Selected quad for the lemma: power_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
power_n	king_n	law_n	tyrant_n	3,396	5	9.9720	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A94040	A glympse of that jevvel, judicial, just, preserving libertie. By Jo. Streater, a member of the Army of the Commonwealth of England serving in Ireland.	Streater, John, fl. 1650-1670.	1653 (1653)	Wing S5947; Thomason E690_11; ESTC R203670	12,715	23

A GLYMPSE OF THAT JEWEL Judicial Just Preserving LIBERTIE By JO. STREATER a Member of the Army of the Commonwealth of England serving in Ireland LONDON Printed for Giles Calvert at the black Spread-Eagle at the West end of PAUL'S 1653. To the READER IT is the general temper of People to slight the looking after matters of publick concernment they conceiving that they are matters too high for common capacities and more becoming States-men That that I shall urge is that every Member of the Common-wealth of right and in duty ought to watch to their Liberty and prevent Absoluteness in persons of great Trust True thou art to be obedient to Higher Powers but that command or exhortation obligeth thee no farther then the Higher Powers act for the general good Suppose that the Higher Powers should command thee to slay thy fellow Member of the Commonwealth wouldst thou obey them therein but if they command thee to preserve and defend thy fellow Member his Liberty Life Estate thou art in pursuance thereof bound to hazard thine That that thou obeyest them in thou oughtest to be able to judg whether he doth right therein or not Be not mistaken in higher Powers they ought to be bound up by a law of mutuall consent of the Generality Alexander grew a cruel Tyrant after his flatterers told him he was a God 'T is the onely way to give the advantage into the hands of those thou chusest to execute thy Laws of consent to make themselves Masters of the common Liberty to set too high an estimation on them or think it is theirs of right Yet the Authoritie that should preserve equity between man and man should not bee slighted for by that means Authority will be weakned Make good thy claim to Equity and to thy right in election of persons in trust Indeavour to understand thy Liberty since Monarchy is destroyed thou hast a perfect equalitie in respect of thy Rights and Priviledges Fear not any be they never so powerfull if thou hast Equitie on thy side Do not seek and scrape for favours nor make parties to obtain thy desires thou knowest not what thou doest therein thou betrayest thy Self thy Libertie and thy Countrie Do not endeavour to prejudicate If thou suest for Right let thy Judges stand in fear of doing thee wrong Is Equitie and Justice theirs to give No it is their dutie it is not their dutie to tire thee with delayes Endeavour to know the Power of thy Judges thy right the Lawes so that though it be not fit or safe for thee to be a Judg in thy own Cause yet that thou mayest judg him that judgeth thee And to the end that thou mayest know the position of Affaires converse often with knowing men and let knowing men endeavour to inform the lesse knowing Lycurgus accounted this an eminent prop or pillar to the State of Lacedemon that his Citizens should converse and confer often of their Liberties of Government of Laws of Peace of War and every one to be as able to rule as those that are chosen to rule It is hard to rob such a people of their Liberties Likewise one Rule would be wel to be observed That if places of Government were made lesse profitable they would be lesse desired when it must be undergone for conscience sake esteem of none but such as are truly virtuous Those that endeavour to enrich themselves children or kindred are not persons fit for trust It is thy duty to watch to thy Liberty so it is also thy duty to watch to the Execution of the Lawes that are for thy Preservation It is not onely thy duty to watch to thy owne Liberty but to thy neighbours Libertie nay thy poor neighbours Libertie that the rich and mighty oppresse him not Hercules was deified for imploying his strength in delivering the oppressed out of the hands of the oppressors The way that the Nimrods of this world grow mighty and powerful by is to oblige such as may be hurtfull to them so that they may dis-ingage them from joyning with the generality in defence of their Libertie so that the Generalitie having their Captains taken away become a prey to their Absolutenesse as AEsop's sheep having their dogs delivered to the Wolves became at length a prey unto the Wolves Flatter none of thy fellow-members of the Commonwealth with Titles as High and Mighty or Excellent The Title of Honor or Honorable is the highest mark of desert that a Member of a Commonwealth is fit to attain unto or bear Reader Here thou art guided to know thy self to know others Their Power and thy Liberty There is no one thing under Heaven the cause of misery by the assumed Lording of Usurpers but Thy not knowing thy Liberties and Rights Confusedly have I presented thee with a Glympse of that which I doubt not if thou wilt cast thine eye to behold thou wilt discover a greater light herein then is discerned by him that is a wel-wisher to Publick Preserving Libertie J. S A glimpse of that Jewel Judicial just preserving Libertie FOrasmuch as Monarchie is destroyed amongst us it is convenient and much in order to the preservation of the just rights of every member of the Common-wealth that they should understand their Rights Priviledges and Liberties It was observable that when Rome grew to that greatnesse that by its Vertues and Arms it not onely preserved it self but gave Lawes to other Cities Common-wealths and Princes it was when every member of that Common-wealth perfectly understood the mysteries of State and were competent Judges in all matters and causes arising in the Common-wealth as also of the disadvantage or advantage of either Peace or Warr. Secondly The great preservation and cause of the growth of the Common-wealth of Rome after their shaking off that yoak Monarchie was the yearly election of all Officers in greatest trust both Military and Civil for by this means they were prevented of obtaining to those advantages of making themselves Masters of the common Liberty Thirdly By this means also every one of the Common-wealth that affected Government had hope of having share of the Government therefore they endeavoured to improve themselves so as to become capable of such and such trusts in Government So that almost every one was an able defendant of their Libertie and Countrie Therefore the greatnesse of that Empire is not to be admired for it is hard to oppose such a composed Bodie by such a Body or power as is acted or supported by the Counsels or Interests of few Romes power began to decline when the power and secret reasons of State were assumed by few or one person They never received such a stroak at their Libertie as when Caesar was made perpetual Dictator Therefore since we finde Rome strip'd of her liberty and glory let England watch to hers and to that end let us take notice of the wayes how persons that affect absolute Government endeavour the accomplishment thereof the which may

be found by knowing what should be on the contrary to preserve it from that danger 1. A Government should or ought to be for the conservation of mankinde for as government and Law is nothing else but a rational restraint of absolute Libertie so it is also a rational restraint of absolutenesse in commanding And natural equity teacheth us 1. That no one should desire profit or honour by the prejudicing of another 2. That no one should do or wish that to another which he would not should be done unto himself Now seeing in Government that every persons interest and good in that bodie is concerned 't is cleer that the power is essentially in the people But forasmuch as the Common-wealth of England is so large that it cannot meet as Rome Athens Sparta or Corinth in a Market place or in a Theater in Councel Judgment or matters of State therefore it hath been the consent of the Commonwealth of England for many hundred years to contract their Authority in a Representative or Parliament Indeed their Kings never had any other power then as their chiefest Minister of State and was no other then a member of the Common-wealth bound up by the same Law and Rules of government witness the Oath of Coronation as also the Oath administred to all Justices both of the peace and the several Benches An. 18 Ed. 3. St. 3. in these words You shall swear well and truly to serve your Lord the King and the People Likewise the King often appeared by his Atturney at the Bar of the Common-wealth sometimes as Plaintiff sometimes as Defendant in several cases at Law nay when the late King was at the height of his Supremacy Hambden and Chambers brought their Action against him at common Law in the case of Ship-money they knowing that the power to impose Laws and Taxes consisted in the Consent of the people represented in Parliament It was notably observed by Plutarch of Solon being chosen chief in Government of the Common-wealth of Athens the people being assembled in the Market place he coming to sit in Councel with them when he drew nigh the Assembly of the people he caused the Rod that was born before him which was a mark or ensigne of Government the head to be turned downward to signifie that essentially the Government was in the People 2. Therefore seeing that Power and Government is essentially the right of the People for the good of the generality or the greatest number it is to be presumed it must be in opposition to some namely the vicious and foolish A rod for the fools back as Solomon sayes Plato saith That true Government is when men govern by Vertue and Wisdome which is in opposition to vice and folly as afore mentioned 3. To prevent the having the Power wrested out of the hands of the People by an assumed absolutenesse of persons in trust Suffer not great power to continue longer then one year in the hands of any one member of the Common-wealth Doubtless it was upon the same reason of State that that Act of Parliament was pass'd An. 4. Ed. 3. cap. 14. wherein it was ordained that Parliaments should be chosen once a yeer or oftner if need be One reason why it is not for the good of the Publick for long continuance of persons in trust is because that continuance in any one action or undertaking whatsoever burdeneth the spirits for the spirits that give life to all action most usually spend vigorously upon noveltie but being spent are no other then as tired jades that leave one half of their work undone A second reason why a prefixt time for the continuance of persons in Publick trusts as one year not more rather less would be much to the advantage of the publick is when they see one year is the time of their continuance they wil be desirous to do something in that time worthie of themselves to preserve their memory and to obtain a good opinion of the Publick they will account it unworthy of themselves to leave any thing undone that should be for the good of the Publick or that they should not relieve distressed persons that have made their applications to them for redresse by this means Petitions wil not lie dormant three four or five years Thirdly It will oblige them to do that which shall indeed be for the good of the Publick they knowing that at the determination of the prefixt time of their Trust they ate in no other condition then the rest of the members of the Common-wealth and so shall have an equal benefit of those good Laws and Provisions of publick safety which they have been instrumental in for publick good It will not be safe in new Elections to chuse any that have served in a Representative again untill five yeers be expired or more 4. In your choice have regard to this rule to chuse men fearing God and hating covetousness for undeniably covetousness is the in-let to all manner of corruption oppression in-justice and Tyranny Covetousness in a person of great trust is evil in these two respects either first he is covetous from a base worldly mind and therefore unfit for Government or secondly being desirous of greatness is covetous to obtain wherewith to support his greatness or defend him in his greatness and therefore in a Common-wealth dangerous 5. The manner of the choice of Members representative in a Parliament should be so as to prevent making of parties for the party or number of men that prevaileth in their Election of any one obligeth him that is elected and on the contrary those that oppose that Election him that is elected will conceive himself disobliged to them therefore to prevent those incoveniencies A more equality of choice will be safe as when for Knights of the Shire and Burgesses there are to be two pitch'd upon by the consent of the County or Burrough that the County or Burrough should chuse ten wise and honest men and out of them ten elect two by lot by this means making of parties will be prevented also many will be prompt to improve their parts so as they may be fit for so great a trust likewise it will oblige more to the owning of that Government wherein they see s possibility of having share of 6. That the persons chusing as well as those chosen or elected should not be persons disaffected to the publick Interest 7. That no one member of the Commonwealth have too much power committed into his hands lest he make himself Lord of the common Liberty or at least become thereby too powerful to be dealt with to call such persons to an account may prove dangerous for they to secure themselves usually make use of their power in defending themselves as Caesar when he made himself Lord of the Empire Alcibiades being told Pericles was making up his accounts to the Commonwealth said That he rather should study that he might not give the Commonwealth an account the