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A49903 Parrhasiana, or, Thoughts upon several subjects, as criticism, history, morality, and politics by Monsieur Le Clerk ... ; done into English by ****; Parrhasiana. English Le Clerc, Jean, 1657-1736. 1700 (1700) Wing L823; ESTC R16664 192,374 324

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and whose Victories and Conquests make their People greater Slaves and more unhappy than before Which puts me in mind of a remarkable Answer of a Roman Senator who at a time when the State was engaged in a dangerous War having used his endeavours to get a Covetous and Interested Man tho' his Enemy to be elected Consul because he was very well skill'd in Military-Affairs rather than any other who were not able to command the Armies of the Republick answered those who were surprised at it † A Gell. Lib. IV. c. 8. That they had no reason to wonder if he had rather be Plunder'd than Sold Nihil est quod miremini si malui compilari quàm venire The third thing which is absolutely necessary to make a State Flourish is that its Members and those who govern it ought to agree among themselves and entirely mind the Publick Good If in a kingly Government when the King can undertake nothing of Moment nor make any alteration in the Laws without the consent of the States it happens that the King aims at an Arbitrary Power and that the States on the contrary make it their Business to preserve their Laws and Liberties such a Division will necessarily unable them to Defend themselves Abroad and make good Laws at Home The King is wholly taken up with the Thoughts of surprising and subduing the States if he can do it and the States being busied in defending their Liberty against Craft and Violence cannot mind things of less Moment In the mean time a thousand Disorders are committed at Home and no care is taken to prevent the Evils which threaten them Abroad Such a Spectacle has been seen Fourscore Years and more in England where Kings and Parliaments were so taken up with their publick and private Divisions that they thought of nothing else In the mean time a neighbouring Kingdom did whatever it pleased and put itself in a Capacity to molest all its Neighbours Nay it was almost ready to Invade a Common-wealth whose Forces joyned with its own would have served to put in Fetters not only the Parliament but also the King of England During that interval of time they might have enacted many Laws which England very much wants as may be seen by the Experience of its Neighbours especially the Vnited Provinces In a Common-wealth made up of equal Members a good Union in procuring the common Good is of very great use to make it Flourish and Dissension is the most dangerous thing in the World We have seen it in these very Provinces when in the Year 1672. they were like to be altogether ruined † Introd ad Hist. Cap. VI. n. 21. Samuel Pufendorf who was a very Great Man has in vain enquired for some other Reasons of the extraordinary Progress the Enemies made in so short a time against that Common-wealth There were no other but Dissension which hindred it from making the necessary Preparations against the Invasion of its Enemies No Body doubts that Concord will make a State Flourish and that Discord is very dangerous to it but care must be taken to have a right Notion of the Meaning of those Words A Concord useful to a Monarchical or Aristocratical Government is such as aims at the general Good of those who live under it If in a Monarchical State wherein the Power of the Monarch is limited by the Laws the chief Members of the State should of their own accord or by force agree to submit all the Laws to the Prince's Will without having any regard to the Good of the State such an Union would not be at all advantageous to it It would change a Society of free Persons into a Company of unhappy Slaves The Readiness of the Chineses to obey their King blindly does but confirm his Tyranny and encrease their Misery For those who depend on the Will of one Man subject to a thousand Passions whose Fancies can be restrained by no Law can be sure of nothing Such a Man has some Favourites who have other Favourites under them and suffer themselves to be Bribed and such a Form of Government is but a Subordination of Tyrants every one of whom endeavours to get something by the Slavery of the People But 't is said That the general Obedience of the Chineses serves to maintain the Peace in their Country and that they enjoy thereby all the Advantages which a good Union can procure They mean all the Advantages which can be enjoyed in Slavery But there is not one Free-Man but had rather see more frequent Disorders than to undergo a perpetual Slavery Besides 't is false that there are no Civil Wars under such a Form a Government The most enslaved People will be at last weary of an excessive Tyranny and at the first opportunity will shew that the Love of Liberty is not quite stifled in their Hearts Such a thing has happened several times among the Chineses and Turks Few People being concern'd in keeping up Arbitrary Power in a certain Family or a certain Person and the greatest part having reason to complain of it few will oppose a Change in the Government and other believe that if they get nothing they will lose but little by it The same ought to be said of an Aristocratical Government The Union of those who Govern such a State would be of no use unless it procured the Observation of the Laws and the general Good of the Common-wealth This we may learn from the History of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens and the Decemviri of Rome The Union of those Men served only to oppress the People and make 'em miserable because their chief Design was to satisfy their Passions without having any regard to the Publick Good Concord may be also considered with respect to the People who when the Government is so setled they may quietly enjoy the Fruits or their Labour by obeying the Laws of their Country which no Member of the Society can alter or transgress at his pleasure ought to think themselves happy and to obey unanimously the Orders of the Supreme Power To keep the Multitude in so good an Union 't is necessary not only that they be the better for it but also that they should know their own Happiness Without which there will always be some restless Men who having lost all they had by Debauchery and Idleness would attempt to recover it by some Disturbance Such Men will easily persuade a People who think they live unhappily to rise up against their Sovereign on the first occasion On the contrary when the People are generally persuaded that they cannot better their Condition by a Change and that they should hazard losing much by it it is a very difficult thing to seduce them I could make several Observations on this Subject but it is not my design to write a general Treatise of Politicks The Union of those who govern a State and of the People ought to aim at the Publick Good from