Aristocraticall Fabrick cannot seem to any impartiall man but as empty a shadow and ayrie a dream as ever mans fancie abused it self withall The Parliament sayes That the Kings power is fiduciary and not to be used against the Kingdom but for it only The King hereupon demands May any thing be taken from a man because he is trusted with it Or may the person himself take away the thing he trusts when be will and how he will Our case of Hull is not so generall The things there remaining in the Kings trust for the use of the Kingdom were Arms and by consequence of more danger then other kinde of Chattels And if I intrust my cloak to anothers custody I may not take it away again by force But if it be my sword and there is strong presumption that it may be drawn upon me I may use any means to secure it The Parliament claims a right of declaring and interpreting Law The King makes this question thereupon Is the Law it self subject to your Votes that whatsoever you say or do shall be lawfull because you declare it so Am I supream and yet you above me Must my power be governed by your discretion This is the Popes Arrogance That all must submit their understanding and Scripture it self to His declaring power and a case is put of the Irish Rebels making themselves a major part in Parliament and so voting against the true Religion c. In perspicuous uncontroverted things the Law is it own interpreter and there no Judge is requisite and the Parliament cannot be taxed to have declared Law by the rule of their Actions They have squared their Actions according to Law They may be censured but they cannot be convinced of any injustice T is true In meer matters of State the Parliament is not bound to strict presidents at all times but in matters of right and justicâ— they have not deviated either to the right hand or to the left Howsoeveâ— In matters of Law and State both where ambiguity is some determinâ—â—ion must be supream and therein either the Kâ—ngs power and tâ—ust must be guided by the discreâ—ion of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meer discretion and there can be nothing said against the Arbitrary supremacy of Parliaments c. But farre more upon better grounds may be said against the Arbitrary supremacy of the King As for the Popes Arrogance who undertakes to interpret Scripture where it wants no interpreter And in matters of meer opinion to usurpe over alâ— mens consciences As if he had an infallibility in his sole breast He is not an instance so fitly to be alleaged against Parliaments as Princes For slavish very probable That if the Church had not submitted it self to so 〈◊〉 a condition under one Man but had been governed by some generall Junto of Divines fairly elected it had never swerved into such soul idolatry and superstition as it has done As for the case of Ireland I conceive t is improperly urged For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion There is as true and intimate an Union betwixt them as betwixt England and Wales And though by reason of remote situation they do not meet in one and the same Parliament yet their Parliaments as to some purposes are not to be held severall Parliaments And therefore if the papists in Ireland were stronger and had more Votes in Parliament then the Protestants yet they would want authority to overrule any thing voted and established before in England For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major is That bloud may not be shed For in probability The major part will prevail and else strife and bloudshed would be endlesse Wherefore the major part in Ireland by the same reason ought to sit down and acquiesce because Ireland is not a severall monarchy from England nor is that a major part of Ireland and England too for if it were it would give Law to us as we now give Law there and their Statutes would be of as much vertue here as ours are there The Parliament In case of extream danger challenges an Authority of setling the Militia in sure hands and removing doubtfull persons if the King will not be entreated to do it of himself The Kings sayes This is to put His intrusted power out of Himself into others and so to devest and disable Himself for the protection of His people This is a strange mistake The Parliament desires no removeall of that power which was in the King But that which was in such or such a Substitute And how doe this devest and disable the King And if the King sayes That He has a better opinion of such a Substitute then of an other Though the Parliament conceive otherwise Then what does He but prefer His own private opinion before the most Honourable of all Councells before the voyce of the whole Kingdom What higher Law then have we remaining then the Kings will And as for his account to God will it be easie for him to pleade That he used such an instrument of His own meer discretion against publike advice if things prove unhappy then that He followed the most noble Councell and such whose lifes fortunes and interests were most deeply concerned in it And as for those absurde unreasonable incredible suppositions of the injustice and treasons of Parliaments as if they were lesse carefull of the publike good then single Rulers Though it be spoken in derision wise men perhaps may be not so apt to laugh in applause as in contempt of it For how has the Parliament removed the rub of all Law out of its way because it assumes to it self to be higher then any other Court and to be in declaring Law as farre beyond the Kings single countermands in Parliament as other inferiour Courts are out of Parliaments Or how has it erected a new upstart Authority to affront the King and maintain an Aristocraticall usurpations when the main body of the Militia is still the same as it was and such as the King professes no suspition of and no alteration is of the heads thereof except only in some few popishly inclined or not publikely so honoured and confided in as they ought And when the same Allegiance is performed The same Supremacy of power confessed to be now in the King over the Militia as has ever been Nâ—y What ground can there be for this imaginary usurpation when the King professes He fixes not that traiterous designe upon both or either House of Parliament being most confident of the Loyalty Good Affectioâ—s and Integrity of that great Body Is the main body of the Kingdom loyall Is the main body of the Parliament loyall Is the King true to Himself And is all His great partie of Clergymen Courtiers Souldiers c. constant And yet is there a machination in hand to introduce Aristocraticall usurpation odious to
Parliament the King 'T is true the King abjures any intention of making Warre against his Parliament but what he intends against the malignant party in or out of Parliament is not exprest and the King abjures invasive Warre against them but whether he think not himself first invaded already is not exprest and the specifying of a faction in Parliament of some few malignants secures none for none can plead force and none ought to plead folly in Treasons of this nature and the major part of the Houses can neither plead absence or dissent and those which can must not be their own purgators Besides the act of Sir John Hotham is disputable the King adjudges it Treason the Parliament adjudge it no Treason and the King has not declared whether he will refer this to the tryall of the sword only or to some other tryall and if so To what kinde of tryall the judgement of a Parliament shall be submitted If we call another Parliament to judge of this so we may appeal in infinitum and why another should be cleerer then this we cannot imagine If we could constitute a higher Court for this appeal so we might do in infinitum also but we know no higher can be imagined and if we appeal to a lower that were to invert the course of nature and to confound all Parliaments for ever if we call all the Kingdom to judge of this we do the same thing as to proclaim Civill Warre and to blow the Trumpet of generall confusion And if we allow the King to be the sole supream competent Judge in this case we resigne all into his hands we give lifes liberties Laws Parliaments all to be held at meer discretion For there is in the interpretation of Law upon the last appeal the same supremacy of power requisite as is in making it And therefore grant the King supream interpreter and t is all one as if we granted him to be supream maker of Law and grant him this and we grant him to be above all limits all conditions all humane bonds whatsoever In this Intricacy therefore where the King and Parliament disagree and judgement must be supream either in the one or other we must retire to ordinary justice And there we see if the King consent not with the ordinary Judge the Law thinks it fit that the King subscribe rather then the Judge And if this satisfie not We must retire to the principles of Nature and there search whether the King or Kingdom be to be lookt upon as the efficient and finall cause and as the proper Subject of all power Neither is the oath of supremacy indangered hereby for he that ascribes more to the whole universality then to King yet ascribes to the King a true supremacy of power and honour above all particulars Nor is our allegiance temerated For when the Judge on the Bench delivers Law contrary to the Kings command This is not the same thing as to proceed against the Kings person upon any judgement given against him The King as to His own person is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doingâ— nor is He accountable for ill done Law has only a directive but no coactive force upon his person but in all irregular acts where no personall force is Kings may be disobeyed their unjust commands may be neglected not only by communities but also by single men sometimes Those men therefore that maintain That all Kings are in all things and commands as well where personall resistance accompanies as not to be obeyed as being like Gods unlimitable and as well in evill as in good unquestionable are sordid flatterers And those which allow no limits but directive only And those no other but divine and naturall And so make all Princes as vast in power as the Turk for He is subject to the directive force of God and natures Laws and so allow subjects a dry right without all remedy are almost as stupid as the former And those lastly That allow humane Laws to obleage Kings more then directively in all cases where personall violence is absence and yet allow no Judges of those Laws but the King Himself run into absurdities as grosse as the former I come now to those seven doctrines and positions which the King by way of recapitulation layes open as so offensive And they run thus 1. THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law So that all the right of the King and people depends upon their pleasure It has been answered That this power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferiour Court or else all suites must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament 2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents Statutes are not binding to them Why then should precedents Yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honor of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity without the King and dispose of anything They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdom is in distresse They may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accounted by the vertue of representation as the whole body of the State 4. That no Member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions only And when leave may be seasonably had and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment 5. That the Soveraign power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose But to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that He preferres dangerous men and prosecutes His loyall Subjects 6. That levying forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King But warre against His authority though not person is warre against the King If this were not so The Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining Himself and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose the King T is denyed That any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected To stand in comparison with these I shall recite some such positions as the Kings papers offer to us And they follow thus 1. THat regall power is so derived from God and the Law as that it has no dependence upon the trust and consent of man and the King is accountable therefore to God and His other Kingdoms not to this And it is above the determination of Parliaments and by consequence boundlesse 2. That the King is supream indefinitely viz. As well universis as singulis 3. That the King has such a propriety in His Subjects Towns Forts c. As is above the propriety of the State and not to be seized by the Parliament though for the publike safety 4. That so farre as the King is trusted He is not accountable how He performs So that in all cases the Subject is remedilesse 5. That the being of Parliaments is meerly of grace So that the King might justly have discontinued them and being summoned they are limited by the writ and that ad consilium Only and that but in quibusdam arduis And if they passe the limits of the Writ they may be imprisoned That if the King desert them they are a voyde assembly and no honour due to them nor power to save the Kingdom That Parliamentary priviledges are no where to be read of And so their representation of this whole Kingdom is no priviledge nor addes no Majesty nor authority to them That the major part in Parliament is not considerable when so many are absent or dissent That the major part is no major part Because the fraud and force of some few over-rules them That Parliaments may do dishonourable things nay treasonable Nay That this hath been so blinded by some few malignants That they have abetted treason in Sir John Hotham Trampled upon all Law and the Kings prerogative And sought to inslave the whole Kingdom under the Tyranny of some few And sought the betraying of Church and State And to the same erected an upstart Authority in the new Militia and levyed warre upon the King under pretence that He levies warre upon them That Parliaments cannot declare Law but in such and such particular cases legally brought before them That Parliaments are questionable and tryable elsewhere These things we all see tend not only to the desolation of this Parliament but to the confusion of all other And to the advancing of the King to a higher power over Parliaments then ever He had before over inferiour Courts Parliaments have hitherto been Sanctuaries to the people and banks against Arbitrary tyranny But now the meer breath of the King blasts them in an instant and how shall they hereafter secure us when they cannot now secure themselves Or how can we expect justice when the meer imputation of treason without hearing tryall or judgement shall sweep away a whole Parliament nay all Parliaments for ever And yet this is not yet the depth of our misery For that private Councell which the King now adheres to and preferres before Parliaments will still inforce upon our understandings That all these doctrines and positions tend to the perfection of Parliaments And all the Kings forces in the North to the protection of Law and liberty I finde my Reason already captivated I cannot further FINIS
OBSERVATIONS upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses IN this contestation betweene Regall and Paliamentary power for methods sake it is requisite to consider fâ—â—se of Regall then of Parliamentary Power and in both to consider the efficient and finall causes and the meanes by which they are supported The King attributeth the originall of his royalty to God and the Law making no mention of the graunt consent or trust of man therein but the truth is God is no more the author of Regall then of Aristocraticall power nor of supreame then of subordinate command nay that dominion which is usurped and not just yet whilst it remaines dominion and till it be legally againe devested referres to God as to its Author and donor as much as that which is hereditary And that Law which the King mentioneth is not to be understood to be any speciall ordinance sent from heaven by the ministery of Angels or Prophets as amongst the Jewes it sometimes was It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the Pactions and agreements of such and such politique corporations Power is originally inherent in the people and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie of men containes in it selfe and when by such or such a Law of common consent and agreement it is derived into such and such hands God confirmes that Law and so man is the free and voluntary Author the Law is the Instrument and God is the establisher of both And we see not that Prince which is the most potent over his subjects but that Prince which is most Potent in his subjects is indeed most truely potent for a King of one small City if he be intrusted with a large Prerogative may bee sayd to be more Potent over his subjects then a King of many great Regions whose prerogative is more limited and yet in true realitie of power that King is most great and glorious which hath the most and strongest subjects and not he which tramples upon the most contemptible vassells This is therefore a great and fond errour in some Princes to strive more to be great over their people then in their people and to ecclipse themselves by impoverishing rather then to magnifie themselves by infranchising their Subjects This we see in France at this day for were the Peasants there more free they would be more rich and magnanimous and were they so their King were more puissant but now by affecting an adulterate power over his Subjects the King there looses a true power in his Subjects imbracing a cloud instead of Juno but thus we see that power is but secondary and derivative in Princes the fountaine and efficient cause is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis Major yet he is universis minor for if the people be the true efficient cause of power it is a rule in nature quicquid efficit tale est magis tale And hence it appeares that at the founding of authorities when the consent of societies convayes rule into such and such hands it may ordaine what conditions and prefix what bounds it pleases and that no dissolution ought to be thereof but by the same power by which it had its constitution As for the finall cause of Regall Authoritie I doe not finde any thing in the Kings papers denying that the same people is the finall which is the efficient cause of it and indeed it were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should ayme at any thing but its owne good in the first and last place T is true according to Machavills politicks Princes ought to ayme at greatnes not in but over their Subjects and for the atchieving of the same they ought to propose to themselves no greater good then the spoyling and breaking the spirits of their Subjects nor no greater mischiefe then common freedome neither ought they to promote and cherish any servants but such as are most fit for rapine and oppression nor depresse and prosecute any as enemies but such as are gracious with the populacy for noble and gallant Acts To be deliciae humani generis is growne fordid with Princes to be publike torments and carnificines and to plot against those Subjects whom by nature they ought to protect is held Caesar-like and therefore bloody Borgias by meere crueltie tâ—eachery hath gotten roome in the Calender of witty and of spirited Heroes And our English Court of late yeares hath drunke too much of this State poyson for eyther wee have seene favorites raysed to poll the people and razed againe to pacifie the people or else which is worse for King and people too we have seene engines of mischiefe preserved against the people and upheld against Law meerely that mischeefe might not want incouragement But our King here doth acknowledge it the great businesse of his coronation oath to protect us And I hope under this word protect he intends not onely to shield us from all kind of evill but to promote us also to all kind of Politicall happinesse according to his utmost devoyre and I hope hee holds himselfe bound thereunto not onely by his oath but also by his very Office and by the end of his soveraigne dignitie And though all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankefulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole State ought to acknowledge that hee cannot merit of it and that whatsoever he hath granted if it be for the prosperity of his people but much more for their ease it hath proceeded but from his meere dutie If Ship money if the Starre Chamber if the High Commission if the Votes of Bishops and Popish Lords in the upper House be inconsistent with the welfare of the Kingdome not onely honour but justice it selfe challenges that they be abolisht the King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought he to thinke that perisht to him which is gained to the people The word grace sounds better in the peoples mouthes then in his his dignitie was erected to preserve the Commonaltie the Commonaltie was not created for his service and that which is the end is farre more honorable and valuable in nature and policy then that which is the meanes This directs us then to the transcendent {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of all Politiques to the Paramount Law that shall give Law to all humane Lawes whatsoever and that is Salus Populi The Law of Prerogative it selfe it is subservient to this Law and were it not conducing thereunto it were not necessary nor expedient Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people as the Authors or ends of all power for meere force cannot alter the course of nature or frustrate the
for this Prince was wise fortunate just and valiant beyond all his Predecessors if not successors also and therefore it is the more glory to our freedomes that as weake and peevish Princes had most opposed them so that he first repaired the breaches which the conquest had made upon them And yet it is very probable that this Law was farre ancienter then his raigne and the words lex stabilita notissima seemes to intimate that the conquest it selfe had never wholly buried this in the publike ruine and confusion of the State It should seeme at this time Llewcllins troubles in Wales were not quite suppressed and the French King was upon a designe to invade some peeces of ours in France and therefore he sends out this summons ad tractandum ordinandum faciendum cum Prelatis Proceris aliis incolis Regni for the prevention of these dangers These words tractandum ordinandum faciendum doe fully prove that the people in those dayes were summoned ad consensum as well as ad concilium and this Law quod omnes tangit c. shewes the reason and ground upon which that consent and approbation is founded It is true we finde in the raigne of Edward the third that the Commons did desire that they might forbeare counselling in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matters in debate were concerning some intestine commotions the guarding of the Marches of Scotland and the Seas and therein they renounce not their right of consent they onely excuse themselves in point of counsell referring it rather to the King and his Counsell How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent or counsell I do not know for at last they did give both and the King vvould not be satisfied vvithout them and the passage evinces no more but this that that King was very wise and Warlike and had a very wise counsell of vvarre so that in those paticulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted as perhaps the more knowing men Now upon a due comparing of these passages with some of the Kings late Papers let the vvorld judge whether Parliaments have not beene of late much lessened and injured The King in one of his late Answers Alleadges that his Writs may teach the Lords and Commons the extent of their Commission and trust which is to be Counsellors not commanders and that not in all things but in quibusdam arduiis and the case of Wentworth is cited who was by Queene Elizabeth committed sitting the Parliament for proposing that they might advise the Queene in some things which she thought beyond their cognizance although Wentworth was then of the House of Commons And in other places the King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when he withdrawes himselfe to be rightly named a Parliament or to have any power of any Court and consequently to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men Many things are here asserted utterly destructive to the honour right being of Parliaments For first because the Law had trusted the King with a Prerogative to discontinue Parliaments therefore if he did discontinue Parliaments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this was no breach of that trust because in formalitie of Law the people might not assemble in Parliament but by the Kings writ therefore in right and equity they were concluded also so that if the King would not graunt his Writ when it was expedient he did not proove unfaithfull or doe any wrong to the people for where no remedy is there is no right This doctrine was mischievous to us when the King had a Prerogative to difuse Parliaments and if it be not now exploded and protested against may yet bee mischievous in the future dissolution of Parliaments for that power still remaines in the Kings trust and if to goe against the intent of trnst be no wrong because perhaps it is remedilesse our Trienniall Parliaments may prove but of little service to us Secondly when Parliaments are assembled they have no Commission to Counsell but in such points as the King pleases to propose if they make any transition in other matters they are liable to imprisonment at the Kings pleasure witnesse Wentworths Case A meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law for some of her actions were retracted and yet without question Queene Elizabeth might do that which a Prince lesse beloved could never have done There is a way by goodnesse and clemency for Princes to make themselves almost unlimitable and this way Queene Elizabeth went and without doubt had her goodnesse and Grace beene fained shee might have usurped an uncontroleable arbitrary lawlesse Empire over us The Sunne sooner makes the travailour desert his Cloake then the wind And the gracious acts of soft Princes such as Tiberius did at first personate if they be perfectly dissembled may more easily invade the subiects liberty then the furious proceedings of such as Caligula was but we must not be presidented in apparent violations of Law by Queene Elizabeth for as generall reverence gave her power to doe more then ordinary so her perfect undissembled goodnesse upon which her reverence was firmely planted made the same more then ordinary fact in her lesse dangerous then it would have beene in another Prince In this point then leaving the meere fact of Queene Elizabeth wee will retire backe to the ancient Law and reason of Edward the first and wee thereby shall maintaine that in all cases wheresoever the generality is touched the generality must bee consulted Thirdly if the Lords and Commons bee admitted to some Cognizance of all things wherein they are concerned yet they must meerely Counsell they must not command and the King Reasons thus that it is impossible the same trust should bee irrevocably committed to Vs and our Heires for ever and yet a power above that trust for so the Parliament pretends bee committed to others and the Parliament being a body and dissolvable at pleasure it is strange if they should bee guardians and controlers in the manage of that trust which is granted to the King for ever It is true two supreames cannot bee in the same sence and respect but nothing is more knowne or assented to then this that the King is singulis major and yet universis minor this wee see in all conditionall Princes such as the Prince of Orange c. And though all Monarchies are not subject to the same condition yet there scarse is any Monarchy but is subiect to some conditions and I thinke to the most absolute Empire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary That the safetie of the people is to bee valued above any right of his as much as the end is to bee preferred before the meanes it is not just nor possible for any nation so to inslave it selfe and to resigne its owne interest to the will of one Lord as that
that Lord may destroy it without injury and yet to have no right to preserve it selfe For since all naturall power is in those which obay they which contract to obay to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme such a contract before their owne preservation are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature The people then having intrusted their protection into the Kings hands irrevocably yet have not left that trust without all manner of limits some things they have reserved to themselves out of Parliament and some thing in Parliament and this reservation is not at all inconsistent with the Princes trust though hee desire to violate the same but on the contrary it is very ayding and strengthning to that trust so farre as the Prince seekes to performe it for the peoples good but it is objected that a temporary power ought not to bee greater then that which is lasting and unalterable if this were so the Romans had done unpolitikely in creating Dictators when any great extremitie assailed them and yet wee know it was verie prosperous to them sometimes to change the forme of government neither alwayes living under circumscribed Consuls nor yet under uncircumscribed Dictators but it in further objected that if wee allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors we make them Commanders and Controllers and this is not sutable to Royaltie We say here that to consent is more than to counsell and yet not alwayes so much as to command and controll for in inferiour Courts the Judges are so Councellors for the King as that the King may not countermand their judgements and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therfore Guardians and Controllers of the King and in Parliament where the Lords and Commons represent the whole Kingdome to whom so great a Majestie is due and sit in a far higher capacitie than inferiour Judges doe being vested with a right both to counsell and consent the case is far stronger and as wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing but what is publikely advantagious so by such Councell and consent wee cannot imagine the King limited or lessened for if it was by so knowne a Law and so wisely established in Edward the firsts dayes the right of the people to be summoned at tractandum ordinandum faciendum approbandum in all things appertaining to the people and this as then was not prejudiciall to the King why should the Kings Writ now abbreviate or annull the same if the King himselfe be disable for many high matters till consent in Parliament adde vigour to him it cannot be supposed that hee comes thither meerly to heare Councell or that when he is more than councelled that it is any derogation but rather a supply of vertue to him A fourth thing alleaged to the derogation of Parliaments is That whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treat in all cases of a publique nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the verie name of Parliament is not due to them This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under For by the same reason that Parliaments are thus vertulesse and void Courts upon the Kings desertion of them other Courts must needs be the like then what remains but that all our lawes rights liberties be either no where at all determinable or else onely in the Kings breast We contend not meerly about the name Parliament for the same thing was before that name and therfore the intent is that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and appeare in the right of the whole Kingdome or else that there is no honour nor power nor judicature residing in that great and Majesticall Body then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall But these divisions betweene the King and Parliament and betwixt the Parliament and Kingdome seeming more uncouth 't is attempted to divide further betweene part and part in Parliament so making the major part not fully concluding and in the major part between a faction misleading and a party mislead Such excellent Masters of devision has Machiavils rule divide impera made since the 3 of November 1640. 'T is a wonderfull thing that the Kings Papers being frayted scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamentall constitutions which support all our ancient liberties and to the erection of arbitrary rule should finde such applause in the world but we say further that there is manifest difference between deserting and being deserted if the wife leave her husbands bed and become an adulteresse 't is good reason that shee loose her dowry and the reputation of a wife but if the husband will causelesly reject her 't is great injustice that she should suffer any detriment thereby or be dismissed of any priviledge whatsoever So if the King have parted from His Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression and he had no other meanes to withstand their tyranny let this proclaime them a voyd Assembly but if ill Counsaile have withdrawne him for this wicked end meerely that they might defeat this Parliament and derogate from the fundamentall rights of all Parliaments as His Papers seeme to expresse under colour of charging some few factious persons in this Parliament God forbid that this should disable them from saving themselves and the whole state or from seeking justice against their enemies So much of the Subjects right in Parliament Now of that right which the Parliament may doe the King by Councell if the King could bee more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court or if His single judgement were to be preferred before all advise whatsoever 't were not onely vaine but extreamely inconvenient that the whole Kingdome should be troubled to make Elections and that the parties elected should attend the publique businesse but little need to bee said I thinke every mans heart tels him that in publique Consultations the many eyes of so many choyce Gentlemen out of all parts see more then fewer and the great interest the Parliament has in common justice and tranquility and the few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their Counsell more faithfull impartiall and religious then any other That dislike which the Court has ever conceived against Parliaments without all dispute is a most pregnant proofe of the integrity and salubrity of that publique advise and is no disparagement thereof for we have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the countrey but never any till now betwixt the Representatives and the Body of the Kingdome represented And were we not now those dregges of humane race upon whom the unhappy ends of the world
are fallen Calumny and Envie herselfe would never have attempted to obtrude upon us such impossible charges of Treason and Rebellion against our most sacred Councell from the mouthes of Popish Prelaticall and Military Courtiers The King sayes 'T is impâ—obable and impossible that His Cabinet Counsellours or his Bishops or seuldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such paines in the procuring thereof and spend so much time and run so many hazards to make themselves slaves and to ruine the freedome of this Nation how strange is this wee have had almost 40 yeeres experience that the Court way of preferment has beene by doing publicke ill Offices and we can nominate what Dukes what Earles what Lords what Knights have been made great and rich by base disservices to the State and except Master Hollis his rich Widow I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parliament but I have heard of trouble and imprisonment but now see the traverse of fortune The Court is now turned honest my Lord of Straffords death has wrought a sudden conversion amongst them and there is no other feare now but that a few Hypocrites in Parliament will beguile the major part there and so usurpe over King Kingdome and Parliament for ever sure this is next to a prodigy if it be not one but let us consider the Lords and Commons as meere Counsellors without any power or right of Counselling or consenting yet wee shall see if they be not lesse knowing and faithfull than other men they ought not to be deserted unlesse we will allow that the King may cause whither he will admit of any counsell at all or no in the disposing of our lives lands and liberties But the King sayes that he is not bound to renounce his owne understanding or to contradict his owne conscience for any Counsellors sake whatsoever 'T is granted in things visible and certaine that judge which is a sole judge and has competent power to see his owne judgement executed ought not to determine against the light of nature or evidence of fact The sinne of Pilate was that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death yet upon accusations contradictory in themselves contrary to strange Revelations from Heaven he would suffer Innocence to fall and passe sentence of death meerly to satisfie a bloud-thirsty multitude But otherwise it was in my Lord of Straffords case for there the King was not sole Judge nay he was uncapeable of sitting as judge at all and the delinquent was legally condemned and such heynous matters had beene proved against him that his greatest friends were ashamed to justifie them and all impartiall men of three whole Kingdomes conceived them mortall and therefore the King might therin with a clear conscience have signed a warrant for his death though he had dissented from the judgement So if one judge on the same bench dissent from three or one juror at the barre from a eleven they may submit to the major number though perhaps lesse skilfull then themselves without imputation of guilt and if it be thus in matters of Law a fortiori 't is so in matters of State where the very satisfying of a multitude sometimes in things not otherwise expedient may proove not onely expedient but necessary for the setling of peace and ceasing of strife For example It was the request of the whole Kingdome in the Parliament to the King to intrust the Militiae and the Magazine of Hull c. into such hands as were in the peoples good esteeme Conscience and understanding could plead nothing against this and if it could have beene averred as it could not for the contrary was true that this would have bred disturbance and have beene the occasion of greater danger yet Where the people by publique authority will seeke any inconvenience to themselves and the King is not so much intressed in it as themselves 't is more inconvenience and injustice to deny then grant it what blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason in things behoofull for the people and will use their fiduciarie power in denying just things as if they might lawfully do whatsoever they have power to do when the contrary is the truth and they have no power to do but what is lawfull and fit to be done So much for the ends of Parliamentary power I come now to the true nature of it publike consent we see consent as well as counsell is requisite and due in Parliament and that being the proper foundation of all power for omnis Potestas fundata est in voluntate we cannot imagine that publique consent should be anywhere more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a creature that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to restrayne him from mischiefe or to make him sociable and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders and to judge of old and to execute according to justice no society could be upheld without society men could not live and without lawes men could not be sociable and without authority somewhere invested to judge according to Law and execute according to judgement Law was a vaine and void thing it was soon therefore provided that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common consent and that the execution and interpretation of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate for the preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject but when it after appeared that man was yet subject to unnaturall destruction by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie how to provide a wholsome remedy therefore was not so easie to be prevented 'T was not difficult to invent Lawes for the limitting of supreme governors but to invent how those Lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted was almost impossible nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes To place a superiour above a supreme was held unnaturall yet what a livelesse fond thing would Law be without any judge to determine it or power to enforce it and how could humaine consociation be preserved without some such Law besides if it be agreed upon that limits should be prefixed to Princes and judges appointed to decree according to those limits yet an other great inconvenience will presently affront us for we cannot restraine Princes too far but we shall disable them from some good as well as inhibit them from some evill and to be disabled from doing good in some things may be as mischievous as to be inabled for all evils at meere discretion Long it was ere the world could extricate it selfe out of all these extremities or finde out an orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand and to excessive liberty on the other and
scarce has long experience yet fully satisfied the mindes of all men in it In the infancy of the world when man was not so actificiall and obdurate in cruelty and oppression as now and when policy was more rude most Nations did chuse rather to submit themselves to the meer discretion of their Lords then to rely upon any limits and to be ruled by Arbitrary edicts then written Statutes But since Tyranny being growne more exquisite and policy more perfect especially in Countreys where Learning and Religion flourish few Nations will indure that thraldome which uses to accompany unbounded unconditionate royalty yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of supreme Lords were so wisely determined or quietly conserved as now they are for at first when Ephori Tribuni Curatores c. were erected to poyze against the scale of Soveraignty much bloud was shed about them and states were put into new broyles by them and in some places the remedy proved worse then the disease In all great distresses the body of the people was ever constrained to rise and by the force of a Major party to put an end to all intestine strifes and make a redresse of all publique grievances but many times calamities grew to a strange height before so combersome a body could be raised and when it was raised the motions of it were so distracted and irregular that after much spoile and effution of bloud sometimes onely one Tyranny was exchanged for another till some way was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples moliminous body I think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world but now since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for Publique Assemblies whereby the people may assume its owne power to do itselfe right without disturbance to it selfe or injury to Princes he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and order That Princes may not be now beyond all limits and Lawes nor yet left to be tryed upon those limits and Lawes by any private parties the whole community in its underived Majesty shall convene to do justice and that this convention may not be without intelligence certaine-times and places and formes shall be appointed for its regliment and that the vastnesse of its owne bulke may not breed confusion by vertue of election and representation a few shall act for many the wise shall consent for the simple the vertue of all shall redound to some and the prudence of some shall redound to all And sure as this admirably composed Court which is now called a Parliament is more regularly and orderly formed then when it was called the mickle Synod or Witenagenot or when this reall body of the people did throng together at it so it is not yet perhaps without some defects which by art and policy might receive further amendment some divisions have beene sprung of late betweene both Houses and some betweene the King and both Houses by reason of the uncertainety of jurisdiction and some Lawyers doubt how far the Parliament is able to create new formes and presidents and has a jurisdiction over it selfe All these doubts would be solemnly solved But in the first place the true Priviledges of Parliaments not onely belonging to the being and efficacy of it but to the honour also complement of it would be clearly declared for the very nameing of Priviledges of Parliament as if they were Chimera's to the ignoranter sort utterly unknown to the learned hath beene entertained with scorne since the beginning of this Parliament The vertue of representation hath beene denyed to the Commons and a severance has beene made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties choosing and so that great Priviledges of all Priviledges that unmoveable Basis of all honour and power whereby the House of Commons claimes the entire rite of all the Gentry and Commonalty of England has beene attempted to bee shaken and disturbed most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliament have proceeded from this that the people upon causelesse defamation and unproved accusations have beene so prone to withdraw themselves from their representations and yet there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing God which can be more perfidious and more pernitious in the people than this Having now premised these things I come to the maine difficulties lying at this time in dispute before us it is left unquestioned that the legislative power of this Kingdome is partly in the King and partly in the Kingdome and that in ordinary cases when it concernes not the saving of the people from some great danger or inconvenience neither the King can make a generall binding Law or Ordinance without the Parliament or the Parliament without the King and this is by a knowne Maxime Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria c. It ought to be also as unquestioned that where this ordinary course cannot be taken for the preventing of publike mischiefes any extraordinary course that is for that purpose the most effectuall may justly be taken and executed by the most transcendent over-ruling Primum Mobile of all humane Lawes if the King will not joyne with the people the people may without disloyalty save themselves and if the people should be so unnaturall as to oppose their owne preservation the King might use all possible means for their safetie yet this seemes to be denyed by the King for he sets forth Proclamations and cites Statutes in them to prove that the power of levying armes and forces is solely in him and he presses them indefinitely not leaving to the Subject any right at all of rising in armes though for their owne necessary defence except he joynes his consent and Authority In the same manner also he so assumes to himselfe a share in the legislative power as without his concurrence the Lords and Commons have no right at all to make any temporary orders for putting the Kingdome into a posture of defence in what publique distresse soever And therefore in Sir Iohn Hothaems case he doth not onely charge him of Treason for observing the Parliaments instructions and Commissions in a pretended danger but he pronounceth the meere act Treason let the circumstances be what they will Let the world judge whether this be not contrary to the clearest beames of humaine reason and the strongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defend himselfe by force if assaulted though by the force of a Magistrate or his owne father and though he be not without all confidence by flight c. yet here whole nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being utterly uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates if their King will not allow them defence See if this be not contrary to the originall end and trust of all power and Lawe and whether it doe not open a gap to as vast and arbitrary a prerogative as the Grand Seignior has and whither this be not the
Monarchy than in a Republique But tracing this no further I will now rest upon this that whatsoever the King has alleaged against raising of Armes and publishing of Orders indefinitely is of no force to make Sir Iohn Hotham or those by whose authoritie hee acted Traytours unlesse it fall out that there was no ground nor necessitie of such defence So much of danger certaine I will now suppose the danger of the Commonwealth uncertaine the King sayes the Parliament denyes the King commands the Parliament forbids The King sayes the Parliament is seduced by a traiterous faction the Parliament sayes the King is seduced by a Malignant Party the King sayes the Parliament tramples upon his Crowne the Parliament sayes the King intends Warre upon them to whether now is the Subject bound to adhere I will not insist much upon generall presumptions though they are of moment in this case for without all question 't is more likely that Princes may erre and have sinister ends then such generall conventions of the Nobility Gentry and Commonalty so instituted and regulated as ours are in England The King does highly admire the ancient equall happy well poyzed and never enough commended constitution of this Government which hath made this Kingdome so many years both famous and happy to a great degree of envie and amongst the rest our Courts of Parliament and therein more especially that power which is legally placed in both Houses more than sufficient as he sayes to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny But how can this be if the King may at His pleasure take away the being of Parliament meerely by dissent if they can doe nothing but what pleases Him or some Clandestine Councellours and if upon any attempt to doe any thing else they shall be called Traitors and without further arraignment or legall proceeding be deserted by the Kingdome whose representations they are what is there remaining to Parliaments are they not more servile then other inferiour Courts nay are they not in a worse condition then the meanest Subject out of Parliament and how shall they restraine tyranny when they have no subsistance at all themselves nay nor no benefit of Justice but arbitrary Surely if these principles hold they will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other Kingdome wee have long groaned for them but we are likely now to groane under them but you will say the King hath a power of dissent he may use it at his pleasure if hee have none then he is a meere Cypher and the Parliament may tyrannize at pleasure either the one or the other must bee predominant or else by a mutuall opposition all must perist and why not the King predominant rather then the Parliament We had a maxime and it was grounded upon Nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe and no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole Kingdome or exercise any tyranny nor is there any possibility how it should The King may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments for none knowes better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well-ballanced a Monarchy then they do and it hath been often in their power under great provocations to load that rule with greater fetters clogs but they would not Let us marke but the nature the right the power the wisedome the justice of Parliaments and we shall finde no cause to suspect them of such unmatchable treasons and conspiracies as are this day and never was before charged upon them for our Chronicles makes it apparent that there is scarce any other Nation wherein Monarchy has been more abused by rash inconsiderate Princes then in this nor none at all wherein it hath been more inviolably adored and loyally preserved from all diminution I wish it were not some incitement to those execrable Instruments which steale the Kings heart from us that they thinke the Religion of Protestants too tame and the Nation of the English too incensible of injuries but I hope God will the more tenderly resent these things The composition of Parliaments I say takes away all jealousies for it is so equally and geometrically proportionable and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts therein that no one can be of any extreame predominance the multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility and Gentry prefer it as much beyond Democracy and we see the multitude hath onely a representative influence so that they are not likely to sway and yet some influence they have and that enough to preserve themselves from being overswaid We also in England have not a Nobility and Gentry so independent and potent as in France Germany Denmarke c. Nor as they were here immediately after the Conquest by reason of their great Feoffes whereby to give Lawes either to the Crowne or the people but they stand at such faire and comely distances between the King and people and also betweene themselves that they serve for an excellent Skreene and banke as the Kings words are to assist both King and people against the encroachments of each other And as the middle Region of the aire treats loving offices betwixt heaven and earth restraining the fumes and exhalations of Sea and Land that they ascend not too high and at the same instant allaying that restlesse Planets scorching flames which else might prove insufferable to the lower Elements So doth both Houses of Parliament as peaceably and sweetly arbitrate betwixt the Prince and his poorest Vassals and declining Tyranny on the one side and Ochlocracy on the other preserving intire to the King the honour of His Scopter and to the people the patrimony of freedome Let us not then seeke to corrupt this purity of composition or conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King when they have no power but derivative the one more depending upon the King and the other upon the people but both most excellently to affect the good of the whole and to prevent the exorbitance of any one part Next the right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of goverement can be advantage to them in that temporary capacity except they could each one obtaine an hereditary Crowne which is a thing utterly impossible Next their power is meerely derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done and if wee conceive that they may by fraud gaine their consent nothing can withstand them Lastly their wisedome hath beene ever held unquestionable and their justice inviolable no Prince that ever cast himselfe thereupon was defrauded no Prince that ever declined the same proved prosperous In sum Parliamentary
government being used as Physicke not dyet by the intermission of due spaces of time has in it all that is excelleut in all formes of Government whatsoever If the King be an affector of true liberty he has in Parliament a power as extensive as ever the Romane Dictators was for the preventing of all publike distresses If the King be apt to intrude upon the common liberties the people have hereby many Democraticall advantages to preserve themselves If Warre bee here is the Unitive vertue of Monarchy to encounter it here is the admirable Councell of Aristocracy to manage it If Peace be here is the industry and courage of democracy to improve it Let us now see how Kings usually governe without Parliaments especially such as are ruled by Councell averse from Parliaments I need not speake of France and other Countries where together with these generall Assemblies all liberty is falne to the ground I need not travell further then our stories nay I need not passe beyond our owne Times my discourse will be endlesse if I doe The wisest of our Kings following their owne private advise or being conducted by their owne wills have mistaken their best Subiects for their greatest enemies and their greatest enemies for their best Subiects and upon such mistakes our iustest Kings have often done things very dangerous And without upbraiding I may say that this King by the fraud of such as have incensed him against Parliaments and his most loyall people hath so far been possest with a confidence in the zeale of Traytors that he hath scarse ever yet enioyed that grandour and splendor which his Ancestors did enioy He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of his own Subiects and yet that Army which he went to destroy and advanced their colours against him was more loyall than that which himselfe commanded and yet both were more loyall than those fatall whisperers which ingaged them so one against the other if the whole Kingdome of Scotland had been more hearkened to rather than some few malignants of the Popish and Prelaticall faction the King had sooner found out the fidelity of that whole Kingdome and the infidelity of that wicked faction But as things then stood the King was as much incensed against them as he is against us now and he that did then perswade him that the Scots were no Rebels seemed as great an enemy as he doth now that shall defend the innocency of Sir John Hotham there was no difference at all betwixt that ease of the Scots and this of ours the King attributed then as much to his own conscience and understanding as he doth now and he attributed as little then to the publike Votes of that Kingdome as he doth now to this only in this our condition is the more unhappy because that so fresh and memorable experiment doth not at all profit us but still by a strange kinde of relapse the King seemes now the more firmly to relie upon his own private reason and counsell the more cause he hath to confide in publike advertisements and the more he professes to doe contrary the maine question now is whether the Court or the Parliament gives the King the better Councell the King sayes he cannot without renouncing his own conscience and reason prefer the Parliaments Councell before the Courts and that which the King here calls Conscience and reason can be nothing else but meere private opinion for if the Councell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation For example the Parliament conceives that such and such ill offices have been done to frame parties and unite forces against the Parliament the State and therfore they desire that such Townes and Forts and the publick Militia may be intrusted to the custody and command of such Noblemen and Gentlemen as they confide in the Kings secret Court-Councell suggests against this that this request incloseth at reasonable intention in it and that the ayme is to wrest all power out of the Kings hand that he may be forced to depose himselfe the effect of this is no more but to let the King know that they are more wise and faithfull than the Parliament and that hee may doe royally to hearken to them in condemning the Lords and Commons of most inexpiable unnaturall impossible Treason for they must needs love him better then the Parliament but he cannot hearken to the Lords and Commons without offering violence to his owne reason and conscience here we see the misery of all if Princes may not be led by their owne opinions though infused by obscure whisperers when they scandall the loyalty of whole kingdomes without cause rather then by the sacred and awfull councels of whole Nations they are denyed liberty of conscience and ravisht out of their owne understandings And yet if Princes may be admitted to prefer such weak opinions before Parliamentary motives and petitions in those things which concerne the Lives Estates and Liberties of thousands what vain things are Parliaments what unlimitable things are Princes what miserable things are Subiects I will enlarge my selfe no longer upon this endlesse Theame Let us look upon the Venetians and such other free Nations why are they so extreamly iealous over their Princes is it for feare lest they should attaine to an absolute power It is meerely for feare of this bondage that their Princes will dote upon their owne wills and despise publike Councels and Laws in respect of their owne private opinions were not this the sting of Monarchy of all formes it were the most exquisite and to all Nations it would be the most desirable Happy are those Monarchs which qualifie this sting and happy are those people which are governed by such Monarchs I come now to the particularities of our own present case for it may be said that though publik advise be commonly better than private yet in this case it may be otherwise some men have advised the King that the Parliament hath trayterous designes both against his Person Crown and not to be prevented but by absenting himselfe denying his influence and concurrence frustrasting and protesting against their proceedings is invalid and seditious and laying heavy charges of Rebellion upon them to this advise the King hearkens so the Parliament requests and advises the contrary and now in the midst of all our calamities of gasping Ireland and bleeding England the Parliament seeing that either they must make use of their legislative power and make ordinance to secure some Forts and settle the Militia of the Kingdome in sure hands and to prevent the seducers of the King or else two Kingdomes should probably bee lost they doe accordingly The King proclaymes to the contrary notwithstanding The question then as I conceive is this onely whether or no the King hath any just cause to suspect the Parliament of Treason
quarrell and in defiance of the adverse trayterous Peeres he which would have told him that those Swords drawne for him were in truth drawne against him and his best friends and those Swords on the other side drawne against him or rather against his seducers were indeed drawne for him should have found but poore acceptance for without doubt the King would have thought such a suggestion an abuse to his sences to his reason to his conscience and an impudent imposture worthy of nothing but scorne and indignation And if it had beene further pressed that the voyce and councell of the Peeres was the voyce and councell of the major and better part of the Kingdome whereas Spencers party was but of inconsiderable fortunes and his Councell was but private and might tend to private ends it is likely the King at the last resort would have referred all to his owne will and discretion but I have now done with the businesse of Hull and therein I thinke with all objections against the Loyaltie of the Parliament for the same reason will extend to all their Votes and actions concerning the Militia c. and in summe all ends in this if Kings bee so inclineable to follow private advise rather then publique and to preferre that which closes with their naturall impotent ambition before that which crosses the same are without all limits then they may destroy their best subjects at pleasure and all Charters and Lawes of publike safetie and freedome are voyd and God hath not left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation But on the contrary if there bee any benefit in Lawes to limit Princes when they are seduced by Privadoes and will not hearken to the Great Councell of the Land doubtlesse there must be some Court to judge of that seducement and some authoritie to inforce that iudgement and that Court and Authoritie must bee the Parliament or some higher Tribunall there can be no more certaine Crisis of seducement then of preferring private advise before publike But the King declines this point and saith that hee doth not undervalue the whole Parliament or lay charge of Treason upon all he doth confesse that divers have dissented and divers beene absent c. hee deserts onely and accuses the faction and conspiracy of some few in Parliament Wee are now at last fallen upon an issue fit to put an end to all other invectives let us sticke close to it The King promises very shortly a full and satisfactory narration of those few persons in Parliament whose designe is and alwayes was to alter the whole frame of government both in Church and State and to subject both King and people to their owne lawlesse Arbitrary power and government a little of this Logicke is better then a great deale of Rhetoricke as the case now stands If the King will please now to publish the particular crimes of such as hee hath formerly impeached of Treason and the particular names of such as now hee sets forth in those Characters and will therein referre himselfe to the strength of his proofes and evidence of his matter it is impossible that any jealousie can cloud his integretie or checke his power any longer Then it will appeare to all that he hath not left us out of any disaffection to Parliaments or out of any good opinion of Papists Delinquents and other Incendiaries but that hee was necessitated to depart from us that hee might be the better able to preserve to us our Religion Lawes and liberties and that none of his solemne oathes of cordiall love to us hath wanted integretie and faith This will satisfie all lovers of Justice that he gives not light credit to weake whisperers or malitious informers whose ayme may bee to bring this Parliament to some ignoble tryall or to confound it without any tryall at all by generall aspertions and meere calumnious surmises this will proclaime his cander and sinceritie and set a brighter luster upon his Justice then any oratory whatsoever By the performance of this promise he shall not doe onely right to himselfe but also to the whole kingdome for the distracted multitude being at last by this meanes undeceived shall not onely prostrate themselves and all their power presently at his feet but for ever after remaine the more assured of his good whether to publike liberties and Parliamentary Priviledges Howsoever nothing but the awfull promise of a King could make us thinke so dishonorably of Parliaments or suspend our judgements so long of them for an Aristocracy in Parliament cannot bee erected without meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutible for the power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tiranny amongst us is not discernable the whole kingdome is not to bee mastered against consent by the Traine Band nor the Traine Bands by the Lords or debutie Lievtenants nor they by the maior part in Parliament nor the maior part in Parliament by I know not what septem-virat there is some mistery in this which seemes yet above if not contrary to nature but since the King hath promised to open it we will suspend our opinion and expect it as the finall issue of all our disputes The maine body of the difference being thus stated I come now to the observations of some other severall obiections against this Parliament and exceptions taken against arbitrary power in all Parliaments and I shall observe no order but consider them as I finde them either dispersed or recollected in the Kings late Expresses The Parliament being complayned against for undutifull usage to the King above all former Parliaments hath said that if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modesty and dutie The King because some Parliaments formerly have deposed Kings applyes these words to those Presidents but it may iustly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truely consent to the dethroaning of any King of England for that Act whereby Richard the second was deposed was rather the Act of Hen. the fourth and his victorious Army then of the whole Kingdome The Parliament is taxed of reproaching this Kings government to render him odious to his subiects whereas indeed all the miscariages and grievous oppressions of former times are solely imputed to the ill Ministers and Councellors of the King And all the misfortunes of these times since November 1640. are imputed to the blame of the Parliament the Kings words to the Parliament are That the condition of his Subjects when it was at worst under his government was by many degrees more pleasant and happy then this to which the Parliaments furious pretences of reformation hath brought them to In this case the Parliament being accused of so haynous crimes did uniustly betray themselves if they should not lay the blame upon the
Kings evill Councellors the onely enemies and interrupters of Parliaments Neverthelesse the King takes this as a way of the Parliament to let them into their franke expressions of him and his actions and takes all things spoken against his ministers as spoken against himselfe how miserable here is the condition of the Parliament eyther they must sinke under uniust charges or be censured for the reproachers of their king nay they are undutifull if they tell not the King himselfe that he ought not to onerate himselfe with the blame of his Councellors The Parliament because it could not obtaine no equall Justice from the Court-Caveleers who are conceived to be the first moovers of those stirres and tumults which happened at Westminster did reserve the hearing of some of the contrary side it selfe upon this it is objected that the Parliament incited those seditious and protected the actors in it whereas they desire Justice yet and that both sides may be brought fairely to an equall hearing and before such hearing they desire that no parties may be condemned And whereas the Parliament upon those rude commotions are condemned as unheard and of that which is unproved and never can be proved That they leavyed Warre upon the King and drove him away yet they desire that that meer imputation may not draw any further opposition to their proceedings and the necessities of the State for if the King could not stay at London with safety yet being now at York in safety he may concurre with the advice of his Parliament the distance of the place needs not cause any distance of affection since the King conceives He hath so few enemies and assures himself of so many friends in Parliament The Parliament sayes That none of its Members may be apprehended in case of suspicion where no information or witnesses appear to make good the Prosecution without acquainting the Parliament if leave may be conveniently obtained In opposition to this a case is put Of a Parliament-man that rides from York to London and takes a purse by the way the Parliament doth not priviledge Robberies so done for though no such thing be likely ever to be done yet if it be in that case the evidence of the fact in that instant allowes not onely the apprehending but the casuall killing of such a Robber Who sees not many differences betwixt such a case and that of the five Members of the lower House where neither Witnesses not Informers nor Relaters nor any particularity of crime could be produced and yet by the same act the whole House might have been surprized And all the world knows That the impeached Members still suffer by that Charge and yet can obtain no right against any Informers though it be now converted to their disadvantage The Parliament does not deny the King a true-reall Interest in any thing held by him either in jure Coronae or in jurae Personae yet meerly because it affirms That in the same thing the State hath an Interest Paramont in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation Hereupon the King replies That this utterly abolishes His Interest in all things so that by this device He is made uncapable either of suffering wrong or receiving right a strange violented wrested conclusion and yet the Kings Interest in Hull and in the lives of his subjects is not such an Interest as in other moveables neither is the Kings Interest taken away from him the same things are still reserved for him in better hands then he would have put them The Parliament maintains its own Councell to be of honour and power above all other and when it is unjustly rejected by a King seduced and abused by private flatterers to the danger of the Common-wealth it assumes a right to judge of that danger and to prevent it the King sayes That this gives them an arbitrary unlimitable power to unsettle the security of all mens estates and that they are seduceable and may abuse this power nay they have abused it and he cites the Anabaptists in Germany and the 30 Tyrants at Athens That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere t is true t is necessary and no inconvenience follows upon it every man has an absolute power over himself but because no man can hate himself this power is not dangerous nor need to be restrayned So every State has an Arbitrary power over it self and there is no danger in it for the same reason If the State intrusts this to one man or few there may be danger in it but the Parliament is neither one nor few it is indeed the State it self it is no good consequence though the King makes so much use of it That the Parliament doth abuse power because it may The King would think it hard that we should conclude so against him and yet the King challenges a greater power then Parliaments and indeed if the Parliament may not save the Kingdome without the King the King may destroy the Kingdom in despight of the Parliament and whether then challenges that which is most Arbitrary and of most danger but the King sayes This Parliament has abused their power I wish Kings had never abused theirs more And the Parliament answers That this is but his nude avirment and in controversies that ought not to condemn private men much lesse ought Parliaments to fall under it And as for Mr Hooker he does not say That the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisie and therefore inferre that Parliaments ought no further to be trusted the stirres of the Anabaptists in Germany conclude no more against Parliaments then the impostures of Mahomet in Arabia do And as for the 30 Tyrants of Athens we know they were not so chosen by the people as our Knights Citizens and Burgesses are nor created or called by any Kings Writ as our Peers are nor did they so meerly depend upon their own good abearing and the good liking both of King and State as our Lords and Commons now do neither had they so many equalls and Rivalls as both our Houses contain we know their power was not founded upon the consent of the Citizens but the strength of their Souldiers neither were their Souldiers such as our Train Bands but meer mercinaries of desperate or perhaps no Fortunes whose Revenue was rapine whose Trade was murther I fear they were more like our Cavaliers at Yorke then the Militia at London Were our new Militia any other our old Trayn Bands or our new Lievtenants and Deputies any other then the same Lords and Gentlemen with very little variation which before were very well reputed of both by King and Commons and not yet by either excepted against or did the whole fate of the kingdom depend meerly upon the new Militia this new device of an Aristocrasie might seem the more plausible but as things now stand this new
all men which neither Kingdom Parliament King nor all the Royallists can oppose What a strange unlathomable machination and work of darknesse is this But this is said to be done by cunning force absence or accident If it be by cunning Then we must suppose that the Kings party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty And that all the Parliament except some few are luld-a-sleep by Mercuries Minstrelsie or that some diabolicall charme has closed up all their various eyes If it be by force Then we must suppose that our Aristocraticall heads carry about them great store of that Serpents teeth which yeilded heretofore so sudden and plentifull a harvest of armed men being but cast into the furrows of the earth Though their armies have been hitherto invisible yet we must suppose That they are in a readinesse to rise upon the first Alarum beaten If it be by absence then we must suppose That this Aristocraticall machination is easily yet to be prevented for t is not a hard matter to draw a full apparence together and that we see has been done lately by the order of the House it self Nay we see t is not the House but the opposite part that desires to scatter and divide and draw away and as much as in them lyes to hinder a full assembly And therefore This is not the way If it be by accident Then we must be contented to expect and have a little patience Fortune is not alwayes constant to one certain posture nor do the Celestiall bodies confine themselves to one unaltered motion The Parliament requests of the King That all great Officers of State by whom publike affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell The King takes this as a thing maliciously plotted against him as a proposition made in mockery of him as a request which He cannot yeeld to without shewing Himself unworthy of that trust which Law reposes in Him and of His descent from so many great and famous Ancestors He conceives He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He abandon this power and assume others into it He conceives it such a Flowre of the Crown as is worth all the rest of the Garland not to be parted with all upon any extremity of conquest or imprisonment nor for any low sordid considerations of wealth and gain whatsoever He conceives That if He should passe this He should retain nothing but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter nay the Stock being dead the Twigs would not long flourish but as to true and reall power He should remain but the outside the picture the signe of a King Could this be If all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty the substance of the request seems to be no more but this That it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments rather then His own meer understanding or any inferiour Councellors in those things which concern the liberties and lifes of the whole people And how could this request seem equall to a demanding of the Crown to a dethroning of the King and to a leaving of the Kingdom destitute of protection if Parliaments were not supposed mortall enemies to Princes and Princes not supposed but openly declared enemies to Parliaments if the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himself of Majesty and devesting himself of Power Ordinary reason cannot suggest otherwise hereupon but either Parliaments affect not Kings nor their own good nor would make good elections or else Kings affect not Parliaments nor the Kingdoms good and therefore they oppose such elections meerly because they are good but let us observe the Kings reasons against Parliamentary elections For first He conceives them prejudiciall for the people Secondly Dishonourable to himself Man is by nature of restlesse ambition as the meanest vassall thinks himself worthy of some greatnesse so the most absolute Monarch aspires to something above his greatnesse Power being over obtained by haughty mindes quickly discovers that it was not first aimed at meerly to effect Noble actions but in part to insult over others and ambitious men thirst after that power which may do harm as well as good nay though they are not resolved to do harm yet they would be masters of it Qui nolunt occidere quenquam Posse volunt And yet let this power be added the minde still remains unfilled still some further Terrestriall omnipotence a sharing with God and surmounting above mortall condition is affected Our Law has a wholesome Maxime That the King may onely do that which is just but Courtiers invert the sense of it and tell him That all is just which he may do or which he is not restrained from doing by Law Such and such things Princes ought not to do though no Law limited them from doing thereof but now those things which by nature they abhorre to do yet they abhorre as much to be limited from That disposition which makes us averse from cruelty and injury we account a noble and vertuous disposition but that Law which shall restrain us from the same is stomacked at and resisted as a harsh bit to put into our mouths or bonds upon our arms Antoninus Pius is greatly renowned for communicating all weighty affairs and following publike advice a dapprobation in all great expedients of high concernment and he was not more honourable then prosperous therein Had he been a meer servant to the State he coulâ— not have condescended further and yet if he had done necessarily what he did voluntarily the same thing had been in the same manner effectuall for t is not the meer putting or not putting of â—aw that does after the nature of good or evill Power then to do such an evill or not to do such a good is in truth no reall power nor desired out of any noblenesse but rather windy arrogance and as it is uselesse to men truely noble so to men that love evill for evill ends t is very dangerous What will Nero more despise then to condescend as Antoninus did yet 't were more necessary that Nero were limited then Antoninus for excessive power added to Nero's cruelty serves but as Oyl poured upon flame When Princes are as potent as vicious we know what Ministers swarm about them and the end is That as vast power corrupts and inclines them to iâ—l Councells so they perish at last by Councellors worst of all T is pretended that Princes cannot be limitted from evill but they may be disabled from doing good thereby which is not alwayes true and yet if it were the people had better want some right then
have too much wrong done them for what is more plain then this That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke then the Turks do under their most absolute Emperours Neverthelesse if we consider the noble Trophees of Rome which it gained under Consuls and conditionaâ—e Commanders we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixt government And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom being but the torn relique of a small Nation yet for their defence would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter under the Conduct of a Generall much limitted Neither have those straitned Commissiâ—ns yeelded any thing but victories to the States and solid honour to the Princes of Orange and what more the mightiest Monarchs of our age have atchieved or enjoy'd besides the filling of a phantasticall humour with imaginary grandour I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage but I know there are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such I desire to be most studious of In some things I know t is dangerous to circumscribe Princes but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure and scarce any hope at all of benefit and amongst other things the choice of publike Officers if the State have at least some share therein with the King what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King is not in me to foresee but if it have no share experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King I see great good but no harm at all that can ensue either to weaken the Crown or disturb the subject thereby But it will be said in the next place If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject yet it diminishes his own Right and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty This is grounded upon a great mistake for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill as well as to save and to have a kinde of a Creators power over Subjects but the truth is such power procures much danger to ill Princes and little good to any for it begets not so much love as fear in the subiect though it be not abused and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love Were Hannibal Scipio c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not independent surely no they were the lesse feared and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved Or were Alexander Pyrrbus c. the more honoured or beloved because they were independant I believe the contrary and that they had lived more gloriously and died lesse violently if a more moderate power had rendred them lesse insolent in their own thoughts and lesse feared in other mens Was Caesar the private man lesse successefull in his Warres or lesse dear in all his souldiers eyes or lesse powerfull in his Countrey-mens affections then Caesar the perpetuall Dictator No if the Imperiall Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar 't was not excellence nor true glory 't was but the externall complements of pomp and ostentation and that might perhaps blow up his minde with vanity and fill the people with 〈◊〉 it could not make Caesar a nobler gallanter greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was I expect no lesse then to be laught at at â—ourt and to be hâ—ld the author of a strange paradox by those men which stick not to say That our King is now no more King of Scotland then he is King of France because his meer pleasure there is not so predominant in all cases of good and evill whatsoever but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it and what not and what proceeds from vain and what from true glory and wherein the naturall perfection of power and honour differs from the painted rayes of spurious Majesty and Magnificence To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in poynt of prerogative then any other in Europe except ours And if the splendor and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious wise magnanimous warlike subjects I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France and that he is so to the meer ingenuity of Government I ascribe it But some will allow That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely and voluntarily as he did is not dishonourable in a Prince but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so is ignoble And this is as much as to say That Law though good yet quateâ—â—s Law is burthenous to mans nature and though it be so but to corrupted nature in asmuch as it retains from nothing but that which nature in its purity would it self restrain from yet corrupted nature it self is to be soothed and observed I have done with this point 't was spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws his Laws by his Lawyers and it might have been added his subjects Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws In this Policy is comprized the whole act of Soveraignty for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges and not violated by power and where Parliaments superintend all and in all extraordinary cases especially betwixt the King and Kingdom do the faithfull Offices of Umpirage all things remain in such a harmony as I shall recommend to all good Princes The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham or interpret the meer shutting of Hull gates and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses to be any preparation for Warre and Invasion against him at York and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying Warre against Him under pretence of His levying Warre against them This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the Kings preparations in the North be onely sutable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no and whether the Parliament be in danger of the Kings strength there or no Or whether is more probable at this time that the King is incensed against the Parliament or the Parliament against the King or that the King is more intentive to assayl the Parliament or the