follows not therefore that naturall men can so aske The thing promised on asking you acknowledge to import acceptation with God but shall it be had upon every asking No T is Wisdome whereof James tells us in the place fore-named in expresse termes it cannot be had but upon asking in faith so that whosoever be meant by Son here he must aske in faith without which his naturall improvements ingage not God at all Not but that such must improve naturall abilities for 't is their duty but yet thereupon 't is not Gods duty to confer Grace Again for I decline exact method as not becoming me the manner after which this duty is to be done appears expresly to be with greatest attention and intention Apply thy heart c. If thou cryest after liftest up thy voyce seekest her as silver c. Now according to that known saying Ignoti nulla cupido 't is impossible meer naturall men not possest with the fear of God which is the very beginning of all saving knowledge should be able so to apply their hearts cry after it seek c. Taking pains as one digging in a mine for hid Treasures swine are not wont to take such paines for pearls As yet therefore I cannot conceive this exhortation to be chiefely directed to naturall men as having a power so to perform the duty as to ingage God to instate them in the promise which to prove you bring it but in strictnesse and propriety as 't is a promise 't is onely absolutely given to them that have faith though the condition on our part so concerns naturall men as to inform them what their duty is as all other of Gods Commands do with making known of which God is not bound to inable all that know their duty to do it so that while naturall 't is impossible for them to keep any one savingly The next Text alledged is John 6.27 Labour c. For that meat which endures to eternall life which the son of man shall give to you namely said you Upon labouring even Naturall mens Labouring to whom you direct the exhortation and that to prove the fifth assertion prescribed to which refer so that by Labour you understand a mans improving his Naturalls with greatest diligence on which God according to his promise will give everlasting meat or saving Grace whereby to interest them into Christ who is life everlasting But that by Labouring here Christ means not their own full improvement of Naturall abilities only or chiefely as whereunto annexing a promise seemes evident because by Labouring he means true beleeving which I prove from 28. and 29. verses Christ having exhorted them to Labour c. Thereupon they perceiving the Exhortation to import Everlasting life were inquisitive in verse 28. What shall we do that we might so labour for the word for Labour in the 27. vers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that in 28. verse following 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 translated might work are the same so that their question propounded was in reference to the duty injoyned before that they might understand the nature of that Command whereto Christ answers telling them what labour or work 't was he required of them where the word translated work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 answers the Verb whence also the Verb is derived and so joyntly import Labour in all three verses which work then is to beleeve in Jesus Christ as is directly laid down in expresse termes verse 29. If then labouring imports the saving work of beleeving then 't is more then utmost improvement of Naturalls because by such improvement we cannot work the great work of faith so then by Labour he commands more then Naturall improvement And because 't is a work far above the reach of mans Naturall improvements he that givâ—s it in command undertakes to work his own will or command in them which follows Which the Son of man shall give unto you So as 't is here granted Christ requires them to improve their naturall abilities but yet withall that also which is infinitely above them all how fully soever improved even saving faith Which the Son of man shall give they must impove c. but yet after all must rest in nothing but Christs gift they were so to labour by naturall improvement as to submit to or rather close with the Spirits exceeding great inspiring power whereby it works faith Object But could they not so labour by naturall improvement as to ingage Christ to give them everlasting meat certainly upon their labouring which 't is brought to prove Answ For Answer as yet I conceive that they had no promise made on their meer Labour though to utmost improving naturall abilities which I prove thus clearly because they did labour according to their power for they took as good a course as naturall reason could prescribe First they desired to understand what their duty exprest by the tearm Labour did import next they desired in a most rationall way some good ground whereon to stablish or bottome this their duty of beleeving even by some sign which was an ancient manner of confirming great matters in answere whereto he declares himself to be the true signe from heaven the bread of God whereupon according to the strength of naturall understanding imprinting in them a desire of happinesse because 't is again and again affirmed to be the bread of life they put forth the utmost of their Naturall abilities in this great request Lord ever more give us this Bread whence Christ again declares himselfe to be that Bread and further tells them who should partake thereof even he that comes to me or beleeves in me not every comming for these came yet to them he saith ye beleeve not shall never hunger c. whereby alluring them to come and yet after their improvement of naturall abilities in affectionate askings Christ tells them Ye come not so as to have life But is not their not improving Naturalls given as the reason thereof Object Answ No in no wise for they improved their Reason judgement c. to the utmost yet further to finde out how it should be true That Christ was the bread of heaven and that by inquiry into his stem or Parentage whence he was the best course their naturall light could guide them to which they followed in verse 41. and 42. but doth Christ hereupon tell them Ye have not yet fully improved your naturalls therefore 't is you beleeve not or doth he expresse by way of promise that because you have improved c. in reasoning disputing begging c. Therefore according to my sure promise ingaging me I le second your improvement with grace I will give it you No but contrarily the reason why they cannot come to life or beleeve which he had said in verse 36. he gives them in verse 44. No man can or hath power to come Except the Father draw him which act he was not ingaged to put forth on them
them without Gods assistance to believe Wherefore you added they have a power but not a disposition and that we must distinguish between having a power and an inclination to which I at present say one word he that hath not a will hath not a power and so wants an executive power by which I conceive you mean a power whereby to execute which you affirme a naturall man hath That such want a power I prove from John 6. verse 44. and 65. where 't is exprest that a meer naturall man without the Fathers drawing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non potest hath not power to do what to come to life or in faith so that 't is clear as I conceive that such want a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power whereby to execute for he that hath not power to will hath not power to do therefore God being said to do all in us is said to work in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure 2 Phil. 13. as if the willing an act were the all in all requisite to produce an act which want of power in man you contradicted in affirming All that was wanting in the Jewes or the reason of their not believing is placed in their will ye will not come he saith not ye have no power ye cannot come which cannot come is expresly affirmed twice in John 6.44 65. But I must most abruptly desist further enlargement as yet praying the LORD to prosper it for the end intended even the propagating of truth Whereto yet to adde one word if in any particular here mentioned any assertion of yours may suffer blame not me but your self of whom I may justly say if any such cause may be found for it Tu te ipsum tuis ipsis armis visisti for that God hath communicated much of my strength by the way of your Ministery A Sermon in Answer to the foregoing Letter preached by Mr. J. G. April 28. 1644. taken after him exactly in Characters by M. THO. RUDYARD a Member of his Church and by him read over to SAMUEL LANE to Copy out whose Copy exactly followes WE desire to look back a litttle to one passage that was delivered the last day for the satisfaction of some who it seems did not clearly understand it the tenour of the motive whereby we perswaded and prest on men not truly converted to God to seek for the grace of God was this That if they would give out themselves in good earnest in the search and seek for it with all their hearts they should finde it having a while insisted on the amplification and inforcement of this motive and cleared the difficulty how and in what sense God may be said to love or be gracious to men before believing and in what not we came to ponder the motive wherein we put this to consideration of how great concernment 't was to them to have fellowship with the Saints of God in the great businesse of salvation giving them assurance that whatsoever their sinnes had been and how great soever their present guilt may be yet if they were but truly willing to come under the wing of Christ not a haire of their heads should fall to the ground In prosecution whereof we propounded and answered this Objection Object You put us in minde and hope of finding grace with God if we will make our endeavours to obtaine it but we have little encouragement for we are dead in sins c. Answ Which we answered by a gradation of five steps The fifth was That though men be dead in sins in such a sense as was formerly explained yet men have a light of reason judgement c. by means whereof they are able to consider of tearms and means proposed c. though happily not able fully to comprehend them as to debate whether faith in Christ or the works of the Law or their own righteousness be likely to carry it in Gods sight wherein they may not be able to come to any certain issue to comprehend the difference between each and to resolve in themselves this is the means that will do it and that not or suppose they finde no satisfaction in way of reason in either of those means yet are able to work it on in a way of reason whether there be any other way besides more likely Now though 't is not to be supposed that they have power to come to such firme bottome whereon to build without doubtings yet they are able and have a scale and ballance of reason and judgement whereby to weigh one reason against another to see which is most hopefull without all question men may go thus far and here re-inforcing the argument we declared to such that if they would be willing to do unfeinedly and impartially what God hath appointed them in a way of nature to do God hath promised successe and acceptation in this way and this was that passage by name which it seems some could not so well understand or comprehend fearing lest it should comply with the Arminian tenent in point of Free-will or that I should magnifie naturall abilities above the line of excellency belonging to it If they will but please to consider for the clearing of the whole businesse but two arguments you will clearly see that there is an absolute necessity for maintaining such an assertion for a truth as this is namely that if naturall men will put forth themselves to the utmost to what they are able to doe to comply with God in the Gospell they shall finde an answerable successe and that there is an absolute necessity to maintaine it for a truth for otherwise we shall expose the truth of God the covenant of grace the doâ—tâ—iâ—e of free-grace which we professe to maintaine we shall expose both the one and the other to an inexpiable and unanswerable reproach dishonour and such indeed as cannot be redeemed by any reason or distinction or project one or other that men are able to devise for the relief of it for that on this 't will follow that the assertion we speak of that men putting forth themselves according to what God hath inâ—bled them to do in a way of nature that God will meet them with grace and acceptation if the former be clearly proved then this will follow upon it that this hath no consistence with the opinion of Free-will but doth indeed intrench on the best foundation that that opinion stands upon We know 't was an order Christ gave for men to deal between Caesar and God Give to Caesar the things that are Caesars and to God c. And indeed no man can give to God the things that are Gods except he give to Caesar the things that are Caesars and that because this is one of Gods things even our subjection to the lawfull governour set over us by God in things lawfull and mans foot may soonest slide here even on a pretence of giving all to God liberally to
is one thing and the appetite the inward faculty of receiving food is another and therefore the having of either may well consist with the want of either one man may have an inward faculty of appetite and want outward food and another may have outward food and want an inward receptive faculty The latter therefore inevitably follows that Adams wating the Revelation c. proves not his wanting an inward power c. because the Revelation of the object by promise the outward means of beleeving being one thing and faith the inward power of receiving it another thing distinct from the former hence it comes to passe that either of them may be where either of them is wanting Adam then might have a power of beleeving and want the word of faith though now faith comes by hearing even as he was created in Gods image perfectly at once though Saints now are transformed into the same image gradually and that by means of the Word 2 Cor. 3.18 and contrarily many now have the Word and not that power the Word being not of the essence of that power Secondly another Argument may be this if Adam had not power to beleeve a thing or object because the object was not revealed then 't will follow that Adam had not a power of staâ—â—â—â— righteous by the Law of works for if he had not power to belâ—â—ve a thing because 't was not revealed then by the same reason he had not power at first to obey any command because 't was not revealed for the Revelation of a command is as much necessary to obeying â—s the Revelation of a promise is necessary to the beleeving therof and the meer Revelation of a promise would have infused into Adam no more power of beleeving then the meer Revelation of a comâ—â—nd would have infused power of obeying whence it follows that Adam in his first perfection was so far from having power to stand righteous by a Law of works by performing any thing to be commanded as that indeed when he was at first created according to this your reason he had not then power to obey any command whatsoever because his creation was fully finished before any command was revealed yea from that time forward when ever any command had been revealed he had stood in â—eed of supply of new power to obey because before 't was revealed he had not power to obey Which consequences utterly overthrow that perfect power by standing righteous by works which you expresly affirm Adam had making him unable to perform any work by his first created power Thus much in Answer to your reasons alleadged against Adams having power of beleeving c. which are all grounded upon a mis-understanding of and swerving from the true definition of such a power and so are made up of an indiâ—tinct and consuled conjumbling of other things with it for neither the need use thereof nor the fore-knowledge or Revelation of an object are at all essentially necessary to make up such a power as hath been proved Touching which matter I must adde one word viz. that it must needs be dangerous presumption to charge such a person with weaknesse before triall who for excellency and perfection of nature is avouched again and again by God himselfe to be created after Gods own Image and likenesse Gen. 1. and to be made upright or righteous Eccles 7.29 Yea especially to ground that charge against him upon such reasons as wholly tend to prove that he was not in a capacity of being tryed whether he had such a power of beleeving or not by which act the grand Master-peece of Gods whol Creation is without all ground vilified Against all which that I may yet adde one passage I shall indeavour to state the question in most cleâ—â— and full tearmes which question being Whether Adam had a power of beleeving in Christ the essence of which power consists in a power to beleeve an object revealed cannot be truely framed except with this supposition That Christ had been revealed so that to go about to examine much more to determine what his power was to beleeve an object without supposing that object to be revealed this is a course inconsistent with the nature of this power which necessarily presupposeth the revelation of an object for the tryall thereof for though such a power may be without an outward Object yet there can be no tryall of its being without it as a man may have an inward appetite but we cannot rightly examine his having it but by giving him outward food which question therefore may be fairly propounded thus Whether Adam had a power of believing Christ supposing Christ had been revealed Answer whereto must be this That he could not but have such a power it being essentially necessary to his state of perfection as appeares by these three consequences First because without it upon the revealing of Christ which is here supposed Adam must have been miserable by opposing the truth of God in that promise and that through want of power Or secondly if upon the revelation of this mystery he had not had power to have beleeved it then necessarily he must have needed supply of new power whereby to have beleeved and so upon this revelation supposed his condition would have been the very condition of unbeleevers now who upon the revealing of this mystery need new power to beleeve it both which consequences are utterly inconsistent with the nature of his first compleat power of standing happy Yea thirdly supposing that Mystery to have been revealed to Adam to be beleeved the very revelation hereof would have required and commanded him to have beleeved it and his beleeving would have been a proper act of Obedience to the Law of that promise requiring faith If therefore he had not a power to have obeyed the law of that promise by beleeving then it follows That his first power could not have inabled him to stand by a Law of Works by perfect obedience which as you expresly grant he was fully able to do And yet before passing from this question I miâ—t 〈…〉 word to prevent the mistaking mine and in answering it 〈◊〉 is That I have not endeavoured to prove Adams â—aving 〈◊〉 power from this reason because without it God could not â—â—â—â—stice destroy mankinde for whether he had a power of beleeving or no is a Question needlesse and impertiment touching the â—â—â—ring of Gods justice in mans destruction as may be made â—â—â—â—fest thus If Adam in whom as you acknowledge all his posterity stood had such a power under the first Covenant as was suâ—â—â—â—â—ent to justifie God in the death or destruction of man disobeying then to examine whether Adam had power to beleeve a second Covenant is altogether â—â—â—iceessâ—ry to clear Gods Justice in â—â—stroying man disobeying But the former is true this Adam had c. because God after stating him in his first power 〈◊〉 thereupon as a righteous Judge fore passe or denounce the
that very manner as you doe by making God ingaged by promise as in these words Annon isto dicto Christi babenti dabitur promissio ista continâ—atur qua Deus spondet se gratia supernaturali illuminaturum qui lumine naturali recte utetur aâ—t saltâ— utetur minus male Which text to him that hath shall be given Arminius produceth instead of those Texts of yours ask and you shall have c. whence he affirmes the same with you saying that by that promise to him that hath shall be given God ingages himselfe to enlighten with supernaturall grace such as rightly use naturall light or at least who will use it as much as he can lesse evilly So that touching the great difference you make between your opinion and that of Free-will as if yours were not Arminian 't is plain Arminius holds the one as strongly as the other yours opposed he plainly holds and labours so to prove it as you do for instead of perfect free-will he acknowledgeth some defect in the will as by that his expression lesse evilly whereby granting some sinfulnesse therein Yea that Arminius holds both opinions how contradictory soever to each other I finde expresly in Doctor Twisse in his third book and first digression touching the sense of that Text to him that hath shall be given as appears by this sentence Quamvis requirant gratiam ad râ—â—te â—â—â—dum naturalibus â—amque supernaturalem tamâ—u iâ—rerdâ—â—â— diserâ—e dâ—ceâ—â— boâ—â—inem ista natura vipraâ—â—are posse which he there proves from Câ—rvinuâ— It appeats therefore from these testimonies that your opinion of ingaging God to give grace c. which you go about to quit them from is most usuall amongst them being more plausible and that which denies a necessity of supernaturall grace is but rarely found among them And touching your complyance with both these opinions as their former is your fifth assertion so the latter of Free-will in the groâ—â—st sense is directly maintained by the force of your second reason as is before proved Furthermore seeing you professe your â—nd in all to be the prevâ—ning of such 〈…〉 pâ—essions 〈◊〉 are given by the most against the Arminians 〈…〉 discourse 〈◊〉 in the â—â—d of this Sermon 〈◊〉 intimated it seems meet to â—â—quaint you â—ow greatly you have crost your own designe and that by the second and maine point of difference which you make between your opinion and theirs For whereas you there charge them with this as their main and only tenent viz. That man hath power to produce a saving act without any supernaturall assistance it appears from those words prescript Quamvis requirant gratiam c. supernaturalem that when they are their Crafts-masters they do and that generally require supply of supernaturall grace so that you seem uncharitably to take them alwayes at the worst In which alleaging of these testimonies though I cannot but acknowledge my prolixity yet must I partly justifie it from the necessity thereof even to establish that truth by the mouth of two or three witnesses which being only affirmed before you did so lightly put by And yet must I adde one word to minde you of your politick method used about denying your tenent to be Arminian that whereas their opinion of Gods being ingaged c. given in those words facienti quod in se est c. is directly yourfifth assertion and their main maxime you wholly neglect to prove wherein your opinion differs from that maxime contenting your self only to shew how it differs from another Arminian opinion which you were not at all charged with so that still your opinion lyes under this heavie charge of being the mainâ— foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme which is now made good by clear evidence Next you raise a question touching the difference between an executive and willing power or a principle drawing out that power into act c. The occasion of your opening which distinction I finde to be from a passage in my discourse given you where 't is denied that man hath an executive power to believe which now you would farther prove In opening of which power you seem to contradict yourself for you take it to be a power whereby to act and yet by those instances you understand that to be an executive power which cannot inable to act you say A rich man hath an executive power to be liberall whilst of a penurious disposition though by that power he is never the nearer being liberall but how contradictory is it to say A man by means of such a thing hath power to exâ—â—â—â—â— such a worke though by that thing be is never the nearer execution thereof by this you seem to nullifie that power in respect of inabling to an act which you call a power to act Again you say he hath an executive power to do though that power be defective touching doing but that which is defective in order to an act cannot be a power to act for a power to act is inconsistent with defectivenesse or want of power power and want of power are contraries But for brevity sake I shall endeavour to grant the utmost extent of your instances viz. A penurious rich man hath such a power in him in order to acts of liberality as an Infant hath principles of reason and understanding which may of themselves in an ordinary way of nature become executive to answerable acts without any super-naturall infusion so a rich penurious man hath such principles as by consideration councell c. may be inclined to liberality without a super-naturall change of those principles but yet whilst penuriously disposed he is as far or farther from an executive power as a willing as a child is in the case given And thus may the rest be understood As that Gen. 31. â—9 't is in the power c. that is he had a sufficiency of outward strength and such a naturall principle of revenge as might act revenge if not hindered by an extraordinary hand and so have not I power to eate c. man hath a naturall receptive faculty for that end The tenour of which instances being thus considered the maine is to examine what is in them to serve your purpose which is to prove that a man hath an executive power to beleeve Between which instances and the things you would prove there is as vast a dis-proportion as between naturall and supernaturall acts for all that these prove is but that men have an executive power to performe such acts as may be done without supernaturall influence as to be liberall to frequent the Ordinances or to speak in your own language to sin revenge eate drink c. Now 'twere most unadvised to conclude because men have an executive power to the externall acts of Religion frequenting the Ordinances to acts naturall eating drinking morall as to be liberall c. that therefore they have a like power to supernaturall acts Of all which instances the most genuine