no personall or instrumentall assent or dissent of the Kings can alter or frustrate the sentence or judgement of any inferiour Court because that though the Iudges there give the Kings Iudgement and not their owne yet the Law having authorized none but them to be the givers of the Kings Iudgement there it taketh no notice of any other judgement in those Courts then only of the sworne Iudges themselves and though the King the Peers and Commons in Parliament have every one the power by any one of their votes to frustrate the votes of two of them from becomming the Iudgement of the whole Court yet cannot the Vote of either the King the Peers or Commons alone or of any two of them frustrate or change the Iudgement of any inferiour Court. And it is further to be observed that in those Courts the Iudges judge as strangers of matters that concernes others only and not themselves and therefore render Iudgement in invitum against the will of one of the parties at least in which case because expedit rei publica ut finis sit litium if all the Iudges agree not yet Iudgement shall be given according to the Iudgement of the Major part But now contrary to the use of inferiour Courts The parties in Parliament in those things that concerne the publique meddle not as meere Iudges but as Parties interessed with things that concerne every of their owne Rights in which case it is neither Law nor reason that some of the Parties should determine of that that concernes all their mutuall interests invitâ altera parte against the will of any one of the Parties But that all Parties concurre or else their mutuall interest to remaine in the same condition it was before For Parties cannot meddle with Iudging in invitum but per consensum and therefore no major part of the three Parties in Parliament but the consent of all three must make the judgement of that Court otherwise two of the three Parties may totally or in part oppresse the third and then one of those two oppresse the other and be a sole arbitrary Tyrant The King and Peers may oppresse the Commons the King and Commons may oppresse the Peers the Peers and Commons may oppresse the King and then the Peers being easily suppressed by the Commons what shall hinder but that some Appian decemvirate that under shew of zeale of reforming Church and Common-wealth may carry the sound and well-affected Subject with them After they shall have not only possessed mens mindes with the lawfulnes of their authority but possessed themselves of the Militia all the Power of the Kingdome and two or three yeare kept all that power in their hands pretending they cannot sooner perfect their Lawes of Reformation though indeed they doe but time it out till they secure all unto their private ends as Appius in all things did what then I say shall hinder but that by meanes of some such decemvirate among the Commons some Appius may invade an absolute Soveraignty over us or missing that resolve yet all our setled State into an unsure troublesome Aristocracy or Republique The better to prepare the way to some such upshot The Observor findes a defect in the frame of our State he cannot see how Parliaments can have sufficient power to restraine Tyranny if they can doe no Act without the Kings consent And he findes that if Princes in matters that concerne the publique be admitted to preferre weake opinions as he calls them before Parliamentary motives then Parliaments are vaine Princes unlimitable and Subjects miserable The Observer will be more wise and faithfull then the Law it selfe and looking only one way tells us of insufficient provision for restraint of regall power without some coercive superintendant be placed over it But the law that lookes every way tells us that the erecting of such a superintending power would unsoveraigne our King and make that superintending power Soveraign and when it were made the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous extravagances then regall power is and yet lesse capable of regulation then it Therefore the law knowing that there is none but God qui custodiat ipsos custodes that can restraine supream Governours and knowing that nothing in this world can be reduced to so absolute a perfection of setlednesse but that in the last meanes it must meerly depend upon the providence of God after a full consideration of the weaknesse and imperfection of every severall forme of Government concludes that the Soveraignty was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince then in a popular or Aristocraticall hand and that a positive knowne law without any coercive superintendant was a sufficient and the best boundary of regall power against any irregularity whatsoever especially when the law being backed with a Parliament of all the orders of the Kingdome shall thereby find meanes of discovery and manifestation both of the truth of the law it selfe and likewise of the violation of it For the law and the transgression of the law being both at once made manifest and notorious that will so sufficient a security of the future observance of the law as Princes will not further endure to violate it because as the Poet saies Nec pueros coram populo Medea trucidat Aut humana palam coquit exta nefarius Atreus Infamous acts will not endure to be committed in the sight of all the world Therefore to say truth the Observor's conceipt of having some superiour power to enforce the law that should regulate the power of the Soveraigne Prince is a meere false conception of an heart as traiterous to God as to his Prince who would have absolute security by an arme of flesh when no such can be given to it For to regulate his Prince he would not only have a law but a superiour power to enforce that law and such a superiour power being once erected that must also be either boundlesse or must be circumscribed with a law if circumscribed with a law then also must that law have a superiour coercive power to enforce it and so must we have superiour Power over superiour Power usque ad infinitum and yet at last leave the most superiour power in that liberty which the Observour calleth boundlesse arbitrary and tyrannicall And how absurd a thing is it to imagine That when the Law hath trusted the soveraigne Power in the hands of the King it should again distrust Him and unsoveraigne Him and place in another the soveraignty of the same soveraign Trust and with a second absurdity leave in the Kings hand the Power of calling together and dissolving the power whereby He himselfe should be constrained and to make up all should by authority of that power constrain all the Heads of the people and even the representative body of that power by solemne oath to declare that the King is not only Supream Governour but that He is the only Supream Governour when such
even by our whole representative body sworne to be defended but even to the rights priviledges and being of the blessed Ordinance of our Peace and well-fare our very Parliaments themselves For we must know that our law taking notice that in every State there are three parties capable of just or unjust Soveraignty that is to say some Prince the Nobles and the People judged no government so safe and assured as where every of the three parties capable of Soveraignty were in some sort admitted to a participation of it but so admitted as that still the Soveraignty should cleerly remaine to Him that ought to be the Soveraigne And to this end our law having first through the piety of our law-giving Princes obtained a just regular course of government the stability whereof it found to be more concerned in the power of making lawes then in any other power belonging to the Soveraigne did for preventing innovations that might subvert that setled regularity in such a sort establish the frame of State and government as that the Prince should have his hands bound up from using the legislative power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons But then to the end that they whose consent was brought in only to prevent the evill which absolute power might worke against the setled frame of the State might not themselves become that evill which they were called to prevent The Law gave to them no more interest in the legislative power then it had still left in the hands of the Prince to wit to every of the three parties the King the Peers and the Commons an equall power of assent or dissent in making of new Law And so by opposing the single power of every one of them to the votes of every other two made so secure a ballancing of their powers one against another as that no practice of any two of them can doe any thing to the prejudice or diminution of the third without that third party it selfe doe give consēt unto it Nor did the providence of the Law here rest But considering that in the power of making Lawes it had now opposed the powers of two numerous bodies against the power of the single Soveraigne It foresaw and feared that by the Soveraignes consenting to Lawes for the ease and benefit of the Subject things might passe to the prejudice and diminution of the soveraignty if the single person of the soveraigne surcharged with the care of the manifold affaires of the Kingdome should be left all alone to advise and dispute His Right against all the wisedome and sollicitation of the numerous body of the Subject To prevent that it ordained that the King should at His owne discretion sweare unto Himselfe a body of Councell to advise Him in the concernements of His Soveraigne Rights and safety which is His Privy-Councell and a body of Councell at law to advise Him that He may neither doe nor suffer contrary to the rule of Law And through this even Counter-poise ballance of all the three States of Parliament as through a meanes wherewith God hath especially blessed us above other Lands doe we enjoy the assurance of a regular freedome under the government of a just and legitimate soveraignty In which if without the free concurrence of every of the three ordained parties there shall be any invasion and exercise of the legislative power then shall the well ballanced frame of legitimate law-making be overthrowne and with it the rightfull being and use of Parliaments destroyed But the Observor having not ascribed such underived Majesty to Assemblies of the Community to the end to maintaine the rights of Parliaments but to innovate Parliaments to the destruction of their true being and to the transformation of the State and government Howsoever that fol. 15. he tells us only of some defects in Parliament that might receive amendment yet let 's he slip that those Defects are Divisions betweene the two Houses and betweene the King and them Now Division being almost inevitable and power of dissenting necessary for ballancing the three differing parts of Parliament to prevent this power of dissenting were to destroy the ballance and being of Parliaments and to make them Courts of popularity where they that please the People should absolutely carry all things Though therefore he here discovers his designe yet being assured not to bring it about but by misleading the most faithfull and well-affected both to true established Religion Government He covertly pursues His purpose altogether under the shew of vindicating the Rights Priviledges being of Parliaments So whereas our Parliaments are assemblies wherein the whole State in three distinct formall parts convenes in Councell wherein every of those three parts have free power of allowing or disallowing of any thing propounded for a law and wherein the law taketh notice of no vote nor act for any generall law save what doth passe with concurrence of all the three parts of the Assembly The Observor tells us that for the King to say that without the Kings concurrence and consent Parliaments are without all power this at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a Regiment of the Kings will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under And his reason is If Kings may so frustrate Parliaments He may by the same meanes frustrate all inferiour Courts then farewell Law Right Liberty and all things O impudence does His Majesty in this claime more then either the House of Peers to it selfe or the House of Commons to it selfe challengeth Nay claimes His Majesty more then He acknowledgeth due by the Law to each of the two Houses as well as to Himselfe freely to assent or disassent to what is propounded for a Law and doe not and have not both they and His Majesty and both their Predecessours ever practised that power so as we have had scarce one Parliament wherein either King or Peers or Commons or perhaps every one of them have not severally dissented from the votes each of other two and tye their dissent frustrated the votes of the other two and yet God be praised our Parliaments doe and we hope still shall continue notwithstanding such undermining foxes would bring that three fold Cord of our State into the singlestring of a popular Assembly and all things so into confusion And how false is the consequence that if the King by dissenting may make voyd the sentence of the two Houses of Parliament He may also voyd the sentence of any inferiour Court of Iustice When in Parliament the law hath appointed the King Himselfe to give His owne Vote and consent personally if He will or by His Letters under His great Seale if He will But in inferiour Courts hath appointed none to give sentence or Iudgement but only those Iudges who in a definite and formall way are ordained to be the only Ministers and Deliverers of the Kings Iustice and Iudgement in that behalfe so as
a superiour power admitted he can be neither only nor at all Supream But the Observour aiming more to subvert what is established then to reduce things unto their first establishment quarrels still with the Regall power and he reasons that whether or no the Law gives the single Person of the Prince as full and free a Vote to assent or not assent as it doth to either the House of Peers or House of Commons yet is not the Prince to use the liberty of His Vote licentiously but advisedly and by Councell and what Councell can He have more wise faithfull and impartiall then theirs that represent the whole Kingdom who cannot be supposed to have private ends as Courtiers Cavaliers and private men may have Truly that Princes ought with great respect to hearken to the advice and information of the great Councell of the body of their people who can so much as make a question of it But why should these things be objected to His Majesty For what Prince of all his Predecessors hath so much harkened condescended to his great Councell as His Majesty at once hath done unto this present Parliament Not any one Nay not the whole succession of His predecessors since the granting of the great Charter hath done the like Witnesse the condescending to the Earle of Staffords attainder the damning of Ship-mony and of all Monopolies the Star-Chamber and high Commission Court the taking away of the Votes of Bishops of Popish Lords the parting with the long used power of imposing upon merchandize bounding of Forrests and yeelding to the regulation of whatsoever further greivance should be found in the common-wealth And for a seale of observance of all the granting of a Trienniall Parliament and the perpetuating of this present Parliament With what dispensation of the violating of Christianity can a Subject through all these presumptions to the contrary charge his Soveraigne with aversnes to publique counsell and inclination to private whi perers O that being at once possest of so many not long since unhoped for satisfactions we might not want hearts to enjoy them and acknowledge them But the two Houses thought the Kingdome in imminent danger and desired it should be put in a posture of defence and His Majesty by evill Counsell refused and deserted them Truly the Observour neither doth nor can shew that His Majesty upon the Parliaments apprehension of danger refused to take order for the defence of the Kingdom for the contrary thereof is true And in His seeking to secure it by a military posture He so farre condescended to the satisfaction of His Parliament as that He offered to change the persons that in any County had the charge of the Militia if His Parliament made any just exception to any of them And for His Maiesties comming to the Parliament to Westminster even in that also He so farre hearkned to them as that he offered that if to secure future seditions they would make some exemplar punishment of the Actors in the late seditious Tumults there He would even come thither And being refused in that He notwithstanding offered them to come to any other indifferent place As for the place where they now sit who that hath vowed His Faith to the Lawes of the Land and to the Priviledge of Parliament can in such conscience as He will answer God withall hold that a place of indifference and of freedom to vote in where the people in Tumult demanded of the House of Commons to know who were the Lords that refused to vote with them and where some of the Peers were assaulted by the multitude for having differed in their votes from them and yet none of those Tumulters were punished or ever questioned for it But ere we leave this point of hearkning to the advice of Parliamet we must cōsider too that though we grant it behoovefull for the King to hearken to His Parliament we must not understand it so behoovefull as that there should be inevitable necessity laid upon Him that He must follow whatsoever they advise for then at one blow we overthrow the fundamentall Law frame of Parliaments If from any of the three formall parts of the Parliament we take away the freedome of voting to assent or dissent we breake the threefold cord of the State we cast away the ballance of it even dissolve the very frame it selfe If when for necessity of State the Head assembles the whole body in Counsell where the Law gives the Head one vote of three and allowes Him a Body of Privy Councell to maintain the proper Rights of the Head the Head may not use that Power which the Law giveth it no not in case the two other partes contest claime part of the Right belonging to the Head where by Law the Vote of the Head is opposed in ballance to the moderation of those two powers as well as their powers are opposed in ballance to the power of the head but that the Head must do all things according to the advice counsell of the two parts which are the body of the Subject Then all that solemne forme of Law that calleth the Head Soveraign that authoriseth the Head to swear a body of Privy Councell to convoke the Nobles and Commons in publique Counsell to call to that Counsell whom He thinker good to take homage of the Peers and Oath of Supreamacy of the Commons and having used their Counsell at His Iudgement to dissolve it All this I say is then a meer misleading formality of the law The Soveraignty against all our Oathes and expressions to the contrary is not in the King but in the people the King is the only Subject and but a common vouchee whose concurrence is unavoidably implyed His will his understanding and his power though he be acknowledged Head Soveraigne and chief residence of authority is all subjected to the body of the very Subject that in Parliament doth sweare subjection to Him The tripartite frame of a Parliament of three Estates is a vanishing apparition there is really nothing but a meer popular assembly not of Subjects but Soveraignes The Crowne Imperiall and Kingdome it selfe though asserted by our solemnest Acts of Recognition and oathes of the body representative are meer non entia we are but a Republique and the chief Head of the Kingdome hath not beside the name more of a King then the Duke of Venice or the Prince of Orange And this being hid ever since the first beginning of the Kingdome the whole generation of the Subject ever since hath by the injury of our Lawes been most impiously mis-worne in their allegiance and the errour hath never been discovered till the whole Kingdome having now solemnly sworne to stand to and defend the Lawes cannot receade from their wrong-sworn obedience but with the guilt of universall perjury and under the burthen of that guilt expose an old grown Kingdom to the hazards of a new framed Common-wealth All this does
them then is every single Subject by himselfe alone a body politique whereof the King as King is Head and so hath as many Kingdomes as Subjects every one being distinct in relation one from the other have not nor can have any civill communion among them neither can any of them have to doe with the civill Affaires one of another And further which is not only false but destructive to the publique weale and safety of all Kingdomes If Kings be not Heades of the publique community of their People as well as of the private particulars of them then is the publique community out of the Kings Protection and Kings are discharged of all care of the publique For the mutuality of relation betwixt Protection and Subjection suffers not the one to move but within the limits of the other and if the universality must be under the Kings Protection it must be also under His Subjection for which cause the ancient and constant wisedome of our Peers and Commons sitting in Parliament as the Body representative of the whole Subject of the Kingdome doe in the Preamble of their Acts in that quality to this day recite themselves His Majesties loyall and faithfull Subjects So that in this point the Observour insolently controules the Wisedome and Iudgement of the representative of the whole Kingdome as well as contradicts the principles of reason Lastly whereas he saith that Treason so farre as it concernes the Prince is not so horrid in nature as oppression in a Prince Without excusing any way or diminishing the faults of Princes in any the least act of oppression let every one but aske his owne conscience whether is more horrid in nature Superiors to wrong Inferiours or Inferiours their Superiours Maisters their Servants or Servants their Masters Husbands their Wives or Wives their Husbands Fathers their children or children their Fathers and he will soon find the impiety of this assertion And whereas now the Observor professeth his good will and affection to Monarchy You may by these grounds which he hath laid and by his propounding to us for a patterne to our Kings the condition of the Prince of Orange and for our Kingdome the patterne of the Common-wealth of Venice know how false a meaning he hath and what his designe is even to loosen the sacred tye of Obedience toward our Liege Soveraigne and with it the firme and setled stability of the Kingdome and to prepare mens hearts and perswasions to the receiving of some new forme of Government according to the fancy of the common People Having therefore with false principles endeavoured to found the originall of all Soveraignty in the People as hoping thereby to find meanes to pluck it out of the Kings hands he then proceeds to perswade that not only naturall reason but even the frame of the Kingdome and the positive lawes thereof doe all concurr to maintaine the highest Soveraignty to be in the People But when he should make that apparent by the manifest Iudgement and Acts of our Law not being able to doe that he seekes by sly insinuations to have that admitted and swallowed which to prove he knowes were impossible Therefore pretending to shew the originall the progresse and changes of soveraigne government all from and by the authority of the People even from the fall of Adam to the present when it should be expected he should shew the Soveraignty of this Kingdome to be deriued from them he runnes himselfe into a puzle and then breakes off and tells us what he thinks and he thinks that when most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable order for publique Assemblies whereby the people may assume its own power to doe it selfe right without disturbance to it selfe or injury to Princes he were unjust that would oppose that art and order That Princes may not be beyond all limits of Law nor tryed upon them by private parties the whole Community in its underived Majesty shall convene to doe Iustice c and so he goes on insinuating that our Parliaments are such publique Assemblies wherein the Community in underived Majesty convenes to doe justice upon the King Truly I am not so well affected to arbitrary Government as to admit the judgement much lesse the thought of one man to be proof of Law and Government We shall therefore by Gods helpe examine how well this new conceipt agreeth with our Lawes and auncient setled frame of Government But this is obvious a forehand that it is so farre from being true that most Countries have found the art and order of Assemblies wherein the People may assume the power of doing themselves right As that unlesse you will call the Assembly of some meere popular Republique such an assembly there is not the ordinance of any such assembly to be found in all the world and the reducing of our Parliaments to such Assemblies will suit as well as the shaping of our Kingdome to the frame of the common-wealth of the Venetians or of the Hollanders That we may know therefore that our Parliaments are no such imaginary Assemblies in which the people in underived Majesty convene to assume any Power supposed to be theirs originally and with that Power to doe themselves right Even the Observour himselfe hath assured us when in his fast and loose play he unawares confesseth that the composition of our Parliaments are so equall and geometricall and all parts so orderly contribute their office as that no part can have any extreame predominance over other This is most true that he confesseth God grant that no endeavour to the contrary may ever deprive the Kingdome of the right benefit of this happy and well composed Ordinance But now then if our Parliaments be ordained Assemblies composed of three necessary different parts one Soveraigne the others Subject some appearing for their own interests others representatively for them that sent them and all ballanced in such a geometricall equality as is proper for the conservation of their severall rights and interests from any extream predominance of one of the parts above the other Then can they not be assemblies of resumption of the peoples supposed power for in such imaginary assemblies there must be a dissolution of all constitute orders degrees and qualities of the parts and all the members must be reduced to a naturall coequality undistinguished by any difference of quality degree or priviledges whatsoever so as there must be neither King nor Peers nor any office or power of the former State remaining but all resolved into a meere Chaos till all be new framed by the deity of the people So farre therefore are our Parliaments from the nature of such assemblies as that the endeavour of introducing of such Assemblies is most seditious traiterous and destructive not only to the person and dignity of the King to the Crowne Imperiall and to the Kingdome it selfe whose well ballanced rights have beside other tyes beene so often so solemnely and by so many of us
Community meane a perfect representation of the whole body Politique so as that the head as well as the other parts doe freely cooperate and concurre as in our Acts of Parliament it ever doth then can we presume no other Counsaile more assuredly wise faithfull or safe for the publique then is the counsaile of the universall representative in that sense But if by the representative we mean the representation of the grosse of the body without the head that is the representative of the body of the Subject only then is the assertion false for the Law presumes not in the representative of the Subject so assured judgement and fidelity for government as it doth in the soveraigne head alone for then it would not have placed the soveraignty in the head but in the representative of the grosse of the body But the Law knowing both Communities themselves subject to dangerous inclinations from private incitements and their representatives likewise subject to misleadings factions and ambitions of private men hath as in the most assured place placed the soveraignty in the head and the head so having the ordinance both for judgement and for government where the ordinance is there is the blessing and there the best assurance We need not seek examples how representative bodies of Subjects moving without consent of their head have been misled there is not one imitable example to be found that ever the representative of the Subject moved to act soveraignly without the consent of the head But we have examples of soveraigne representatives in Republiques themselves notoriously misled by private men was there ever a more reverend representative then the Roman Senate yet did not Appius and his Faction under the Colour of a Decâ—mvirate or Comittee of reformation so blind that Senate as to work them to conferre all the power of the Commonwealth into his and his Factious hands to the subversion of the common liberty so as that if by accident he had not been taken away he had made himselfe Prince And was not that soveraigne representative another time wholly swayed and caried by Marius and Sulpitius Sure as nothing is more wholsome for the publique then that the Soveraigne of a Kingdom should often have the advice of the body representative of the Community so is it most dangerous for the publique to have the advice of the Community enforced on the Soveraigne Least so that that should be for Our good be unto us an occasion of falling But the Observour insists not so much that the representative body is the great Councell of the King and Kingdom as that it is the supream judge and the most soveraigne power If the Prince saith he be seduced some Court must judge of the seducement and some power enforce that judgement and that must be the Parliament meaning the two houses of Parliament We have already shewed the absurdity of a superior power to enforce the Soveraigne but farther to dissolve all difficulties in this false assertion we must know that in Parliament there are diverse kinds of judgements And that the meer representative body that is the house of Commons solely hath not any judicatory power by it selfe unlesse it be in particular cases concerning their own house and members But they are as the great Inquest of the Kingdom to enquire discover impeach c. The house of Peeres hath generally in all things judgement preparatory in order to judgement of Parliament as to give Oath to take recognisance to fine to imprison c. In matters that come before them bywrit of Error it hath judgement decisive to determine and adjudge Law But this judgement it hath not as it is part of the representative body for the representative body hath not therein any part with it But the house of Peeres alone hath this superior judgement as great Court of the Kings Barons of the Kingdom which being assisted with the Iudges of all the Benches is by formall Ordinance of Law in all matters so coming before it the proper and immediat superior Iudge of Law But it is not absolute supreme Iudge of Law in all things and therefore it cannot revoke the judgement which it selfe hath given Neither can the House of Commons nor the two houses together revoke or anull any judgement given in the House of Peeres or elsewhere therefore also the two Houses are not supream judges or declarers of Law The Observer fol. 44. tells you the reason To be supream judge or declarer of Law is all one as to be supream maker of Law and that you know the two Houses are not But in the whole three Estates of Parliament that is in the King the Peeres and Commons there and there only are all powers ingredient for they upon Bill are not only judges of the last resort to reverse the judgement of the House of Peeres and of inferior Courts but they can repeale and restore and repeale againe in infinitum their own Iudgements and Acts. And they can not only declare the Law but they can make the law and none but they They alone are they that cannot be bound by precedents or Acts of Parliament they alone are they that have the Legislative Power and therefore they and only they that have the absolute Supream Iudgement of the Law But saith the Observer The King deserts His Parliament implying that then the two houses must be Supream judges though otherwise they were not As well may he imply that if the King come not to Parliament then are the two Houses no more Subiects but Soveraign's yea Soveraign's in the highest exaltation Let us see what this deserting is that shall so easily create Soveraignty in Subiects We know that by the law the Kings personal presence is of no absolute necessity to the proceedings of Parliament and that by the law declared and confirmed 33. Hen 8.21 the Kings presence is not necessary at His giving consents to Acts passed but He may give consent in His absence by His great Seale If then the Law count His personall absence no deserting and as to deserting for want of iust and reasonable consent to their demands His Maiesty be so little faulty toward this Parliament as that he hath given His Consent beyond the example of His Predecessours Where then shall a sincere Conscience in any deserting the King hath made finde warrant enough to desert this Soveraign and acknowledge another Superiour but to return Diversity of Powers and authorities exercised in the severall parts of Parliament necessarily causes a diversity of respect and observance to be rendred to them And though the iudgement of the representative of the Subiect that is of the Peers and Commons in those things wherein it is properly exercised ought to have esteem and credit before any other iudgement of the Subiect Yet is it not to be opposed to the iudgement of the Soveraigne in those things which the law hath entrusted to the iudgment of the Soveraign for the law trusteth none