Selected quad for the lemma: power_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
power_n	king_n	law_n	supremacy_n	3,288	5	10.6148	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A94040	A glympse of that jevvel, judicial, just, preserving libertie. By Jo. Streater, a member of the Army of the Commonwealth of England serving in Ireland.	Streater, John, fl. 1650-1670.	1653 (1653)	Wing S5947; Thomason E690_11; ESTC R203670	12,715	23

be found by knowing what should be on the contrary to preserve it from that danger 1. A Government should or ought to be for the conservation of mankinde for as government and Law is nothing else but a rational restraint of absolute Libertie so it is also a rational restraint of absolutenesse in commanding And natural equity teacheth us 1. That no one should desire profit or honour by the prejudicing of another 2. That no one should do or wish that to another which he would not should be done unto himself Now seeing in Government that every persons interest and good in that bodie is concerned 't is cleer that the power is essentially in the people But forasmuch as the Common-wealth of England is so large that it cannot meet as Rome Athens Sparta or Corinth in a Market place or in a Theater in Councel Judgment or matters of State therefore it hath been the consent of the Commonwealth of England for many hundred years to contract their Authority in a Representative or Parliament Indeed their Kings never had any other power then as their chiefest Minister of State and was no other then a member of the Common-wealth bound up by the same Law and Rules of government witness the Oath of Coronation as also the Oath administred to all Justices both of the peace and the several Benches An. 18 Ed. 3. St. 3. in these words You shall swear well and truly to serve your Lord the King and the People Likewise the King often appeared by his Atturney at the Bar of the Common-wealth sometimes as Plaintiff sometimes as Defendant in several cases at Law nay when the late King was at the height of his Supremacy Hambden and Chambers brought their Action against him at common Law in the case of Ship-money they knowing that the power to impose Laws and Taxes consisted in the Consent of the people represented in Parliament It was notably observed by Plutarch of Solon being chosen chief in Government of the Common-wealth of Athens the people being assembled in the Market place he coming to sit in Councel with them when he drew nigh the Assembly of the people he caused the Rod that was born before him which was a mark or ensigne of Government the head to be turned downward to signifie that essentially the Government was in the People 2. Therefore seeing that Power and Government is essentially the right of the People for the good of the generality or the greatest number it is to be presumed it must be in opposition to some namely the vicious and foolish A rod for the fools back as Solomon sayes Plato saith That true Government is when men govern by Vertue and Wisdome which is in opposition to vice and folly as afore mentioned 3. To prevent the having the Power wrested out of the hands of the People by an assumed absolutenesse of persons in trust Suffer not great power to continue longer then one year in the hands of any one member of the Common-wealth Doubtless it was upon the same reason of State that that Act of Parliament was pass'd An. 4. Ed. 3. cap. 14. wherein it was ordained that Parliaments should be chosen once a yeer or oftner if need be One reason why it is not for the good of the Publick for long continuance of persons in trust is because that continuance in any one action or undertaking whatsoever burdeneth the spirits for the spirits that give life to all action most usually spend vigorously upon noveltie but being spent are no other then as tired jades that leave one half of their work undone A second reason why a prefixt time for the continuance of persons in Publick trusts as one year not more rather less would be much to the advantage of the publick is when they see one year is the time of their continuance they wil be desirous to do something in that time worthie of themselves to preserve their memory and to obtain a good opinion of the Publick they will account it unworthy of themselves to leave any thing undone that should be for the good of the Publick or that they should not relieve distressed persons that have made their applications to them for redresse by this means Petitions wil not lie dormant three four or five years Thirdly It will oblige them to do that which shall indeed be for the good of the Publick they knowing that at the determination of the prefixt time of their Trust they ate in no other condition then the rest of the members of the Common-wealth and so shall have an equal benefit of those good Laws and Provisions of publick safety which they have been instrumental in for publick good It will not be safe in new Elections to chuse any that have served in a Representative again untill five yeers be expired or more 4. In your choice have regard to this rule to chuse men fearing God and hating covetousness for undeniably covetousness is the in-let to all manner of corruption oppression in-justice and Tyranny Covetousness in a person of great trust is evil in these two respects either first he is covetous from a base worldly mind and therefore unfit for Government or secondly being desirous of greatness is covetous to obtain wherewith to support his greatness or defend him in his greatness and therefore in a Common-wealth dangerous 5. The manner of the choice of Members representative in a Parliament should be so as to prevent making of parties for the party or number of men that prevaileth in their Election of any one obligeth him that is elected and on the contrary those that oppose that Election him that is elected will conceive himself disobliged to them therefore to prevent those incoveniencies A more equality of choice will be safe as when for Knights of the Shire and Burgesses there are to be two pitch'd upon by the consent of the County or Burrough that the County or Burrough should chuse ten wise and honest men and out of them ten elect two by lot by this means making of parties will be prevented also many will be prompt to improve their parts so as they may be fit for so great a trust likewise it will oblige more to the owning of that Government wherein they see s possibility of having share of 6. That the persons chusing as well as those chosen or elected should not be persons disaffected to the publick Interest 7. That no one member of the Commonwealth have too much power committed into his hands lest he make himself Lord of the common Liberty or at least become thereby too powerful to be dealt with to call such persons to an account may prove dangerous for they to secure themselves usually make use of their power in defending themselves as Caesar when he made himself Lord of the Empire Alcibiades being told Pericles was making up his accounts to the Commonwealth said That he rather should study that he might not give the Commonwealth an account the