witt Gabriel Biel after Occam Nowe what will you say if they resolve it for the negative and so bothe wayes namely both negatively and affirmatively which you say they holde for a point irresoluble And indeede they resolve it bothe wayes for I have not tolde you all They interpose a caution the caution is this Si possibilie esset locus indivisibilis Whence you may easily guesse what their meaninge is to witt that indeede a punctuall and indivisible place cannot be existent and consequently neyther can an Angell be defined therin or coasist therto there is the resolution negative But in case such a punctuall place were possible then an Angell might coasist therto there have you the resolution affirmative in both opposite to this assertion of yours But who they be you speake of that holde this point irresoluble you conceale And yet it may be some such there are For as Cicero sometimes sayde there was nothing so absurde but had bene delivered by some or other of Philosophers so the like may be verified of Schoolemen allso For amongst all kindes of humane writers there may be some vanities more or lesse and some thinke most amongst Schoolemen according to the censure passed upon them Ab hoc tempore Philosophia sacularis sacram Theologiam sua curiositate muliti saedari caepit From Angells you proceede to God and without scruple maynteyne that he is as properly in every Center as in every place and I confesse the reason here added why you may say so is very sounde seing we acknowledge him a like incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both For surely a man may say that which he dothe acknowledge but take no more along with you herein then are willing to accompany you upon good termes Now Occam and Biel propose certeyne termes and they are these si locus punctualis possibilis esset But if such a thing be not possible to say that God is therin is to say that God is in nothing and so you returne to your old course of amplifyinge the immensitie or indivisibilitie of the glorious essence of God that made us And wheras we are willing to acknowledge that God is in all thinges as conteyninge them I doe not finde that a point is of any conteynable nature As for example there is punctus lineam terminant now suppose God conteynes the line and conteynes not the point shall the line herupon be without an ende I professe I cannot finde any other thinge in the notion of such a point but negatio ulteriorie tendentiae and what neede hathe this of the divine power to conteyne it And surely the point which continueth a line is nothing more then the center of the earthe and of that you professe in the next chapter and second section that it is a matter of nothing The manner of Gods indivisibility we conceave say you by his coexistence to a Center his incomprehensiblenes by his coexistence to all spaces imaginable as much as to say The indivisibility and incomprehensiblenes of God is best conceaved when we conceave his coexistence to such thinges as are founde only in imagination or to thinges that are but have no realitie in them Now if God be all in all and all in every part is he not better conceaved by comparison with the soule of man which is made after the image of God then by comparison to a base Center or thinges in imagination only especially seing Imaginatio non transcendit continuum If God were more in a great place then in a lesse then it would followe that an Asses head shoulde participate the essentiall presence of the deitie I speake in your owne instance and phrase in greater measure then a mans heart dothe And doe not you affect some popular applause in this discourse of yours the vulgar sort being apt to conceave the contrary namely that a mans heart participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure then an Asses head and by the same reason they may conceave that a mans head participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure then an asses heart which yet is as contrary to your assertion as to the truthe But it is manifest herby more then enoughe that your care is not so much for the investigation of truthe as to give satisfaction unto vulgar conceyte 9. That Gods immensitie or magnitude is not like magnitude corporall as being without all extension of parts as there is no doubt so wee neede no great paynes to satisfie reason how this may be especially to every Scholar that knowes but that receaved Axiome even amongst naturalists concerning the soule namely that she is all in all and all in every part not only in the least childe newe borne but in the greatest Anakim that ever was which in my opinion gives farre better satisfaction then by multiplyinge bare woordes as in sayinge God is unitie it selfe infinity it selfe immensitie it selfe perfection it selfe power it selfe which serve neyther for proofe nor for illustration But if we goe about to satisfie imagination we shall never come to an ende For Imagination transcends not that which is continuall and hathe extension of parts and all your courses of illustration hitherunto have inclined this way You speake in your owne phrase when you say that all these before mentioned to witt unitie infinitie immensity perfection power are branches of quantitie wheras we have more just cause to professe that no quantitie is to be found in God no more then materiall constitution is to be found in him We make bolde to attribute unto God quantitatem virtutis quantitie of vertue and perfection but every scholar should knowe that Analogum per se positum stat pro famesiori significato And yet to speake more properby the quantity of God which we call quantitatem virtutis and the quantity of bodies which we call quantitatem motis quantitie of extension have no proportion at all betweene them but the terme of quantitie attributed to both is merely equivocall It is true that if God were not nothing could be for as much as all other thinges have their being from him But it is a very incongruous course in my judgement which you take by multiplyinge of quantitie materiall to guesse of Gods immensitie And yet you should have observed a better decorum in your phrase if insteede of multiplication you had putin the woord amplification For immensitie is rather magnitude infinite then multitude I cannot away with that which you subjoine that imaginary infinity of succession or extension shoulde be a beame of that stable infinitenes which God possessethe Hertofore you called it a shadowe nowe a beame And is this a proper course to runne out to the imagination of thinges impossible to represent God by For wherto tendeth this but to conceave him infinite first by way of extension which is quite contrary to spirituall perfection and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be Yet
As if this consequence were evident of it selfe wheras on the contrary all Philosophy is against it For Aristotle maynteyned the World to be independent all others maynteyned the matter wherof the world was made to be independent Yet none conceaved that herehence it woulde followe that eyther of them was therfore illimited or at all illimited That Gods attributes are not really distinguished we all confesse you neede not have brought in Austins authoritie to justify this But you take upon you to confront Atheists by evidence of demonstration wherin you fayle very much For it will not followe that if these attributes be distinct among themselves or from the essence of God then the Divine essence is limited Like as on the contrary it will not followe that if the essence of something be limited the attributes therof must needes be distinct from the essence For the soule of man is limited yet some have maynteyned that the faculties of the soule are not really distinct from the essence of the soule as Scotus that by shrewde arguments And Zabarell professethe that Intellectus practicus is all one with Voluntas And all beit the power of God be distinct from the wisedome of God yet if bothe be acknowledged to be infinite each in his kinde what prejudice is this to the infinitenes of Gods essence Neyther will it followe that one attribute shall want so much of infinite beinge in his kinde as another hathe of proper being distinct from it consideringe that these notions are of different kindes As for example if a body as put the case the outward heaven were infinite there shoulde be bothe infinite lengthe and infinite breadthe and infinite thicknes neythers infinitenes being any whit prejudiciall to the infinitenes of the other because they are of different kindes And what colour of reason have you why infinitenes of power should prejudice the infinitenes of wisedome thoughe they were distinct really which yet we believe they are not And what thinke you if some attributes be founde answerable to personall distinctions in the Trinity Is it not commonly sayde that the second person in Trinity is the wisedome of the Father and commethe from the Father per modum intellectus and that the H. Ghost proceedeth from bothe per modum voluntatis But I have no edge to looke into the Arke or suffer my disputation to trenche upon these mysteries Yet I confesse thoughe the Father be not the Sonne nor the H Ghost c. Yet they are not really distinct one from the other In the Trinity there is alius alius not aliud aliud But you maynteyne that Gods power is his wisedome c. which yet notwithstanding I mislâ—ke not but only doe question the argument wherby you endeavour to proove it and to my judgement it seemes very superficiall But my comfort is this if you weakely maynteyne the nature of God you will as weakely oppose the grace of God Agayne I say it will not followe that if the severall beings of wisedome and power were distinct and not identically the same with the essence of God then the essence should not be infinite For it may be sayde that the essence is infinite in a beinge substantiall the power and wisedome of God are infinite in a being accidentall thoughe such as necessarily flowes from the nature of God Indeede if it were prooved that there is no accident in God then the case were cleere that these attributes were not distinct from the essence of God as indeede they are not but this is more then hitherto you have prooved And till you have prooved it they may be conceaved as distinct from the essence as before hathe bene sayde without any prejudice to the infinity of Gods essence or danger of exposing it unto nakednes for ought your discourse hathe as yet alleaged to the contrary 5. As for that definition of a thing absolutely infinite Infinitum est extra quod nihil est which you make so much reckonninge of I take it to be a vayne conceyte considering that the Philosophers who urged it never made any such construction of it as you doe but applyinge it only to materiall bodies of quantitie and extension maynteyned that in this sense the World was infinite But Aristotle dothe not approove of such a notion of infinite as nothinge agreable with the denomination the world being finite rather then infinite in his opinion and yet as they all thought without the world nothing was Yet some in my knowledge have avouched the world to be infinite thoughe I nothing commend eyther their learninge or their honestie herein And in those former dayes finitum infinitum were taken only for materiall differences of bodies nothing at all belonging to immateriall natures abstract from bodily or materiall extension of parts And Zabarell as I remember observes as much as touching the opinion of Aristotle upon the last chapters of the eighthe booke of Physicks And howe farre foorthe infinitum is to be acknowledged in nature Aristotle in his Physicks hath discoursed Now in the sense before spoken of it is very absurd to attribute such a definition of infinity unto God who is not only a Spirite but the Father of Spirits and incapable of parts much more of extension in any materiall manner But let the wordes be shaped after such a construction as you devise to make the definition suitable to the nature of God to witt as if he were such an entitie as comprehendes all entitie I say it is manifestly untrue For is not the World all the parts therof from Angells unto the basest woorme that creepethe and drop of mire or sparkle of fire or the least cinder are not all these something and that extra Deum For thoughe eminently they may be sayde to be in God yet undoubtedly they are extra Deum formally and to my understanding it is absurde to say they are identically conteyned in Gods essence It is true that Gods essence dothe represent them For God knowes them not but by knowing of himselfe and his essence and beinge of infinite power can produce any thing that implyes not contradiction I cannot represent a fitt comparison but such as the creature can affoard if you give me leave to make use of I say that every thing which a glasse represents is not identically conteyned in the glasse neyther is it true that whatsoever is knowne by the understanding of man or Angell is identically conteyned in the understanding or spirite of man or Angell As I have sayde so I say agayne I see no evidence of that consequence you make thus God is illimited therfore all thinges are in God and therfore allso all thinges that are in God or are attributed unto him are all one That which you adde when you say whatsoever is uncapable of limit is uncapable of division or numericall difference is very ambiguous and the ambiguitie being cleered will proove partly to be without all question and nothinge
goodnes To be essentiall to the nature of God is more noble I grant then to be accidentall but howe any power can be greater then power infinite or any wisedome greater then wisedome infinite or any goodnes greater then goodnes infinite I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe that whersoever infinite power infinite wisedome infinite goodnes is founde that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerfull and wise good as namely the nature of God thoughe of the evident demonstration therof for ought you have brought to helpe us herein we may be still to seeke As for succession and extension we holde that each is impossible to be infinite And neyther of them any attribute of God as power and wisedome and goodnes is And therfore the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kinde must needes be wonderous wilde Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations but rather wonder that succession and extension shoulde be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections conteyned in God and that all these mentioned attributes layde out in severall should have infinities added unto them Much more should we have wondered if the issue of your discourse had bene answearable to the originall which is to shewe not how power and wisedome goodnes are all one in God which are with us of accidentall denomination but to shewe how every substance is in God of Angell of man of beasts of birds of fishes of woormes and every creeping thinge and that all these are to be accoumpted excellencyes and perfections And surely they had neede to be in God in a more excellent manner then they are in themselves otherwise their advancing so highe woulde be too great a degrading of the nature of God But to adde my mite of discourse touching the being of all thinges in God and the precise unitie of all thinges in God which under a forme of pluralitie according to our conceytes are attributed unto him As touching the first that all perfections are in God is to be acknowledged without all controversy because we understand by God such a nature as nothing can be imagined better and I approove of Aquinas his reason Like as heate if it did exist of it selfe it should comprehende all degrees of heate so the essence of God being all one with his existence that is he beinge essentially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him But as for the perfections of beinge which are founde without God according to their severall rankes and kindes therein â—s namely of being without life of being and life without sense or reason of beinge life sense without reason of bothe beinge life and sense and reason as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species oâ—kind but only analogicall which as Aquinas shewethe is this that God is entitie by essence every other thinge is an entity only by participation So likewise their perfections cannot be sayde to be in God univocally but only analogically as the effect is sayde to be in the Agent in as much as he hathe power to produce it It is true some thinges are attributed unto creatures which cannot be attributed unto God and some thinges are attributed bothe to God and to the creatures As for example God is not a body man is a body God is a spirite an Angell is a spirite God hath beinge so have all thinges God hath life so have many thinges God is wise good powerfull these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angells Yet these denominations in admitting wherof bothe God and creatures doe agree are as different in respect of God and the creatures as those denominations in the communion wherof they doe not agree As for example the Spirituall nature of God is as farre different from the spirituall nature of an Angell as from the bodily nature of maâ— or beast as being infinitely different from eache And therfore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God but rather their remotion a non esse One creature having more perfections of beinge then another consequently so much the more remooved from not beinge But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely remooved from God who is infinite So that like as the bodily nature of man dothe not agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God so neyther dothe the spirituall nature of an Angell agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God But God is equally an equivocall Agent in respect of bothe And no merveyle for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree are commonly such as are of accidentall denomination unto the creatures as when we say God is wise and holy and powerfull a man or Angell is wise and holy and powerfull c. But is there any colour why the nature of God shoulde come nearer unto those thinges that are of accidentall denomination in us then unto those that are substantiall wheras every meane scholer knowes that substances are more noble then accidents and as for substantiall denominations wherein God and the creature doe agree if they be examined it will be founde that in the resolution of the truthe the agreement will appeare to be only in negation As when we say God is a spirite the negation of extension corporall and materiall is the only thinge wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angell Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirite in distinction from a man to consist in this that a spirite hathe not fleshe and bones And as for the generall not on of entitie common to all marke what a vast difference there is herein betweene God and the creature and such as excludes all univocation God is an entity independant and wherof all other entities depend bothe for their production and for their preservation and that out of nothinge as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles Let it suffize then that all perfections are in God and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence But as for created perfections the word created is a terme diminishing perfection but such as they are they are in God only as effects are in their causes and they not univocall but equivocall only or at the best but analogicall Let us come to the consideration of the unitie of Gods attributes especially with Gods essence whence it will followe that an unitie of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves And the question wil come to this whether there be any accident in God Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysicall speculations or that I thinke our language to be fitt for them for want of termes of Art in common use to expresse such notions as here must necessarily occurre But only being provoked herunto by
be confined to one place more then to another yea to the Court of Heaven rather then to the basest corner of the earthe is so absurd to my judgement that I professe ingenuously all the reason and witt that I have is not sufficient to make it good of Angells as being Spirits abstract from materiall extension And I will remember how Aquinas makes Angells to be in place only in respect of their operation And places are for the natures of bodies and not of Spirits and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angells and such things as I am willingly content they should continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place then to another And indeede to my judgement to be in place is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God And Durand as allready I have shewed professethe that God secundum se is in no place but only secundum effectus and so every where for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects And as God is sayde to have bene in seipso in himselfe before the World was made is he not so to be accoumpted still according to those verses of course in this argument Dic ubi tunc esset cum praeter eum nihil esses Tunc ubi nunc inse quoniam sibi sufficit ipse And is there not reason for it For Gods essence hathe no respect to outward thinges as his power hathe and his operation hathe And see whether by ascribing place to him you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo which opinion but erst you impugned For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre as some are called Princes of the ayre and so within the hollowe of the moone and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remayninge It will not followe herehence that the Angells supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone shall be annihilated because they being abstract substances and undependant on any matter shall exist still and consequently shall be in Uacuo For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies not of Spirits And who doubts but that God could have created spirituall substances only and not bodily in which case they must be sayde to be in Uacuo or no where without them Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselfes within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated yet God shall not cease to be existent there upon the annihilation of Angells like as Angells did not cease to exist there upon the annihilation of bodies and consequently God himselfe shall exist in Vacuo and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence and from his power Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned but only as conteyninge now to conteyne is the worke of his power and of his will not of his essence save as his essence and power and will are all one realitie in God And so God may be sayde to be every where not only three manner of wayes to witt by his essence by his presence by his power but more manner of wayes to witt by his knowledge by his wisedome by his will by his goodnes Yet all these shall be but one way as all these are but one in God But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where but it may content us to say that God ever was and is in himselfe only so his goodnes is no where but in himselfe his knowledge wisedome and understanding no where but in himselfe his will mercy and justice no where but in himselfe his power to make to preserve to worke no where but in himselfe but the operations of all these united in himselfe are every where and so sayth Durand God fillethe all thinges with his sweete influence and effects of his power wisedome and goodnes all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence Thus we may say his power and wisedome and goodnes reachethe unto the earthe and to every thinge within this canopy eyther by way of influence naturall or by way of influence gracious like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven by way of influence glorious All which are not properly his wisedome and power and goodnes but rather the effects of them of them I say which yet are all one thinge with his essence But Gods essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward thinges as his wisedome power and goodnes doe bothe in the way of mercy and in the way of judgement It implyes contradiction to affirme his power or wisedome to be more infinite then his essence if so be we conceave his power and wisedome to be his essence And yet to be in many places more then another thing is is not to make it infinite because all places put together are but finite much lesse to make it more infinite Not only some great Schoolemen as you speake but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary distinguishe of Gods being in all thinges by his essence by his power by his prosence and so the vulgar verse runnes Enter praesenter Deus est ubique potenter Allthoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them as we may reade in Vasquez Three of which explications he takes upon him to confute to witt that of Alexander Halensis as allso the way of Bonaventure and lastly the way of Durand resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas followed as he saythe by Cajetan Albertus Aegidius Ricardus Capreolus Gabriel the exposition there set downe is this 1. God is in all thinges by his essence because his substance is not distant from things but joyned with them whether in respect of himselfe or in respect of his operation 2. By his presence because he knowes all thinges 3. By his power because his power reachethe unto every thinge Nowe I freely professe I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction And to my judgement presence is only in respect of essence or of that individuall substance whatsoever it be which is sayde to be present whether it hathe knowledge or no what power soever it hath much or litle whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power And God indeede cannot be sayde in proper speeche to be more distant from one place or thinge then from any other But he may be sayde I confesse to be in one place more then in another in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place then in another He is in all places as the Author of nature communicating the gifts of nature in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace communicating the gifts of grace but in most
speciall manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory communicating himselfe in glorious manner unto his Angells and Saints all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power then of his essence For how is God sayde to be in any thinge as conteyned by no meanes but rather as conteyninge which conteyning is a transient operation of God proceeding from his power his will Thus saythe the Apostle God is not farre from every one of us for as much as in him we live moove have our beinge And marke but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius according to the best opinion in his judgment to witt according to that of Aquinas God is in all things by his essence because his substance is not distant this is most true I confesse for certeinly he is no more distant in place from a mouse then from an Angell but he is joyned with the things themselfes whether in respect of himselfe or of his operation So then if Gods operation be joyned with the thinges themselves it suffizeth by this opinion to maynteyne that God is present with them by his essence yet if you consider it well you shall finde that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power for that was expounded thus God is in the whole Vniverse by his power because his operation reacheth unto every thing Next consider how God is in every thing by his presence First to say that God is in every thing by his presence seemes a very absurde manner of speeche for it is as much as to say that God is present in every thing by his presence Then consider the explication of it He knowethe all thinges therfore he is present with all things Now this seemes very absurd For we read that God revealed to Elishah what was done in the King of Arams privy Chamber might therfore Elishah justly be sayde to have bene present in the Kings privy Chamber We knowe the number of the Starres what therfore are we present with them God foreknowes things to come is he therfore present with them allso which yet are not Vasquius himselfe professed before in confuting the opinion of Durand that Nothing is sayde to be present with another unles that other thing were conscious therof and he prooved it out of the digests and out of the lawe Coram Coram Titio aliquid fecisse jussus non videtur praesente eo fecisse nisi is intelligat allso out of the 112. epistle of Austin plane sorsitan satis est si praesentia hoc loco intelligamus quae praesto sunt sensibus sive animi sive corporis unde etjam ducto vocabulo praesentia nominantur As if praesens were as much as prae sensibus To this I may adde that of Aeneas in Virgill when the cloud wherwith his mother Venus had covered him vanished away then he breakes out into these wordes Coram quem quaeritis adsum Troius Aeneas But now consider according to this interpretation of the word praesent God shall be sayde to be present with none but with intelligent creatures for such alone can knowe him and take notice of him and because but fewe of them take notice of him therfore he can be sayde to be present but with a fewe of them allso Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods beinge in all thinges by his presence is quite of a contrary nature to witt because God knowes them and not because they knowe or take notice of him Last of all to be every where by his power is sayde to be in this respect that his operation reacheth to every thinge Now who seethe not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation and actuall workinge then of his power to worke And if we ascend to the caâ—se of his operation we must ascend not only to the power of God but even to his wisedome and goodnes as which is the cause of his operation as well as his power And if we looke for some thing more proper to admitt this denomination then other we must take notice of his will rather then of his power as which is the most immediate cause of his operation For infinite power to be able to reache every possible effect is no more then to be able to produce it or being produced to preserve it or to worke in it or by it whatsoever it pleasethe which is nothing pertinent to the being of it therein as in a place which belongs to essence rather then unto power For when I am sayde to be here and there the meaning is not my power is here or there but my person which is properly sayde of me because I am a body to which kinde or natures place properly belongethe But as touchinge the essence of God that being spirituall infinite it is not capable of any place to conteyne it but rather it conteynes every thinge in which respect your selfe have allready observed that by the Hebrewes he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place it selfe Nowe Iudge whether God may be sayde in any congruitie to conteyne bodies by his essence or Spirits eyther created and whether that were not to signify that bodies and Spirits created were of the essence of God Neyther is it proper to say that God by his essence dothe worke eyther the creation or the conservation of outward things but rather by his understanding power and will For to worke by essence is to worke in the way of naturall Agents necessarily but to worke by wisedome will is to worke after the way of free Agents freely If God were every where according to the sayinge reported and avouched by you before there was any distinction of times then surely God allso was every where before there was any distinction of place For certeinly distinction of time and distinction of place beganne together And must you not herby be driven to the acknowledgement of a Vacuum before the World was and that conteyning distinction of parts in such sort as to make way for the denominations of here and there and every where and that God was therein and every where therein before the World was which opinion your selfe in this very section have impugned To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power in case his knowledge were not infinite or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite I judge to be a very vayne thinge because it is impossible that the one shoulde be infinite without the other For seing many things cannot be brought to passe without knowledge like as without knowledge none of such thinges can be brought to passe at all so likewise without sufficiency of knowledge such things coulde not be brought to passe as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to performe them And if God had but a finite power he coulde foreknowe no more thinges then coulde be brought to passe by that finite power
It is true God is where any thing is but howe as conteyning it not as conteyned by it but it is untrue that God is where any thing may be For without the Heavens something may be but God is not without the Heavens For without the Heavens is Uacuum but God is not in Uacuo as before your selfe have disputed And indeede how should he be there seing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge nor as conteyned For that which is nothing is neyther fitt to conteyne nor fitt to be conteyned In fine I observe how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads The one is his creation the other his preservation of them And so I confesse God is not distant from any of us for as much as we live and moove and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speakethe 4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where as you construe the Prophet Ieremy are by Piscator conceaved to be but one the latter wordes Can any hide himselfe in secret places that I shoulde not see him being but an explanation of the former Am I a God at hande and not a God a farre off As much as to say that God seethe as well thinges done in earthe as thinges done in Heaven So that in Scripture phrase thinges done in earthe are called things done a farre of God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension Wheras God is sayde to fill Heaven and Earthe hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are nor definitively as Angells are but repletively that is filling all thinges but howe that is saythe Durand with his effects God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe For he hathe made them and dothe maynteyne them not only fillethe them with all creatures fitt for them Water filles the bucket and the bucket conteynes the water But God forbid we should so conceave of the nature of God as by filling the Heavens and the Earth to be conteyned in them His infinite power and wisedome serves his turne first to make them afterwards to preserve them and unto proper congruous endes to order them and with his various effects to fill them but not with his essence least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence and maynteyne that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have shewed Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven and no more distant or absent from us then from them But how is God present Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Austins exposition of the word praesent for God is no sensible thinge for then he were corporall and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose God dothe coexist with every thing that is For they doe exist and God doth exist But doth God coexist with them in time they doe exist in time that is their measure of duration but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration to witt himselfe They doe exist in place that is the measure of corporall extension but doth God exist in place who hathe no extension dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe like as is his eternitie In a word the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses Insunt pars totum Species Genus calor igni Rex in Regno res in sine locoque locatum Now see whether any of these are competible unto God Your selfe have observed and approoved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures whether visible or invisible corporall or spirituall namely that as he hath made them so he conteynes them praeserves them ordereth them fillethe them all with his effects and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them and by them And this his presence it is impossible he should withdrawe from them â—ave as he shall be pleased â—o destroy them and take all beinge from them and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme as from the most glorious Angell But to talke of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only but with his essence as the light piercâ—th the ayre I dare not enterteyne any such gâ—osse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God for feare attributinge extension unto his essence and such as should continue thoughe the World were destroyed and make roome for the essence of God to extende it selfe in Uacuo and the parts therof which are merely imaginary as well as in the World and in the parts therof like as before I have argued The power of God dothe exercise it selfe according to the pleasure of his will And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me that you should ascribe power to God to dispose of his essence as touching the placinge of it in space locall Neyther doe I see cause why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God more then bodies inglorious God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme as in the most glorious Angell And so farre foorthe as it beto Gods essence to be every where I presume no sober Divine will maynteyne that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise or so And therfore when you aske whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven it is not possible that God should be therin I answere looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here And yet without all change in them thoughe not without change in things without him one creature beinge annihilated and another created a newe And thoughe Angells be subject to change yet God is not But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency I will renoâ—nce the Prophet that laythe The Lord is not changed and take you for my Apostle And surely if not to be changed were to be impotent how impotent must God needes be with whome is no variablenes nor shadowe of change 5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned then his eternitie But as God is not in time that being a measure only fitt for creatures subject to mutation but in his owne eternitie which is all one with himselfe So neyther is he in place a measure fitt for creatures only subject to extension but in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places So that neyther doe we say that the first could not be neyther doe we say that this your second way can be Only we dare not say
the essence of God dothe pierce all things least we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature some kinde of extension And how can you avoyde it in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all thinges how I say can you avoyde the maynteyninge of Gods essence to be changeable from place to place upon supposition that the World may moove eyther Eastward or Westward farther then it is or that his essence is in Uacuo and that after a manner of extension as before hathe bene argued Now you tell us that mutabilitie is imcompetent with infinitie yet in the very next section foregoinge you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change as Angells doe their mansions when they mislike them Of which course of Angells eyther as touchinge their mistake or change of mansion I am nothing conscious as neyther am I of any oracle tending that way By your leave there is no proportion betweene Gods immensitie in respect of all places filled by him and the infinity of his nature For seing place and created things can be but sinite his immensitie this way never extends farther then to the filling of a finite creature Neyther doe you well to confound distinction with limitation as if they were all one For when we distinguishe Gods power and wisedome and goodnes or the Persons in the Trinity herby we doe neyther limit the nature of God nor the Persons nor his attributes It is true that God is the supporter of all thinges and in this respect the Apostle acknowledgeth that He is not farre from any of us for as much as In him we live and moove and have our beinge 6. You say that God was when nothing was A most improvident speeche and as good as sacke and sugar unto Atheists For it is as much as to say that God was nothinge or that sometimes God was not But eftsoones you alter this dangerous forme of wordes and tell us that God was when nothing was besides himselfe Without all peradventure before the creation of the world there was neyther distinction of time nor of place Thoughe you doe not cloathe God with an imaginary space as without him yet may you doe as great wrong to imagine such a space in the nature of God as it seemes you doe and that you call immensitie For you say such an imaginary space should be a checke to his immensitie as being a parallel distance locall So that you seeme manifestly to acknowledge a distance in Gods nature but you woulde not have it checkt by any parallel distance as immense as himselfe This imagination is wonderous grosse Wheras on the contrary I finde none to conceyte of any immensitie in God otherwise then as he is sayde to fill all places and therfore before places or bodies are existent only a power and abilitie is in God to fill all places that filling Durand professethe to be in respect of the effects wrought by him wherwith he filles all places not with his essence piercinge all thinges as you discourse as if it were as bigge as the World or as an infinite World yet you thinke to charme this extravagant conceyte with calling it indivisible And so the light of the Sunne which filles the world with manifest extension is yet indivisible Gods essence you say conteynes the Heavens I would you would consider this phrase well what it imports If you were askt what the essence of man conteynes would you say that it conteynes any thing more then that which is of the essence of man as Animal rationale Yet without making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your owne conceytes you say that the essence of God conteynes the Heavens May you not as well say that the essence of God made the Heavens I had thought it had bene a more congruous speeche to say that God by his power will made the Heavens so dothe preserve and conteyne them rather then by his essence For in respect of essence only such thinges are attributed unto God as doe necessarily belong unto him as for example that he is eternall unchangeable omnipotent most wise most good But no sober man woulde say I thinke that God is the creator preserver conteyner of all thinges by his essence But these attributes belong unto him by the freedome of his will I nothing doubt but that if the World were a thousand times bigger then it is God should be as intimately coexistent to every part of it as he now is to any part of this Heaven Earthe which we now see For all thinges that live or moove or have any beinge doe must live moove have their beinge in him But yet as it is by his will that he made them and not by his essence so it is by his will and not by his essence that he dothe preserve them You pursue the phrasifying of your owne conceytes according to your owne pleasure But where doe you finde in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of Gods essence thorough all thinges Yet I confesse Anselme saythe that Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet and whether you tooke it hand over head from him I knowe not You seeme to make Gods essence a space of some spirituall extension to which kinde of conceyte our imagination I confesse is wonderous prone as if it did penetrate all thinges as light dothe penetrate the ayre and so fill all thinges with it selfe and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it Nowe this is a dangerous conceyte and obnoxious to a foule errour and opposite to the simplicitie of Gods nature which you perceave wel enoughe and therfore you thinke to checke this errour of conceyte by saying that he is indivisible as if wordes would serve the turne to salve Gods pure simplicitie Durand I am sure professethe against this penetration which you are so enamoured with Durand 1. dist 37. q. Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam vel intrinsecus penetrantem sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem quia quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui For thus he writes when we say that God is in thinges we doe not understand him to be an intrinsecate part or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them but we understand him to be present to the thing not only according to the duration therof in being when the things are not by corporall touch seing he is not
a body nor any qualitie in a body but according to order which in Spirits is answerable to situation in bodies Which order in Spirits excells situation in bodies in this respect because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreame parts therof immediately But by order a Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part therof Our imagination I confesse is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtile quantitie penetrating all But to conceave so of an Angell is too grosse how much more of God Durand 1. dist 37. part 2. qu. 1. num 17. Differentiae situs non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas cujusmodi sunt Angeli Huic autem contradicit imaginatio quae non transcendit quantum continuum secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto sicut a quali ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri frigidi aut calidi sic de caeteris qualitaetibus corporalibus sic non sunt magni vel parvi quia non sunt quanti per consequens hic vel ibi ratione suae essentiae quia hae sunt proprietates quanti The proper differences of corporall thinges saythe Durand are not to be extended to incorporall things such as Angells are Imagination contradicteth this which dothe not transcend quantities according wherunto we fashion to our selves Angells as if they were of a most subtile quantitie But we doe not well to followe imagination in this For Angells are natures abstract as well from quantitie as from qualitie therfore like as they are not white and black cold and hott and so of the rest of corporall qualities and so they are not great or small because they have no quantity consequently are not here or there in respect of their essence seing these differences are proper unto quantitie But some may say If Gods essence be not here where is it then I answeare that God is as much here as any where and when I say God is here and every where I doe not exclude his essence For by God I understand his essence But I deny that he is here or any where els secundum essâ—ntiam as if his essence had any situation here which kind of being is proper only to bodies and not to Spirits and makes Gods nature subject to extension We may be bold to say that Gods essence is indistant from every thing For herein we goe along with the Apostle who sayth that God is not farre from every one of us For in him we live moove have our beinge But as for penetration of all things with Gods essence I leave that phrase to them that like it As for Gregories trimeÌ„bred sentence one part therof alone is to your purpose namely when he saythe that God is intra omnia non â—nclusus And indeede we all say that God is so in all thinges as that he rather conteynes them then is conteyned by them Now which I pray is the more sober speeche to say that Gods essence conteynes all thinges or to say that Gods power will conteynes all thinges let every learned and sober Reader judge 7. Thoughe I deeme it not much woorthe the while to searche after this distinction in Anselme the place wherof you conceale Yet I have taken that paynes to the ende I might the better consider in what sense and upon what grounde of reason he dothe deliver it And in his Monologion I finde he discoursethe of Gods beinge in time and place But no such distinction can I finde in him nor any such assertions as you impute vnto him In his 19. chap. he disputethe that God is in no place and time In the 21. How he is in all places and in no place In the 22. That It may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be allwayes then in all time In the 23. How it may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be every where then in all places But that it is fitter to be sayde of God that he is with place then in place I finde no where nor in any place in Anselme Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselme and as well approoved of good writers but who they are you keepe to your selfe Notwithstanding you tell us that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction is blameable in two respects 1. For that it conceales much matter of admiration which the description of immeÌ„sitie used by Barnard and others dothe promptly suggest 2. Because it dothe occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence As touching the first I see nothing to the contrary but that Gods being with every place dothe every way conteyne the very same matter of admiration which his being in every place dothe For the woonderful nature of his immensitie in playne termes is but this thoughe it may be phrasified diverse wayes as it pleasethe the writer that he conteynes all thinges and is conteyned in none Now this may as well be signified by sayinge God is with every place as by sayinge God is in every place For being with a place is indifferent to admitt such a manner of being with it as namely by way of conteyning it But being in a place dothe rather incline to signify a beinge conteyned by it Which is opposite to the active conteyning of it Place say the Durand may be considered two wayes eyther as a naturall thing or as conteyning the thing placed As it is naturall thinge so God is in every place but as it conteynes the thinge sayde to be in it so he is in no place For he conteynes all and is conteyned of none As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence to my judgement your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all thinges hathe bene very prone therunto And howe to be with every thinge dothe more include a coextension of nature then to be in every thinge I cannot possibly conceave But I pray in what sense of truthe or truthe of sense can you averre that every body is with every place You may as well avouche that every worme here on earthe is with the Sunne or with the place of the Sunne And can the mathematicall dimensions of a bodily substance be accoumpted the place of that bodily substaÌ„ce that you should say Every bodily substance is with the mathematicall dimensions therof and that even there where you speake of a substance his being with a place And why you should terme them mathematicall dimensions rather then Physicall I knowe not You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body so as not to be conteyned in them dothe exclud all conceyte of coextension But I see no reason for this assertion it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all
thinges then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are especially wheras you maynteyne that God is in all thinges not only as conteyning them with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence as I have shewed but rather in respect of his power and wil but by way of penetration thoroughe all and that in respect of his essence and not in respect of his power only like as light is diffused thoroughe our Hemi spheare which similitude I am bolde to adde because you fayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way But I dare not adventure vpon such an apprehension because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God I content my selfe with this that as God before the world was in himselfe so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse But then nothing being made he had nothing to conteyne governe and worke by or in as nowe he hathe As touchinge all other manner of being in all thinges I content my selfe with ignorance You magnify Trism gâ—sts definition of Gods immensitie and much good doe it you It is suitable with your dicourse But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vpon Empedocles for this figurative obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truthe why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches that so we may have somethinge wheron to dispute Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all thinges and that of supportance now out of Trismegist you tell us that God hathe a Center and that every where but not of supportance passive I thinke as wherby he shoulde be supported but of supportance active wherby he supporteth all thinges Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference For Gods supporting of the earth may well be accoumpted the Center and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accoumpted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earthe In as much as there is no divine supporting without it at least of materiall creatures but all with it Thoughe it be true that God coulde can make the world much bigger then it is But Gods will hathe herein circumâ—scibed himselfe thus farre to proceede as he dothe in supporting all thinges no farther I doe not like your phrase of inlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence For dare any sober divine say that Gods actuall existence hathe boundes and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged And yet the face I confesse of your discourse lookes hitherwardes How then doe you say that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged The only way to helpe it is to say that Gods existence is never enlarged but the existence of creatures by the encreasing of newe may be enlarged and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged not that his existence is more then it was but that the existence of created substances is more then it was And more creatures coexisting with God then formerly there did he doth coexist with more then he did His existence is no greater then it was nor hathe no larger boundes then it had but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God more then formerly did exist And yet the omnipotency of God hathe pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures and that is the circumference of the world For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within And albeit God coulde make the world greater and greater yet still it shoulde be but finite as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing so likewise of Gods coexisting with them To say that God only truly is is one of the paradoxes That God alone is id quod est that is that whatsoever is attributed unto God is essentiall to him not accidentall I have often read But that God only truly is I never read but in your writings In him we live and moove and have our being saythe Saint Paul but this by your subtile commentary must be understood with a distinction In him we live but not truly in him we moove but not truly in him we have our being but not truly That God conteynes all things and is not conteyned in any thing we easily grant Spheares doe conteyne by way of place but I hope you will not say that God in such sort conteynes any thinge thoughe therfore called by the Hebrewes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he conteynethe all thinges And yet certeinly there is no Spheare conteynes so much but that a square figure may conteyne as much thoughe not under the same limits And can any man make doubt but God coulde make a World of a square figure that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe thoughe in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is But because that all thinges cannot comprehend God therfore you say He is rightly resembled to a spheare whose Circumference is no where A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselfes sport withall I say impossible more then one way For first it is a thing impossible that a body should be infinite Secondly it is impossible that a body infinite should be Sphericall If you aske of what figure then shoulde it be my answeare is it should be of no figure For figures are the boundes of quantities it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes And yet if all this were receaved as fitt and convenient what shall we gayne therby when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall who indeede is merely spirituall For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bodies We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God Yet upon these conceytes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties that so Drismagist his definition of Gods immensitie may finde the more easy admittance into the Articles of our imagination if not into the Articles of our Creede Which yet truly I should not have excepted against but rather have admitted if to no other ende yet to this even to cutt of curious speculations about the immensitie of God had you not so farre magnified it as if it had bene some Oracle of natures light and made use of it not as a Rhetoricall flashe and
such courses all they must needes take that seeke out to satisfie imagination For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schooles non transcendit continuum You proceede to shewe how Gods immensâ—ie hathe no diversitie of parts and your argument intends to drawe to an inconvenience as many as maynteyne the contrary But the inconvenience which you inferre depends only upon peradventure thus A concurrence of all parts in number infinite would perhaps be impossible why then perhaps it would not be impossible and what then shall become of your argument Besides this the whole frame of your argument is unsound For infinite natures such as man is there is no necessitie of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions no nor to the performing of any action As for example if he gives himselfe to study and meditate there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his minde If he playeth upon the Lute there is no use of his legges and feete If he fighteth with his enemies there is no use of his tongue or teethe nor so much use of his legges as of his handes thoughe sometimes one payre of leggs is better then two payre of handes yet not to fight but to runne away rather thoughe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Demosthenes sometimes sayde being put to his witts to save the credite of his courage Indeede if God were not as he is he coulde not be so omnipotent as he is we neede no paynes at all to proove this 10. We are never so safe in matter of divinitie as when we goe along with scripture one place may easily prevent the mistaking of another if we give our selves to the due consideration of it and submitt unto those meanes which God hathe appoynted for our edification And the Scriptures represent his being every where in respect of two thinges 1. In respect of knowinge all thinges as Why sayest thou o Iacob and speakest o Israel My way is hid from the Lord and my judgement is passed over my God Knowest thou not or hast thou not heard that the everlasting God the Lord hath created the ends of the Earthe c. 2. In respect of his power conteyning them as whither shall I goe from thy Spirite or whither shall I slee from thy presence If I ascend into Heaven thou art there c. Let me take the winges of the Morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea yet thither shall thine hand lead me and thy right hand hold me But to talke of Gods essence penetrating and diffufed is to vent such phrases as I dare not adventure on I have allready tolde you what I have read to the contrary in some naming my Author as you take libertie to doe the like without naming of them Quando dicimus sayth Durand Deum esse in rebus non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam vel intrinsecus rem penetrantem ut magis infra patebit sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem quia est quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem quum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus fitum in corporibus quia persitum se habet anum corpus ad aliud immendiate quoad sui extremum sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quod libet sui saltem non est hoc dubium de Spiritu increato scilicet de Deo quicquid sit de aliis propter quod potest dici esse non solum juxtares fed in rebus And agayne in a question following Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique ita quod infinitas suae substantia sit ei ratio ubique essendi sed est ubique solum ratione suorum effectuum us dictum fuit in praecedente questione Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae tunc competeret ei esse necessariò ubique vel in loco infinito nullo modo finito sicut à contrariò dicitur de Angelo quod ratione suae essentiae finitae convenit ci esse in loco sinito nullo modo infinito Esse autem ubique non est esse in loco infinito Ergo infinitas Divinae essentiae non est ipsi ratio essendi ubique quod tamen assumebat ratio aliorum In a word I have no edge to cast my selfe upon any curious inquisition hereabouts because errours are dangerous about the nature of God eyther in denyinge unto him what is beseeming him or ascribing such things unto him as doe unbeseeme him which in the Schooles are accoumpted certeyne kindes of blasphemies I content my selfe with the simplicitie of Scripture institution which professethe that God filleth Heaven and Earthe and this undoubtedly is true as Durand saythe in respect of Gods effects wherewith he filleth all thinges as allso that he knowethe all thinges that he cannot be any where as conteyned but is every where as conteyninge governing orderinge working the good pleasure of his will in and by all thinges Now whether God conteynethe all thinges by his penetrative and diffused essence and not rather by his power and will let every sober Reader judge Before the World was God was in himselfe and so he is still how his power is extended to the making and conteyninge of his creatures I easily conceave but how his essence is extended I conceave not I conclude with those old verses Dic ubi tunc esset cum praeter eum nihil esset Tune ubi nunc in se quoniam sibisufficit ipse CHAP. VI. Of Eternity or of the branch of absolute infinities whereof Successive Duration of the imaginary infinity of time is the modell I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition wherewith you begin your discourse on this Argument as touching the exact proportion betweene immensity and eternity For Gods immeÌ„sity is that whereby he is ubique or every where like as by his eternity he is semper or alwayes But to be every where supposeth the creations but to be semper alwayes doth not For God was alwayes ever before the world Againe God in proper speech hath true being and consequently true Duration of Being which having neyther beginning nor ending is properly eternall But God in proper speech hath no quantity and consequently neyther extension and so in proper speech cannot be coumpted immense which signifieth extension without beginning and end and having no extension at all being merely spirituall and not materiall And ere you turne over a new leafe your self make doubt whether Time hath the same proportion to eternity as magnitude created hath to Divine Immensity In a word I doe not beleive you are like to find so many nothings to resemble
that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united that so his vigour might be greater what base comparisons are these to represent the infinite power of God by them Then you roule in your woonted Rhetorick to amplifie the vehemency of his motive power in that it cannot be exprest by a motion that should beare levill from the Sunnesetting in the west to the Moone riseing in the East which is a very faire marke I confesse for the case put is in plenilunio when the Moone is att full Then to cast the fixed starres downe to the center belike you meane one after another otherwise there would be no roome for them in the center and hoyse the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye or to send both in a moment beyond the extreamities of this visible world into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued would not straine his power motive Yet all this you confesse to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something that is to take not your words but rather your good meaning to create out of nothing Wherby nothing doth not become something but something hath a being which before it had not But here you power out many wilde conceits besides this first as when you say Essence swallowes up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant I had thought rather this had bene the property of eternity not of essence You might as well say essence swallowes up all places into an indivisible unitie or point Then how may eternitie be sayde to swallow up that which it doth not contayne neyther formally for certeynly there is no formall succession in eternitie nor eminently For to conteyne eminently is to be able to produce succession but it is not Gods eternitie that denominates him able to produce time or the existence of thinges in time but his power So neyther his essence nor his eternitie swallowes up motion for the same reason But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest to witt by mooving the eighth spheare round in a moment Of the nakednesse and absurditie that is shamefull nakâ—dnesse of such an assertion we have discoursed enough Againe is it not enough for you to maynteyne motion in vacuo but you must needes affirme that this visible world issued from the vacuum which now we imagine without the extreamities of it where now the world is was a vacuum before the world was but yet the world issued not from it neyther in the kinde of a materiall cause nor in the kind of a formall cause nor in the kind of an efficient cause much lesse did it issue from that vacuum which you terme without the extreamites of this world Then againe I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from Gods immensitie but only from the counsayle of his will by his immensitie he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections therby When you call Nothinge the mother of Gods creatures tell mee I pray did you affect poeticall witt or Metaphysicall truth I had thought Nothing had not afforded so much as the matter of any thinge as the Mother doth the matter at least of the childe It is true we were not any thing before God made us And as sure I am that this which we call nothinge did not contribute any thinge to the creation of men The basenes of mans originall is a common place of another nature Now your text is the Infinity of Gods power but you may squander from it as you please Whatsoever implyes not contradiction the production therof is within the compasse of Gods power and whatsoever God can do he can doe with ease His head aked not in the makeing of the World neyther doth it ake in providing for and preserving all things But to talke of the possibilitie of more worlds hand over head under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this Yet as touching Gods omnipotency for the strengthening of our faith we are promised somethinge hereafter as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination by comparing it first to the susteÌ„tative force of a center which is a matter of nothing and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something Whether we are like to meete with a more wise discourse concerning Gods infinite Wisedome if others know yet I know not CHAP. VIII Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence 1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power unles he were infinite in Wisedome allso And that power ungoverned by Wisedome would bring forth very enormous effects But if a duble portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt surely where the power is equall the Wisedome insinitly unequall there the effects cannot be the like Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours not yet extant I confesse that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath he might well thinke he coulde dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed by the Wisedome which man allready hath And you give this reason for in thinges wee can lay any necessitie upon wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World doth not arise from the difference of mens powers but merely from the difference of theire skill and Wisedome in severall trades 2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength for strength is only power naturall but there is a civill power goeth beyond that And there is no question to be made but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body But where civill power is supreame that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect and seing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome what should move you to maynteine the one to be greater then the other I can not devise Princes have guides to governe them which yet are not therfore greater theÌ„ they but inferior by farre
decree necessitie or contingency in generall but not the necessitie of this particular or the contingency of this particular For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars Now there is a contingency taken in another sense which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it and denominates it before it doth exist as when we say raine to morrow is contingent it is as much as to say it is possible to raine it is possible not to raine So touching the actions of men of any action we may say it is contingent for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing for it may continue or no. So before the World was made it was possible to be and not to be and so the making of it contingent but not by the decree of God For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered for Gods decree is a free act But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World or not to make it according to his will Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God as all necessary truthes are derived therefrom Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree it might be otherwise For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth so that if he decree them to be possible he might have decreed them not to be possible Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this as when you say God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discerne your meaning But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God your confirmation thereof we must expect when you come to treat of mans fall This thus by fetching compasse expressed by you I doubt will prove no more then this that God decreed to make man a free agent yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require and promise some exquisite perfourmance And I am verily perswaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome as to make it good will surpasse the perfourmance of any Schoole divine that ever was from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live But of the nature of your perfourmances we have had reasonable experience You may remember what he sayd while he was shearing his hogges Here is a great deale of cry and a little wooll In the next place you dictate your parallells wherein it seemes you take great pleasure That Gods wisedome is infinite we nothing doubt but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to doe we take to be a very hungry description of it For is either man or Angell any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to doe Gods immensitie consists in filling all places which are but finite neythâ—r is it possible they should be infinite yet beyond things that are this immensitie is not extended And you have already denyed precisely that God is in vacuo But as for Gods eternity that doth not only coexist with all time but had existenâ—e before it actually and that without all beginning In a word Gods immensitie is not in respect of any quantitas molis quantitie of extension but only in respect of quantitas virtutis And what is this different from his infinite power And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing but only after the way of containing and supporting all things And looke by what quantitie he made all things by the same quantity he supports all things and that is the quantitie of his power A very weake amplification it is in my judgement of Gods incircumscriptible presence which yet is nothing els but his immensitie to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it as well as that which circumscribes it coexists with that which is circumscribed by it As for your Mathemâ—ticall conceyts of center and circumscrence I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them To say that eternity is more then commensurable to time is to graunt that it is commensurable thereunto which is very absurde And how is it possible that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end You say it is in all durations not as contained in them I hope if as containing them this also is untrue For like as it is not Gods eternity whereby he made the World but by his power so it is not by his eternity that he maintayneth the duration of it but by his power What noone tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing but as for fluent instants we knowe none For fluent is as much as succedent and succession is not but in respect of parts and an instant hath no parts Yet if we give way to such imaginations like as sluxus puncti in Longitudinem is not contayned in the line but is the line so sluxus instantis is not contayned in a set time but is the very set time it selfe Nor is it a part of it as noone-tide is of the day And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of Gods eternitie to resenâ—ble the proportion that is betweene the part of time and the whole time you may say as well the World is contained in Gods immensitie like as halfe the yard is contayned in the whole yard Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest the proportion of the least beame of light to the light of the World may be expressed the proportion of things that are to the things that God is able to produce cannot the first is finite this is infinite Yet by your leave there is no greater disproportion betweene Gods wisedome manifested and manifestable then betweene his power manifested and manifestable In a word God hath
of the reprobates after they suffer it shall be mutable Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touchâ—ng his elect that they shall ever be with the Lord and as touching the reprobate that their Worme shall never dye and their fire never be extinguished Yet I confesse either is simply mutable in respect that God hath power to alter it But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that Yet it is true that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently and some things necessarily But this is onely in respect of the agency of second causes some of them being made by God agents naturall working necessarily some agents rationall and free working contingently and freely Not in respect of Gods owne agency for whatsoever God doth work outwardly that must needs come to passe contingently or freely for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily it is the perfection of God unalterable to be necessarily to worke freely Now the doome of any man is the work of God and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels and not the worke of second causes and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree God doth not decree that to fall out contingently much lesse doth he decree that after it is it shall be mutable speake your minde plainly and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas or of the Angels that fell or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable I presume you dare not affirme this and what is the reason not because God wants power to alter but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise and his will can neither bee changed from within nor resisted from without because it is omnipotent In this case therefore this consequence is good God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas and his decree is immutable and omnipotent therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable to wit supposing the foresaid decree of God Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life hath God decreed it or no if no then his decrees are not everlasting the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words though I feare your meaning is otherwise Againe if God hath not yet decreed it then hereafter he shall decree it for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them and consequently there shall be a change in God and something found in him which before was not contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter sect 2. in these words Vnto infinite perfection what can accrew If then God hath decreed it and this decree or will of God cannot be changed for you confesse it is immutable nor can be resisted for you confesse it is omnipotent will it not necessarily follow herehence that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable This I speake in your phrase but in mine owne phrase I say onely that herehence it necessarily followeth that all such shall bee damned which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree and therefore not necessity simply so called but onely secundum quid and upon supposition So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect who are yet surviving if God hath decreed it seeing his will is both unchangeable and unresistible their salvation must needs bee immutable to speake in your phrase but to speake in mine owne phrase it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved There is to way to help this but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement And indeed if you would deale plainly and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely but to all conditionally and withall by sound arguments confirme it there should be no further question we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably as you speake or necessarily as we speake no not so much as in respect of Gods decree if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely but conditionally and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no. For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein and deny all this unto others herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation and not other and it will necessarily follow herehence that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance and perseveranâ—e they shall be saved and as necessarily that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace unlesse you will say that though God doth not give any such grace yet they may beleeve and repent if they will and therein persevere unto the end I see no reason to the contrary but this must be upon your opinion as before hath beene specified albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much And in this place you scatter somthing that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto For consider though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable yet you deny that hethence it followes their doome shall be immutable Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue as I presume will appeare of it selfe For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this If thou beleevest thou shalt be saved if not thou shalt be damned the case is cleare that this doome is immutable not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome as salvation or damnation but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it selfâ— as the salvation of Peter by it selfe or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be forset by the decree of God which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God Now I say if it be decreed by God seeing his decrees cannot be
such Ifs and And 's that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honestie by this information Onely in this clause alone I finde some coherence with the former to wit with the first sentence of this Section for that laid downe the thesis this delivers the selfe same in hypothesis The conclusion is that Gods ideall perfection in integrity and constancie hath no mixture of vice or humerous impotency And our conceit of this perfection in God you say is rectified thus to wit by experience of the strength of unconstant humerous desires of the faintnesse of our love and equity as well as by the contrary vertues Your wit hath plaid his part here when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits touching Gods integrity and constancie from the contrary disposition in man Belike if Adam had never fallen our conceits could not have beene so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are neither shall they bee so well rectified in the kingdome of heaven because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconstancy or faintnesse of equity in man 2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxime mentioned so far as naturally it would reach and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour and the cause of it The consequence was partly aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you and ignorance to assoile them The cause was the extending of our owne power too farre And in this Section you endeavour to rectifie our conceits hereabouts now whereas I was intent as it is fit every Reader should bee to observe what was your drift and scope in all this in the end of the former Section you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideall perfection in the way of integrity and constancy as if that were the scope you aimed at but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto though finally it lighted thereupon neither doe I yet perceive whereunto this ideall perfection of God you speake of is directed as being nothing congruous for ought I discerne to the point in hand I rather thinke that was delivered as many other things in that Section on the by and that the immediate end you aime at is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section namely the rectifying of our conceits touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxime which is the principall negative touching contradictories Both parts of contradiction cannot bee true no nor false neither you had rather expresse it thus To make both parts of contradiction true or false is no object of power omnipotent Now wee seeme to have found the hare againe at least the tract and sent of the hare and desire to pursue without making any fault as neare as wee can Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxime mentioned is this Many effects are very possible to power alone considered which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me and as it were Iuterpretationem commodam indignata such as could not admit a commodious interpretation and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof is not to justifie it but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein In the former Section you complained of men as extending their owne power too farre which you conceived to bee the reason why they did not extend the maxime there proposed so farre as naturally it would reach But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright not considering it at large but rather as joyned with other attributes of God Secondly you complained that men did not extend the maxime you speake of so farre as naturally it would reach and therfore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full whereas indeede you take a course to restraine it for you tell us here that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power but in reference unto other attributes of God also as love truth goodnesse and justice which manifestly doth restraine the possibility of any thing rather then enlarge it Thirdly whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place is onely this To make both parts of contradiction true when you tell us that Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes What doe you but hereby give us to understand that this effect to wit of making both parts of contradiction true though it bee possible to power alone considered yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobrietie whether this be a decent thing to say that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered whereas indeed it is no more possible in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true then to make both parts of contradiction false Neither indeed is it in the power of God as touching any one part of contradiction if it be not true to make it true or if it be true to make it false As for example I am alive it is not in the power of God to make it false Hee may take my life from me but that is not a course to make that proposition false For it was true onely for that time when it was pronounced not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false Socrates is alive neither is it in the power of God to make it true for though hee can restore life to Socrates yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true For that proposition was true for that time only when it was pronounced not for the time to come least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates But you will say the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true not on the contrary And God is the cause of the being of things This I confesse is a truth in part God is the cause of the being of things yet not of all things but onely of things contingent God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being such as he is himselfe So that these like propositions God is eternall omnipotent omniscient most simple c. no way depend on the execution of God his power which proceeds alwayes according to the counsell of his owne will But hereupon depends not the nature of God nor many other principles containing necessary truth I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature which are not so in reference to the divine For the humane nature hath power to transgresse the divine nature hath not
not only before all time but after all time You adde unto this and will have this comprehension to be circular and elswhere have called it a circular duration Yet as for this conceyte of theirs Durand hath longe discovered the absurdity therof confuted it And as greate a Mathematician as you are I doe not like your interpretatiō of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which you render as if it signified all sides and all angles I rather take it to signifie all angle all side as if it were an angle throughout and one side throughout not all sides and angles Ant it is apparent the circumference is but one that encloseth this figure and angles arising from inclination of lines in the circumferenc there is a perpetuall inclination not the least part that may be designed and imagined but hath an inclination of partes When you say the sides are angles and the angles sides if not essentially yet penctratively the fame You speake gibrish you may as well say in any right angled figure that the angles and sides are penetratively the same the sides are lines and in the predicament of quality the angles are the beginning of figures as poynts are of lines and so in the predicament of quality of which figures lines are the determinations and outward limites This I speake but upon remembrance of my old philosophy and the angles arise from the inclinations of lines one towards another What liberty you take in saying that a circle is of equall sides and of equall angles whereas indeede it is but a side throughout and an angle throughout let the reader judge Yet it contaynes the space of any other figure of equall circumference and somewhat more and so vertually it may be sayd to conteyne them even theire sides and angles in as much as it doth conteyne the space of them So whatsoever the power habits and affections of men doe signifie allwayes provided that you take theire significatiō as touching the perfections in them severed from theire imperfections they are in God and much more And thus touching your theame proposed how Anger Love Compassion Mercy and other affections are in God your resolution may be this if you thinke good that all perfectiōs are conteyned in him not tanquam trigonum in tetragonon but tanquam triganon and tetragonon and pentagonon and all angled figures in circulo but then they must be of equall circumference which limitation hath no place in the comparison betweene God the Creator and his creatures If your meaning be no other then that these which we call passions are in God eminently the resolution of the question proposed had bin as easy as it is vulgar for to be in God eminently is by your owne exposition no more then God to be the Author of them And no Christian doubts but that as God is the Author of our bodyes and of our soules so he is the Author of our naturall affections also 4. The Diameter I confesse is the measure of a circle that being knowne all is easy to be knowne I meane in the poynt of measure but as for the proportion you speake of betweene that and a man in reference to the World I leave to every one to judge of that Who they be that are the Authors of such proportions I willingly confesse I know not In these kindes of proportions you are very excellent although you complaine of the barrenesse of your imagination that way as when you tell us that mans nature uncorrupt did include such an eminent uniformity to all things created as the eye doth unto colours I professe you stone me with these resemblances of yours and make me wonder at my dwarfy capacity that is so overcoped to speake in your owne phrase with these your tall inventions For it were strange you should not understand your selfe that were like the Nunne at Delphos to give out oracles to set others on worke to understand that which shee understood not her selfe And first I cannot devise what that uniformity should be which you say the eye hath to all colours you seeme not to understand it of the morall constitution of the eye for that is different as colours are different but rather of the formall constitution in respect of the discerning faculty it hath Now the uniformity betweene this is no other then betweene any faculty and his object So then the uniformity runnes this way like as the eye of man judgeth of all colours so man was in his innocency to all things created here I was about to adde for the completing of this sentence I know not what but on a sodayne I remembred what erst you proposed namely that man was like the diameter in a circle the measure of all things The meaning whereof I conceaved to be this as by the knowledge of the diameter the circle is easily knowne so by the knowledge of man which conteynes the nature of all things created the nature of all created things may be knowne In like sort touching this last uniformity you speake of Like as the eye judgeth of all colours so by the knowledge of man we may judge of all other things created I neede not trouble my selfe in taking exception against these illustrations I doubt not but I shall performe a meritorious worke in gratifying your reader so farre a◠to blanch your meaning and of the congruity or incongruity to leave it unto him to judge Thus was man the true image of God for his essence and in this properly beares a true shadow of the divine prerogative For like as all perfections are conteyned in God so all created things are conteyned in the nature of man save that they are eminently conteyned in God in such sort as he is able to produce them but so created things are not conteyned in the nature of man Yet as the eye judgeth of all colours so man participates of all other natures and by the knowledge of him men may judge of them If the divine nature conteyned lesse perfections then the perfections of all things then indeede it were something strange it should be the measure of all But seeing perfections in him are infinite there was no reason that you should bring mans acknowledgement that his essence is the measure of all perfections with an allthough in reference to his measurelesse perfection Yet I professe I am to seeke how to conceave Gods essence to be the measure of created perfections seeing mensura mensuratum ought to be in the same kinde as it was wont to be sayd But all this may be helpt with saying he is the measure of them eminently and indeed he is the Author of them For he made all things in number weight and measure And indeede ere I was awarre I find you fall upon this in the very next sentence where you say All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by Philosophers are as truly conteyned in the incomprehensible essence as sides