AN ANSWER TO A PRINTED BOOK INTITULED OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAIESTIES LATE ANSWERS and Expresses Printed by His MAIESTIES Command AT OXFORD By LEONARD LICHFIELD Printer to the Vniversity 1642. AN ANSWER TO A PRINTED BOOKE INTITULED OBSERVATIONS Vpon some of His MAIESTIES late Answers and Expresses IN this discourse concerning Regall authority it is needlesse to wast time in declaring the originall since it is granted to be at least mediately from God Who intending the good of mankind which was not to be obtained without preservation of order hath therefore commanded all to be subject to the lawes of society not only for wrath but for conscience sake not only whil'st they enjoy the benefit of Governours but likewise whilst they doe suffer under some accidentall abuses The reason of which obligation may be this we cannot reap the constant fruits of an established policy unlesse by compact we submit our selves to some possible inconveniences Hence it follows after a people hath by solemne contract devested it selfe of that power which was primarily in them they cannot upon what pretence soever without manifest breach of divine ordinance and violation of publique faith resume that authority which they have placed in another to the end that being united in one it may thence receive strength be enabled to protect all as also to prevent those fatall divisions which attend multitudes endued with equall power where almost every one upon reall or fancyed injuries undertakes to right himselfe and although before positive constitution this is not absolutely unjust yet reason informes us it is most fit by some agreement to part with this native right in consideration of greater good and prevention of greater evills which will ensue and to restraine our selves from being judges in our own cause It followes moreover though the people should conceave they might live more happily if the Kings prerogative were more bounded his revenews diminished and it is no hard matter to perswade them to think so to effect this wants not so much rhetorique as malice since what is taken from the King turnes to their present profit though they oft-times dearely pay for it by disabling their King to provide for their security it were high sinne to entrench upon his rights For hereby they loosen the very sinewes of government by receding from that compact which crafty men out of their own private interests perswade them they might have made more advantagious It doth no way prejudice Regall authority that God is the author of Aristocraticall he may adde Democraticall power also If these were not lawfull formes of government their execution of judgement would be sinne and whilst they punish they would commit murder Yet in these kindes we may observe more or lesse perfection according to the aptnes they beare to those ends which States ayme at which are safety and plenty To haue riches and not be able to defend them is to expose our selves as a prey to be safe and poore is to be securely miserable Besides if we had leisure to look back to the Originall of Governments we might finde that God was the immediate donor of Regall power whereas other formes referre to him onely as confirming the peoples Act. This the Author cunningly dissembles and therefore treading in the steps of Mariana and Buchanan sworn enemies to Monarchy he presents us with J know not what rude multitudes living without lawes without government till such time as out of the sense of their sufferings which evidently proceeded from this want they were inforced to fly to such remedies However this fancy might passe for currant among such heathen Polititians as were ignorant of the originall of the world dreamed that the first men were bred as Insects out of the mud of the earth whence that frequent mention in their writings of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Aborigenes yet we who are satisfied with the history of the creation cannot imagine that Anarchy was before a regulated Government and that God who had digested one Chaos into order should leave the most noble creatures in a worse confusion unlesse we will deny to Adam either that power or providence which is naturall and ordinary in a father over his children and granted by this observer pag. 18. to be more then the King can challenge over his people We find in this infancy of the world upon the multiplying of mankinde Colonies were sent out and a City was built by Cain Those long lived Patriarchs had this advantage by begetting a numerous posterity they might people a Nation out of their own loynes and be saluted Patres patriae without a metaphor the same being their subjects and their children In relation to this it was properly said by the Ancients a Kingdome was but a larger family Aristotle tells us a Regall power belonged to the Paterfamilias and accordingly Homer I. 1. pol. c. 8. Odyssâ—◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that it was then no more possible in right for such a people to choose their rulers then to choose their Fathers Thus Regall power sprang first from Paternall and Trogus made a truer observation then this author when he said Principio rerum as well as gentium nationumque imperium penes reges erat And therefore may challenge more from God nature then other formes of government and certainly it hath received larger elogies from God in Scripture then any other can pretend to To say nothing of the Kings of Israel who are confest by the adversary to be of divine institution very heathen Monarchs are acknowledged by God himselfe to be no lesse Where he calls Nebuchadrezzar his servant Ier. 43.10 and Cyrus his annointed Es 45.1 Notwithstanding this to the end I may give the clearest satisfaction I have thought it fit not to take advantage from the excellency of Monarchy whether in regard to its antiquity as being not much younger then man himselfe or the severall commodities thereof For the truth is it were no excuse for such endeavours of innovation were it the most imperfect governement I shall therefore take into consideration this Authors grounds in the method they lye upon which he would overthrow so ancient and well founded a monarchye His first exception is The King attributeth the originall of his Royalty to God and the Law making no mention of the grant consent or trust of man therein A groundles cavill wheÌ„ God is first named under what notion can be apprehend Law but as an agreement of the people deriving their power and committing the Kingdom to his trust within few lines he confutes himselfe telling us that Law which the King mentioneth is not to be understood to be any speciall ordinance sent from heaven by the ministery of Angels or Prophets as amongst the Iewes it sometimes was It can be nothing else amongst Christians but the pactions and agreements of such and such politique corporations if so he might have spared this observation That Dominion which
Politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in tearmes and by names of spiritualty and temporalty been bounden and owen to beare next to God a naturall and humble obedience If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confesse that name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voice t is all one as if he had no voice if their power must over-rule his t is all one as if he were devested of all nay why is it thought fit to send to him and sollicite his consent when it is legally past in that the two houses have voted it why to all publique bills do they require this confirmation Le Roy Le voet is it only for the same reason that Bellarmine gives why the Pope being alone infallible calls generall councells ut res suavius transigatur suppose he should returne in answer that of SENECA Si vultis scire an velim efficite ut possim nolle Thus though he plead for a new government he is ashamed to own it by the right name For he tells us not without some indignation at the very thought of such an innovation This new Aristocraticall fabrique cannot seem to any impartiall man but as empty a shadow as airy a dream as ever mans fancy abused it selfe withall I dare say he cannot meet in all histories and records except of such Parliaments as have depos'd Kings which he confesseth no free one ever did with one example of this nature that the two Houses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King Indeed a reasonable man cannot imagine any president possible because since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater then his own if they had ever made claim to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute Before this power be challenged it would befit to vote down that clause in a law made 2. Hen. â— cited by His Majesty that it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth himselfe Yet notwithstanding this he must be UNIVERSIS MINOR for this wee see in all conditionate Princes such as the Prince of Orange c. I never knew he had Regall power before This instance abundantly manifests his designe though he is pleased to say he speakes nothing in favour of any alteration but is as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage To the most absolute Empire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sense to suppose a King that is in his wits me thinkes all good people should take to heart those desperate conclusions which are built upon most unreasonable and most unworthy suppositions of a King that is mad or a child since never subjects had greater obligation to be thankfull to Allmighty God for giving them a Prince as eminently able as vertuous who will not provide for the safety of His people nay who will not part with some of His right rather then they should perish because in their destruction He looses all Yet this does not prove a King should part with His rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange intelligence would be received from invisible spyes and as often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so often the filly people were to be frighted Since all naturall power is in those which obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme such a contract before their owne preservation are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature He cannot mean any people contracting to their own certain ruine there never was government guilty of this madnes therefore He must understand a contract to a possible ruine for example an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the ordinary tryall of Law and to suffer if it should so fall out though under an undeserved sentence In this case he that does not make resistance and prefer his preservation to his contract is pronounced felo dese and a rebell to nature Unhappy thiefe who for felony is condemned to be hang'd and will be guilty of another felony in being hanged what way is left unto innocency He must kill as many as he can in His own defence so shall He escape or dye in the quarrell either way He hath done right to nature Let us put another case an innocent man by the ordinary course of justice is adjudged to dye upon the testimony of two bearing false witnes he was free from fault before now he is in some danger except he refuse to be punisht he becomes guilty no lesse then a selfe murderer I wonder what opinion this man hath of Martyrs who valew not their owne preservation can he think by submitting themselves to one fire they deserve to be cast into another nay what of Christ himselfe who certainly suffered most injuriously though he had strength enough to preserve himselfe and could have been assisted by an Army of Angells yet he was obedient to death I cannot imagine from what principle he should draw such a conclusion unlesse it be from this whence indeed most of his book will naturally flow that there is no such thing as justice but suprema lex the paramount law is profit and the faults of men consist in the not violation of contracts in the not breaking promises if they be for their disadvantage for it were a sinne against native liberty to make our selves the slaves of justice If we examine the ground of this doctrine most destructive of all commerce all government we shall discover it to be no other but this that the law of nature doth allow a man to defend himselfe and provide for his owne preservation But the observer takes no notice that it is in our power to part with this right yet doe nothing contrary to nature if reason tell us we shall thereby obtaine a more excellent good the benefit of peace and society nay that this restraining Our selves by compact of that naturall liberty to defend our selves will conduce more to that end for which it was given us our preservation and safety Because in probability we shall be in lesse danger living amongst men who have agreed to be governed by certaine lawes then if every one followed his owne inclination Where one suffers hereby wrongfully thousands enjoy the benefit of being protected from wrong And therefore though it should happen to me in particular to be condemned by the magistrate without cause I am bound to suffer patiently because having made such a bargain which might have been profitable I have no right
to recall it when it appears disadvantageous I owe that I have been safe thus long to the benefit of this covenant therefore am bound in justice to share the inconveniences If reason will not satisfie perhaps Christianity may Qui resistunt potestati Rom. 13. ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt To resist the magistrate damnable The powers here spoken of were heathen yet Christ commanded his to be subject even to them That answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion This precept obliges private men but not magistrates Since inferiour magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as private men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to both Neither is this a hard law if duly considered If we suffer justly we have no reason to complain if undeservedly we are punished but not hurt The magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum because God will abundantly reward us for our patient suffering in obedience to his command But this is against nature He must mean nature guided by right reason and doth that dictate that rather then part with a temporall life we ought to forfeit an eternall It is objected that a temporary power ought not to be greater then that which is lasting and vnalterable He does not frame the Kings argument aright which concludes on this ground that it is not probable the lawes should place a power greater then his in such a body and yet leave it to his disposall when to call that body together when to dissolve it that is to determine when and how long he would be over-ruled when be King again His Majesty presses it farther which he dissembles This trust being irrevocably committed to Him and His heires for ever it cannot be conceived how it should sleep during the sitting of the Houses But if this were so the Romans had done unpolitiquely in creating Dictators when any great extremity assailed them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the form of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not an Aristocracy and much lesse to a democracy The Romans successe cannot be imputed meerely to their change but to this that they altered their form from worse to better as to their present ends but that will not justifie his desire of innovation from better to worse It is further objected He sayes if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more then counsellors we make them Comptrollers and this is not suitable to Royalty He answers we say here that to consent is more then to counsell and yet not alwayes so much as to command and comptroll True not alwayes but then it is when their consent shall impose a necessity upon the King of doing the like He hath not laid down his Majesties words faithfully The point He stands on is that their advise is not His law neither is He bound to captivate His reason or submit His conscience to their Votes Yes it must be so because in inferiour Courts the Judges are so counsellors for the King as that the King may not countermand their judgements and yet it were a harsh thing to say that they are therefore Guardians and Comptrollers of the King therefore it holds in Parliaments a fortiori The reason why the King cannot countermand their judgement is because they sustain His person and His consent is by law involv'd in what by law they do and there would be no end if He should undoe what He hath done Authoritas rei judicatae vim legis habet there can be no appeal from himselfe to himselfe He therefore makes the Judges take an oath they will deny to no man common right by His letters because He is not to passe sentence in private but in publique and in a Judiciall way That it is his owne act appears from this that He delegates his power to them and this is a known rule Quod Rex facit per officiarios per se facere videtur The truth is Kings have a right and heretofore they made use of it to sit in judicature personally Camden tells us that Bancus Regius ita dictus erat â—rit 112. quòd Rex ipse in eo praesidere solebat Sir Tho Smith too in his description of England Subsellia Regia vulgo Bancus Regius ex eo sortita sunt appellationem l. 2. c. 14. quia ibi ipsi Angliae Regessedere consueverunt This Court was called the Kings Bench because the King sate as judge in it in His proper person It removed with the King as is to be seen 9. Hen. 3. cap. 11. by which the Court of common Pleas is fixed Common pleas shall not follow our court but shall be holden in some certain place Moreover the Judges swear they will not assent to any thing which may turne the King in damage or disherison by any manner way or colour 18. Edw 3. when he can make these things agree to the two Houses he shall conclude from the Iudges sentence to their votes But since it will clearly appeare that they are not the mouth of the King the Lords sitting in a personall capacity and the House of Commons as representing the body of the Kingdom though not that to all intents and purposes the inference must by no means be granted I shall adde this to make the answer more clear and to avoid mistake in matters of Law there lyes an appeal to them a writ of errour being brought as to the highest Court not so in matters of state Because whilst they passe sentence according to known lawes the state is no way indangered thereby but if they challenge to themselves a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of state they may when they please overthrow our lawes The Counties which intrusted them looke upon them as Judges not Politicians But we ought not to conceive that they well either Councell or consent to any thing but what is publiquely advantagious When the King conceives they do not otherwise He will most willingly follow their advise This fallacy though extreamly weak hath influenced on all his book He takes the two Houses in such a Notion as not failing of their duty but doing every thing as they ought and supposeth the King to be wanting to that trust which is committed to him By such Councell and consent we cannot imagine the King limited or lessened Such a Consent in which his is necessarily involv'd renders his Power not so properly lesse as none at all it doth not limit but take it away Pray put the Case a thousand pounds is left to Titius and Sempronius to be bestowed upon joynt consent Sempronius being just and reasonable grants to Titius the right of a Negative so that without he will concurre he confesses he can doe nothing The King doth not pretend to have power of repealing old or constituting new Lawes without them Titius
not content with this Negagative affirmes Sempronius is bound to consent to what ever he thinks fit if so is not this money wholely at Titius his disposall Can any one be so stupid as to tell Sempronius notwithstanding this He hath a full power How did ship-money destroy our propriety but by this very consequence Law and Reason informe us that Ejus est velle qui potest nolle L. in bello §. medio D. de captiv postlim Hence Tryphonius determines that a Captive cannot consent to his sonnes Marriage Why Cum utique nec dissentire posset And Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is alledged in derogation of Parliaments that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treate in all cases of a publicke nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliaments is not due to them If this Man had a mind to deale candidly he would deliver the Kings sense truly and let Him speak His own words The summe of which is onely this the two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established goverment without Him But this Allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under Very tragically expressed and with high confidence but not any colour of reason For are we not left in the same state in which we were His Majesties denying to bring in a new government doth not take away the old If He thinke it not convenient to alter that forme which the least deceitfull Argument long experience under so many of His glorious Ancestors hath proved happy can any who is not in love with error inferre hence this subjects us to a lawlesse and most unbounded regiment Vpon the same reason by the Kings desertion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void It were a strange consequence to conclude that because that may be done without the King to which His consent by law is not required therefore that may be done without him to which his consent is by law necessary Many Kings have dissented from Bills yet the people were never so mad as to feare a desertion of all Courts It is against common sense to fancy that He which enjoyes all by the benefit of Laws should hinder the due administration of Justice according to those Lawes so willfully endanger not onely his rights but safety by putting His Kingdome into tumults and combustion Every wise man may have as strong security he shall not suffer from the onely not impossible execution of such a power because it is so manifestly destructive of the Kings own interest and made evident to be so as well by experience as by reason as any man can have reason not to be afraid of himselfe because he hath a full power over himselfe and may destroy himselfe when he pleases The intent of the King is that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and appeare in the Right of the whole Kingdome or else that there is no honour nor power nor Iudicature residering in that great Majesticall Body then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall A most impudent collection the meaning in breife is onely this when the particular consents of three are necessary it 's not in the power of any two to effect whatsoever they please A most prudent establishment in favour of present government that we may have no innovation without the mutuall agreement of King and people It is attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament Who these attempters are I enquire not I suppose he meanes those who devided the Lords into good and bad the Members of the House of Commons into well and ill affected So making the major part not fully concluding They are not denyed to conclude as far as the power of that House extendeth but this cannot reach to an absolute and finall decision It is a wonderfull thing that the King's papers being fraited scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division 't is more wonderfull that in a well governed state such disrespectfull language of Princes from private pennes should passe unregarded unpunished tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamentall constitutions which support all our ancient liberties and to the erection of Arbitrary rule should find such applause in the world There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are and causing them to be to shew is not to teach division But it is beyond admiration if the King's aimes are such as He would have the world beleeve that they should find such applause Especially if we consider the persons from whom men that have much more to loose then some who may ayme at getting greater fortunes by pretending they are in danger to loose what they have Men that are knowen not to value their lives equall to their liberties men of as great wisdome as honesty neither of which would permit them to be active to make themselves miserable and pull upon their posterity and Countrey perpetuall slavery What impudence of malice is it to accuse the King to intend that when the world sees how much He hath suffered meerly to prevent it Could our Ancestors ever have beleeved there should come a King who would plead for Magna Charta who would hazard His Crown in defence of the subjects Liberty and desire nothing more then the utter abolition of all Arbitrary rule If the King have parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression He had no other means to withstand their tyrany Let this proclaim them a voyd assembly His Majesty never layd such charge to the Parliament yet it is most evident there was too great reason elsewhere to justifie His feares when notwithstanding His deepest Protestations to maintaine the true established Religion they still imputed to Him inclining to Popery when notwithstanding His utmost endeavours to suppresse that unhappy Rebellion in Ireland and after the Houses had taken that worke into their care His frequent pressing them to send over sufficient supplyes and not to spend their time in businesses of little moment whilst their poore Brethren were dayly butcherd yet the people were made beleeve He was a favourer of their bloody designes when the baser sort of the people were permitted to come even to the Parliament in Clamarous and unwarrantable multitudes and there was a kind of discipline in disorder tumults being ready at command upon a watch-word given when seditious Pamphlets hourely came out and many Presses laboured day and night to abuse the King when factious Preachers were incouraged whilst they did cast publick obloquies on the Lawes which stood in full force and which if they had been duly executed would have justified themselves by restoring Us to our former Peace and happinesse which We so long injoyed as
he please to consult Livy or Tacitus he may find what most unworthy ends the Senate of Rome proposed to themselves and be quickly satisfied in the falsehood of this Maxime taken in his sense The truth is he raises probabilities into demonstrations and because it is not so likely it being a work of greater difficulty that four hundred should contrive things for their private interests as that four should the takes it for impossible Whereas experience clearly confutes him in other states we find nothing more common That we in England have so seldome suffered under such corruptions proceeds from causes which are peculiar to this government It was a court for the most part but of short continuance so that they had not time to mould and fashion their aimes and when called together againe the body was much altered But the chief reason and that to which the Subject especially owes his security is this that the finall determination is not in one nor two houses but the joynt consent of three Estates is necessary So that nothing is likely to passe but what is for the interest of the major part and what is so is publiquely advantagious It is more possible they may now prosequute private interests since they challenge a power to themselves sufficient to advance their designes which heretofore they never pretending to could not hope to compasse particular ends The King may safely leave His highest rights to Parliaments If this be all the motive he may as safely keep them Why did the Lawes entrust Him with them if it were fitting for Him to make no use of them None knows better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Monarchy I believe they affect Monarchy why then doth this Author endeavour to take it away by denying the King a power of dissent which our Ancestors inviolably preserved as a most happy restraint of Aristocracy or Democracy It hath been often in the power of former Parliaments to load that rule with greater fetters and cloggs but they would not A very good argument there is little reason now to doe it After a commendation of the exact temper and due proportion between the three Estates the many affecting Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility preferring it as much beyond Democracy He exhorts us not to seek to corrupt this purity of composition Very good counsell but which he overthrowes in the words immediatly following We must not conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King Therefore it will be fitting for the King to leave all to their disposall who certainly can doe nothing but what is fitting In how few words hath he destroyed that constitution which he told us was so perfect it could admit of no change but for worse But we could not stay here if the Kings negative were once taken away like decaying bodies our health would dayly impaire The next step must be the Lords sitting in a personall capacity no reason they should deny what the Kingdom hath voted to be necessary or convenient either let them not speak at all or let the greater part of Commons joyne with the lesser part of Peeres The right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of government can be advantage to them except they could each one attain an hereditary Crowne May they not attain as much as Malignant Counsellors are pretended to aime at Honours Offices Wealth Power Commands Their power is meerly derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and People will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done Then it is confest the King hath a right of dissenting Except both King and People here a power is given to the People collectively beyond the Lords Commons and King If the King be an affector of true Liberty He has in Parliament a Power as extensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike distresses The Dictator had absolute Authority nor was he circumscribed in power but in time only There lay no appeale from him neither was he questionable for any action after his government expired Though the humor of that people could not endure the name of King they had the same thing for in imminent dangers whether from forrain invasions or intestine seditions necessity of state forced them to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence we may make the truest judgement what forme of government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient their actions which proceeded from feare were unfeigned interpreters of their thoughts That they fell back still into their old rule and were not as wise to prevent dangers by conserving that Authority as they were to encounter them by erecting it must be imputed to the inconstant temper of the people who in times of peace were as proud and insolent as when ruine threatned which their wantonnesse pulled upon themselves they were basely humble Since then the Romans preferred even the unbounded power of one to a popular sway wee have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this government wherein Monarchy is so wisely ballanced that as we are not exposed to the dangers which attend the rule of the many so we may avoyd the inconveniences which might probably flow from the Arbitrary power of one He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of His own Subjects and yet that Army which He went to destroy and advanced their colours against Him was more loyall then that which himselfe commanded Had he made a Conscience of unjust slander or had he any sense of the honour of his Nation these words had never fowled the paper That which the King here calls conscience and reason can be nothing else but meer private opinion What other possible notion can any man have of conscience is it not the light of reason informing us in our duty If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Counsell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there would be no such contestation It is a very unfaithfull way of judging to measure the goodnesse of Counsell by the person advising not by the thing advised His Majesty allwayes examined what not who and hath given His Subjects a most certain pledge of His Royall affection in passing so many good Acts and was resolved to grant as long as any thing could in reason be desired After He hath fully satisfied the publique interest even to the utmost extent of what most understanding and disingaged men wish for he is not bound to undoe again in part and so farre to comply with the interests of private men as to place a power in some by which they shall be
committed so many outrages and such high injustice that Theramenes one of their own body one of the thirty professed his publique dislike of those proceedings Then was he accused as a Traitor to them and though it was a priviledge of the three thousand that none of them should suffer death by the sentence of the thirty but according to accustomed processe and tryall yet Critias wip't his name out of that number and so reduced him to their tryall Theramenes pleads for himselfe they ought to look upon his as a common case their names might as easily be blotted out he advises them to be very wary in making such a president which might ruine them and their posterity The issue was this Particular men being over-awed by their fears thought it their wisest way to hold their peace since if they should speak in his behalfe there was little hopes to redeeme him but great probability to ruine themselves So they chose rather to expose themselves to those future inconveniences which possibly might not come upon them then hazard a present danger By this advantage the Tyrants prevailed and condemned him to dye The things taken from the King at Hull were Armes which are of more danger then other kind of chattels By the same Law all that part of the Kingdom which is not confided in may be disarmed nay why may not their mony be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it The Subject is in a miserable condition that is lyable to be undone as often as they please to be fearfull It is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings Armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize what ever else belongs unto His Majesty The Law of this Kingdom hath only intrusted the Prince with Armes so that the Subject ought not to be arraied trained and mustered but by His Commission But some determination must be supream and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the discretion of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meer discretion No necessity of either For in cases of this nature which he confesses to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary Law The case of Ireland as it is laid down by His Majesty is unanswerable and therefore he is forced to extreme shifts being unable to say any thing materiall and yet unwilling to hold his peace England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them as betwixt England and Wales If this were so Irish Barons would be English Peeres and English Peeres would have a right to vote in Irish Parliaments Besides all lawes here enacted would stand in full force in Ireland as they doe in the Kings dominion of Wales Though the major part should vote a thing yet if it be disliked here they would want authority to over-rule the thing so voted For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major is that blood may not be shed for in probability the major part will prevaile This is a good reason for such a contract that the minor part should subscribe but after such agreement in States justice laies an obligation on them so to doe upon his grounds if the lesser part in Parliament though never so few can make it appeare the greater part of the Kingdom are of their opinion the major part ought to subscribe to the minor Nay if at any time the major part of Ireland joyning with the minor part of England make a major of the whole then the major part in our Parliament must sit downe He takes no notice of the other case suppose the malignant party should be a major part of both Houses which His Majesty shewes how very probably it might have been and were there a new election it is not impossible the Counties should send up the greater part of such men as he calls malignant would he think the King bound to consent to all such alterations as they should propose Some scattering reasons are laid down concerning the Militia which are but repetitions of what I have formerly answered A Faction is said to have prevailed upon a major part by cunning force absence or accident He argues thus against it if by cunning we must suppose the King's party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty The reason why they are over-borne may be this not because they have lesse Law but more Honesty which will not permit them to maintain a good cause by ill meanes We all know in how great stead those piae fraudes holy falshoods and religious untruths stood the Church of Rome though there were such who laid down better reasons for the contrary opinions yet truth prevailed slowly and with a few only because the minds of most were craftily prepossest with prejudice against it begotten and nourished by fained stories The dispute proceeded upon very unequall termes for the Roman party gave themselves the liberty of taking all advantages whereas their adversaries were forced to betray a good cause out of meer ingenuity they had none of their side who could lye We ought to examine whether this policy work not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falshoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be reipublicae salutares which have so strong an influence on the understandings of many that they can submit to the votes of some who have insinuated themselves into their affections against the cleer reasons of others whom they have been taught causelesly to suspect How easy is it to deceive by giving in false informations of dangers from abroad If some more scrupulous then to be abused and led away by light reports inquire after the hand that they may judge of the probability of the intelligence according to the faith and credit of the relator they must be satisfied with this the informer desires his name should be concealed Pour l'eviterâ—le tiltre d'espion It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in Law to be done by force not only when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfy the passion and humor of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this works on the mind as strongly as the other on the body And therefore Seneca tells us stating this point of freedom vim majorem metum excipio quibus adhibitis electio perit and Cicero nec quicquam aequitati tam infestum est quà m convocati homines armati It remaines then we examine whether the names of many gentlemen were not openly read in tumults whether they were not posted with directions to
slavery Besides what can he propose to himselfe The people will give more then can be forced from them so he looses by it and then how much doth he hazard against lesse then nothing He hath least reason to break the lawes willfully because he injoyes most by them and experience having shew'd the benefit of observing them and the ill of the contrary He cannot but doubt the People would fail of their duty if he doe in performance of trust and cast of the bond of obedience if he doe that of Protection These things duly weighed render that malice inexcuseable which hath long time exercised the people with most unreasonable feares of lands and liberty and Religion being in danger and this notwithstanding the King 's many sacred Protestations to the contrary before God and all the world and the whole course of his proceedings which evidently tend to the securing all Now I think it doth fully appeare that the doctrine of that Remonstrance laid down by His Majesty by way of recapitulation in seven positions is most justly offensive being such as doth threaten ruine to both Church and State not permitting us either to obey the King or serve God as we ought 1. That the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law so that all the right of King and People depends upon their pleasure This power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferior Court or else all suits must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament The two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates Some things are cleare and evident in Law and want no declarer if otherwise all the Subjects right would lye in the brest of the Iudge If the two Houses should Vote younger Brothers ought to inherite by the Law of England could this destroy the right of the first born 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honour of a Parliament This is an excellent ground to justifie their innocence against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound to keepe any law no man can accuse them for the breach of any What obligation can justice lay on them who by astrange vertue of representation are not capable of doing wrong It will become justice because they did it when he hath declared what Honour is I shall be able to judge of that bond it may perchance not stand with their honour not to be able to prove men guilty after they have once accused and imprisoned them Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses as being not voyd till repealed by a joynt consent of all the Estates 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publique necessity without the King and dispose of any thing They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdome is in distresse they may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accompted by the vertue of Representation as the whole body of the State To dissent after he hath granted what ever can in reason be desired is not to desert the Houses Upon pretence of distresse to take illegall courses is as if they should perswade us we are not in health and therefore they must breake our heads to forward our recovery They represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicion only and when leave may seasonably be bad and when competent accusers appeare not in the impeachment If by suspicions be meant only a bare not considing in this in justice cannot be sufficient ground But upon Articles drawn and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused partyes are at liberty they may be medled with for designes of this nature may brook no delay because it might prove dangerous to the King's safety or at least afford them liberty to escape If the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence should not be willing hath not the Law provided in such a case for triall of Treason 5. That the soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that be proferres dangerous men and prosequutes his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be King's as long as they please and when they are weary of Reigning the Kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe To save it from ruine the Law hath better provided for the Peoples safety by prohibiting all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever And in case where the King is seduced that is when he is not so wise as he should be because he does not think as they doe and refuses to satisfy the humors and interests of some And prefers this seems to be the true cause of all preferments doe not goe the right way dangerous men i. e. such as desire he should govern according to the known Lawes of the Land And prosequutes his loyall Subjects i. e. is driven from London to Yorke where He long time patiently expected the undeceiving of His People 6. That leavying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not leavying warre against the King but warr against his Authority though not Person is warre against the King If this were not so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on It is against common sense to fancy a King ruining Himselfe and Kingdom He can neither be willing nor able Upon a mad supposall mad consequences will follow 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings 'T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairely elected This is most certain but takes not off those words upon which this Proposition is grounded These might well have been omitted as being more fully handled in the book But least he should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer The Propositions collected out of His Majesties Declarations are but the brief of his Observations to all which I have already spoken To conclude if the people hearken to reason they must needs think His Majesty will be more ready to prevent all reall danger then any Subject whatsoever because He is sure to beare the greatest share in the losse It alwaies was the master Policy amongst the wisest Legislators to grant to them the greatest power of government to whom the preservation of the present state would be most beneficiall because their private interests were the same with the publique from which if they swarv'd by error or misinformation their own disadvantage did soon appeare FINIS
is usurped and not just yet whilst it remaines dominion and till it be legally againe devested refers to God as to it's author and donor as much as that which is haereditary Usurpation unjust dominion can give no right to the possessor he that looses a kingdome by force may recover it by the same title So Athalia in the seventh yeare of her raigne was slaine by the command of Iehoida and Joash anointed King 2. King 11. and restored to his right He must againe answer him selfe pag. 3. he tells us Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes c. for meere force cannot alter the course of nature or frustrate the tenour of law and if it could there were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due liberty then the Prince might to subvert the same And 't is a shamefull stupidity in any man to think that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and lawes of which the conquerour and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury then they which put them to such conflicts Is it not a cleare contradiction to say that God is the author and Donor of Dominion usurped and not just as well as of that which is haereditary Certainly God being Lord Proprietary of all his donation transfers a full right to him on whom he bestowes it This deed of guift being knowne it is not lawfull to endeavour a recovery This was the case of Rehoboam who after the defection of ten tribes raised an army out of Judah and the tribe of Benjamin in hopes to reduce them to obedience But he was warned by Shemajah the man of God not to fight against his brethren not because it was unlawfull in it selfe or the successe improbable but for that this was from the Lord. 2. Kin. 12. As this was not setting aside that extraordinary consideration unlawfull So neither was it as he is pleased to terme it a ridiculous attempt to indeavour to reduce ten tribes by the strength of two For he had raised an army consisting of one hundred and fourescore thousand chosen men v. 21. which were warriers And it may probably be collected from the muster roll which Ioab brought in to David where the men of Iudah were 500000 2. Sam. 24.9 that those two tribes were able to furnish an army strong enough to bid all Jsraell battell Besides as he had lost them only by harsh language so he might hope to regain them by faire promises It may be not unworthy our observation what good consequences did attend the defection of these ten tribes Did they not presently fall away from the true God as well as their King and were they not shortly after led into captivity This we must observe though force be not law yet if after conquest a people resigne their right in part or in whole by a subsequent act of consent they are obliged to stand to those conditions which they made perchance out of a probable feare of harder usage For the law of God generally L. si mulier D. quod me t. cau and the civill law in this case makes the Act binding That covenants should not be violated will appeare by the revenge God took in behalfe of the Gibeonites The children of Israell suffered three yeares famine and after this seven of Sauls sonnes were hanged to make an atonement for this breach of promise Notwithstanding the Gibeonites had overreached the Children of Jsraell by craft yet they having sworne were bound to performe their oath unto the Lord. Doli exceptio could not take of this obligation That they were deceived gave no right to them to imitate what they condemned and to deceive againe Thus we see what speciall care God takes to preserve the faith of contracts He will returne abundantly what any mans honesty costs him and therefore it is great reason he that sweareth to his neighbour should not disappoint him though it be to his own hindrance After some generall truths he comes to this issue The fountaine and efficient cause of power is the people and from hence the inference is just the King though he be singulis major yet he is universis minor This inference most weak the quite contrary may clearly be concluded The people being the efficient cause of power which can be no other way but by deriving their divided power and uniting it in him since they cannot retaine what they have parted with nor have what they gave away it follows he which hath all their power I may adde his own particular besides must needs be greater and more powerfull then they The truth is he is now the only fountaine of all power and justice But he offers us a proofe for if the people be the true efficient cause of power it is a rule in nature Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale Strange that men upon such palpable sophistry should endeavour to cast of Monarchy He will be unwilling to follow the consequence of it He hath an estate which no question he would willingly improve let him bestow it upon me he will make me rich and himselfe richer For Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale I believe rather then part with his meanes he will finde an answer to his own argument By the same reason one that entreth into his service because he hath made him his master shall conclude himselfe the better man and challenge power over him For Quicquid â—fficit tale est magis tale But because to prove his reasoning absurd is not fully to answer I will shew the ground of this fallacy The axiome is true ante effectum productum not alwaies after So a sparke firing a City was once more fire then the houses nor so after the whole towne is become one flame or else thus it is true in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is inherent and from whom it cannot be seperated not true in those who by way of donation devest themselves of power or wealth Because a thing can not retaine a fullnesse after it hath emptied it selfe Jf the King be universis minor then the people have placed a King not over but under them and they doe â—ll to petition when they might command they may require it from the Prince their Subject Hence it appeares that at the founding of authorities when the consent of societies convaies rule into such and such hands it may ordain what conditions and prefix what bounds it pleases This is most true and therefore J shall easily grant the name King to signifie a person invested with different power according to the varietie of lawes in severall nations His Majesty doth most freely acknowledge and will constantly maintain what ever rights the law doth give us yet He is not bound to betray his own The truth is we should be equally miserable under either extreme if the Kings prerogative should
swallow up the Subjects right or the Subjects right the Kings just prerogative No dissolution ought to be of rule convayed by the consent of societyes into such and such hands but by the same power by which it had it's constitution This J grant being rightly understood but because the sense may be easily mistaken J shall enlarge my selfe upon it It is most agreeable to reason that the same power should by equall right abrogate as it did at first constitute For it is not possible any body should lay a necessary obligation upon it selfe to doe thus when it had liberty to doe otherwise except in relation to some other person to whom I may part with that right I had without possibility of recalling it And this either by actuall donation so when I have given away my money J cannot challenge it as due on my repentance or by promise which is an earnest of my performance In these cases J cannot use my liberty because it would be to the injury of another according to that rule grounded on great equity Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam L nemo D. de reg jur In a popular state there is but one simple power and therefore the people upon consent may establish an Aristocracy or Monarchy when they please But in the other two where the authority is placed in the hands of a few or of one there are two parties in the contract and therefore even the whole people have not any power of dissolving this government unlesse this one or those few will voluntarily resigne up their power into those hands from which they received it and that such resignation be not to the injury of a third party It were strange if the people in subjecting it selfe to command should aime at any thing but it's own good in the first and last place No question rule and subjection divided paternall powers finding it necessary to yeeld to one Regall and instead of many to submit to one common father did spring from reason directing man-kind to its greatest convenience Therefore the people ayming chiefly at their own good yet perceiving this was not to be attained except they had a common protector to administer justice equally amongst them they found it necessary in a higher degree to provide for his good in recompense of their security and out of their particular estates to grant to him honourable demaines to whose care and justice they owed the peaceable possession of all So the good of either is mutually involved and that the people may be happy they must first provide for the happinesse of their ruler What followes I shall think unworthy any answer He breaks out into a most scandalous and false invective against the late government That the subject groaned under some grievances cannot be denied and we owe to the goodnesse of his Majestie that we are free even from the feare of them for the future J speak sincerely what I think though the wit of malice should set before us the most exact table of all our sufferings let it not impose upon us what we never felt and compare us to any other nation of the Christian world we in our worst times were least unhappy Because we have no reason to be in love with any evils I shall not endeavour to excuse them by comparison with our present miseries Though neither be desirable yet we are too sensible which we have justest reason to complain of I hope under this word protect the King intends not onely to shield us from all kinde of evill but to promote us also to all kinde of Politicall happinesse according to his utmost de voyre I never before did apprehend in the word Protect this large notion we may expect all happinesse from His goodnesse we cannot challenge it from His duty How should we conceave that the Prince is obliged by oath to take care for his people in such a degree as the most affectionate mother never yet took for her dearest children If it were so then all his Majesties Royall ancestors who did not provide for their people in such a high degree of happinesse as he by the advise of this present Parliament hath done were perjured as having all taken the oath to Protect Every particular subject hath a just title and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word Protection Is the King therefore bound to promote every particular person to all kinds of politicall happinesse to advance all to honours offices power command Though all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King as matters of Grace with all thankfulnesse and humility yet the King himselfe looking upon the whole state ought to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it c. all hath proceeded but from his meere duty It was believed heretofore the greatest happinesse of a Prince that he was able his greatest glory to be willing to oblige his people But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesie When he hath done all that he can he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant I am confident never any age was guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect to Princes as is shewne in this book If all single persons ought to look upon the late bills passed by the King as matters of Grace then they truly are so for no obligation can lay upon a man to believe things otherwise then they are This ground destroyes the power of beneficence in a Prince and the duty of gratitude in Subjects We should think it very hard if we who are but subjects should be dealt with by the same rule All owe a duty to their King to their country yet upon extraordinary services we beleive we deserve well of both The example of the House of Commons will better instruct him who have severall times presented their thanks and humble acknowledgment of his Majesties gracious favours and have likewise received thanks from most Counties in the Kingdome for procuring those bills so beneficiall to the subject and yet surely the trust reposed in them by those that chose them and the end for which they met did no lesse oblige them in point of duty to doe whatsoever might conduce to the generall good of the Kingdome The King ought not to account that a profit or strength to him which is a losse and wasting to the people nor ought he to think that perisht to him which is gained to the people By the same argument the people may share all that he hath and he is bound to believe he has lost nothing If King and people have severall rights what law is there which binds the King suo jure cedere and enables the people to preserve their rights nay to challenge his And if they have not but the interests of King and people be either altogether one and the same or so inseparably united as they cannot be severed then it
equally follows the people ought not to account that a profit or strength to them which is a losse and wasting to the King nor ought they to think that perisht to them which is gained to him Regall dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty It was so for out of the sense of those miseries which the want of due administration of justice produced routs became societies and placed a head over them to whom they paid the tribute of reverence for the benefit of Protection But that which is the end is farre more honourable and valuable in nature and policy then that which is the meanes The conclusion implied is therefore the Commons more honourable then the Soveraign J will frame some other arguments upon the same principle see how he approves them Angels are ministring spirits for the good of men but the end more honourable and valuable then the meanes therefore men more honourable then Angels Once more in a closer paralel Christ is made the head of the Church for the salvation of man but that which is the end is far more honourable and valuable c then that which is the meanes therefore man far more honourable and valuable then Christ If any should think these instances doe not fully conclude because the highest end of Angels ministration and the obedience of Christ is the glory of God he must consider Gods glory is the supream end of government also And therefore this being common to both cannot difference the case Though we grant the good of the people is more valuable he cannot hence infer a greater worthinesse or more power to be in them though the safety of patients is most to be regarded yet the Physitian is much better qualified to effect that end Marriage was ordained for the lawfull procreation of children that is honourable amongst all men we doe not read this is so The rule doth hold in such meanes as are only valuable by that relation they beare unto their ends and have no proper goodnes of their owne But a King is not so to his people if we looke back unto his first extraction when he was taken from among the people to be set over them we must needs behold him even then as a man of some worth honour and eminency which the superaddition of Royalty did not destroy but encrease To be a meanes of his peoples preservation is very consistent with the height of honour The case is not unlike in the noblest professors the Divine the Lawyer the Physition compared to their severall charges they the meanes these the ends shall we from thence conclude the poore client a better man then his learned counsell or the simple patient then his Doctor This directs as to the transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all politiques to the Paramount law that shall give law to all humane lawes whatsoever and that is Salus populi How many nations hath this abused principle brought to ruine and confusion It is unquestionable in the constitution of all Governments this is the prime end as being most agreeable with the joynt interest both of rulers and people It is as much without doubt that after estates established the governours proportion all their lawes to this end for who that is wise will not provide for their safety as well as he can in whose destruction his own is involv'd notwithstanding this the multitude not comprehending the reason which made all people commit themselves their lives and fortunes to the trust of their rulers who were wiser and therefore could better foresee dangers and had the greatest share in the present state and therefore would more carefully endeavour to prevent them readily hearken to crafty men who seeme to pitty their sufferings and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be Thus Absalon stole away the hearts of his Fathers Subjects O that I were made judge in the land 2. Sam. 15.4 that every man which hath any suit or cause might come unto me and I would doe him justice There is little good to be expected from those who will doe wrong that they may have opportunity to do right Such men have great advantage on weake understandings because there is no state wherein it might not be wished that somethings were amended and they presse upon them present inconveniences and frame some new form wherein they promise them they shall be free from all and therefore desire their assistance in bringing this happy change about The people full of great hopes cry up these men as the only fit instruments of state who pretend only to take care for the publique and though they have nothing yet would be thought not to desire any thing Having thus gained the affections of the people their next worke is to pick a quarrell with great officers they conceave because they accuse so zealously it will be presumed they are innocent themselves that by displacing them they may make roome for themselves If such men will not easily out of their preferments the people are acquainted these are the only rubs which stand betwixt them and an happy government these are the close enemies to the State and so much the more dangerous because they carry their malignant designes so secretly they cannot find proofes against them Salus populi is now concerned the whole Kingdome is in danger no way to scape this imminent perill but by tearing these men from the Prince if in a Monarchy or putting them out of the Senate if in an Aristocracy Amongst these distractions and unsettlement of Government what course is to be taken The best way I know but 't is difficult is to make the people wise and make it appeare there is no reall danger except from their tumultuous endeavours to avoyd those which are imaginary Let them rely upon their governours who have most to loose especially if they have given them great late signes of their affection to care of them this is the most probable way of safety but if they should miscarry which they can have no reason to suspect they will perish with a great deale of discretion It seemes unnaturall to me that any nation should be bound to contribute its owne inherent puissance meerely to abet Tyranny and support slavery The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just monarchs we are acquainted only with those happy names of King and Subject It is so farre from being unnaturall that any nation should be bound by which I suppose he meaneth consent from which an obligation naturally followes for it is as with him in the Comoedy voluntate coactus sum meâ to contribute it's power to that end that some have made it their choice others their refuge Seneca tells us speaking of the state of Rome in Iulius and Augustus his times Salva esse Roma non poterat nisi beneficio servitutis How is it against nature for the Turkes to be obedient to the grand Seigneur or the
are met We called them and without that call they could not have come together to be our Counsellors not Commanders for however they frequently confound them the offices are severall The writ runs super dictis negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri so that the cleare meaning is their advise is not Law except the Royall assent establish it into an act 'T is alleadged he calls them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Q. Eliz. but for proposing they might advise the Queen in a matter Shee thought they had nothing to doe to meddle with He answers a meere example though of Q. Elizabeth is no law It is true a bare example shewes only what was not what ought to be but when grounded on authority and no way excepted against by those who have alwayes been earnest defenders of their Priviledges it may be reckoned amongst sound Presidents what he adds that some of Her actions were retracted is a confirmation of this for this being out of the number it seems it was accompted legall Exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis Yet neither did the King so quote this president as to build a right upon it He alleadges the King denyes the Assembly of the Lords and Commons when he withdrawes himselfe to be rightly named a Parliament or to have any power of any court and consequently to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsly imposed on His Majesty His Answers and Messages speak the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Besides He hath passed some bills since his withdrawing All that He affirms is that the sole power of making or repealing lawes and altering any thing established is not in them but if He upon mature deliberation shal preferr the present government to the proposed change then their order is not to have the force of law and oblige the Kingdom The King is said to assert that because the law hath trusted him with a prerogative to discontinue Parliaments therefore if He do discontinue Parliaments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in formality of law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by His writ This is grosse forgery if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdom He acknowledges He is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writs And to this end He gratiously signed the bill for a trienniall Parliament which like Physick well timed may preserve the body of this state in health and strength by not sufferring ill humors to grow to any head Another assertion of the Kings he saies is if the Parliament make any transition in other matters then what he pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure All this he collects from the citation of Wentworths case The sence of his inference is this because they cannot justify the medling with things which belong not to their cognisance therefore they may be punisht if they medle with those that do We may observe an affected mistake in this author of which he makes frequent use and this animadversion though once laid down may often be applyed Whatsoever the Houses do he calls that the Act of the people Whereas the truth is they represent them only to some purposes and ends So that if they exceed their commission and vote things not belonging to their cognisance the People by no meanes is engaged in it as having no legall way of expressing themselves in such cases His Majesty clearly to prove that the trust committed to both Houses cannot bind Him to assent to what ever they propose seem it of never so dangerous consequence to the Kingdom nor absolve Him in point of conscience if His reason tell Him His people will extreamly suffer vnder the grant argues thus It is impossible that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to Us and Our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend be committed to others did not the people that sent them look upon them as a body but temporary and dissoluble at Our pleasure and can it be beleived that they intended them for Our Guardians and comptrollers in the managing of that trust which God and the law hath granted to Us and Our posterity for ever Strange it is that affection should so blinde the understanding and worke mens beliefe not according to reason but desire I must needs think the let lies only in his will else he could never satisfy himselfe with such weak answers It is true faith he two supreames cannot be in the same sence and respect If he had not hoped to hide himselfe in generalls he would have descended to particulars and told us in what sence what respect and what matters the King was supream in what the two Houses But an application would have discovered the truth even to weak understandings Nothing is more knowne or assented to then this that the King is singulis major and yet universis minor I have already evidenced the contrary yet I will speak something to it here By universis he must mean the representative all which therefore he concludes to be above and have greater power then the King that is such a power as He is bound to obey So it seems the King hath taken the oath of allegiance as well as we and we may call Him our fellow subject Yet the oath of Supremacy he tells us is no waies endangered The sense of his reason is because he is a better man then any one of us take us single He tels us He is better then any one He does not tell us He is better then two if the Kings supreamacy be no more but this it is no more then possibly He might have and probably had before He was King It is not the Prince singulis major nay may not any Lord in the Land challenge the same supreamacy over all the Knights any Knight over all esquiers to be singulis major though universis minor But perhaps some othes limitation may be found out the meaning shortly shall be that he is above the Pope in these his dominions not but that He is under His subjects to take of these and all other corrupt glosses I shall refer him to cap. 12. vices 4o. Hen 8. In the preface of which statute the Kings supreamacy not over single persōs but the body Politique is clearly delivered The words are these Where by divers sundry old authentick histories chronicles it is manifestly declared expressed that this Realm of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world governed by one Supream head and King having the dignity and Royall estate of the Imperiall Crown of the same unto whom a Body
in the fidelity of others If it could have been averred as it could not for the contrary was true that this would have bred disturbance and have been the occasion of greater danger Truly then he shall get the better if he can impose upon our sense and make the Kingdom beleeve contrary to what they see and suffer under What hath been the cause of these unhappy distractions but as the taking the Kings Towne from him by force and the illegall alteration of the Militia upon pretence of apparent danger Though for a time they were afraid where no feare was quis illis sic timere permisit yet after they have had so long a time to recover their understandings and to consider with themselves if the danger were apparent it might in so many months be made evident and they might know whence to expect the blow I dare now appeale to the weakest part of men their distrusts and aske them if they can now believe there was any just ground for jealousies It is not improbable since they have raised a house without a foundation it may fall upon the heads of the master builders Where the people by publique authority will seek any inconvenience to themselves and the King is not so much interessed in it as themselves 't is more inconvenience and injustice to deny then to grant it More injustice to deny then grant therefore it seemes that injustice too Into what streights must a King be brought by the mindes of the people If they seek any inconvenience injustice to deny it O unheard of Maxims out of these new Politiques that a King should be bound by Law to destroy his people and kill them out of duty that he doth not preserve their rights except he doe them wrong This affabile odium hath often had but never deserved thanks Can a man imagine those people of whom Juvenall speaks Evertêre domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles if they had understood their own prayers would have accused the Gods for denying them Charior est Regipopulus quà m sibi How great are His deserts towards His People that will not suffer them to be miserable though they intreat him though they provoke him to it and can content himselfe with the conscience of merit whilst his honour suffers under the envy of wrong doing Indeed this is the end of all government for the people finding they were not fit to govern themselves resolved to be ruled by those that were wiser and so committed their safety to the trust of others Now this were to reduce themselves to that first state which their sufferings made them weary of to place a Governour over them and to governe that Governour What blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason No man justifies pretended conscience no man can condemne reall But what grounds can malice have to cast this aspersion of pretence of conscience and reason If we looke either on that unhappy misunderstanding of the people who would not be undeceaved by pretences his actions must appeare unto them as cleare as the day or on his owne necessities his owne extreame wants it cannot be For certainly he that hath granted so much in this Parliament and that in a short time as put all his Royall Ancestors Acts of grace together they fall much short of his would not have denyed any thing which was reasonable not any thing since his wants required supplyes from them but what should put him into farre worse condition then that of Poverty After a long and generall discourse of the originall of government the various formes and severall distempers whil'st policy was yet imperfect he returnes to the present matter The vertue of Representation hath been denyed to the Commons and a severance has been made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties choosing and so that great priviledge of all priviledges that unmoveable Basis of all honour and power whereby the House of Commons claimes the entire right of all the Gentry and commonalty of England has been attempted to be shaken and disturbed The sense of it is a trust is committed to them and they are to be guided according to conscience in the performance of it Let it be so but is not this cleerly the Kings case who is entrusted certainly as highly as they So that they will find the ready way to endanger their own rights is to entrench upon the Kings Yet there may be a mistake in the imputation of severance and denyall of representation to the Commons For put the case if a few men of a County present a Petition to the House against established lawes and the setled Discipline of the Church this is received and thanks returned if after another Petition modestly and discreetly expressing their desires and withall due respects to the House as to instance in that most excellent Petition of Kent be presented attested by men much more eminent then the former whether we respect number Gentry meanes or reputation and this in favour of present government which they have found happy by long experience and therefore have no reason to be so desirous of a change of which they are not able to judge so well without tryall this by no meanes is to be called a severance or denyall of representation though I confesse the Kingdome apt to mistake may easily be deceived and learn to miscall it because the Gentlemen were imprisoned who presented it Most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliaments have proceeded from this that the people upon causelesse defamation and unproved accusations have been so prone to withdraw themselves from their representatives and yet there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing God which can be more perfidious and more pernitious in the people then this Here we may see the strength of passion above reason Certainly we never took the oath of Supremacy nor of Allegiance unto them Hence it will evidently follow that Treason against a Burgesse is higher then that against the King This he grants as unquestionable that the legislative power of this Kingdome is partly in the King and partly in the Kingdome so that neither the King can make a generall binding Ordinance or Law without the Parliament or the Parliament without the King This one truth if constantly stood to would have prevented our miseryes and if yet embraced might restore the Kingdome to happinesse But alas it is soon recalled as bolding only in ordinary cases but if the safety of the people be concerned if it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them then an extraordinary course may justly be taken This is it which hath so miserably rent this Kingdome and caused these sad divisions First the people are made beleeve they are in danger and then a prevention of those dangers is promised This must needs be very gratefull to them so out of that naturall love they bear to themselves they favour that side
Respublica let the brand of Treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the Remedy should prove the greatest disease Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just excuse to take away a mans money and say he did first desire him to deliver it Or if their grounds of jealousy were meerly vaine It is against all equity to doe wrong because there is a possibility of suffering it no man can have a full security and therefore we must arme our selves against uncertain feares not by injuries but a wary innocence Or if the jealousy of a whole Kingdom can be counted vaine Too large an expression much the greater part of the Kingdom apprehend no just grounds of jealousies Though the mindes of many were a long time unsetled being daily disturbed by suggestitons of plots at home and invasions from abroad yet if we duly weigh the businesse such fears ought not to be valued If forty severall men reporte the same thing yet if upon examination thirty nine of them say they had it from the other man this in Law makes but one witnesse so the fears of many thousands if grounded upon informations and those informations come from very few who can no way evidence the probability of such reports they ought not to be regarded they will vanish into nothing Or if they claime any such right of judging of dangers and preventing them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetuall As often as they have a mind to make use of such a right 't is easy for them to call the case extraordinary and pretend a publike danger For my part I know not how they can ever be confuted if not now For certainly apparent dangers did never lesse appeare It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had been frighted with secret plots and conceald designes The King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand That is if He had not come to get in He had not been shut out if He would have stayed away he would not have denyed Him entrance Or by coming without any such considerable forces Let His forces be great he was not to give Law to his Prince but neither is it likely he would have admitted Him then for you confesse a little above He offered to enter Hull with twenty horse only unarmed The Scots in England took New-castle but by private authority yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The King and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an Act of oblivion He flourishes at large upon the example of Richard the second he means Edw. 2. misled by Spencer It doth not follow because one King hearkned to evill counsell therefore all must be denied the liberty to hearken to good Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the Scales and ballancing their reputations At length yet there is some little hopes he may prove a convert since he doth almost promise to suspend his judgement till he may have full satisfaction from His Majesties Narration which in due time will more fully informe him An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withoutsome means and what this means shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted then not to perceive what is so obvious Deny the King a negative and the thing is done The power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publique consent and how publique consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious Tyranny amongst us is not discernable It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs For though their power depend upon a publique consent in the election yet not so after they are met together The necessities of the time made His Majesty grant that this Parliament should not be dissolved without their consent but they may now challenge it as their right if the King be bound to confirme what they vote necessary or expedient But it cannot be and his reason is the Kingdom would not obey them In truth a very probable thing I beleeve they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdom His Majesty expresses His just indignation that they He imputes it not to the Houses though this Author still involve them but to the contrivers penners of the Declaration should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him He returnes answer this cannot be collected from those words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty because it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroning of any King of England What was there affirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of Free in it If the â— of Hen. 4. Were indeed not Free why were Statutes cited out of it The authors of those quotations must be presumed to accompt it so The King is offended at their franck expressions disguised under the charge of a malignant party The sense of his answer is this they have no other way to cleere themselves for there being faults somewhere not to lay them upon others were to take them upon themselves His Majesty hath proposed a very good way which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency and that is not alwaies to accuse but sometimes to prove The King demands justice for tumults and high indignities offered and complaines of a prohibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke to hinder the processe against a Riot according to Law His answer is equall justice could not be obtained against the Court-Cavaleeres His Majesty never protected them from legall tryall it was free for them to have proved what they could against them The Kingsaies it being granted by them that their priviledges doe not extend to Treason Felony or breach of the Peace so as to exempt the Members from all manner of tryall yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their tryall that the cause must first be brough before them and their consent asked before you can proceed then their Priviledges extend as farre in these as in the most unquestioned cases because no priviledge exempts them from all manner of tryall the House being acquainted and
leave given He sayes nothing can take of this it was fully intended the Members should have had a legall and speedy tryall for His Majesty conceives it high injustice to clap men up upon a bare charge and after they are in prison forget there are such men in the world The Parliament does not deny the King a true reall interest in anything held by him either in jure Coronae or in jure Personae but only affirmes that in the same thing the State hath an interest Paramont in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation The King is a part of the state and therefore the other part hath not any power warranted by Law to doe what they think fit to His prejudice upon pretence of publique extremity This is ship-money again in every mans lands goods the State hath an interest Paramount in cases of publique extremity by vertue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation Here 's the difference the head without the body was the State before now it is the body without a head The King hath graciously freed us from that inconvenience and we hope He will not suffer us to be opprest with this The prudence of our lawes hath provided against either but were there a necessity we must fall into one we ought in reason to choose the former we are acquainted with that and therefore could better digest it It would be a great affliction to fall from such hopes and what we lookt on as a remedy to find that our disease but especially it would be lesse burthen to our estates to satisfy one then five hundred But the King's things are still reserved for him in better hands then he would have put them Though this were true it were an ill president for the Subject who must be bound to give up his meanes as oft as they conceive they could dispose it more wisely as they yet keep them away from him for his good so hereafter they may spend them against him for his advantage Let what will be pretended the Subject cannot be so stupid as not to understand these who undertake to manage the Paramount interest of the State may seize on any subjects fortunes by the same right they take the King 's That there is an Arbitrary power in every State somewhere 't is true 't is necessary and no inconvenience followes upon it If he mean by arbitrary a legislative power this is granted yet not to a part but the whole body But this speakes not to the case for still they give us a certain rule to live by The old lawes are in force till repealed and when new are once enacted we must conform our actions to those standing rules He is to justifie there is such a Paramount Law which shall make all our other lawes truly Oracles that is capable of contrary meanings So that now a man may be justly punisht for doing such a thing because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law a week after he shall be justly punisht too for not doing the same thing because he hath disobeyed the equity of the Law Aristotle tells us and 't is very wisely said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rhet. l. 1. c. 1. Those lawes are with greatest prudence established which define most cases and leave nothing which possibly may be determined to the brest of the judge The reason of it is this Lawes are made without any respects to persons it cannot be foreseen what parties would be engaged but Judges doe not allwayes abstract from these they may be mislead by the relation of Kinsman friend Patron or other interests Now how fully may these corrupt ends be satisfied by this equitable construction of Law Mr Hooker does not say that the Anabaptists in Germany did deceive Parliaments with their hypocrisye No man told you he did we only learne thus much from that story of their foul injustice and cruelty that upon proportionable principles such mischiefes being then may be again For example if a power be placed in a certain body of men by which they are allowed to breake all inferiour lawes if they think it is for the good of the people c and if this body be backt by the greater part of the people as having gained on their affections by fair promises of a perfect reformation and that they shall at length enjoy the purity and simplicity of the Gospell in this case may it not be a sufficient motive to take away mens estates because they cannot confide in them is it not just to take from enemies of the State the power of hurting it 'T is very obvious that for those men of whom they have no good opinion to have wealth may be a crime to have honours treasonable As for the thirty Tyrants of Athens we know they were not chosen by the people as our Knights Citizens c This circumstance alters not the case if after they are elected they challenge as unquestionable and as irrevocable power But the main intent of that instance was to shew there may be a tyranny of many and that much more miserable then that of one in many respects If the inordinate desires of one are hardly satisfied how much more may we suffer under those of many we cannot hope to weary them If we must be slaves better to have one master then foure hundred Though the blowes were equall that from a Royall hand would not smart so much it wounds the very soul to be trampled on by equalls The weight of present evills would lesse afflict then the fear of future There may be continuall supply of torment new and hungry flyes may succeed in the room of the old and suck strongly not regarding many have already been glutted Neither can we expect an end of these miseries such a body is immortall whereas the vices of a Prince are personall and dye with the man we may be restored to happinesse by His successor I will in briefe relate the story of their reigne They had got into their hands the power of declaring what was Law and this by the consent of the people In the beginning they call some men into Question who were much hated by the Citty and though the law could not take hold of them so farre yet they past sentence of death This was very plausible to most who judged of this proceeding by the rule of their present affections not looking so farre into the future as to consider what ill consequences this might produce for by the same way innocent men might be cut off if they were pleas'd to call them enemies of the State After this they gave some part of publique authority to three thousand of the Cittizens and disarmed all the rest by this means and the benefit of a Militia from Sparta the Citty was wholly in their disposall In a short time they had
their particular lodgings whether the way to the house were not so beset with clamarous multitudes that they must passe thorough the midst of them whilst they inform them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take The other two may be reduced to those It is no wonder many stay away since they must be absent even whilst they are there The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom publique affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell could the King conceive this dishonourable for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights because he takes all the rest of mankind for deadly enemies Can he with honour confesse himselfe unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him with equall reason they may challenge to themselves the nomination of all Bishops Ministers Sheriffs Justices c and dispose of all the Preferments in England The substance of the request seemes to be no more but this that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments c What an affected mistake is this He is ashamed to call it by the true name and therefore styles that advice which is properly command if it be not in His power to reject their counsell seem it never so unreasonable If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommēdation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majesty and devesting himselfe of power If this will content them they shall have as much power as He grants to His Courtiers Counsellors are not names of authority they are the Princes eares His eyes this relation is neare enough He sees and heares by them yet they must not passe their bounds they must be like to the outward senses still and make a bare representation the office of reason is peculiar to him to passe judgement thereon Their information is not alwayes faithfull he may consult reason and by the benefit of that correct their errour misrepresenting an object as crooked which in it selfe is streight If not out of duty to their King and a just sense of His honour yet out of love to themselves and a naturall care of their own safety Subjects are bound in all legall wayes to expresse their dislike of this proposition For they must expect to suffer all those evills which Faction can produce and what happinesse can be hoped for in a Kingdome divided in it selfe This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowells which would first break out in the Countyes electing and divide the familyes of the gentry by irreconcileable hatred For it cannot be imagined but that power will bandy against power and relations against relations to put Sons or Kinsmen into that roade which only leads unto preferment Nor would the flames be quenched but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses as being pent in a narrow room to which the insolency of some attaining offices to which they are not equall the shame and discontents of others repulsed and the ambition of all would adde continuall fuell But the greatest misery of all is were their corruptions never so high we could have but slender hopes of redresse Since the prevayling party jealous of their own honour would easily maintain the reputation of their choice and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at another He that cannot think it probable that out of private ends they should so farre neglect justice and honour let him only examine whether in some Parliaments most known offendours and active instruments in the peoples misery by striking in with the prevailing side have not been more safe then innocency could have made them There are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such J am most studious of Certainly it were to be desired we might enjoy the benefits of power and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof But since this cannot be fully provided for because the same hand which is enabled to protect may injure the aimes of wisest States have been not so much to take away the power because then they should be likely to suffer under a weak Protector as the will of oppression The most probable means to effect this is after a certain rule is agreed upon and Lawes are established to acquaint a governor what he ought to doe in performance of that trust committed to him so to order his interests that to advance the peoples good shall be for the Princes advantage Subjects will have great reason to promise to themselves a full happinesse from the faithfull discharge of his Regall office to which he is so strongly tyed by those bonds of justice and profit This the wisdom of our Ancestors hath provided for in a high degree and so temper'd this governement that both King and people will be joyntly happy or joyntly miserable The severall goods of each forme are here united we have great Democraticall advantages and yet may avoyd the evills of a popular State as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legall tryall we have the good of Aristocracy counsell of the best experienced such as have studied nations and men nor yet are we acquainted with the disease of it faction amongst the Nobility The Counsell of many is profitable but the resolve of one is necessary Since they looking upon one another as equalls would be very apt to quarrell for when one contradicts what another hath advised the debate between them seems to be which is the wiser man Their discourses are like so many pleadings for honour and we know what issue such suites would come to when the thing in controversy is so highly valued if there were not a judge to determine And this is the benefit of Monarchy which is so restrained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny For how should this enter in The old lawes the security of our libertyes cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent but grant an illegall violent Government should break in upon us by what meanes could it be maintained The King can have no supply of money without the House of Commons and without these sinewes his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reines which should govern that provoked beast the multitude But He may take it by force He cannot doe it in person and it is not to be imagined any considerable number of His people will be active in their owne