Cases besides those which depended on the Canon-Law For saith he the Pope usurped such a Power in derogation of the Authority Royal and then that Power must be originally in the King otherwise in the Construction of the Act it could be no Usurpation But this is a very false way of Reasoning The Pope usurped such a Power on the Crown therefore the Crown hath it of Right For the Popes Usurpations were many of them unreasonable his Primacy according to Canons being allowed and our Law did restore to the King the ancient Right and Jurisdiction of the Crown and not put him into the Possession of all the extravagant Power which the Pope usurped For this Law charges the Pope with intolerable Exactions of great Sums of Money in Pensions Censes Peter-Pence Procurations Fruits Suits for Provisions and Expeditions of Bulls for Arch-Bishopricks and Bishopricks and for Delegates and Rescripts in Causes of Contentions and Appeals Jurisdictions Legantine as well as Dispensations Licenses Faculties Grants Relaxations Writs called Perinde valere Rehabilitations Absolutions c. Now all these were Usurpations in Derogation of the Crown but doth it therefore follow that the Crown hath a Right to them all But to go no further than the Business of Dispensations Hath the King a Right by this Statute to dispense as far as the Pope The Pope usurped a Power of dispensing in Matrimonial Contracts in Oaths in Vows in some positive Divine Laws which I suppose H. 8. by vertue of the Supremacy never pretended to So that it is a very mistaken Notion of some Men That the King had all the Power which the Pope usurped And as to the Act it is plain by the Words of it That the Original Power of Dispensing was lodged in the King Lords and Commons and the Ministerial Execution of it with the Arch Bishop of Canterbury even with respect to the King himself But if the King had pretended to all the Power which the Pope usurped he must have dispensed with himself But this Author offers to Prove That there is a Power in the Crown to dispense with Acts of Parliament even such as concern the Consecration of Bishops because it is said 8 Eliz. That the Queen by her Supreme Authority had dispensed with all causes or Doubts of any Imperfection or Disability in the Persons c. To give a clear Answer to this we must consider these Things 1. That 1 Eliz. 1. The Act of 25 H. 8. for the Order and Form of Electing and Making Arch-Bishops and Bishops was revived as appears by the same Act 8. Eliz. 1. 7. 2. That by another Act 1 Eliz. 2. The Book of Common-Prayer and Administration of Sacraments and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England which were in use in the time of 6 E. and repealed by Queen Mary were re-inforced 1 Eliz. 2. 2. and the Repeal annulled But by the Act 5 and 6 E. 6. c. 1. § 5. the Form and Manner of making Arch-Bishops Bishops Priests and Deacons was added to the Book of Prayer as of like Force and Authority with it 3. That the Act of E. 6. being revived with the express mention of the Alterations and Additions made to it there was ro Necessity apprehended 1 Eliz. to make a distinct Act for that which was in force already by the Name of Additions therein added and appointed by that Statute And this I conceive was the true Reason why a Bill did not pass 1 Eliz. to that purpose For I find by the Journals of the House a Bill was prepared and read the third time in the House of Lords but upon Consideration it was laid a side as superfluous 4. That the Popish Party took Advantage of this and pretended That the Book of Consecration c. was not established by Law being not expresly mentioned and therefore the Bishops made by it were not Legal Bishops And upon this Bonner resolved to stand the Trial against Horn Bishop of Winchester as may be seen in Dyer R. f. 234. So that the Papists then stood upon it That the Crown could not dispense with Laws otherwise Bonner's Plea signified nothing For if there were such an Inherent Right in the Crown to Dispense with Laws in Ecclesiastical Matters then these were Legal Bishops having all the Queen 's Dispensing Power for them 5. The Clause in the Queen's Letters Patents for Dispensing with Imperfections and Disability was put in out of abundant Caution and not for any Necessity that we can find But it was Customary in the Popes Bulls to put in such kind of Clauses and therefore they would omit no Power in that Case which the Pope did pretend to which the Act faith was for avoiding all Ambiguities and Questions 6. But after all lest there should be any Colour for Disputing this Matter left according to the express Letter of the Law therefore it was declared 8 Eliz. 1. 3. That not only the Book of Common-Prayer but the Form of Consecrating Archbishops Bishops c. which was set sorth in Edward the Sixth's Time and added to the Common Prayer shall stand and be in full Force and Effect And all Acts done by it are declared to be Good and Perfect to all Intents and Purposes So that this Act of Parliament doth rather overthrow a Dispensing Power for if there were then such a Supreme and Absolute Power in the Crown as to Ecclesiastical Matters what need such an Act of Parliament to Confirm and Ratifie what our Author supposes done by virtue of it But to return to the 25th of H. 8. In the same Act of Parliament care is taken for the Visiting Exempt Places as Monasteries Colledges and Hospitals by a particular Commission under the Great Seal But that which comes nearest to our Business is That 26 H. 8. c. 1. another Act passed wherein the King's Supremacy is acknowledged and a Power given by Act of Parliament for him to Visit Redress and Amend all Errors Heresies Abuses Contempts and Enormities whatsoever which by any manner of Spiritual Authority or Jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be Reformed in any Usage Custom Foreign Laws Foreign Authority Prescription or any Thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding If the King had this Power by virtue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal can we imagin H. 8. so weak a Prince and so little a valuer of his own Prerogative as to have that given him by Act of Parliament which was acknowledged to be in him before But the Words are express And that our Sovereign Lord c. shall have full Power and Authority from Time to Time to Visit c. From whence it follows That in the Judgment of H. 8. and the Parliament such a Power was not personally inherent in him but that it did belong to the Legislative Power and therefore an Act of Parliament was required for it so that the Supremacy as then setled by Law lay in a total rejecting any Foreign Jurisdiction
A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ILLEGALITY OF THE LATE Ecclesiastical Commission In ANSWER to the VINDICATION and DEFENCE of it Wherein the true Notion of the LEGAL SUPREMACY Is CLEARED And an Account is given of the Nature Original and Mischief OF THE DISPENSING POWER LONDON Printed for Henny Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard and at the White Hart in Westminster-Hall M D C LXXXIX AN Advertisement THIS Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Late Ecclesiastical Commission was written when the Author of it was summoned to appear before it and was in continual Expectation of undergoing its Censure for not Complying with the Orders of it This put him upon an Enquiry into the Grounds on which it stood From whence he proceeded to search into the True Notion of the Legal Supremacy and finding it very imperfectly set down in the famous Fifth Report De Jure Regis Ecclesiastico he took the Pains to Examin it through every Reign there mentioned and upon the whole Matter he finds him and his Adversary F. P. equally mistaken But in the Management of it he hath rather endeavoured to give Light to the Thing than to discover any Mans Errors And it is hardly possible to settle the Notion of it aright without considering the Practice of other Countries as well as our own Of both which the Reader will find a short but impartial Account which I believe the Author could more easily have inlarged than have brought it into so narrow a Compass By this I hope the World will see That it was not Humor or Faction but a real and well-grounded Dissatisfaction which made those of the Church of England oppose the Proceedings of that Time and that such have as great and real a Zeal for the Ancient and Legal Constitution of our Government as those who make a greater Noise and Clamor about it and that not upon any new Notions or Phrases but upon the very same Grounds which our Ancestors made use of and carry in them the true Basis of our English Government It is possible some worthy Men may have carried some Notions beyond our Legal Constitution but the more they search into it the better Opinion they will have of it Which I think is so well setled that every Deviation from it tends to our Ruin. As to the Dispensing Power the Author hath inlarged that Part since some late Discourses have been published both for and against it He hath neglected nothing which hath been most plausibly pleaded for it but hath given a full Answer to the most material Instances which have been insisted on in behalf of it And after all I cannot but conclude That the Dispensing Power is a kind of Mental Reservation which quite alters the Meaning and Design of a Law. When the Late Ecclesiastical Commission was superseded if not dissolved the Author laid by these Papers as Useless but having communicated them to one Particular Friend whose Judgment and Authority he had a great Regard to he hath been prevailed with by him to make them Publick at this Time It being still necessary to shew with what Justice and Reason we refused to own the Jurisdiction of it And it seems to me as hard to reconcile it to our Laws as Liberty of Conscience to the Principles of Popery or the Worship of Images to the Second Commandment THE CONTENTS CHAP. I. THE State of the Question concerning the Court of the late Ecclesiastical Commission Pag. 1 CHAP. II. The King's Supremacy by common-Common-Law enquired into Coke's fifth Report de Jure Regis Ecclesiastico examined p. 8 CHAP. III. Whether the King's Supremacy by Law extends to the Dispensing with Laws Of the Nature and Original of that Power The Inconsistency of such a Dispensing Power with the Frame of our Government p. 25 CHAP. IV. Of the Alterations made in the Supremacy by the Statutes of Henry the Eighth with an Answer to the Objections p. 49 THE LEGALITY OF THE COURT OF Ecclesiastical Commission Stated and Argued In ANSWER to the VINDICATION and DEFENCE of it CHAP. I. The State of the Question concerning the Court of the late Ecclesiastical Commission The Case stands thus BY the Act of 1 Eliz. 1. it was established and enacted That such Jurisdictions Priviledges Superiorities and Preheminencies Spiritual and Ecclesiastical as by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Power or Authority have heretofore been or may lawfully be exercised or used for the Visitation of the Ecclesiastical State and Persons and for Reformation Order and Correction of the same and of all manner of Errors Heresies Schisms Abuses Offences Contempts and Enormities shall for ever by this present Parliament be united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm And that the Kings and Queens of this Realm shall have ful Power and Authority by virtue of this Act by Letters Patents under the great Seal of England to assign name and authorize when and as often as they shall think meet and convenient and for such and so long time as they shall think meet to exercise use occupy and execute all manner of Jurisdictions Priviledges and Preheminences in any wise touching or concerning any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction within these Realms and to visit reform redress order correct and amend all such Errors Heresies Schisms Abuses Offences Contempts and Enormities what soever which by any manner of Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Power Authority or Jurisdiction can or may lawfully be reformed ordered redressed corrected restrained or amended to the Pleasure of Almighty God the increase of Virtue and the conservation of the Peace and Unity of this Realm And that such Person and Persons so to be named authorized and appointed after the said Letters Patents to him or them made and delivered shall have full Power and Authority by virtue of this Act and of the said Letters Patents to exercise use and execute all the Premises according to the Tenour and effect of the said Letters Patents any Matter or Cause to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding But in the Act 17 Car. 1. c. 11. after the recital of this latter Clause these words follow And whereas by Colour of some Words in the aforesaid Branch of the said Act whereby Commissioners areauthorized to execute their Commission according to the Tenor and Effect of the King's Letters Patents and by Letters Patents grounded thereupon the said Commissioners have to the great and unsufferable Wrong and Oppression of the King's Subjects used to fine and imprison them and to exercise Authority not belonging to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction restored by that Act and divers other great Mischiefs and Inconveniences have also ensued to the King's Subjects by occasion of the said Branch and Commissions issued thereupon and the Executions thereof therefore for the Repressing and Preventing of the aforesaid Abuses Mischiefs and Inconveniences in time to come Be it enacted by the King 's Most Excellent Majesty and the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by the Authority
hath no Jurisdiction it is no Court if it have Jurisdiction it is void in Law for the Act of Parliament takes away all Power Jurisdiction and Authority from any such Court. 3. The Explanatory Act 13 Car. 2. c. 12. makes this more evident for there being a Clause inserted 17 Car. 1. c. 11. which seemed to take away the Ordinary Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts it was thought fit to make that Act on purpose to clear that Matter by repealing that Clause But that Clause being part of the Act which took away the High-Commission Court lest by such a Repeal the Act it self should be thought repealed therefore there is only an Exception put in not barely as to the Old High-Commission but as to the new erecting some such like Court by Commission And a particular Proviso is added That neither this Act nor any thing herein contained shall extend or be construed to revive or give force to the said Branch of the said Statute made in the said first Year of the Reign of the said late Queen Elizabeth mentioned in the said Act of Parliament made in the seventeenth Year of the Reign of the said King Charles but that the said Branch of the said Statute made in the said first Year of the Reign of the said late Queen Elizabeth shall stand and be repealed in such sort as if this Act had never been made Now it ought to be considered That even this Parliament doth not fix upon the Power to Fine and Imprison to take that away but upon the Original Clause in the Act which gave Power to erect such a Court. And this Parliament was zealous to assert the Ordinary Jurisdiction and as zealous to prevent any such extraordinary Jurisdictions as was in the High-Commission which it shewed by continuing the Repeal of that Power by which it was established CHAP. II. The King's Supremacy by Common-Law enquired into Coke 's fifth Report de Jure Regis Ecclesiastico examined BUT against this it is pleaded with some Appearance of Reason That in Caudry 's Case the Judges resolved That the Act of the first Year of the late Queen was not introductory of a new Law but declaratory of the Old and that the King by the Ancient Law might make such an Ecclesiastical Commission And since the Act 13 Car. 2. c. 12. saith That we are not to abridg or diminish the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters and Affairs Therefore we are still to suppose That the King hath a Power by Law to appoint such a Commission for Ecclesiastical Matters This is the Substance of what is pleaded for the Legality of the Court And since the Argument is confined to Matter of Law to clear this Matter it will be necessary to give an Account of these two things I. What the Ancient Law was as to this Matter II. How far the Legal Supremacy is abridged by these Statutes I. As to the Ancient Law in this matter It 's true that the Lord Coke in Caudry's Case hath endeavoured to prove That the Statute 1 Eliz. was not introductory of a new Law but declaratory of the Old but the Instances he produces fall very short of being Demonstrative Proofs as he calls them For the true Case is not 1. Whether the King ought not to interpose in Ecclesiastical Matters so far as the Peace and good Government of his Realm was concerned Nor 2. Whether he might not order things which concerned the Right of Ecclesiastical Possessions as in Bishopricks Commendams Right of Patronage Pleas of Tiths c. Nor 3. Whether the King by his Supreme Authority might not limit the Proceedings of ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts in Matters concerning his Crown and Dignity by granting Prohibitions Nor 4. Whether the King by Common Law cannot grant a Commission of Review after the Proceedings of the Ecclesiastical Courts which Judge Hutton affirmed Was all that was determined in Caudry 's Case Nor 5. Whether the King in Parliament may not make Law for Reformation of Religion and establishing good Order therein Nor 6. Whether the Supreme Coactive Jurisdiction were not always a Right of the Crown however it were in a great Measure usurped by the Pope after King John 's Resignation But Whether our Ancient Law doth give the King a Power by virtue of his Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction to appoint Commissioners by an extraordinary way of Jurisdiction to proceed in prima instantia against Persons by Ecclesiastical Censures And to prove this I cannot find one sufficient Example as I shall make appear by a short Account of the Instances he produces and the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction exercised at that time In the Time of the Saxons In the Saxon Times he brings first an Instance of Kenulphus King of Mercia granting an Exemption to the Abbot of Abingdon But what does this signifie to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction to prove That the King gave the Abbot an Exemption from the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Bishops for in those Days there were great Disputes between the Bishops and Abbots about the Temporal Jurisdiction over the Lands of their Abbies which the Bishops claimed and the Abbots refused and put themselves under the Protection of Princes and Great Men as appears by the Councils of Cloveshoo and Becanceld in the time of Kenulphus But Stamford puts this Matter out of Dispute in the Confirmation of the Charter of Kenulphus by Edwin for the Words are Quod praefatum Monastrium omnis terrenae servitatis esset liberum And what is this now to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction But we have manifest Proof in the Saxon Times That the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was never exercised by such a Commission but that all extraordinary Cases were dispatched in Parliamentary Assemblies and the Ordinary Jurisdiction was exercised by the Archbishop of Canterbury in Chief and by the rest of the Bishops The first extraordinary Instance of proceeding against an Ecclesiastical Person in the Saxon Times was that of Wilfred Archbishop of York who because he would not consent to the making three Bishopricks in his Province was deposed by Theodore Archbishop of Canterbury the King himself being present and the great Council of the Nation For so King Alfrith saith that he was bis à toto Anglorum Concilio damnatus as the Words are in Malmsbury and Eddius who lived at that time saith That King Alfrith gave this Reason against restoring him because he had been condemned by the Kings his Predecessors with their Council the Archbishop assisting and himself had judged him cum omnibus pene Britanniae vestrae Praesulibus all the Bishops almost being present In the Council of Nester field in his Case it is said The King was present and Berthwaldus Archbishop of Canterbury cum totius pene Britanniae Episcopis In the Council at Nid it is said sedentibus Rege Episcopis cum Principibus eorum in loco Synodali which was a Parliamentary Assembly Not long after Tunbert was deposed from his Bishoprick but it
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction are either such as other Princes have an equal Right to or else they must imply such proper Eclesiastical Jurisdiction as follows the Power of Order and then how can the Pope give the one without the other Such a Gift is like an Appropriation of a Benefice with a Cure to a Nunnery which the Lord Hobart saith is void in Law by reason of the incapacity of the Persons But the Supremacy which our Law gives is not any proper immediate spiritual Jurisdiction like that of Bishops but an Authoritative and Legislative Supremacy without any foreign Appeals as will appear afterwards But the Rights which the Kings of Sicily challenge are these 1. That they have the same Powers which Legates a Latere have and may judge of the same Causes and proceed in the same manner with Ecclesiastical Censures 2. That no Appeal lies from the King's Commissioner even to Rome it self and it is common to appeal from the Censure of the Bishop to him The former is a Power which our Kings never pretended to by vertue of their Supremacy for it is a Delegation of the Power of the Keys which the Legates à Latere exercise by vertue of their Function as well as their Commission But the Legal Supremacy with us is a Right to govern all sorts of Men by our own Laws without any foreign Jurisdiction and that with respect to Ecclesiastical Matters as well as Temporal But to prevent Mistakes and Cavils about this Matter it will be necessary to clear the Notion of Supremacy as it hath been owned and received in the Church of England And for this we have two Authentic Declarations of it to rely upon The first is mentioned 5 Eliz. c. 1. § 14. Where the Supremacy is declared to be taken and expounded in such form as is set forth in the Admonition annexed to the Queens Injunctions published in the first year of her Reign And the Words there are That the Queen neither doth nor will challenge any Authority but such as was of ancient time due to the Imperial Crown of this Realm that is under God to have the Sovereignty and Rule over all manner of Persons born within these her Realms Dominions and Countries of what Estates either Ecclesiastical or Temporal soever they be so as no other foreign Power shall or ought to have any superiority over them The Second is in the 37th Article wherein it is declared That by the Supremacy is meant that only Prerogative which we see to have been always given to all Godly Princes in Holy Scriptures by God himself that is that they should rule all Estates and Degrees committed to their Charge by God whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal and restrain with the Civil Sword the stubborn and evil doers So that granting a Commission for proceeding by Ecclesiastical Censures is no part of that Supremacy which our Church owns And thus the Divines of our Church have understood it By the Supremacy saith Bishop Andrews we do not attribute to the King the Power of the Keys or Ecclesiastical Censures R. Thompson in his Desence against Becanus saith The Supremacy is not to be defined by Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction but by Supream Government Becanus urged this as an Argument against the Kings Supremacy That he had no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Dr. Burrhil answered That the Supremacy implied many other things as the Power of calling Convocations of confirming Canons of giving Commissions of Delegates of taking Cognizance of the Misdemeanors of Church-men as well as others but for proper Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction he denies it to belong to Supremacy And after asserts That the King's Supremacy is preserved if he takes care that those who have the Power of Ecclesiastical Censures do exercise them and not as though it belonged to the Supremacy to give an immediate Power to proceed by Ecclesiastical Censures which was not supposed to belong to it but a supreme Right of governing all sorts of Persons by our Laws The King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters doth not saith Mason imply the Power of the Keys which the King hath not but he may command those who have them to use them rightly All these wrote in King James I. his Reign when the Point of Supremacy was throughly sifted on both sides And the King himself who very well understood these Matters saith That the Oath of Supremacy only extended to the King's Power of Judicature over all Persons as well Civil as Ecclesiastical excluding all foreign Powers and Potentates to be Judges within his Dominions Not as though the King hereby challenged to himself a Power of inflicting Ecclesiastical Censures on Persons but leaving the Spiritual Jurisdiction to those who have the Power of the Keys it belonged to him to exercise his Supreme Authority over Ecclesiastical Persons and Causes as he did over Temporal For saith Archbishop Bramhal our Laws never invested the King with any Spiritual Power or Jurisdiction witness the Injunctions of Q. Eliz. witness the Publick Articles of Our Church witness the Professions of King James witness all our Statutes themselves The King of England saith he by the Fundamental Constitution of the Monarchy hath plenary Power without the Licence or Help or Concurrence of any Foreign Prelate or Potentate to render final Justice that is to receive the last Appeals of his own Subjects without any Fear of any Review from Rome or at Rome for all Matters Ecclesiastical and Temporal Ecclesiastical by his Bishops Temporal by his Judges And thus our Laws were in the Right when they called the Act of Supremacy Restoring the Rights of the Crown for if we take away all the Papal Usurpations as to Appeals Exemptions of Persons Dispensations Provisions making Canons sending Legates to hold Courts to call Convocations c. we may easily understand what the Supremacy is viz. a Power of Governing all Sorts of Men according to the Laws Ecclesiastical and Temporal without any Foreign Jurisdiction But as in Temporal Matters the King 's Supreme Authority is exercised in his Ordinary Courts so likewise in Ecclesiastical Which deriving their Jurisdiction from the King as Supreme his Supremacy is preserved in the ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts but as to extraordinary Jurisdiction that deper ds on the Legislative Power And whether that be not now taken away by it is the thing in Question Having endeavoured to set this Matter in as clear a Light as I could I now return to the Instance of Edward the Confessor And those Words of his as they are in Hoveden signifie no more than a General Right of Protecting and Defending the Church which is not denied to belong to Kings where the Pope's Authority is the most owned I cannot but take notice of a different Reading in the Lord Cokes Copy from all that I have seen for where he hath it Sanctam Ecclesiam regat defendat Lambard veneretur regâ—t but Hoveden revereatur ab
injuriatoribus defendat Which is that Right of Protection which is allowed by all The Spanish Lawyers hold That there lies an Appeal to the Kings Courts by his Right of Protection in Case of any violent Proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts Which Violences are so many as make such Appeals so frequent and necessary that whole Volumes have been written about them And this they say Is not Introductory of a New Law but only declaratory of a Natural Right The French Lawyers allow Appeals from the Ecclesiastical Courts tanquam ab abusu which must be founded on an Original Right in the King to defend the Church both from Injuries and Abuses And as to the Church it self it is fully expressed in the Writ de Excommunicato capiendo in these Words Quia vero Potestas Regia Sacrosanctae Ecclesiae in querelis suis deesse non debet But such a Right of Protection and Assistance is different from that of Jurisdiction unless it be that which is only Coactive which is not the Jurisdiction we now enquire into But it is most considerable that King Edward saith He is God's Vicar and therefore could not look on himself as acting by Commission from the Pope It is true that in the third Charter of Westminster there is a Bull of Nicholas the Second wherein he gives to the King and his Successors the Protection and Defence of that Place and of all the Churches of England and a Power in his stead to make good Laws with the Advice of the Bishops and Abbots But I do not find that King Edward owned that he acted in these Matters by any Commission from the Pope but from God himself And this Law in Hoveden and others overthrows any such pretended Commission And yet the Pope himself doth not give him a Power to delegate his Authority to others but to act in it himself and that only with the Advice of Bishops and Abbots The Point then which was to be proved was not that the King had a Right to protect the Church from Injuries but such an Inherent Right of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which he might delegate to others whether Bishops or not and impower them to proceed by Ecclesiastical Censures against Offenders summoned to appear before them And the Question now is not Whether by the Supreme Legislative Power of the Nation such an Authority might not in an extraordinary Case be Committed to particular Persons by Act of Parliament but Whether such an Act of Parliament being granted to be taken away the King by the Ancient Law of the Realm may appoint such Commissioners as he thinks fit Laymen or Bishops to proceed against the King's Subjects by Ecclesiastical Censures And this very stating of the Case as it ought to be shews how impertinent the remainder of his Examples are But to proceed In the Reign of King William the First In the time of William the Conqueror he only mentions a Case out of Fitz-Herbert That he made an Appropriation of Churches with Cure to Ecclesiastical Persons viz. to a Prebend of the Church of York now this saith he was agreed by all could not be done without Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction It is too common a Fault in some great Lawyers that what they find once setled for Law in their Books they imagine was never otherwise Thus Appropriations after Diocesses were setled being looked on as chiefly the Act of the Ordinary who is to take Care of the whole Diocess From hence they infer That in all Times an Appropriation must argue Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction But before the Parochial Rights were established there were many Volantary Appropriations made by particular Persons who thought there was no more Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in the Appropriation of Churches than in the Endowments of them and in the Right of Patronage only the one is setled on a Spiritual Corporation as perpetual Incumbent and the other on particular Persons in Succession It s true since the Acts for restoring Jurisdiction to the Crown the Power of making Appropriations in the King is said to be from his Supreme Ecclesiastical Authority Grindon's Case in Pl. f. 448. But then we are told It was because the Pope as Supreme Ordinary had such a Power without the Bishops which Reason will not hold as to such Times when the Pope was not owned to be Supreme Ordinary as he was not in the Conqueror's Time the Canon-Law not being then received in England But what a mean Proof is this in such a busie Time as that of William the Frst when so many great Churchmen were deprived of their Bishopricks being English and the Normans put in their Places Was this done by any Commission from William to his Great Lords and others to proceed against them by Ecclesiastical Censures nothing like it Stigand Archbishop of Canterbury if Spot's Story be true was too great a Friend to the English Liberties to be endured by him But he was too great a Dissembler to seem to have any thing to do in it himself and therefore knowing he was of the opposite Party to the prevailing Pope he privatly sends to him To send a Legate for that Purpose wherein the Pope and He had their several Ends and then in Parliament Time the King keeping his Easter at Winchester Stigand was deposed and Agilmarus Bishop of the East Angles and several others without any evident Reason saith Hoveden but only to make way for the Normans This was in Concilio Magno saith he and the rest for Easter was one of the three Seasons for the Parliamentary Meeting in the Year which William kept up in Imitation of the Saxons who at Christmas Easter and Pentecost held their Publick Courts and did wear their Crowns till the Times of H. 2. and then they did dispatch Publick Affairs Thus far he complied with the Saxon Customs but he had a new Work to do The Archbishop he could not rely upon and therefore was put to find out a new way by sending for a Legate from the Pope to serve his turn And thus William for his own Ends having so hard a Game to play here called in the Pope's Assistance who knew well enough how to draw his own Advantage out of it But William would go no further than his Interest carried him for afterwards he declared That he would maintain his own Rights which he enjoyed in Normandy viz. That nothing should be done without him in Convocation no Legate come but as he pleased c. But still he seemed to let them enjoy their Saxon Liberties in Matters of Ecclesiastical Proceedings so far as to have them debated in Parliament Thus the Controversie between the two Archbishops was referred to Parliament the King and the Great Men as well as the Bishops being present The Controversie between Lanfrank Archbishop of Canterbury and Odo Bishop of Baieux was referred saith Eadmerus to a Conventus Principum at Pinnedenen and when the King heard their Resolution cum consensu omnium
upon themselves to be sole Judges in it and for all that I can see the Act 2 H. 4. owns this to be part of their Spiritual Jurisdiction And this is one Reason alledged for the Repeal of this Act 25 H. 8. c. 14. because there is no Declaration of Heresie made in it but it is left to the Judgment of the Ordinary And therefore this Act was ill thought upon to prove the King 's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction In Henry the Seventh's time the King is said to be persona mixta because he hath both Ecclesiastical and Temporal Jurisdiction But this Argument is drawn only from some occasional Talk mentioned in the Year Books 10 Hen. 8. 18. Brian said That a sage Doctor of Law said one time to him That Priests might be tried at Common Law Car il dit quod Rex est persona mixta car est persona unita cum sacerdotibus saint Eglyse If all this be granted it proves no more than that the King hath Jurisdiction by his Law over Ecclesiastical Persons which is not disputed CHAP. III. Whether the King's Supremacy by Law extends to the Dispensing with Laws Of the Nature and Original of the Power The Inconsistency of such a Dispensing Power with the Frame of our Government HAving thus far proceeded in clearing the ancient Legal Supremacy I am now come to an Instance of greater Weight and Difficulty and which will therefore require more Pains and Care in the Examination of it viz. 11 H. 7. 12. By the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed with in this Realm a Priest cannot have two Benefices nor a Bastard can be a Priest but the King may by his Ecclesiastical Power and Jurisdiction dispense with both these because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. Here we are to enquire into these things 1. How far the King's Power and Jurisdiction did extend in the Cases mentioned 2. How far the Reason here given will justifie a Power of Dispensing with Laws 1. As to the Cases here mentioned there is no doubt but the Canonists made the Power of Dispensing in these to be an Argument of the Pope's Supremacy or the Plenitude of his Power But doth it hence follow That what Princes did to their own Subjects as to the qualifying them for a Legal Possession of Benefices must argue a Supremacy in them over Ecclesiastical Persons and Causes And there is a difference to be made between not Receiving the Pope's Canons in particular Cases and a Power of Dispensing with Ecclesiastical Laws If the Law were so then as is noted by Fineax in 11 H. 7. 12. the plain Consequence is That the contrary were no part of the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed within this Realm As in the famous Case about the Canon Law concerning Bastardy when the Barons said Noluleges Angliae mutari no man can say That the Barons dispensed with the Pope's Ecclesiastical Laws but that they refused to execute them for as it is well observed in Standish's Case in Kelway's Reports 7 H. 8. Ecclesiastical Laws have no force where the General Practice hath been contrary If this were no more than a private Opinion of Fineux of what he thought the King might do although there were no Precedent for it then it signifies little but if from hence it appears What the Common Law of England was then it follows That this was not received at that time for the Ecclesiastical Law of this Kingdom And so Hobart in Colt and Glover's Case understands it f. 147. for he produces this as an Instance That the Crown always kept a Possession of its Natural Power And to this he adds a Power of Commendam or Retaining a Benefice with a Bishoprick 11 H. 4. 60. This he calls a Power of Dispensation in Spiritualibus But with submission to two such great Men in the Law If the Crown always kept a Possession of these Rights there could be no Dispensation with the Ecclesiastical Law in these Matters but an Exclusion of it As for Instance The Kings of France do challenge many Priviledges to themselves in their Kingdoms in plain Derogation to the Canon Law and for these Priviledges they plead an Ancient Right of the Crown or an immemorial Custom As in the great Controversic of late Years about the Regale the Canon Law is express That upon Pain of Excommunication no Lay Person what soever shall presume to meddle with the Profits of Vacant Bishopricks which was decreed by two Popes in several Councils Urban II in a Council at Awergn MXCV and Innocent II in Lateran Council MC XXXIX both entred in the Body of the Canon Law And yet the Kings of France insist to this Day on the Rights of Vacant Sees as belonging to them But can this be pleaded as a Dispensing with the Ecclesiastical Laws allowed in that Realm No but that this Part of the Ecclesiastical Law was not received there for that partly by the Feudal Right partly by the Right of the Crown partly by Immemortal Custom the Profits of Vacant Bishopricks accrue to the King. It is a harder Point to defend the Regale where the Custom hath gone along with the Canon but if the Rights of the Crown be defended in France against Custom and Canon too our Kings cannot be blamed for resuming other Rights after so long Usurpation by the Popes But where the Canon Law was not received in any Part of it there it hath no Force to oblige and where there is no Ecclesiastical Law in Force there can be no Dispensing with it for although the later Canon Law doth void all Customs against the Liberties and Priviledges of the Church Non debet in hac parte Canonibus ex aliqua consuetudine praejudiâ—ium generari Yet when these Canonists come to explain it they tell us That an immemorial Custom hath Force against a Canon but how Not as a Custom but as it is a Proof of an Ancient Priviledge granted by the Pope although there be not the least â—ootsteps of it And so this Instance of H. 7. will prove according to this Way only some Ancient Priviledge our Kings had and no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction by the Right of the Crown But whether the King could Dispense with the Ecclesiastical Laws in these Cases or not it is certain the Pope challenged to himself the Power of doing it For after that the Third Council of Lateran liad strictly forhidden Pluralities which were then so common and scandalous upon pain of Forfeiture Innocent the Third complained in the Fourth Lateran That he saw little or no Benesit come by that severe Canon and therefore he seems to make one more severe That whosoever takes another Benefice shall be deprived of the former ipso jure and if he seeks to keep it to lose the other Yet after all this ends only in the Popes Power to dispense as he saw Cause with Persons of greater Rank or Merit and greater Preferments The Words are Circa sublimes tamen
he is not Lord over the Community but Governour 2. That for him to Dispense in a Law made for the Community without a just Cause is not only malum quia prohibitum sed ex se ex natura rei semper malum Therefore Suarez was far from thinking a Prince might Dispense with any thing that was not malum in se for he makes it to be so for him to dispense with a malum quia prohibitum if it be prohibited by a Law made for a Publick Good and there be no just Cause for it 3. That although a Prince sins in Dispensing with such a Law yet his Dispensation holds as to the Force of the Law which he supposes to depend on the Will of the Prince and therefore his Will being altered the Obligation ceaseth as to the Persons Dispensed with 4. That although such a Dispensation holds as to the Law yet he thinks a Prince bound in Conscience to Revoke such a Dispensation because it is unlawful for him to persist in such a Will it being repugnant to the Common Good and the Obligation of his Duty 5. That if such a Dispensation be to the Injury of a third Person then it is void in it self as being repugnant to Justice Vasquez saith They are all agreed That no Prince hath a Power to Dispense with his Laws according to his Pleasure or because they are his Laws But he saith There is a Dispute Whether an unlawful Dispensation be valid or not And he thinks not and that a Man's Action after the Dispensation is as faulty as if there had been none His Reason is because a Prince is bound by his own Laws so that he cannot Dispense with himself as to the Obligation of them for if he could at Pleasure Dispense with himself he could never be bound for how can a Man be bound to keep a Law in which he can Dispense with himself when he pleases And if he cannot Dispense with himself much less with any under him Having thus endeavoured to clear the Nature and Original of the Dispensing Power I now come 2. To the Reason assigned by Sir E. Coke from the Year Books why the King may Dispense with Laws because they be mala prohibita and not mala per se. My Lord Vaughan said Right concerning it That this Rule hath more confounded Men's Judgments on this Subject than rectified them Which I shall make appear by shewing I. That it alters the Frame of our Government II. That it takes away all Security by Law. III. That it contradicts the Sense of our Nation in former Ages IV. That the Rule is contrary to the Precedents in Law. I. That it alters the Frame of our Government For it goes upon a very false Ground viz. That the King may Dispense with any thing which is not Evil in its own Nature or antecedently to any Human Laws which is to suppose the whole Legislative Power to be lodged in the Person of the King For all who understand these Matters do agree That a Power to Dispense with Laws is the same with a Power to make them Dispensare hoc est lege solvere is solus potest qui ferendae abrogandaeque leg is potestatem habet saith H. Grotius Suarez saith He hath the Power of Dispensing qui legem tulit quia ab ejus voluntate potentia pendet Vasquez That the Dispensing Power lies in him qui habet Potestatem condendi abrogandi legem Pufendorf That none can Dispense with a Law but such as have the Power of making it But we need no Authorities in this Matter For to Dispense in the Sense it is here taken is to take away the Obligation of a Law and whoever takes it away must have the Power of laying it on And there is no Difference between the Dispensation with a Law and the Abrogation of it but that a Dispensation is an Abrogation of it to particular Persons while others are under the Force of it and an Abrogation is a General Dispensation that being no more than a Relaxation of the whole Law to those Persons who were bound by it before But if a part of the Law be taken away as to the whole Community then it is called a Derogation of it But if the Law be Relaxed only for a limited Time and under certain Conditions then it is not an Abrogation but an Indulgence or Suspension of the Law. To Dispense with a Law is more than to give an Equitable Sense or a Favourable Interpretation of a Law for he that Inteprets a Law supposes his Interpretation to agree with the Sense and Design of the Law he that Dispenses owns that which he dispenses with to be against the Intention of the Law but that he hath Power to take away the Force of it so far as he thinks fit He that saith Thou shalt not kill doth not reach to Legal Executioners of Justice interprets the Law according to Reason and Equity But when God said to Abraham Go and Sacrifice thy Son he must be supposed by virtue of his Supreme Authority to Dispense with the Law in his Case so as to make that Lawful upon his Command which would not have been so without it Some will not allow this to be called a Dispensation but an alteration of the Matter of the Law but when that Alteration comes from the Authority of the Law Makers it is the same so that to Interpret a Law is an Act of Discretion and Judgment but to Dispense with it of Authority and Jurisdiction And none can therefore Dispense in the Law of God but he that made it all that the Wisest and greatest Men can justly pretend to is no more than to give the true Sense of it and it is intolerable Prsumption for any Creature to pretend to more An Equitable Sense as to Human Law is not always that which seems to be most favourable to those who go against the Letter of it but that which most enforces the End and Design of the Law although it be not comprehended in the Words of it If a Law mentions a Crime of a lesser nature in regard of Circumstances and in regard of those Circumstances promises some Favour as Benefit of the Clergy it can be no Equitable Sense to extend it to such Acts which have worse Circumstances because the Ground of the Favour was the extenuation of the Fact by the Circumstances so that the chief Rule of Equity in the Interpretation of a Law is to attend to the Intention and Design of it more than to the bare Words The Intention and Design of the Law is not to be measured by Particular and Accidental Cases wherein some Inconveniencies are to be born but by the Publick and General Good which more than makes amends for them which is the Reason of that Maxim Better a Mischief than an Inconvenience which is false unless taken in such an Equitable Sense There are
certain Ways of Reason which Mankind do allow in the Equitable Interpretation of Laws as That no positive Law must be interpreted against Natural and Divine Laws That if Laws contradict each other one or the other must lose its Force That no Case which overthrows a Law by necessary Consequence was ever intended to be allowed by it For that were to make a Law and to give a Liberty to break it at the same Time. If a Law be designed for a Publick Good and an Exception be afterwards made against it as to the Incapacity of some Persons by it for Publick Service which could not but be foreseen and considered at the Time of making the Law there is no Reason that should be alledged as a Reason for Dispensing with the Law which was intended at first by the Law For however the Case may be put as to such things which could not be foreseen at the making of a Law yet what was intended to be prevented by the making it cannot in Reason be alledged against it Because if there had not been other things to have over-ballanced that Inconvenience the Law had never been passed There is no doubt but the same Power which makes a Law may Dispense with it if it sees Cause for if it can Abrogate a Law as to the whole Community it may as well Dispense with it as to particular Persons and leave it in Force to all others The Question then is Whether a Prince assuming to himself a Dispensing Power doth not thereby assume the Legislative too Since it appears That there can be no Power to take off the Obligation of a Law but that which causes it although it be with respect to particular Persons but if it amount to a General Suspension of a Law there can be no Question to those who understand what these things mean. Our present Business was to shew That if the King can dispense with Mala prohibita as such the Legislative Power must be resolved into him because a Dispensing Power can be refer'd to no other And if the King may Dispense with all Mala prohibita he may Dispense with all just human Laws For no Law can be just which requires Malum in se and therefore such a Law being void of it self there can be no Exercise of a Dispensing Power but concerning Mala prohibita And if the King can therefore Dispense because they are only prohibited then from a Parity of Reason he may Dispense with all Laws that concern only such things and we cannot be secure of any Laws but such as forbid things that are evil in themselves II. And this is my Second Reason against it That it takes away all Security by our Laws both as to our Religion and Liberties 1. As to our Religion I grant that to take away all Religion is Malum in se to take away the true Religion is Malum in se but in a Nation divided about the true Religion and where the Prince is of one Opinion and the main Body of the Nation of another concerning it what Security can the People by this Rule have as to the enjoying that which they account the true Religion but the Prince doth not The utmost we can suppose in this Case is for such Laws to be made as they apprehend to be most effectual for this Purpose But what Security can these Laws afford if the Prince assume a Power of Dispensing with Ecclesiastical Laws It is not possible they can have any unless they can be secure he shall never exercise this Dispensing Power for by it he may equally suspend all Laws which relate to it he may give a Dispensation to such as are unqualified by our Laws and put them not only into Places of Authority and Trust but into all Ecclesiastical Preferments as soon as he thinks fit and that without any Check upon his Conscience because those whose Office it is to interpret the Laws tell him he hath such a Power by Law to Dispense with Ecclesiastical Laws although passed in the solemnest manner and with a Design to give Security to the People concerning the preserving their Religion And the higher this Point is carried still the less Security For if it be thought such a Prerogative of the Crown as voids all that is made against it then Laws signifie just nothing For every Law is a Limitation of unbounded Will and Power and therefore Laws afford no manner of Security for either they are void of themselves or may be made void when a Sovereign Prince pleases And I think as Men are meer Will and Pleasure will never be taken for an infallible Security But it may be said That taking away the true Religion is Malum in se and therefore by this Rule such Laws cannot be dispensed with Very true we think so But suppose a King of another Opinion and that he should think it good Service to destroy Heresie and Schism and those are Mala in se what Security can there be then from this Rule For the same Persons who assert the Dispensing Power make the King to be Judge not meerly of the Necessity and urgent Occasions but of what is Malum in se and what not Suppose then he should look on our Religion as Heresie and Schism what possible Security can this Distinction afford us 2. As to our Civil Liberties Which are founded upon our Laws made by the Consent of King and People But if there be such an inseparable Prerogative in the Crown as enables the King to Dispense with all Mala prohibita what becomes of all the Ancient Charters of Liberties For no one can pretend that the contrary to them all are Mala in se. And if there be no farther Security than what this Distinction affords we are in a very precaridus Condition as to all our Liberties I confess the Case is different as to the Ecclesiastical Laws mentioned in 11 H. 7. 12. and as to our Civil Liberties because these Ecclesiastical Laws had their Force as such from a foreign Power and as far as they were the Laws of the Kingdom it was by a Tacit Consent and Acceptation and not by any solemn Enacting of them And as to such as these where the Laws were not received and the things were no farther evil than as they were prohibited by such a Foregin Power there is nothing but what is reasonable in the Case of 11 H. 7. 12. as it is in the Books But when this hath been extended to Laws which have passed in the most solemn manner by the King in Parliament it is time not only to take notice of but to set forth the mischievous Consequences of this Distinction as it is so applied for it leaves us under no manner of Security by our Laws 3. It contradicts the Sense of our own Nation in former Ages Which I shall shew in a remarkable Instance about the Statutes of Provisors 35 E. 1. 25 E. 3. 13 R. 2. which were Prohibitory
although he had the King's Assent to it and he exercised it several Years by his Permission Stephen Gardiner in his Letter to the Protector saith That he obtained his Legatine Power by the King's Assent From whence he observes What Danger they may fall in who break the Law with the King's Consent for in the Cardinal's Case he saith That because his Legatine Power was against the Laws of the Realm the Judges conclude the Offence to be such as incurred the Praemunire And this he Asserts was the Sense of the Lawyers of that Time and for confirmation of it he brought the Case of the Lord Tiptoft who sufferd on Tower-Hill because in execution of the King's Commission he had offended against the Laws of the Realm And of many Judges who had Fines set on their Heads in like Case for acting against the Law of the Realm by the King's Commandment But it is pleaded on the other side That the Commons 1 H. 5. n. 22. put in the saving the King's Prerogative into their Petition concerning the Statute of Provisors that it may stand in full Force And this was an owning the King's Dispensing Power by all the Commons in Parliament when they were in a high Debate with the Crown This seems to have a good shew of Reason to any one that doth not consider the Practice of those Times in Acts of Parliament for the Petitions of the Commons before 2 H. 5. were not taken entire and just as they delivered them but several Clauses were inserted by the Court especially such as seemed to preserve the King's Prerogative which the Commons found so inconvenient That the next Year as Serjeant Glanvil observed and probably on the Occasion of these Savings 1 H. 5. n. 15 and n. 22. the Course was altered and hath so continued Therefore methinks so great Weight should not be laid on these Savings as if they implied the owning the Dispensing Power when the Design of the Law was against it And the King's Answer is Let the Statutes be held and kept I appeal to any Man's Understanding whether the saving the King's Prerogative can be any other than a General Clause put in without respect to the Dispensing Power since the Petition is against the Exercise of it and the Answer That the Statutes should be observed If they were observed what Use of the Dispensing Power for that lay in giving leave not to observe them What strange Sense is this The King promises The Statutes shall be kept saving his Prerogative that they may not be kept for they feared the not keeping them from such a Prerogative and when the King therefore Yields they shall be kept he doth give up any such Prerogative or else he doth not answer their Petition The Truth is when the Kings had got this Power into their Hands though it were with such Limitations at first yet they found Arts from time to time to keep it till at last they were unwilling to part with it as appears by H. 4. but upon the restless Importunity of the Commons it was laid down by him And now in the beginning of H. 5. the Commons took Care to prevent its Rising in a new Reign but he being a Prince not ready to part with any thing which looked like Power was in probability not easie to be brought to confirm the Statute of Provisors without some general Words of saving his Prerogative which the Commons might yield to that they might gain the main Point since those Words could signifie nothing against the very Intention and Design of the Law. IV. The Precedents in Law do contradict this Rule as will appear by those which are produced by the Lord Chief Justice Vaughan in the Case of Thomas and Sorrel 1. The King cannot Dispense with a Common Nusance for The King he saith cannot Pardon continuing Nusances but the Penalty he may The King cannot Dispense with a Nusance to the High Ways by 11 H. 7. he cannot Pardon or Discharge the Nusance or the suit for the same the High-ways being necessary for such as Trawel but Common Nusances are not mala in se which are not Evils at Common Law as some understand them but things so intrinsecally Evil that no Circumstances can make them lawful Malum in se is a Moral Evil in its own Nature and therefore can never be Dispensed with but a Nusance at Common Law is but a Natural Evil and all the Moral Evil of it lies in the Prohibition by Law And yet in these it is granted That the King cannot Dispense And the Year-Book saith That a Licence to make a Nusance in the High Way were void For what Reason Is it a thing forbidden by the Natural or Divine Law Cannot the King for his Will and Pleasure License the Making a Nusance and yet is it possible for Men of Sense to imagin That he can by his Dispensing Power give leave to do such things as in consequence overthrow our Laws and Religion Doth the Law take greater Care of the High-Way than of our Liberties and Religion This would seem strange Doctrine to People of another Country viz. That by the Law of England the King hath no Power over the High-Way to Dispense with a Common Nusance therein but he hath over the Laws made for the most Publick Good and Security of the Nation And truly this cannot but seem strange to as many among our selves as allow themselves the Liberty of thinking Doth the Law only take care of Oxen and High-Ways But it is well observed by the Learned Chief Justice Vaughan That Publick Nusances are not mala in se but mala politica introducta and when a thing is said to be prohibited by the Common Law the meaning is no more but that the Ancient Record of such a Prohibition is not to be found 2. The King cannot Pardon the Damage done to particular Persons saith the same Chief Justice where the Suit is only the Kings but for the Benefit and Safety of a third Person the King cannot Dispense with the Suit but by Consent and Agreement of the Party concerned And again Penal Laws the Breach whereof are to Men's particular Damage cannot be Dispensed with And the Chief Justice Herbert owns That the King cannot Dispense with Laws which vest the least Right or Property in any of his Subjects Here we see the Prerogative bounded where the Interest of particular Persons is concerned but doth the Law take more Care of them than of the Publick Interest and the concernment of the whole Nation But I find another Distinction in this Case viz. There is Bonum Publicum and Laws made for that may be Dispensed with And there is Bonum singulorum Populi and with Laws that concern that the King cannot Dispense This is admirable Learning if it be brought out of these Terms And the meaning is The King can do nothing to the Prejudice of the People in
the Prince and the Council and Consent of the great Men and Agreement of the Common-wealth And he adds further That our Laws being thus made and established mutari non poterunt nec destrui sine communi Consensu Consilio eorum omnium quorum Consilio Consensu fuerunt promulgatae Which are very remarkable Words against a dispensing power For that doth imply a Power to change the Law and in effect to destroy it without the Advice or Consent of those that made it He saith indeed The Law may be improved without their Consent i. e. by the Judges Interpretation as to parallel Cases not expressed But if any new or hard Case happens it ought he saith to be respited usque ad magnam Curiam i. e. to the Parliament ut ibi per Concilium Curiae terminentur that being the Supreme Judicature of the Nation Fortescue who very well understood our Constitution saith That the King although he be the Head of the Political Body can neither change our Laws nor take away Property without Consent And that our Laws are made not by the Princes Will but by General Consent Totius Regni Assensu He saith They may be changed but it must be Non sine Communitatis Procerum Regni Assensu quali ipsae primitus emanarunt He takes notice That several of our Kings did not like our Constitution but affected a more Arbitrary and therefore approved the Civil Law for that Maxim Quod Principi placuit Legis habet vigorem But he shews our Constitution to be better for King and People For here he saith The King levies no Taxes nor alters Laws or makes new ones sine Concessione vel Assensu totius Regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso But certainly dispensing with Laws is altering them not as to their Words but as to the Intention and Design of them which is the main thing in a Law and he that alters the Law as to any one whose Case is common with others may alter it as to all others in equal Circumstances And what doth such a Law then signifie In the Charter of King John the Commune Consilium Regni was to pass all Aids and besides particular Summons to the Great Men general Summons were to be given to others to appear within forty days and if they did not Matters were to go on however This very Charter as appears by Matt. Paris was renewed 9 H. 3. But he had learned the Trick of a Non obstante from his good Friend the Pope and when he was urged with his own Grants he said Doth not the Pope void his Grants with a Non-obstante Why may not I do the same by the Grants of my Self and my Predecessors To whom a sharp Reply was made As long as he observed Justice in his Actings he would be King and no longer Which I only mention to shew that the Use of a Non obstante was then looked on as a Violation of Justice And so it must needs be if our Laws as Bracton saith be Communis Reipub. Sponsio for then they are of the Nature of Contracts and when Laws are so it is agreed by those who write of these Matters although otherwise no Enemies to a Dispensing Power That they are not to be Dispensed with by a non obstante If a Prince makes a Grant of any thing wherein he hath Power to oblige himself in Justice it becomes saith Baselius Pontius of the Nature of a Contract which gives a Right to those to whom it is made and lays an Obligation of Justice upon him Where a Grant is made for the Benefit of others and is ac cepted by them it is not in the Granter's Power to revoke it as Sanchez shews from many Authorities And the Lawyers are of the same Mind as appears by what is already produced out of Baldus and others but I shall mention some who declare the Opinion of others Explorati juris est eas Constitutiones quae in contractum transeunt ita ligare Principes ut iis derogare nequeant saith Gerl. Buxtorffius Gail saith That Princes are bound by all Grants made per modum contractus de Jure Communi and that is the general Opinion One of the latest Writers de Jure Gentium saith That Princes are more strongly bound by Laws which pass by way of Contracts than by any positive Laws made by Absolute Power Although they relate to the weightiest Points of Government That a Prince cannot grant a non obstante to such Laws as he hath sworn to observe is not only the Opinion of other Lawyers but of some of the highest Canonists And it is a Rule among them That no Clause of non obstante can take away Constitutionem Juratam Where there is therefore not only a Contract with others in the passing of a Law but an Oath to observe the Laws I do not see how a non obstante or a Dispensing Power can take Place 2. We have the Advantage in Point of Authority as well as Reason as to this very Case of Dispensing with the Statute of 23 H. 6. For I take it for granted That the Authority of Parliament is more to be regarded than the Opinion of Judges And I think we have good Reason to believe That the Parliament did not think this Act could be voided by a non obstante 1. The Parliament that declared any non obstante against the Act to be void was certainly of that Opinion or else they did a ridiculous thing to put in a Clause which was void of it self 2. The Parliament 28 H. 6. c. 3. was of that Mind for what need an Indemnity by Act of Parliament if the King could by his Dispensing Power have made it lawful for the Sheriffs to continue 3. The Parliament 8 E. 4. 4. continued in the same mind for whereas in the beginning of his Reign Sheriffs were continued more than a Year by reason of the Troubles it was not then thought though in a Case of such Necessity That the King could Dispense with this Law but they were indemnified by Act of Parliament and the Act declared to stand in full Force 4. the Parliament 6 H. 8. c. 18. after the supposed Judgment 2 H. 7. And in the time of a Prince who would lose none of his Prerogatives was still of the same Judgment for it not only recites the Statute but particularly takes notice of the voiding all Pardons and non obstante's and by Act of Parliament indemnisies the Under-Sheriffs of Bristow and gives them the same Priviledge which those of London had What need all this if it had been thought good Law at that time that the King might by his Dispensing Power have given Sheriffs leave to have acted against that Statute And now I leave any Man of Reason to judge Whether this famous Case be a sufficient Foundation for the seting up a Dispensing Power either as to a
is not the Kings Law. For taking one Example for many every Leet or view of Frank Pledge holden by a Subject is kept in the Lords Name and yet it is the Kings Court and all the Proceedings therein are directed by the Kings Laws and many Subjects in England have and hold Courts of Record and other Courts and all their Proceedings be according to the Kings Laws and Customs of the Realm But there is a Material Objection or two yet to be answered 1. It is Objected That 2 Jac. the Judges declared in the Star-Chamber That the Deprivation of Non-conformists was lawful because the King had supreme Ecclesiastical Power which he hath delegated to the Commissioners whereby they had Power of Deprivation by the Canon Law of this Realm and the Statute of 1 Eliz. doth not confer any new Power but explain and declare the ancient Power And therefore they held it clear that the King without a Parliament might make Orders and Constitutions for the Government of the Clergy and might deprive them if they obeyed not To which I answer 1. Our Question is not Whether the King without a Parliament may not require the Observation of Canons passed the Convocation so as to deprive the Obstinate by Vertue of his Supreme Power in Ecclesiastical Matters but whether he may appoint a Commission with Power to deprive against an Act of Parliament which hath taken away the Legal Power of any such Commission 2. In matters of this nature it is safer trusting the Supreme Judicature of the Nation in Parliament than the Extrajudicial Opinion of the Judges And in this Case the Parliament hath declared it self another way as appears by the Canons 1640. which were not only condemned in Parliament afterwards which then might be imputed to the heat of the Times but in the most Loyal Parliament after the King's Return particular care was taken that neither the Canons of 1640. should be confirmed nor any other Ecclesiastical Laws or Canons not formerly confirmed allowed or enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land as they stood in the Year of the Lord 1639. Which implies that the Sense of the Parliament then was that we are not to own any Canons but such as were confirmed allowed or Enacted by Parliament or by the Established Laws of the Land before 1639. And therefore no new Injunctions without a Parliament or Convocation can make the Clergy liable to a Legal Deprivation No not that which the Defender is so pleased with the thoughts of viz. to give their Assent and Consent to the King's Declaration on pain of Deprivation 3. The Temporalties of the Clergy especially the Bishops are secured by several Acts of Parliament without a Tryal at Law. Which because I see none of our great Lawyers take notice of I shall here set down 14 Edward the Third c. 3. We Will and Grant for us and for our Heirs that from henceforth We nor Our Heirs shall not take nor cause to be taken into Our Hands the Temporalties of Archbishops Bishops c. or other People of Holy Church of what Estate or Condition they be without a true and just Cause according to the Law of the Land and Judgment thereupon given 25 Edward the Third c. 6. The Title of the Statute is A Bishops Temporalties shall not be seized for a Contempt And this was received for good Law 9 E. 4. 28. Br. Ord. 12. Reg. f. 32. But a very late Writer tells the World That the Possessions of Ecclesiastical Persons are but Conditional Freeholds and although Absolute Freeholds require a due Course of Law yet Conditional do not so that if a Man chance to be deprived of his Office his Freehold is gone This is touching Clergymen's Freeholds to purpose and no doubt out of pure Zeal to the Church of England But see the Equity and Impartiality of this Man He had undertaken before to give Publick Assurance of Abby-Lands to the present Possessors And for what Reason Because the Pope granted a Dispensation with a non obstante to the Canon Law And yet in this Book he proves That a non obstante is no ways binding to the Supreme Power so that no Man could more effectually overthrow his own Assurance than he hath done himself For saith he Present Sovereigns whether King or Pope cannot bind their Successors And again Acts of Graces and Favours are alterable and suspendible at the Pleasure of the Succeeding Sovereign Why then should any be so weak as to think the Plenitude of the Pope's Power as to Abby-Lands can be bound up by the Act of any former Pope I confess the comparing these two Books together hath extreamly lessened his Assurance of Abby Lands with me And his Answers to the Power of Revocation are so weak that they come at last to no more than this It is a thing which cannot well be done at present therefore there is no fear it ever should be done Here is some Security at least till it can be done But as to the Possessions of the Ecclesiastical Persons of the Church of England he endeavours to prove That they can have no Security at all of their present Possessions notwithstanding any Promise or a Legal Title For if as he saith The King by his Paramount Jurisdiction can make any Exceptions null and so void a solemn Oath not to accept a Dispensation from that Oath why should he not as well make void any Promise of his own when it hinders as he thinks a greater Good especially if the Prerogative cannot be bound But then as to a Legal Title that is the vainest thing imaginable as to such Conditional Freeholds which Clergymen have for if the Commissioners deprive them by their Power ab Officio Beneficio their Attendent Frehold saith he is gone without any Course of Law. And the Defender saith The Commissioners may deprive if Clergymen should not assent and consent to all contained in the King's Declaration if he required it But it is to be hoped That Princes will not take the Measures of Justice and Wisdom and Honour from such Men We will therefore set aside the Omnipotent Engine of a non obstante which doth not batter so much as it undermines and consider the Legal Security of these Conditional Freeholds I. All Freeholds are in some Sense Conditional or else they could never be forfeited Which shews that there are none Absolute with Respect to the Law. And as to their Original among us it is agreed That by the Ancient Right of Tenures all Fees are Conditional for they suppose Fealty the non-performance whereof is Felony Which is not that which is done felleo animo as Sir Edward Coke trifles but it is the same with Falshood or Treachery The Laws of H. 1. c. 5. Si Dominus de Felonia vel Fide mentitus compellat hominem suum And in another Law the punishment of Felony is Forfeiture of the
Principum suorum confirmavit saith the Textus Roffensis He likewise confirmed Charters as the Saxons had done that to Battel Abby was Consilio Episcoporum Baronum meorum But the most considerable thing he did as to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was separating the Courts Ecclesiastical from the Hundred Courts by his Charter to Remigius and others which he saith was granted in a great Council and by the Advice of the Archbishops Bishops and all the Great Men of his Kingdom So that still extraordinary Acts relating to Church Matters were passed in Parliament by General consent And what now doth the Appropriation of a Church with a Cure of Souls signifie to prove his Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction When those things in his Time were not brought under such strict Rules as they were afterwards but Appropriation might have been made by any Lay Person that never pretended to the least Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and he might as well have brought his demolishing so many Churches in the New Forest for an Instance of his Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction In the Reign of William the Second In William Rufus his time a great Heat arose between him and Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury about owning the Pope Whether the Archbishop could do it without the King's Consent the Business was referred to Parliament which the King called on purpose at Rockingham saith Eadmerus who was there present The Bishops declared they could not deprive him as the King would have had them to whom they had promised Obedience After which it was again referred to Parliament but Anselm not yielding he went out of the Land. In the Reign of King Henry the First In the Reign of Henry the First a new Controversie arose between the King and the same Archbishop about the Ancient Right of the Crown as to Investiture of Bishops the King calls a Parliament about it wherein the Bishops and Lords joyned with the King afterwards Anselm desired The Advice of the Bishops and Nobles might be heard at Easter which shews that both Sides referred it to the Parliament In his Time a Council was called and several Canons passed and the Archbishop desired of the King That the Primates Regni might sit with them that all things might pass utriusque Ordinis concordi cura with the Consent of both Estates The King afterwards takes the Advantage of these Canons and prosecutes the Breakers of them and raises Money upon Pretence of Forfeitures to the great Grievance of the Clergy Anselm although then in Disfavour writes to the King about it and tells him This was a new Method of Proceeding because it belonged to the Bishops in their Diocesses to call the Clergy to an Account or if they neglected to the Archbishop and Primate The King Answers That his Barons were to meet him on Ascension-day and by their Advice he would give an Answer but upon Anselms Return this Prosecution ceased Other Affairs of the Church were then referred to the Parliament at Easter from thence to Pentecost and by reason of Anselm's Sickness to August and then the Bishops Abbots and Lords of the Kingdom met in the King's Palace at London and by Consent of Parliament Investiture was turned into Homage In his time the Bishoprick of Ely was erected by the King's Consent in Parliament Regi Archiepiscopo caeterisque Principibus Regni visum fuit saith Eadmerus The Consecration of an elect Archbishop of York was transacted in Parliament the King advising with the Bishops and Nobles about it for Anselm before his Death had sent an Inhibition to the Bishops Not to consecrate him unless he made the Profession of Obedience to the Archbishop of Canterbury The Bishops resolved to adhere to Anselm's Inhibition and the King yielded After Anselm's Death the King advised with his Parliament at Windsor about a Successor to him and the Bishop of Rochester at the Request of the Bishops was agreed upon And the King filled the Abbies before he went into Normandy consisto Principum Episcoporum suorum In the latter End of Henry the First many Disputes hapned about Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction as between the Bishops of S. Davids and Glamorgan which were debated in magno Placito apud London saith Henry of Huntingdon And for such Causes saith he another Assembly was held in the beginning of Lent and again in Rogation Week In all this time when the Norman Kings asserted all the Rights of Sovereignty with great Zeal yet they never pretended to appoint any Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes but still referred them to Parliaments In the Reign of King Henry the Third The next Instance the Lord Coke brings falls as low as the Time of Henry the Third The first whereof is the King 's granting a Writ of Prohibition if any man sued in the Ecclesiastical Court for any thing of which by Allowance and Custom it had not lawful Cognizance But how doth the King's Power of granting Prohibitions prove his Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction It effectually proves the King 's Right to preserve his Crown and Dignity as the Prohibition implies but how doth it hence appear that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction comes from his Crown and Dignity The contrary seems rather to follow viz. That the Ecclesiastical Courts were held from another Power but all Matters of Temporal Cognizance did belong to the Crown There is no Question but since the Acts for restoring Jurisdiction to the Crown the supream Jurisdsction both in the Ecclesiastical and Civil Courts is derived from the Crown And in whose-soever Names the Courts are kept the Authority of keeping them is from the King. For it is declared by Act of Parliament 1 Eliz. 1. 17. That all Ecclesiastical Power is united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm which all Bishops do own in taking the Oath of Supremacy and therefore the old Form continuing can signifie nothing against the Law of this Realm and their own Oaths But as long as the main Points were secured by the Laws there was no necessity apprehended of altering the Forms for on the other side it was objected that since the Laws had placed all Jurisdiction in the Crown it seemed as unreasonable to continue the old Form of Prohibitions in laesionem Coronae Dignitatis Regiae how can this be say they when the Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical as well as Civil is owned to be from the Crown It is said in Answer That a Prohibition implies that the thing is drawn into aliud Examen than it ought to be and this is contra Coronam Dignitatem Regiam Why not then as well when an Ecclesiastical original Cause is brought into a Temporal Court for that is aliud Examen then by Confession on that side and if Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction be derived from the Crown the aliud Examen must relate only to the Court and not to the Crown All that I infer from hence is that the old Forms were thought fit to be continued both Parties reconciled them as well
as they could to the Laws in force But the Judges confessed That although de jure both the Jurisdictions were ever in the Crown yet the one was sometimes usurped by the See of Rome which is a plain acknowledgment that by the Matters of Fact in those times the Right could not be proved and especially in the times of H. 3. when the Popes Usurpations here were at so great a height that the King upon Writs of Enquiry sent into the several Counties found That the Revenues of the Roman Court by Provisions Extortions c. exceeded the Kings And the King had so little Authority left that the Pope put Bishops upon him Rege penitus irrequisito saith Matt. Westm. so that he was so far from Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that he had not the Nomination of his Bishops nor so much as a Consent to their Election unless the Pope thought fit sometimes to gratifie him in it For the Pope pretended to the Right of Disposal of Church Preferments by Vertue of his Ordinary Jurisdiction which was said to be twofold 1. Voluntary in the Collation of Benefices 2. Judicial in the hearing of Causes the former might be done at Rome but the other in the Ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts And Bracton who was a Judge in his time owns the Pope as much to have the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction as the King had the Temporal but yet he adds That if an Ecclesiastical Judge did meddle with Matters out of their Cognizance the King's Prohibition did lye against him and he ought to supersede his Proceedings till it were tryed in the King's Court to whom the Jurisdiction belonged But it is still harder to prove the King's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction because the Spiritual Courts were to certifie the Kings Courts in case of Bigamy Bastardy and such like For the Question is not about their Temporal Subjection to the King in signifying the Sentence of the Court but whence they derived their Authority of holding the Ecclesi astical Courts over which Bracton saith the Pope had the ordinary Jurisdiction the Power to delegate others to execute it What doth it signifie to the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction that the Barons of England would not receive that part of the Canon Law which concerned the Legitimation of Children born before Wedlock For it depended upon the Barons Consent Whether a Canon of the Church should be made the Law of the Land concerning the Rights of Inheritance In the Reign of King Edward I. In the Time of Ed. I. we may expect some brisker Sallies towards the Kingdoms Deliverance from the Popes Usurpations which were thought so intolerable even by the Monkish Historians in his Fathers Reign What that Bull was the bringing whereof the Law-Books say was then adjudged Treason it would have been worth our while to have known For it is hard to imagine that at that time the meer bringing a Bull should be so Capital a Crime when so many were brought without danger both before and after But it seems by the Certificate of the Judges concerning it still in the Tower the Matter of it was very prejudicial to the Crown And it argues no Spiritual Jurisdiction for Princes to examine and refuse when they see cause Bulls that come from Rome For this is practised in those Countries which profess Obedience to the Popes Jurisdiction Covarruvias affirms it of Spain In Portugal when John the Second would have given up that Right to the Pope the Estates of the Kingdom would not permit him Peter the Second Duke of Britain forbad receiving any Bull before Examination by his Council under pain of Corporal Punishments and Confiscation of Goods Ant. Faber saith in Savoy No Bulls have Authority there till they are approved by the Senate and an Appeal lies from them tanquam ab Abusu Even in Naples it self Ferdinand the Catholick King gave a severe Reprimand to his Vice-Roy for not hanging up a Person who would have executed a Bull without his Authority The Letter it self is Published in the Jus Belgarum where many other things may be seen to the same purpose The Right of Patronage is a Civil Right in Princes as well as others and therefore E. 1. Without pretending to Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction might justly punish the Archbishop of York for his obstinate refusing to admit the Kings Clerk because of a Papal Provision The Statute of Bigamy might very well be interpreted in Parliament and yet the King have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction For it was no more than declaring in what sense a Law should be taken i. e. Whether it should extend to Bigamy before the Constitution of the Council of Lyons or after The Act of Parliament made at Carlisle 35 E. 1. against Aliens possessing Benefices is no more than hath been done in Countries where the Popes Jurisdiction is the most owned As in Spain Covarruvias saith They have Prescription and Pragmatical Sanctions against Aliens possessing Benefices The Laws of Poland and many Edicts in France exclude Strangers But I shall now produce some considerable Precedents in the time of Ed. 1. to shew that the Proceedings against the Arch-Bishops and Bishops for Misdemeanors or Contempts was in Parliament and not by Commissioners the inferior Clergy being left to the Jurisdiction of their Ordinaries 3 Ed. 1. E. Warren complained to the King That the Archbishop of Canterbury had contemned his Orders in not taking off Excommunication from some of his Servants The King sends to him to proceed no further against the Earl or his Servants usque ad Parliamentum where the Matter of Contempt might be debated But in the mean time the Archbishop sends to the King a true Account of the Matter and how far he was from Contempt which is still extant in the Records of the Tower. 7 E. 1. John Peckam Archbishop of Canterbury was summoned to Parliament to answer to a Charge of Misdemeanors against him for some Passages in the Council at Reading which he was fain to revoke and to declare that no Articles there passed should create any Prejudice to the Crown or Kingdom 8 E. 1. The Archbishop went about to Visit the Kings Free Chappels The King hearing of it sent a Writ to him to forbear usque ad proximum Parliamentum ut tunc ex unamini mutuo consensu provideamus quid fieri debeat in Praemissis 21 E. 1. John Roman Archbishop of York was Attached upon a Contempt for Excommunicating the Bishop of Durham while he was in the King's Service And after a full hearing in pleno Parliamento he was condemned and upon Submission was Fined to the King sour thousand Marks 28 E. 1. A Controversie arose between the King and the Bishop of Chichester about his refusing to admit a Person Presented to a Prebend in the Free Chappel of Hastings the King sends his Writ to the Warden of Cinque-Ports extant in the Tower among the Writs of that Time to enquire into this Matter
and to bring an Account next Parliament ad quod praedictum Episcopum adjornavimus are the Words of the Writ And that the Business was heard in Parliament appears by the Records 31 E 1. The King seized on the Temporalities of the Bishop of Durham upon a Judgment given against him in Parliament for extending his Spiritual Jurisdiction too far as appears by the Record of the Concord made between the King and him In the Reign of King Edward the Second In the Reign of K. E. 2. nothing is produced but the Statute 9 E. 2. for Regulating the Proceedings between the Civil and Ecclesiastical Courts But how the Kings Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is proved hereby is hard to understand It appears indeed that the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction is allowed and limited by Parliament But from hence saith he it follows that these Laws may be called the Kings Eccclesiastical Laws or the Ecclesiastical Laws of England There is no question but they may But there is a Difference between Laws so called by Acceptation and Allowance and such as have their whole Force and Authority from the King. For otherwise where the Popes Jurisdiction is owned and received the Pope must receive his Authority from the King. But a Liberty to exercise Authority and deriving Authority are two Things In the Reign of King Edward the Third In the Time of E. 3. many things are alledged and to more purpose but yet a short Answer will serve If the first Instance doth hold viz. That the Sentence of Excommunication by the Archbishop holds against the Sentence of the Pope or his Legate it only proves that the Eccesiastical Jurisdiction here by Law is in the Archbishop and not in the Pope or his Legate But there may be another Reason mentioned by Fitz Herbert viz. That the Certificate of the Archbishop might be more Authentick than the Seal of a Legate The second sixth and eighth only prove the King Supreme Patron and a Right of Patronage is distinct from a Right of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and so it was resolved in Grendon's Case Pl. f. 498. That the King presents by Lapse as Supreme Patron and not as Supreme Ordinary For this belongs to him as King the Land on which Churches are built being originally held of him And this Right the King enjoyed when the Pope was owned to be Supreme Ordinary But in the Case of his own free Chapels Fitz-Herbert saith right That in Case of Lapse by the Dean the King presents as Ordinary the Archbishop and Bishop having no Authority there as Ordinaries The third fourth and fifth are about Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdictions granted by the King especially in his own free Chapels which are only visitable by Commission from the King. But this very Pretence of Exemptions from Episcopal Jurisdiction was founded upon the Belief of the Pope's being Supreme Ordinary for exempt Places were not supposed to be free from all Ordinary Jurisdiction but from that of Inferior Ordinaries being immediately subject to the Pope A Bishop by the Canon Law may grant an Exemption from his Right of Jurisdiction but not from his Right of Visitation but the Pope from both And in the Grant of Exemption the immediate Subjection to the Roman See is expressed As to the King 's free Chapels their Exemption was by an express Bull of Innocent III to King John and in the Case of the free Chapels of S. Martins Henry III granted a Prohibition wherein it is inserted That it was a free Chapel ab omni Jurisdictione Episcopali per Sedem Apostolicam exempta And 45 Hen. 3. in a Prohibition concerning the free Chapel of Wolverhampton the Grant of Innocent III is repeated The Right to extra-parochial Tithes is Provisional and not by way of Inheritance and so it may belong to the King although he have no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction As to the severe Proceeding about Bulls from Rome I have given an Account of that already in E. 1. The anointing of Kings proves no more their Capacity of Spiritual Jurisdiction than it proves the Kings of Israel to have been High Priests There is no doubt the Ecclesiastical Courts may be limited by the Laws of the Land and there are some Causes which belong to them not originally of a Spiritual Nature but they have been a long time possessed of them by Custom and are allowed by Law which is well expressed in 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. where it is said That all Causes Testamentary Causes of Matrimony and Divorces Rights of Tithes Oblations and Obventions the Knowledge whereof by the Goodness of Princes of this Realm and by the Laws and Customs of the same appertaineth to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of this Realm shall be determined within the Kings Jurisdiction and Authority It doth not seem probable That the King by his own Authority would remove Secular Canons and put in Regular when Hoveden saith in the same Case H. 2. did it by the Pope's Authority and with the free Consent of the Parties The Statutes of Provisors were excellent Statutes but are said to be enacted for the Good and Tranquility of the Realm which no doubt the King and his Parliament were bound to take care of But they prove no more Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction than the Pragmatick Sanctions of Lewis IX and Charles VII in France did which were of the same nature The following Instances in other Reigns are many of them of the same kind with those already answered but what seems to have any new Force shall be considered In the Reign of King Henry the Fourth 2 H. 4. c. 15. is urged to prove That the King by consent of his Parliament did direct the Proceedings of the Spiritual Courts in Cases of Heresie and other Matters more Spiritual but it is evident by the Act it self That the Spiritual Jurisdiction was left wholly to the Ordinaries and only an Inforcement of it by the Civil Power was added by the Law then made for the Words are Whereas the Diocesans of the said Realm cannot by their Jurisdiction Spiritual without Aid of the said Royal Majesty sufficiently correct c. Therefore a Power to Imprison and Fine was given to the Ordinaries who might before have proceeded by Ecclesiastical Censures but these being contemned by them the Ordinaries called in the Assistance of the Civil Power If there had been a Power before to have proceeded against Hereticks by Common Law when convict by their Ordinaries I cannot see any Reason why that Law should be made In case of Apostacy i. e. Renouncing Christianity Bracton saith The Person convict is to be burned and he instanceth in the Deacon who turned Jew in the Council of Oxford And Fleta speaks only of Apostates whether Clerks or others and those are the Miscreants in Briton and in Horn Heresie was then the same with renouncing Baptism or turning Jew or Turk or using Sorcery but after Wickliff's Time the Ordinaries inlarged the Notion of Heresie and took
Statutes And it cannot be supposed that at that time when the Pope was allowed to be Head of the Church and consequently Supreme Patron of the Benefices of it that the Acceptance of a Title to an Ecclesiastical Benefice from him should be thought Malum in se. But these Statutes being in force I shall make it appear that the King did own he had no Power to Dispense with them but as the Parliament thought fit to allow it I begin with 15 R. 2 at a time when the Kingdom was in quiet and however could not be in any disturbance on the Account of the Statute of Provisors which the Nation desired and only those who depended on the Court of Rome opposed But the Court-Bishops suggested that it was for the Kings Interest in dealing with the Court of Rome to have a Power to Relax and to Dispense with these Statutes as he saw Cause Therefore the Arch-Bishop of York then Chancellor proposed it in the opening of the Parliament as one of the things for which it was called viz. To find out a Temperament in that Matter so as the Pope might not lose his Right nor the King his After this Matter was debated the Commons declare their Assent en plein Parliament That without prejudice to the Rights of those who were in Possession by virtue of the Statute the King by the Advice and Consent of the Lords might Dispense with the said Statute so as should seem reasonable and useful till the next Parliament but so as the said Statute be repealed in no Article of it And they reserve to themselves the Liberty of disagreeing the next Parliament And they conclude with a solemn Protestation That this was a Novelty not practised before and ought not to be drawn into an Example and Precedent for the future and they desire this Protestation might be Entred and Recorded in the Rolls of Parliament which the King commanded to be done Doth this now look like a Declaratory Act and made in Affirmance of the Kings Dispensing Power It might as well be said That an Act for Restraining the Prerogative is made in Affirmance of it It is true there is a Dispensing Power granted but with such Restrictions and Limitations as shew that such a Power was not then thought to be inherent in the Crown For 1. Why should it be proposed to the Parliament to grant it if the King had it before Did the King ever put it to the Parliament to grant him a Power to Pardon Malefactors But in the case of Dispensing with a Law it was not only proposed but assigned as one Reason of calling the Parliament 2. Why till the next Parliament if it were owned to be an inherent Right of the Crown Would the Parliament go about to bound and limit an inseparable Prerogative in such a manner 3. Why is it called a Novelty and a thing not to be drawn into example Was ever any thing like this said of a Declaratory Act The Natural Consequence whereof is just contrary that whereas some just Right of the Crown hath been contested and denied for the future it ought to be owned and submitted to by all Persons It is hard to think of Words more inconsistent with a meer Declaratory Act than those Ne soit trait en ensample nen Consequence en temps avenir 4. If this were a Declaratory Act what need it be repeated so often in Parliament afterwards Were the Commons so forgetful of the Kings Prerogative as to need making so many Declaratory Acts about the same thing Yet thus we find it about this Dispensing Power as to the Statutes of Provisors For 16 R. 2. The Archbishop of York again declared in the opening of the Parliament That one Cause of calling it was to settle this Matter about Provisors And the Commons again yielded The King should have such a Power to moderate it as he should with his Council judge expedient but so as it be all laid open before the next Parliament that they might upon good Advice agree to it 17 R. 2. Tydeman Abbot of Beauley was by the Popes Provision made Bishop of Landaff But the King notwithstanding the former Proceedings did not take upon him to dispense with the Statute but left it to the Parliament and his Dispensation was passed by Act of Parliament the King Lords and Commons assenting thereto 20 R. 2. The Commons in Parliament do again Assert de bon gre de leur parte en plein Parlement That the King with his Council may dispense with the Statute of Provisors as shall seem fit so as the same be heard and examined the next Parliament and so corrected as shall be thought convenient by the King with the Advice of his Council in Parliament 1 H. 4. The Commons in like manner give their Assent That the King should have the same Power of Dispensing with the Statute which his Predecessors had and to Repeal and Annul it as should seem expedient to him Which was no more than a General Dispensation Yet notwithstanding this was recorded in Parliament 2 H. 4. The Commons appearing before the King and the Lords it was declared That the Dispensation should not extend to Cardinals or other Strangers At the same Parliament a Petition was presented to the King That if any one did accept a Benefice by Papal Provision against the Statute and had his Pardon from the King for it yet if he went about to disturb the present Possessor by virtue of his Provision then his Pardon should be void and he should incur the Penalty of the Statute To which the King gave his Assent 3 H. 4. The King having granted particular Licenses for Dispensations as to this Statute and finding the great Inconveniences which came by them he generally and universally revovoked them and promised in Parliament to find out some proper Remedy in this Matter 7 H. 4. The King was moved in Parliament to confirm that Revocation but he then took time to consider But 9 H. 4. c. 8. the King reinforced in Parliament all the Statutes against Provisors as it is in Print 1 H. 5. The Commons pray That the Statutes may stand in full force against Provisors and that no Protection or Grant made by the King to hinder the Execution of the said Statutes shall be allowable or of any force and whatever is done contrary to them shall be null The Answer is Let the Statutes be observed and kept But if the Statutes were to be strictly observed what saving can there be to the King's Prerogative since the Statutes were Universal and the King 's particular Grants in this Case were the great Motive of the Commons Desire to have them reinforced in the beginning of this King's Reign And these Statutes continued in full Force to the Time of H. 8. insomuch that Cardinal Woolsey was prosecuted by the King's Attorney for offending against them by his Legatine Power
their Private Capacities but he can do what he will with the Publick I had thought a Prince had been in the first Place bound to regard the Good of the Publick and to take Care of the salus Populi complicati as it is called i. e. as they are imbodied together and not of the Private Interests of particular Men which can never be preserved when the Publick Safety is not secured 3. It is granted That in Penal Laws by Act of Parliament where the Offenders are punishable at the King's Suit but where the Offence is to the immediate Wrong of Particular Persons and for which the Law gives them special Actions the King cannot Dispense Never was Law more tender of the Interest of Particular Persons than ours But suppose a Penal Law by Act of Parliament relates immediately to the Publick and gives no particular Persons any Special Actions is such a Law therefore Dispensable because only the Publick Good and the Safety of the Nation are concerned which are not it seems to be valued with the Private Interests of Particular Men. They who affirm such things may be very learned in Book Cases but they do not seem to have studied the Jus Publicum as Bracton calls it which concerns Statum Reipub. or the Political Law of this Nation which shews the great Respect which the Good of the Community ought to have above Private Interests But when Persons take up their Notions and Maxims from Laws relating to Meum and Tuum they are very apt to judge of Publick Laws according to those Measures 4. It is granted That the King cannot license a Baker Brewer or Victualler to break the Assize of Bread or Ale nor a Miller to take more Toll than the Law appoints therefore these are mala prohibita nor a Taverner to break the Assize of Wine Nor a Butcher to sell measled Swines-Flesh or Murrain Flesh nor any Man to forestal the Market by a non obstante of the Statute de Pistoribus which prohibits all these under several Penalties Nor can he licence Butchers Fishmongers Poulterers or other Sellers of Victuals nor Hostlers to sell Hay and Oats at what Price they please by a non obstante of the Statute of 23 E. 3. c. 6. and 13 R. 2. c. 8. Still the Law is extreamly tender of us as to Meat and Drink and not only for our selves but for our Horses too so that the King cannot Dispense with the Laws about them And yet can we think so meanly of the Wisdom of our Ancestors that they would take such Care of Bread and Wine and Horse-Meat that the King himself could not inhance the Price of them but that as to their Laws which relate to the Publick they were content to leave them to the Will and Pleasure of their Prince No one that reads the History of our Ancestors and the Contests they had with Kings to obtain their Publick Liberties could ever entertain such a Thought concerning them 5. If Foreign Manufactures or Foreign Corn be prohibited for support of the Natives a Licence to one or more to bring them in if General is void by the Case of Monopolies notwithstanding a non obstante This is certainly Malum prohibitum and yet the King cannot Dispense with it And it is really a very hard Case if the King cannot Dispense with a Monopoly in Trade and may Dispense with a Monopoly in Religion i. e. That notwithstanding all the Laws for setling our Religion at Home he may grant a Licence to Foreigners to introduce another although never so repugnant to our Laws for none who understood our Affairs could imagine That this Dispensing Power was set up for any other End. But what shall we say to the Precedents on the other side I shall pass by others which have been sufficiently answered already and only speak to that which above all others hath been declared to be the Foundation of the Dispensing Power and therefore deserves to be farther cleared and that is The Case of Dispensing with the Statutes about Men's continuing Sheriffs more than a Year which is urged as plain and concluding because it was for a Publick Good and preventing great Mischiefs yet the King's Power of Dispensing in this Case was allowed by all the Judges of England 2 H. 7. and this hath been cited as adjudged in several Books of great Authority Fitz-Herbert Plowden Coke c. and the Practice hath ever since been accordingly This is the whole strength of the Argument And I shall not repeat what others have already said to shew that this was not the Reason of the Judicial Sentence then given but the particular Ground of one of the Judges after they had declared the Patent to be good But however that were it cannot be denied that great Lawyers since that time have taken it to have been the Sense of the Judges then For Coke's Words are express in Calvin's Case It is Enacted by the Parliament of 23. H. 6. That no man should serve the King as Sheriff of any County above one Year and that notwithstanding of any Clause of Non-obstante to the contrary that is to say notwithstanding that the King should expresly dispense with the said Statute howbeit it is agreed in 2 H. 7. That against the express purview of that Act the King may by a special Non-obstante dispense with that Act. Here it is plain that in Coke's Opinion at least the Judges did agree that although King and Parliament had made an Act which made void any Grant with a Non obstante yet that such a Grant made afterwards with a special Non obstante was good I am not much concerned whether it were their Opinion or not because I think there is much greater Reason and stronger Authority on the other side 1. As to Reason If a Non-obstante from the King be good when by Act of Parliament a Non-obstante is declared void what doth an Act of Parliament signifie in such a Case Must we say It is a void Clause But then to what purpose was it put in Did they who made the Act understand it to be a void Clause when they put it in Certainly it was then thought otherwise and if it were so we have the Authority of the Parliament against the Opinion of the Judges If it were not a void Clause then how came it to be so afterwards What Alteration was made in the Law of England in that Interval and by whom How comes a Clause that had force in 23 H. 6. to have none 2 H. 7 Could Radcliff or the rest by their Opinions destroy the Force of an Act of Parliament No But Coke saith No Act can bind the King from any Prerogative which is sole and inseparable from his Person but he may dispense with it by a Non-obstante as a Sovereign Power to command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick Weal and this solely and inseparably is annexed to his
Person and this Royal Power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament neither in Thesi nor in Hypothesi but that the King by his Royal Power may dispense with it for upon the Commandment of the King and Obedience of the Subject does his Government consist as it is provided by the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. That all Patents made or to be made of any Office of a Sheriff c. for Term of years or for Life in Fee-simple or in Tail are void and of none effect any Clause or Parol of Non-obstante put or to be put into such Patents to be made notwithstanding And further Whosoever shall take upon him or them to accept or occupy such Office of Sheriff by vertue of such Grants or Patents shall stand perpetually disabled to be or bear the Office of Sheriff within any County of England by the same Authority And notwithstanding that by this Act 1. The Patent is made void 2. The King is restrained to grant a Non-obstante 3. The Grantee disabled to take the Office yet the King by his Royal Sovereign Power of commanding may command by his Patent for such Causes as he in his Wisdom doth think meet and profitable for himself and the Commonwealth of which he himself is sole Judge to serve him and the Weal Publick as Sheriff for such a County for years or for Life c. And so was it resolved by all the Justices of England in the Exchequer Chamber ' 2 H. 7. Here the Point is resolved into an inseparable Prerogative in the King which no Act of Parliament can restrain although made with his own Consent Is there no Act of Parliament then which this great Lawyer will allow to restrain the King's Prerogative so as he cannot disperse with it What saith he to the Case of Buying Offices at Court Cannot the King by vertue of his Prerogative order his Houshold as he pleases to dispose of Offices about him as he thinks fit No. The same Lawyer saith That no Non obstante could dispense with the Act against buying of Offices And yet one would think that the King had as great a Prerogative in the Court as over the Kingdom But how comes he to say That the King can dispense notwithstanding the Disability when elsewhere he saith The King cannot dispense in the Case of a Disability by Law For the Reason he gives why the King cannot present a Man to a Living who is convict of Simony is because the Law hath disabled him Very well And yet in this Case although the Law hath disabled him the King may dispense Where are we now The King can dispense with a Disability and he cannot dispense with it This is indeed a very dark learning of Dispensations as C. Justice Vaughan well called it for we cannot yet find the way through it Can the King dispense with a Disability in Law or not If not the Case of Sheriffs is gone If he can then why not in the case of Symony Why not as to sitting in Parliament without taking the Oaths No here is a Disability in Law. What then Cannot the K. dispense with a Disability in one Case as well as the other Bu the same Person saith That in that Case because the Words amount to a Disability the King cannot dispense and here where the Disability is expressed he may But we are lately told there are two sorts of Disabilities one is actually incurred as that upon the Members who sit without taking the Oaths and the other is a Disability annexed to the Breach of a Law as a penalty and that penalty not to be incurred before a Legal Conviction and in this Case the King's Dispensation coming before the Conviction doth prevent it by making that lawful which would not have been so without it But when a Disability is actually-incurred it cannot be taken off but by Act of Parliament I Answer That if the Law which makes the Disability doth allow of a Dispensation antecedent to the Conviction then I grant that the Dispensation before Conviction prevents the Disability As in Digby's Case if the Dispensation had come before Institution the Disability as to holding the former Living had been prevented because the Law doth expresly allow of a Dispensation in the Case But here is no such thing The Act of Parliament supposes no Dispensation but makes an utter Disability as to the holding the Office in Sir Edward Hales his Case but a dispensing Power is set up against the Act of Parliament and such a Dispensation neither before nor after Conviction can prevent a Disability If it could I can by no means see why it might not as well hold as to Members of Parliament at least as to the Oath of Supremacy if they take their Dispensation before Sitting in the House For the Disability doth not take place till they enter the Parliament 5 Eliz. c. 1. And he that entreth the Parliament without taking the said Oath shall be deemed no Knight Citizen Burgess or Baron nor shall have any Voice but shall be as if he had been never Returned or Elected The Intention of the Law for the Test was a disability to hold the Office but it allows time for Persons to qualifie themselves as appears by the Act for the Test. Is not this plain overthrowing the design of the Law for Persons instead of doing what the Law requires to take out a Dispensation for not doing it and so prevent the Disability And what doth a Law signifie when the very design of it is overthrown And what is the Power of making Laws by common Consent in Parliament if without such Consent the whole force of the Law may be taken away by a dispensing Power So that this doth not meerly make Laws to signifie nothing but according to Will and Pleasure but it makes our very Constitution insignificant which requires to every Law the Consent of the People in Parliament As for Instance By the first Constitution of the Roman Government the King had the custody of the Laws but no Laws were to be made but by the Consent of the Roman People in the Curiae thence called Leges Curiatae Would any one have thought this any Privilege if after these Laws were passed the King should claim an inseparable Prerogative of dispensing with them as he sees Cause For it is implied in such a Fundamental Contract as this that Laws when made should not lose their Force without their Consent who made them Else it is not Contractus bonae Fidei I will not dispute whether this were the Original Contract of our Nation or not but this I may say That when our Government came to a Settlement after long struglings this was one of the Fundamental Articles of it That no Laws should pass or Burdens should be laid upon the People but by their own Consent in arliament Bracton saith That a Law among us supposes the Authority of
Particular Statute made for the Security of our Religion or for a Suspension of our Ecclesiastical Laws CHAP. IV. Of the Alterations made in the Supremacy by the Statutes of Henry the Eighth with an Answer to the Objections I Now come to the Alterations made in our Laws about the King's Supremacy in the Time of Henry the Eighth 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. An Act passed for taking away all Appeals to Rome which is founded on the King 's Natural and Independent Right of Governing and doing Justice to all his People and the Sufficiency of his own Clergy for Hearing and Determining such Matters as belonged to their Function and therefore all Causes are to be Heard Discussed Examined finally and definitively Adjudged and Determined within the King's Jurisdiction and Authority and not elswhere in the Courts Spiritual and Temporal But if the King be concerned then it is referred to the Upper-House of Convocation The Preamble of this Act against Appeals to Rome is considerable Whereas by divers Authentick Histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed That this Realm of England is an Empire governed by one Supreme Head and King c. with plenary whole and entire Power Preheminence Authority Prerogative and Jurisdiction c. for final determination of Causes c. so that here is an Appeal to Ancient History in this Matter and we have still sufficient Evidence of it before the Popes Encroachments prevailed The Bishops and Barons told Anselm in William Rufus his time It was a thing unheard of and contrary to the Custom of his Realm for any one to go to Rome without the King 's Leave which is after explained by way of Appeal Anselm made but a shuffling Answer to this although he had sworn to observe the Customs of the Realm and he could not deny this to be one but he pretended It was against S. Peter 's Authority and therefore could not observe it for this were saith he to abjure S. Peter From whence I infer That the Custom of the Realm was then thought by Anselm to be inconsistent with the Pope's Authority For whatever they talk of S. Peter it is the Pope they mean. In the Reign of H. 1. the Pope complains grievously That the King would suffer no Appeals to be made to him and that due Reverence was not shewed to S. Peter in his Kingdom and that they ended Ecclesiastical Causes at Home even where Bishops were concerned and very learnedly quotes the Deâ—retal Epistles against them Afterwards the Pope sent his Legate and the King denied him Entrance and the whole Parliament rejected it as contrary to the Ancient Custom and Liberty of England That Passage in the Laws of H. 1. c. 5. which seems to allow of Appeals is a mere Forgery the whole Chapter being a Rapsody taken out of the Canonists H. Huntingdon saith That Appeals were brought in in King Stephen 's time by Henry Bishop of Winchester his Brother being the Pope's Legate By the Constitutions of Clarendon c. 8. the Appeal lay from the Archbishop to the King which is well expressed by Robert of Gloucester And the K. amend solde the Ercbishops deed And be as in the Pope's sted and S. Thomas it withsteed And although H. 2. in his Purgation for the Death of the Archbishop did swear That he would hinder no Appeals to Rome in Ecclesiastical Causes and that he would quit the Ancient Customs of the Realm Yet Hoveden saith The Constitutions of Clarendon were renewed in the Parliament at Northampton and the Justices in Eyre were sworn to observe them and to make others observe them inviolably And for those who went out of the Kingdom in Case of Appeals the Justices were to enquire per consuetudinem Terrae according to the Ancient Custom and if they did not return and stand to the King's Court they were to be outlawed In the Time of R. 1. the Popes complained much of Geofry Archbishop of York for slighting Appeals made to Rome and imprisoning those that made them Celestine doth it twice and in the same Words And Innocent the Third in King John's Time renews the same Complaint of him That he shewed no regard to Appeals made to the Apostolick See. But when the Rights of the Crown were given up by King John to the Pope no Wonder if the Liberties of Appeals were granted by him But yet in the succeeding Reigns we have several Instances upon Record of Persons imprisoned by the King for making Appeals to Rome John of Ibstock in the Time of E. 1. The Abbot of Walden and a Prebendary of Banbury in the Reign of E. 2. The Parson of Leighe Harwoden and the Prior of Barnwel in the time of E. 3. So that this Right was still owned by our Princes when the Matter came into Contest and therefore the Act of H. 8. against Appeals was but a just Resuming of the Ancient Rights of the Crown 25 H. 8. c. 19. A Commission is appointed for reviewing the Canons And it is observable That because it could not be done in Parliament Time the King hath Power given him by Act of Parliament to nominate the thirty two Persons to act in this Matter in these Words Be it therefore enacted by the Authority aforesaid That the King's Highness shall have Power and Authority to nominate and assign at his Pleasure the said thirty two Persons of his Subjects whereof sixteen to be of the Clergy and sixteen to be of the Temporality of the Upper and Nether House of Parliament And because the last Resort was to the Arch-Bishop in the former Act of Appeals therefore to prevent any Inconveniences thereby a new Power is granted by this Act i. e. Upon an Appeal to the King in Chancery a Commission is to be directed to such Persons as the King shall appoint who are to hear and determine such Appeals and the Causes concerning the same 25 H. 8. c. 21. After the Submission of the Clergy and the King being owned Supreme Head yet the Power of dispensing with the Canons in particular Cases did not pass by Commission from the King but by Act of Parliament The Words are It standeth therefore with natural Equity and good Reason that all and every such Laws human made without this Realm or induced into this Realm by the said Sufferance Consents and Custom Your Royal Majesty your Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons representing the whole State of your Realm in this your High Court of Parliament have full Power and Authority not only to dispense but also to Authorize some elect Person or Persons to dispense c. So that the Power of granting Faculties at a time when the Prerogative was highest was not executed by Commission from the King by vertue of his Supremacy and Prerogative Royal but was granted to the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury in the manner expressed in that Act. A late Author has stretched this Statute to a Power of dispensing in other
and governing this Church and Kingdom by our own Laws Which is well expressed in the Preamble to the Act against Appeals viz. That this Realm of England is an Empire governed by one Supreme Head and King having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same unto whom a Body Politick compact of all Sorts and Degrees of People divided in Terms and by Names of Spiritualty and Temporalty been bounden and ought to bear next to God a Natural and Humble Obedience By virtue of this Act Cromwel was made Vicegerent and Vicar General for both are in the same Commission and the King gave to him omnem omnimodam Jurisdictionem Authoritatem sive Potestatem Ecclesiasticam quae nobis tanquam supremo Capiti hujusmodi competit c. which are the Words of his Commission It 's true That the Power of granting a Commission to exercise this Power is not expressed in the Act of Parliament but it being vested in the King by the Act he might appoint One or more Commissioners to do it in his name but the Case is very different where that very Power of Delegation is taken away by Act of Parliament for that is the present Case To make this clear we must consider the Words of this Act and compare them with 1 Eliz. 1. the 17 Car. 1. 12. and the present Commission The Words 26 H. 8. 1. are the same in effect with those 1 Eliz. 1. But with this observable Difference That whereas the Statute of H. 8. gives the King his Heirs and Successors full Power and Authority from Time to Time to Visit c. That of 1 Eliz. 1. unites the Jurisdiction to the Imperial Crown of this Realm but then it doth not proceed as the other did To give full Power and Authority to her her Heirs and Successors to visit c. but the Words are And that your Highness your Heirs and Successors Kings or Queens of this Realm shall have full Power and Authority by this Act by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England to Assign Name and Authorise when and as often as your Highness your Heirs and Successors shall think meet to Exercise Use Occupy and Execute under your Highness your Heirs and Successors all manner of Jurisdictions Priviledges and Preheminences in any wise touching or concerning any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction c. so that the Administration of this Extraordinary Jurisdiction is by this Act limited to such who are nominated and appointed by the Letters Patents The Fountain of all Jurisdiction is acknowledged to be in the Imperial Crown of this Realm but the Administration is twofold Ordinary in the Archbishops Bishops and Ecclesiastical Courts and to secure their Dependance on the Crown the Oath of Supremacy is required by this Act to be taken by every Archbishop Bishop and all Ecclesiastical Persons and Officers But besides this it was then thought fit That there should be an Extraordinary Administration of it which is limited by this Act to such as should be nominated and appointed in Letters Patents c. and no other Reason can be given of the Change from what it was in the Time of Henry the Eighth for it is not now placed absolutely as then in the Queen her Heirs and Successors but the Jurisdiction is annexed to the Crown and the Extraordinary Administration to be by Commission under the Broad Seal Now since this Power of nominating Commissioners for Extraordinary Jurisdictions is taken away by Act of Parliament the only Question is Whether notwithstanding the Right of Jurisdiction being still in the Crown a new Commission may not be granted for Extraordinary Jurisdiction There had been no Question in this Case if the Administration of Extraordinary Jurisdiction had not been setled 1 Eliz. 1. to be by Commission and that very Power of granting such a Commission had not been taken away by Act of Parliament But as the Matter now stands the only Pretence left for it is That the same Act which confirms the Repeal hath a Salvo for the King's Supremay in these Words Provided always That this Act shall not extend or be construed to extend to abridg or diminish the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters or Affairs If these Words be taken strictly with Respect to the same Matter they make the Act inconsistent with it self For then the meaning would be The King's Supremacy shall not extend to the setting up such a Court always provided that his Supremacy notwithstanding this Act may extend to the setting up such another Court. Is it consistent with the Wisdom of a Parliament to make such delusory Acts Therefore we must understand the King's Supremacy in other Matters And there was this Reason for it All the Acts of Parliament touching the Supremacy in Henry the Eighth's Time were repealed by Queen Mary and the Restoring the Supremacy to the Crown was by the same Act which set up the High Commission and therefore when part of that Act was Repealed and that Repeal confirmed it was fitting to add a Clause That there was no intention to abridg or diminish the Supremacy setled by Law especially since by that Act the Ordinary Jurisdiction of the Bishops in their Courts was revived And it is very well known what Clamors had been made As though the Bishops Courts being held in their own Names were inconsistent with the King's Supremacy and although the Judges had declared July the first 1637. That there was no necessity that Processes Ecclesiastical should be in the King's Name and the King August the eighteenth in 13 Car. 1. published a Proclamation to that purpose Yet all this did not satisfie some but the Bishops were still thought by them in their Ordinary Jurisdiction to usurp upon the King's Supremacy and to abridg and diminish it therefore when this Act passed to revive their Jurisdiction it was no more than reasonable to add such a Clause to prevent Misconstruction viz. That this Act nor any thing in it be construed to extend to abridg or diminish the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters as the Ordinary Jurisdiction of the Bishops had been thought to do And the Vindicator of the Ecclesiastical Commission could not forbear a Marginal Note to that purpose The Court held by his Majesties Ecclesiastical Commissioners is more legal than the Bishops Courts This is in the Kings Name theirs in their own Name only As though the new setting up a Court forbidden by Law did not make it illegal in whose Name soever it were and as though Courts expresly owned and allowed by Law were illegal meerly because the Forms of their Proceedings do not run in the Kings Name But I desire him to take an Answer from his own Oracle the L. Ch. J. Coke Now albeit the Proceedings and Process in the Ecclesiastical Courts be in the Name of the Bishops c. it followeth not therefore that either the Court is not the Kings or the Law whereby they proceed
was saith Florentius Wigorniensis congregata Synodo sub praesentia Regis Egfridi The Archbishop Theodore likewise deposed Winfred Bishop of the Mercians saith the same Author after Bede for some Disobedience and consecrated Saxulphus the first Abbot of Peterborough in his Place This Winfred had been present at the Council at Herudford and there consented to the Canons then first received in the English Church and there they submitted to Ecclesiastical Censures upon the Violation of them At this Council saith Matt. Westminster were present not only all the Bishops but all the Kings and Great Men of the Nation so that the first Canons were received in a full Parliament One of these Canons was for increasing the Number of Bishopricks as the Number of Believers increased And upon this Canon Theodore proceeded against both Wilfred and Winfred For not long after Theodore divided his Bishoprick into five but it was done saith Florentius consensu ejusdem Regis Principum illius as Ina divided the Western Province into two Bishopricks Synodali Decreto saith Mat. Westminster which then was the same as by Act of Parliament And the opposing such a Division seems to have been the Crime of Disobedience for which he was deprived by the Archbishop For as Bede observes of him He first exercised Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction over all England In the great Council at Beâ—anceld where King Withred was present A. D. 694. with his Nobles Ducibus Satrapis in unum glomeratis together with the Clergy He there disowrs any Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and leaves it to the Archbishop of Canterbury Metropolitani Episcopi est Ecclesias Dei regere gubernare c. and then follows Presbyteros Diaconos eligere statuere sanctificare firmare amovere And he makes this an inviolable Law as far as his Words could make it Si quis autem Rex post nos levatus in Regnum aut Episcopus aut Abbas vel Comes vel ulla potestas hominum contradicat huic Chartuae aut infringere tentaverit sciat se sequestratum à Corpore Sanguine Domini c. And after it follows Haec Lex inviolabilis usque ad consummationem Saeculi permaneat c. Mr. Prynn out of his old Kindness to the Archbishops of Canterbury in his vast Heap of Collections would have this rejected as Spurious but Sir H. Spelman whose Judgment was far beyond the others saith He had perused five MSS. of iâ— whereof one was with a mixture of Saxon Letters and he had â—o Mistrust of its Sincerity And the Learned and Judicious Editors of the Decem Scriptores Sir Roger Twisden and Mr. Selden have thought fit to insert it after them out of a MS. in CCC But Mr. P. thinks it is contradicted by the Council of Berghamstead about Ecclesiastical Affairs under King Withred But I can find nothing like it It is true there are Laws made concerning Ecclesiastical Matters by common consent of the King the Nobles and Bishops but the very first is Ecclesia libera sit fruaturque suis judiciis c. But besides in the Great Council at Clovesho where AEthelbaldus King of Mercia was present and Cutbert Arch-Bishop of Canterbury with the other Bishops this Charter of Withred's was read and approved and consirmed with the like Sanction annexed to it In the Council at Clovesho A. C. 787. The extent of the Jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury was very much lessened by the means of King Offa who caused another Archbishoprick to be set up in Mercia and the Archbishop of Canterbury gave his Consent saith Matt. Paris But his former Jurisdiction was restored in the Council of Clovesho A. D. 803. by a general Consent But in the former Council the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was strenuously asserted in these Words Sicut Reges omnibus dignitatibus praesunt ita Episcopi in his quae ad Deum attinent And in the latter there is a severe denunciation against all that should lessen the Honour or take away the Jurisdiction of that See. From henceforward I find no Diminution of the Archbishop's Ordinary Jurisdiction through the Saxon times The King had the Political Supremacy in him by which he erected and divided Bishopricks and nominated Bishops and summoned Councils and confirmed their Proceedings as he saw Cause but the immediate Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction was left to the Archbishop of Canterbury in the first place and to the rest of the Bishops As to any Publick Acts which related to Ecclesiastical Affairs they were not dispatched by particular Commissions but in the Parliamentary Assemblies In which the custom was to begin with what related to the Church and then to proceed to other Business Of this Ingulphus gives us an Instance in Ceolnothus Archbishop of Canterbury for in the Parliament Assembled at Kingsbury A. C. 851. in Hebdomada Pasch. which was chiefly assembled pro Regni negotiis yet even then he proposed That Church Affairs might be first dispatched Divina Negotia debere primitus proponi to which they all assented And so Bertulphus his Charter of Crowland then passed as Withlasius his did before at a time when the Bishops and Nobles attended the King at London to consult about the Danish Pyrates which very much infested our Coasts Thus AEthelwolfus passed his Famous Grant of the Tenth of all the Lands to the Church in a Council at Winchester himself and the Kingâ— of Mercia and East-Angles being present and all the Nobility and Bishops giving their free Consent as Ingulphus relates it Several others might be produced but these are sufficient And the Saxon Laws are a plain Evidence That Church-Matters were in those times determined in the same Assemblies wherein the other Laws of the Kingdom were passed In the Reign of King Edward the Confessor The next Instance is of Edward the Confessor who saith in his Laws That he is Vicar of the highest King and he is ordained to this end that he should Govern and Rule the People of the Land and above all things the Holy Church and that he defend the same from Wrong-doers and root out Workers of Mischief F. Parsons saith All this was by Commission from the Pope such as the Kings of Sicily had But in my Opinion this is a very bad Answer For it supposes Persons otherwise uncapable to be made capable of the same Jurisdiction which follows Orders provided they have a Delegation from the Pope Which is in effect to confound all Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in any but the Pope himself and those to whom he commits it But those who assert the Right of Jurisdiction to follow the Power of Order must first suppose a Person duly qualified before he can receive from the Pope himself the Power of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction If therefore a Prince hath not an inherent Right to it he cannot receive it by Commission from the Pope And the Powers which the King of Sicily challenges relating to