in this Figure Apophasis which promises not to mention those things which are most industriously mention'd and offer'd to the Hearers consideration In the latter of these Passages he says that he would not dispute against them who pretended to have discover'd that Death was the end of all things and yet in the very next words he does dispute against them and that sufficiently to the declaration of his own Opinion upon the Question if not to the conviction of his Adversaries N. 49. Nec tamen mihi sane quicquam occurrit cur non Pythagorae sit Platonis vera sententia And yet I know no reason but that the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato may be true which was for the Immortality of the Soul And a little after Neque aliud est quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur aeternitas nisi quod nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intelligere cogitatione comprehendere Nor is there any thing else in the case why they his Adversaries could not believe the Immortality of the Soul but because they can't conceive how the Soul can subsist without the Body and think and by thinking understand and yet they understand nothing of the nature of the Soul in the Body Much more to the same purpose follows 2 dly As to that Reflection which Tully makes after the account which he had given of Socrates viz. That his Discourse was like a floating Vessel toss'd to and fro in the wide Sea I answer That notwithstanding this Comparison suppos'd to savour so much of the old academic Uncertainty he continues his Discourse perswading to the practice of Virtue and to the contempt of Death because of the Advantages which good Men should find thereby hereafter And 3 dly What is still more He always brings in Atticus the other Person in the Dialogue as convinc'd by what he offers and fully satisfied concerning the Truth of the Immortality of the Soul by which the Orator enforces what he says concerning the Contempt of Death and the Practice of Virtue 4 ly To put this matter out of controversy and make it incontestably manifest that Tully was not such a Sceptic in the Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul as one or two of my Acquaintance contend at the latter end of a set Speech which Plato puts into the Mouth of dying Socrates N. 99. Sed tempus est jam hinc abire me vos ut vitam agatis Vtrum autem sit melius Dii immortales sciunt hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem But 't is now time that I go hence and die do you my Friends live on but which of the two is best that only the Gods know I am of the mind that no Man living does Upon these words the Orator has this Reflection Etsi quod praeter Deos negat scire quenquam id scit ipse utrum melius nam dixit ante sed suum illud nihil ut affirmet tenet ad extremum Tho that which he says none but the Gods know he himself knows well he knows which is better he had before declar'd which is better but that way of his that way afterwards call'd Academic of determining nothing he holds to the end Here Tully plainly reproves that foolish Philosophical Humour which obtain'd so much of talking off and on in matters of moment and declares it as his opinion that however Socrates in his last words did seem to play fast and loose yet he was in his own mind sufficiently convinc'd of the Immortality of the Soul and the future State on which account it was better for injur'd good Men to die than to live I hope this labour to prove that Tully did not disbelieve the Immortality of the Soul consequently nor a future State may not seem to the Reader tedious or impertinent for if it could be made out that the wisest of the Heathens rejected these Notions and never us'd them as Arguments to encourage Virtue and restrain Vice it would be a prejudice against my Discourse who have endeavour'd to gain some Credibility to these Notions from the Principles of natural Reason It would be a prejudice I say against not an utter subversion of my Discourse for my Adversaries must show where I have argued wrong and not tell me of great Authorities against me if they mean utterly to subvert it But if when they object great Authorities against me which I acknowledg to be a Prejudice for how can I hope to see farther than such a Man as Tully I give a fair Answer and make it appear that the Citations which are objected against me are by my Adversaries mistaken and misapplied and that the same if rightly consider'd are so far from contradicting that they favour the Doctrines which I defend by the acknowledg'd Principles of natural Reason then I think I have been all this while strengthning those Doctrines not spending my time in an impertinent Labour I have this to say further for my self I have not only answer'd the Objections which have been offer'd by my learned Acquaintances but I have also accounted for those Difficulties which I my self chanc'd to meet with while I read those Tracts of the great Orator whence their Objections were taken For I will never contend for any Opinion against which I know of an Objection which appears so considerable that it is the interest of the Opinion to have the Objection pass'd over without any notice taken of it If I could not have solv'd those Difficulties which I my self chanc'd to meet with I would have given up the Authority of Tully tho the Objections of my Adversaries were not of strength sufficient to oblige me to it In pleading a Cause at the Bar in our Courts of Judicature the Lawyer will answer what he can but to be sure start no Objection against his Client which is not easily answer'd and possibly sometimes he may win the day by taking no notice of some Circumstances which the Adversary oversees but in our Disputes concerning Philosophical Truths a Man must leave no Objection without Reply for these Causes are try'd over and over again every day and he that takes no notice of a considerable Objection will be found out by one or other and suppos'd to have silently pass'd it by as being conscious of the weakness of his Cause and unable to answer it Again in answering I have answer'd fairly I have not by a cheating Translation or otherwise misrepresented the Author to serve the ends of my Discourse which is a method but too frequent with them who dispute for Religious Opinions but thereby they do their Cause be it good or bad a great disservice for a bad Cause by dissembling Artifices is render'd more odious in the eyes of all prudent Men who search diligently into the nature of things and a good Cause by such poor methods is brought under deserv'd suspicion I will give one instance of this which shall not be an invidious one from
Hearts content but at every other time if he has an inviting great probability of Success and Secrecy he cannot restrain himself from making his Circumstances easy and to his Hearts content by doing positive harm This I have prov'd in what went before I only now add that I am strongly of the opinion that were our Author to choose a Servant with whom he must intrust a considerable Stewardship in the East or West-Indies where he had no means narrowly to inspect his Management or punish his Mismanagement he would rather choose a Servant of good Reputation in the belief of a future State than a Servant of good Reputation in the Atheistick Belief P. 53. It is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection to have a liking or dislike of moral Actions and consequently a sense of Right and Wrong before such time as he may have any Notion or Sense of God at all this is what will hardly be question'd By several Passages which follow I cannot but allow that our Author has no ill meaning in this but then it has so untoward an Air and is liable to so obvious and unhappy Misconstruction that I think fit to descant upon it but this I shall do with all candour That a Creature capable of using Reflection may have a Dislike of moral Actions before he has any Notion or Sense of God at all thus much of the Remark is by me wholly granted to our Author For nothing can contribute more to a Dislike of moral Actions than the utter want of all Notion or Sense of God But what degree of liking of moral Actions what measure of sense concerning right and wrong a Creature capable of using Reflection may have before he has any Notion or Sense of God at all ought to be carefully examin'd and distinctly weigh'd before any deduction be made or intimated from such a Remark as this With our Author's leave thus much I will presume to determine and make good viz. It will not only be question'd but absolutely deny'd by the generality of thinking Men that a Creature capable of using Reflection can have so just a liking of moral Actions and so true a sense of Right and Wrong before he has the notion and sense of God as he ought to have and cannot but have using Reflection when he has once learn'd the Notion and becomes affected with the sense of a God Indeed moral Actions are altogether agreable to a rational Nature or as our Author phrases it to a Creature using Reflection but the Exercise of his Reason or his using Reflection will lead him to the Notion of a God and that Notion will make his Sense of right or wrong more correct and give it a larger Scope give it a wider field to exercise it self in that Notion heedfully adverted to will raise his liking of moral Actions far above what it could arrive at without it And this our Author seems to grant p. 59. If there be a Being conceiv'd All-intelligent and All-seeing of infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness the Belief of such a Being must of necessity be highly effectual to the creating or farthering of good Affections and to the removing of contrary ones by rendering every thing that is of Virtue more lovely splendid and attractive and every thing that is of Vice more ignominious and deform'd But without the Notion of a Being All-intelligent All-seeing of infinite Power Wisdom and Goodness the rational or reflecting Creature 's liking of moral Actions will show it self only in some cheap and easy Instances and be very apt to be diverted or abated by the secular Interest of the private System In few and plain words this matter may be thus sum'd up A Man that has no Notion nor Sense of a God may possibly like and practise moral Actions when he has no beloved Lust to gratify nor dreaded Danger to avoid the one of which may be easily gratified and the other securely avoided by Actions immoral but when he has a beloved Lust to gratify which may be easily gratified or a dreaded Danger to avoid which may be securely avoided and no Notion nor Sense of God at all to influence him he will at that time be sure to gratify his Lust and do what he can to avoid his danger tho the means to be us'd for such ends be never so immoral the reason of this is because in all Creatures especially the rational Self-love is the predominant Principle A rational Creature who believes a God and expects a future Existence may generously prefer the noble Interests of Society before Wealth and Health and even his Life it self if the Case so require because he expects hereafter to find an inconceivable Advantage in so doing but there is no Argument in Nature no Reason nor shadow of a Reason to perswade a rational Man who knows nothing of God and expects no future Existence to venture the loss of his Life or but of his Estate without which he cannot provide Necessaries for his Wife and Children for the Service of his Country when the Laws and Liberties thereof are in danger either from crafty Priests imposing gainful Doctrines for necessary Faith or arbitrary Princes dispensing with the Laws which they swore to maintain P. 81. It will appear that one who has not the opinion or belief of an intelligent Principle or God may tho very difficultly and at a great hazard be capable of Virtue so as to have an Honesty a Faith a Justice perhaps of great Note and Worth may have many generous and good Passions and possibly that of love to Virtue for its own sake as well as for being believ'd advantageous I am not willing to quit the respect which I have and think I ought to have for our Author yet I cannot but declare that he has here made a very erroneous and pernicious Conclusion which neither does appear from the Reasons by him offer'd nor can it be made to appear from any thing which the Wit of Man can offer indeed he has cautiously worded his Conclusion and wisely guarded himself He has wisely guarded himself in this Prefatory Induction If the Reasons I have offer'd be found of any weight I am glad that he is not confident of having prov'd so erroneous and pernicious a Doctrine He has worded it very cautiously viz. in these Phrases and Terms of abatement may tho with great difficulty and at a great hazard may perhaps may possibly But contrary to what he has thus concluded I have already prov'd and shall now essay farther to confirm it that one who has not the Opinion or Belief of an intelligent Principle or God can by no means be capable of such a Virtue as to have an Honesty a Faith a Justice of great weight and worth I take my rise for what I have now in my thoughts from a Passage of our Author according to him p. 59. The word God imports no less than a Being all-intelligent all-seeing of
be govern'd by you I should refuse to give my Reasons I am not of the Comic Poet's mind from whom we have the Proverb Nullum est jam dictum quod non dictum fuit prius I rather fancy since the Universe has no bounds that there may be eternal Progressions in Reasonings eternal advances in Knowledg so that if perhaps I have wrote nothing but what has bin wrote before yet there 's no cause to imagin the Subject to have bin so copiously and clearly handled already that nothing of moment can be added by the study of them who come after Upon which account I had reason on my side thus far at least viz. That I endeavour'd to give some new accession of strength to those Foundations of natural Religion without which I don't see how difficult Virtue can subsist Let me digress so far as here to call in a few words which should have bin inserted in my Dissertation being part of a Letter wrote to me by one that uses me kindly as you do It seems plain that no Man loves Misery no nor Labour to no purpose and he that thinks he shall cease to be after this Life must think he shall cease to exercise Virtue his chief Delight or his All so he has no Motive to dy for the sake of his Country or on any noble account whatsoever and at last will come to this Result that Self-preservation is the truest Virtue tho on the meanest Terms But to return that I have troubled the Press with nothing but what the Letter to the Deist made publick some years past This I think I may without departing from the Rules of Modesty positively deny But not to offend the Reader with a Crambe bis coctâ I shall only note that it must be granted me I did not borrow from that Letter all which I have offer'd in defence of this Doctrin that the hope of future Reward is not a base mercenary but a reasonable and just Motive to Virtue 2. Nor thence have I borrow'd what I have answer'd to the Objections of nominal Deists drawn from the Writings of moral Heathens for I met those Objections in Conversation not Books 3. What I have oppos'd to the Author of the Inquiry concerning Virtue could not be borrow'd from the Letter to the Deist which was wrote before it but must needs be as new as the Inquiry And if the Inquiry be an ingenious subtle erroneous and dangerous Book then it will be farther granted that a solid good answer comes seasonably and usefully whether my Answer be such the Reader must judg but for your part Sir you have approv'd it and therefore if you agree with your self you must not blame my printing Now as to those particular Arguments the Substance of which I confess my self to have in common with the Letter to the Deist I will not say as Hierom's Master Donatus commenting on the above-cited Verse from Terence Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt Confounded be all they who said the things which I have said before I said them no I had rather go into that better natur'd Defence Non quicquid cum antiquis convenit ex antiquis sumptum Upon which Lemma Paschasius has this witty Epigram tho he points it with a little of Donatus's assuming waggish Self-love Plurima me veterum sensa expressisse fatebor Ne fatear fursim vel furiosus ego Multa sed ex aliis falsò sumpsisse putabis Quae mea percupiam dicier mea sunt Conveniunt tamen haec antiquis Dî male perdant Antiquos mea qui praeripuere mihi I gave these Lines to be translated to my second Son the Boy you took such a fancy to Often on antient Fancies have I hit And for this Luck must I be call'd a Cheat They err who say I steal the Antients Fame For I no more than what 's my own do claim In mine and theirs if you no difference see Blame th' Antients for their stealing mine from me Now my hand is in to you it comes into my mind that you once acquainted me that some of my learned Acquaintance dislik'd this Essay But this I am far from putting off with that old hypocritical Saw No Man can have a meaner Opinion of my performance than I have my self because their dislike whereof I have bin all along conscious prompted me to consider the matter again and again and that repeated Consideration has confirm'd me in my Sentiments and made me in love with them so that if these Acquaintances can still be my Friends notwithstanding their Dislike I will thank them for their Dislike as well as for their Friendship This notwithstanding I am not so vain as to reckon that I have borrowing or not borrowing exhausted the Argument or said half which their singular Parts and Attainments might have help'd me to have said no for even my present mediocrity could and would have added some method and farther strength to it but my much Business and many Infirmities made me willing to put such an end to it as you see I have now one Favour to beg of you and I take leave pray thank my Adversaries in my Name for their opposing the Sentiments in this Dissertation defended thank them heartily I really hold it a very singular good Office to have my Sentiments seriously and strenuously oppos'd for no longer than I can defend will I retain them Old as I am I am not so afraid of altering my Opinions as not to listen to Reason whoever offers it he that convinces my Understanding shall while I live lead my Affections but if what is offer'd has not evidence enough to convince me they use me very hardly who will not admit me into their Friendship because I am not their Proselyte I am pleas'd to be seriously and strenuously oppos'd by them who best can do 't even tho they go for Hereticks that so I may go upon the surer ground And for this cause I much wonder that the best Reformed Church should have any of her Sons desirous to put a Restraint on the Press for all Truths the more they are impugn'd the surer they are establish'd and the more the Press is restrain'd the more our Articles will be suspected whether there be any other just cause of suspicion or no. There 's ten thousand to one against a Man who takes Doctrines upon trust and assents to this or that Scheme with Faith implicit but that which he suffers to be examin'd to be sifted and which he himself considers over and over again in that it is impossible he should be deceiv'd unless it be a matter wherein he may be mistaken innocently and without prejudice to his future hopes I thought I had done but one thing more comes in my way You once let me know that I was suspected to favour heretical Opinions To this I answer I hope it is no fault not to run from the converse of Men of Learning and Probity but from the Persons you nam'd I do assure you I differ and that in all points that can be insimulated of Heresy particularly I think the Socinians in the wrong and never was of their Congregation I do not know the names of three Socinians nor the Persons of any two such but I confess I look upon them as Men of Learning and Probity Allow me but to have Charity for all honest Men however differently perswaded and you will have no cause to deny me being a not unworthy Member of the Church of England And pray observe one thing more their Conversation is very narrow who are perswaded altogether as the Men they converse with I take it that a free Conversation is the most useful thing in the World and that their Company is worth nothing who will not endure Contradiction They whom I converse with know and are not angry with my Church-Sentiments I know and will never persecute their dissent For Non eadem sentire bonis de rebus iisdem Incolumi licuit semper amicitia FINIS