submissivenesse pray or petition his Maâ—…estie than we have done or can all preceeding ages produce an example of greater humilitie and loyaltie to their Soveraigne but to passe this we shall ever count it our dutie to petition and acknowledge our King while others though not in words yet in heart disclaime him The Author saith His Majestie doth most freely acknowledge and will constantly maintaine what ever rights the Law doth give us â—…et he is not bound to be ray his owne Happy England if this were made good unto us I doe not question his royall heart I believe it to bâ—…â—…ull of pieâ—…y aâ—…d truth but it is you and your Complices that have divided him from his people and made him act a part cleane contrary to his pâ—…ous 〈◊〉 obtruding the rights and liberties of his 〈◊〉 in not dâ—…fending the power and priviledges of Parliament in taking up of Aâ—…es against his people theâ—…eby to inforce that which law and right proclaimes unjust but I presâ—…e this no further Happy 〈◊〉 when that prerogative and subjects liberty doe not invade each other But let this 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 construction if preâ—…ive be abused to the endangering of the State t is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Majesties right to bee ruled by the Counsell of his Parliament for the securing 〈◊〉 his people No dissolution ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the consent of 〈◊〉 into such and such hands but by the same 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 it had its 〈◊〉 The Author by a needlesse endeavour would â—…ne have us riâ—…tly 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 saith he Where a man doth by donation or promise part with any 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it as his due upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it would 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hee where there are â—…wo parties to the contract as 〈◊〉 case of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 there the people cannot 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 government without this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those few 〈◊〉 For my 〈◊〉 I dâ—…e nâ—…t believe that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intended to attribute such a power to the people as is here 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no other power may abrogate but that which did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not in 〈◊〉 â—…clude that they in all cases may doe it 〈◊〉 the author nâ—…ght well have 〈◊〉 his labour It were strange if the people subjecting it selfe to â—…mmand should 〈◊〉 at 〈◊〉 thing but its owne good in the fiâ—…st and last place After the Author had confessed this yet saith he for that the peoâ—… could not attaine this without a common protector to adminâ—…ster justice equally amongst them they found it nâ—…ssary in a higher degree to provide for his good in recompence â—…f their 〈◊〉 c. and so concludes that the good of either is muâ—…ally involved and that the people may be hapâ—… they must first provide for the happâ—…nesse of their Ruler That the good of both hath a 〈◊〉 dependance upon each other no 〈◊〉 but that the constitution of government was 〈◊〉 and principally for the good of the peâ—…ple that 's as 〈◊〉 and therefore that ought first to be 〈◊〉 The Author charges the Observator with breaking out into a most scandalous and false invective 〈◊〉 the late government and this he counts 〈◊〉 of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he give any answer we should be sâ—…re to have it but what he cannot answer hâ—…e cannot answer he can by some sophysticall flight evade or els tell you as â—…re that it is false though the lye reflect upon himselfe but he may without offence give it to himselfe as he doth in the very words following by which he confesses that the Subject groaned under some grievances If I should have demanded of the Author before Parliament granting he were not one who added to the burden whether that the Kingdom were not even ready to sink and faint away under those heavie pressures of Monopolies Ship-mony Cote and conduct money and the like most illegall charges such as our Ancestors never knew I am confident that hee would have answered me in the affirmative and have further added that the body politike must die if that a Parliament did not interpose for the securing of it and are these now become false and scandalous invectives t is very strange that the Author should so sodainly forget Gods goodneâ—…e and mercy towards us in this Parliament as not only to forget the blessing but even to deny the benefit for hee saith Wè owe it to the goodnesse of his Majesty that we are free even from the feare of them for the future No respect at all is to be had of the Parliament as if they were not so much as instruments in the conveyance of this mercy t is pitty that he should share in the blessing that will not acknowledge the hand that conveyed it We shall ever with all humilitie acknowledgâ—… his Majesties goodnesse and grace towards us this Parliament in taking off those unjust burdens that pressed our shoulders and yet not forget our Worthies and by the way let me say this he that layes an unjust burden upon me and after long suffering binds himselfe to ease me of it for the future as it is no restitution or recompence for the evill already undergone so he doth no more then what the Law of God and an upright conscience ties him to I but saith the Author Compare us to any other Nation in the Christian world we in our worst times were least unhappy A strange reason that because other Nations are not so happy as wee perchance out of defect of their Government or themselves that therefore wee must inslave our selves to be like them I feare this is the labour of the time to reduce us to their condition and I hope this will be our care not to be content with a comparative happinesse only but to labour to maintaine our ancient rights and priviledges Againe the Author saith that he shall not endeavour to excuse the former times by comparison with our present miseries though neither be defirable yet we are too sensible which we have justest reason to complaine of T is certaine that no evill is defirable but yet if Fate decree it let me suffer under the hand of justice rather than of wrong and oppression Besides desperate diseases must have desperate cures if these times bring greater misery than the former thanks be to the Author and his conâ—…derates the publike calamity now is but the sad effect of that before Had we freely enjoyed our birth-right and inheritance then there would not have beene this civill combustion now bad premisses must have bad conclusions I 〈◊〉 under this word protect the King intends not only to shield us from all kinde of evill but to promote us also to all kinde of Polyticall happinesse according to his utmost devoyre Saith the Author I never did apprehend in the word protect 〈◊〉 large notion Every particular subject hath a just title and may challenge an interest
the conclusion deduced thence he may finde as much difference between the tenses as betweene Democracy and Monarchy Give me leave to make the Premisses and doe you raise what conclusion you will The Observator who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author seems to intend only thus much that if elegerit be taken in the future tense well and good it makes for him for then the King according to the very letter of his oath is bound under the heavy sinne of perjury to grant such lawes as aâ—…e requested of him by his people and then hee can have no negative voyce But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense and not in the future why yet saith the Observator it matters not for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request is an act of justice necessary as well as the dispencing of the old therfore there being the same necessitity the publike trust must needs equally extend to both But the Aethor will shew us why elegerit must of necessity bee taken in the preterrerfect not in the future as this case is for saith he the word consuetudines which cannot referre to the future undenyably evinces it was meant of the time past Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense for no more then the King can grant such customes as the people shâ—…ll chuse for that it must be time not the Kings Patent that can create a custome so neither can the King grant such lawes or customs unto a people which they have already chosen and which have beene established and ratified unto them by all his predecessors for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest that which is mine owne already cannot be given unto me So that the oath must bee construed reddendo singula singulis as we say in law that is that he will confirme their ancient customes which they doe already enjoy and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choyce of other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his Magisties oath where demand is made whether his Majestie will grant and coâ—…firm unto his people their ancient lawes and customes who answers that he will And contrary to that which the Author doth assert the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published how that elegerit hath been alwayes rendered in the future tense and not in the preter perfect tense So that I shall passe this over without any further trouble conceaving that the Author may if he have not resolved to the contrary upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular The King is bound to consent to new Laws â—…f they be necessary as well as defend the old His Majestie never thought otherwise but he is not bound to an implicit faith to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so This is in plaine termes to invert the method for the King to chuse Lawes not the people for if he will consent to none be they of never so great necessity but such as hee himselfe holds convenient what then is become of the peoples election this is to prescribe and enforce lawes upon the people â—…ot to consent to them upon their election Besides who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publiâ—…e law as the republike those that knowe the want of the benefit must needs be most sensible of the necessity The word elegerit if it be in the preterperfect tense yet shews that the peoples election had beene the ground of ancient â—…aâ—…es and customes and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever I cannot discover The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive noâ—… of any representative body that with the tacit consent of the Prince and so os much other authority Under favour it is of no other authority for though it should be conâ—…essed that at first the diffusive body did chuse their Lawes which had the tacit consent of the Prince and that since the people have granted the King a negative voyce in his Parliaments which is the representative body of the Kingdome yet being with this qualification that his Majesty grant all necessary lawes desired by the people hence it followes that the representative body having as great power and as good judgement to discern of laws necessary as the diffusive have the same power of election which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever For the representative their ancient right is not denyed no law shall be abrogâ—…ted none â—…acted without their assenâ—… But there is a meane betweene doing nothing aâ—…d all I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and knowne falsities How often have the priviledges of Parliament beene infringed even to amazement and wonder that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like and is there not an illegall commission of Array though not enacted yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament But whtch is yet above all and strikes at their very essence are they not because others doe neglect their duty and the trust reposed in them by the publike denyed even the very name of a Parliament and therein the power and vertue of it and whether this be not a denying of their right let the world judge The Author saith true that there is a meane betweene doing nothing and all But I would faine know how we shall be assured of this meane if his Majestie upon pretence of unnecessary shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the Parlament The result of all is Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all tâ—…e subjects lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the Crowne appertaining as subjects have in the Kings dignitie The Author saith That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and hâ—…gh 〈◊〉 in the Kings dignity surpasses his understanding 〈◊〉 not the Author loved division he would not have thus severed the Observators words thereby to puâ—… a dylemma upon himselfe and others for the Observator saith before that the King was made for the people and not the people for the King and thence raiseth this conclusion which under savour is very naturall that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest as they have in his Majestie and his possession and now will any man except our Author who understands not deny this for a truth I but he sa th it seemes to sâ—…eake this wicked doctrine that subjects may dispose of the
Soveraignty as â—…hey please T is strange that our Author will passe his judgement especially so severe an one upon any thing that he doth not understand because happily it may conclude thus much that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great councell the Parâ—… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced that they may dispose of his Soveraignty at pleasure this is the Authors meaning not ours If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expoâ—…e his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to doe so What a strange 〈◊〉 is this is it not lawfull for a man by the hazzard of his person to defenâ—… his properâ—…y which cannot be maintained without the defense of his Countrey But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects that he might expose hâ—…s life and forâ—…une for their defence for no doubt hee that looseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer and if the people had beene made for the King not the King for the people what Law could have warranted the hazzarding of his person â—…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But to disprove this conclusion he saith That the people have as great 〈◊〉 gâ—…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…or the King and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 that I become your Leâ—…ge of life 〈◊〉 gâ—…ds c. as 〈◊〉 by â—…he Proâ—…station and 〈◊〉 of Ligeance which are to the same effect He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath for the preservation of his King anâ—… Soveraâ—…e we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to doe it But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the Kings oath and the Law of the Land which engage the King to protect and defend his Kingdome and people are equalâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Observator had shewen the efficâ—…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people anâ—… he finall cause safety and libertie he descends to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments not to be attained to by oâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied â—…nd Kings better counselled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high deâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 Monarchs who knew no Parliaments Thâ—…s possibly may be 〈◊〉 but I â—…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉 I believe indeede that this is that the Author would faine perswade us to These are the maine grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments God enable us to maintaiâ—… both for if wee part with either we shake hands and bid adue to all happinesse The Author saith that two â—…her 〈◊〉 might have beene named as assentiall as the former which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies and assent to the abrogation of old Lawes and enacting new The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so but I never heard before that the supplying of his Majesties wants by Subsidies was one of the essentiall ends of the calling of Parliament It was accounted formerly the maiâ—… end of calling of a Parliament the ease or Releife of the subject and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankfull acknowledgment of the Kings grace and favour towards them in that Parliament and is it now become one of the maine ends I suppose the Author speakes out of a late experience 'T was never happy with England since this Law was broached And wheresoever Kings advance their owne profit or but make it â—…quall with that of the publique the people will never enjoy true happinesse In the Summes of Edward 1. â—…laus 7. in 3. dors We see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writt that whatsoeveâ—… affaire is 〈◊〉 publique concernment ought to receive publique approbation Quod ownes tangit 〈◊〉 omnibus appâ—…obari debet tractari The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution lest wee reduce our selves to our primirive estate by dissolving the bonds of Government and therefore saith he the policie of all estâ—…tes for the avoydiâ—…g of all confusion hath been to leave the transaction of publique affaires to some certaine number and their suffrages doe in Law binde the rest So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all and hee makes the result of all to be this Those things which the Law doth require shall be transacted onely by Parliament the people doe handle and approve of by their Knights and â—…rgesses those things which the law hath intrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the whoâ—… what bee doth is their act I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments whose power is vaste and incognit as my Lord Cooke speakes And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them as to give them juâ—…isdiction in all cases They themselves who best know their power have in their late Declaration protested against it for they say they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in perticular cases before them then not in all cases But who shall bee Judge of those cafes by which they are intituled to jurisdiction can therâ—… be any one a Competent Judge of this but themselves and they having past their judgement who ought or dare to contradict it no reversing of their judgement but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament why then since none can know their power or if they could they are not competent Judges of it how dare any one goe about to dispute their power or call in question their judgement The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. was that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matter in debate then concerning the setling of intestine commotions guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas concludes no more than this that they thought themselves not competent Counsellours in thiâ—… case happily by reason of their unskilfulnesse in that way or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction But to give a more full and satisfactory answer at that time the King complyed with his Parliament and would not be advised by others and then there being no breach of trust there 〈◊〉 the lesse reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affaires of that nature But if the King had then deserted the Counsell of his Parliament and cleaved to the advise of his young men like Rehoboam certainely then they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-wâ—…alth which by their
Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
might enact any new lawes or abrogate the old without his Majesties consent Nay â—…ove they not frequently prosessed the contrary why then what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an Aristocraticall Government O yes for they have voted and published it to the world that the power of declaring law 〈◊〉 Paul amento in case of any publike concernment doth refide in them and that though the King neither doth nor will consent yet he is obliged by their Votes And is this any greater power or priviledge than every other inferiour Court hath or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised by declaring law in dubious points of Statâ—…s and erroneous judgements And is their ancient undoubted and unquestionable right now become a power Aristocraticall T is strange that the times should so vary the case and that long enjoyment or possession which doth usually confirme and strengthen a mans right should be a meanes to take it away But before I passe this over let me tell the Author that it is a most idle scandalous and false aspersion and if I do in all this wrong him let hee himself judge upon his owne inference which is this that the defending and maintaining of the ancient â—…ight and government is a labouring for an introducting of a new and if he chance to blush as he well may at his own inconsequent reasoning let him mend it hereaâ—…ter I but saith he I dare say that all Histories and Records except of such Parliaments which deposed their King which the Observâ—…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did cannot produce an example of this nature that the two Howses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power I have before plainly evidenced it Kut I pray heare his reason why this power as to some respects may not be greater than the King Because saith he since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving of the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater than his owne if they had ever made claime to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute This is in plaine termes to say that a power that is but temporary cannot be greater than that which is continuing and unalterable a strange fallacy why if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉 whom we know hath a power very extensive shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferiour to others of lesse qualitie and esteeme because dissolvable at the Kings pleasure Or if the King conferre the dignitie and Office of Lord Keeper to another by committing of the seale unto his custody is he therefore not superiour to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his Majesties will and discretion an absurditie to thinke it Before this power be challinged it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty That it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himselfe For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty I shall not question the truth of it though I have searched the Statutes and I cannot find any such clause But admitting it to be so did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura as the Kings negative voyce certainly not The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can doe nothing no not so much as declare what the common law is without his Majesties consent or whether it be boun ed and limited So that this great and most supreame Court may not be like a body without a soule or a numberlesse cypher And for thaâ—… of the Statute that he may deny their petitions can you thence deduce that he may deny their rights their right of declaring law in caâ—…e of publike concernment is not involved within the narrow compasse of a petition To the most absolute â—…mpire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sâ—…nse to suppose a King that is in his â—…its who â—…ll not provide for the safety of his people nay who will not part with some of his right rather than they should perish because in their destruction he looseth all I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak severall languages one thing to us another to his Majesty if it were not so the setling of the Militia by his Parliament by reason of the abuse of that trust to the endangering of the Kingdom by â—…he advise of ill affected counsellors would not have caâ—…sed this great combustion I but then the Author saith This doth not prove a King should part with his rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger Nor can it be thought reaâ—…onable if that a Parliament and in that a whole kingdome can use pretences Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange 〈◊〉 would be received â—…rom invisible spies Strange that a Parliament should fancy and invent nâ—…series to themselves and should thus frighten the publike with Phantasmes or Chimaeraes I hope thâ—… Author will prove it by experience that it is not so easie a mâ—…tter to deceive a whole Common wealâ—…h I saith he and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so ofâ—…n the silly people were to be frighted More strange yet that ambition and covetousnesse should at once possesse a whole Parliament and that a whole Common-wealth should be accounted but a silly people so easie to be wrought upon I hope this disparagement to the publike will work an answerable acceptance to the people Since all naturall power is in those who obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme sucâ—… a contract before their owne preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature For example sayes the Author an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary tryall of law and to suffer if it should se fall out tâ—…ough under an undeserved sentence In this case bee that doth not make resistance and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se and a rebell to nature And he puts other examples of the like nature as that of the Martyrs â—…nd of our saviour Christ and demands our thoughts of â—…hem whether they were selfe murtherers or no What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered to justifie any individuall opposition and infringment of contract or to make
not countermand their judgements and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therefore 〈◊〉 â—…nd Coâ—…rs of the King therefore it holds in Parliaments a â—…tiori I but saith the Author the 〈◊〉 why the King cannot countermand their judgement is because they 〈◊〉 his person and â—…is consent is by law involved in â—…at by law they do for that the act of a delegated power is his act and there would be no end if he should undoe what be hath done But saith hee in Paâ—…ament the Lords 〈◊〉 in a personall capacity and the House of Commoâ—…s as representing the body of the Kiâ—…me and therefore the cases doe not agree Under correction of the Author I shall make the case parallel notwithstanding this objection I do agree that in all acts of publique 〈◊〉 which â—…e but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only I hope it will not offend any one to say that they are Ministers to the Common-Wealth as in case of making and consenting to new Lawes or repealing of the old or the like there the Loâ—…ds sit in a personall capacity and the Commons as represeâ—…ting the body of the Kingdome But in all acts that are judiciall as in case of reversing of 〈◊〉 judgements or of declaring or explayning the law of the Land there they represent the person of the King for that he is â—…ons Iustitiae the fountaine of justice and noâ—…e câ—…n 〈◊〉 such a power without it be first delegated to them by the King and therefore in such a case their judgements doe â—…ly involve the judgement of the King and do oblige him as strongly as the 〈◊〉 oâ—… dâ—…terminations of the Judges Now none can deâ—…y their declaring of the law in case of the Militia to be a judiciall act therefore the consequence is cleare that the King is justly bound by it I but further he saith The judges sweare they will not assent to any thing 〈◊〉 may turne the King in damage or 〈◊〉 by any manner way or coloâ—… 18. E. 3. And do not the Parlâ—…ent â—…o the same by their oath of supremacy and their late Proteâ—…tion If you seriously examine them you will finde that their obligation is the same And now I hope the Aâ—…thor will make good his 〈◊〉 to mee who said that when I could make these thâ—…nges agree to the two Houses I should conclude from the Judges sentence to their votes wherefore I doe 〈◊〉 that there being the sâ—…e reason there oâ—…ght to be the same Laâ—… I but for a further answere seing his former will not hold saith the Author in matters of law there lyes an appeale to them a writ of errour being brought as to the highest Court not so in matters of State Beâ—…ause whilst they 〈◊〉 sentence according to known Lawes the State is no way indangered thereby but if they challenge to themselvs a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of State they may when they please overthrow our lawes The counties which 〈◊〉 them looke upon them as judges â—…ot Politiâ—…s T is not impossible they should be both and whatsoever the judgement of the Coâ—…ties were that intrusted them certaine I am that he is not fit to occupie a place in that great Assembly that is not at least in some reasonable measure so qualified that whilst the 〈◊〉 and other Sages skilled 〈◊〉 that profession are within guiding and directing of his great Ship 〈◊〉 to â—…aw men experienced in the Politiques may sit at Sterne to secure it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 invasion and civill combustion And whâ—…n the Author can produce so able a 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 so much ingaged in the welfarre of the Kindome and so void of selfe respect then will we upoâ—… his request deâ—…ert our Parliament untill then I hope all faithfull and true hearted people will adhereunto them For that empty shadow and vaine dreame of a possibiliâ—… of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 the Law it is a wonder to me that any 〈◊〉 mans sancie should so abuse it selfe To 〈◊〉 the Authors language upon himselfe Can it be conceived that men in their wits who 〈◊〉 all that they have by the benefit of the Law and no doubt have as great a portion to lose 〈◊〉 others should exâ—…te that which is the principall evidence of theâ—…r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of life or 〈◊〉 and so pinne themselves and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon unknowne 〈◊〉 t is extreame madnesse and folly to thinke it Wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing but what is publiquelâ—… advantagious When the King 〈◊〉 they doe not otherwise hee will 〈◊〉 willingly sollow their 〈◊〉 I dare confidently affirme that no antiquity or Records wâ—… 〈◊〉 are aâ—…le to 〈◊〉 one example of this nature where the Kings single conceipt or 〈◊〉 is opposed 〈◊〉 that oâ—… hâ—… whole Parliament But it canâ—… be expâ—… that they should 〈◊〉 while that the King by such malignant Coâ—…nsell is kept aâ—… so great a dâ—…st 〈◊〉 By such Counsâ—…ll and 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Kâ—…ng liâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such a consâ—…nt in which his is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at all 〈◊〉 doth not limit but take it away Doth this 〈◊〉 which doth â—…citely 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 more 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his power than that of their 〈◊〉 oâ—… 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 sai h hee doth not 〈◊〉 to have to 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 old or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them Neither doe they without his 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so would he Aâ—…thor ingenioâ—…sly acknowledge if that he were not so much 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 and prejudice But happily hee doth not understand the difference bâ—…tweene constituting new or repealing the old Lawes and declaring or expounding the Lawes in being how did Ship-money destroy our propriety saith he but by this very consequence What a grosse mistake is this Because the Kiâ—…gs judgement is involved in that of his Parliaments and of his Judges according to law must it therefore follow thâ—…t the whole Kingdome should be obliged by his Majesties determination against Law Or because legally we coulâ—… not be divested of our property without our consâ—…nt must not therâ—…fore the King be bound by the judgement of his Parliament which doth tacitly include his consâ—…nt I but saith hee Ejus est velle qui potest nolle He onely haâ—â— freedome of consent or disagreement that may at his election do either 'T is true But this must be understood of an actuall consent or disâ—…greement and not of an implied For in Corporations or bodies politique whâ—…re the Major part carriâ—…s it will you say that the residue are not bound because that they had not â—…lection to â—…ssent or dissent as the case falls out to be This were a way to open a gappâ—… to all disorder and confusion So the Kings consent is included in that of his Judges and yâ—…t I hope you will not say that the King there had freedome of dissenting which is the
hath a right of dissenting Confest out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us out of our owne confession why was it ever denyed that the Kings consent wâ—…s not necessary to the making of new lawes or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old Nay hath it not beâ—…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases that if he will dissent as hee may nothing can be donâ—… without him why then a fortiori he shall have a nâ—…gative power where the alteration of thâ—… forme of Government is propoundâ—…d But he must understand that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them without his Majesties consent for that that is a power incident to this great Court as well as others inferiour and in such case the King hath no negative voyce â—…xcept both King and people Heâ—…e saith hee a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and King If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words I le râ—…nounce my understanding All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us is but this that the changing of the auncient established forme of our Government is Casus omissus out of their Commission and therefore not to be accompliâ—…ed by them without the consent of both King and people 〈◊〉 doth not say that the Collective body may doe it without the consent of the 〈◊〉 Lords and Commons This happily might be a predominant power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary for the introducting of a new frame of Government Now how this should be a transferring of a power to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and king I must confesse I apprehend not therefore the construction is either very forraigne or my capacitie extreame dull If the King be an affecter of true liberty he hath in Parliament a power as â—…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike dâ—…resses He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King yet in effect they had the same thing for in any immiâ—…nt dangers necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator which as he sayes had absolute power over them and to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence he saith we may make the truest judgement what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power And may this happy glo rious succesefull and never sufficiently to be encomiasted Government continue without the least interruption amongst us untill time hath spent its last period and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation That the Parliament and Court should be at varience t is no news there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy bâ—…twixt them The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people nor they the oppression and publique disservice of the Court the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty But I nâ—…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament or could any way ballance with that doubâ—…lesse they are not equâ—…ll competitors the Parliament represâ—…nt the publique and those counsellors themselves onely the one studies to augment the Common wealth the other their owne wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe and treacherous to hâ—…s countrey that can be so transported with words as to renounce the Parliament for my part I shall lay it down as one of the Articles of my beleife that the Counsell of â—…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament evidently consonant thereunto good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 câ—…nnot reasonably be supposed the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not giâ—… the most faithfull advise adds thereâ—…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations unreasonably complaine they are denied liberty of conscience and 〈◊〉 out of their owne undeâ—…standings I appeale to any mans judgment whether any thing can be â—…ged for the authority of a Lay councell that it 〈◊〉 to inâ—…orce a submission of judgment and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable thereâ—…o which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall And yet theâ—…e he saith it would go hard but a man would find some answer as easily he mighâ—… wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies we may with very little alâ—…eraton apply to civill counsells I confeâ—…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine than a Lawyer but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession 〈◊〉 give me â—…ave a little that our Author may not passe uâ—…nswered to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular Now with the favour of the Author if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not there is a wide 〈◊〉 as to our case betweâ—…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells For I take this for a â—…rtaine and cleare truth in dâ—…vinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever be it of never so great ability or eminency 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations for thâ—…t the conscience of a man is if I may so speake out of their jurisdiction t is God alone that hath power over that Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse one man esteemeth one day above another another estâ—…emeth every day alike let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men Againe ver. 14 there is nothing saith he uncleane of it selfe but â—…o 〈◊〉 that
power Is this will contâ—…nt them thâ—…y shall havâ—… as much power as be â—…rants to his Courtiers If this might be obtained I am consident they neede not make a second requâ—…st Nay could they be perswaded thâ—…t whatâ—… they could propose would be conceed by his Majesty I dare say 〈◊〉 owne modesty judgement and 〈◊〉 would not permit them to be guilty of so great dishonour to their King as to extend their peâ—…itions so farre for inâ—…rease of power as some lately to our sad experience have enjoyed I but he sayes 〈◊〉 must be like the outward senses and make a true represent at con the 〈◊〉 of reason is 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 to make judgement therein 〈◊〉 informatâ—…n is not alwayes faithfull This 〈◊〉 no way 〈◊〉 have deprived the King of the Office of reason for their 〈◊〉 did not 〈◊〉 away 〈◊〉 Majesties power of refusall upon just caâ—…se rendered If by his last words 〈◊〉 intends the information of the Court there he is in the right this age can 〈◊〉 to him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not beene alwayes faithfull But if he do intend his great 〈◊〉 the Parliament there he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 against common judgement and understanding for that no age is able to wâ—…tnesse any unfaithfulnes or 〈◊〉 in a Parliament I but he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to their King and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 themâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their owne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to expresse their 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And why so pray 〈◊〉 his reason For saith hee they must 〈◊〉 to suffer 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoped for in a 〈◊〉 divided in it 〈◊〉 This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Very tragically 〈◊〉 though without any 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 that if 〈◊〉 Author 〈◊〉 but to make a 〈◊〉 he will easily informe himselfe 〈◊〉 that it is very 〈◊〉 to have great 〈◊〉 of State of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it will be very difficult to 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that danâ—… incurred to by 〈◊〉 of such a power to the Parliament 〈◊〉 since there can be no absolute 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 on this side heaven but that all humane inventions whether of law or whatever else will retaine or contract either more or lesse some mixture or tincture of ill in them Why then sâ—…uld 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 benefit for a possible inconvenience or reject the unquestionable commodum for â—…are of a casuall incommodum the bread that a man doth now eat may choak him and his house that he now lives in fals upon his head shall he therefore deny himselfe the certain nutriment of the one or the secure habitation of the other for feare of these visible dangers t were phanatick â—…nd rediculous By this râ—…le a man should 〈◊〉 and declâ—…ne all terrene and sublunary happinesse whatsoever for that there is not so 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 condition that is not subject to a possible pollution and corruption Now I bâ—…lieve it doth fully appeare that the Law of that Remonstrance laid down by his Majesti by way of 〈◊〉 in seven positions is just and without offence â—…eing such as will bring unquestionable happinesse both to Church and 〈◊〉 not denying our obedience to the King 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 and faithfull service to God 1 That the Parliament hath an absolute and 〈◊〉 power of declaring Law This power must rest in 〈◊〉 or in the king or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Courts or 〈◊〉 all suite must bee endlesse and it can no where rest more safely than in Parliament 〈◊〉 two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates If deserted by the King they are otherwise not I but he sayes some things are cleare and evident in law and want 〈◊〉 if otherwise all 〈◊〉 subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Iudge Very just and some things are dubious in law and want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is the case betweene the King and Parliament and this must rest upon the breast of the 〈◊〉 whiâ—…h in this case is the Parliament I but hâ—… sayes If the Houses should vote youâ—…ger brothers ought to 〈◊〉 by the law of England could this 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the first 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but most easily answered and resolved It is very manifest it could not for 〈◊〉 this is a case which is evident and cleare and here the law may be its owne judge and needs no other interpreter or declarer Besides this is a destroying or repealing of the old law and an intâ—…oduction of a new which canâ—…ot be done without the three estaâ—…es But they may declare what the common law of the land is without the King which is only a passing senâ—…ence upon the 〈◊〉 and reasoning of a new case by the old law so that the Judges are guided by this rule of law 〈◊〉 eadem ratio ibi idem 〈◊〉 where there is the same reason there ought to be the same law pray observe and this will correct your mistake though the case be new 〈◊〉 if it may be brought to the 〈◊〉 of the old law tis idem jus not 〈◊〉 the same no new law The truth of it is that law is but a more pure and 〈◊〉 reason and as reason is alwayes one and the same so of necessity must the law be That the Parliament are bound 〈◊〉 no Presidents Statute are not binding 〈◊〉 them why then should Presidents Yet there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 This is an excellent ground to justifie their owne innocâ—…ncy against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound â—…o keepe 〈◊〉 law no 〈◊〉 can accuse 〈◊〉 for the breach of any Our Author thinks he hath here got a strong hold and advantage against us Why wee shall allow as without 〈◊〉 the Law is that 〈◊〉 are binding to the two Houses of Parliament as well as others till repealed But doth this any way disprove 〈◊〉 position that they are not bound to Presidents You know what they say who are best acquainted with the bounds and 〈◊〉 of their owne power some Presidents are not to be followed 〈◊〉 being not 〈◊〉 and all may fall short and be different from the 〈◊〉 case and condition of things and therefore t is no reason that they should be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity withâ—…ut the King and dispose of any thing They may not 〈◊〉 the King but being 〈◊〉 by the King when the Kingdome is in 〈◊〉 they may judge of that
A REPLY TO THE ANSWER Printed by his Majesties Command at OXFORD to a Printed Booke Intituled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses By J. M. LONDON Printed for Matthew Walbancke Anno Dom. 1642. A reply to the Answer printed by his Majesties Command at Oxford to a printed booke intituled Observations upon some of his Maiesties late Answers and expresses THe Authour of the Answer to the Observator which was pâ—…inted aâ—…Oxford no place more fit to entertaine such cavils by his 〈◊〉 Command too good a Patron to be thus abused Begins his disâ—…urse by way of Preface and there would tell us the Originall of Regall Authority were it not a losse of time he has been to profuse prodigall of it in his Book he doth well to spare it in the Preface for that he sees t is granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no For I take it to be very cleare and evident that the Kings of Israel were of Divine instiâ—…tion But that Royall Authority should bee unto us or the sâ—…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power that I deny 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution it must of necessity be that all States must be fwayed and ruled by Kings and the execution of other power were sinne and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to aâ—…rt Againe were they of Divine right they ought to have equall power and Dominion in all places and that they have not for as it is well known in some Kingdomes they have greater Authority in some lesse And all vary according to the severall Lawes and Constitutions of their Countries Why then if they bee of humane institution it must be agreed that no King hath at thiâ—… day any speciall Ordinance from Heaven by which to intitle himselfe to his Crowne and Regall authority And hence the consequence is just that Kings are bound by thâ—…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people and ought to discharge and execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto But then he goes on anâ—… tels us that power or governement was oâ—…yned of God for the good of mankind which was not to bee obtained without preservation of order and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the Lawes of society not onely for wrath but for conscience sake With this limitation the Author saith true we must submitt to the Laweâ—… of society where they doe not oppose the Law of God otherwise not for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience And he saâ—…es we must submit not onely whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors but 〈◊〉 whilst we dâ—…e suffer under some accidentall abuses I but what if those abusâ—… provâ—…â—…o be wilfull I know that is the Authors meaning though he will not expresse it for if his opinion miâ—…ht passe as Orthodox the cases would be all one I and what if thâ—…se abuses strike at our Religion at our lives libeâ—…ies and estates at all that God hath entrusted us with and made us happy in must wee here submitt and quietly surrender up all our happinesse at once a most strange Doctrine Well let him Preach it at Oxford to those whom a foolish zeale hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their Soveraign But let us know that good subjects may preserve these yet not be the lesse but the more dutifull to their King Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tels mee that I ought not to grant or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my Soveraigne which styles mee just before God well to passe this because I shall have occasion to speake more fully to it after those that maintaine this error misery will bee this portion here and a just judgement hereafter But he tels us that we cannot reape the constant fruits of an establâ—…shed policy unlesse by compâ—…ct we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he meanes by those inconveniences bâ—…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning for the whole sâ—…ope of his Booke speakes as mâ—…ch that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Tyâ—…ant and make his boundlesse Arbitrary will to be Law and if this fall out as too commonly it doth yet wee must patiently doe or sâ—…ffer what ever though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience is imposed upon us and which is more wee must by solemne contract binde our selves beforehand this to doe and why so for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy A most strange and unnaturall assertâ—…on was it ever heard or can it bee imagined that a people should contract to their owne ruine there is a mutuall compact betwixt King and People the King is to governe by a rule if he would have his people to obey and if he swerve from that this dissolâ—…es the contract and gives the people pâ—…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves And if this were not Law what benefit could we expect to reape of such an established destructive policy He hath made bad premiâ—…es and worse conclusion for marke what he has dâ—…uced from thence Hence saith he it followes after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contraâ—… divested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretâ—…ce soever withoâ—…t manifâ—…st breach of Divine Ordinance and violation of publique saâ—…th resume that authority which they have placed in another This by the way power according to the Authors owne 〈◊〉 was primarily in the people a truth ingeniously acknowledged but the mischiefe 〈◊〉 they have by contract divestâ—…d themselves of that power how is that made good why thus they chose one to be King over them and contracted to obey him what in omnibus 〈◊〉 in all his commissions nothing lesse for that might be to disodey God and whether it bee lawfull to obey God or man judge you I but they have given him an absolute Authority and made him supreme and therefore not to be qâ—…stioned by â—…ny inferiour pâ—…wer and if this were true his Majesties counsell who too 〈◊〉 malâ—…ne â—…he haâ—…pinesse of King and peopâ—… and would worke oâ—… their owne 〈◊〉 desâ—…gnes by the ruine of boâ—…h wâ—…ld never have advised hâ—…s Majâ—…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declaratâ—…ons that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law in trust for the well governâ—…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committâ—…d to his charge And as a trust is for the benefit and behoofe of him for whose sake the convâ—…yance in trâ—…st was made nâ—…t of him who is the party intrusted So likewâ—…se every trust doth implâ—… a conditâ—…on that the party doe dâ—…ly perfâ—…rme and discharge thâ—… tâ—…st or if hâ—…e doe not that he bee 〈◊〉 so to doe Thâ—…s
thâ—…n being thus hâ—…w hâ—…ve the people totaâ—…ly divestâ—…d themselves of their power I dâ—…e nâ—…t speake this to defend the peoples 〈◊〉 of their Authority or to 〈◊〉 that poâ—…tion of depoâ—…ng Princes so farre I concurre wâ—…th the Author but that thâ—…y should haâ—…e a boundlâ—…sse 〈◊〉 power that I denie Againe for he maketh a second conclusion oâ—…t of the former premisses hence it 〈◊〉 saith hee though â—…he peâ—…ple should 〈◊〉 thâ—…y â—…ght live more hapiâ—… if the Kiâ—…gs 〈◊〉 were morâ—… 〈◊〉 his revenues diminishâ—…d it were hâ—…gh sinne to 〈◊〉 upon his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Stâ—…e when that the Kâ—…ngs Prerogative doth not invade the subâ—…ects 〈◊〉 nor their 〈◊〉 entrench 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but eaâ—…h keepe within their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumference But thâ—…s wee must â—…ow that as the Kings Crowne and 〈◊〉 â—…ower was committed to him in trust fâ—…r the good of his 〈◊〉 so likewise wâ—…re his 〈◊〉 and Prerogatives and if these bâ—… abused to the 〈◊〉 of lâ—…berty and the 〈◊〉 or the destâ—…uction of his peoâ—…le t is no entrenching upon Prerogative to qâ—…estion this abâ—…se and indeavour our owne preservation I but then he saies it doth no way prejudice regall Authority that God is the Author of Aristocrat call or Democraticall power Doth the observators saying that God is the auhor of those powers any way conclude against regall authority where the powers are various and no way contradictory or opposite one to another for a man to conclude the illegality of the one from the legality of the other were a very simple and fallacious kinde of reasoning But our Authour will not bee thus satisfied for he doth here charge the Observator with â—…reading in the steps of Maâ—…iana and Buchanan sworne enemies â—…o 〈◊〉 And why so pray you why because the Observator doth shew how the infancy of the world was governed Most Nations being ruled by their Lords and their Arbitrary edicts which was not he saith in a long time digested And then for that he further sheweth the inconveniences which in more matâ—…re ages were â—…onnd to accompany unconditionate Royalty but concludes that since most Countries have soâ—…nd out an art for the regulating the exorbitances of Princes hee is very unjust that will oppose this Aâ—… and Order And now let any wise and indiffâ—…rent man jâ—…dge how falsely and maliciously this imputation of an enemy to Monarchy is cast upon the Observator for doth the dâ—…monstrating and disproving of other Governements any way strike at Monarchy or doth it not rather propp or support it doth not the disâ—…llowing of other powers if not commend yet tacitly allow and approve our owne Nay doth he not here as in other places exprâ—…sly applaâ—…de the order and constâ—…tution of 〈◊〉 Monarchy so well fenced in by the Art of Parliaments why then what colour or ground is thâ—…re for this imputation Is there not a wide dâ—…fference beâ—…wixt modification and extirpation had our Author consâ—…red this certainely he would not have beene thus unjust in his censure Buâ—… here we may learne what Doctirine is daily delivered to the King That it is the Kings Crown that is aimed at not onely so but even the very dethroning of him his whole posterity and in truth so it is but by his Majesties evill Câ—…ncellors who to magniâ—…ie themselves intend the ruine of tâ—…e Common-wealth and is not that in effect a dâ—…throning of his Majestâ—… all that I shall say is but this No Govenement more blest or happie if not abused by the advice of vile and malignant Coâ—…ellours After so long a Preface the Author tells us that hee will now take iâ—…to consideration the Observators grounds upon which hee would overthrow so ancient and well â—…unded a Monarchâ—… The false impâ—…tation of enmity against this great and well established power will not be thus shaken â—…ff The truth of it is he that resolves to say any thing be it never so scandalous and void of truth will againe 〈◊〉 to stand or fall upon the same principles But give him leave and he will shew you one of the grounds that strikes at Monarchie pâ—…ay observe what an unnecessary â—…nference is hâ—…re made by the Author Tâ—…e observator saâ—…th that The King aâ—…tributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law making no mention at all of the grant consent or trâ—…st of man therein A groundâ—…sse cavile sâ—…th the Author and why so because when God is fiâ—…St named under what notion can he apprehend â—…aw but as an agâ—…eement oâ—… the people deriving of their power and committing the 〈◊〉 to his trust You charge the Observator with a â—…avile and you labour to maâ—…e it good by so large allowance that I could not have 〈◊〉 so much from Oxâ—…d What an agreement oâ—… the people in the 〈◊〉 of a King and a deriving of â—…heir power unto him and whiâ—…h hâ—…s yet more a 〈◊〉 of thâ—… 〈◊〉 to hâ—…s Maâ—…esty â—…n trâ—…st why then that is no absolute and 〈◊〉 power tâ—…s mâ—…ch all thâ—…s shâ—…ld bee granted but yet I feare â—…is yoâ—… not the Observator that deaâ—…es 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 tellâ—…ng him that the 〈◊〉 and agreement of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 obliterated and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not now to be taken notice of or â—…hat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the â—…etter of thâ—… Law so what else can be the meaning 〈◊〉 thaâ—… fâ—…equent â—…xpression in many of his 〈◊〉 Declarations that he is responsible to God alone for his Actions not to man Is not this since no absolute power was transferred by the people as it is here confessed as I have made it good before a denying of the consent and agreement of the people and a granting of a boundlesse Authority And how can that and a trust stand together certainely a dependant and an independant governement are not Synonyma T is true that if a people doe erect a King over them that this is confirmed aâ—…d ratified in Heaven But being of humane institution this doth no way expunge those qualifications of trust and condition which are incident to and tacitly passe with this sacred function and if so we must of necessity allow a power in some to see the due discharge and execution of them nor will it derogate from the honour of God or the dignity of a Prince that the people exact the due execution of the Law and the performance of that compact trust and condition that followes Soveraignty By this time I hope our Author may be satisfied that it is he that cavils not the Observator since it is plaine that the word Law though it doe receive so candid an interpretation from the Observator may be and is denyed to be the consent and agreement of the people But now how doth this determine against Monarchy why yes thus or not at all The King denies the people their right therfore the people may take away his Is this one of the grounds upon which the Observator doth intend
argument of true absolute Soveraignty But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty There is Onus aswell as honos that is a great burden charg and care aswell as honour and renowne thâ—…t is inseperably incident to this great function and therefore he that gaines the one be it by discent conquest or otherwise must discharge the other The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor The author tels us that This inference is most weake and that the quite contrary may clearely be concluded pray heare his reason The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it followes â—…e which 〈◊〉 their power I may adde his owne perticular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The Authors argument to destroy the Observators inference is but this that though the people be the fountaine and efficient cause of power yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away therefore it must needs follow that the King is greater then the people I doubt the Author will finde it a greater difficulty to maintaine this Argument then to make it for if it can be proved on that hangs the strength of his argument that the people have not divested themselves of all power oâ—…t of his premisses the consequence is just that the universe is greater then the King Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Soveâ—…ty as I have shewed before it must follow that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be in effâ—…ct 〈◊〉 which hath been denied even by the King himself who acknowledgeth that his Kingdome is commited to him in trust and if so as no doubt pâ—…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity for that no question that was one maine ground of the constitution of Parliaments the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes why then how can it bee that the people should have divested themselves of all their power for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreame and superintendent for no inferiour power can doe it so that by this time I hope the Author is satisfied that the Obseâ—…ors inference is just and his reason weake and defective But the Observator tenders a proofe of the premisses for saith he If the people be the true â—…ent cause of poweâ—… it is a rule in naâ—…ure quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Sâ—…ange sayes the Author that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast off Monarchy It is more strange to mee that men against cleare reason should make theâ—…selves so palpably ignorant can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatioâ—… from an extreame extirpation or eradication if my reason faile me not it is he that indeavoureth what ever he pretend the casting off of Monarchy for as Monarchy is never so secure as when fenced in by the wisdome of Parliaments it submits to their determinations so it is never so much in danger as when it exalts it selfe above and against them and endeavoureth an absolutenesse of Soveraignty hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of why it is this he hath given you a rule that is regularly not generally true that will maintaine the case in question not all others for instance he tels the Observator That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule and why for that saith he he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich aâ—…d 〈◊〉 richer for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale I this is thaâ—… â—…hat hath made this great combustion maâ—…r of â—…ight and estate could you perswade us out of our reason you would quickly seize upon these but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense as to betray our selves to ruine by a foolish prating with that which God dispenced unto our Ancestors and they through his mercy â—…queathed unto us If I should tell you that God made man therefore God is greater than man or that the Ocean distributing it selfe into severall streames or rivolets is greater than those rivolets and so conclude that therefore quicquid efficit tale est magis talâ—… you would presently say that this were no infallible way of reasoning why for you to conclude that it doth not hold in some cases therefore not in the case in question is not this the same fallacy but as befor s now I shall make good the Axiome in our case upon his owne grounds for he saith it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is â—…erent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation dâ—…st themselves of power or wealth That power was origiâ—…lly inherent in the people that I thinke will not be questioned That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power is cleared thus as I have shewn before that power that is fiduciary and upon condition must needs bee subject to a power more supream to see the due discharge of this trust and condition or othâ—…rwise it would in effect prove absolute but I say the Royall dignite and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition therefore it must be subâ—…ect to a power more suâ—…e wâ—…h can bee no other than the people represented by a Parliament Besides what a groundlesse and unnaturall thing is it to think that a people in whom all power did origâ—…y reside should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one which being abused must without hope of redresse prove their owne inevitable destruction I but saith the Author If the King be universis minor then the people have pâ—…ced a King not over but 〈◊〉 them and 〈◊〉 doe ill to 〈◊〉 when they might command they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject The King is universis minor lesse than the Publike but he is singulis major over and above all individuals and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himselfe for that undutifull and â—…urable passage of commanding of his Majestie and of making him our subject I wish withall my soule that the Author of this booke and his associates were not more guilty of this then his Parliament could ever Parliament or â—…ple with more
in whatsoever is meant by the word protection is the King therefore boâ—…nd to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command I wonder how you can now apprehend this word protect under so large a notion or is it possible were you not resolved to cavill that these words should give you ground for it certainly if my reason faile me not politicall happinesse hath reference only to the body politike and that is not capable of any advancement to any hoâ—…our office or power and to take the words in other sense were to make them impossible for can it be thought or expected that his Majestie should be bound to advance all his Subjects to places of honor or power since if all should be in authority they might command themselvs there would be none left to obey The sence of the Observator is plainely this that the King by this word protect is not only to intend a shielding us from all evill but likewise a promoting of the commoâ—…wealth to all kinde of politicall happinesse by endeavouring to inrich not impoverish his Kingdom by maintaining peace and establishing good and wholesome laws amongst his people and by putting of such in place of power and authority that may see the due execution of the same Though all single 〈◊〉 ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole State ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore saith the Author the greatest happinesse of a Prince that 〈◊〉 was able and his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capeable of doing any courtesie VVhen he hath done all he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant Whatsoever hath beene or could be attributed to any Prince in point of grace or humble acknowledgement that we ascribe unto our gracious Soveraigne with all humilitie and we shall alwayes account it our happinesse to have a Prince not only able but willing to engage his people by his grace and goodnesse But must it therefore be thought to be a dishonour or derogation from his gracious and publike favours to say that hee doth but fungi officio discharge his office or duty according as the law of God and man obligeth him certainly had Rhehoboams Sages thought that their Councell had carryed the least badge of irreverence or disrespect to their Prince they would not have advised him in such rough and unacceptable language that if he would be a servant to that people and serve them c. that then they would be his servants for ever Good Princes have acknowledged themselves servants to the common wealth And t is the councell of young men only that suggest the contrary But it is a certaine position that that Prince will never discharge his trust aright that sacrifices too much to his Royaltie Here the Author may see that other ages have beene guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect as this Sycophantean Coâ—…tier is pleased to stile it to Princes Againe he saith That if all single persons ought to looke upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of grace Then they truly are so for no obligation can lye upon any man to believe things â—…therwise than they are T is true things that are simply good or simply evil cannot be varied by circumstances and therefore no obligation may constrain a man to believe them otherwise But that which is not in it selfe good or bad but varies according to its severall object in such case for one and the same act to produce good to one and ill to another is no novelty and here the application denominates the action So in this case one and the same action may be matter of grace to one and yet but matter of dâ—…ty to another As when a Iudge doth Justice to a man as to him t is grace and favour but with reference to the law tâ—…s but his dutie I but he saith That this ground destroyes the power of beneâ—…nce in a Priâ—…ce and the duty of gratitude in subjects Under favour nothing lesse for as it is his Maâ—…esties office and duty by all meanes of grace and favour as also by justice and right to endeavour the happinesse of the common Wealth so it is our duty by all meanes of humble acknowledgement to bee gratefull t is a great mercy for to have a Prince that will governe his people according to Law and right And it were a great judgement for the people not to bee thankfull The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought â—…ee to thinke that peâ—…sht to him which is gained to the people By the same Argument the people may share all that be hath and he is â—…ound to believe that be hath lost nothing All that the observator here drives at is but this that the Kings strength and riches aâ—…e imbarked in the happinesse and prosperity of hâ—…s people and therefore that it is not their debilitating or impoverishing that will any way 〈◊〉 or enrich his Majestie but the contrary Blest be the King in his portion may it increase to nonplus Arithmeticke and his dayes time But yet let him know that the misery or happinesse of his people are by way of râ—…flection made his Is King anâ—… people have severall â—…ghts saith the Author what law is there which binds the King suo jâ—…re cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his No doâ—…bt the King and people have severall rights happy State when they doe not intrench upon each other but in this they vaâ—…y the King for the most part is seized or possâ—…ssed in jure 〈◊〉 and the people in their owne right so that the King hath nâ—… that 〈◊〉 of property that the people hath And no doubt the King at first as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Author received his demesnes from his people as a recompence of his care to whom they owed their securitie and therefore if it were law for 〈◊〉 no question the people might most colourably justifie an incroachment Aâ—… the King by the Law of God and man is bound to doe justice and to protect and deâ—… his people and therefore if he have any right or priviledge that is inconsistent wiâ—…h these he is obliged suo jure cedere But againe doth any one goe about to take away the Kings right or to divest any property of his Nay rather doe they not in defect of his 〈◊〉 and in his right imploy and mannage them according to the trust reposed in him or if they did doe it ought not the King rather to loose his right
prove even the destroyers 〈◊〉 it And is not salus â—…uli now concerned and the whole Kiâ—…gdome in danger and to use his owne words though with more reall intention no way to escape this imminent perill but by tearing oâ—… these men from the Prince who endeavour to rent the King from his people and utterly to destroy both Aâ—…ter all this large and darke discourse hee concludes by way of advise and what is that why wholesome counsell I warrant you Let them saith he rely upon their Governours who have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 esâ—…ecially iâ—… they have given them great and late sigâ—…es of their 〈◊〉 to and care of 〈◊〉 this is the most 〈◊〉 way of safety I marry sir thiâ—… is good doctrine indeed because 〈◊〉 will hazzard his fortune which iâ—… greater must I therefore expose mine to ruine which is lesse but stay hath any one individuall a greater portion than the publike or mâ—…re to loose than the body politicke if so we will intrust our store with him and runne the hazzard if otherwise you will give us leave to secuâ—…e the greatâ—…r and more considerable portion Aâ—…d under the Aâ—…thors favour t is no probable way of safety â—…r a man to 〈◊〉 himselfe witâ—… his enemie I but thâ—…n heare what he saith immediately after the precedent words if 〈◊〉 should miscary saith he which they can have no reason to suspect they would perish with a great deale of diâ—…cretion The Law of God of Nature of Nations and the Municipall Law of the Land doe all inab'e a man to maintaine his life and fortunes though by force and violence And can it then be thought that a whole Kingdome and people should bee bound under I know not what divine obligation to yeeld themselves as a pray to the malice of their enemies T is not the bond of Governours that can challenge a submission to things unlawfâ—…ll and for that cause that I am not bound to obey it were unnaturall if I mighâ—… not defend and therefore with the Authors favour it were high sin and indiscretion for me to loose my life when I might save it It seemes 〈◊〉 all to me that any Nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet tyranny and support slavery The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just Monarchâ—… That is true I but what if a just Monarch shall degenerate into a tyrant then I perceive you will allow that the inconveniences of Tyranny conclude somewhat I but saith the author It is so far from being unnaturall that any nation should be bound to contribute its power to that end that some have made it their choice others their refuge What to be made slaves most unreasonable most unnaturall All creatures much more man doe by nature desire liberty T is that we were all borne to and as he doth oppugne nature so hee waves part of his right and inheritance that consents to thralldome No temporall blessing next to life greater than an ample freedome No greater misery than a vile and sordid slavery I but whâ—…t if the Authors position hold true that some Nations have so far degenerated as to exchange a Palace for a Prison though perchance that by force too as the State of Rome Turkey and France must their examples be precidents for us or is it any whit the lesse unnaturall because they doe it I but the Author saith There may bee reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery as if in danger of a potent enemy they could hire none on gentler conditions to undertake their defence or if reduced to extreme want they had not wherewith to sustaine themselves they may very probably like Esau â—…asse away their 〈◊〉 right 〈◊〉 and he gives you an instance of both these of the fiâ—…st the 〈◊〉 to the Children of Israel and of the last the Egyptians to Pharaoh T is an old and true saying that necessity hath no law the law of nature bindes every man to defend and maintaine his libertie but necessity may untie this bond for it is better to be though miserable then not to be at all But now to conclude from a case of necessity to a case out of necessity is no good reasoning To say that to save my life I may part with my liberty and therefore like Esau with his birth-right I may passe it away for a messe of pottage this is a most foolish and unreasonable argument To conclude this freedome as it is a great mercy so it ought of temporall blessings next to our lives to receive the greatest estimate the slavery of the body is the 〈◊〉 to the thraldome of conscience and if we foolishly surrender up this the other will not be long after From the word trust used by his Majestie he gathers the King doth admit his interest iâ—… the Câ—…owne in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No ground for this collection for there may be a trust and that is so much the greater if free from condition Under the Authors favour the collection is very naturall for as I have shewen before every trust implyeth a condition that the party intrusted faithfully discharge and execute that trust that is reposed in him and did not the King accept his crowne upon the same condition Besideâ—… â—…ll osfices of trust and confidence or that concerne the administration of justice as Lawyers well know carry a long with them a tacit condition and thâ—… office of a King hath those qualifications in the most sâ—…perlative degree of any other and therefore must of necessity be conditionate But the Author saith That this is true in some sense and his Majestie hath alwayes acknowledged he is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the Subject yet we must not so understand it as if the right to his Kingdom were so conditionate that it werâ—… capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant It can never be thought with any candid and fâ—…ire interpretation that the Observators intention was that the King might for breach of this condition forfeit his crowne for it is cleare that the not executing of a trust doth not forfeit the estate or interest intrusted besides t is regularly true in our law that that which is not grantable is not forfeitable but the crown is not grantable eâ—…go c. â—…ut that which most confirms me in this is that the Observator hath in â—…art declared his judgement against the opinion oâ—… deposing Prinâ—…es which I concâ—…ive he would not have done had he thought the crown forfeitable all that he intends if I may be thought fit to be his expositer is as I suppose but this that he would not have Kings have an absolute and unquestionable power so that their exorbitancy might not though with greater happinesse to the Common wealth be regulated by a Parliament As for the word elegerit whether it be future or past it skils not much If he â—…ake notice of
writt and their oathes they are bound to preserve and defend and therefore clearely not out of their â—…gnizance for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so farre forget himselfe as to think that authorâ—…ty of any moment when he doth produce the Record I will then give him an answer So that I take this as an undeniable position that where the King doth duely execute the trust reposed in him there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act and the Parliament in such caâ—…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction Bâ—…t if on the coâ—…trary the King infring his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom there the Parliament may are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing oâ—… the King 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 will not passe over thâ—…s râ—…le thus for saith he if quod omnes tangit ab 〈◊〉 opprobâ—…ri debet with what equity then may the Clergie who are a considerable part of this Kingdome be excluded Why yes by the same eqâ—…ity that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth exclâ—…de them from being Farmers that those who have devoted themselves soly to Gods service might not miscere se secularibus negotijs incumber themsâ—…lves with secular affaires for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function 'T was neâ—…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousnesse so possessed the Clergie and temporall jurisdiction was dispensed by Ecclesiasticall persons And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines they â—…arved their flocke and made them more like wolves than Sheepe and Heathens than Christians I wish they would not desire temporall preâ—…erment but keepe themselves as they ought in their proper Spheare ponder on this that it is no small happines to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 molestations that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God The Author saith that the King tells them their writt may direct them to know their power which is to counsell not to command I wish with all my heart that he and his associates could pleade as cleare a conscience from this as his Parliament can though certainely they may make a more colourable pretence to it than the Cavalliers if begging and intreating with all the submissivenesse that possibly can be be a commanding then are the Parliament highly guilty if it otherwise not Againe saith the Author the writt runnes super dubijs negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri So that the cleare meaning is their advise is not law except the Royall assent established it into an Act. If the Authour please but to advise with the learned he will finde that tractare is of a more large signication than to treat of or debate onely But was it ever said that their advise should be Law without the Regall assent They have power to declare what the law of the land is in case of publique concernement as now but it was never so much as thought on that they could make a new law or alter the old without his Majesty We must distinguish betweene the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law and the making of a new law the one they may doe without his Majesties consent the other they cannot 'T is alleadged that the King callâ—…th them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Queene Elizabeth but for proposing they might advise the Qâ—…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to doe to mâ—…ddle with To which the Observator answereth a meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law 'T is true saith the Author but when grounded upon Authority I pray where is it and no way excepted against by those who have beene alwaies earnest defendors of their priviledges it may bee reckoned among sound presidents Happily there was never the like occasion to except against iâ—… as having never beene urged how then could it be answered I am confident that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments But pray heare the Parliament and as you ought so rest satisfied who say that some Presidents ought not to be rules this you must agree to for that some are not lawfull But furthey they say that no presidents can bee bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament because some ought not to be followed and all may â—…all short and be different from the case in question The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when be withdraweth himselfâ—… to bee rightly named a Parlâ—…ament or to have any power of any Court and consequenâ—…ly to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsely imposed on his Majesty his answers and massages speakes the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Had it not beene doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage or at least have deniâ—…d them that acceptance that his Majestiâ—…s Messages do dâ—…serve I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oâ—…her name and style would have beene found out for doth he not in these very Mâ—…ssages call thâ—…m an inconsiderable number and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the likâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the stiles of a Parliament and for thâ—…ir powâ—…r if they can doe nothing wiâ—…hout his Mâ—…jesties consent and that not to be obtained neither what are they more thâ—…n a Cipher or a meere convâ—…ntion of private men And is this a falsity But our Authours language shâ—…ll not provoke to a retaliation The King doth assert that because the law hath trusted him with a Pâ—…erogative to discontinue Pâ—…aments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in 〈◊〉 of Law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by his writt 〈◊〉 is grosse 〈◊〉 saith the Authour Howevâ—…r I am sure the language is grosâ—…e I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author but this I am certaine of that his Mâ—…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and â—…lection thereby which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedome and power therein But why is it false because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdome hee acâ—… he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writts T is not to be 〈◊〉 â—…hat whâ—…n the people granted this Prerogative to his Majestie that they would give him so vast a power as to make him the sole Judge of the necessitie of a Parliâ—…ment for if so upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellers be the Kingdome in never so imminent never so appaâ—…ent danger it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament certainly this was never the intention of this trust
good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
very casâ—… of the Parliament It is alleaged in derogation of Parliaments whaâ—…soever the right of Parliament is to assemble and treate in all cases of a publique nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliaments is not due to them I but saith the Author you should deliver the Kings sense and words truely the summe of which is onely thus The two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established governement without him What a strange construction is this This is no more than will be readily agreed you you shall not neede disputâ—… it therefore questionlesse the words must import somewhat else The truth of it is your mistâ—…ke of which you are frâ—…quently guilty is this that you promiâ—…uously counfound the making of new lawes and the altering of the establishâ—…d Governement with declaring of the Common-law in being which is palpable sophistication And now I would faine be resolved by any indifferent understanding whether if thâ—…y may not do that without the Kings actuall concurrence and agreement and that not to be obteined they be not a meere liveleâ—…e convention of private men without all vertue or power It must be agreed that he that is actâ—…ated and moved by another power onely hath none in himselfe This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us â—…o as unbounded a regiment of the Kingâ—… meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under The Author saith that there is no colour of reason in this and why for saith he are we not lefâ—… in the same state in which wee were His Majesty denying to bring in a new goveâ—…nmennt doth not take away the old The Author saith true that we are in the same state indeed but 't is as we were before and without the Parlâ—…ament subject to the Kings meere will and lawlesse regiment And though his Majesties dâ—…nying to bring in a new government doth not take away the old yet his denying of the old governement is an introducting of a new Vpon the same reason by the Kings dâ—â—â—â—tion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void It were a strange consequence to conclude that because that may be done without the King to which his consent by law is not required therefore that may be done without him to which his consent is by law necessary Under reformation the Kings actuall consent to any legall or judiciall determination in Parliament is no more required than it is to that of his Judges yet with the Authors favour both have the implied and tacite consent and therefore upon the same ground of the Kings desertion other Câ—…urts must be vertulâ—…sse and quietly possesse a vacation in Terme time as well as his Parliament I but saith the Author it is against common sense to fancie â—…hat he which enâ—…oyes all by the benefit of lawes should hinder the due administration of Iustice according to those â—…awes and so wilfully endanger not onely his rights but safety by putting the Kingdome into tumults and combustion Tâ—…is is an argument to perswade a man no ground to convince him or a probable inducing râ—…ason no legall conclusion To argue from a probability to necâ—…ssity as to saâ—… it is not likely it should be so therefore it is not so is a strang pâ—…ece of Logick administration of jâ—…stice is delegated to the Parliament though in a more high and supâ—…reminent way â—…swell as to inferiour Judges and the King gaines as much honour and benefit nay moâ—…e by the free efflâ—…x and current of justice in that Coâ—…rt than in any other and yet we see the streame is stopt so that a deluge and inundation of misery hath be-spread the face of the whole Kingdome and â—…o have fancied this not long since would have bâ—… as much opposite to common sense as the other It is attempted to divide betweene part and part in Parliament Who those attempteâ—…s are I inquire not I suppose be meanes those who divided the Lords into good and bad the members of the House of Commons â—…to well and ill affected You need not much enquire your Booke speaks you an acquaintance with them But know those that are bad or ill affected made that distinction themselves not others It is a wonderfull thing that the Kings papers being â—…raited scarce with any thing â—…s but such doctrines of division tending all to the subveâ—…sion of our ancient â—…damentall constitutions 〈◊〉 support all our ancient liberties â—…nd to the erection of an 〈◊〉 rule should fiâ—…d such applause in the world There is a vast difference betweene declaring what divisions are and causing them to bâ—… to shew is not to teach division Farre be it from me to lay the least imputation of guilt in this kind upâ—…n his sacred person No the confidence that I ever had of his goodnesse piâ—…ty and love to his people bids me silence But this I may without breach of charity or staine of loyalty conclude that the best Prince may be corrupted or if not so seduced by those who vâ—…w themselves 〈◊〉 servants to his Majesty and the publique whereas thâ—…ir actions which tend to nothing but rapine and spoyle do plainely testifie the contrary These are they that can dispence with their breach of trust how they will be absolved I know not and not onely sequester themselves but 〈◊〉 the King from his Parliament and his people and to open the gap more wide and make the breach more incurable advise His Majesty contrary to his pious 〈◊〉 by published declarations to traduce his Parliament anâ—… cast most strang and unheard of obliquies upon them and to charge them with such 〈◊〉 their thoughts were never guilty of Thereby to render them odious unto the people So that by destroying the mutuall bond of confiâ—…ence and affection we our selves might be made actors in our owne ruine and if this be not to cause division aswell as to declare it and to teach it aswell as shew it let the woâ—…ld judge I bâ—…t 〈◊〉 the Author it is beyond 〈◊〉 if the Kâ—…ngs aâ—…mes are such as he would have the world beleeve that they should finâ—… such applause I neither dâ—…re nor can charge his Mâ—…jesty with aimes that are indirect but if he were guilty in this nature which I professe my faith is not as yet strong enough to beleeve we must know that all actions oâ—… Kings find acceptance and renowâ—…e with many and the very worst will not want some to applaâ—…d them But pray heare his reason why 't is not propable iâ—… the Kings intentions were such they should finde such applause for saith he consider the persons from wâ—…m men that have mucâ—… more to lose than some who may ayme at geâ—…ting 〈◊〉 foâ—…unes by pretending they are in danger to loâ—…e what they have None are so riâ—…h but they may
in the North 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King could be 〈◊〉 wisely or faithfully advised by any other Couâ—…t oâ—… 〈◊〉 his single 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all advise whatsoever t were not only vaine but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 Kingdome should be troubled to make elections and that the 〈◊〉 eâ—… 〈◊〉 attend the publike 〈◊〉 The King never refused to advise with them What a 〈◊〉 falsitie is this No doubt the Author can 〈◊〉 London from Yorke And the Commission of Array from the Miâ—… But then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 us that the â—…all but not the onely forme of the Kings answere to such 〈◊〉 as they were not 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 L'Roy 〈◊〉 proves that after the advise of this his great 〈◊〉 he is yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 further with persons or 〈◊〉 as his owne 〈◊〉 shall thinke 〈◊〉 Master Crompton in his 〈◊〉 of Couâ—…ts â—…ells us â—…at when the King did consâ—… a Bill then he endorsed it L'Koy volt the King will hâ—… it so is â—…e did not â—…gree then he indorsed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which as he â—…es was an absoluâ—… denyall why â—…hen no ground for this inâ—…erence that the King was at election to advisâ—… further with any other Coâ—…ll 〈◊〉 if it were so this proves de facto that thâ—… King hath had this powr but doâ—…h no way 〈◊〉 thâ—… Obs rvators reason how that if this might be permitted 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 to call Parliaments â—…sides they are the most supreame Councell in England and therefore according 〈◊〉 the rule of Law in â—…he presence of this Counsâ—…ll all infâ—…riour Councâ—…ls ought to cease Againe what they councell or detâ—…rmine is done in a legall and judiciall way and therefore not to bee 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 extra judiciall advice whaâ—…ever No nor by 〈◊〉 judgâ—…ment of any other Court but a subsequent Parliamâ—…nt And the Observator adds this as a reason why the Kings judgement onely ought not to bee 〈◊〉 for saith he the many eyes of so many chiefe Gentlemen out of all parts see more than sewer The same reason saith the Author which denys a liâ—…y of dâ—…ing to the King that is such a number who see more because they are more may deny it to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so 〈◊〉 King and Lords are voted out of Parliament What a poore evasion is this and contrary to common sense that this reason should deny a liberty of dislenting to the House of Peeres in comparison of the House of Commons for that they are much the major part of the Parliament and to that Hoâ—…se too in comparison 〈◊〉 the people For the first he may aswell argue that the major part of the Judges in the Kings Bench should binde the minor in the common Pleas or 〈◊〉 versá and as soone maintaine it for though both the Houses make but one Court yet they are so distinct that each doth officiate in its proper Spheare and the conclusions of the one cannot bind the other and for the lattâ—…r that the peoples judgement because the greater number should sway the House of Commons Hâ—…e may aswell reason that though I give away my â—…t yet the property is not altered and as soone prove it When hee can make 〈◊〉 pâ—…ople to represent the House of Commons not the House of Commons the people then shall the peoples judgâ—…ment for majority carry it Vntill then we must as wee are 〈◊〉 by our election submit to their determinations Besides four hundred choice grave and solid men may 〈◊〉 and discover as much as fâ—…ure hunâ—…d thousand 'T is no 〈◊〉 of number but 〈◊〉 qualification not the plurality of eyes bâ—… the 〈◊〉 that sees most yâ—…t as one good 〈◊〉 mâ—…y seâ—… more than many bad ones so iâ—… must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many good ones must 〈◊〉 that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Au 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sheweth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is noâ—… gâ—…lly truâ—… iâ—… it be 〈◊〉 true it is 〈◊〉 For 〈◊〉 he I dâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost any Paâ—…ent man hee will 〈◊〉 us upon the 〈◊〉 of a Bill 〈◊〉 one 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Houâ—…e hath found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and urged more exceptions than 〈◊〉 hunâ—… would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eâ—… This possibly may be but the str ng probability is on the oâ—…r fiâ—…le 〈◊〉 câ—…ally one may seâ—…â—…ore than 〈◊〉 â—…ndred is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eiâ—…her probable or 〈◊〉 that it will be 〈◊〉 For my part I shall never waive a propable certainty for a meere 〈◊〉 nor in â—…quall judgemenâ—…s preferre an Vnite before a Pluralitie Thâ—…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay whole Parliaâ—… 〈◊〉 beene 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Null â—…y succeeding Paâ—…liaments and instances in many I shall not indeavour to maintaine an infallibility in a 〈◊〉 nor did I ever beleive considering them to be bâ—…t â—…n that they could not 〈◊〉 in judgement aswell as others But for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 to an 〈◊〉 to say that which ha h beene may be and therefore it 〈◊〉 is sâ—…ch a peece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—… I never 〈◊〉 oâ—… The â—…w 〈◊〉 ends 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 needs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Coâ—…lls moâ—…e 〈◊〉 impeâ—…all and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ceâ—… 〈◊〉 mâ—…y 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as any other private Subject What may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 casually meâ—… from the severall Counties strangers to each other the most 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 men for wisedome and mannâ—…rs and propably of the best forâ—…nes intrusâ—…d with the publique have as many bye and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as soone infring their 〈◊〉 as any 〈◊〉 suâ—…iect When ever the 〈◊〉 makes this good I will sacrifice my reason to his will aâ—…d bâ—…ve all to be sound Doctrine which he preaches They are strangly transported with the love of a popâ—… state who can so 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉 as to force themselves to thinke the members of it may not be extreamely subâ—…ect to amâ—…ition covetousnesse batred and affection And they are as strongly ravishâ—… wiâ—… the love of Moâ—…rchy who can belâ—…ive that all these may not sway the Scepâ—…er and rule the King to the oppressing anâ—… iâ—…aving of his Subjects But what doâ—…h the Author count this a popular State I never learned before that whâ—…re the people had one principâ—…ll Governor over them as a King that that should be a Democracy Doubtlesse he is noâ—… well read in the Politiques or if he be he doth much wrong himselfe and dishonour his King so grosly to mistake a Monarchy for a Democracy Then hee instances in the Bishop of Durhams case by which he saith Wee are told in the 3. cap. of the second Parliament held 1. Mariae how that that Bâ—…prick was dâ—…lved in a forme Parâ—…ament 7. Ed. 6. Which was compassed and brought to passe by the â—…nister labour great 〈◊〉 and corrupt meanes of certaine ambitâ—…s persons then being in 〈◊〉 â—…ather to iâ—…rich themselves and their friends with a great part oâ—… the possessions of 〈◊〉 saâ—…d â—…shopprick than upon just occasion
the reason of it is evident for though every man aime at his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 interest yet except it be agreeable to the inâ—…erest of the Major part it will never passe into an act and iâ—… it be advantagious for the most it is to be esteemed publike Now what service this câ—…n do the two Houses I cannot see because they are a representative body O yes very much and let me tell you none could have said more in their vindication for 〈◊〉 your owne language upon your selfe though every man in Parliament aime at his 〈◊〉 â—…erticular interest 〈◊〉 except it be agreable to the interest of the Major part it will never 〈◊〉 into an act and if it be advantagious for the most it is to be esteemed publique But you will say it is indeed to bee esteemed so and yet in truth it may be otherwise First this oughâ—… not to be presumed and againe I dare confidently asfirme it that the 〈◊〉 part of 3. or 4. hundred may carry as publique Spirits and as free from selfe respects or the persecution of Private interest as the Major part of the collective body And no doubt had not our predecessours at first and all the succeeding ages since beene possessed with these thoughts two should not have satisfied every Buâ—…rough nor the like number every County I but he 〈◊〉 the reasons why this Kingdom hath seldom 〈◊〉 under the corruptions of a 〈◊〉 He doth well to say seldome indeed for he cites no example of this nature and had there beene any such I know the Author would not withheld them are First for that it was a 〈◊〉 for the most part but of short continuance so that they hold not time to â—…ould and fashion 〈◊〉 aimes and when called together againe the body was much altered The Author no doubt had hee beene so wâ—…ll disposed as to have done his Countrey that right could have shewne us many Parliaments of long continuance and when he had done 〈◊〉 have beene able to have charged them with the least corruptions But hâ—…e is mightily carried â—… way with vaine imaginations and 〈◊〉 He thinks short Parliaments had they been long would have beene adulterated and donis empta corrupted with gifts like the 〈◊〉 of Rome which he so much instances in Had he ever beene acquainted with charity it would have taught him better surmises of his private brother much more of so great and reverend As semblie as the Parliament But his second and cheife reason is â—…or that the finall determination 〈◊〉 not in one nor two hands but the joynt consent of three estates is necessary 'T is true for the making new lawes or altering or repealing the old But not so in case of declaring of the common Law of the land for that the two Houses may do as an ancient right belonging to that supreame Court without the consent of his Majesty and why this power should be conceived more to traduce this Parliament as our Author laboureth to insinuate into our beleife than it hath done others formerly 〈◊〉 to me a Mystery The king may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments If this be all the motive he may as safely keepe them Must the Kingdome be put to confâ—…ict with uâ—…ter ruine and 〈◊〉 the sad but certaine 〈◊〉 of cruell warre for want of that which 〈◊〉 granted by the Kiâ—…g would no way prejudice his right and being enjoyed by the people would bring great happinesse and security to both None knowes better or affâ—…cts more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Monaâ—…chy I beleâ—…ve they affect Monarchy why then doth this Author indeavour to take it away by denying the king power of 〈◊〉 which our Ancestours inviolably presâ—…rved as a most happy râ—…straint of Aristocracy or Dâ—…mocracy It is said that by debating or reasoning of a thing a man shall thereby be brought at last to discover the true reason Which certâ—…inely our Author will never do who labours to defend one 〈◊〉 by another â—…he subverting of Monarchy by denying of the King a negative voice None can spâ—…ake morâ—… that is not a ravished doctor or fauning parasite to tâ—…stifie his affections to thâ—…s admira le and well established Government than the Author doth Neither doth he throughoâ—…t his 〈◊〉 booke deny the Kings Prerogative of a negative voice All that he undertakes iâ—… but to shew them their ne plus ultra â—…nd to del neate and demonstrâ—…te thâ—… true cirâ—… and boâ—…ndaries of Royalty and whether this be an endâ—…avour to take it away let the weakest capacity judge It hath beâ—…ne often in the power of former Parliaments to load that rule with greater â—…etters and cloggs but they would not A 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉 there is little reason now to do it Their 〈◊〉 of their just rights and priviledges is no loading or settering of 〈◊〉 but a keeping it in its equall and due 〈◊〉 The Observatoâ—…r having shewed the exact and Geometâ—…icall distance that the three estates keep one having no power to hurt or prejudice the other but all labouring exactly for the good whole 〈◊〉 us not to secek to 〈◊〉 this purity of composition Very good councell but 〈◊〉 â—…e 〈◊〉 in the words 〈◊〉 following Is not a perswading of he King that his Parliament intends the divesting of his ancient prerogatives and rights and which is more the dissâ—…lution of Monarchy and by these 〈◊〉 insinuations dividing him from his Parliamâ—…nt a meanâ—…s to corrupt this 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Why then no doubt his words following are very seasonable That wee must not conceive that both Gentâ—…y and Nobility can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 king Therefore it will be 〈◊〉 for the king to leave all â—…o their disposall who certainâ—…ly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing but what is fitting This is the Authors construction and conclusion But t is â—…ery 〈◊〉 that he should 〈◊〉 it out of this text that because the Parliament cannot combine 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 therefore it is fitting for the King to surrender up his power to the 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 say that such a rule and predominancy never entrâ—…d the thoughts of any one but himselfe Is not the conclusion more just that therefore this will maintaine the Parliament in defending their owne rights Doubâ—…lesse it is For my part my Vote shall alwayes be that the King may sway his Scepâ—…er in its just extent and latitude that the people may bâ—… made to know thâ—…ir due distance and that the Parliament enâ—…oy their ancient rights that the King may not 〈◊〉 upon liberty The Observator having shewed how that no change of Government can be advantagious to the Lords and Common hee descends to shew how that though it might yet it cannot be effected For that their power is meerely derivative so that except wee will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done Then it is confessâ—…d the King
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended
at their frank expressions disguised under the charge of a malignant party The sense of his answer is this they have no otherway to cleare themselves for there being foults somewhere not to lay them upon others were to take them upon themselves Happy were our condition if his Majesties evill Counsellors could so easily acquit themselves of any wrong done to the publike as the Parliament can but then he goes on and sayes that his Majesty haâ—…h proposed a very good way which will fully satisfie the world in their innocency I hope the world is sufficiently satisfied without that which is not alwayes to accuse but some times to prove A most unusuall and illegall way was it ever heard of or knowne that evidence should be produced against any man for any kind of delinquency before the party was brought to his tryall t were very unjust to condemn a man not seeâ—…ng his Accusers noâ—… hearing their evidence I rather believe tâ—…is is to bâ—… a proposition of the Authors coyning than to proceed from his Majestie And if any Messenger were sent from the Parlibe a proposition of the Authors coyning than to proceed from hâ—…s Majesty And if any Messenger were sâ—…nt from the Parliament as I believe one was to demand a delinquent accused by them he might have beene sufficiently beaten for his paines and have returned without him How then could the Parliament make their proofe in a legall way according to this proposition The King demands justice for Tumults and high indignities offered and complaines of a prohibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke to hinder the processe against a Ryot according to law The Observators answer is Equaâ—… justice could not be obteined against the Court Cavalliers His Majestie never protected them from legall tryall it was free for them to have proved what they could against them It must have beene behind their backs â—…hen which is a pâ—…ece of admirable justice and when they had made good their proofes they must have sent to Yorke for to impeach and dâ—…mand them and what successe that journey would have produced your jdgmenâ—… could easily informe you The kâ—…ng sayes it being granted by them that their priviledges do not extend to Treason felony or breach of the peace so as to exempt the members from all manner of tryall yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their â—…yall that the cause must first be brought before them and their consent asked before you can proceed then their priviledges extend as far in these as in the most unquestioned cases because no priviledges exempt them frâ—…m all manner of tryall the House being acquainted and leave given I take the law to be pardon me if I judge amisse in all cases of a criminall nature where the person may be seised and sequestred there though he may be arrested or detained to appeare before them yet he cannot be proceeded against in any other Court or way than in Parliament whereby he may he taken or detained frâ—…m the service of Parliament without their consent and this is no exemption from tryall but only a priviledge in the method of it But now on the other side in all civill causes if they demand their priviledg t is the frequent practice to allow it them and this doth totally suspend the prosecution of the suit or tryall I but he saith It was fully intended the members should have had a legall and speedy tryall It cannot be conceived so since his Majestie was advised to make such an unusuall and illegall impeachment and prosecution against them The Parliament do not deny the king a true reall interest in any thing had by him either in jure Coronae or in jure personae but only affirms that in the same thing the State hath an interest paramount in cases of publâ—…ke extremitie by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its owne necessary preservation The king is a part of the state and therefore the other part hath not any power warranted by law to do what they think fit to his prejudice upon pretence of publike extremity We shall a low your assertion that the King is part of the State and that therefore the other part cannot without him upon any pretence whatsoever do any thing that may turn him in pre judice But this doth tacitly grant that they may do any thing in case of his diserâ—…ion without his consent that is for his Majesties and the publike advantage and if you had meant to make good your ground by applying it to the case in quâ—…stion you should not have reasoned thus by way of admition of that that will by no meanes be allowed you but you ought to have proved that the Parliament have done that which is a prejudice to his Majestie and then your consequence would have beene very just whereas it is now but a meere scandalous and Libellious argument I but he sayes this is Ship money in every mans lands and goode the State hath an interest paramount in cases of publike extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its owne necessary preservation doubtles no man who pretâ—…nds to knowledge were not his reason and understanding captivated would go about to perswade any man that it is all one to be divested of his property by violence and oppression as to part with it by free consent and donation why this is all the resemblance or similitude that the Ship money and the proceedings of Parliament have then let all the world judge how these contraries can possibly run parallel The head without the body was the State before now it is a body without an head That 's a monster of your making t is not we but you that divide the head from the body I will not turn Prophet but know if heaven be just a crime of so great aggravation cannot passe unpunished But the kings things are still reserved for hâ—…m in bâ—…tter hands than he would have put them Though this were true it were an ill president for the subject who must be bound to give up his meanes as often as they conceive they could dispose it more wisely There is no concluding from the seising of Forts Castles and the like things meerly of publike use and concernment in which the King hath no other interest but in reference to his trust for the good of the publike To the seizing of any mans private or particular inâ—…erest in which he hath a sole absolute and unquestionable property No why heare what the Author saiâ—…h Let what will be pretended the subject cannot be so stupid as not to understand thesewho undertake to manage the paramount interest of the state may seise on any subjects fortunes by the same right they take the 〈◊〉 With the Authors favour he is grossely mistaken for though it must be agreed that the State hath an interest
future thus abuse his judgement and discretion Lâ—…t me give him this caution when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsell whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceipt of them to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust and when he hath done this ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power and himself and this will either ingage him to a better beleife or force him to silence And let thâ—… people take this Caveat that the subtile prâ—…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men ought not though it be most maliciously indeavoured to perswade us to a beleife of the like corruptions in the Parliament The things taken from the King at Hull were armes which are of more danger than other kind of Chattells By the same law all that part of the Kingdome which is not confided in may be disarmed Good reason too if in a publique 〈◊〉 they shall appeare in opposition to them who indeavour nothing but the publique fafety and preservation Nay why may not their money be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proofe I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword to helpe to cut his owne throat nay more to hasten the ruine of the Common-Wealth The Subjâ—…ct is in a miserable condition that is liable to be undone as often as they please to be fearefull Wee should be in a farre worse condition if we should not feare when we have just cause and prevent the losing of the whole by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion Let Brainford evidence this truth I but he saith it is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty It doth much extenuate the fact to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the publique ruine I but then againe hee sayes that the law of the land hath onely intrusted the Prince with armes so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed trayned and mustered but by his Commission He sayes very much and of great consequence had it beene at another time But as circumstances may vary a case so I hope the Author will learne to distinguish betwixt a case in neceâ—…ity and one out of necessity Betweene the Kings adhering to the advise of his great Counsell the Parliament and his deserting of them and betweene the due execution of his trust and the breach of it These layed together will much vary the case and justifie the Parliament in their arraying trayning and mustering without his Majesties Commission But some determination must be supreame and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the directions of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meere direction No necessity of either for in cases of this nature which is confessed to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary law Our Author doubâ—…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtile a decision of a matter of so great controveâ—…sie But I beleive this concept was as soone penned as it was thought on For what is this but in plaine termes to tell the Parliament hat they might aswell have saved their labour And that if a King seduced by evill counsell shall indeavour the destruction of the publique yet it lyes not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it A sad conclusion if it would hold But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power puts this case whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there and had pretended the trust which the Parliament here doth from the Kingdome of Ireland thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to â—…e in danger of extirpation from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritanes and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that Kingdome were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in c. Wheâ—…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations as these men should propose to him and resolve to be for the publique good I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends nor go about maintaine with the Observator that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales Neither do I thinke if it were so that the two Parliaments would joynâ—… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states But to the question I shall give this short answere that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposalls For I never did nor shall allow where their conclusions and requâ—…sts are evidently against lâ—…w reason or Religion if that may bâ—… presumed of a Parliament that in such case the Kiâ—…g is bound to yeâ—…ld to their Votes No farre be it from any one thus to judge for that were to make him a â—…yrant though against his will and to be ingaged in his peoples ruine against his conscience But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the casâ—… in question â—…he Parliaments proposalls being not apparently either against law reason or Religion doâ—…h nonplus my understanding to imagine A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning â—…orce absence or accident The Observator argues thus aginst it If by cunning we must suppose the Kings party in Parliament hath lost all their law policy and 〈◊〉 The reason why they are overborne may be this not because they have lesse law but more hoâ—…sty which will not permit them to maintaine a good cause by ill meanes No the reason is evidently this that they have liâ—…le law and 〈◊〉 Honesty which wiâ—…hholds them from promoting the publique safâ—…ty I but how falls it out that after so many reiterated scandalls of pretences and deceivings of the people the Author should now confesse that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it which he ought to prove if he expects we should beleive him Certainely he did not read what he had writâ—…en or not understand it or there is some hope now at the last after the venting of his spleâ—…ne that he will prove a convert But I dispaire of convincing him by better reason for he is here in his very next words fallen into a contradiction where he saâ—…es that wee all know in how great stead these Piae
fraudes holy salsehoods and religious untruth stood the Church of Rome c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine whether this policy worke not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falsehoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth for he is revolted againe into his pretences deceipts and falsehoods And I wish from my very heart that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man and such as he is than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived I but then the Observator sayes It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in law to be done by force not onely when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this workes on the minde as strongly as the other on the body I but with the Authors favour this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera such as they use to bugbearâ—… Children withall It remaines then we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults I marry Sir here is onâ—… of the imaginary Spiriâ—…s that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men Doubtlâ—…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare were it true which I much question to a resolved and setled judgement neither doth the law tâ—…ke hold of any such feare as thiâ—… is I but then he goes on whether that they were not poasted with directions to thâ—…ir perticular lodgings I here you have another of these Hobgoblins and deformed Images more fit to fray children with than men Because if that were true they were directed to their Chambers and never intended as the event cleares it to approach them therefore they complied or were silent and so that faction prevailed I but he goes yet further whether the way to the House were not set with clamarous multitudes that they must passe through the middest of them whilâ—…st they insorme them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur it is their bâ—…sinesse that is there transacted have recourse thi her with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament and how thingâ—… succeed for their good but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Assâ—…mblies and clamorous multitudes For their inquiring what their names were and which sâ—…de they tooke certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 and that can be no cause to make me dread a man because he knowes my name No nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 if I am conscious to my self that they are such as are just and honourable â—…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted that is as like to be true as that they shoâ—…ld vote what they had informed them For the other two of absence and accident he sayes they may be reduced to this I t is no wondâ—…r many stay away since they must be absent even whilest thâ—…y are there If their wills were absent by being a verse from the publique good whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers better in such case their rome than their company The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom pâ—…blique affaires shâ—…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the â—…eason why each man preserves his owne right bâ—…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies No but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them I but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament one may manâ—…ge a trust well and yet no dishoâ—…â—…hat a whole Kingdom may doâ—… it better With equall reason sayes he they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops 〈◊〉 Sherâ—…ffes 〈◊〉 c. and dispose of all the preserments of England For thâ—… Bishops thouâ—…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us that they have been very bad yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be that they likewise should be nominated by the great counsell for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons But now for the Sheriffes Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred for the nominating of these as for the other for though they may be corrupt in their way yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests no danger to the publike The truth of it is this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the heaâ—… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Staâ—…e who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike have and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it Was not then their reqâ—…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence who by their sedulous care honest and direct counsell and which is above all by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future But to passe this had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to hâ—…s people If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie and 〈◊〉 himselfe of
〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 it and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 as the whole body of the 〈◊〉 To 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but then by the rule of contraries to dissent 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉 is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses and this you do 〈◊〉 allow Why now the onely judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands is the Parliament and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉 wherefore it is your duty and mine 〈◊〉 wee will oppose our judgements to theirs which will be extreame arrogancy to believe they are so however what their awefull authority will not do their reason ought But he sayes upon pretence of distresse to takâ—… illegall courses is as if thâ—…y should perswade us we are not in 〈◊〉 and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery Right but in case of apparent and imminent danger as now if the great Physitian of the common-wealth shall neglect his patient it may by all lawfâ—…ll and legall courses as it doth now indeavour its owne preservation Thâ—…y represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State Very true if the King do not desert them but if he do then they represent the whole State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions onely and when leave cannot sâ—…asonably be â—…ad and when Competent accuse appeare not â—…n the impeachment If by suspitions be meant onely a bare not confiding in this injustce cannot be sufficient ground No nor if by suspitions is meant a labouring for an Arbitrary power for which there is no ground and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty this is as insufficient â—… cause of impeachment as the other But upon Articles drawne and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused parties are at liberty they may be meddled with True if competent 〈◊〉 appeare in the impeachment then they may be arrested and deteined to appeare before the Parliament but there ought to be no other prosâ—…cution in any other Court or way than in Parliament whereby they may be deprived of a member without their consent I but sayes hee if the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence shoâ—…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for tryall of treason For the first no doubt where they are not able to give consent there they have not power to dissent And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause the accusers appeare to be competent and the cause of impeachment legall and just t were to much presumption and confidence in us for to believe them so confident as not to be willing to give way for a legall tryall 5. That the Soveâ—…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no Negative voyce This power is not claymed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdome from ruine in case where the King is so seduced and that he preserres dangerous men and prosecuâ—…s his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be Kings as long as they please and when they are weary of 〈◊〉 the kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King and Parliament if he had pleased That is they will as of right they ought represent the whole State the King deserting of them so that they may be enabled to preserve the kingdome from ruine and when that shall be out of danger then shall his Majestie freely enjoy his negative according to law and right To save it from ruine the law hath better provided for the peoples safety by prohibitâ—…ng all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever 〈◊〉 As illegall executions of power such as the Commission of Array are not to be justified So legall such as the Militia are not to be condenmed And in case where the King is seduced that is when â—…e is not so wise as he should be because he doth not thinke as they do and refuses to satisfie the humors and interests of some I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be No such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author But this I may say had not his Majesty waived the faâ—…full advise of his Parliament who seek nothing but the peace and happinesse of him and his people and satisfied the humours and interests of others who ayme at nothing more than the ruine of both these sâ—…d disasters had not fallen upon us And preferres this seemes to be the cause of all preferments do noâ—… goe the right way true for none but Commissioners of Array do now happe preferments dangerous men that is such as desire he should governe according to the known lawes of the land were we before the Parliament governed according to the known lawes of the land they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power And prosecuâ—…es his loyallâ—… Subjects that is is driven from London to Yorke where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people No he paâ—…ed from London or if you please that I may speake truth was seduced by malignant Counsell to make so unhappy a change And I wish from my very soule that his sacred person were not more deceived by such than his people are by the Parliament 6. That leavying of forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not levying war against the King but war against his authority though not person is war against the King If this were noâ—… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdome could not save both but must stand and looke on It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himselfe and kingdome he can neither be willing not able T is not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will but a King seduced may and uponRep. â—…reacherous and unworthy advise for raigne aid will not be wanting to do that which domâ—…stick cannot 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected This is mâ—…st 〈◊〉 but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded But it doth with any faire and candid reading and interpretation For when the Parliament saith that all Presidents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings for that the presidents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed These might well have beene omitted as being more fully handled in the booke But least hee should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer FINIS Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 1 King 12. Verse 8. Verse 7. Verse 8. 9. Verse 10. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 Râ—…p Obser. Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. â—…ep Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aâ—…s 〈◊〉 Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Ans. Rep. Rom. 13 â—… Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Râ—…p Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. 〈◊〉 Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5 〈◊〉 14. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obser. Aâ—…s Râ—… Obser. Ans. Rep. That was a Pâ—…pular 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Dr. Ferne Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Rep. Obsâ—…r Ans. Mâ—…t 27. 19 Rep. 〈◊〉 18. Obsor Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Obs. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obâ—… Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Oâ—… Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep. Obâ—… Aâ—… Rep Oâ—…s Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Oâ—…s Aâ—…s Rep. Obser. Ans. Râ—…p Obs. Ans. 〈◊〉 Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obs. Ans. Rep. Obseâ—… Ans. Rep. Obs. 〈◊〉 Obs Ans. Rep. Olâ—… Ans. Obs. Ans. Rep.