Commonwealth And as amongst the Archontes in the State of Athens which were nine in number one of them was called the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Archon in the way of excellency after whose name the year was called and their reckonings made as Titio Sempronio Coss in the State of Rome so had the Ephori their Eponymus one who by way of eminency was called the Ephorus c Pausan lib. 3. in Lacon But for this first reason of their institution take it thus from Plutarch d Plutarch in Lycurgo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Lycurgus having thus tempered the form of his Common-wealth it seem'd notwithstanding unto those which came after him that this small number of thirty persons which made the Senate was yet too mighty and of too great authority Wherefore to bridle them a little they gave them as he cites from Plato a bit in their mouthes which was the authority of the Ephori erected in the time of King Theopompus about 130 years after the death of Lycurgus A second reason which induced those Kings to ordain these Ephori was to ease themselves and delegate upon them that remainder of the Royal power which could not be exercised but within the City For the Kings having little or no command but in wars abroad cared not for being much at home and thereupon ordained these Officers to supply their places Concerning which Cleomenes thus discourseth to the Spartans e Id. in Agis Cleomenes after they had destroyed the Ephori and suppressed the Office informing them that Lycurgus had joyned the Senators with the Kings by whom the Common-wealth was a long time governed without help of any other Officers that afterwards the City having great wars with the Messenians the Kings were alwaies so imployed in that war that they could not attend the affairs of the State at home and thereupon made choice of certain of their friends to sit in judgement in their stead whom they called the Ephori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for a long time did govern only as the Kings Ministers though afterwards by little and little they took unto themselves the supreme authority Another reason hath been given of the institution which is that if a difference grew between the two Kings in a point of judgement there might be some to arbitrate between them and to have the casting voice amongst them when the difference could not be agreed And this is that which Lisander and Mandroclidas two that had been Ephori suggested unto Agis and Cleombrotus the two Kings of Sparta declaring f Id. ibid. That the office of the Ephori was erected for no other reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But because they should give their voices unto that King who had the best reason on his side when the other would wilfully withstand both right and reason and therefore that they two agreeing might lawfully do what they would without controlment that to resist the Kings was a breach of law considering that the Ephori by law had no power nor priviledge but only to arbitrate between them when there was any cause of jarre or controversie And this was so received at Sparta for an undoubted truth that Cleomenes being sole King upon the death of Agis of the other house recalled called Archidamus the brother of Agis from his place of banishment with an intent to make him King not doubting but they two should agree together and thereby make the Ephori of no power nor use So then we have three reasons of the institution and more then these I cannot finde of which there is not one that favoureth the device of CALVIN or intimateth that the authority of the Ephori was set up to pull down the Kings And to say truth it is a most unlikely matter that the Kings of Sparta having so little power remaining should need more Officers to restrain them then they had before that they should make a new rod for their own poor backs and add five Masters more to those eight and twenty which Lycurgus had imposed upon them Which makes me wonder much at Tully who doth acknowledge that the Ephori were ordained by Theopompus as both Aeristotle h Aristot Polit. l. 5. c. 11. and Plutarch do affirm and yet will have them instituted for no other cause nisi ut oppositi sint Regibus but to oppose and curb the Kings i Cicero de legibus l. 3. but more that Plato who had so much advantage of him both in time and place should ascribe the institution to Lycurgus and tell us that he did not only ordain the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Plato Ep. 8. edit gr lat To. 3. but that he did also constitute the Ephorate for the strength and preservation of the Regal power 5. For out of doubt it is affirmed by Plutarch l Plut. in Lycurgo confirmed by Scaliger m Scalig. animadvers in Euseb Chron. and may be gathered from some passages in Eusebius Chronicon and the authoritie of Aristotle who refers the same to Theopompus as before was shewed that the first Institution was no less then 130 years after the death of Lycurgus Who was the first that bore this Office hath been made a question but never till these later times when men are grown such Sceptics as to doubt of every thing Plutarch affirms for certain n Plutarch in Lycurgo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the first Ephorus that is to say the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who had the name of Ephorus by way of excellencie for otherwise there were five in all was called Elatus and hereto Scaliger did once agree as appears expressly pag. 67. of his Annotations on Eusebius where he declares it in these words Primus Elatus renunciatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But after having a desire to controll Eusebius he takes occasion by some words in Diogenes Laertius to cry up Chilo for the man first positively Primus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fuit Chilon and next exclusively of Elatus Quibus animadversis non fuerit Elatus primus Ephorus sed Chilon To make this good being a fancie of his own and as his own most dearly cherished he produceth first the testimony of Laertius and afterwards confirms the same by a new emendatio temporum a Calculation and accompt of his own inventing The words produced from Laertius are these verbatim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o Diogen Laeâ—t l. 1. in Chilo Which is thus rendred in the Latine and I think exactly Fuit autem Ephorus circa quinquagesimam quintam Olympiada Porro Pamphila circa sextam ait primumque Ephorum fuisse sub Euthydemo autore Sosicrate primumque instituisse ut Regibus Ephori adjungerentur Satyrus Lycurgum dixit If it be granted in the first place that Chilo was not made Ephorus until the 55 Olympiad as 't is plain he was not and Scaliger affirms as much it must
their Priests 3 This brings me on to the power and practise of the Priests in the land of Judah who from the very first beginning of that State and Nation to the final dissolution of it were of great authoritie not only in composing of inferiour difâ—erences which casually did arise amongst the people but in the managerie of the chief affairs both of State and Government and that not gained by connivence of Princes or by entrenching on the rights of the secular powers but by the institution and appointment of the Lord himself When Moses first complained that the sole Government of the people was a burden too heavie for him to bear it pleased God to appoint a standing Consistory of r Numb 11. v. 16. Seventie Elders men of abilitie and wisdom who were to have a share in the publick Government and to decide amongst themselves such weightie businesses great matters s Exod. 18. v. 22. as the Scripture calls them which were reserved to Moses by a former Ordinance Of these the Priests as men who for the most part were at better leisure then the rest to attend the service and generally of more abilities to goe through with it made alwayes a considerable number and many times the major part In which respect it was ordained by the Lord when a matter did arise to be scanned in judgement between bloud and bloud between plea and plea and stroke and stroke being matters of controversie within their gates the people should arise and goe unto the place which the Lord should choose and come unto the Priests the Levites and unto the Judge that shall be in those days and enquire and they shall shew them the sentence of judgement t Deut. c. 17. v. 8 9. The like is also ordered in the case of false witâ—esses where it is said that If a false witness rise up against any man to testifie against him that which is wrong then both the men between whom the controversie is shall stand before the LORD before the Priests and Judges which shall be in those dayes u Deut. 19. v. 17. Which passages are not understood of any particular Priests or Judges dispersed in their several dwellings up and down the Countrey but of the Priests and other Judges united and assembled in that famous Consistorie of the 70 Elders conveened together in that place which the Lord should choose called by the Jews the Sanhedrim by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and was the great Councel of estate for the Jewish Nation To this Josephus doth attest where he informeth us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 x Joseph adv Appâ—on lib. 2. that the Priests of Jewrie had the cognâ—zarce of all doubtful matters more plainly Philo who knew well the customs of his native Countrey where he affirms expressly and in terminis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Philo de vita Mesis that the Priests had place and suffrage in this great 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Court of Sanhedrim And this is that which Casaubon doth also tell us from the most learned and expert of the Jewish Rabbins Non nisi nobilissimos â—e sacerdotibus Levitis caeteroque populo in lege peritissimos in Sanhedrim eligi z Casaub Exercit in Baron 1. Sect 3. that is to say that none but the most eminent of the Priests the Levites and the rest of the people and such as were most conversant in the Book of the Law were to be chosen into the Sanhedrim But to return again to the Book of God the power and reputation of this Court and Consistorie having been much diminished in the times of the Kings of Judah was again revived by Jehosophat Of whom we read that he not only did appoint Judges in the laâ—d throughout all the fenced Cities of IVDAH a 2 Chron. 19. 5. but that he established at HIERVSALEM a standing Councel consisting of the Levites and of the Priests and of the chief of the Fathers of ISRAEL for the judgements of the Lord and for controversies b Ibid. r. 8. according to the model formerly laid by God himself in the Book of Deuteronomie Which Court or Councel thus revived continued in full force authoritie and power during the time of the captivitie of Babylon as appears plainly by that passage in the prophesie of Ezekiel where it is said of the Priests even by God himself in controversie they shall stand in judgement c Ezeck 44. v â—24 compared with another place of the same Prophet where he makes mention of the Seventie of the Antients of the house of ISRAEL d Id. c. 8. v. 11. and Jaazaniah the son of Shaphan standing in the midst as Prince of the Senate And after their return from that house of bondage they were confirmed in this authoritie by the Edict and Decree of Artaxerxes who gave Commission unto EZRA to set Magistrates and Judges e Ezra c. 7. â— 25. over the people not after a new way of his own devising but after the wisdom of his God e Ezra c. 7. â— 25. declared in the foregoing Ages by his servant Moses In which estate they stood all the times succeeding until the final dissolution of that State and Nation with this addition to the power of the holy Priesthood that they had not only all that while their place and suffrage in the Court of Sanhedrim as will appear to any one who hath either read Josephus or the four Evangelists but for a great part of that time till the reign of Herod the Supreme Government of the State was in the hands of the Priests In which regard besides what was affirmed from Synesius formerly it is said by Justin Morem esse apud Judaeos ut eosdem Reges sacerdotes haberent that it was the custom of the Jews for the same men to be Kings and Priests f Justin hist l. 36. and Tacitus gives this general note Judaeis Sacerdotii honorem firmamentum potentiae esse that the honour given unto the Priesthood amongst the Jews did most especially conduce to the establishment of their power and Empire g Tacit. hist l 3. And yet I cannot yeeld to Baronius neither where he affirms the better to establish a Supremacie in the Popes of Rome Summum Pont. arbitrio suo moderari magnum illud Conciliâ—m c. h Baron Annal. â—n 57. that the high Priest was alwayes President of the Councel or Court of Sanhedrim it being generally declared in the Jewish Writers that the High Priest could challenge no place at all therein in regard of his office and descent but meerly in respect of such personal abilities as made himself to undergo such a weightie burden for which see Phagius in his notes on the 16. of Deuteronomie 4 Thus have we seen of what authoritie and power the Priests were formerly as well amongst the Jews as amongst the Gentiles we must next see whether they have not
now goeth were the meetings oftner For whereas there are three Principal if not sole occasions of calling this Assemblie or Conventus Ordinum that is to say the disposing of the Regency during the nonage or sickness of the King the granting aids and subsidies and the redress of the grievances there is now another course taken to dispatch their business The Parliament of Paris which speaks most commonly as it is prompted by power and greatness appointeth the Regent f Contin Thuani An. 1610. the Kings themselves together with their Treasurers and Under-officers determine of the taxes g View of France and they that do complain of grievances may either have recourse to the Courts of justice or else petition to the King for redress thereof And for the making new Laws or repealing the old the naturalization of the Alien and the regulating of his sales or grants of the Crown-lands the publick patrimony of the Kingdome which were wont to be the proper subject and debates of these grand Assemblies they also have been so disposed of that the Conventus Ordinum is neither troubled with them nor called about them The Chamber of Accompts in Paris which hath some resemblance to our Court of Exchequer doth absolutely dispose of Naturalizations and superficially surveyeth the Kings grants and sales * Andr. Du Mesn which they seldom cross The Kings Car tel est nostre plaisir is the Subjects law and is as binding as any Act or Ordinance of the three Estates and for repealing of such Laws as upon long experience are conceived to be unprofitable the Kings sole Edict is as powerfull as any Act of Parliament Of which Bodinus doth not only say in these general terms Saepe vidimus sine Ordinum convocatione consensu leges à Principe abrogatas k Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. that many times these Kings did abrogate some antient laws without the calling and consent of the three Estates but saith that it was neither new nor strange that they should so do and gives us some particular instances not only of the later times but the former ages Nay when the power of this Assemblie des Estats was most great and eminent neither so curtailled nor neglected as it hath been lately yet then they carried themselves with the greatest reverence and respect before their King that could be possibly imagined For in the Assembly held at Tours under Charles the 8. though the King was then no more than 14 years of age and the authority of that Court so great and awfull that it was never at so high an eminence for power and reputation quanta illis temporibus as it was at that time yet when they came before the King Monseiur de Rell being then Speaker for the Commons or the third Estate did in the name of all the rest and with as much humility and reverence as he could devise promise such duty and obedience such a conformity of his will and pleasure such readiness to supply his wants and such alacrity in hearking unto his Commandements that as Bodinus well observes his whole Oration was nothing else quam perpetua voluntatis omnium erga Regem testificatio l Id. ibid. but a constant testimony and expression of the good affections of the subject to their Lord and Soveraign But whatsoever power they had in former times is not now material King Lewis the thirteenth having on good reason of State discharged those Conventions for the time ensuing Instead whereof he instituted an Assembly of another temper and such as should be more obnoxious to his will and pleasure consisting of a certain number of persons out of each Estate but all of his own nomination and appointment which joyn'd with certain of his Counsel and principal Officers he caused to be called L' Assembly des Notables assigning to them all the power and privileges which the later Conventions of the three Estates did pretend unto right well assured that men so nominated and intrusted would never use their powers to his detriment and disturbance of his Heirs and Successors 5. But to proceed Bodinus having shewn what dutifull respects the Convention of Estates in France shewed unto their King addes this note nec aliter Hispanorum conventus habentur that the Assembly of the three Estates in the Realms of Spain carry themselves with the like reverence and submission to their Lord the King Nay major etiam obedientia majus obsequium Regi exhibetur m Id. ibid. the King of Spain hath more obedience and observance from his three Estates than that which is afforded to the Kings of France Which being but general and comparative is yet enough to let us see that the Assembly of Estates in the Realms of Spain which they call the Curia is very observant of their King and obsequious to him and have but little of that power which is supposed by our Author to be inherent in the three Estates of all the Christian Kingdoms But this Bodinus proveth more particularly ascribing to the King and to him alone the power of calling this Assemblie when he sees occasion and of dissolving it again when his work is done according as is used both in France and England And when they are assembled and met together their Acts and consultations are of no effect further than as they are confirmed by the Kings consent Which he declareth in the same form eadem formulà quâ apud nos that hath accustomably been used by the Kings of France which is authoritative enough that is to say n Id. ibid. p. 90. decernimus statuimus volumus We will and we appoint and we have decreed The Kings of Spain though not so despotical in their Government as the French Kings are are as absolute Monarchs and have as great an influence on the three Estates to make them pliant to their will and to work out their own ends by them as ever had the French Kings on their Courts of Parliament a touch whereof we had before in the former Chapter And this we may yet further see by their observance of the pleasure of King Philip the 2d Who having maried the Lady Elizabeth Daughter of Henry the 2d of France Convocatos Castellae reliquarum Hispaniae Provinciarum Ordines o Thuan. â—ist sui temp h 23. l. calling together the Estates of Castile and his other Provinces of Spain he caused them to swear to the succession of his Son Prince Charles whom he had by the Lady Mary of Portugal and after having on some jealousies of State put that Prince to death caused them to swear to the succession of another son by the Lady of Austria And for the power of his Edicts which they call Pragmaticas they are as binding to the Subject as an Act of Parliament or any kind of Law whatever examples of the which are very obvious and familiar in the Spanish Histories For though
be imputed to the three Estates convened in Parliament or to any power or Act of theirs but only praefervido Scotorum ingenio z Rivet cont tenuit as one pleads it for them unto the natural disposition of that fierce and head-strong people yet easilier made subject unto rule and government The three Estates assembled in the Court of Parliament when in the judgement of our Author they are most fit to undertake the business have for the most part had no hand in those desperate courses 7. And now at last we ate come to England where since we came no sooner we will stay the longer and here we shall behold the King established in an absolute Monarchy from whom the meeting of the three Estates in Parliament detracteth nothing of his power and authority Royal. Bodin as great a Politick as any of his time in the Realm of France hath ranked our Kings amongst the absolute Monarch of these Western parts a Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. And Camden as renowned an Antiquary as any of the Age he lived in hath told us of the King of England supremam potestatem merum imperium habere b Camden in Britan. descript that he hath supreme power and absolute command in his dominions and that he neither holds his Crown in vassallage nor receiveth his investisture of any other nor acknowledgeth any Superiour but God alone To prove this last he cites these memorable words from Bracton an old English Lawyer omnis quidem sub Rege ipse sub nullo sed tantum sub deo that every man is under the King but the King under none saving only God But Bracton tells us more than this and affirms expresly that the King hath supreme power and jurisdiction over all causes and persons in this his Majesties Realm of England that all jurisdictions are vested in him and are issued from him and that he hath jus gladii or the right of the sword for the better governance of his people This is the substance of his words but the words are these c Bracton de leg Aâ—gl l. 2. c. 24. Sciendum est saith he quod ipse dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem dignitatem potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt Habet enim omnia jura in manu sua quae ad coronam laicalem pertinent potestatem materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernandum c. He addes yet surther Habet item in potestate sua leges constitutiones d Id. l. 2. c. 16. that the Laws and constitutions of the Realm are in the power of the King by which words whether he meaneth that the Legislative power is in the King and whether the Legislative power be in him and in him alone we shall see anon But sure I am that he ascribes unto the King the power of interpreting the Law in all doubtfull cases in dubiis obscuris domini Regis expectanda interpretatio voluntas which is plain enough For though he speaketh only de chartis Regiis factis Regum of the Kings deeds and charters only as the words seem to import yet considering the times in which he lived being Chief Justice in the time of King Henry the 3d. wherein there was but little written Law more than what was comprehended in the Kings Grants and Charters he may be understood of all Laws whatever And so much is collected out of Bractons words by the L. Chancellor Egerton of whom it may be said without envy that he was as grave and learned a Lawyer as ever sat upon that Bench. Who gathereth out of Bracton that all cases not determined for want of foresight are in the King to whom belongs the right of interpretation not in plain and evident cases but only in new questions and emergent doubts and that the King hath as much right by the constitutions of this Kingdom as the Civil law gave the Roman Emperors where it is said Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita e Case of the Post-nati p. 107 108. And though the Kings make not any Laws without the counsel and consent of his Lords and Commons whereof we shall speak more in the following Section yet in such cases where the Laws do provide no remedy and in such matters as concern the politick administration of his Kingdoms he may and doth take order by his Proclamations He also hath authority by his Prerogative Royal to dispense with the rigour of the Laws and sometimes to pass by a Statute with a non obstante as in the Statute 1 Henr. 4. cap. 6. touching the value to be specified of such lands offices or annuities c as by the King are granted in his Letters patents But these will better come within the compasse of those jura Majestatis or rights of Soveraignty which our Lawyers call sacra individua f Camden in Bâ—it sacred by reason they are not to be pryed into with irreverent eyes and individual or inseparable because they cannot be communicated unto any other Of which kind are the levying of Arms g Case of our Assairs p. 3. suppressing of tumults and rebellions providing for the present safety of his Kingdom against sudden dangers convoking of Parliaments and dissolving them making of Peers granting liberty of sending Burgesses to Towns and Cities treating with forein States making war leagues and peace granting safe conduct and protection indenizing giving of honor rewarding pardoning coyning printing and the like to these But what need these particulars have been looked into to prove the absoluteness and soveraignty of the Kings of England when the whole body of the Realm hath affirmed the same and solemnly declared it in their Acts of Parliament In one of which is affirmed h 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. that the Crown of England hath been so free at all times that it hath been in no earthly subjection but immediatly to God in all things touching the regality of the said Crown and to none other And in another Act that the Realm of England is an Empire governed by one supreme head and King having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same unto whom a Body politick compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of Spiritualty and Temporalty been bounden and ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience i 24 Henr. 8. c. 12. And more than so that the King being the supreme head of this Body Politick is instituted and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary whole and entire power preheminence authority prerogative and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of Subjects within this Realm and in all causes whatsoever Nor was this any new Opinion invented only to comply with the Princes humour but such as is
or interrupted by any claim of right made in the behalf of the two Houses which is as sure a title as the Law can make the Houses have declared by a Act of Parliament a Sâ—at 7 Ed. 1. cap. 1. that of right it belongs unto the King streightly to defend that is prohibit all force of Arms and that the Parliament is bound to aid him in that prohibition Touching the Royal navy and the ports and forts the Kings prescription to them is so strong and binding that in the 3d. of Edward 3. Edw. 3. the House of Commons did disclaim the having cognisance of such matters as the guarding of the Seas and marches of the Kingdome which certainly they had not done had they pretended any title to the ports and navy As for suppressing tumults and providing for the safety of the Kingdom against sudden danger the Law commits it solely to the care of the King obliging every Subject by the duty of his allegeance to aid and assist him at all seasons when need shall require b 11 Henr. 7. c. 18. And for their power of declaring law in the House of Peers wherein they deliver their opinion in the point before them in true propriety of speech they have none at all c Case of our Affairs p. 4. And this is that which was affirmed by his Majesty at the end of the Parliament Anno 1628. saying that it belonged only to the Iudges under him to interpret laws and that none of the Houses of Parliament joynt or separate what new Doctrine soever might be raised had any power either to make or declare law without his consent d 3 Car. And if it be done with his consent it is not so properly the declaring and interpreting of an old law as the making rather of a new saith a learned Gentleman e Case of our affairs P. 5. 9. Others have found out a new way to invest the Parliament with the robes of Soveraignty not as superiour to the King but co-ordinate with him and this say they appears sufficiently in that the two Houses of Parliament have not only a power of consulting but of consenting and that too in the highest office of the Monarchy whereof they are a Coordinative part the making of Laws f Fuller Answer to D. F. p. 2. Which dangerous doctrin as it was built at first on that former error which makes the King to be one of the three Estates in Parliament so it is super-structed with some necessary consequents whether more treasonable or ridiculous it is hard to say For on these grounds the Author of the Fuller Answers hath presented us with these trim devises g Id. pag. 1. viz. that England is not a simple subordinate and absolute but a coordinative and mixt Monarchy that this mixt Monarchy is compounded of three coordinate Estates a King and two Houses of Parliament that these three make but one supreme but that one is a mixt one or else the Monarchy were not mizt and finally which needs must follow from the premises that although every Member of the Houses sâ—orsim taken severally may be called a Subject yet all collective in their houses are no Subjects Auditum admissi risum teneatis Can any man hear these serious follies and abstain from laughter or think a fellow who pretends both to wit and learning should talk thus of a Monarchy which every one that knoweth any thing in Greek know to imply the supreme government of one compounded of three coordinate Estates and those coordinate Estates consisting of no fewer than 600 persons Or that a man who can pretend but to so much use of reason as to distinguish him from a beast could fall on such a senselest Dotage as to make the same man at the same time to be a Subject and no Subject a Subject in the Streets and in his private House no Subject when he sits in Haberdashers Hall for advance of moneys or in either of the two Houses of Parliament And yet this senseless Doctrine is become so dangerous because so universally admired and hearkned to that the beginning and continuance of our long Disturbances may chiefly be ascribed unto this opinion to which they have seduced the poor ignorant people The rather in regard that some who have undertook the confutation of these brainless solies have most improvidently granted not only h As in the book called Conscience satisfied that the two Houses of Parliament are in a sort coordinate with the King ad aliquid to some Act or exercising of the supreme power that is to the making of Laws but that this coordination of the three Estates of which the King is yielded every where for one is fundamental and held by the two Houses on no worse a title than a fundamental Constitution which is as much as any reasonable Parliamentarian need desire to have Therefore in Answer to the Fuller not taking notice of his foolish and seditious inferences we will clear those points 1. That the two Houses of Parliament are not coordinate with the King but subordinate to him And 2. that the power of making laws is properly and legally in the King alone As for the first we had before a Recognition made by Act of Parliament by which the Kingdom of England is acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreme head and King to whom all sorts and degrees of people ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience i 24 H. 8. c. 12. which certainly the Lords and Commons had not made to the dethroning of themselves their heirs and successors from this coordinative part of Soveraignty if any such coordination had been then believed Or if it be supposed to excuse the matter that K. Henry the 8th being a severe and terrible Prince did wrest this Recognition from them which yet will hardly serve for a good defence what shall we say to the like recognition made in the beginning of Queen Elizabeths reign k 1 Eliz. c. 1. when she was green in State and her power unsetled and so less apt to work upon her people by threats and terrors Assuredly had the Houses dream't in those broken times of that coordinative Soveraignty which is now pretended they might have easily regained it and made up that breach which by the violent assaults of King Henry the 8th had been made upon them which was a point they never aimed at Besides if this coordinative mâ—jesty might be once admitted it musts needs follow that though the King hath no Superiour he hath many Equalls and where there is Equality there is no Subjection But Bracton tells us in plain terms not only that the King hath no Superiour in his Realm except God almighty but no Equal neither and the reason which he gives is exceeding strong Quia sic amitteret praeceptum cum par in Parem non habeat potestatem l Bracton de leg Aâ—gl
l. 1. c. 8 because he could not have an Equal but with the losse of his Authority and Regal Dignity considering that one Equal hath no power to command an other Now lest the Fuller should object as perhaps he may that this is spoken of the King out of times of Parliament and of the Members of the Houses seorsim taken severally as particular persons but when they are convened in Parliament then they are Soveraigns and no Subjects first he must know that by the Statute of Queen Elizabeth all of the House of Commons are to take the oath before remembred for the defending of all preheminences and authorities united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm and for bearing faith and true allegiance to the King his Heirs and lawfull Successours and that if any of them do refuse this Oath he is to have no voice in Parliament m Stat. 5 Eâ—iz 1. 2. He cannot choose but know that even sedente Parliamento both the Lords and Commons use to address themselves to his sacred Majesty in the way of supplication and petition and certainly it is not the course for men of equal rank to send Petitions unto one another and that in those Petitions they do stile themselves his Majesties most humble and obedient Subjects Which is not only used as the common Complement which the hypocrisie of these times hath taken up though possibly it might be no otherwise meant in some late addresses but is the very phrase in some Acts of Parliament n â—25 Hen. 8. c. 22. c. as in the Acts at large doth at full appear 3. They may be pleased to know how happy a thing it was for the Realm of England that this Fuller did not live in former times For had he broached this Doctrine some Ages since he would have made an end of Parliaments Princes are very jealous of the smallest points of Soveraignty and love to reign alone without any Rivals their Souls being equally made up of Pompeys and Caesars and can as little broke an Equul as endure a Superiour And lastly I must let him know what Bodinus saith who telleth us this Legum ac edictorum probatio aut publicatio quae in Curia vel Senatu fieri solet non arguit imperii majestatem in Senatu vel Curia inesse o Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. viz. That the publishing and approbation of Laws and Edicts which is made ordinarily in the Court or Parliament proves not the Majesty of the State to be in the said Court or Parliament And therefore if the power of confirmation or rejecting be of a greater trust and more high concernment than that of consulting and consenting as no doubt it is the power of consulting and consenting which the Fuller doth ascribe to the two Houses of Parliament will give them but a sory Title to Co-ordinative soveraignty 10. This leads me on unto the power of making Laws which as before I said is properly and legally in the King alone tanquam in proprio Subjecto as in the true and adequate subject of that power And for the proof thereof I shall thus proceed When the Norman Conqueror first came in as he wonne the Kingdom by the sword so did he govern it by his power His Sword was then the Scepter and his will the Law There was no need on his part of an Act of Parliament much less of calling all the Estates together to know of them after what form and by what Laws they would be governed It might as well be said of him as in the flourish and best times of the Roman Emperors p Justin Institut l. 1. c. Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem that whatsoever the King willed it did pass for Law This King and some of his Successours being then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and having a despotical power on the lives and fortunes of their Subjects which they disposed of for the benefit of their friends and followers Normans French and Flemangs as to them seemed best But as the Subjects found the yoke to be too heavy and insupportable so they addressed themselves in their Petitions to the Kings their Soveraigns to have that yoke made easier and the burden lighter especially in such particulars of which they were most sensible at the present time By this means they obtained first to have the Laws of Edward the Confessor contain'd for the most part in the great Charter afterwards and by this means that is to say by powring out their prayers and desires unto them did they obtain most of the Laws and Statutes which are now remaining of the time of King Henry the 3d. and King Edward the first Many of which as they were issued at the first either in form of Charters under the Great Seal or else as Proclamations of Grace and favour so do they carry still this mark of their first procuring the King willeth the King commandeth the King ordaineth the King provideth the King grants c. And when the Kings were pleased to call their Estates together it was not out of an opinion that they could not give away their power or dispence their favours or abate any thing of the severity of their former government without the approbation and consent of their people but out of just fear lest any one of the three Estates I mean the Clergy the Nobility and the Commons should insist on any thing which might be prejudicial to the other two The Commons being alwaies on the craving part and suffering as much perhaps from their immediate Lords as from their King might possibly have asked some things which were as much derogatory to the Lords under whom they held as of their Soveraign Liege the King the chief Lord of all In this respect the Counsel and consent as well of the Prelates as the Temporal Lords was accounted necessary in passing of all Acts of Grace and Favour to the people because that having many Royalties and large immunities of their own a more near relation to the person and a greater interesse in the honour of their Lord the King nothing should passe unto the prejudice and diminution of their own Estates or the disabling of the King to support his Soveraignty And this for long time was the Stile of the following Parliaments viz. q Preface an 1 Ed. 3. To the honour of God and of holy Church and to the redresse of the oppressions of the people our Soveraign Lord the King c. at the request of the Commonalty of his Realm by their Petition made before him and his Counsel in the Parliament by the Assent of the Prelates Earls Barons and other great men assembled in the said Parliament hath granted for him and his Heirs c. To this effect but with some little and but a very little variation of the words was the usual Stile in all the Prefaces or Preambles of the Acts of Parliament from the
beginning of the Reign of King Edward the third till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th save that sometimes we find the Lords complaining r 10 Ed. 3. c. or petitioning Å¿ 21 Ed. 3. c. and the Commons assenting t 28 Ed. 3. c. as their occasions did require and sometime also no other motive represented but the Kings great desire to provide for the ease and safety of his people upon deliberation had with the Prelates and Nobles and learned men assisting with their mutual Counsell u 23 Ed. 3. And all this while there is no question to be made but that the power of making Laws was conceived to be the chiefest flower of the Royal Diademe to which the Lords and Commons neither joynt nor separate did not pretend the smallest Title more than petitioning for them or assenting to them it being wholly left to the Kings grace and goodness whether he would give ear or not unto their petitions or hearken unto such advise as the Lords or other great men gave him in behalf of his people And this is that which was declared in the Parliament by the Lords and Commons and still holds good as well in point of Law as Reason that it belonged unto the regality of the King to grant or deny what Petitions x 2 Her 5. in Parliament he pleaseth But as the Kings came in upon doubtfull Titles or otherwise were necessitated to comply with the peoples humours as sometimes they were so did the Parliaments make use of the opportunities for the increase of their authoritie at least in the formalities of Law and other advantages of expression So that in the minority of King Henry the sixth unto those usual words by the advise and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and at the special instance and request of the Commons which were inserted ordinarily into the body of the Acts from the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 6th was added this By the authority of the said Parliament y 3 Hen. 6. c. 2. 8 H. 6. 3. c. But still it is to be observed that though those words were added to the former clause yet the power of granting or ordaining was acknowledged to belong to the King alone as in the places in the Margin where it is said Our Lord the King considering the premises by the advise and assent and at the request aforesaid hath ordained and granted by the authority of the said Parliament 3 H. 6. 2. and our Lord the King considering c. hath ordained and established by authority of this Parliament 8 H. 6. 3. And thus it generally stood but every general rule may have some exceptions till the beginning of the reign of King Henry the 7th about which time that usual clause the special instance or request of the Commons began by little and little to be laid aside and that of their advise or assent to be inserted in the place thereof for which I do refer you to the book at large Which though it were some alteration of the former stile and that those words By the authority of this present Parliament may make men think that the Lords and Commons did then pretend some title unto the power of making laws yet neither advising or assenting are so operative in the present case as to transfer the power of making laws to such as do advise about them or assent unto them not can the alâ—eration of the forms and stiles used in antient times import an alteration of the form of Government unless it can be shewed as I think it cannot that any of our Kings did renounce that power which properly and solely did belong unto them or did by any solemn Act of Communication confer the same upon the Lords and Commons convened in Parliament And this is that which is resolved and declared in our Common law where it is said z Cited in the unlawfulness of resist p 107. Le Roy fait les loix avec le consent du Seigneurs et communs et non pas les Seigneurs et communs avec le consent du Roy that is to say that the King makes Laws in Parliament by the assent of the Lords and Commoni and not the Lords and Commons by the assent of the King And for a further proof of this and for the clearing of this point that the Lords and Commons pretend to no more power in the making of laws than opportunity to propound and advise about them and on mature advise to give their several Assents unto them we need but look into the first Act of the Parliament in the third year of King Charles being a Recognition of some antient Rights belonging to the English subject An Act conceived according to the primitive form in way of a Petition to the Kings most excellent Majesty a Statut. 3 Carol. in which the Lords and Commons do most humbly pray as their Rights and Liberties that no such things as they complained of might be done hereafter that his Majesty would vouchsafe to declare that the Awards doings and proceedings to the prejudice of his people in any of the premises shall not be drawn hereafter into consequence or example and that he would be pleased to declare his Royal pleasure that in the point aforesaid all his Officers and Ministers should serve him according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm To which although the King returned a fair general Answer assuring them that his Subjects should have no cause for the time to come to complain of any wrong or oppressions contrary to their just Righâ—s and Liberties yet this gave little satisfaction till he came in person and causing the Petition to be distinctly read by the Clerk of the Crown b Ibid. returned his Answer in these words Soit droit fait come est desire that is to say let right be done as is desired Which being the very formal words by which the said Petition and every clause and Article therein contained became to be a law and to have the force of an Act of Parliament and being there is nothing spoken of the concurrent authority of the Lords and Commons for the enacting of the same may serve instead of many Arguments for the proof of this that the Legislative power as we phrase it now is wholly and solely in the King although restrained in the exercise and use thereof by constant custome unto the counsel and consent of the Lords and Commons Le Roy veult c Smith de Rep. Angl. or the King will have it so is the imperative phrase by which the Propositions of the Lords and Commons are made Acts of Parliament And let the Lords and Commons agitate and propound what Laws they please for their ease and benefit as generally all Laws and Statutes are more for the ease and benefit of the Subject than the advantage of the King yet
aswell now as formerly in the times of the Roman Emperors Quod Principi placuerit legis habet vigorem nothing but that which the King pleaseth to allow of is to pass for Law the laws not taking their coercive force as judicious Hooker well observeth from the quality of such as devise them but from the power which giveth them the strength of laws d Hooker Ecclesiast Pol I shut up this Discourse with this expression and comparison of a late leatned Gentleman viz. That as in a Copyhold Estate the Copybolder of a meer Tenant at will comes by custom to gain an Inheritance and so to limit and restrain the will and power of the Lord that he cannot make any determination of the Copyholders Estate otherwise than according to the custome of the Mannour and yet doth not deprive the Lord of his Lordship in the Copyhold nor participate with him in it neither yet devest the Fee and Franktenement out of the Lord but that they still remain in him and are ever parcel of his Demesn e Case of our Affairs p. 6. so in the restraining of the Kings Legislative power to the concurrence of the Peers and Commons though the custome of the Kingdom hath so fixed and setled the restraint as that the King cannot in that point use his Soveraign power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons according to the custom of the Kingdom yet still the Soveraignty and with it the inseparable Legislative power doth reside soly in the King 11. If any hereupon demand to what end serve Parliaments and what benefit can redound to the Subject by them I say in the Apostles words much every way f Rom. 3. 2. Many vexations often times do befall the Subjects without the knowledge of the King and against his will to which his ears are open in a time of Parliament The King at other times useth the eyes and ears of such as have place about him who may perhaps be guilty of the wrongs which are done the people but in a Parliament he seeth with his own eyes and heareth with his own ears and so is in a better way to redresse the mischief than he could be otherwise Nor do the people by the opportunity of these Parliamentary meetings obtain upon their Prayers and petitions a redress of grievances only but many times the King is overcome by their importunity to abate so much of his power to grant such points and pass such Laws and Statutes for their ease and benefit as otherwise he would not yield to For certainly it is as true in making our approaches and petitions to our Lord the King as in the pouring out of our prayers and supplications to the Lord our God the more multitudinous and united the Petitioners are the more like to speed And therefore said Bodinus truly Principem plaeraque universis concedere quae singulis denegarentur g Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. that Kings do many times grant those favours to the whole body of their people which would be absolutely denied or not so readily yielded to particular persons There are moreover many things of greater concernment besides the abrogating of old Laws and making new which having been formerly recommended by the Kings of England to the care and counsel of their people convened in Parliament are not now regularly dispatched but in such conventions as are altering the tenure of Lands confirming the rights titles and possessions of private men naturalizing Aliens legitimating Bastards adding sometimes the secular authority to such points of Doctrin and forms of worship as the Clergy have agreed upon in their Comvocations if it be required changing the publick weights and measures thorowout the Kingdom defining of such doubtfull cases as are not easily resolved in the Courts of Law raising of Subsidies and Taxes attainting such as either are too potent to be caught or too hard to be found and so not tryable in the ordinary Courts of Justice restoring to their blood and honours such or the Heirs of such as have been formerly attainted granting of free and general pardons h Sir Tho. Smith de Rep. Angl. Camden in Brit. Crompt of Courts c. with divers others of this nature In all and each of these the Lords and Commons do co-operate to the publick good in the way of means and preparation but their co-operation would be lost and fruitless did not the King by his concomitant or subsequent grace produce their good intentions into perfect Acts and being Acts either of special grace and favour or else of ordinary right and justice no way derogatory to the Prerogative Royalâ— are usually confirmed by the Royal assent without stop or hesitancy But then some other things there are of great importance and advantage to the Common wealth in which the Houses usually do proceed even to final sentence the Commons in the way of imquisition or impeachment the Lords in that of judicature and determination with the consent and approbation of the King though many times without his personal assent and presence The King may be abused in his Grants and Patents to the oppression of the people or the dilapidation and destruction of the Royal Patrimony Judges and other the great Officers of Law and Equity are subject to corruptions and may smell of gifts whereby the passages of Justice do become obstructed The Ministers of inferiour Courts as well Ecclesiastical as Civil either exhaust the miserable subject by extortions or else consume him by delayes Erroneous judgements may be given through fear or favour to the undoing of a man and his whole posterity in which his Majesties Justices of either Bench can afford no remedy The great ones of the State may become too insolent and the poor too miserable and many other waies there are by which the Fabrick of the State may be out of Order for the removing of which mischiefs the rectifying of which abuses the Lords and Commons in their several waies before remembred are of special use yet so that if the Kings Grants do come in question or any of his Officers are called to a reckoning they used heretofore to signifie unto his Majesty what they found therein and he accordingly either revoked his Grants or displaced his Servants or by some other means gave way unto their contentment the Kings consent being alwaies necessary and received as a part of the final sentence if they went so far So that we may conclude this point with these words of Bodin who being well acquainted with the Government of this State and Nation partly by way of conference with Dr. Dale the Queens Ambassadour in France and partly in the way of observation when he was in England doth give this resolution of the point in controversie i Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c. 8. Habere quidem Ordines Anglorum authoritatem quandam jura vero majestatis imperii summam in unius Principis arbitrio
made for the common use and benefit of the Subject they are left at liberty and may proceed in governing the people given by God unto them according to their own discretion and the advice of their Counsel New Laws are chiefly made for the Subjects benefit at their desire on their importunate requests for their special profit not one in twenty nay I dare boldly say not one in an hundred made for the advantage of the King either in the improvement of his power or the increase of his Revenue Look over all the Acts of Parliament from the beginning of the reign of King Henry 3. to the present time and tell me he that can if he finds it otherwise Kings would have little use of Parliaments and less mind to call them if nothing but the making of new Laws were the matter aimed at And as for raising monies and imposing taxes it either must suppose the Kings to be always unthrifts that they be always indigent and necessitous and behind-hand with the world which are the ordinary effects of ill husbandry or else this argument is lost and of little use For if our Kings should husband their estates to the best advantage and make the best benefit of such escheats and forfeitures conâ—iscations as day by day do fall unto them If they should follow the example of K. Henry 7. and execute the penal Laws according to the power which those Laws have given them and the trust reposed in them by their People if they should please to examine their revenue and proportion their expence to their comings in there would be litle need of subsidies and supplies of money more than the ordinary aids and impositions upon Merchandize which the Law alloweth of and the known rights of Sovereignty backed by prescription and long custom have asserted to them So that it is by Accident not by right and nature that the Parliament hath any power or opportunity to restrain their King in this particular for where there is no need of asking there is no occasion of denying by consequence no restraint upon no baffle or affronting offered to the Regal power And yet the Soveraign need not fear if he be tollerably carefull of his own estate that any reasonable demand of his in these mony matters will meet with opposition or denial in his Houses of Parliament For whilest there are so many Acts of Grace and favour to be done in Parliament as what almost in every Parliament but an enlargement of the Kings favours to his people and that none can be done in Parliament but with the Kings fiat and consent there is no question to be made but that the two Houses of Parliament will far sooner choose to supply the King as allwise Parliaments have done than rob the Subject of the benefit of his grace and favours which is the best fruit they reap from Parliaments Finally whereas it is objected but I think it in sport that the old Lord Burleigh used to say that he knew not what a Parliament in England could not do and that King Iames once said in a Parliament that then there were 500 Kings which words were took for a Concession that all were Kings as well as he in a time of Parliament they who have given us these Objections do either mis-understand their Authors or abuse themselves For what the Lord Burleigh said of Parliaments though it be more than the wisest man alive can justifie he spake of Parliaments according as the word is used in its proper sense not for the two Houses or for either of them exclusive of the Kings presence and consent but for the supreme Court for the highest Judicatory consisting of the Kings most excellent Majesty the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Representees of the Commons and then it will not serve for the turn intended And what King James said once in jest though I have often heard it used in earnest upon this occasion was spoke only in derision of some daring Spirits who laying by the modesty of their Predecessors would needs be looking into the Prerogative or finding errors and mistakes in the present Government or medling with those Arcana imperii which former Parliaments beheld at distance with the eye of reverence But certainly King James intended nothing lesse than to acknowledg a co-ordinative Soveraignty in the two Houses of Parliament or to make them his Co-partners in the Regal power His carriage and behaviour towards them in the whole course of his Government clearly shews the contrary there never being prince more jealous in the points of Soveraignty nor more uncapable of a Rival in those points than he 14. But yet the main objection which we may call the Objection paramount doth remain unanswered For if the three Estates convened in Parliament or any other popular Magistrate whom Calvin dreams of be ordaned by the Word of God as Guardians of the peoples Liberties and therefore authorised to moderate and restrain the power of Kings as often as they shall invade or infringe those liberties as Calvin plainly saies they were or that they know themselves to be ordained by Gods word to that end and purpose cujus se lege Dei Tutores positos esse norunt as he saies they do then neither any discontinuance or non-usage on their parts nor any prescription to the contrary alledged by Kings and supreme Princes can hinder them from resuming and exercising that Authority which God hath given them whensoever they shall finde a fit time for it But first I would fain learn of Calvin in what part of the Word of God we shall finde any such Authority given to those popular Magistrates by what name soever they are called in their several Countreys as he tels us of Not in the old Testament I am sure though in the institution of the seventy Elders there be some hopes of it For when Moses first ordained those Elders it was not to diminish any part of that power which was vosted in him but to ease himself of some part of the burthen which did lie upon him And this appears plainly by the 18. Chapter of the Book of Exodus For when it was observed by Jethro his Father in Law that he attended the businesses of the people from morning till night he told him plainly ultra vâ—res sâ—as negotium esse that the burthen was too heavy for him vers 18. and therefore that he should choose some Under-officers and place them over Thousands over Hundreds and ever Fifties and over Tens Vers 21. Leviusque sit tibi partito in alios onere that so it might be the easier for him those officers bearing some part of the burthen with him Yet so that these inferior Officers should only judge in matters of inferior nature the greater matters being still reserved to his own Tribunal Which counsel as it was very well approved by Moses so was it given by Jethro and approved by Moses with reference to the
THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF Disobedience and Rebellion Cunningly laid by Calvin in the Subjects way Discovered Censured and Removed By P. H. ROM 14. 13. Offendiculum fratri tuo ne ponas Let no man put a Stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his brothers way 1 SAM 24. 6. And David said to his men The Lord forbid that I should do this thing unto my Master the Lords anointed to stretch forth my hand against him seeing he is the anointed of the Lord. LONDON Printed by E. Cotes for Henry Seile over against St. Dunstans Church in Fleet-street 1658. THE PREFACE IT will appear to any who shal read this Treatise that it was written in the times of Monarchical Government but in the later and declining times thereof when the change of that Government was in agitation and in part effected In which respect I doubt not but the publishing of this Discourse at this present time may seem unseasonable unto some and yet it may be thought by others to come out seasonably enough for these following reasons 1. To give warning to all those that are in Supreme Authority to have a care unto themselves and not to suffer any Popular and Tribunitian Spirits to grow amongst them who grounding upon Calvins Doctrine both may and will upon occasion create new disturbances 2. To preserve the Dignity of the Supreme Power in what Person soever it be placed and fix his Person in his own proper Orb the Primum Mobile of Government brought down of late to be but one of the three Estates and move in the same Planetary Sphere with the other two 3. To keep on foot the claim and Title of the Clergy unto the Reputation Rights and Priviledges of the Third Estate which doth of right belong unto them and which the Clergy have antiently enjoyed in all and to this day in most Christian Kingdoms 4. To shew unto the world on whose authority the Presbyterians built their damnable Doctrine not only of curbing and restraining the power of Princes but also of deposing them from their Regal Dignity whensoever they shall please to pretend cause for it For when the Scotch Commissioners were commanded by Queen Elizabeth to give a reason of their proceedings against their Queen whom not long before they had deposed from the Regal Throne they justified themselves by those words of Calvin which I have chosen for the Argument of this Discourse By the authority of Calvin as my Author hath it they endeavoured to prove that the Popular Magistrates are appointed and made to moderate and keep in order the excess and unruliness of Kings and that it is lawful for them to put the Kings that be evill and wicked into prison and also to deprive them of their Kingdoms If these reasons shall not prove the seasonableness of this Adventure I am the more to be condemned for my indiscretion the shame whereof I must endure as well as I can This being said in order to my justification I must add somewhat of the Book or Discourse it self in which the canvassing and confuting of Calvins Grounds about the Ephori of Sparta the Tribunes of Rome and the Demarchi of Athens hath forced me upon many Quotations both Greek and Latine which to the learned Reader will appear neither strange nor difficult And for the sake of the unlearned which are not so well verst and studyed in forein Languages I have kept my self to the direction of St. Paul not speaking any where in a strange tongue without an Interpreter the sense of every such Quotation being either declared before or delivered after it Lastly whereas the Name of Appius Claudius doth many times occur in the History of the Roman Tribunes it is not always to be understood of the same Man but of diverse men of the same Name in their several Ages as the name of Caesar in the New Testament signifieth not one man but three that is to say the Emperor Tiberius in the Gospels Claudius in the Book of the Acts and that most bloudy Tyrant Nero in the Epistle to the Philippians Which being premised I shall no longer keep the Reader in Portch or Entrance but let him take a view of the House it self the several Rooms Materials and Furniture of it long Prefaces to no long Discourses being like the Gates of Mindum amongst the Antients which were too great and large for so small a City The Argument occasion of this following Treatise Joh. Calvini Institution Lib. 4. cap. 20. sect 31. NEque enim si ultio Domini est effrenatae dominationis correctio ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur quibus nullum aliud quam parendi patiendi datum est Mandatum De privatis hominibus semper loquor Nam siqui nunc sint Populares Magistratus ad moderandum Regum libidinem constituti quales olim erant qui Lacedaemoniis Regibuâ— oppositi erant Ephori aut Romanis Consulibus Tribuni Plebis aut Atheniensium Senatui Demarchi qua etiam forte potestate ut nunc res habent funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines cum primarios Conventus peragunt adeo illos ferocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto ut si Regibus impotenter grâ—ssantibus humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem qua populi libertatem cujus se Dei ordinatione tutores positos norunt fraudulenter produnt NOr may we think because the punishment of licentious Princes doth belong to God that presently this power is devolved on us to whom no other warrant hath been given by God but only to obey and suffer But still I must be understood of private persons For if there be now any popular Officers ordained to moderate the licentiousness of Kings such as were the Ephori set up of old against the Kings of Sparta the Tribunes of the people against the Roman Consuls and the Demarchi against the Athenian Senate and with w ch power perhaps as the world now goes the three Estates are seized in each several Kingdom when they are solemnly assembled so far am I from hindring them to put restraints upon the exorbitant power of Kings as their Office bindes them that I conceive them rather to be guilty of a perfidious dissimulation if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the common people in that they treacherously betray the Subjects Liberties of which they knew they were made Guardians by Gods own Ordinance Syllabus Capitum CHAP. I. The Doctrine of Obedience laid down by Calvin and of the Popular Officers supposed by him whereby he overthroweth that Doctrine I THe purpose and design of the work in hand II The Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes soundly and piously laid down by CALVIN III And that not only to the good and gratious but even to cruel Princes and ungodly Tyrants IV With Answer unto such Objections as are made
against it V The principles of Disobedience in the supposal of some popular Officers ordained of purpose to regulate the power of Kings VI How much the practise of CALVINS followers doth differ from their Masters doctrine in the point of Obedience VII Several Articles and points of Doctrine wherein the Disciples of CALVIN are departed from him VIII More of the differences in point of Doctrine between the Master and his Scholars IX The dangerous consequences which arise from his faulty principles in the point or Article of Disobedience X The Method and distribution of the following work CHAP. II. Of the Authority of the Ephori in the State of Sparta and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin I The Kings of Sparta absolute Monarchs at the first II Of the condition of that State when Lycurgus undertook to change the Government III What power Lycurgus gave the Senate and what was left unto the Kings IV The Ephori appointed by the Kings of Sparta to ease themselves and curb the Senate V The blundering and mistakes of Joseph Scâ—liger about the first institution of the Ephori VI The Ephori from mean beginnings grow to great Authority and by what advantages VII The power and influence which they had in the publick Government VIII By what degrees the Ephori incroached on the Spartan Kings IX The insolencies of the Ephori towards their Kings altered the State into a Tyranny X The Spartan Kings stomach the insolencie of the Ephori and at last utterly destroy them XI An application of the former passages to the point in hand CHAP. III. Of the Incroachment of the Tribunes on the State of Rome and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin I The Tribunes of the People why first instituted in the State of Rome II The Tribunes fortifie themselves with large immunities before they went about to change the Government III The Tribunes no sooner in their Office but they sâ—t themselves against the Nobility and the Senate contrary to the Articles of their Institution V The many and dangerous Seditions occasioned by the Tribunes in the City of Rome VI The Tribunes and the People doe agree together to change the Government of the State VII By what degrees the People came to be possessed of all Offices in the State both of Power and Dignity VIII The Plots and practises of the Gracchi to put the power of Judicature and Supreme Majesty of the State into the hands of the People IX The Tribunes take upon them to commit the Consuls and bring all the Officers of the State under their command X The Office and Authority of the Tribunes reduced unto its antient bounds by Cornelius Sylla and at last utterly destroyed XI An Application of the former passages to the point in hand CHAP. IV. Of what Authority the DEMARCHI were in the State of ATHENS and of the danger and unfitness of the instances produced by CALVIN I Athens first governed by Kings and afterwards by one Sâ—veraign Prince under other Titles II The Annual Magistrates of Athens what they were and of what Authority III By whom and by what degrees the State of Athens was reduced to Democratie IV Of the Authority of the Senate and the famous Court of the Areopagites V What the Demarchi were in the State of Athens and of what Authority VI The Demarchi never were of power to oppose the Senate nor were ordained to that end VII Calvins ill luck in making choice of three such instances which if true would not serve his turn VIII The danger which lieth hidden under the design of such Popular Magistrates as are here instanced in by Calvin IX What moved Calvin to lay these dangerous Stumbling blockt in the Subjects way X The dangerous Seditions and practises which have hence â—nsued in most parts of Europe XI The Sectâ—â—f Calvin professed Enemies to Monarchy and the Power of Princes CHAP. V. What are the Three Estates in each several Kingdom of which CALVIN speaks and what they are particularly in the Realm of ENGLAND I Of the division of a people into Three Estates and that the Priests and Clergy have been always one II The Priests imployed in Civil Matters and Affairs of State by the Egyptians and the Persians the Greeks Gauls and Romans III The Priests and Levites exercised in Affairs of Civil Government by Gods own appointment IV The Prelates versed in Civil Matters and Affairs of State in the best and happiest times of Christianity V The Clergy make the third Estate in Germany France Spain and the Northern Kingdoms VI That antiently in the Saxons times the Ecclesiasticks of this Realm were called to all publick Councels VII The Prelates an essential fundamental part of the English Parliament VIII Objections answered and that the word Clerus in the Legal notion doth not extend unto the Prelates IX That the inferior Clergy of the Realm of England had antiently their votes in Parliament to all intents and purposes as the Commons had X Objections answered and that the calling of the Clergy to Parliaments and Convocations were after different manners and by several Writs XI The great Diffranchisement and Slavery obtruded on the English Clergy by the depriving of the Bishops of their Votes in Parliament XII A brief discussion of the question Whether that any two of the three Estates conspiring or agreeing together can conclude any thing unto the prejudice of the third CHAP. VI. That the three Estates of every Kingdom whereof CALVIN speaks have no authority either to regulate the power or controll the actions of the Soveraign Prince I The Bishops and Clergy of England not the King make the third Estate and of the dangerous consequences which may follow on the contrary Tenet II The different influence of the three Estates upon conditional Princes and an absolute Monarch III The Sanhâ—drim of no authority over the persons or the actions of the Kings of Judah IV The three Estaâ—es in France of how small authority over the actions of that King V The Kings of Spain not over-ruled or regulated by the three Estates VI Of what authority they have been antiently in the Parliaments of Scotland VII The King of England always accounted heretofore for an absolute Monarch VIII No part of Soveraigntie invested legally in the English Parliaments IX The three Estates assembled in the Parliament of England subordinate unto the King not co-ordinate with him X The Legislative power of Parliaments is properly and legally in the King alone XI In what particulars the power of the English Parliaments doth consist especially XII The Kings of England ordinarily over-rule their Parliaments by themselves their Counsel and their Judges XIII Objections answered touching the power and practise of some former Parliaments and the Testimonies given unto them XIV No such Authority given by God in holy Scripture to any populâ—r Magistrates as Calvin dreams of and pretends XV The Application and Conclusion
of the people that all are equally invested with that sacred Majesty wherewith he hath apparelled the most lawful powers I shall proceed no further in this present business till I have made some proof of that which is said before Not that I mean to spend my time in the proof of this that a wicked King is one of Gods curses on the earth for besides that there is none who gainsay the same we should say no more in this of Kings then of the Theef that steals thy goods or the Adulterer that defiles thy marriage bed or the Murderer that seeks thy life all which are reckoned for Gods curses in the holy Scripture The point we purpose to make proof of goeth not down so easily that is to say That in the vilest men and most unworthy of all honour if they be once advanced to the publick government there doth reside that excellent and divine authoritie which God hath given in holy Scripture to those who are the Ministers of his heavenly justice who therefore are to be reverenced by the subject for as much as doth concern them in the way of their publick duties with as much honour and obedience as they would reverence the best King were he given unto them And first the reader must take notice of the especial Act and Providence of Almighty God SECT 26. not without cause so oft remembred in the Scriptures in disposing Kingdoms and setting up such Kings as to him seems best Dan. 2. 21 37. The Lord saith Daniel changeth the times and the seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings And in another place That the living may know that the most High ruleth in the Kingdoms of men and giveth them to whomsoever he will Which kinde of sentences as they are very frequent in the Scriptures so is that prophesie most plentiful and abundant in them No man is ignorant that Nebuchadnezzar who destroyed Hierusalem was a great spoiler and oppressor yet the Lord tells us by Ezechiel that he had given unto him the land of Egypt for the good service he had done in laying it wast on his commandement And Daniel said unto him thus Dan. 2. 37. Thou O King art a King of Kings for the God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom power and strength and glory And wheresoever the children of men dwell the beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven hath he given into thy hand and hath made thee Ruler over them all Again to Belshazzer his son Dan 5. 18. The most high God gave unto Nebuchadnezzar thy father a Kingdom and majesty and glory and honour and for the majesty that he gave him all people nations and languages trembled and feared before him Now when we hear that Kings are placed over us by God let us be pleased to call to minde those several precepts to fear and honour them which God hath given us in his Book holding the vilest Tyrant in as high account as God hath graciously vouchsafed to estate him in When Samuel told the people of the house of Israel what they should suffer from their King he expressed it thus 1 Sam. 8. 11. This will be the manner of the King which shall reign over you he will take your sons and appoint them for himself for his Chariots and to be his Horsemen and some shall râ—n before his Chariots And he will appoint him Captains over thousands and Captains over fifties and will set them to ear his ground and to reap his harvest and to make his instruments of war and instruments of his Chariots And he will take your daughters to be his Confectionaries and to be Coâ—ks and to be Bakers And he will take your fields and your Vineyards and your Olive-yards even the best of them and give them to his servants And he will take the tenth of your seed and of your Vineyards and give to his Officers and to his Servants And he will take your menâ—servants and your maid-servants and your goodliest young men and your Asses and put them to his work He will take the tenth of your sheep and ye shall be his Servants Assuredly their Kings could not do this lawfully whom God had otherwise instructed in the Book of the Law but it is therefore called Jus Regis the right of Kings upon the subject which of necessitie the Subjects were to submit unto and not to make the least resistance As if the Prophet had thus said So far shall the licentiousness of your Kings extend it self which you shall have no power to restrain or remedie to whom there shall be nothing left but to receive the intimation of their pleasures and fulfil the same But most remarkable is that place in the Prophet Jeremie SECT 27. which though it be somewhat of the longest I wil here put down because it doth so plainly state the present question Jer. 27. 6. I have made the earth saith the Lord the man and the beast that are upon the ground by my great power and by my out-stretched Arm and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me And now have I given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon my servant and the beasts of the field have I given him also to serve him And all Nations shall serve him and his son and his sons son until the very time of his land come And it shall come to pass that the Nation and Kingdom which will not serve the same Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon and that will not put their neck under the yâ—ke of the King of Babylon that Nation will I punish saith the Lord with the sword and with the famine and with the pestilence Wherefore serve the King of Babylon and live We see by this how great a measure of obedience was required by God towards that fierce and cruel Tyrant only because he was advanced to the Kingly throne and did by consequence participate of that Regal majesty which is not to be violated without grievous sin Let us therefore have this always in our minde and before our eyes that by the same decree of God on which the power of Kings is constituted the very wickedest Princes are established and let not such seditious thoughts be admitted by us that is to say that we must deal with Kings no otherwise then they do deserve and that it is no right nor reason that we should shew our selves obedient subjects unto him who doth not mutually perform the duty of a King to us 4. It is a poor objection which some men have made SECT 28. viz. that that command was only proper to the Israelites for mark upon what grounds the command was given I have given saith he the Kingdom unto Nebuchadnezzar wherefore serve him and ye shall live and thereupon it needs must follow that upon whomsoever God bestows a Kingdom to whom we must address our servrce and that assoon as God hath raised any
to the Regal Throne he doth sufficiently declare his will to be that he would have that man to reign over us Some general testimonies of this truth are in holy Scripture Prov. 24. 2 For thus saith SOLOMON For the transgression of a land many are the Princes thereof Job 12. 18. and JOB He looseth the band of Kings and girdeth their loins with a Girdle Which if confessed there is no remedy at all but we must serve those Kings if we mean to live There is another text in the Prophet Ieremie by which the people are commanded Jer. 29. 7. to seek the peace of Babylon whither God had caused them to be carried away captive and to pray unto the Lord for it for in the peace thereof was their peace to be Behold the Israelites being dispoiled of their estates driven from their houses carried into exile and plunged in a most miserable thraldom are yet required to pray for the prosperitie of the Conquerour not only as we are commanded in another place to pray for them that persecute us but that his Empire might continue in peace and safetie that they themselves might quietly enjoy the protection of it Thus David being appointed King by the Lords own Ordinance and anointed with his holy Oyl when undeservedâ—y he was persecuted and pursued by Saul would not give way that any corporal hurt should be done to that sacred person whom God had raised unto the Kingdom 1 Sam. 24. 6. The Lord forbid saith he that I should do this thing unto my Master the Lords anointed to stretch forth my hand against him seeing he is the Anointed of the Lord. Again But mine eye spared thee aâ—d I said I will not put forth my hand against my Lord for he is the Lords Anointed And again who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed and be guiltless As the Lord liveth the Lord shall smite him or his day shall come to die or he shall descend into battel and perish The Lord forbid that I should stretch my hand against the Lords Anointed This reverence and dutiful regard we ought to carrie towards our Governours SECT 29. to the very end however they may chance to prove Which therefore I repeat the oftner that we may learn not to enquire too narrowly into the men but to rest our selves content with this that they sustain that place or person by the Lords appointment in which he hath imprinted and ingraved a most inviolable character of sacred Majestie But some will say that Rulers owe a mutual dutie to their Subjects That hath been formerly confessed from which if any should infer that no obedience must be yeelded but to their just and legal power he were a very sorry disputant Husbands are bound in mutual bonds unto their Wives and so are Parents to their Children Suppose that both neglect their duties that Parents who are prohibited by God to provoke their Children unto wrath be so untractable and harsh to them that they do grieve them above measure with continual sowreness and that husbands who are commanded to love their wives and to give honour to them as the weaker vessel should use them with contempt and scorn should therefore children be the less obedient to their Parents or wives less dutiful to their husbands We see the contrary that they are subject to them though both lewd and froward Since thereâ—ore nothing doth concern us more then that we trouble not our selves with looking into the defects of other men but carefully endevour to perform those duties which do belong unto our selves more specially ought they to observe this rule who live under the authority and power of others Wherefore if we are inhumanely handled by a cruel Prince or by a covetous and luxurious Prince dispoiled and rifled if by a slothful one neglected or vexed for our Religion by a lewd and wicked let us look back upon our sins which God most commonly correcteth with this kinde of scourges the thought whereof will humble us and keep down the impatience of our angry spirits Let us consider with our selves that it appertains not unto us to redress these mischiefs that all which doth belong to us is to crie to God in whose hands are the hearts of Kings Prov. 21. 1. and he turneth them whither soever he will He is that God which standeth in the Congregation of the mighty and judgeth amongst the Gods before whose face all Kings shall fall and be confounded and all the Judges â—f the earth who do not reverence his CHRIST but make unjust laws to oppress the poor and offer violence to the man of low condion and make a spoil of Widows and a prey of Orphans And here we may aswell behold his goodness SECT 30. as his power and providence For sometimes he doth raise Avengers from amongst his servants and furnisheth them with power sufficient aswell to execute vengeance on such wicked Rulers as to redeem his people so unjustly vext from the house of bondage and sometimes useth to that end the fierce wrath of others who think of nothing less then to serve his turn Thus he redeemed his people Israel from the tyrannie of Pharaoh by the hand of Moses from Cushan Kâ—ng of Syria by Othoniel from other thraldoms by some other of their Kings and Judges Thus did he â—ame the pride of Tyre by the arms of Egypt the insolence of Egypt by the Assyrians the fierceness of Assyria by the Chaldeans the confidence of Babylon by the Medes and Persians after that Cyrus had before subdued the Medes Thus did he sometimes punish the ingratitude of the Kings of Judah and Israel and that ungodly contumacie which they carried towards him notwithstanding all his benefits conferred upon them by the Assyrians first the Baâ—ylonians after But we must know that though these several instruments did the self same work yet they proceeded not in the self same motives For the first sort being thereto lawfully authorized and called by Almighty God by taking up Arms against their Kings did nothing less tâ—â—n violate that sacred Majestie which is inherent in a King by Gods holy Ordinance but being armed from heaven did only regulate and chastise the lesser power by the help of the greater as Princes use sometimes to correct their Nobles The later sort though guided by the hand of God as to him seemed best so that they did unknowingly effect what he had to do intended only the pursuit of their own designs 5. But whatsoever their designes and intentions were SECT 31. the Lord did justly use them to effect his business when by their means he broke the bloudie Scepters of those insolent Kings and overthrew their wicked and tyrannical Empires Hear this ye Princes and be terrified at the hearing of it But let not this afford the least incouragement unto the subject to violate or despise the authoritie of the Magistrate which God hath filled so full of
majestie and fortified by so many Edicts from the Court of Heaven though sometimes an unworthie person doth enjoy the same and such a one as doth dishonor it by his filthie life Nor may we think because the punishment of licentious Princes doth belong to God that presently this power of executing vengeance is devolved on us to whom no other precept hath been given by God but only to obey and suffer De privatis hominibus semper loquor Nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus ad moderandum Regum â—libidinem constituti quales olim erant qui Lacedaemoniis Regibus oppositi erant Ephori aut Romanis Consulibus Tribuni Plebis aut Atheniensium Senatui Demarchi qua etiam fortè potestate ut nunc res habent funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines quum primarios conventus peragunt adeo illos ferocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto ut si Regibus impotenter grassantibus humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant eorum dissimulationem nefariâ perfidiâ non carere affirmem quia populi libertatem cujus se Dei Ordinatione tutores positos norunt fraudulenter produnt But still I must be understood of private persons For if there be now any Popular Officers ordained to moderate the licentiousness of Kings such as the Ephori of old set up against the Kings of Sparta the Tribunes of the people against the Roman Consuls and the Demarchi against the Athenian Senate and with which power perhaps as the world now goes the three Estates are furnished in each several Kingdom when they are solemnly assembled so far am I from hindering them from putting a restraint on the exorbitant power of Kings as their Office bindes them that I conceive them guiltie rather of a perfidious dissimulation if they conâ—ive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the common people in that they treacherously betray the subjects Libertie of which they know they were made guardians by Gods own Ordinance and appointment But this must always be excepted in the obedience which we have determined to be due to the commands of our Governors and first of all to be observed that it draw us not from that obedience which is due to him to whose will all the commands of Kings must be subordinate to whose decrees their strongest mandates must give place and before whose Majestie they are bound to lay down their Scepters For how preposterous were it to incur his anger by our compliance with those men whom we are bound no otherwise to obey then for his sake only The Lord is King of Kings who when he speaks is to be heard for all and above them all We must be subject to those men who have rule over us but in him alone If against him they do command us any thing it is to be of none account Nor in such cases is the dignity of the Magistrate to be stood upon to which no injurie is done if in regard of the more eminent and supreme power of God it be restrained within its bounds Dan. 6. 22. In this respect Daniel denied that he had trespassed any thing against the King in not obeying his prophane and ungodly Edict because the King had gone beyond his proper limits and being not only injurious against men but lifting up his horns against God himself had first deprived himself of all Authoritie The Israelites are condemned on the other side for being so ready to obey their King in a wicked action when to ingratiate themselves with Jeroboam who had newly made the Golden Calves they left the Temple of the Lord and betook themselves to a new superstitious worship And when their Children and posteritie with the like facility applied themselves unto the humors of their wicked Kings the Prophet doth severely rebuke them for it So little praise doth that pretence of modesty deserve to have with which some Court-Parasites do disguise themselves and abuse the simple affirming it to be a crime not to yeeld obedience to any thing that Kings command as if God either had resigned all his rights and interess into the hands of mortal men when he made them Rulers over others or that the greatest earthly power were a jot diminished by being subjected to its Author before whom all the powers of heaven do trembling supplicate I know that great and imminent danger may befall those men who dare give entertainment to so brave a constancy considering with what indignation Kings do take the matter when they once see themselves neglected whose indignation is as the messenger of death saith the wise man Solomon But when we hear this Proclamation made by the heavenly Cryer Act. 5. 29. that we ought to obey God rather then men let this consideration be a comfort to us that then we yeeld that obedience unto God which he looks for from us when we rather choose to suffer any thing then to deviate from the way of godliness And lest our hearts should fail us in so great a business S. Paul subjoyns another motive 1 Cor. 7. 23. that being bought by Christ at so great a price we should not re-inthral our selves to the lusts of men much less addict our selves to the works of wickedness 6. These are the very words of Calvin from which his followers and Disciples most extreamly differ both in their doctrine and their practise First for their practise CALVIN requires that we should reverence and respect the Magistrate for his Office sake a Sect. 22. and that we entertain no other then a fair esteem an honorable opinion both of their actions and their Counsels His followers like filthy dreamers as they are do not only despise dominion b Jude 8. but speak evill of dignities that is to say they neither reverence the persons of their Supreme Magistrate nor regard their Office and are so far from cherishing a good opinion of those higher powers to which the Lord hath made them subject that their hearts imagine mischief against them all the day long and though they see no cause to condemn their actions they will be sure enough to misconstrue the end CALVIN requires that we should manifest the reverence and respect we bear them by the outward actions of obedience c Sect. 23. and to the end that this obedience should proceed from the very heart and not to be counterfeit and false he addes that we commend their health and flourishing estate in our prayers to God d Ibid. His Followers study nothing more then to disobey them in every one of those particulars which their Master speaks of refusing to obey their laws and to pay them tribute and to undergoe such services and burdens as are laid upon them in reference to the publick safety spare not as occasion serves to manifest the disaffection of their hearts by such outward acts as disobedience and disloyalty can suggest
unto them and aâ—e so far from praying for them that many times they pray against them blaspheming God because he will not curse the King and making that which they call Prayer so dangerous and lewd a libel that their very prayers are turned to sin CALVIN requires such moderation in the subject that they neither intermeddle in affairs of State nor invade the Office of the Magistrate and that if any thing be amiss in the publick Government which stands in need of Reformation they presume not to put their hands unto the work or be tumultuously active in it e Sect. 23. His followers will not trust the Magistrates in the performance of their own Office but are all Counsellors and Statesmen and think that nothing is done well but what is done as they would have it and by their own hands too none other Whether things be amiss or not they must needs be doing Not by presenting their desires for a Reformation and making known the fault if such fault there be to their Supreme Magistrates which was the way their Master taught them but by raising tumults to affright them The attempt of the French Hugonots at Ambois upon Charles the ninth and the two tumults at Edenburgh the one about the year 1593. against the person of King James and the other in the year 1637. against the Ministers of King Charles will not be forgotten whilest Calvin and his Institutions are in print amongst us CALVIN requires that we should yeeld obedience not only to such Kings and Princes which faithfully and as they ought do discharge their Office but even to all those also which do nothing less then perform their duties f Sect. 25. not only to the meek and gentle but even unto the fiercest and most cruel Tyrant if any such be raised by God to the Kingly throne g Sect. 27. His followers resolve not to yeeld obedience to their Kings and Princes though they can charge them with no fault but their too much lenity unless it be that they have caused them to surfeit upon peace and plenty or that the people grew too rich and lived too happily and drove too great a Trade under their command and are so far from yeelding obedience to a Tyrant or a severer and cruel Prince call him which you will that neither the innocent minoritie of Charles the ninth nor the moderate Government of the Duchess of Parma in the Netherlands nor the milde peaceable temper of King James when he reigned in Scotland could save them from their insolencies and insurrections Finally CALVIN doth declare that though we be inhumanely handled by a cruel Prince or by a covetous and luxurious Prince dispoyled and rifled though by a slothful one neglected or vexed for our Religion by a lewd and wicked yet it pertains not unto us to redress these mischiefs that all the remedie that we have is to cry to God h Sect. 29. and till God takes the work in hand to obey and suffer i Sect. 31. and absolutely condemns those seditious thoughts which some men are too apt to harbour that we must deal with Kings no otherwise then they shall deserve k Sect. 27. His Followers if they think themselves oppressed though indeed they are not or that Religion is in danger though indeed it be not or the honor of the State neglected though never of so much repute nor so bravely managed will not descend so low as to cry to God or be so pusillanâ—mous and so poorly minded as only to obey and suffer that were a weakness fit for none but the primitive Christians but take the sword into their hands be it right or wrong to force their Kings to come unto a reckoning with them as if they would have reparation from them for their former sufferings and could have reparation no way but that And as for dealing with their Kings no otherwise then they do deserve although the maxime be unsafe and the very thought thereof seditious as their Master tells them would they would hold themselves to that which had they done so many Kings in Christendom had not been so unjustly handled driven from their Palaces expelled their Cities robbed of their Fortresses and Revenues assaulted in the open fields and forced sometimes to change both their Counsel and their Guards the ordinary practise by the Hugonots in France the Presbyterians in Scotland the Calvinists in the Netherlands and indeed where not had they been dealt withall no otherwise then they deserved 7. Next let us look upon them in their points of doctrine and we shall finde the Scholars and their Master at a greater distance then before we saw them at in point of practise CALVIN determines very soundly that Kings have their authoritie from none but God non nisi a se habere imperium l Sect. 25. that the supreme Magistracie is a jurisdiction devolved from God upon the person of the Magistrate or delegata a Deo jurisdictio m Sect. 22. that it is the singular work or act of God to dispose of Kingdoms and to set up such Kings as to him seems meet which he calls Singularem Dei actionem in distribuendis Regnis statuendisque QUOS ILLI VISVM FVERIT REGIBVS n Sect. 26. and finally that in every King or Supreme Governor there is inviolabilis majestas an indelible character of Majestia imprinted by the hand of God His Scholars tell us that Kings are only creatures of the peoples making and that whatever power they have is derived from them The Observator and the Fuller Answer unto Dr. Fern and almost all our later Scriblers do resolve it so They tell us secondly which must needs follow from the former that the people have the sole power of disposing Kingdoms and setting up such Kings as they list themselves and being so set up that there is no more Majestie no brighter beam of Gods divinitie in them then in other men Buchannan so affirms for certain Populo jus est imperium cui velit deferat o Buchannan de jure regni and confidently reckoneth those reverend attributes of Majestie and Highness which usually are given to Kings and Princes inter soloecismos barbarismos Aulicos p Id. in Epist ad amongst the Solecisms and absurdities of Princes Courts CALVIN determines very Oxthodoxly that though the King degenerate and become a tyrant though he infringe the subjects liberties and invade their fortunes persecute them for their pietie and neglect their safetie and be besides a vitious and libidinous person yet still his Subjects are to look upon him in all things which pertain to their publick duties with as much honour and obedience as they would do the justest and most vertuous Prince that was ever given unto a people Eadem in reverentia dignatione habendum quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet qua optimum Regem si dareâ—ur habituri essent q Sect.
pressed the points before delivered unto the conscience of the subject and utterly disabled them from lifting up their hands against the Supreme Magistrate or any occasion whatsoever he shews them how to help themselves and what course to take for the asserting of their liberties and the recovery of their rights if the Prince invade them by telling them that all he spake before was of private persons c Sect. 31. but that if there were any popular Officers such as the Ephori of Sparta the Tribunes of Rome the Demarchi of Athens ordained for the restraint of Kings and Supreme Governors it never was his meaning to include them in it And such power he doth suppose to be in the three Estates of every Kingdom when they are solemnly assembled whom he condemns as guiltie of perfidious dissimulation and the betrayers of the Subjects liberties whereof they are the proper and appointed Guardâ—ans if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or want only insult on the Common people This is the gap through which rebellions and seditions have found so plausible a passage in the Christian world to the dethroning of some Kings and Princes the death of others For through this gap broke in those dangerous and seditious doctrines that the inferiour Magistrates are ordained by God and not appointed by the King or the Supreme Powers that being so ordained by God they are by him inabled to compel the King to rule according unto justice and the laws established that if the King be refractary and and unreclaimable they are to call him to account and to provide for the safety of the Common-wealth by all ways and means which may conduce unto the preservation of it and finally which is the darling doctrine of these later times that there is a mixture in all Governments and that the three Estates conveened in Parliament or by what other name so ever we do call their meeting are not subordinate to the King but co-ordinate with him and have not only a supplemental power to supply what is defective in him but a coercive also to restrain his Actions a corrective too to reform his Errors But this I give you now in the generals only hereafter you shall see it more particularly and every Author cited in his own words for the proof hereof Many of which as they did live in CALVINS time and by their writings gave great scandal to all soveraign Princes but more as to the progress of the Reformation so could not CALVIN choose but be made acquainted with the effects and consequences of his dangerous principles Which since he never did retract upon the sight of those seditious Pamphlets and worse then those those bloudie tumults and rebellions which ensued upon it but let it stand unaltered to his dying day is a cleer argument to me that this passage fell not from his pen by chance but was laid of purpose as a Stumbling-block in the Subjects way to make him fall in the performance of his Christian duty both to God and man For though the Book of Institutions had been often printed in his life time and received many alterations and additions as being enlarged from a small Octavo of not above 29 sheets to a large folio of 160 yet this particular passage still remained unchanged and hath continued as it is from the first Edition of it which was in the year 1536. not long after his first coming to Geneva 10. But to proceed in our design What fruits these dangerous doctrines have produced amongst us we have seen too plainly and we may see as plainly if we be not blinde through what gap these doctrines entred on what foundation they were built and unto whose authoritie we stand indebted for all those miseries and calamities which are fallen upon us Yet to say truth the man desired to be concealed and not reputed for the Author of such strange conclusions which have resulted from his principles and therefore laies it down with great art and caution Si qui and Fortè and ut nunc res habent that is to say Perhaps and as the world now goes and if there be such Officers as have been formerly are the three disguises which he hath masked himself and the point withall that he might pass away unseen And if there be such Officers as perhaps there are or that the world goes here as it did at Sparta or in the States of Rome and Athens as perhaps it doth or that the three Estates of each several Kingdom have the same authoritie in them as the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes had as perhaps they have the Subject is no doubt in a good condition as good a man as the best Monarch of them all But if the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes were not appointed at the first for the restiaint and regulating of the Supreme Powers as indeed they were not and if the three Estates in each several Kingdom have not that authoritie which the Ephori and the Tribunes did in fine usurp and the Demarchi are supposed to have as indeed they have not perhaps and peradventure will not serve the turn The subject stands upon no better grounds then before he did Therefore to take away this stumbling-block and remove this rub I shall propose and prove these three points ensuing 1. That the Ephori the Demarchi and the Roman Tribunes were not instituted at the first for those ends and purposes which are supposed by the Author 2. If they were instituted for those ends yet the illation thereupon would be weak and childish as it relates to Kings and Kingdoms And 3. That the three Estates in each several Kingdom without all peradventures have no such authoritie as the Author dreams of and therefore of no power to controul their King Which if I clearly prove as I hope I shall I doubt not but to leave the cause in a better condition then I found it And in the proof of these the first point especially if it be thought that I insist longer then I needed on the condition of the Spartan Ephori the Roman Tribunes and the Demarchi of Athens and spend more cost upon it then the thing is worth I must intreat the Reader to excuse me in it I must first lay my grounds and make sure work there before I go about my building And being my design relates particularly to the information and instruction of the English Subject I could not make my way unto it but by a discoverie of the means and Artifices by which some petit popular Officers attained unto so great a masterie in the game of Government as to give the Check unto their Kings Which being premised once for all I now proced unto the proof of the points proposed and having proved these points I shall make an end Haec tria cum docuero perorabo in the Orators language CHAP. II. Of the Authority of Ephori in the State of
Sparta and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin I The Kings of Sparta absolute Monarchs at the first II Of the declining of the Regal power and the condition of that State when Lycurgus undertook to change the Government III What power Lycurgus gave the Senate and what was left unto the Kings IV The Ephori appointed by the Kings of Sparta to ease themselves and curb the Senate V The blundering and mistakes of Joseph Scaliger about the first Institution of the Ephori VI The Ephori from mean beginnings grew to great authoritie and by what advantages VII The power and influence which they had in the publick Government VIII By what degrees the Ephori incroached on the Spartan Kings IX The insolencies of the Ephori towards their Kings altered the State into a Tyrannie X The Spartan Kings stomach the insolencie of the Ephori and at last utterly destroy them IX An application of the former passages to the point in hand I. I Know it is conceived by some that the Kings of Sparta were but titularie a Unlawfulness of resistance p. 90. that they were little more then Subjects at best of no more power and influence in the publick Government then the Duke of Venice at this day in that Republick And to say truth they were but little better in the latter times though not altogether so restrained after Lycurgus first and the Ephori afterwards had by their power and practises intrenched upon them and pared away so many of the fairest Jewels in the Regal Diadem But ab initio non fuit sic it was not so from the beginning the Spartan Kings being at first as absolute Monarchs as any other of those times ubi addictius regnabantur b Tacit. Annal. when men were most devoted to the will of Princes For if we look into the antient stories of the States of Greece it will there be found that at the return of the Heraclidae into Peloponnesus under the conduct of Temenus Ctesiphon and Aristodemus the sons of Aristomachus of the race of Hercules Temenus possessed himself of Argos Ctesiphon of Messene and Aristodemus conquered the City and Dominion of Sparta which dying very shortly after he left unto his two sons Eurysthenes and Procles c Pausanias in Lacon l. 3. with the authority and name of Kings So that acquiring the estate by conquest and claiming by no other Title then by that of Arms there is no question to be made but that they governed in the way of absolute Monarchs it being not the guise of such as come in by conquest to covenant and capitulate with their Subjects but to impose their will for a law upon them In the first times and in Dominion so acquired Arbitria Principum pro legibus erant d Justin hist l. 1. as we read in Justine 'T is true the Royal Familie was divided from the very first into two Regal Stems or Branches both honoured with the name of Kings both ruling the Estate in common by their mutual Counsels of which the eldest house was that of Agidae so called from Agis son and Successor unto Eurysthenes the second that of the Eurypontidae denominated from Eurypon the third from Procles e Pausanias l. 3. It was appointed so to be by Aristodemus confirmed by the Oracle of Apollo and so continued till the subjugating of all Greece to Macedon But this concludes no more against absolute Monarchie then if it should be said on the like occasion that the Roman Emperors were no Monarchs or that State no Monarchie because Carus and Numerianus Diocletian and Maximianus Constantius and Maximinus ruled the same together as after Valentinian and his Brother Valens and the two sons of Valentinian and Theodosius did by their example And so it seems it was conceived by Cleomenes who having rooted out the Ephori and being grown almost as absolute in the State of Sparta as any of his Predecessors caused his Brother Euclidas upon the expiration of the Eurypontidae to be made King with him f Plutarch in Agis Cleomen which certainly he would not have done had he believed that the assuming of a partner would have made him less For that the Spartan Kings were as absolute Monarchs as any others of those times when there was almost no form of Government in the world but that doth appear by Plutarch where speaking of the condition of that Government in the time of Eurypon whom he calls Eurytion he saith that it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 g Plutarch Lycurgo sufficiently Monarchical if it were not more And hereto Aristotle doth agree who stiles the Government of Sparta under Charilaus before whose times by reason of the negligence and connivence of some former Kings the people were become too head-strong to be kept in order by the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 h Aristot Polit. lib. 5. cap. 12. the tyrannie or absolute command of Charilaus in the State of Sparta But whatsoever it was in the first foundation it held not very long in so good condition For Eurypon the Nephew of Procles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i Plutarch in Lycurg affecting to be plausible and gracious with the common people improvidently let loose the reigns of Government and was the first that laid aside that sole and absolute power of a King whereupon followed great disorder and distraction which continued long For the people finding themselves at liberty became very bold and disobedient some of the Kings which did succeed being hated to the very death because they did indevour the recovery of their old authoritie others being forced to dissemble and wink at any thing either in hope thereby to gain the love of the people or because indeed they were not strong enough to rule them And this did so increase the stomach of the dissolute and rebellious multitude that Eunomus the Father of Lycurgus being the fifth King from Procles and the third from Eurypon was slain amongst them in a tumult At such a dear and costly rate did Eurypon procure the favour and good will of the rascall rabble by which he purchased nothing but the losse of Royalty besides the empty honour of having the second house of the Royal Family to be called by his name the Eurypontidae Things growing thus from bad to worse and both the Kings and people waxing weary of that disorder and confusion which did reign amongst them both parties cast their eyes upon Lycurgus of whose integrity and wisdome they had conceived a great opinion For the people finding that their Kings had nothing but the name and title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and nothing else whereby they differed from the rest sent many a several message to him to require his counsel And on the other side the Kings were as desirous that he should return being then gone abroad to travel in hope that the authority of his presence would bridle and restrain
needs follow upon true account that either Chilo was not the first Ephorus or that the Ephori were not instituted in more then twice an hundred and thirtie years after Lycurgus had new molded the Common-wealth contrary unto that which is said by Plutarch and out of him repeated by Joseph Scaliger For from the time wherein Lycurgus made his Laws which was in the 25 year of Archelaus the eighth King of the elder house unto the death of Alcamenes which was the year before the first Olympiad p Euseb Chron. lib. post p. 114. of Scaligers edit were 112 years just none under From thence unto the last year of the 55. 220 years complete which put together make no fewer then 332 years full a large misreckoning Whereas the second year of the fifth Olympiad in which Eusebius puts the Institution of the Ephori both in the Greek and Latine Copies set out by Scaliger himself q Pag. 115. of the Latine 35. of the Greek Edition that second year I say being added to the 112 before-remembred in which King Alcamenes died makes up the full number of 130 which we finde in Plutarch and agrees punctually with the time of Theopompus who as it is confessed by Scaliger did first ordain them Nor doth Laertius say if you mark him well either that Chilo was the first that was ever Ephorus or the first that joyned the Ephori to the Kings of Sparta both which absurdities are by Scaliger imposed upon him For unto any one who looks upon Laertius with a careful eye it may be easily discerned that he speaks no otherwise of the Ephorate then of an Office instituted a long time before with the condition of the which Chilo was well acquainted and therefore thought himself more fit to undergo it then his Brother was who very earnestly desired it r Laertius in visa Chilon All that Laertius saith is no more but this that Chilo was made Ephorus first not the first Ephorus which was made as Scaliger would have it under Euthydemus and that as Satyrus affirmed who therein questionless was misled by Plato Lycurgus was the first who joyned the Ephori to the Spartan Kings which words viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath left out of purpose to abuse his Author and make him speak the thing which he never meant His other blunderings and mistakes to make good this business first laying the dissolution of the Ephorate by Cleomenes non multo ante vel post initium Philippi s Pag. 67. of the Animadvers either not long before or shortly after the beginning of the reign of Philip the last King of Macedon but one which indeed is true and within nine lines no more laying it in the 13. year of the self same King Philip most extremely false the changing of his Authors words from Fuit autem sub Regibus Lacedaemon annis 350 as they occur in the Translation of S. Hierom printed at Basil into Fuit sub Regibus Lacedaemoniorum Annis 350 against the Authors minde and the rules of Grammar only to bring about his device of Chilo and blinde his Readers eyes with a new Chronologie and others I could point to if my leisure served I purpose to forbear at the present time Nor had I been so bold with Scaliger at all or at least not now but that the proud man is more bold with the Antient Fathers whom he is pleased to look on with contempt and scorn as often as they come before him for which see pag. 255 of his Annotations And so I leave him with that censure which he gives Eusebius as learned and industrious an Antiquarie as any Scaliger of them all no man dispraised Erratis hujus Autoris enumerandis charta non suffecerit t Animadvers in Euseb p. 255. and so fare him well 6. But to proceed the Ephori being thus ordained by Theopompus became not presently of such authority and power as by degrees they did attain to For being chosen by the Kings as their proper Ministers as before was said and many times 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 even from their very neerest friends as we read in Plutarch u Plutarch in Agis Cleomen they were hard thrust at by the Senate and forced to put up many an affront from that mightier body And this was it that Chilo aimed at when he told his Brother who at the same time desired the Office and seemed offended that he lost it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 x Laertius in vita Chilon that he was better skilled in bearing injuries and affronts then his Brother was But this continued for no longer then whilest the Kings served their turns upon them to oppose the Senate and kept the nomination of them in their own hands For afterwards the Kings relinquishing the election to the common people upon a forlorn hope of gaining their affections by so great a benefit they began to set up for themselves and in a very little time gained all the custom of the City And of this new election I am apt to think that Chilo whom before we spake of was the first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Which I propose not so much out of a desire to comply with Scaliger who for ought I can see aimed at no such matter as on the credit of Eusebius whom he so much slighteth For in Eusebius Chronicon of Joseph Scaligers own Edition after he hath put down the institution of the Ephori in the second of the fifth Olympiad as before I told you he gives this Item in the third of the five and fiftieth which is the very same that Laertius speaks of Chilo qui de Septem Sapientibus fuit Lacedaemone Ephorus constituitur y Euseb Chronic. lib. poster p. 127. dispositione communus gentis that Chilo one of the seven wise Masters was ordained Ephorus at Sparta by the general consent of all the people But whether this were so or not I am not able to determine absolutely All I observe from hence is this that it is past all question that from this time they took upon them more then they had done formerly and were intent on all advantages to improve their power For whereas at the first they were appointed by the Kings to sit in judgement in their steeds as before was said by little and little 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 z Plutarch in Agis Cleom. they drew that power unto themselves and exercised it in their own name by their own authoritie not as the Ministers of the Kings they would none of that but as the Officers of the Common-wealth And to that end they did erect a Court of Judicature which for power and greatness of authoritie was little inferiour to the Senate drawing unto them all such businesses as were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Pausan l. 3. in Laconicis most worthy of care and consideration By means whereof as they drew many of the people to depend
upon them whose businesses and suits of law were brought to be determined by them b Aristot Polit. lib. 3. cap. 1. so they increased that dependance by husbanding such difference as did oft arise between the Senate and the Kings to their own advantage For it is well observed by Aristotle that as long as the Senate and the Kings did agree together they kept all the power in their own hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c Id. ibid. l. 2. c. 9. but when they jarred amongst themselves they gave the people opportunitie to become their Masters But that which raised them to the height and made them terrible at last both to King and Senate was the mutual tie and correspondence which was between them and the people by whom they were not only chosen and therefore cherished by them as their own deâ—r creatures but for the most part chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of the body of the people and sometime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d Aristot Polit. l. 2. cap. 7. out of the very meanest and the neediest of them which made them on the other side to court the people and to apply themselves unto them upon all occasions And though it happened many times that some of them being indigent and needie men were easily wrought upon by money and apt to sell as well the justice as the honor of the Common-wealth to enrich themselves and raise their families whereof Aristotle much complains and that deservedly e Id. ibid. et c. 8 yet this corruption served to advance their power and put them into a condition to be the better able to oblige the people So that the common sort of people doing all they could to advance the power and reputation of the Ephori whom they accounted for their own as indeed they were and the Ephori striving by all possible means to gratifie the people by obtaining new laws and large immunities to be enacted for them as they saw occasion they altered the whole frame of Government and made it of an Aristocracie to become an Oligarchie and in conclusion a plain popular tyrannie 7. For trusting to the power and interess which they had in the Commonaltie and the support they were assured from them if the case required it they drew unto themselves the managerie of the State-affairs and grew so powerful at the last that if they did not all things of their own authoritie yet they had such an hand on the Kings and Senate that nothing could be done without them Were any laws to be enacted who but the Ephori must propound them Or any Taxes to be levied for the necessarie uses of the Common-wealth who but the Ephori must impose them f Plutarch in Agis Cleomen When Lysander had reduced the City of Athens unto such extremities that they were glad to yeeld unto such conditions as the Conquerors were pleased to impose upon them from whom must the Capitulations come but from the Ephori It was the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 g Id. in Lysandro the final resolution of the Ephori from which they were to expect either bonds or libertie Cynado is accused of Treason against Agesilaus and the State of Sparta the Ephori must take the information and proceed accordingly h Xenophâ—n in vita Agesilai and if Pausanias be accused of holding correspondence with the King of Persia the Ephori send out their commands i Thucydides l. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and commit him presently to Prison When any Ambassadors were sent forth on the publick service from whom must they receive their power from whom be furnished with instructions but from the Ephâ—ri alone k Plut. in Nicias and who but they must appoint Commanders for the Wars require accompt of their imployments and either punish or reward them as they have deserved When Cleonymus was displeased because Areus was preferred before him in his pretensions to the Kingdom the Ephori did not only take upon them to sweeten and demulce the man by great gifts and presents 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l Pausan l. 3. in Lacon but also to confer upon him the command of the Army though of right belonging to the Kings When Mindarus the Admiral of their Navie was miserably beat by the Athenians in the straight of Hellespont an express is presently dispatched to Sparta to give unto the Ephori an account thereof m Plutarch in Alcibiades Lysander had no sooner revenged this quarrel and beat the Fleet of the Athenians neer the self same place but he acquaints the Ephori with his good success with all speed that might be n Idem in Lysandro And if the Wars prove fortunate and the spoil so great that part thereof be sent to Sparta to be laid up in the publick Treasurie the Ephori and none but they must have the fingering of the money o Id. ibid. Finally there was no Commander of the Armies or other Officer imployed by the Common-wealth whom they called not to an accompt as their stomachs served not staying till the Office was expired and the Commander or the Officer become a private man again as in other States but even in the midst of their Command and Magistracie whatsoever it was and whom they did not punish when they came before them either by imprisonment or death p Xenophon de Repub. Lacedaem as to them seem'd best Thus have we brought them to their height and seen them absolutely possessed of the Supreme Power in making peace or war as they thought convenient and in disposing of the goods the liberties yea and the lives too of the Spartan subject It had been a strange temper in them had they tarried there and not incroached as much whilest the tide went with them upon the persons and the power of the Kings themselves 8. For howsoever at the first they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Ministers of the Kings as before was told you and accomptable to none but them yet after they were reckoned for the Officers of the Common wealth they cast off all relation to the Kings their Masters and thought themselves their Equals at the best and at last their betters A point which Theopompus did but little dream of when first he set them up to oppose the Senate although his Queen a wise and understanding Ladie did evidently see and tell him what would follow on it Of which we finde this storie in the works of Aristotle and from him borrowed by Plutarch if I guess aright that his wife seeing what design he was bent upon and how unluckily he was carried on to effect the same advised him to take heed that by erecting this new Magistracie he did not leave the Kingdom in a worse condition to his Heirs and Successors then he received the same from his Predecessors and that he answered thereunto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 e Aristot Polit. l. 5. c 11. that by
Mother and Grand mother 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 g Id. ibid. And this saith Plutarch was the first time that ever the Ephori put a King to death And so perhaps it was the first but the last it was not For Archidamus the Brother of Agis being recalled from banishment by Cleomenes to the end he might enjoy the Kingom which did by right belong unto him was preseutly seised on by the murderers and dispatched in private for fear he should revenge the death of his slaughtered Brother h Id. ibid. By which it is most evident without further proof that the Spartan Aristocratie was become a tyrannie and of all Tyrannies the most insupportable because meerlie popular Or if more proof should be desired both Aristotle and his his Master Plato will not stick to say it though they both died before these two last Tragedies were acted on the stage of Sparta For Plato being to declare what he conceived of the Government of that Common-wealth resolves that it did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i Plato de legibus l. 4. approach more neer to tyrannie then to any other form what ever the power and empire of the Ephori being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plainly tyrannical and no otherwise And Aristotle who had studied the condition of that State exactly though at the first he seemed to think that it was very well compounded of the three good forms yet upon full debate thereof he concludes at last 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Aristot Poliâ— l. 2. c. 4. that the dominion of the Ephori was an absolute Tyrannie Assuredly had they lived to have seen that day wherein the Ephori embrued their hands in the bloud of their Princes under pretence of safetie to the Common-wealth they would have voted it to have been a tyrannie in the highest degree and then the most unsufferable Tyrants that ever wretched State groaned under For though the Kings of Sparta were so lessened by Lycurgus laws that little more was left unto them then the name and title yet they were Kings and held so sacred by their neighbors even their very Enemies that none dâ—d ever offer to lay hands upon them in the heat and furie of their fights 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l Plutarch in Agis Cleom. out of the reverence they did bear to those beams of Majestie which most apparently shined in them 10 The Ephori being grown to this height of Tyrannie were the more readie for their fall which followed not long after that most barbarous fact upon the persons of their Princes The Kings had long since stomached them and their high proceedings bearing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 m Id. in Agesil a kinde of heritable grudge betwixt them as my Author calls it ever since they took upon them to control their Masters but either wanted opportunitie or spirit to attempt any thing to their prejudice and therefore thought it safer to procure their favours then run themselves upon a hazardous experiment Pausanias the 20. of the Elder House was the first that ever did attempt either by force or practise to subvert the Office the insolencies of the which were then grown so great that being a stout and active Prince he was not able to endure them That he had entertained such thoughts is affirmed by Aristotle where he informs us that Lysander had a purpose to take away the Kingly Government or rather to acquire it to himself as we finde in Plutarch n Id. in Lysandro 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that Pausanias had the like to destroy the Ephorate o Aristot Polit. lib. 5. c. 1. But what he failed to bring about his Successors did at last accomplish Of which Cleombrotus and Agis joyning their hands and heads together did proceed so far that going into the Market place well attended by their friends and followers they plucked the Ephori from their seats and substituted others in their rooms p Plutarch in Agis Cleom. whom they conceived would be more pliant to their present enterprises which was the first actual attempt that ever had been made against them by the Kings of Sparta But evulgato imperii Arcano when so great a mysterie of State was once discovered that the Ephori were but mortal men and might as easily be displaced and deposed as any of the other Magistrates Leonidas immediately upon his restitution to the Kingdom made the like removal and displaced those who had took part against him with the former Kings q Id. ibid. So that the ice being broken and the way made open Cleomenes son unto Leonidas had the fairer way to abrogate the Office utterly which at last he did For being a brave and gallant Prince and seeing that the project he was bent upon for the reduction of the Common-wealth to its primitive honour could not be brought about but by their destruction he fell upon them with his Souldiers as they sate sate at supper and killed four of them in the place the fift escaping shrewdly hurt to the neerest Sanctuarie r Id ibid. That done he went into the Market place and overthrew all the Chairs of the Ephori saving only one which he reserved for himself as his Chair of State and sitting in the same in the sight of the people gave them an accompt of his proceedings and the reasons which induced him to it Declaring how the Ephori were at first appointed by the Kings themselves that for long time they governed only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Kings Ministers and no otherwise thatt many years after this Asteropus one of the Ephori building upon a new foundation and being the first Author of that dangerous change they took the Government unto themselves and exercised the same in their own names only that though they had usurped a power which belonged not to them yet had they managed it discreetly they might perhaps have held it longer and with better liking but that licentiously abusing the authoritie which they had usurped by suppressing the lawful Governors ordained of old by taking upon them to banish some of the Citizens and to put some to death without law and justice and finally by threatning those who were desirous to restore the Government to its antient form they were no longer to be suffered that for his part he should have thought himself the happiest King that ever was if possibly he could have cured his Countrey of that foul affection without grief or sorrow but being it was not to be done that way he thought it better that some few should be put to death then the whole Common-wealth run on to a swift destruction This said he presently dissolved the Assembly and seriously betook himself to the Reformation which formerly he had projected and in short time reduced the people to the antient Discipline the state and reputation of the Common-wealth to its antient height 11 Thus have we made a brief discoverie
of the Spartan Ephori upon what grounds first instituted and on what destroyed by what foul practises and unlawful means they gained the Soveraigntie of the State and by what they lost it how and by what degrees they came from low and mean beginnings to so strange a tyrannie and with what suddenness they lost their power and their lives together But in all this there is not any shew or colour for that which is affirmed by CALVIN no ground for nor veritie at all in that assertion that the Ephori were at first ordained to oppose the Kings to regulate their proceedings and restrain their power but rather that they were ordained as indeed they were to curb the Senate to be the Ministers of the Kings and sub-servient to them to sit in Judgement for them and discharge such Offices as the Kings pleased to trust them with in their times of absence If Calvins popular Magistrates have no more authoritie then the Spartan Ephori according to the rules of their Institution they will have little colour to controll their Princes and less for putting a restraint on the Regal power The most they can pretend to must be usurpation and that will hold no longer if it hold so long then they have power to make it good by bloud and violence which I hope Calvin did not aim at And if they have no other ground then an unjust title prescription will not serve the turn for nullum tempus occurrit Regi as our Lawyers tell us when a couragious Prince is concerned in it and oppressed by it If any Popular spirits entertain such hopes if nothing else will satisfie their vast ambitions but to be equal with their Kings and Supreme Governors and at last above them let them remember what became of the Spartan Ephori and that there was a Cleomenes which called them to a sad account for all those insolencies and affronts which they had put upon himself and his Predecessors And let all Kings and Supreme Governors take heed by the example of these Spartan Princes how they let loose the reins of Government and lay them on the necks of the common people which if unbridled once and left at libertie will not be easily induced to receive that Bit into their mouths which before they champed on and that they give no way to such popular Magistrates as Calvin hath presented to us who whatsoever colour and pretence they make aim at no other mark then the Royal power though out of too much modestie they disclaim the title and must be either Kings or nothing Of which invasions and incroachments on the Supreme Power our Author gives another hint in the Roman Tribunes the truth and fitness of which supposition must be looked on next CHAP. III. Of the Incroachments of the Tribunes on the State of Rome and that they were not instituted for the ends supposed by Calvin I The Tribunes of the people why first Instituted in the State of Rome II And with what difficultie and conditions III The Tribunes fortifie themselves with large immunities before they went about to change the Government IV The Tribunes no sooner in their Office but they set themselves against the Nobilitie and the Senate contrary to the Articles of their Institution V The many and dangerous Seditions occasioned by the Tribunes in the City of Rome VI The Tribunes and the people do agree together to change the Government of the State VII By what degrees the people came to be possessed of all the Offices in the State both of power and dignity VIII The Plots and Practises of the Gracchi to put the power of the Judicature and Supreme Majestie of the State into the hands of the people IX The Tribunes take upon them to commit the Consuls and bring all the Officers of the State under their command X The Office and authoritie of the Tribunes reduced unto its antient bounds by Corn. Sylla and at last utterly destroyed XI An application of the former passages to the point in hand 1 ALthough the reasons which induced the people in the State of Rome to desire some Officers of their own and the considerations which induced the Senate to give way unto it are obvious to the eyes of every Reader which hath perused the Roman stories yet I shall briefly lay it down the better to remove the intimation which we finde in Calvin that they were purposely ordained to oppose the Consuls The storie then in brief is this The people having not long before expulsed their Kings and got some reputation by their prowess in those petit States which bordered neerest to the City found quickly that the libertie which they expected was nothing but a golden dream not able to protect them from the common Gaols and that their reputation in the wars would not pay their debts or save them from the hands of their cruel Creditors For serving in the wars at their own proper charges and having little else to subsist upon but their trades or labor they were fain sometimes to take up money upon usurie And though they did return from the wars with victorie and shewed those honorable scars which they had received fighting in defence of their Countrey and the Common-wealth yet this did edifie but little with their hungry Creditors a Plutarch in M. Coriolano who did not sell their goods if they were not solvent but apprehended their persons also and either laid them up in the common prisons or made them serve in stead of Bond-men and made them subject to the whip and other base corrections fit for none but Slaves And somewhat to this purpose the old man complained as we read in Livie declaring to the people who were apt to hear it how his Patrimonie had been seized on by the merciless Usurers his person apprehended by them and that he was not only made a Slave but marked out for slaughter Inde ostentare tergum foedum recentibus vestigiis verberum b Livie hist l. 2. shewing withall upon his back the miserable prints which the whip had left This made the people murmur and at last to mutinie and in tumultuous manner minaciter magis quam suppliciter rather with threats then supplications to require the Senate to take some course for their relief resolving otherwise to go no more unto the wars serve the State who would The Senate promised fair as there was good cause the Volsci pressing hard upon them to their very gates and by that promise won the people and obtained a victorie But when the wars were done and performance looked for in stead of finding a redress of their former grievances the rigor of the law took place creditoribus tradibantur and they were seised on by their Creditors as in former times the Senate thinking it unreasonable to make the law submit to the necessities of particular men and against law to defraud any man of the debts which were due unto them c Dionys
s Plutarch in Pompeio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gratified them in that point and thought himself an happy man to finde so fair an opportunitie to oblige them to him On which deceitful grounds for they proved no other he set them in their power again as before was said for which he stands accused by Quintus t Cicero de Legâ—buâ— l 3. and I think deservedly Certain I am that Pompey bought the short affection and applause of the common people at no less a price then his own destruction the Tribunes being the very men which pulled down his pâ—ide u Plutarch in I. Caesare and set up Caesar to oppose him Who going the same way to work that Sylla did and knowing that a Tribune and a Tribunitian spirit were no friends to Monarchie left them the name but nothing else The power and priviledge of the Office he kept unto himself for his own security x Dion histor Rom. lib. 53. as one that understood none better how many notable advantanges he should gain thereby for the confirming of his Empire Which course Augustus followed also taking the Tribunitian power into his own hands posito Triumviri nomine y Tacitus Annal lib. 1. assoon as the Triumvirate was expired by the death of his partners and from thence reckoned the years of his Government as Tribunitiae potestatis tertium quartum c. which his Successors did after his example till the time of Constantine when the name of Tribune was laid by as a thing forgotten z Rosin Antiq. Rom. The Empire was then cast into another kinde of mould then it had been formerly new Offices ordained new forms of Government introduced and a new Rome built and to what purpose should they keep the name when the thing was gone 11 Let us look back on all that is said before and we shall finde but little reason to relie upon Calvins word He saith the Tribunes were fet up to oppose the Consuls but the best Writers do affirm that they were instituted only to protect the people and to protect the people in such cases only when they did suffer any tort or unjust oppression He reckoneth them for instances of such popular Magistrates as were ordained to moderate and restrain the vast power of Kings and other Supreme Magistrates but the best Writers do affirm that the Tribunes were not instituted till the Kings were outed nor instituted at the first to restrain the Consular power though by degrees they did restrain it as they pleased and finally that they were again abridged of their power and tyrannie assoon as Monarchie was restored and the State brought to be obedient to one Soveraign Prince He seems to intimate that the Consuls were not wronged by such oppositions as the Tribunes daily made against them and that the Tribunes did no more in such oppositions then by their place and office they were bound to do But the best Writers do affirm that the Consuls made complaint from time to time of those wrongs and insolencies which those proud creatures of the people did afflict them with and they complained not without cause as their stories tell us So that there is but little ground for the supposition touching the first creation of these mighty Tyrants which Calvin trimly puts upon us less for the application of it to his end and purpose What other power soever they enjoyed or exercised more then the power of interceding when any Bill or Ordinance was to pass the Senate by which the people might have suffered in their goods and liberties was an incroachment on the Consuls and wrested from them by strong hand sometimes with bloud but never without dangerous tumults The best use can be made of such false surmises especially when they are false and factious too and some good uses may be made of the strongest poysons is that an Item may be taken by all Kings Princes and Supreme Governors to have a care of their Estates and neither suffer any Tribunes or men of Tribunitian spirits or such as challenge to themselves Tribunitian power to grow up under them or live within the verge of their Dominions The Tribune and the Tribunitian spirit are no friend to Monarchie and have so much of Pompey in them who restored the Office that they will never be content to endure an equall much less to suffer a Superior For further proof of which if more proof be requisite and for discovering to the world with what arts and practises those factious and seditious spirits did attain their height it would be a most excellent piece of service to all Soveraign Princes if a just Tribunitian historie were composed by some man of judgement for the recovery of this Age from the present maladies and a Memento to the future But this I leave to those who have time and leisure and other fit abilities to goe through with it I have another task in hand and the Demarchi call upon me to pass on to Athens where we are like to finde worse work then we met with hitherto Worse work I mean in this respect that we are like to finde less ground for the supposition for otherwise we are like to finde no work at all as will appear more evidently by that which followeth CHAP. IV. Of what authority the DEMARCHI were in the State of ATHENS and of the danger and unfitness of the instances produced by CALVIN I Athens first governed by Kings and afterwards by one Soveraign Prince under other titles II The Annual Magistrates of Athens what they were and of what authoritie III By whom and what degrees the State of Athens was reduced to a Democratie IV Of the authoritie of the Senate and the famous Court of the Areopagites V What the Demarchi were in the State of Athens and of what authoritie VI The Demarchi never were of power to oppose the Senate nor were ordained to that end VII Calvins ill luck in making choyce of three such instances which if true would not serve his turn VIII The danger which lyeth hidden under the disguise of such popular Magistrates as are here instanced in by Calvin IX What moved Calvin to lay these dangerous stumbling-blocks in the Subjects way X The dangerous oppositions and practises which have hence ensued in most parts of Europe XI The sect of CALVIN professed Enemies to Monarchie and the power of Princes 1 THE State of Athens as were all others at the first was under the Government of Kings all of them of the race of Cecrops from whom his Successors were called Cecropidae and they as other Kings in those antient times ut libitum imperitabant a Tacit. Annal. lib. 3. governed the people under them by no other rule then their own discretion Theseus the tenth from Cecrops was the first King of Athens which let goe his hold and parted with so many of the Regal rights as made the Kings weak and the Subjects wanton For having
a desire to incorporate all the Inhabitants of Attica into the City of Athens the better to unite them against forein force and to assemble them together as occasion served he was fain to win them to it by large promises of giving them some share in the publick Government without which bait the wealthier sort and such as had authoritie in their several Burroughs could not be drawn into the City b Plutarch in Theseo Yet still he kept unto himself and to his successors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as we finde in Plutarch the chief Cnmmandery in the wars and the preservation of the laws together with a superintendency in matters which concerned Religion the main points of Soveraigntie And in this State things stood till the death of Codrus the seventh from Theseus who giving up his own life to preserve his Countrey became so honored and admired amongst his people that they resolved for his sake to have no more Kings for fear they should never meet with any who might be worthy to succeed him which was one of the prettiest wanton quarrels that ever was picked against a Monarchie The Princes which succeeded after his decease they called not Kings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Governors but the change was only in the name and in the manner of their getting the Supreme authoritie For being once invested with the Supreme power they held it during life without check or censure as is affirmed by Africanus an antient writer who laying down the succession of the Kings of Athens to the death of Codrus d African apud Eusib Chron. edit Scaliger addes this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that after them succeeded the perpetual Archonteâ— who held the Government during life The like Eusebius doth affirm e Euseb in Chro. and all Authors else which treat of the affairs of Athens The difference was that formerly the Kingdom was successive meerly entailed upon the Princes of the line of Cecrops now it began to be Elective and to be given to them who best pleased the people Et loco libertatis erat quod eligi coeperunt f Tacit. hist l. 1. and it was some degree of liberty and a great one too that they had power to nominate and elect their Princes But long they did not like of this although no doubt a great intrusion on the Regal dignity The Princes were too absolute when they held for life not so observant of the people as it was expected because not liable to accompt nor to be called unto a reckoning till it was too late till death had freed them from their faults and the peoples censure And therefore having tryed the Government of 13 of these perpetual Archontes of which Medon the son of Codrus was the first and the last Alâ—maeon In decem annos Magistratuum consuetudo conversa est g Euseb in Chr. they introduced another custom and every tenth year changed their Governors These they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 h African apud Euseb Chronic. or Decennial Archontes of which they had but seven in all and then gave them over and from that time were governed by nine Officers or Magistrates chosen every year who for that cause waa called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Annual Magistrates And yet it is to be observed that in both these changes the Archon whosoever he was and whether he was for term of life or for ten years only had all the power which formerly was belonging to the Kings save the very name in which regard Eusebius doth not stick to call them by the name of Kings where speaking of the institution of these Annual Magistrates he doth thus express it Athenis Annui principes constituti sunt cessantibus Regibus i Euseb Chron. as St. Hierom renders it 2 Now for these Annual Magistrates they were these that follow that is to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Iul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. which we may call the Provost who 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was called the Archon the Bishop or High Priest the Marshal and the six Chief Justices Of these the Provost was the chief 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of whom they did denominate the ensuing year and by whose name they dated all their private contracts and Acts of State l Id. ibid. Sect. 2. To him it appertained to have a care of celebrating the Orgies of Bacchus and the great festival which they termed Thargelia consecrated to Apollo and Diana as also to take cognizance of misdemeanors and in particular to punish those who were common drunkards and to determine in all cases which concerned matter of inheritance and furthermore to nominate Arbitrators for the ending of fuits and private differences to appoint Guardians unto Orphans and Overseers unto women left with childe by their husbands The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call the Bishop or high Priest had the charge of all the sacred mysteries m Id. ibid. Sect. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the administration of the usual and accustomed sacrifices together with the cognizance of sacriledge prophaneness and all other actions which concerned Religion as also power to interâ—â—ct litigious persons or Common Barretters as we call them from being present at the celebrating of the holy mysteries And he retained the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because that antiently their Kings as in all places else had the chief hand in matters which related to the publick service of the Gods and the solemn sacrifices On the which reason and no other the Romans had their Regem Sacrificulum whom Plutarch calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Plutarch in Problemat in imitation of the Latine but Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o Dionys Halicarnens hist l. 5. in the true Greek phrase of which Livie thus Rerum deinde divinarum habita cura quia quaedam publica sacra per ipsos Reges factitata erant necubi Regum desiderium esset Regem Sacrificulum creant p Livie hist Rman lib. 2. But to proceed the Polemarchus whom we English by the name of Marshall sate judge in cases of sedition and such whereby the grandour of the State might suffer detriment as also in all actions which concerned either Denizens or Merchant-strangers and unto him it appertained to sacrifice to Diana and to Mars the two military Deities q Jul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to prescribe the funeral pomp for such as lost their lives in their Countries service Each of these had their two Assessors of their own election but so that they were bound to choose them out of the Senate of five hundred r Id. ibid. Sect. from no lower rank Finally for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call Chief Justices they were six in number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s Suidas in Lex and had authority to give judgement absolutely in all
civil pleas to judge of strangers which abused the priviledges which they had in the City of briberie conspiracies false inscriptions in cases of adultery and publick crimes in points of trade and actions which concerned the Sâ—annaries t Jul. Pollâ—x in Onomall l. 8 c. 9. sect 1. as also to review the sentence of the Provost and the decrees of the Senate if occasion were and to give notice to the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Julius Pollux if any man preferred a law which was not profitable and expedient for the Common-wealth Such were the Officers and such the duty of those Officers ordained at Athens upon the last alteration of the Government which before we spake of and amongst these we finde not any popular Magistrate who was to have a care of the Common people and to preserve them in their rights and liberties from the oppression of the greater and more powerful Citizens much less set up of purpose to oppose the Senate And to say truth we must not look for any such amongst the nine nor in these times in which this alteration of the Government was first established They could not fall immediately from a Regal State to a Democratical but they must take the Aristocratie in the way unto it They had been under Kings at first or such as had the power of Kings although not the name And when they chose these Annual Officers they chose them ex nobilibus urbis out of the Nobles only as Eusebius hath it u Euseb Chron. which Scaliger is forced to grant to be so at first x Scaliger in Animadvers though out of a desire to confute his Author he would very fain have had it otherwise Whether or no they had such Officers as Calvin dreams of when they had setled their Democratie we shall see anon having first shewn by whom and by what degrees the government of the State was cast on the peoples shoulders and the form thereof made meerly popular or Democratical For certainly it is most true that never any Democratical State shewed it self at the first in its proper colours or came into the world by a lawful entrance but crept into it secretly at the back-dore either of faction or sedition 3 Now the first man that gave the hint to the Democratie and made the people fall in love with a factious libertie was Theseus a valiant but unfortunate King who the better to induce the people of Attica to desert their dwellings and be incorporated into Athens promised them as before was said that all of them should have some share in the publick government and after the form and manner of a Common-wealth And so far he performed his promise as to devest himself of some parts of Soveraigntie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and laid the first foundation of that popular State which was after built but he paid deer for it y Plutarch in Thâ—seo For the people who before had been so tractable that they would do whatsoever their Kings commanded at the first words speaking began to take more state upon them and became so stub born that they would do nothing on command but looked to be flattered with and courted upon all occasions z Idâ—ibid Which being noted by Menestheus a popular man but otherwise of the Royal bloud he so sed that humor and wrought so finely on them by his wit and cunning that Theseus was in fine deposed and his sons disherited and the remainder of the Royaltie conferred by them upon Menestheuâ— as their deed of gift And though no doubt the people did improve their power both when their Kings became elective and when their Governors were elected but for term of years and specially when the Magistrates were no more then Annual yet they could get no further then an Aristocratie till the time of Solon which were about 170 years after the Annual Officers were first established the Annual Officers being established in the first year of the 5. Olympiad and Solons reformation hapning in the second of the 47. But Solon being chosen Provost or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and finding the Republick much embroyled in dangerous factions which had been long since bred between the Nobles and Commons in the change of Governments took on him by the joynt consent of both parties the emendation of the laws and the reducing of the State of the Common-wealth to a more peaceable and equal temper a Id. in Solone And he so ordered their affairs that the chief Offices of the City remained in the hands of the Nobilitie as before they were which for the time contented them but the election of those Officers and the dernier resort or the admittance of Appeals upon Writs of error as we call them that he confirmed unto the people which did not only please the people for the present time but put them into a condition of drawing to themselves the supreme authority Insomuch that Aristotle though he seem to say that Solon setled in the City a mixt form of Government the Court of Areopagites which he also instituted pretending to an Oligarchie the Annual Officers or Archontes to an Aristocratie and the power of judicature being vested in the common people unto a Democratie b Aristot Politic l. 2. c. 10. yet he confesseth at the last that this power of judicature and the necessity which all men found of applying themselves unto the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 changed the Republick in conclusion to a meer Democratie as it continued till his time But yet it was not brought about but with great adoe Pisistratus first reducing the estate to an absolute Monarchy c Plutarch in Soâ—one which because he got it from them by fraud and force they called a Tyranny and after Clisthenes freeing his countrey from that yoke by driving his posterity out of Attica restoring it unto an Aristocratie d Id. in Aristide in Pericle et Cimâ—nc as before it was At last it seemed good to Aristides though for a time he concurred with Clisthenes in his form of government to cast a more indulgent eye on the common people who had behaved themselves exceeding gallantly in the dreadfull war against the Persians and to cause a law to be enacted that all authority and power of government should be communicated equally to all the Citizens e Id. in Aristide 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they should be capable of all the Offices and honours in the Common-wealth Which as it added much to the authority of the common people so that authority was increased much more by the Arts of Pericles who bearing a grudge unto the Court of the Areopagites whereof he was never any Member and finding that the power thereof and of the Senate of five hundred did derogate exceeding much from the power of the people to whose faction he was wholly wedded by the help and setting on of Ephialtes a busie and
against the Senate who began sensibly to incroach on the Regal power that the Tribunes were first instituted to no other end but to preserve the people from unjust oppression and that their opposition to the Consuls was accounted alwayes to be against the rules of their institution and a breach of Articles And as for these Demarchi whom we spake of last that neither by their institution nor by usurpation they did oppose against the Senate in behalf of the people but executed their commands upon the people as their duty bound them So that the great imagination which the Author had of shewing to the world a view of such popular Magistrates as might incourage men of place and eminence to think themselves ordained after these examples to moderate their licentiousness of Kings and Princes is fallen directly to the ground without more ado as being built upon a weak nay a false foundation not able to support the building And more then so in case the instances proposed had been rightly chosen and that the Ephori in Sparta had been first ordained to oppose the Kings the Tribunes to oppose the Consuls and the Demarchi to keep under the Athenian Senate yet these would prove but sorry instances of such popular Officers as were ordained ad moderandum Regum libidinem to moderate the licentiousness of Kings soveraign Princes for proof of which they were produced The Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta till the Kings were brought under the command of the Senate and the State become an Aristocratie in which the Kings had very little left them of the Royal dignity but the empty name and were in power no other then the Dukes of Venice save that they were to have the command of the Armies which those Dukes have not And for the Tribunes 't is well known to every one who hath perused the Roman story that there were no such creatures to be found in Rome till the Romans had expuâ—sed their Kings were under the command of Coâ—suls the Monarchie being changed to an Optimatie and the people bound by solemn oaths never to admit of a King amongst them The like may be affirmed also of the Demarchi of Athens supposing that they were of as great authority as either the Ephori or the Tribunes that they were instituted in a time when the affairs of State were managed by nine Annual Magistrates all of them chosen by the people and accomptable to them In all these cases â—um non in regno populus esset sed in libertate e Livie hisâ— lib. 2. when the people had sued out their Wardship and thought themselves to be at liberty freed from those bonds which nature and allegiance formerly had laid upon them they did no more then what a wise and understanding people had good cause to do in taking the best course they could for their future safety And in my minde the people pleaded most unanswerably in their own behalf when they alleadged se foris pro imperio libertate dimicantes domi a civibus captos oppressos f Id. ibid. that fighting valiantly abroad both for their own liberty and their Countries honor against their Kings they were oppressed and wronged at home by their fellow Citizens that their condition as things stood was better in times of war then in times of peace their liberty never more assured then when they were amongst their Enemies and therefore being no otherwise bound to submit themselves to that change of Government then as it had been introduced by their own consent they had all the reason in the world to get as good terms as they could and be no losers by the bargain Which though it were the case and plea particularly of the people of Rome might be used also very fitly by the Spartans and Athenians on the self same reasons But this can no way be pretended or alleadged by those who live in an established and successional Monarchie where there is one only to command in chief and nothing left to the Subject g Tacit. Annal. praeter obsequii gloriam but the glory of obedience only and the necessity of submitting with a loyal heart to those commands and impositions which may be â—aid upon them with an unjust hand So that admitting it for true as indeed it is not that the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes were ordained for the ends supposed yet it can follow by no rules of law or logick that because such popular Officers have been sometimes instituted to keep the scale upright and the balance even betwixt the Nobles and the People in an Aristocratie therefore the like are to be fancied in a setled Monarchie for moderating the licentiousness that is to say for that no doubt must be his meaning for regulating the authority of the Soveraign Prince 8 Thus have we seen a manifest discovery of Calvins purpose for setting up some popular Officers in every Kingdom to regulate the authority and restrain the power of Soveraign Princes and we may see a secret and more subtile danger included in that short Parenthesis then what is obvious at first sight to the unwary Reader For by the instances proposed and presented to us it seems to be his meaning that these popular Officers should not hâ—ve power only to restrain their Kings when they transgress the bounds of law or equity and either tyrannically oppress the Subject or wilfully dilapidate the patrimony of the Common-wealth but that they should set themselves against them and control their doings in the same way after the same manner as the Ephori did the Kings of Sparta or the Tribunes did the Roman Consuls Now we have shewn before out of several Authors h Vide chap. 2. that the Ephori did not only take upon them to appoint such Privie Counsellors about their Kings as to them seemed best to limit and prescribe them in the choyce of their wives to send them out unto the wars and recall them home as if they had been hirelings only and of no more reckoning to put them upon fine and ransome if they did any thing which was not pleasing to these humorous Gentlemen to have them at command both to come and goe as often as they whistled for them or held up a finger and finally to look for lowly reverence from them whensoever they vouchsafed to summon them to attend their pleasures but also to imprison next to banish and in fine to murder them And we have shewed you of the Tribunes i Vide chap. 3â— that after they had fortified themselves with large priviledges and grew predominant in the affections of the common people they did not only quarrel and oppose the Consuls under pretence of setting forth new laws for the peoples benefit nor were content to put the people into the possession of all the offices and honors of the Common-wealth which formerly belonged to the Nobles only whether the Consuls
from the Civil Magistrate Next it is clear that the Bishops did continue the possession of this Supreme Power till Viret and Farellus two zealous Gospellers came to live amongst them who finding that those of Berne in the year 1528. had made an alâ—eration of Religion practised the like upon the City of Geneva Which not being likely to effect with the Bishops leave and as little able to effect against his liking considering the great power and sway which legally and properly was inherent in him they set the Syndicks whom they had wrought upon before to make head against him who by a popular tumult made him flâ—e the City which presently they changed to a Common-wealth after the manner of the Free or Imperial Cities In which respect Calvin bestows upon Farellus the title of libertatis Patrem s In Epistola ad Minist Tigurin 1553. the Father of that common libertie which by his means the people of Geneva at that time enjoyed As for the Syndicks by whose power and countenance they advanced the business they were a kinde of popular Officer who had the care of looking to the conservation of the peoples liberties as Thuanus intimates and were much used in many parts of France and Italy as Bodinus tells us t Bodin de Repub lib. â— c. â— Their Office did consist of two special points the one a Magistratibus rationem reposcere to call the ordinary Magistrates to an after reckoning u Id. ibid. if they did any thing unworthy of their place and dignitie or to the hinderance and disservice of the Common-wealth which had somewhat in it of the Ephori in the State of Sparta the other was prospicere ne tenuiores infimae sortis homines a nobilibus uti fit â—premerentur to have a care that the poor people be not wronged or injured as many times it hapneth by the power of the Nobles which was the main reason for the institution of the Roman Tribunes In this regard the Civil laws interpret Syndicuâ— to be the same with defensor Civitatis y Calvin in Leâ—ico Jurid verbo Syndicus the Conservator of the liberties of a Town or City as full well they might the Office being made up as it seems it was of that of the Ephori and the Tribunes mixt together Now though this change was made before Calvins coming to Geneva which was not till the year 1535 yet he affirms it of himself that whatsoever had been done in the alteration suffragio meo comprobavi z Calvin in Epistola ad Cardinal Sadolet he had confirmed and approved as a thing well done and therefore thought himself to be no less obliged to defend the action then if it had been done at first by his own command For doubtless that of Tully is exceeding true Nil refert utrum voluerim fieri vel gaudeam factum a Cicero in Philip 2. between the doing of a foul and dâ—sloyal act and the approbation of it when it is done is but little difference 10 But to proceed our Author being thus made a party in the cause and quarrel of Geneva thought himself bound not only to justifie unto others what himself approved but also to lay down such grounds whereby the example might be followed and their disloâ—altie and rebellion the less observed because they did not goe alone without company In which respect and 't is a thing to be observed although that Book of Institutions hath been often printed and received many alterations and additions as before was noted yet this particular passage still remains unalâ—ered and hath continued as it is from the first Edition which was in the year 1536. when the rebellion of Geneva was yet fresh and talked of as an ill example Nor was the man deceived in his expectation For as he grew into esteem and reputation in the world abroad so he attained at last to that power and empire over the souls and consciences of his followers that his errors were accounted Orthodox his defects perfections and the revolt of the Genevians from rheir natural Prince must by no means be called Rebellion because projected and pursued by such popular Officers to whom it appertained of common course to regulate the authoritie of Kings and Princes And though he doth not say expressly that there either are or ought to be such popular Officers in every Realm or Common-wealth but brings it in upon the by with his ifs and ands yet ifs and ands are not allowed of in the laws to excuse rebellions b Bacons history of King Henry the seventh and by the setting up of that dangerous Si quis si qui sint populares Magistratus as his words there are he seems to make a Proclamation that where there were such popular Officers it was their bounden duty to correct their Princes after the manner of Geneva where there were none the people were God help them in an ill condition unless some other means were thought of for their ease and remedie Upon which Principles of his his followers raised such Positions and pursued such practises as have distracted and embroyled the most parts of Europe and made it of a Garden to become a Wilderness For finding that they could not easily create such Popular Magistrates to lord it over Kings and Princes who had not been accustomed to the like controlments they put that power of regulating the Supreme Authoritie either upon the body of the people generally whereof you were told before from Buchannan or upon such to whom they should communicate or transfer their power as occasion served whereof you may hear further in that which followeth And that not only in the case of civil libertie for which the examples of the Ephori and the Roman Tribunes were at first found out and that of the Demarchi thrust upon the Readers for the like foul end but specially in such matters which concerned Religion wherein the extraordinary calling of some men in the holy Scriptures must serve for Precedents and examples to confirm their practises From hence it was that Buchannan doth not only subject his King unto the Ordinary Judges and Courts of Justice as before was noted but fearing that Kings would be too potent to be so kept under adviseth this Eorum interfectoribus praemia decerni c Buchann de jure Regni that rewards should publickly be decreed for those who kill a Tyrant and Kings and Tyrants are the same as heretofore in the word and notion so now in the opinion of the Presbyterian or Calvinian faction as usually are proposed to those who kill Wolves or Bears From hence it was that the inferiour or Subordinate Magistrate is advanced so high as to be entituled to a power adversus Superiorem Magistratum se Rempub. Ecclesiam etiam armis defendere d Paraeus in Epistola ad Rom. cap. 13. of taking Arms against the King or superiour Magistrate in defence of himself his
Countrey and true Religion which though they are the words of Paraeus only yet they contain the minde and meaning of all the rest of that faction as his son Philip doth demonstrate e In Append. ad Cap. 13. Epist ad Rom. Hence was it that John Knox delivered for sound Orthodox doctrine Procerum esse propria autoritâ—te Idololatrian tollere Principes intra legum rescripta per vim reducere f Camden Annal Eliz. An. 1559. that it belonged unto the Peers of each several Kingdom to reform matters of the Church by their own authoritie and to confine their Kings and Princes within the bounds prescribed by law even by force of Arms. Hence that Geselius one of the Lecturers of Roterdam preached unto his people that if the Magistrates and Clergie did neglect their duty in the reformation of Religion necesse est id facere plâ—beios that then it did belong to the Common people g Necessaria Respons who were bound to have a care thereof and proceed accordingly And as for points of practise should we look that way what a confusion should we finde in most parts of Europe occasioned by no other ground then the entertainment of these principles and the scattering of these positions amongst the people Witness the Civil wars of France g Jean de Serres inventaire de Fr. the revolt of Holland h History of the Netherlands the expulsion of the Earl of East-Friezland out the City of Embden i Thuan hâ—st l. 114. the insurrections of the Scots k Camden Annal An. 1559. the tumults of Bohemia l Laurca Austriaca the commotions of Brandenbourg m Continuati Thuan. hist l. 8. the translation of the Crown of Sweden from the King of Pole to Charles Duke of Finland n Thuan. hist l. 8. the change of Government in England all acted by the Presbyterian or Calvinian partie in those several States under pretence of Reformation and redress of grievances 11 And to say truth such is the Genius of the sect that though they may admit an equal as paritie is the thing most aimed at by them both in Church and State yet they will hardly be perswaded to submit themselves to a Superiour to no Superiours more unwillingly then to Kings and Princes whose persons they disgrace whose power they ruinate whose calling they indevour to decry and blemish by all means imaginable First for their calling they say it is no other then an humane Ordinance and that the King is but a creature of the peoples making whom having made they may as easily destroy and unmake make again Which as it is the darling doctrine of this present time so is it very eagerly pursued by Buchannan who affirms expressly Quicquid juris populus alicui dederit idem justis de causis posse reposcere o Buchann de â—ure Regni that whatsoever power the people give unto their King or Supreme Magistrate they may resume again upon just occasions Their power they make so small and inconsiderable that they afford them very little even in matters temporal and no authoritie at all in things spiritual CALVIN professeth for himself that he was very much agrieved to hear that King Henry the eight had took unto himself the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England accuseth them of inconsiderate zeal nay blasphemie who conferred it on him and though he be content at last to allow Kings a Ministerial power in matters which concern the Reformation of Gods Publick Worship yet he condemns them as before of great inconsiderateness Qui facerent eos nimis spirituales p Calvin in Amos cap. 7. who did ascribe unto them any great authoritie in spiritual matters The designation of all those who bear publick office in the Church the calling of Councels or Assemblies the Presidencie in those Councels ordaining publick Fasts and appointing Festivals which anciently belonged unto Christian Princes as the chief branches of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which is vested in them are utterly denied to Kings and Princes in their Books of Discipline In so much that when the Citizens of Embden did expel their Earl they did it chiefly for this reason Quod se negotiis Ecclesiasticis Consistorialibus praeter jus aequitatem immisceret q Thuan. hist l. 114. that he had intermedled more then they thought fit in Ecclesiastical causes and intrenched too much upon their Consistorie As for their power in temporal or civil causes by that time Knoxes Peers and Buchannans Judges Paraeus his inferior Magistrates and CALVINS popular Officers have performed their parts in keeping them within the compass of the laws arraigning them for their offences if they should transgress opposing them by force of arms if any thing be done unto the prejudice of the Church or State and finally in regulating their authoritie after the manner of the Spartan Ephori and the Roman Tribunes all that is left will be by much too little for a Roy d' Ivitot or for a King of Clouts as we English phrase it Last of all for their persons which God held so sacred that he gave it for a law to his people Israel not to speak evill of their Princes saying Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people Let us but look upon these men and we shall finde the basest attributes too good for the greatest Kings Calvin calls Mary Queen of England by the name of Proserpine r Calvin in Amos cap. 7. and saith that she did superare omnes Diabolos that all the Devils of hell were not half so mischeivous Beza affords Queen Mary of Scotland no better titles then those of Medea and Athaliah s Beza in Epist ad Jo. of which the last was most infamous in divine the other no less scandalous in humane stories the one a Sorceress and a Witch the other a Tyrant and usurper The Author of the Altare Damascenum whosoever he was can finâ—e no better a tribute for King James of most blessed memorie then infensissimus Evangelii hostis t Didoclavius in Epistola ad Lâ—ctor the greatest and deadly enemie of the Gospel of Christ And Queen Elizabeth her self did not scape so clear but that the zealous Brethren were too bold sometimes with her name and honor though some of them paid dearly for it and were hanged for their labour How that seditious Hugonot the Author of the lewd and unworthy Dialogue entituled Eusebius Philadelphus hath dealt with three great Princes of the House of France and what reproachful names he gives them I had rather you should look for in the Author then expect from me being loath to wade too far in these dirtie pudoles save that I shall be bold to adde this general Character which Didoclavius gives to all Kings in general viz. Naturâ insitum est in â—mnibus Regibus Christi odium that all Kings naturally hate Christ which may
serve for all This is enough to let us see how irreconcileable an hatred these of the Calvinian faction bear against Kings and Princes how well they play the part of the very Antichrist in exalting themselves against whatsoever is called God and that the special reason why they affect so much to be called the Saints is out of a strong probable hope to see the day in which they shall binde Kings in chains and all the Princes of the earth in fetters of iron Finally such is their disaffection unto sacred Monarchie which they have sucked out of the grounds and principles here laid down by Calvin that we may justly say of them what was most truly said of the ancient Romans quasi nefas esset Regem aliquem prope eorum terminos esse u Justin hist l. 29. they have bestirred themselves so bravely in defiance of the Regal Government as if they did account it an unpardonable sin to suffer any King though most good and gracious to border near them Which lest they should not be of power to compass by their popular Magistrates or by the Judges or the Peers or the People severally which make the main Battel for this combat let us next look on the Reserve and see what hopes they have to effect the business by the three Estates conjoyned in Parliament or by what other name soever we shall call their meeting which CALVIN in the last place doth reflect upon but cautiously with a qua forte or a peradventure as in that before CHAP. V. What are the three Estates in each severall Kingdome of which CALVIN speaks and what particularly in the Realm of ENGLAND I Of the division of a People into three Estates and that the Priests or Clergie have been alwaies one II The Priests employed in Civill matters and affairs of State by the Egyptians and the Persians the Greeks Gaules and Romans III The Priests and Levites exercised in afaffairs of Civill Government by Gods own appointment IV The Prelates versed in Civill matters and fairs of State in the best and happiest times of Christianity V The Clergie make the third Estate in Germany France Spain and the Northern Kingdomes VI That anciently in the Saxon times the Ecclesiasticks of this Realm were called to all publick Councels VII The Prelates an essential fundamental part of the English Parliament VIII Objections answered and that the word Clerus in the Legal notion doth not extend unto the Prelates IX That the inferior Clergie of the Realm of England had anciently their votes in Parliament to all intents and purposes as the Commons had X Objections answered and that the calling of the Clergie to Parliaments and Convocations were after different manners and by several writs XI The great disfranchisement and slavery obtruded on the English Clergie by the Idepriving of the Bishops of their Votes in Parliament XII A brief discussion of the question whether any two of the three Estates conspiring or agreeing together can conclude any thing unto the prejudice of the third BUt first before we fall on the point it self and search into the power ascribed by Calvin to the three Estates of every Kingdome we must first see what kinde of men they are and of what condition who constitute the said Estates which being fiâ—st setled and determined we shall the better be inabled to proceed accordingly in the inquiry after that authority which our Author gives them of regulating the proceedings of the soveraign Prince and putting a restraint on the exorbitant power of Kings In which we shall presume for granted what our Author gives us viz. tres Ordines in singulis Regnis that in each several Kingdome there are three Estates and those three we shall prove to be though our Author is no otherwise to be understood the Clergy the Nobility and the Common people which distribution of the Subject into three Estates as 't is very ancient so was the distribution of them into three neither more nor less founded on good prudential motives and grounds of Polity For as judicious Bodin very well observeth should there be only two Estates and no more then so either upon such differences as might rise between them the one side would be apt to compell the other by force of violence or else aequatis Ordinum suffragiis a Bodin de Repub. l. 3. cap. uâ—t the ballance being even between them their meetings would be many times dissolved without producing any notable effect to the benefit of the Common-wealth In which respect the counterpoise or addition of a third Estaâ—e was exceeding necessary ut alterutri sese adjungens utrumque conciliet that joyning unto either of the other two it might unite them both into one opinion and advance the service of the publick And on the other side were there more then three opinionum multitudo the difference of opinions and pretence of interesses would keep them at perpetual distance and hinder them from pitching upon any point in which all their purposes and aims were to be concentred So that the casting of the body of a people into three Estates seems most convenient for the furtherance of the publick service and of those three three Estates the Priests or Clergy as we call them since the times of CHRIST have generally been accounted one For though Hippodamus whom Aristotle justly taxeth for defects b Aristot Politic l. in Politic ordained his three Estates to be the Souldiery the Handicrafts-man and the Husbandman yet wiser Statists saw no reason that the two last should passe for severall estates or ranks of men being that both might be more fitly comprehended under the name and rank of the common people And therefore the Egyptians did divide the people into these three ranks the Priest which is respondent to the Christian Clergy the Souldier who carrieth most resemblance to the State of Nebles and those which lived by trades and labours whom by one generall name they called Operarii c Diodor. Siculus as we now the Commons which coursâ— we finde to be observed also by the ancient Gaules dividing their whole body into these three orders d Caesar de Bel â—o Gallico l. 6. the Druides who had the charge of matters which concerned Religion the Equites who managed the affairs of war and then the Plebs or common people who were subordinate to the other two and directed by them How this division hath succeeded in the States of Christendom we shall see hereafter 2 In the mean time we may take notice that the Priests of Egypt the Druides of Gaul and those who had the ordering of those services which concerned the gods by whatsoever name or title they were known and called in other Countreys were not so tied unto the Altars and other ministerial Offices which concerned the gods as not to have some special influence in ordering the affairs of the Common-wealth The Priests of Egypt as we read in Aelian an
it should be otherwise in the present times the equity and justice of it being still the same and the same reasons for it now as forcible as they could be then Had it been otherwise resolved of in the former ages wherein the Clergy were so prevalent in all publique Counsails how easie a matter had it been for them either by joyning with the Nobility to exclude the Commons or by joyning with the Commonalty to exclude the Nobles Or having too much conscience to adventure on so great a change an alteration so incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitution of a Parliament how easily might they have suppressed the potency and impaird the Privileges of either of the other two by working on the humours or affections of the one to keep down the other But these were Arts not known in the former daies nor had been thought of in these last but by men of ruine who were resolved to change the Government as the event doth shew too clearly both of Church and State Nor doth it help the matter in the least degree to say that the exclusion of the Bishops from the House of Peers was not done meerly by the practice of the two other Estates but by the asseâ—t of the King of whom the Laws say he can do no wrong and by an Act of Parliament wherof our Laws yet say quae â—ul doit imaginer chose dishonourable c Plowden in Commentar that no man is to think dishonourably For we know well in what condition the King was when he passed that Act to what extremities he was reduced on what terms he stood how he was forced to flye from his City of London to part with his dear Wife and Children and in a word so overpowred by the prevailing party in the two Houses of Parliament that it was not safe for him as his case then was to deny them any thing And for the Act of Parliament so unduly gained besides that the Bill had been rejected when it was first brought unto the Lords and that the greater part of the Lords were frighted out of the House when contrary unto the course of Parliament it was brought again it is a point resolved both in Law and reason that the Parliament can do nothing to the destruction of it self and that such Acts as are extorted from the King are not good and valid whereof we have a fair example in the Book of Statuers d 15 Ed. 3. For whereas the King had granted certain Articles pretended to be granted in the form of a Statute expresly contrary to the Laws of the Realm and his own Prerogative and rights royal mark it for this is just the case which he had yielded to eschew the dangers which by denying of the same were like to follow in the same Parliament it was repealed in these following words It seemed good io the said Earls Barons and other wise men that since the Statute did not proceed of our free will the same be void and ought not to have the name nor strength of a Statute and therefore by their counsail and assent we have decreed the said Statute to be void c. Or if it should not be repealed in a formal manner yet is this Act however gotten void in effect already by a former Statute in which it was enacted in full Parliament and at the self same place where this Act was gained that the Great Charter by which and many other Titles the Bishops held their place in Parliament should be kept in all points and if any Statute be made to the contrary it shall be holden for none e 42 Ed. 3. c. 1. CHAP. VI. That the three Estates of every Kingdom whereof CALVIN speaks have no authority either to regulate the power or controll the Actions of the Soveraign Prince I. The Bishops and Clergy of England not the King make the third Estate and of the dangerous consequences which may follow on the contrary Tenet II. The different influence of the three Estates upon conditional Princes and an absolute Monarch III. The Sanhedrim of no authority over the persons or the actions of the Kings of Judah IV. The three Estates in France of 〈◊〉 small authority over the actions of that King V. The King of Spain not over-ruled or regulated by the three Estates VI. Of what authority they have been antiently in the Parliaments of Scotland VII The King of England alwaies accounted heretofore for an absolute Monarch VIII 〈◊〉 part of Soveraignty invested legally in the English Parliaments IX The three Estates assembled in the Parliament of England subordinate unto the King not co-ordinate with him X. The Legislative power of Parliaments is properly and legally in the King alone XI In what particulars the power of the English Parliament doth consist especially XII The Kings of England ordinarily over-rule tâ—eir Parliaments by themselves their Counsel and their Judges XIII Objections answered touching the power and practice of some former Parliaments and the testimonies given unto them XIV No such Authority given by God in Holy Scripture to any such Popular Magistrates as CALVIN dreams of and pretends XV. The Application and Conclusion of the whole Discourse I Have been purposely more copious in the former Chapter because I thought it necessaâ—y to declare and manifest who made the three Estates in each several Kingdom which are pretended by our Author to have such power of regulating the authority and censuring the actions and the persons of their Soveraign Princes And this the rather in regard it is thought of late and more than thought presented to the world in some publick writings especially as it relates to the Realm of England that the King the Lords and Commons make the three Estates which brings the King into an equal rank with the other two in reference to the businesse and affairs of Parliament A fancy by what Accident soever it was broached and published which hath no consistence either with truth or ordinary observation or with the practice of this Realm or of any other For the proof of this my position that the King is none of the three Estates as is now pretended if all proofs else should fail I have one from Calvin whose judgement in this point amongst many of us will be instar omnium For where he saith in singulis Regnis tres esse Ordines e Calvin instâ—t 4. cap. ult that there are three Estates in each several Kingdom and that these three Estates convened in Parliament or by what other name soever they call their meeting are furnished with a power Regum libidinem moderandi of moderating the licentiousness of Kings and Princes and that they become guilty of perfidious dissimulation si Regibus impotenter grassantibus c. If they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the Common-people I trow it cannot be conceived that the King is any one of the three Estates who are here
trusted or at least supposed to be intrusted with sufficient power as well to regulate his authority as to controll his actions If Calvin be allowed to have common sense and to have wit and words enough to expresse his meaning as even his greatest Adversaries do confesse he had it must be granted that he did not take the King of what Realm soever to be any of the three Estates or if he did he would have thought of other means to restrain his insolencies than by leaving him in his own hands to his own correction Either then Calvin is mistaken in the three Estates if he be mistaken in designing the men he aims at may he not be mistaken in the power he gives them or else the King is noâ—e indeed can be none of the three Estates qui primarios conventus peragunt who usually convene in Parliament for those ends and purposes before remembred But not to trust to him alone though questionlesse he be ideoneus testis in the present case Let us behold the Assembly of the three Estates or Conventus Ordinum in France from whence it is conceived that all Assemblies of this kind had their first Original and we shall find a very full description of them in the Assemblie des Estats at Bloys under Henry 3. Anno 1577. of which thus Thuanus f Thuanus in histor sui temp l. 63. Rex insublimi loco sub uranisco sedebat c. The King saith he sate on an high erected Throne under the Canopy of State the Queen-mother and the Queen his wife and all the Cardinals Princes Peers upon either hand And then it followeth Transtris infra dispositis ad dextram suam sacri Ordinis Delegati ad laevam Nobilitas infra plebetus ordo sedebat that on some lower forms there sate the Delegates of the Clergy towards the right hand of the King the Nobility towards the left and the Commissioners for the Commons in the space below We may conjecture at the rest by the view of this Of those in Spain by those Conventions of the States which before we spoke of at Burgos Monson Toledo and in other places in which the King is alwaies mentioned as a different person who called them and dissolved them as he saw occasion For Scotland it is ordinary in the stile of Parliaments to say the King and the Estates do ordain and constitute g Statutes of Scotland for which I do refer you to the Book of Statutes which clearly makes the K. to be a different person from the Estates of that Kingdome And as for England besides what may be gathered from the former Chapter we read in the History of Titus Livius touching the Reign and Acts of K. Henry the 5th that when his Funerals were ended the three Estates of the Realm of England did assemble together and declared his Son K. Henry the 6. being an Infant of 8 months old to be their Soveraign Lord h Tit. Liv. M. S. in Bibl. Bodl. as his Heir and Successor And in the Parliament Rolls of K. Richard the 3d. there is mention of a Bill or Parchment presented to that Prince being then Duke of Glocester on the behalf and in the name of the three Estates of this Realm of England that is to wit of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Commons by name which forasmuch as neither the said three Estates nor the persons which delivered it on their behalf were then assembled in form of Parliament was afterwards in the first Parliament of that King by the same three Estates assembled in this present Parliament I speak the very words of the Act it self and by authority of the same enrolled recorded and approved i Ap Speed in K. Rich. 3â— And at the request and by the assent of the three Estates of this Realm that is to say the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons of this Land assembled in this present Parliament and by authority of the same it be pronounced decreed and declared that our said Soveraign Lord the King was and is the very and undoubted heir of this Realm of England c. And so it is acknowledged in a k 1 Eliz. cap. 3. Statute of 1 Eliz. ca. 3. where the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons in that Parliament assembled being said expresly and in terminis to represent the three Estates of the Realm of England did recognize the Queens Majesty to be their true lawfull and undoubted Soveraign Liege Lady and Queen This makes it evident that the King was not accounted in the times before for one of the three Estates of Parliament nor can be so accounted in the present times For considering that the Lords and Commons do most confessedly make two of the three Estates and that the Clergy in an other Act of Parliament of the said Queens time are confessed to be one of the greatest States of the Realm l Statut. 8 Eliz. cap. 1. which Statute being still in force doth clearly make the Clergy to be the third either there must be more than three Estates in this Kingdome which is against the Doctrine of the present times or else the King is none of the Estates as indeed he is not which was the matter to be proved But I spend too much time in confuting that which hath so little ground to stand on more than the dangerous consequences which are covered under it For if the King be granted once to be no more than one of the three Estates how can it choose but follow from so sad a Principle that he is of no more power and consideration in the time of Parliament than the House of Peers which sometimes hath consisted of three Lords no more or than the House of Commons only which hath many times consisted of no more than 80 or an hundred Gentlemen but of far lesse consideration to all intents and purposes in the Law whatever than both the Houses joyned together What else can follow hereupon but that the King must be co-ordinate with his two Houses of Parliament and if co-ordinate then to be over-ruled by their Joynt concurrence bound to conform unto their Acts and confirm their Ordinances or upon case of inconformity and non-complyance to see them put in execution against his liking and consents to his foul reproach And what at last will be the issue of this dangerous consequence but that the Lords content themselves to come down to the Commons and the King be no otherwise esteemed of than the chief of the Lords the Princeps Senatus if you will or the Duke of Venice at the best no more which if Sir Edward Dering may be credited as I think he may in this particular seems to have been the main design of some of the most popular and powerfull Members then sitting with him for which I do refer the Reader to his book of Speeches Which dangerous consequents whether they were observed at
first by these who first ventured on the expression or were improvidently looked over I can hardly say Certain I am it gave too manifest an advantage to the Antimonarchical party in this Kingdome and hardned them in their proceeding against their King whom they were taught to look on and esteem no otherwise than as a Joynt-tenant of the Soveraignty with the Lords and Commons And if Kings have partners in the Soveraignty they are then no King such being the nature and law of Monarchy that si divisionem capiat interitum capiat necesse est m Lactant Institut Div. l. 1. c. if it be once divided and the authorities thereof imparted it is soon destroyed Such is the dangerous consequence of this new Expression that it seemeth utterly to deprive the Bishops and in them the Clergy of this Land of all future hopes of being restored again to their place in Parliament For being the Parliament can consist but of three Estates if the King fall so low as to pass for one either the Bishops or the Commons or the Temporal Lords must desert their claim the better to make way for this new pretension and in all probability the Commons being grown so potent and the Nobility so numerous and united in blood and mariages will not quit their interesse and therefore the poor Clergy must be no Estate because lesse able as the world now goeth with them to maintain their title I have often read that Constantine did use to call himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Euseb de vita Constant the Bishop or Superintendent of his Bishops and I have oft heard our Lawyers say that the King is the general Ordinary of the Kingdome but never heard nor read till within these few yearrs that ever any King did possess himself of the Bishops place or vote in Parliament or sate there as the first of the three Estates as antiently the Bishops did to supply their absence By which device whether the Clergy or the King be the greater losers though it be partly seen already future times will shew 2. This rub removed we next proceed to the examination of that power which by our Author is conferred on the three Estates which we shall find on search and tryal to be very different according to the constitution of the Kingdome in which they are For where the Kings are absolute Monarchs as in England Scotland France and Spain l Bodin de Repub. l. 1. c. the three Estates have properly and legally little more authority than to advise their King as they see occasion to represent unto his view their common grievances and to propose such remedies for redresse therof as to them seem meetest to canvass and review such erroneous judgements as formerly have passed in inferiour Courts and finally to consult about and prepare such laws as are expedient for the publick In other Countries where the Kings are more conditional and hold their Crowns by compact and agreement betweeen them and their Subjects the reputation and authority of the three Estates is more high and eminent as in Polonia Danemark and some others of the Northern Kingdomes where the Estates lay claim to more than a directive power and think it not enough to advise their King unless they may dispose of the Kingdome also or at least make their King no better than a Royal Slave Thus and no otherwise it is with the German Emperors who are obnoxious to the Laws m Thuan. hist sui temp l. 2. and for their Government accomptable to the Estates of the Empire insomuch that if the Princes of the Empire be perswaded in their consciences that he is likely by his mal-administration to destroy the Empire and that he will not hearken to advice and counsel n Anonym Script ap Philip Paraeu in Append. â—d Rom. 13. ab Electorum Collegio Caesaria potestate privari potest he may be deprived by the Electors and a more fit and able man elected to supply the place And to this purpose in a Constitution made by the Emperor Jodocus about the year 1410. there is a clause that if he or any one of his Successors do any thing unto the contrary thereof the Electors and other States of the Empire sine rebellionis vel infidelitatis crimine libertatem habeant o Goldast Constit Imperial Tom. 3. p. 424. should be at liberty without incurring the crimes of Treason or Disloyalty not only to oppose but resist them in it The like to which occurs for the Realm of Hungary wherein K. Andrew gives authority to his Bishops Lords and other Nobles sine nota alicujus infidelitatis p Bonfinius de Edict publ p. 37. that without any imputation of disloyalty they may contradict oppose and resist their Kings if they do any thing in violation of some Laws and sanctions In Poland the King takes a solemn oath at his Coronation to confirm all the Privileges rights and liberties which have been granted to his Subjects of all ranks and orders by any of his Predecessors and then addes this clause quod si Sacramentum meum violavero incolae Regni nullam nobis obedientiam praestare tenebuntur which if he violates his Subjects shall no longer be obliged to yield him obedience q Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. Which oath as Bodine well observeth doth savour rather of the condition of the Prince of the Senate than of the Majesty of a King The like may be affirmed of Frederick the first King of Danemark who being called unto that Crown on the ejection of K. Christian the 2d An. 1523. was so conditioned with by the the Lords of the Kingdome that at his coronation or before he was fain to swear that he would put none of the Nobility to death or banishment but by the judgement of the Senate that the great men should have power of life or death over their Tenants and Vassals and that no Appeal should lye from them to the Kings tribunal nor the King be partaker of the confiscations nec item honores aut imperia privatis daturum c r Id. ibid. nor advance any private person to commands or honors but by authority of his great Counsel Which oath being also taken by Frederick the second made Bodinus say that the Kings of Danemark non tam reipsa quam appellare Reges sunt were only titular Kings but not Kings indeed Which character he also gives of the Kings of Bohemia Å¿ Id. ibid. p. 88. But in an absolute Monarchy the case is otherwise all the prerogatives and rights of Soveraignty being so vested in the Kings person ut nec singulis civibus nec universis fac est c. that it is neither lawful to particular men nor to the whole body of the Subjects generally to call the Prince in question for life fame or fortunes t Id. ibid. p. 210. and amongst these he reckoneth the kingdoms of France
Spain England Scotland the Tartars Muscovites omnium paene Africae Asiae imperiorum and of almost all the Kingdomes of Africk and Asia But this we shall the better see by looking over the particulars as they lye before us 3. But first before we come unto those particulars we will look backwards on the condition and authority of the Jewish Sanhedrim which being instituted and ordained by the Lord himself may serve to be a leading case in the present business For being that the Iews were the Lords own people and their Kings honored with the title of the Lords Anointed it will be thought that if the Sanhedrim or the great Councel of the seventie had any authority and power over the Kings of Iudah of whose jus Regni such a large description is made by God himself in the first of Sam. cap. 8. the three Estates may reasonably expect the like in these parts of Christendom Now for the authority of the Sanhedrim it is said by Cardinal Baronius that they had power of judicature over the Law the Prophets and the Kings themselves u Baron Annal. Eccl. An. 31. §. 10. Erat horum summa autoritas ut qui de lege cognoscerent Prophetis simul de Regnibus judicarent Which false position he confirms by as false an instance affirming in the very next words horum judicio Herodem Regem postulatum esse that King Herod was convented and convicted by them for which he cites Iosephus with the like integrity I should have wondred very much what should occasion such a grosse mistake in the learned Cardinal had I not shewn before that as he makes the Sanhedrim to rule the King so he hath made the high Priest to rule the Sanhedrim which to what purpose it was done every man can tell who knoweth the Cardinal endeavoureth nothing more in his large Collections than to advance the dignity and supremacy of the Popes of Rome x Id. in Epist dedicator But for the power pretended to be in the Sanhedrim and their proceedings against Herod as their actual King Iosephus when he cite's is so far from saying it that he doth expresly say the contrary For as Josephus tells the story Hyrcanus was then King not Herod and Herod of so little hopes to enjoy the Kingdom that he could not possibly pretend any Title to it But having a command in Galilee procured by Antipater his Father of the good King Hyrcanus he had played the wanton Governor amongst them and put some of them to death against Law and Justice For which the Mothers of the slain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did often call upon the King and people in the open Temple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Joseph Antâ—q Judic l. 14. cap. 17. c. that Herod might answer for the murther before the Sanhedrim Which being granted by the King he was accordingly convented by them and had been questionlesse condemned had not the King who loved him dearly given him notice of it on whose advertisement he went out of the Town and so escaped the danger This is the substance of that story and this gives no authority to the Court of Sanhedrim over the persons or the actions of the Kings of Iudah Others there are who make them equal to the Kings though not superiour Magnam fuisse Senatus autoritatem Regiae velut parem z Grotius in Matth. cap. 5. v. 22. saith the learned Grotius And for the proof thereof allege those words of Sedechias in the Book of Ieremie who when the Princes of his Realm required of him to put the Prophet to death returned this Answer a Jerem. 38. 5. Behold he is in your hâ—nd Rex enim contra vos nihil potest for the King is not he that can do any thing against you Which words are also cited by Mr. Prynne to prove that the King of England hath no Negative voyce b Prynne of Parl. pt 2. p. 73. but by neither rightly For Calvin who as one observeth composed his expositions on the book of God according to the doctrine of his Institutions c Hookers preface would not have lost so fair an evidence for the advancing of the power of his three Estates had he conceived he could have made it serviceable to his end and purpose But he upon the contrary finds fault with them who do so expound it or think the King did speak so honorably of his Princes ac si nihil iis sit nequandum d Calvin in Jerem. c. 38. v. 5. as if it were not to deny them any thing Not so saith he it rather is amerulenta Regis querimonia a sad and bitter complaint of the poor captivated King against his Counsellors by whom he was so over-ruled ut velit nolit cedere iis cognitur that he was forced to yield to them whether he would or not which he expresly calls inexcusabilem arrogantium an intollerable piece of sawciness in those Princes and an exclusion of the King from his legal rights 4 Let us next take a view of such Christian Kingdomes as are under the command of absolute Monarchs And first we will begin with the Realm of France the government whereof is meerly Regal if not despotical such as that of a Master over his Servants which Aristotle defineth to be a form of Government 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c Aristot Politic. l. 3. wherein the King may do whatsoever he list according to the counsel of his own mind For in his Arbitrary Edicts which he sendeth abroad he never mentioneth the consent of the People or the approbation of the Counsel or the advice of his Judges which might be thought to derogate too much from his absolute power but concludes all of them in this Regal form Car tel est nostre plaisir for such is our pleasure And though the Court of Parliament in Paris do use to take upon them to peruse his Edicts before they passe abroad for d View of France by Dallington Laws and sometime to demurr on his grants and patents and to petition him to reverse the same as they see occasion yet their perusal is a matter but of meer formality and their demurs more dilatory than effectual It is the Car tel est nostre plaisir that concludes the business and the Kings pleasure is the Law which that Court is ruled by As for the Assemblie des Estats or Conventus Ordinum it was reputed antiently the Supreme Court for government and justice of all the Kingdome and had the cognizance of the greatest and most weighty affairs of State But these meetings have been long since discontinued and almost forgotten there being no such Assembly from the time of K. Charles the eighth to the beginning of the reign of K. Charles the ninth e Thuanus hist sui temp which was 70 years and not many since And to say truth they could be but of little use as the world
there be a body of Laws in use amongst them partly made up of some old Gothish Laws and Constitutions and partly of some parts of the Law imperial yet for the explanation of the Laws in force if any doubt arise about them or for supplying such defects which in the best colllection of the Laws may occur sometimes the Magistrates and Judges are to have recourse to the King alone and to conform to such instructions as he gives them in it And this is it which was ordained by Alfonso the tenth qui etiam magistratus ac judices Principem adire jussit quoties patrio jure nihil de proposita causa scriptum esset p Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 8. as Bodinus hath it 'T is true that for the raising of supplies of mony and the imposing of extraordinary taxes upon the subject the Kings of Spain must be beholden to the three Estates without whose consent it cannot legally be done But then it is as true withall that there are customary tributes called Servitia q Id. ibid. p. 90. which the King raiseth of his own authority without such consent And their consenting to the extraordinary is a thing of course the Spanish Nation being so well affected naturally to the power and greatness of their Kings whom they desire to make considerable if not formidable in the opinion of their Neighbours that the Kings seldome fail of monies if the Subjects have it Finally that we may perceive how absolute this Monarch is over all the Courts or Curias of his whole dominions take this along according as it stands verbatim Å¿ Spanish hist 67. by Tyrannell in the Spanish Historie The King of Spain as he is a potent Prince and Lord of many Countries so hath he many Counsels for the managing of their affairs distinctly and apart without any confusion every Counsel treating only of those matters which concern their Jurisdiction and charges with which Counsels and with the Presidents thereof being men of chief note the King doth usually confer touching matters belonging to the good Government preservation and increase of his Estates and having heard every mans opinion he commands that to be executed which he holds most fit and convenient .. 6. Next let us take a view of Scotland and we shall find it there no otherwise I mean in reference to the point which is now in question than in France or Spain For besides that Bodinus makes it one of those absolute Monarchies ubi Reges sine controversia omnia jura Majestatis habent per sese t Bodin de Repub. l. 2. c. 7. in which the Kings have clearly all the rights of Majesty inherent in their own persons only it is declared in the Records of that very Kingdome that the King is directus totius dominus u Camden n Britan. deicript â— the Soveraign Lord of the whole State and hath all authority and jurisdiction over all estates and degrees aswel Ecclesiastical as lay or temporal And as for those Estates and Degrees convened in Parliament we may conjecture at their power by that which is delivered of the form or order which they held it in which is briefly this x Form of holding the Parl. in Scotl. Assoon as the Kings writ is issued out for summoning the Estates to meet in Parliament he maketh choyse of eight of the Spiritual Lords such on whose wisdom and integrity he may most rely which eight do choose as many of the Temporal Lords and they together nominate eight more out of the Commissioners for the Counties and as many out of the Commissioners for the Towns or Burroughs These 32 thus chosen are called Domini pro Articulis Lords of the Articles and they together with the Chancellor Treasurer Keeper of the Privy Seal and Principal Secretaries of state and the Master of the Rolls whom they call Clerk Register do admit or reject every bill but not before they have been shewn unto the King if they pass there they are presented afterwards to the whole Assembly where being thorowly weighed and examined put unto the votes of the house such of them as are carried by the major part of the Voices for the Lords and Commons sit together in the same house there are on the last day of the Sessions exhibited to the King who by touching them with his Scepter pronounceth that he either ratifieth and approveth them or that he doth disable them and make them void But if the business be disliked by the Lords of the Articles it proceeds no further and never comes unto the consideration of the Parliament or if the King dislikes of any thing in it when they shew it to him it either is razed out or mended before it be presented to the publick view King James of blessed memory who very well understood his own power and the forms of that Parliament describes it much to the same purpose in his Speech made at Whitehall March 31. Anno 1607. About twenty daies saith he before the Parliament Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom to deliver unto the Kings Clerk of Register all Bils to be exhibited that Session before a certain day Then are they brought unto the King and perused and considered by him and only such as he alloweth of are put into the Chancellors hands to be propounded to the Parliament and none others And if any other man in Parliament speak of any other matter than is in this sort first allowed by the King the Chancellor telleth him that the King hath allowed of no such Bill Besides when they have passed them for Laws they are presented to the King and he with his Scepter put into his hands by the Chancellor must say I ratifie and approve all things done in this present Parliament And if there be any thing that he disliketh it is razed out before So the eldest Parliament-man as he said himself at that time in Scotland This was the form of holding Parliaments in Scotland which whosoever doth consider with a serious eye may perceive most plainly that it is wholly in the Kings power to frame the Parliament to his own will or at the least to hinder it from doing any thing to the prejudice of his Royal Crown and Dignity in that the nominating of the Lords of the Articles did in a manner totally depend on him Which being observed by the Scots they took the opportunity when they were in Arms to pass an Act during the Presidency of the Lord Burley Anno 1640. y Acts of Parliaments 16 Carol. for the abolition of this Order and for reducing of that Parliament to the forms of England as being thought more advantagious to their purposes than the former was So that the violent disloyalty of the Scotish Subjects their Insurrections against their Kings and murdering them sometimes when their heels were up which makes that Nation so ill spoke of in the Stories of Christendom are not to
declared to have been fortified by sundry Laws and Ordinances made in former Parliaments k Ibid. and such as hath been since confirmed by a solemn Oath taken and to be taken by most of the Subjects of this Kingdom Which Oath consisting of two parts the one Declaratory and the other Promissory in the Declaratory part the man thus taketh it doth declare and testifie in his conscience that the Kings Highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm and of all other his Dominions and Countries aswell in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal c. l 1 Eliz. c. 1. And in the Promissooy part they make Oath and swear that to their power they will assist and defend all Jurisdictions Privileges Preheminences and Authorities granted or belonging to the Kings Highness his Heirs and Succcesseors or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm Put all which hath been said together and it will appear that if to have merum imperium a full and absolute command and all the jura majestatis which belong to Soveraignty if to be so supreme as to hold immediatly of God to have all persons under him none but God above him if to have all authority and jurisdiction to be vested in him and proceeding from him and the material sword at his sole disposal for the correcting of offenders and the well ordering of his people if to have whole and entire power of rendring justice and final determination of all causes to all manner of Subjects us also to interpret and dispence with Laws and all this ratified and confirmed unto him by the solemn Oath of his Subjects in the Court of Parliament be enough to make an absolute Monarch the Kings of England are more absolute Monarchs than either of their Neighbours of France or Spain 8. If any thing may be said to detract from this it is the new devise so much pressed of late of placing the chief Soveraignty or some part thereof in the two Houses of Parliament concerning which Mr. Prynne published a discourse entituled The supreme power of Parliaments and Kingdoms and others in their Pamphlets upon that Argument have made the Parliament so absolute and the King so limited that of the two the Members of the Houses are the greater Monarchs But this is but a new devise not heard of in our former Monuments Records of Law nor proved or to be proved indeed by any other Medium than the Rebellions of Cade Tiler Straw Kett Mackerell and the rest of that rascall rabble m Prynnes book of Parl. c. pâ— 3. or the seditious Parliaments in the time of K. Henry the 3d. King Edward the 2d and King Richard the 2d when civil war and faction carried all before it For neither have the Houses or either of them enjoyed such Soveraignty de facto in times well setled and Parliaments lawfully assembled nor ever could pretend to the same de jure Or if they did as many have been apt enough to raise false pretences it would much trouble them to determine whether this Soveraignty be conferred upon them by the King or the people whether it be in either of the Houses severally or in both united If they can challenge this pretended Soveraignty in neither of these capacities nor by none of these Titles it may be warrantably concluded that there is no such Soveraignty as they do pretend to And first there is no part nor branch of Soveraignty conferred upon them by the King The writs of Summons which the Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled at Oxon. 1643. doth most truly call the foundation of all power in Parliament n Declaration of the Treaty p. 15. tell us no such matter The writ directed to the Lords doth enable them only to confer and treat with one another consilium vestrum impendere and to advise the King in such weighty matters as concern the safety of the Kingdom But they are only to advise not compell the King to counsell him but not controll him and to advise and counsel are no marks of Soveraignty but rather works of service and subordination Nor can they come to give this Counsel without he invite them and being invited by his writ cannot choose but come except he excuse them which are sure notes of duty and subjection but very sory signs of power and soveraignty 'T is true that being come together they may and sometimes do on a writ of Error examin and reverse or affirm such judgements as have been given in the Kings Bench and from their sentence in the case there is no appeal but only to the whole body of that Court the King and both the Houses the Head and Members o Case of our Affairs p. 7 8. But this they do not as the upper house of Parliament but as the distinct court of the Kings Barons of Parliament of a particular and ministerial jurisdiction to some intents and purposes and to some alone which though it doth invest them with a power of judicature confers not any thing upon them which belongs to Soveraignty Then for the Commons all which the writ doth call them to is facere consentire to do and consent unto such things which are ordained by the Lords and Common Counsel of the Kingdom of England and sure conformity and consent which is all the writ requireth from them are no marks of Soveraignty nor can an Argument be drawn from thence by the subtillest Sophister to shew that they are called to be partakers of the Soveraign power or that the King intends to denude himself of any branch or leaf thereof to hide their nakednesse And being met together in a body collective they are so far from having any share in Soveraignty that they cannot properly be called a Court of Judicature as neither having any power to minister an Oath p Id. p. 9. or to imprison any body except it be some of their own Members if they see occasion which are things incident to all Courts of Justice and to every Steward of a Leet insomuch that the House of Coâ—mons is compared by some â—and not incongruosly unto the Grand Inquest at a general Sessions q Review of the Observat p. 22. whose principal work it is to receive bils and prepare businesses and make them fit and ready for my Lords the Judges Nay so far were they heretofore from the thoughts of Soveraignty that they were lyable to sutes and punishments for things done in Parliament though only to the prejudice of a private Subject untill King Henry 8. most graciously passed a Law for their indemnity For whereas Richard Strode one of the company of Tinners in the County of Cornwall being a Member of the Commons House had spoken somwhat to the prejudice of that Society and contrary to the Ordinances of the Stanneries at his return into the Country â—e was arested fined imprisoned Complaint whereof being
made in Parliament the King passed a Law to this effect viz. r 4 Hâ—n 8. c. 8. That ull sutes condemnations executions charges and impositions put or hereafter to be put upon Richard Strode and every of his Complices that be of this Parliament or aâ—y other hereafter for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any thing concerning the Parliament to be communed and treated of shall be void and null but neither any reparation was allowed to Strode nor any punishment inflicted upon those that sued him for ought appears upon Record And for the Houses joyned together which is the last capacity they can claim it in they are so far from having the supreme authority that as it is observed by a learned Gentleman they cannot so unite or conjoyn as to be an entire Court either of Soveraign or Ministerial jurisdiction no otherwise co-operating than by concurrence of Votes in their several Houses for preparing matters in order to an Act of Parliament s Case of our Affairs p. 9. Which when they have done they are so far from having any legal authority in the State as that in Law there is no stile nor form of their joynt Acts nor doth the Law so much as take notice of them until they have the Royal Assent So that considering that the two Houses alone do no way make an entire Body or Court and that there is no known stile nor form of any Law or Edict by the Votes of the two Houses only nor any notice taken of them by the Law it is apparent that there is no Soveraignty in their two Votes alone How far the practise of the Lords Commons which remaind at Westminster after so many of both Houses had tepaired to the King c. may create Precedents unto posterity I am not able to determine but sure I am they have no Precedent to shew from the former Ages But let us go a little further and suppose for granted that the Houses either joynt or separate be capable of the Soveraignty were it given unto them I would fain know whether they claim it from the King or the people only Not from the King for he confers upon them no further power than to debate and treat of his great Affairs to have access unto his person freedome of Speech as long as they contein themselves within the bounds of Loyalty authority over their own Members which being custumarily desired t Hakewell of passing bils in Parliament and of course obtained as it relates into the Commons shews plainly that these vulgar privileges are nothing more the rights of Parliament than the favours of Princes but yet such favours as impart not the least power of Soveraignty Nor doth the calling of a Parliament ex opere operato as you know who phrase it either denude the King of the poorest robe of all his Royalty or confer the same upon the Houses or on either of them whether the King intend so by his call or otherwise For Bodin whom Mr. Prynne hath honored with the title of a grand Politician u Pryn of Parliam par 2. p. 45. doth affirm expresly Principis majestatem nec Comitorum convocatione nec Senatus populique praesentia minui x Bodin de Repub. that the majesty or Soveraignty of the King is not a jot diminished either by the calling of a Parliament or Conventus Ordinum or by the frequency and presence of his Lords and Commons Nay to say truth the Majesty of Soveraign Princes is never so transcendent and conspicuous as when they sit in Parliament with their States about them the King then standing in his highest Estate as was once said by Henry 8. who knew as well as any of the Kings of England how to keep up the majesty of the Crown Imperial Nor can they claim it from the people who have none to give for nemo dat quod non habet as the saying is The King as hath been proved before doth hold his Royal Crown immediately from God himself not from the contract of the people He writes not populi clementia but Dei gratia not by the favour of the people but by the grace of God The consent and approbation of the people used and not used before the day of coronation is reckoned only as a part of the solemn pomps which are then accustomably used The King is actually King to all intents and purposes in the Law whatever immediately on the death of his Predecessor Nor ever was it otherwise objected in the Realm of England till Clark and Watson pleaded it at their arraignment in the first year of King James y Speeds History in K. James Or grant we that the Majesty of this Kingdom was first originally in the people and by them devolved upon the King by their joynt consent yet having given away that power by their said consent and setled it upon the King by an Act of State confirmed by Oaths and all solemnities which that Act requires they cannot so retract that grant or make void that gift as to pass a new conveyance of it and settle it upon their Representees in the House of Commons Or if they could yet this would utterly exclude all the Lords from having the least share or portion in this new found Soveraignty in that they represent not the common people but sit there only in their own personal capacities and therefore must submit at last to these new made Soveraigns who carry both the Purse Sword at their own girdles So then the people cannot give the Soveraignty and if they have no power to give it the Lords and Commons have no claim thereunto de jure See we next therefore how much of this Soveraignty they or their Predecessors rather have enjoyed de facto in peaceable and regular times fit to be drawn into example in the Ages following The chief particulars in which the Soveraignty consists we have seen before and will now see whether that any of them been exercised and injoyed in peaceable and regular times by both or either of the two Houses of Parliament And first for calling and dissolving Parliaments making of Peers granting of liberty to Towns and Cities to make choyse of Burgesses which antiently had no such liberty treating with forein States denouncing war or making Leagues or Peace after war commenced granting safe conduct and protection indenizing of Aliens giving of honors unto eminent and deserving persons rewarding pardoning coyning printing making of corporations and dispensing with the Laws in force they are such points which never Parliament did pretend to till these later times wherein every thing almost is lawfull I am sure more lawâ—ull than to fear God and honor the King Nor do I find that Mr. Prynne hath laboured to entitle them to these particulars For levying of Arms and the command of the Militia besides that the Kings of England have ever been in possession of it and that possession never disturbed
in number nor more obvious than those of our Kings serving their turns by and upon their Parliaments as their occasions did require For not to look on higher and more Regal times we find that Richard the 2d a Prince not very acceptable to the Common people could get an Act of Parliament t 21 Ric. 2. to confirm the extrajudicial opinion of the Iudges given before at Notingham that King Henry 4th could by an other Act reverse all that Parliament u 1 Hen 4. entayl the Crown to his posterity and keep his Dutchy of Lancaster and all the Lands and Seigneuries of it from being united to the Crown that King Edward the 4th could have a Parliament to declare all the Kings of the House of Lancaster to be Kings in fact but not in right x 1 Ed. c. 1. and for uniting of that Dutchy to the Crown Imperial notwithstanding the former Act of separation that King Richard the 3d. could have a Parliament to bastardize all his Brothers Children to set the Crown on his own head though a most bloody Tyrant and a plain Usurper y Speeds hist in K. Richard 3. that King Henry 7. could have the Crown entayled by an Act of Parliament to the issue of his own body z Verulam hist of K. Hen 7. without relation to his Queen of the house of York which was conceived by many at that time to have the better Title to it another for paying a Benevolence which he had required of the subject a 11 Hen. 7. c. 10. though all Benevolences had been damned by a former Statute made in the short but bloody reign of King Richard the 3d. that King Henry 8. b 65 Hen. 8. c. 22 28. c. 7. 35 H. 8. c. 1. could have one Act of Parliament to bastardry his Daughter Mary in favour of the Lady Elizabeth another to declare the Lady Elizabeth to be illegitimate in expectation of the issue by Queen Jane Seymour a third for setling the succession by his Will and Testament and what else he pleased that Queen Mary could not only obtain several Acts in favour of her self and the Sâ—e of Rome c 1 Mar. sâ—s 2. c. 1 2. 1. 2 Ph. M. c. 8. 10. but for the setling of the Regency on the King of Spain in case the Children of that Bed should be left in nonage And finally that Queen Elizabeth did not only gain many several Acts for the security of her own Person which were determinable with her life but could procure an Act to be passed in Parliament for making it high treason to affirm and say That the Queen could not by Act of Parliament bind and dispose the Rights aâ—d Titles which any person whatsoever might have to the Crown d 13 Eliz. c. 1. And as for raising monies and amassing treasures by help of Parliaments he that desires to know how well our Kings have served themselves that way by the help of Parliaments let him peruse a book intituled the Privilege of Parliaments writ in the manner of Dialogue between a Privy Counsellor and a Iustice of Peace and he shall be satisfied to the full Put all that hath been said together and sure the kingdom of England must not be the place in which the three Estates convened in Parliament have power to regulate the King or restain his actions or moderate his extravagances or where they can be taxed for perâ—idious treachery if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the Common-people or otherwise abuse that power which the Lord hath given them Calvin was much mistaken if he thought the contrary or if he dreamt that he should be believ'd on his ipse dixit without a punctual enquiry into the grounds and probability of such a dangerous intimation as he lays before us 13. But against this it is objected that Parliaments have disposed of the Militia of the Kingdom of the Forts Castles Ports and the Navie Royal not only without the Kings leave but against his liking that they have deposed some Kings and advanced others to the top of the Regal Throne And for the proof of this they produce examples out of the reign of K. Henry 3. K. Edw. 2. and K. Richard the 2. e Prynnes Book of Parl. part 2. Examples which if rightly pondered doe not so much prove the power as the weakness of Parliaments in being carried up and down by the privat conduct of every popular pretender For 't is well known that the Parliaments did not take upon them to rule or rather to over-look K. Henry 3. but as they were directed by Simon Montfort Earl of Leicester who having raised a potent faction in the State by the assistance of the Earls of Glocester Hereford Derby f Maâ— Paris Henr. 3. and some others of the great Lords of the kingdom compelled the King to yeeld unto what terms he pleased and made the Parliaments no other than a means and instrument to put a popular gloss on his wretched purposes And 't is well known that the ensuing Parliaments which they instance in moved not of their own accord to the deposing of King Edward the 2. or King Richard the 2. but sailed as they were steered by those powerfull Counsels which Queen Isabel in the one and Henry Duke of Lancaster in the other did propose unto them g Walsingham in Hist Angl. Hypodig Neustriae It was no safe resisting those as their cold wisdoms and forgotten loyalties did suggest unto them qui tot legionibus imperarent who had so manany thousand men in arms to make good their project and they might think as the poor-spirited Citizens of Samaria did in another case but a case very like the present Behold two Kings stood not before him how then can we stand h 2 Kings 10. 4. For had it been an argument of the power of Parliaments that they deposed one King to set up another dethroned King Richard to advance the Duke of Lancaster to the Regal diadem they would have kept the house of Lancaster in possession of it for the full demonstration of a power indeed and not have cast them off at the first attempt of a new plausible pretender declared them to be kings in fact but not in right whose lawfull right they had before preferred above all other titles and set the Crown upon the heads of their deadly Enemies In the next place it is objected that Parliaments are a great restraint of the Soveraign power according to the Doctrine here laid down by Calvin in that the King can make no laws nor levy any money upon the Subject but by the counsel and assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament But this objection hurts as little as the former did For Kings to say the truth need no laws at all In all such points wherein they have not bound themselves by some former laws
will and pleasure of All-mighty God vers 23. And what the Lord God did in it we shall finde in the Book of Numbers chap. 11. For when Moses made complaint to God that the Burthen of all the people was laid on him vers 11. where note it is the burden still which he makes complaint of and that he was not able to hear all the people alone because it was too heavie for him vers 14. God willed him to make choice of seventy of those Officers which before he had placed over the people and to present them to him in the Tabernacle of the Congregation where he would give unto them the Spirit of Government ut sustentent tecum oâ—us populi to the end that they might bear the burthen of the people with him vers 17. Nothing in all this but the easing of the Supreme Magistrate of some part of the Burthen which was before too heavie for him without any diminution of his power in the least respect Nor doth it make for Calvins purpose that God said to Moses that he would take of the Spirit which was upon him and put it on the seventy Elders vers 17. the Spirit resting upon Moses in as full a measure as at first it did not lessened by the communication of it to those Under-officers And so the point is stated by two learned writers though otherwise of different perswasions in the things of God By Estius for the Pontificians it is so determined Estius in 〈◊〉 sacrae scripturae loca Num. 11. v. 17. Non significatur per hoc quod minus haberet Moses de spiritu quam antea sed significatur quod ex eodem spiritu gratiae quo repletus Moses populum illum regebat etiam alii adjutorium essent habituri ad eundem populum regendum Deodat Annot. in Num. 11. The very same with that of Deodatus for the Protestant or reformed writers Not that the gift of the Spirit saith he should be in any manner truly or really diminished in Moses but because that infallible conduct of the Spirit of God which untill then had been peculiar to Moses should be made common to all the seventy in the publick government And much lesse did it derogate from the spirit and power of Moses that the seventy were indued by God with the gift of prophesie vers 25. that being but a personal grace and perhaps but temporary to those persons neither to gain them at the first the greater estimation amongst the people whom they were to govern never pretended to by any of their Successors in that Magistracy for the times insuing And therefore when Moses was told of it he made light of the matter and was so far from envying at it that he seemed to wish that all Gods people might be able to prophesie to one another Estius in Num. 11. v. 29. vers 29. conceiving rightly nihil abesse dignitati suae personae as my Author hath it that it did nothing derogate from his power and dignity though Jâ—shua out of an honest zeal to his Masters greatnesse might fear it tended or might tend unto the diminution of his Masters dignity and credit as is observed by Deodate What power these seventy Elders had in succeeding times when they were drawn into a body and made up that great Court which was called the Sanhedrim and how far they were then from curbing and restraining the power of those several Kings under which they lived hath been shewn already Now if the old Testament do give so little countenance to that great Authority which Calvin hath assigned so peremptorily to his three Estates or any other popular Magistates in their several Countreys I am sure the New Testament doth afford them lesse in which obedience to the Supreme Magistrate is punctually and frequently required of all sorts of persons Let every soul be subject to the higher powers saith the Apostle of the Gentiles Rom. 13. 1. If every soul then neither any Papal Presbyterian or popular pretender can challenge any exemption from that obedience and subjection to the higher powers which is required of them in this Text and much lesse exercise any jurisdiction or Authority over them whereby they may be brought in subjection to him Hieronym in Rom. 13. St. Jerome tels us that this rule is given by the Apostle for fear lest some presuming on that Christian Liberty unto which they were called might possibly refuse to yeeld obedience and pay their just Tributes to those higher powers to which the Lord had made them subject And therefore he desires to humble them and bring them unto a better understanding of their Christian duty ne forte propter superbiam magis quam propter Deum contumeliam patiantur Lest the reproach or punishment which they suffered for it should be imputed rather to their pride and arrogancy then their zeal to God Now what St. Jerome tels us in the general only is by St. Chrysostome prest particularly with reference almost to all degrees and estates of men Here the Apostle sheweth saith he that these things are commanded to all men Chrysost in Rom. Hom. 23. both Priests and Monks and not to temporal men only which he declareth in the beginning when he said Let every soul be subject to the highest powers although thou be an Apostle although thou be an Evangelist although thou be a Prophet although thou be whatsoever thou art Which said he gives this reason for it that Religion is not overthrown by this subjection If no Apostle could pretend to an exemption from those common duties which Subjects owe unto their Princes then certainly the Pope who pretends to sit in Peters Chair and to challenge all the priviledges which belonged unto him must needs be in as great subjection to a Christian Emperor as the Apostles were in their times to any Heathen King If those things were required of Priests and Monks as he saies they were then must the Papal Clergie whether they be Monasticks or secular Priests perform those duties and yeeld that due obedience unto those Kings and Princes under whom they live which are here required But so it is that partly by strong hand and partly by taking their opportunities in the darker Ages of the Church the Pope hath not only freed his Clergie from the power of Princes in matters even of Civill nature and concernment but challengeth for himself a power above them and exercised it for a long time with great pride and Tyranny contrary to the Apostles Rule and the Fathers Commentary If no Evangelist or Prophet could challenge any such exemption as the Father plainly saith they could not then much lesse can the Presbyterian Minister pretend unto it though he be both a Prophet and an Evangelist also in his own conceit Which notwithstanding the Scottish Presbyterians had got unto so great a head in the minority of King James in all matters which related to Ecclesiastical cognizance and to that cognizance
they reduced all matters they commonly declin'd the Kings judgement and his Courts of Judicature as altogether incompetent appealing from them either to their own Presbyteries or to the next general Assembly of their own appointing and standing so wilfully to those Appeals that some of them had like to have paid dear for it after that Kings coming into England if the King had not been more mercifull to them then they deserved at his hands If no man whatsoever he be can lawfully acquit himself from this subjection as is said by Chrysostome what will become of Calvins popular Magistrates and of the great authority which he gives them over Kings and Princes those popular Officers being included equally with the rest of the people in St. Pauls injunction It 's true that Calvins popular Officers may seem to have some colour for it both from our English Translation and the vulgar Latine by which obedience is required sublimioribus potestatibus to the higher powers and all such popular Officers whatsoever they be may warrantably be lookt upon as higher powers in respect of the residue of the people But first the words in the original viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do not so properly signifie the higher as the supreme powers and so the word is rendred in the first of St. Peter cap. 2. vers 13. in which submission is required to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be unto the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Supreme or unto such as are sent by him c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith St. Peter in the singular 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith St. Paul in the plural number both words proceeding from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Nominative Case and consequently being of the same sense and signification But secondly permitting them the benefit of these translations yet will they finde but little colour for that coercive power that soveraign Authority and Jurisdiction which Calvin hath assigned to the three Estates or any other popular Officers over Kings and Princes For though such popular Officers may warrantably be lookt upon as higher powers in respect of the residue of the people as before was said yet are they lower powers in respect of the King from whom as they receive all the Authority which they have whatsoever it be so unto him they are to render an accompt of their actings in it whensoever he pleaseth So that these popular Officers may be compar'd not unfitly unto the Genera subalterna in the Schools of Logick each of them being subordinate to one another the Constable to the Maior or Bayliff in a corporate Town or to the Justices of the Peace in the County at large the Maiors and Justices to the Judges in their several Circuits the Judges in their several Circuits and their Courts of Judicature to the Lord Chancellor for the time being and he unto the three Estates when convened in Parliament till they end all in genus summum in that supreme power which is subordinate to none and unto which the rest are Species subalternae as the Logicians phrase it in their several orders till they end all in Specie infimâ even in the lowest of the People Less comfort can I give them from the Apostle of the Jewes from the words of St. Peter in which submission is required as before was said to every ordinance of man whether it be unto the King as unto the Supreme or unto Governors as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evill doers and for the praise of them that do well Now those which are thus authorised and sent by Kings to the ends and purposes before mentioned may very properly be resembled unto Jehosophats Commissioners in the Kingdome of Judah 2 Chron. 17. 7. or the itinerary Judges in the Realm of England and can neither claim nor exercise any other Authority then what in their Commissions and instructions is assigned unto them And certainly no King did or will ever grant any such Commission whereby his Vnder-officers and inferior Magistrates may challenge any power above him or exercise any jurisdiction or Authority over him If any thing in this Text may be thought to favour Calvin in this strange opinion it is that Kings are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 humana creatura saith the vulgar Latin an ordinance of man as the English reads it and being but a Creature of the peoples making the rest may think themselves as good men as he The Rhemists will have Kings to be called humane creatures because elected by the people or holding their Soveraignty by birth and carnall propagation ordained for the wealth peace and prosperity of the Subjects to put a difference betwixt that humane Superiority and the spiritual Rulers and Regiment guiding and governing the people to an higher end and instituted by God himself immediately Christ having expresly constituted the form of Regiment used ever since in the Church Whereunto Dr. Fulk for want of a better doth return this Answer viz. That though there be great difference between the government of Princes and Ecclesiastical Governors yet the Apostle calleth not Princes an humane creation as though they were not also of Gods Creation for there is no power but of God but that the form of their Creation is in mans appointment All the Genevians generally do so expound it and it concerns them so to do in point of interesse The Bishop of that City was their Soveraign Prince and had jus utriusque gladini as Calvin signified in a Letter to Cardinal Sadolet till he and all his Clergy were expelled the City in a popular Tumult Anno 1528. and a new form of Government established both in Church and State So that having laid the foundation of their Common-wealth in the expulsion of their Prince and the new model of their Discipline in refusing to have any more Bishop they found it best for justifying their proceedings at home and increasing their Partizans abroad to maintain a parity of Ministers in the Church of Christ and to invest the people and their popular Officers with a chief power in the concernments and affairs of State even to the deposing of Kings and disposing of Kingdoms But for this last they finde no warrant in the Text which we have before us For first admitting the Translation to be true and genuine as indeed it is not the Roman Emperor and consequently other Kings and Princes may be said to be an humane Ordinance because their power is most visibly conversant circa humanas Actiones about ordering of humane Actions and other civill affairs of men as they were subjects of the Empire and Members of that Body politick whereof that Emperor was head Secondly to make soveraign Princes by what name and Title soever called to be no other then an humane Ordinance because they are ordained by the people and of their appointment must needs create an irreconcileable difference
between St. Peter and St. Paul by which last the Supreme Powers whatsoever they be are called the Ordinance of God The Powers saith that Apostle are ordained of God and therefore he that resisteth the Powers resisteth the Ordinance of God Upon which words Deodate gives this Glosse or Comment That the supreme Powers are called the Ordinance of God because God is the Author of this Order in the world and all those who attain to these Dignities do so either by his manifest will and approbation when the means are lawfull or by his secret Providence by meer permission or toleration when they are unlawfull Now it is fitting that man should approve and tolerate that which God approves and tolerates But thirdly I conceive that those words in the Greek Text of St. Peter viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not so properly translated as they might have been and as the same words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are rendred by the same Translators somewhat more neer to the Original in another place For in the 8. chapt to the Romans vers 22. we finde them rendring 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the whole Creation and why not rather every Creature as both our old Translation and the Rhemists read it conform to omnis Creatura in the vulgar Latine which had they done and kept themselves more near to the Greek Original in St. Peters Text they either would have rendred it by every humane Creature as the Rhemists do or rather by all Men or by all Man-kinde as the words import And then the meaning will be this that the Jewes living scattered and disperst in Pontus Galatia Cappadocia and other Provinces of the Empire were to have their conversation so meek and lowly for fear of giving scandal to the Gentiles amongst whom they lived as to submit themselves to all Man-kinde or rather to every Man unto every humane Creature as the Rhemists read it that was in Authority above whether it were unto the Emperor himself as their supreme Lord or to such Legats Prefects and Procurators as were appointed by him for the government of those several Provinces to the end that they may punish the evil-doers and incourage such as did well living comformably to the Lawes by which they were governed Small comfort in this Text as in any of the rest before for those popular Officers which Calvin makes the Overseers of the soveraign Prince and Guardians of the Liberties of the common people If then there be no Text of Scripture no warrant from the word of God by which the popular Officers which Calvin dreams of are made the Keepers of the Liberties of the Common people or vested with the power of opposing Kings and soveraign Princes as often as they wantonly insult upon the people or wilfully infringe their Priviledges I would fain learn how they should come to know that they are vested with such power or trusted with the defence of the Subjects Liberties cujus se Dei ordinatione Tutores positos esse norunt as Calvin plainly saies they do If they pretend to know it by inspiration such inspiration cannot be known to any but themselves alone neither the Prince or people whom it most concerneth can take notice of it Nor can they well assure themselves whether such inspirations come from God or the Devil the Devil many times insnaring proud ambitious and vain-glorious Men by such strange Delusions If they pretend to know it by the Dictate of their private Spirit the great Diana of Calvin and his followers in expounding Scripture we are but in the same uncertainties as we were before And who can tell whether the private Spirit they pretend unto and do so much brag of 1 King 22. 22. may not be such a lying Spirit as was put into the mouthes of the Prophets when Ahab was to be seduced to his own destruction Adeo Argumenta ex absurdo petita ineptos habent exitus as Lactantius notes it All I have now to add is to shew the difference between Calvin and his followers in the propounding of this Doctrine delivered by Calvin in few words but Magisterially enough and with no other Authority then his ipse dixit enlarged by David Paraeus in his Comment on the 13. chapter to the Romans into divers branches and many endevours used by him as by the rest of Calvins followers to finde out Arguments and instances out of several Authors to make good the cause For which though Calvin scap'd the fire yet Paraeus could not Ille Crucem pretium sceleris tulit hic Diadema For so it hapned that one Mr. Knight of Brodegates now Pembroke Colledge in Oxford had preach'd up the Authority of these popular officers in a Sermon before the University about the beginning of the year 1622. for which being presently transmitted to the King and Councel he there ingenuously confessed that he had borrowed both his Doctrine and his proofs and instances from the Book of Paraeus above mentioned Notice whereof being given to the University the whole Doctrine of Paraeus as to that particular was drawn into several Propositions which in a full and frequent Convocation held on the 25. of June 1622. were severally condemned to be erroneous scandalous and destructive of Monarchical Government Upon which Sentence or determination the King gave order that as many of those books as could be gotten should solemnly and publickly be burnt in each of the Universities and St. Pauls Church-yard which was done accordingly An accident much complained of by the Puritan party for a long time after who looked upon it as the funeral pile of their Hopes and Projects till by degrees they got fresh courage carrying on their designs more secretly by consequence more dangerously then before they did The terrible effects whereof we have seen and felt in our late Civil Wars and present confusions But it is time to close this point and come to a conclusion of the whole Discourse there be no other Objections that I know of but what are easily reduced unto those before or not worth the Answering 15. Thus have we took a brief Survey of those insinuations grounds or Principles call them what you will which CALVIN hath laid down in his Book of Institutions for the incouragement of the Subjects to rebellious courses and putting them in Arms against their Soveraign either in case of Tyrannie Licentiousness or Mal-administration of what sort soever by which the Subjects may pretend that they are oppressed either in point of liberty or in point of property And we have shewn upon what false and weak foundations he hath raised his building how much he hath mistook or abused his Authors but how much more he hath betrayed and abused his Readers For we have clearly proved and directly manifested out of the best Records and Monuments of the former times that the Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta to oppose the Kings nor the Tribunes in the State of Rome to oppose the Consuls nor the Demarchi in the Common-wealth of Athens to oppose the Senate or if they were that this could no way serve to advance his purpose of setting up such popular Officers in the Kingdoms of Christendom those Officers being only found in Aristocraties or Democraties but never heard or dreampt of in a Monarchical Government And we have shewn both who they are which constitute the three Estates in all Christian Kingdoms and that there is no Christian Kingdom in which the three Estates convened in Parliament or by what other name soever they do call them have any authority either to regulate the person of the Soveraign Prince or restrain his power in case he be a Soveraign Prince and not meerly titular and conditional and that it is not to be found in Holy Scripture that they are or were ordained by God to be the Patrons and Protectors of the Common people and therefore chargeable with no lesse a crime than a most perfidious Dissimulation should they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or want only abuse that power which the Lord hath given them to the oppression of their Subjects In which last points touching the designation of the three Estates and the authority pretended to be vested in them I have carried a more particular eye on this Kingdom of England where those pernicious Principles and insinuations which our Author gives us have been too readily imbraced and too eagerly pursued by those of his party and opinion If herein I have done any service to Supreme Authority my Countrey and some misguided Zelots of it I shall have reason to rejoyce in my undertaking If not posterity shall not say that Calvins memory was so sacred with me and his name so venerable as rather to suffer such a Stumbling-block to be laid in the Subjects way without being censured and removed than either his authority should be brought in question or any of his Dictates to a legal tryal Having been purchased by the Lord at so dear a price we are to be no longer the Servants of men or to have the truth of God with respect of persons I have God to be my Father and the Church my Mother and therefore have not only pleaded the Cause of Kings and Supreme Magistrates who are the Deputies of God but added somewhat in behalf of the Church of England whose Rights and priviledges I have pleaded to my best abilities The issue and success I refer to him by whom Kings do reign and who appointed Kings and other Supreme Magistrates to be nursing Fathers to his Church that as they do receive authority and power from the hands of God so they may use the same in the protection and defence of the Church of God and God even their own God will give them his Blessing and save them from the striving of unruly people whose mouth speaketh proud words and their right hand is a right hand of iniquity FINIS
Etymologicon Magnum in Deâ—archo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So he which is in sum what we had before 'T is true there was another Officer of the same name in the City also and for each tribe one the Alderman of the Ward we may fitliest call him but not of much more power and reputation then the Countrey-Bailiff Of these saith Harpocration an old Grammarian that they were called Naucrari at the first and had authority to arrest or destrain such persons as stood indebted to the Exchequer or the Common-wealth r Harpocrat in Demarcho 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so Harpocration briefly in his wonted manner But Julius Pollux in his Onomasticon goes to work more plainly and telleth us of these Demarchi that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s Jul. Pollux l. 8. c. 9. sect 30. the governours or Aldermen of their severall Wards that formerly they were called Naucrari that anciently the twelfth part of a Tribe or Ward was called Naucraria and in the later times the whole Ward it self that these Demarchi had the ordering of the Taxes raised in every Ward and looked unto the issuing of them for the publick use and finally that every Naucraria or Ward was to finde two horse-men and one ship for the service of the Common-wealth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from whence in probability they derived the word Add unto this from Suidas as the close of all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 t Suidas in Lex that they had also the setting forth of the great festivall called Panathenaea ordained by Theseus on the incorporating of all the people of Attica into the City of Athens u Plutarch in Theseo 6 Put all that hath been said together touching these Demarchi and more then this I cannot finde which concerns that Office and we may easily perceive that they were men of no authority in affairs of State so far from being likely to protect the people from the power and pressures of the Senate that they were rather executioners or Ministers of justice to afflict the people when the occasions of the Senate did require it of them That the Demarchi were ordained to oppose the Senate when it lay heavy on the necks of the common people or actually did make head against them in behalf of the people if at any time they were oppressed and injured by it cannot be found I dare with confidence affirm in any Author of good credit either Greek or Latine 'T is true there were some people-pleasers in the State of Athens whom they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who by applying themselves to the peoples humour and seeming zealously affected to their power and profit could lead them whither they would and to what they listed and sometimes did oppose themselves for the peoples sake not only against the Senate but all other Magistrates Of these it is that Aristotle doth make frequent mention in his books of Politicks and seems to prophecy that if not looked into in time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 x Aristot Politi c. l. 5 c 5. they would change the State into a Tyrannie But these were neither Officers of State nor justice nor indeed any Officers at all though many times they did ill Offices to the Common-wealth the better to advance the hopes of the popular faction and by it themselves And it is true which Aristotle tells us in another place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the people had not only power to elect their Magistrates y Id. ibid. l 2. c. 12. but to call them also to accompt in case of mal-administration and had their proper Officers appointed to that end and purpose But then it is true withall that amongst them we meet not these Demarchi of whom Calvin dreams or any others which stood up in behalf of the common people but only in behalf of the Common-wealth Of this sort were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded to the nine Archontes and of authority to call them to an after-reckoning if they found them guilty of extortion z Jul. Pollux l. 8. c. 9. Sect. 16. and of this sect were also those whom they called Logistae some of the which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Id. ibid. Sect. 13. saith mine Author were purposely appointed to observe and enquire into the Acts of the Senate and to proceed against them when their time was out according as they saw occasion which kinde of Overseers had an eye also on the Areopagites And this is that which is observed by Aeschines the famous Orator where speaking of the Fundamental constitutions of the Common-wealth he tells us that it was ordained by the Legislators 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 b Aeschin in Orat. contra Demâ—sto Ctesiphon that even the Senate of five hundred should give up an accompt of their ministration and that the holy Councel of the Areopagites should be obnoxious to the censure of the Logistae for by that very name he calls them Of any accompt they were to give to these Demarchi or any thing they did de facto or might do de jure with reference to the ease and benefit of the common people nothing but sileâ—ce to be found in all Antiquity And to say truth it was not necessary that any popular Magistrates should be made of purpose to save the people from the pride and tyrannie of the higher Courts which were accomptable to the people upon all occasions and were to be accomptable to them according to the fundamental institution of the Common-wealth The State of Athens being one of the absolutest Democraties which was ever extant and so accounted of by all who write of Politicks had little need or use of such popular Magistrates which Calvin fancieth in that place which may be serviceable to the people in an Aristocratie but in a popular estate of no use at all Which makes me wonder by the way why Plato should affirm against right reason that the State of Athens in his time and the times before 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was an Aristocratie c Plato in Meneximo when by the current of all writers and the course of story it appâ—ars most evidently that it was not only a Democratie but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 d Plutarch in Cimone the purest and most unmixt Democratie that was ever read of 7 Thus have we proved the first of the three points propounded in the beginning of this work viz. that the Ephori the Demarchi and the Roman Tribunes were not ordained at first for those ends and purposes which are supposed by the Author but more particularly that neither the Ephori of Sparta were first instituted to oppose the Kings nor the Tribunes first ordained to oppose the Consuls nor the Demarchi of authority to oppose the Senate And we have proved which is directly contrary unto Calvins aim that the Ephori were at first ordained to ease the Kings and to be aiding to them