then believe that Transubstantiation which would destroy them should it take place is not one of the Christian Doctrines He will confirm himself in this Opinion by this Consideration That the Author of Christianity whoever he was having form'd his Religion with a design to make it be embraced by all Men and being able to make it very fit to be universally received by not burdening it with Transubstantiation it is not to be supposed he introduced this Doctrine which is likely only to make it be rejected by judicious Men. This will more especially appear to him inconceivable in respect of God whom he will acknowledg for the true Author of this Holy Religion if he well comprehends the force of Mr. Huet's Reasons So good and wise a God could nto on one hand require Men should embrace the Revelation he offered them and on the other lay an invincible opposition between this Revelation and the purest notices of Reason which he himself had given them to be their Rule in all Cases he could not on one hand oblige them to be Christians under pain of eternal damnation and on the other so order things that they could not be such without violating all the Maxims of good Sense and all the Rules of Prudence And this is Sir what the Insidel will say if he be a rational Person But if he has not understanding enough to perceive all this yet at least he will see That right Reason will not let him embrace the Christian Religion such as it is offered him I add in the Third place That not only he ought not to embrace it but that it is impossible he should Which is easy to be proved from the principles of your own Divines All of
obtain what I demand I shall be willing it should be in the manner you please whether it be the Senses or the rational Faculty or what other Faculty you will which makes us distinguish the Substances all this is indifferent to me provided you grant me That 't is the same Faculty which discerns that which makes us become Christians This being granted 't will be undeniable that this Faculty cannot be accused of deceiving us in what she tells us of the Eucharist without taking from it whatever it has of Certainty and Authority in the Facts which serve for a Foundation to Faith. Here 's then my second Proof perfectly reestablish'd I shall now do the same thing for the first I drew it hence That the Certainty of the Senses being incomparably greater than that we call Moral should it be granted that Transubstantiation was one of the Doctrines which Christianity obliges us to believe the Objections which might be made against this Holy Religion would have more strength than the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it because that in effect these Proofs have only a moral Evidence whereas the Objections which may be offered against this Holy Religion might have the Evidence of all the Senses which clearly witness against Transubstantiation You do not grant me this last Proposition you affirm 't is not the Senses but Reason which says the Eucharist is Bread and Wine because you pretend there 's only this last Faculty in a condition to discern the Substances and that should the Senses give some Indication they would do it in a manner equally doubtful and indirect I have already declared my unwillingness to enter into all these Discussions for whatever the Faculty is which makes us discern whether the Substances in general or that of the Eucharist in particular it 's sufficient it is a natural Faculty In this Supposition I thus reestablish my first Proof The certainty which accompanies the Functions of the natural Faculty which makes us discern one Substance from another is greater than that we call Moral If then this Faculty tells us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine as it must be granted it does one may offer against Transubstantiation and consequently against Christianity allowing Transubstantiation to be one of its Doctrines one may I say offer against it a greater certitude than that of the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it whereby 't will be more rational to reject than embrace it This Consequence is necessary and whatever past in our first Conference does invincibly prove it So that I only need to establish the Principle whence I draw it viz. That the certainty whereby we commonly discern the Substances from one another is greater than that we call Moral And this is all you can desire of me and if I convince you I expect from your justice no further contentions about it It 's then easy to make you acknowledg this Be pleased then to consider that when we are only morally assured of a thing the certainty we have of it is not comparable to that which those have on whose Testimony it 's believed For Example I am only morally assured of Cesar's Victories and Alexander's Conquest But the Souldiers which serv'd under these two Captains and were in their Armies and shared with them in their Labours these Souldiers I say were far more certain of them than I am yea more than the Historians themselves to whom they related them and on whose Testimony I believe them I am only morally certain of the being of the Cities of Jerusalem Rome and Constantinople having never been in those Places But those that have been and lived there those are far more certain of it than I can be because in effect they have seen these Cities with their own eyes You gave me the Reason of this in our first Conference tho indeed you made the Application of it to the certainty of the Senses But it not being the Application which makes the solidity of it 't will be still as strong whatever use is made of it You tell me we know the things of which we have that which we call a moral certainty only because they are attested to us by Persons whom we have no cause to suspect and who tells us they have seen them with their own Eyes But tho these Persons be not in any sort suspected by us we are far from being so assured of the truth of their Testimony as we are from the Reports of our Senses it 's impossible for us to doubt we see what we do see but it 's not impossible for us to doubt whether others have seen what they tell us We see in this respect the bottom of our own Hearts but we see not all that passes in the Hearts of others We have great Reasons to believe they do not deceive us but these Reasons have not the evidence which accompanies this inward sense of our own Actions which is commonly called Conscience You made me observe in the second place that our Senses do not attest to us the truth of things of which we have no other Certitude than that we call Moral whereas we may easily have a Moral Certainty of most things which are attested to us by our proper Senses My Senses for example do not inform me there 's a City call'd Rome wherefore I have no other than a moral Certainty of it But I do not only know by my own Senses there is a City call'd Paris I know it moreover by those of others who see and have seen it a thousand times so that I have a double Certainty of the being of this Town the moral one and that of Sense By consequence as two is more than one so that Certainty which is merely Moral is necessarily inferior to that of the Senses Suppose we now they are not our Senses but some other Faculty which makes us immediatly discern things yet this will not hinder us from saying still That those who are assured of the Existence of any thing by the reports of this Faculty whatever it be have greater certainty of it than those who know it only from the Testimony of those who have informed themselves by themselves and from the exercise of their own proper Faculties So that take it how we will it is clear that when we are assured only morally of a thing we are much less than those on the Testimony of whom it is believed Or to speak better it is plain that the moral Certainty do's still suppose another greater in those whose Authority is its Prop and Foundation If I then shew you one may have this kind of Certitude term'd moral touching Substances which are no longer or are now in distant parts and where we have never been but I do not say enough if I shew you we may have the highest degree of this kind of certainty shall I not hereby convince you That the moral Certainty is always inferior to that which attends
the Functions of the natural Faculty which discovers to us the difference of Substances If I do this Sir will you not be satisfied I shall be fully so answered he and I promise you that if you prove it me clearly I shall not trouble my self nor you with a Reply I can easily do it said I For is it not true that when any one would make us conceive a moral Certainty in the highest Point of its Perfection the commonest Examples which are produced are those of the Existence of the City of Rome to those who have never been there that of the Pope Grand Signior or Emperor to those that have never feen them and as to the past that of Alexander the Great Cesar Pompey and other Hero's of Antiquity Scarcely any Author that treats of this Suject but alledges one or the other of these Instances Yet the City of Rome is a Substance or to speak more exactly an heap of Substances of several kinds Alexander Caesar Pompey and all the rest of the ancient Hero's were something more than Accidents And consequently had not God given us a Faculty capable of discerning the Substances with certainty there would be no assurance from the Testimony of those who have seen this and instead of a moral Certainty the greatest which can be imagin'd we should only have a slight Opinion and without Foundation Is it not true Sir that we are morally assured there was heretofore at Rhodes a great Colossus of Brass that there was a stately Temple at Ephesus consecrated to Diana and at Rome another dedicated to Jupiter Have we not the like certainty that there are still Pyramids of Stone in Egypt of excessive heights that there 's a Mount in Sicily which vomits Fire that there are Elephants in the Indies Lions in Africk Crocodiles in the Nile Yet this Colossus these Temples Pyramids Mountain Lions and Crocodils what are these but Substances whose Existence is not known to us but by the Testimony of those who have seen them with their own Eyes or to say nothing which may move you who perceived them by means of the Faculty which God has given us to know these kind of Objects But not to go so far I now shew'd you that the Truth of the Facts whence are taken the Proofs which establish the Divinity of the Christian Religion and even of the Jewish depends on the faithfulness of the Report which this natural Faculty has made of several Substances and that if this Faculty may be herein mistaken these Proofs are in no wise convincing It being then certain that we are morally assured of the Truth of these Facts it cannot be denied we have a moral Certainty of several Substances and that those who were inform'd of them by themselves have a greater certainty than we Can you Sir now doubt I have not made good my word Will you not grant me that the discerning of Substances whatever the Faculty is whereby this is done is attended with a greater certainty that the moral one Thus this Faculty telling me the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and telling it me with all the force and constancy it is able is it not apparent there 's a clearness in its Evidence far greater than that in the Proofs of Christianity Do's not my Proof then return with its full strength and convictions May I not always say That Transubstantiation is opposed with greater strength of Argument than the Christian Religion is defended with We are agreed that the Proofs for Christianity have only a moral Evidence and I now shewed you That that which perswades us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is far more certain than what is morally so Can you after this deny that there is not greater certainty in what combats Transubstantiation than in what establishes the Truth of Christian Religion Can you deny that that which is more than sufficient to establish the Truth of Christian Religion discharged of Transubstantiation is too weak to maintain it granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Doctrines which she requires to be believed You see then Sir the fruitlessness of your Answer you see it lets my two Proofs subsist in their full strength you see that whether it be the Senses or Reason which make us know and discern the Substances we have still cause to believe the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and that this Perswasion cannot be rendred doubtful and uncertain without shaking the whole Foundation of Christianity and without giving the Infidels an infallible means of triumphing over this Holy Religion Mr. N. was about forming an Answer when he was hindred by the arrival of one of my Friends who came from a long Voyage and whose return was a surprize to me I was much joyed to see him But Mr. N. to whom he was a Stranger took hence an occasion to be gone without informing me of his thoughts on what I told him CONFERENCE IV. The Third Proof That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration I Was very desirous to know what effect my last conference had on Mr. N. I was moreover willing to shew him my third Proof Whereupon I went to his House where he received me with his usual civility and our Discourse having insensibly led us to Matters of Religion I took the liberty to ask him Whether he had throughly considered what had past in our foregoing Debates He hereupon ingenuously acknowledg'd He could find no means to defend against my Instances the Answer he had made me nor how to offer me better Yet he added he was so perswaded of the truth of his Belief That he would rather yield up to me Mr. Huet's Proofs than to imagin the whole Church could be deceived in so important a Matter as that of the Sacrament In effect said he to me What hurt can there be in saying this Author has ill defended a good Cause and made use of false reasonings for the maintaining of the Truth What do you say Sir said I you ask me What hurt there can be in what you say I affirm to you that nothing can be worse For Sir I would not have you mistaken Mr. Huet's Proofs are not of his invention he only digested them into order strengthened and illustrated them with curious Remarks and pressing Considerations and as to the main of them he has taken them out of Authors that have wrote on that Subject before him and indeed he has also commendably taken them from the discourses of the Prophets and the Son of God himself and his Apostles Christ himself is the first that has used these Proofs He several times alledg'd the Predictions of the Prophets and as oft did cite his Miracles He alledg'd his Resurrection and these were his strongest Arms his greatest Arguments He made use of them to stop the mouths of the Scribes and Pharisees whom he look'd upon as his profest Enemies He used them to perswade the multitudes
and on the other all Authors of your Communion who have Treated on the Controversies which separates us For as to the First did not Justin Martyr Tertullian Minutius Felix Theophilus of Antioch Origen Arnobius Lactantius St. Augustin St. Cyril and a great many others oppose Paganism with the absurdities and extravagancies of its mysteries Did not the same Fathers writing against Hereticks use this very argument affirming the Chimera's and extravagancies which these people believ'd cou'd in no sort come from God being apparently false and contrary to all the lights of Reason Have not in sine all your Authors who write against us followed the same method tho with different success See Bellarmin Gregory de Valentia Richlieu the Author of Prejudices and generally all your Controvertists There 's not one of them but has pretended to shew our Doctrine is not of God because of the absurdities therein contained All these Authors argue on two Principles The one That God has revealed nothing which is false The other That whatever is contrary to Reason is thereby contrary to Truth Take away which of these Principles you will and all the Arguments of these Writers will be meer Sophisms St. Augustin proceeds farther He says we ought to forsake the Communion of the Orthodox Church and pass over into that of the Hereticks and despise whatever you respect as the foundations of your Faith cou'd it be made appear the most dangerous Hereticks such as were then the Manichees taught the Truth * Aug. cont Epist fund cap. 4. and this is what he teaches us in this famous passage which your Doctors have ever in their mouths and wherein he declares that several things retain him in the bosom of the Catholick Church The consent of all people The authority grounded on Miracles and confirm'd by Antiquity Succession and even the name of Catholick You affirm these are the props and foundations of the true Faith and I will not now set on shewing you the contrary We may do this another time if you think fitting At present I am willing to suppose what you say I pray then consider what Saint Augustin adds Amongst you says he where I see nothing like this we hear nothing on all hands but promises of Truth and I confess adds he That could you shew it me so clearly that I could not doubt of it I must prefer it before whatever withholds me in the Catholick Church You see here how St. Augustin acknowledges That the evidence which excludes doubtings is to be preferred before the motives of Faith. He does not say that if the Manichees had this evidence on their side we shou'd despise it and offer against it the certainty of Faith as you pretend He says the contrary He says we shou'd yield and that which hinder'd him from doing it was That whatever the Manichees said They had not this evidence which they vaunted of That they promised great matters but cou'd not shew them Bellarmin does something like this * Bell. de Motis Eccles l. 4. cap. 11. He reckons amongst the Notes of the Church the holiness of its Doctrine and makes this holiness consist in her teaching nothing which is false and imposing nothing which is unjust and will have us judg of this by the lights of Reason He afterwards makes the application of this to the Pagans Jews Mahometans ancient Hereticks and lastly to us He shews as to the first That they have taught things absurd and abominable and attempting afterwards to shew this on our Subject he thence concludes none of these Societies is the true Church By this way of disputing he plainly subjects your Church to this examination and tacitly implies she may be rejected provided she can be convinced of all which he accuses the others For besides that he cannot take it ill That the Infidels and Hereticks should treat him in the same manner as he uses them besides this his greatest pretension is That the Church must be known by his marks seeing then one of his marks is That she teaches nothing which is false he hereby consents to the rejection of your Church if it can be shew'd from Reason That she teaches things false and absurd It cannot be deny'd but Bellarmine has had some Reason to deal thus For 't wou'd certainly be a great scandal to the Faithful and much more to Infidels cou'd it be clearly and plainly shew'd That Christian Religion teaches things directly contrary to Reason In effect seeing we embrace this Religion only on the account of the proofs which authorize it and of whose goodness we cannot judg but by Reason shou'd this Reason meet with things evidently false in this Religion she wou'd hereby carry us off as far from it as she cou'd bring us near it by making us comprehend these proofs Moreover making two contrary judgments on the subject of Religion the one That it is true because the proofs which authorize it are good the other that it is false because it teaches things absurd she must of necessity be deceived in the one or the other and so neither is certain The Author of the Art of Thinking was not of this mind says Mr. N. It 's certain says he * Art of Thinking part 4. ch 11. That Divine Faith should have more force on our minds than our own Reason and this from Reason it self which shews us we should always prefer what is more certain to what is less It being more certain that what God says is true than what our Reason perswades us because 't is more impossible God shou'd deceive us than our Reason All this said I appears to me false and ill digested and 't is easie to observe herein such a slight of hand as shews little love to truth To see this more distinctly be pleas'd to consider That the certainty of every act of Faith depends on the perswasion which we have of two Truths which are in some sort their props and foundations The first That whatever God attests is true The second That God has attested the Doctrine which we believe You see that if we doubt of either of these two Truths it 's impossible our Faith can be firm To what purpose is it to know that God does not lye if we doubt God has not said a thing And granting he has said something if we doubt he has said in particular what 's proposed to us to believe And further what signifies it for us to know That God has reveal'd what 's offer'd us if we doubt whether all which God says be true It 's then equally necessary to know these two Truths but they be not always equally evident The first is ever incomparably more than the second It 's always highly evident That whatever God says is true and therefore no body differs about it no not the Athiests For tho the Atheists hold there 's no God yet they acknowledg if there were one he would never speak any thing but what