Selected quad for the lemma: power_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
power_n	king_n	people_n	prerogative_n	3,798	5	10.0274	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A90386	A vvord for the common vveale tending towards the begetting and continuing, a right vnderstanding and good opinion betweene the Parliament and the people. And towards the laying a firme foundation of constant peace and good will towards each other. / By Isaac Penington, Esquire.	Penington, Isaac, Sir, 1587?-1660.	1650 (1650)	Wing P1148; Thomason E593_10; ESTC R206894	11,431	20

respect let such as are able and truly love them not take advantage hereof but help them out of the mire by putting them into a way whereby they may do it now or by doing it to their hand so cleerly so justly as they may not chuse but owne it Yet further There is great need of some fixed bounds and limits to be a square or standard to measure the actions of the Parliament by whereunto the People might have recourse in matters of controversie between them and the Parliament or in case of jealousie that they were nor dealt faithfully with It is a great trust the people have committed to the Parliament upon the faithfull discharge whereof their wellfare doth much depend by whose care they may be set into and preserved in a free and flourishing condition by whose negligence or devotion they may easily be impoverished and enslaved Now in equity the people are not only allowed but it behoveth them in point of wisdome and by that duty of selfe-preservation which nature teacheth all to look after the managing of this their trust to expect an account of it from those who are entrusted by them to have full satisfaction that it is managed with the best care speed and fidelity to their advantage But how shall the People know this how shall the People be thus satisfied is it not fit they should be If any controversie arise about it that the people think or say they are not well dealt with their trust is abused Power not made use of to preserve them and their liberties but to enslave them that the Priviledges of Parliament swallow up their Rights and Liberties which they were ordained to defend How shall this be decided how shall it be truly and clearly known whether these things be so or whether they be unjust reproaches unlesse there were some standing Priviledges of reason or rules of Law extant whereto any person doubting might addresse himselfe for satisfaction and whereto their actions should so cleerly answer that it should not need any great depth of reason to discerne the justnesse plainnesse and integrity of them And it might not be much out of the way to search and inquire whether this hath not been the bottome root of all our disturbances the want of some cleere and setled Principles for the Parliament to proceed by or at least the not divulging and making common these Principles The Parliament were at first looked upon with a loving aspect generally by the people within a while the Kings party falls of conceiving his trust and interest intrenched upon by them and still calling for the discovery of those priviledges and fundamentall Lawes which were pleaded in the behalfe of the Parliament Afterward the Parliament looses more and more and growes too sudainly to a very low ebbe in the eyes of the people and though occurrences help to raise it againe yet not to its former lovelinesse nor so but that it sinks afterwards againe and its very freinds are often divided amongst themselves How can it be otherwise how can men but fall out when occasions of difference are continually arising and every man is left to his owne perhaps misbyassed reason and judgement to determine and has no cleare Rule before him to guid his eye and thoughts by This made the case between the late King and them somewhat more difficult then some have thought He had a trust committed to him so had they also but the bounds of either were not fully cleared and so they clashed as powers are very apt to do and in their clashing their charge against one another was one and the same They charged him with violating the Lawes with extending his prerogatives to the hurt of the people with ruling according to will c. He likewise charged them with overturning the Lawes with assuming priviledges prejudiciall both to him and the People with entring into an Arbitrary government So these two great Powers fall out having no standard to determine these things by whereby it might appeare which were truly guilty but each justifie themselves and condemne the other according to the ordinary course of man who is very sensible of the injuries he receives but very insensible of those hee does Nor had the people any standard neither and so they fell in with either as their minds lead them to the ruining destroying of one another Now the same case may hapen between the people the Parliament as hath done between the Parliament and the late King The people may vote it in their thoughts and minds that the Parliament do not discharge their trust that they meddle with that which the people hath not entrusted them with neglect the doing of that which the people have entrvsted them to do that they elevate their priviledges not in circumstances but in substantiall things to the prejudice of the people The Parliament on the contrary may contend that they have been faithfull have run great hazards through their love and faithfullnesse to the people have denyed themselves more then ever any Parliament hath done that the people owe them a better requitall and ought to allow them power and priviledges answerable to the work they employ them about which in equity would arise far higher then any they make use of How may this be fairly endod what shall be done in this case is there no way of determining this but by strength and power shall the people make use of their power taking their accusation for granted and rush upon the Parliament to seek its destruction or shall the Parliament being cleare in their owne eyes and looked upon with an evill eye by the people make use of an Army to stop the peoples mouths that they may not dare to mutter any thing against them were it not better that some cleare Principles of Reason whereby Parliaments were first founded might be produced and brought to light both to square their actions by and to square mens judgements in the consideration of their actions So that this might be usefull both in respect of the Parliament and people for want whereof the Parliament may have been drawne to do many things which otherwise they would not have done if they had cleerly seene they had not been entrusted with them and the people may have been ensnared to entertaine and reteine hard thoughts of the Parliament about actions which were regular by undertaken and faithfully managed for the peace and safety of the people Vpon these and such like considerations I cannot but wish that some such thing might be speedily and effectually done with equall respect both to the people on the one hand whose safety and prosperity is mainly to be minded and to the Parliamen-on the other hand who are so far to be honoured and furnished with power and priviledges as they may best effect and not deviate from the good and prosperity of the people In order whereunto I am constrained to propound and desire these three ensuing

to be governed by but also due bounds for them to keepe within who are to act in the execution of the Lawes And it may be worthy the consideration whether the late King were sufficiently furnished in this respect and if he were left too much to his owne liberty and thereby somewhat occasioned to miscarry what may free us from this danger for the future There is no such great matter in the change of Government as many conceive who peirce not into the true causes of things but are ready to fly out upon that which stands most in their eye every Government having its advantage as well as its disadvantage but the goodnesse and safety of every government lyes in that well ordering and well bounding of it for speedy and due administration of the Lawes And upon this ground it seemeth to me improper for Parliaments to intermeddle with matters of Government further then to settle it in fit hands and within just bounds because they are entrusted with an arbitrary power which is absolutely necessary to the work whereunto they are called they are to redresse things at present for which there is as yet no Law and to provide future remedies for things amisse which the Law did not foresee Now this is exceeding usefull to the People and necessary for the People in such cases but if this power shall be drawne out into acts of Government so far as it is so drawne out the people are governed arbitrarily by an Arbitrary power which power the people did put into their hands not to make use of to this end but to enable them to prevent in any whatsoever The power they are intrusted with is an extraordinary power for extraordinary ends and purposes to which safely and swiftly applyed it will produce excellent effects but if extended too far and to cases for which it was not appointed nor is proper it will prove as great a mischeife as it was hoped to be a remedy for the greatest power being misapplyed having nothing to check it must needs be the greatest oppression A Parliament may far more easily err in Government then a King or ordinary Councel for they have or should have their rule to act by but a Parliament act by meere supremacy by power paramount and from their determinations there is no orderly appeale what they do but Vote is so or shall be so they expect the people are bound to stand to therefore if they keep not within a cleare circumference within the bounds of cleare reason and justice they do unadvoidably make the people slaves Remedies of this nature should be very warily used and very carefully applyed to the disease for as the advantage is great in the right and skilfull application so the danger is as great in the misapplication Now since I have thus lighted upon so needfull a subject wherewith my mind hath been long full both for mine owne ease and for publique benefit I intend to vent my selfe a little further about it The safety of the People lies in government for whose welfare it was erected The safety of Government consists much in the limits set unto it and the strict observation of those limits which if it fall short of it is defective and cannot attaine its end if it exceed it proves burdensome and Tyrannous Take into consideration what Government you will if it have not limits or be not well bounded those who are under it must needs smart by it and be entangled in those miseries which Government is appointed to prevent Now this is it I have much bewailed in mine owne thoughts concerning Parliaments whether justly or no let the Reader well consider that they are not well bounded that the trust which is reposed in them is not clearly known either by the People or perhaps by themselves but they are left unto and take unto themselves so much scope as it is very easie for them to erre almost impossible for them to act aright Every man that is to do any work must throughly know his work his rule whereby he is to do it and be carefull to eye the conformity of the one with the other if he know not his work how can he set about it at all if he know not his rule how can he set about it a right how apt will he be to slip into by-actions at least and this great mischeife accompanyes it too he will be apt to think he does every thing a right and so to justifie himselfe in the most apparant injustice and oppression as the wit of man is very subtle to do for though he have a rule he can bend the rule and make it suit with his owne miscarriages how much more when he thinks himselfe left at liberty It is ill trusting unbounded Power any where it is hard keeping Power upright though never so well bounded but unbounded it is a very sharp toole and will quickly eat out all but it s owne Soveraignty Man is very brutish in this respect not searching into the root and ground of things but according to sence flying out upon that which is most obious If he find himselfe oppressed remove but the hand that laid the burthen upon him he presently thinks he is eased for ever when alas poore foole he finds by after experience that the succeeding finger is heavier then the foregoing loyns And how can this be otherwise you must still set up a greater power to remove a lesse else it will not availe to do it and the greater it is the weightier strokes can it give the weightier burdens can it impose and the more unlimited it is the sooner is it tempted so to doe and the more unsuspicious others are of it or it is of it selfe the more likely is it to do it So that there is no trusting any man or any sort of men they are all of the same make they have all the same principle to mislead them the same by-ends and interests the same at bottom though they appeare not the same to work upon them one as well as another and though man under the sence of feare and danger may act warily and somewhat righteously yet let those obstacles be a little removed you shall see what command selfe hath over him it hath the cheife command in his heart and will quickly appeare at his fingers ends He that knowes not this by himselfe knowes little of himselfe and he that knowes this by himselfe and is not willing to be chained up as a man would chaine up a Lyon or a Wolfe from doing harme nourisheth in himselfe a desire tp be a Tyrant And people by calling persons to any office putting them in any trust investing them with any power in a dark confused way without cleare and distinct limitations do sow the seed-plors of Tiranny which by this meanes they too carelesly sow and may too soon reap And if the People of this Nation have been too negligent of their owne security in this