Selected quad for the lemma: reason_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
reason_n	angle_n	equal_a	line_n	4,117	5	11.1250	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A70182	Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.	Rust, George, d. 1670. Discourse of truth.; More, Henry, 1614-1687. Annotations upon the two foregoing treatises.; Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680. Lux orientalis.	1682 (1682)	Wing G815; Wing G833; Wing M2638; ESTC R12277	226,950	535

Annotations upon Bishop Rusts ingenious Discourse of Truth which with my Annotations and the serious Hymn annexed at the end to recompose thy Spirits if any thing over-ludicrous may chance to have discomposed them I offer courteous Reader to thy candid perusal and so in some hast take leave and rest Your humble Servant The ANNOTATOUR Annotations UPON THE Discourse of TRUTH Sect. 1. pag. 165. AND that there are necessary mutual respects c. Here was a gross mistake in the former Impression For this clause there ran thus By the first I mean nothing else but that things necessarily are what they are By the second that there are necessary mutual Respects and Relations of things one unto another As if these mutual Respects and Relations of Things one to another were Truth in the Subject and not Truth in the Object the latter of which he handles from the fourth Section to the eighteenth in which last Section alone he treats of Truth in the Subject or Understanding The former part of the Discourse is spent in treating of Truth in the Object that is to say of Truth in the nature of things and their necessary Respects and mutual Relations one to another Both which are antecedent in the order of nature to all Understandings and therefore both put together make up the first branch of the Division of Truth So grosly had the Authours MS. been depraved by passing through the hands of unskilful Transcribers as Mr. J. Glanvil complains at the end of his Letter prefixed to this Discourse And so far as I see that MS. by which he corrected that according to which the former Impression was made was corrupt it self in this place And it running glibly and they expecting so suddainly the proposal of the other member of the Division the errour though so great was overseen But it being now so seasonably corrected it gives great light to the Discourse and makes things more easie and intelligible Sect. 2. pag. 166. That any thing may be a suitable means to any end c. It may seem a monstrous thing to the sober that any mans Understanding should be so depraved as to think so And yet I have met with one that took himself to be no small Philosopher but to be wiser than both the Universities and the Royal Society to boot that did earnestly affirm to me that there is no natural adaptation of means to ends but that one means would be as good as another for any end if God would have it so in whose power alone every thing has that effect it has upon another Whereupon I asked him whether if God would a Foot-ball might not be as good an Instrument to make or mend a Pen withal as a Pen-knife He was surprized but whether he was convinced of his madness and folly I do not well remember Pag. 167. Is it possible there should be such a kind of Geometry wherein any Problem should be demonstrated by any Principles Some of the Cartesians bid fair towards this Freakishness whenas they do not stick to assert that If God would he could have made that the whole should be lesser than the part and the part bigger than the whole Which I suppose they were animated to by a piece of raillery of Des Cartes in answering a certain Objection where that he may not seem to violate the absolute Power of God for making what Laws he pleased for the ordering of the matter of the Universe though himself seems to have framed the world out of certain inevitable and necessary Mechanical Laws does affirm that those Laws that seem so necessary are by the arbitrarious appointment of God who if he would could have appointed other Laws and indeed framed another Geometry than we have and made the power of the Hypotenusa of a Right-angled Triangle unequal to the powers of the Basis and Cathetus This piece of Drollery of Des Cartes some of his followers have very gravely improved to what I said above of the Whole and Part. As if some superstitious Fop upon the hearing one being demanded whether he did believe the real and corporeal presence of Christ in the Sacrament to answer roundly that he believed him there booted and spurred as he rode in triumph to Jerusalem should become of the same Faith that the other seemed to profess and glory in the improvement thereof by adding that the Ass was also in the Sacrament which he spurred and rid upon But in the mean time while there is this Phrensie amongst them that are no small pretenders to Philosophy this does not a little set off the value and usefulness of this present Discourse of Truth to undeceive them if they be not wilfully blind Pag. 167. Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones namely Because a Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines It is at least a more operose and ambagious Inference if any at all The more immediate and expedite is this That the two internal alternate Angles made by a right line cutting two parallels are equal to one another Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones P. Ram. Geom. Lib. 6. Prop. 9. If the reasoning had been thus A Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are not equal to two right ones as the Conclusion is grosly false so the proof had been egregiously alien and impertinent And the intention of the Author seems to be carried to Instances that are most extravagant and surprizing which makes me doubt whether equal was read in the true MS. or not equal but the sense is well enough either way Sect. 4. pag. 168. The Divine Vnderstanding cannot be the fountain of the Truth of things c. This seems at first sight to be a very harsh Paradox and against the current Doctrine of Metaphysicians who define Transcendental or Metaphysical Truth to be nothing else but the relation of the Conformity of things to the Theoretical not Practical Intellect of God His Practical Intellect being that by which he knows things as produced or to be produced by him but his Theoretical that by which he knows things as they are but yet in an Objective manner as Existent objectively not really And hence they make Transcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God which alone is most properly Truth and indeed the fountain and origine of all Truth This in brief is the sense of the Metaphysical Schools With which this passage of our Author seems to clash in denying the Divine Intellect to be the fountain of the Truth of things and in driving rather at this That the things themselves in their Objective Existence such as they appear there unalterably and unchangeably to the Divine Intellect and not at pleasure contrived by it for as he says it is against the nature of all understanding to make its Object are the measure