Selected quad for the lemma: reason_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
reason_n	angle_n	equal_a	triangle_n	2,577	5	14.6378	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A66053	Of the principles and duties of natural religion two books / by the Right Reverend Father in God, John, late Lord Bishop of Chester ; to which is added, A sermon preached at his funerals, by William Lloyd ...	Wilkins, John, 1614-1672.; Lloyd, William, 1627-1717. Sermon preached at the funeral of John, late Lord Bishop of Chester.; Tillotson, John, 1630-1694.	1675 (1675)	Wing W2204; Wing L2705_PARTIAL; ESTC R20334	178,528	530

which is evil is to be avoided The greater congruity or incongruity there is in any thing to the reason of Mankind and the greater tendency it hath to promote or hinder the perfection of mans nature so much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion There is in some things such a natural decency and fitness as doth render them most agreeable to our reason and will be sufficient to recommend them to our practice abstracting from all considerations of Reward As in loving those who are kind to us and from whom we receive benefit In compensating Good with Good and not with Evil. It is most suitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind that every one should submit themselves to him upon whom they depend for their Well-being by doing such things as may render them Acceptable to him It is a desireable thing for a man to have the assistance of others in his need and distress And 't is not reasonable for him to expect this from others unless he himself be willing to shew it to others The rational nature and the Perfection belonging to it being more noble than the Sensitive Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided than that which is Natural A present Natural Good may be parted with upon a probable expectation of a future Moral good A present Natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil. CHAP. III. Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing of several prejudices in Debates about Religion BEsides what hath been already suggested concerning the first foundations to be laid in order to a discourse about Natural Religion I shall in the next place offer to consideration these seven following Propositions as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious men 1. Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain may not yet be capable of the same kind or degree of Evidence as to us As for instance That there was such a man as King Henry the Eighth that there are such places as America or China I say these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other matters That we now see and are awake That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones Though for the first of these we have only the testimony of others and humane tradition whereas for the other we have sensitive proof and Mathematical demonstration And the reason is because all Truths are in themselves equal according to that ordinary Maxim Veritas non recipit magis minus And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a man to doubt of or deny the truth of any thing because it cannot be made out by such kind of proofs of which the nature of such a thing is not capable A man may as well deny there is any such thing as Light or Colour because he cannot hear it or sound because he cannot see it as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonstrative proofs The kinds of Probation for several things being as much disproportioned as the objects of the several senses are to one another 2. Things of several kinds may admit and require several sorts of proofs all which may be good in their kind The Philosopher hath long ago told us that according to the divers nature of things so must the Evidences for them be and that 't is an argument of an undisciplined wit not to acknowledge this He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any case than the subject-matter will bear H●w incongruous would it be for a M●●●●●atician to perswade with eloquence to 〈◊〉 all imaginable insinuations and 〈◊〉 that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make six It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator to pretend to strict Demonstration All things are not capable of the same kind of Evidence Though the Conclusions in Mathematicks by reason of the abstracted nature of those Sciences may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reason yet it is not rational to expect the like proof in such other matters as are not of the like nature This he himself applys to Moral things which being not of such simple abstracted naturès but depending upon mixed circumstances are not therefore capable of such kind of Demonstrative proofs 'T is a saying of Jamblicus That demonstrations are not to be expected in matters concerning God and divine things Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of such things than it is that God is invisible And thus likewise it is for the same reason with many particular conclusions in Natural Philosophy And as for matters of Fact concerning Times Places Persons Actions which depend upon story and the relation of others these things are not capable of being proved by such scientifical Principles as the others are Now no sober man can deny but that several things in Moral and in Natural Philosophy are in themselves as absolutely and as certainly true and as firmly believ'd by us as any Mathematical principle or conclusion can be From whence I infer this That it is not ought not to be any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing that it is not to be made out by such kind of proofs of which the nature of that thing is not capable provided it be capable of satisfactory proofs of another kind 3. When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind men ought to rest satisfy'd in the best evidence for it which that kind of things will bear and beyond which better could not be expected supposing it were true They ought not to expect either sensible proof or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such proofs supposing them to be true Because otherwise nothing must be assented to and believed but that which hath the highest Evidence All other things being to be looked upon as uncertain and doubtful and wholly excluded from all possibility of being known And at this rate men must believe nothing at all in story because such things cannot be demonstrated and 't is possible that the rest of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by these relations And how abhorrent such Sceptical Principles must needs be to common reason I need not say Those who will pretend such kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing will never be able to perswade others that the true cause why they do not give their Assent is because they have no reason for it but because they have no mind to it Nolle in causa est non posse praetenditur And on the