excepting this one Article that IESUS IS THE CHRIST which only is necessary to salvation in relation to internall faith all the rest belong to obedience which may be performed although a man doe not inwardly beleeve so he doe but desire to beleeve and make an outward profession as oft as need requires of whatsoever is propounded by the Church how it comes about that there are so many Tenets which are all held so to concern our Faith that except a man doe inwardly beleeve them He cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven But if he consider that in most controversies the contention is about humane Soveraignty in some matter of gain and profit in others the glory of Wits he will surely wonder the lesse The question about the propriety of the Church is a question about the Right of Soveraignty for it being known what a Church is it is known at once to whom the Rule over Christians doth belong for if every Christian City be that Church which Christ himselfe hath commanded every ChristiaÌ„ subject to that city to hear then every subject is bound to obey his City that is to say Him or them who have the supreme power not only in temporall but also in spirituall matters but if every Christian City be not that Church then is there some other Church more universall which must be obeyed All Christians therefore must obey that Church just as they would obey Christ if He came upon Earth She will therfore rule either by the way of Monarchy or by some Assembly This question then concerns the Right of ruling To the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility for whosoever were truly and internally beleeved by all mankinde that he could not erre would be sure of all Dominion as well temporall as spirituall over all mankinde unlesse himselfe would refuse it for if he say that he must be obeyed in temporalls because it is supposed he cannot erre that Right of Dominion is immediately granted him Hither also tends the priviledge of interpreting Scriptures For he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of Scriptures hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine all manner of controversies whatsoever but he who hath this hath also the command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of God To this end drive all the disputes about the power of remining and retaining sinnes or the authority of excommunication For every man if he be in his wits will in all things yeeld that man an absolute obedience by vertue of whose sentence he beleeves himselfe to be either saved oâ— damned Hither also tends the power of instituting societies for they depend on him by whom they subsist who hath as many subjects as Monks although living in an Enemies City To this end also refers the question concerning the Iudge of lawfull Matrimony for he to whom that judicature belongs to him also pertains the knowledge of all those cases which concern the inheritance and succession to all the goods and Rights not of private men onely but also of Soveraign Princes And hither also in some respect tends the Virgin-life of Ecclesiaâ—ticall Persons for unmarried men have lesse coherence then others with civill society and besides it is an inconvenience not to be slighted that Princes must either necessarily forgoe the Priesthood which is a great bond of civill obedience or have no hereditary Kingdome To this end also tends the canouization of Saints which the Heaâ—heâ— called Apotheosis for he that can allure forraign subjects with so great a reward may bring those who are greedy of such glory to dare and doe any thing For what was it but an honourable Name with posterity which the Decii and other Romans sought after and a thousand others who cast themselves upon incredible perils The controversies about Purgatory and indulgencies are matter of gain The questions of Free-will Iustification and the manner of receiving Christ in the Sacrament are Philosophicall There are also questions concerning some Rites not introduced bur left in the Church not sufficiently purged from gentilisme but we need reckon no more All the world knows that such is the nature of men that dissenting in questions which concern their power or profit or preeminence of Wit they slander and curse each other It is not therefore to be wondred at if almost all tenets after men grew hot with disputings are held forth by some or other to be necessary to salvation and for our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven insomuch as they who hold them not are not only condemned as guilty of disobedience which in truth they are after the Church hath once defined them but of Infidelity which I have declared above to be wrong out of many evident places of Scripture to which I adde this one of Saint Pauls Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth for God hath received him One man esteemeth one day above another another esteemeth every day alike Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind Rom. 14. v. 3 5. FINIS The Introduction That the beginning of mutuall society is from fâ—ar Annotation Annotation That men by nature are all equall Whence the wil of mischieving each other ariseth The discord from comparison of wits From the Appetite many have to the same thing The definition of Right A right to to the end gives also a right to the means By the right of nature every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation By right of nature all men have equall right to all things Annotation The right of all to all is unprofitable The state of men without Society is a state of War The definition of War and Pace War is an adversary to mans preservation That by the right of nature it is lawfull for any man to compell him whom he hath in his power to give him caution for his future obedience That the Law of nature is not an agreement of men but the Dictates of Reason Annotation That is the fundamentall Law of Nature to seek Peace where it may be had and where not to defend our selves The first special Law of Nature is That our Rights to all things ought not to be retain'd What it is to quit our right what to convey 〈…〉 it The will of the receiver must necessarily be declar'd before the right be convey'd Words convey not except they relate to the time present Words of the future suffice to convey if other testimonies of our will be not wanting In matters of free gift words of the fiâ—ure â—onveigh no Right The definition of Contract and Covenant In Covenants we passe away our Rights by words signifying the future Covenants in the state of nature are in vain and of none effect not so in Civill Government Annotation That no man can make Compacts with Beasts neither with God without
questions concerning Right and Philosophy And they who doe judge that any thing can be determin'd contrary to this common consent of men concerning the appellations of things out of obscure places of Scripture doe also judge that the use of speech and at once all humane society is to be taken away for he who hath sold an whole field will say he meant one whole ridgâ— and will retaine the rest as unsold nay they take away reason it selfe which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent These kinde of questions therefore need not be determin'd by the City by way of interpretation of Scriptures for they belong not to Gods Word in that sense wherein the Word of God is taken for the Word concerning God that is to say for the Doctrine of the Gospell neither is he who hath the Soveraigne power in the Church oblig'd to employ any Ecclesiastical Doctours for the judging of any such kind of matters as these but for the deciding of questions of Faith that is to say concerning God which transcend humane capacity we stand in need of a divine blessing that we may not be deceiv'd at least in necessary points to be deriv'd from CHRIST himselfe by the imposition of hands For seeing to the end we may attaine to aeternal Salvation we are oblig'd to a supernatural Doctrine which therefore it lis impossible for us to understand to be left so destitute as that we can be deceiv'd in necessary points is repugnant to aequity This infallibility our Saviour Christ promis'd in those things which are necessary to Salvation to his Apostles untill the day of judgement that is to say to the Apostles and Pastors succeeding the Apostles who were to be consecrated by the imposition of hands He therefore who hath the Soveraigne power in the City is oblig'd as a Christian where there is any question concerning the Mysteries of Faith to interpret the Holy Scriptutes by Clergy-man lawfully ordain'd And thus in Christian Cities the judgement both of spirituall and temporall matters belongs unto the civill authority And that man or councell who hath the Supreme power is head both of the City and of the Church for a Church and a Christian City is but one thing CHAP. XVIII Concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven I. The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying God and Men is to be remov'd by the distinction betweene the points necessary and not necessary to Salvation II. All things necessary to Salvation are contain'd in Faith and Obedience III. What kind of Obedience that is which is requir'd of us IV. VVhat Faith is and how distinguisht from profession from science from opinion V. VVhat it is to beleeve in CHRIST VI. That that Article alone THAT JESVS IS THE CHRIST is necessary to Salvation is prov'd from the scope of the Evangelists VII From the preachings of the Apostles VIII From the easinesse of Christian Religion IX From this also that it is the foundation of Faith X. From the most evident words of CHRIST and his Apostles XI In that Article is contain'd the Faith of the Old Testament XII How Faith and Obedience concur to Salvation XIII In a Christian City there is no contradiction betweene the commands of God and of the City XIV The Doctrines which this day are controverted abâ—â—t Religion doe for the most part relate to the Right of Dominion I. IT was ever granted that all authority in secular matters deriv'd from him who had the Soveraigne power whether he were one Man or an Assembly of Men that the same in spirituall matters depended on the authority of the Church is manifest by the next foregoing proofs and besides this that all Christian Cities are Churches enduâ—d with this kind of authority From whence a man though but dull of apprehension may collect that in a Christian City that is to say in a City whose Soveraignty belongs to a Christian Prince oâ— Councell all power as well spiritual as secular is united under Christ and therefore it is to be obey'd in all things but on the other side because we must rather obey God then Men there is a difficulty risen how obedience may safely be yeelded to them if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which CHRIST hath prohibited The reason of this difficulty is that seeing God no longer speakes to us by CHRIST and his Prophets in open voice but by the holy Scriptures which by divers men are diversly understood they know indeed what Princes and a congregated Church doe command but whether that which they doe command be contrary to the word of God or not this they know not but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporall and spirituall death as it were sailing betweene Scilla and Caryâ—â—is they often run themselves upon both But they who rightly distinguish betweene the things necessary to Salvation and those which are not necessary can have none of this kind of doubt for if the command of the Prince or City be such that he can obey it without hazard of his aeternnll Salvation it is unjust not to obey them and the Apostles praecepts take place Servants in all things obey your Masters according to the flesh Children obey your Parents in all things Col. 3. v. 20 22. And the command of CHRIST The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses chair all things therefore whatsoever they command you that observe and doe Mat. 23. v. 2. On the contrary if they command us to doe those things which are punisht with aeternall death it were madnesse not rather to chuse to dye a naturall death then by obeying to dye eternally and then comes in that which CHRIST sayes Feare not them who kill the body but cannot kill the Soule Mat. 10. v. 28. We must see therefore what all those things are which are necessary to Salvation II. Now all things necessary to Salvation are comprehended in two vertues Faith and Obedience The latter of these if it could be perfect would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation but because we have all of us beene long since guilty of disobedience against God in Adam and besides we our selves have since actually sinned Obedience is not sufficient without remission of sinnes but this together with our entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven is the reward of Faith nothing else is requisite to Salvation for the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to none but sinners that is to say those who have not perform'd due Obedience to the Lawes and not to those neither if they beleeve the necessary articles of the Christian Faith Now if we shall know in what points Obedience doth consist and which are the necessary articles of the Christian Faith it will at once be manifest what we must doe and what abstaine from at the commands of Cities and of Princes III. But by Obedience in this
and motion In the second we would have beene conversant about imagination Memory intellect ratioâ—ination appetite Will good and Evill honest and dishonest and the like what this last Section handles I have now already shewed you Whilest I contrive order pensively and slowly compose these matters for I onely doe reason I dispute not It so happen'd in the interim that my Country some few yeares before the civill Warres did rage was boyling â—ot with questions concerning the rights of Dominion and the obedience due from Subjects the true forerunners of an approaching War And was the cause which all those other matters deferr'd ripen'd and pluckt from me this third part Therefore it happens that what was last in order is yet come forth first in time and the rather because I saw that grounded on its owne principles sufficiently knowne by experience it would not stand in need of the former Sections I have not yet made it out of a desire of praise although if I had I might have defended my selse with this faire excuse that very few doe things laudably who are not affected with commendation but for your sakes Readers who I perswaded my selse when you should rightly apprehend and throughly understand this Doctrine I here present you with would rather chuse to brooke with patience some inconveniences under government because humane affairs cannot possibly be without some then selfe opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the publique That weighing the justice of those things you are about not by the perswaâ—ion and advise of private men but by the Lawes of the Realme you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streames of your blood to wade to their owne power That you will esteeme it better to enjoy your selves in the present state though perhaps not the best then by waging Warre indeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age your selves in the meane while either kill'd or consumed with age Farthermore for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civill Magistrate and will be exempt from all publique burthens and yet will live under his Jurisdiction and looks for protection from the violence and injuries of others that you would not looke on them as fellow Subjects but esteeme them for enemies and spies and that yee rashly admit not for Gods Word all which either openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so I say more plainly if any Preacher Confessor or Casuist shal but say that this doctrin is agreeable with Gods word namely That the chief ruler nay any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chiefes command or that Subjects may resist conspire or covenant against the supreme power that ye by no means beleeve them but instantly declare their names He who approves of these reasons will also like my intention in writing this book Last of al I have propounded to my self this rule through this whole discourse First not to define ought which concerns the justice of single actions but leave theÌ„ to be determined by the laws Next not to dispute the laws of any government in special that is not to point which are the laws of any country but to declare what the laws of all countries are Thirdly not to seem of opinion that there is a lesse proportion of obedience due to an Aristocraty or Dâ—mocraty then a Monarchy for though I have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth Chapter to gain a belief in men that Monarchy is the most commodious government which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book not to be demonstrated but only probably stated yet every where I expresly say that in all kind of Government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equall power Fourthly not in any wise to dispute the positions of Divines except thâ—se which strip Subjects of their obedience and shake the foundations of civill government Lastly lest I might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need what I had thus written I would not presently expose to publique interest wherefore I got some few copies privately disperst among some of my friends that discrying the opinions of others if any things appeared erroneous hard or obscure I might correct soften and explain them These things I found most bitterly excepted against that I had made the civill powers too large but this by Ecclesiasticall Persons that I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience but this by Sectaries that I had set Princes above the civil Laws but this by Lawyers wherefore I was not much moved by these mens reprehensions as who in doing this did but do their own business except it were tye those knots somewhat faster But for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the Principles themselves to wit the nature of men the authority or right of nature the nature of compacts and contracts and the originall of civill government because in finding fault they have not so much followed their Passions as their common sense I have therefore in some places added some annotations whereby I presumed I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts Lastly I have endevoured to offend none beside those whose Principles these contradict and whose tender mindes are lightly offended by every difference of opinions Wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpnesse and lesse of certainty then they ought to have since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the establishment of peace and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some liberty it is his only request to ye Readers ye will deign to receive them with an equall mind The Index of the Chapters under the titles of LIBERTY CHAP. I. OF the State of men without civill society 1 CHAP. II. Of the Law of nature concerning contracts 16 CHAP. III. Of the other Lawes of nature 34 CHAP. IV. That the Law of nature is a divine Law 58 EMPIRE CHAP. V. OF the causes and first Originall of civill government 73 CHAP. VI. Of the right whether we consider it in an Assembly or in one Person 〈◊〉 which he hath who is endued with supreme authority 82 CHAP. VII Of the three kindes of government Democraty Aristocraty and Monarchy 100 CHAP. VIII Of the right which Lords and Masters have over their Servants 126 CHAP. IX Of the rights which Parents have over their children and of a Kingdome Paternall 173 CHAP. X. A comparison of the three kinds of government each with other according to the inconveniences of each one 146 CHAP. XI The places and examples of Scripture concerning the right of government which make for proof of the foresaid Doctrines 165 CHAP. XII Of the inward causes which dissolve all civill government 172 CHAP. XIII Of the duties of those men who sit at the Helm of State 189 CHAP. XIV Of Lawes and Sinnes 208 RELIGION CHAP. XV. OF Gods government by
themselves to the will of the company simply and in all things but in certain things onely determined by the City and on such termeâ— as it is lawfull for any one of them to contend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality which is by no means allowable to a Citizen against the City such like societies therefore are civill Persons subordinate to the City XI In every city That Man or Counsell to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared is said to have the SUPREME POWER or CHIEFE COMMAND or DOMINION which power and Right of commanding consists in this that each Citizen hath conveighed all his strength and power to that man oâ— Counsell which to have done because no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner is nothing else then to have parted with his Right of resisting Each Citizen as also every subordinate civill Person is called the SUBJECT of him who hath the chiefe command XII By what hath been sayed it is sufficiently shewed in what manner and by what degrees many naturall persons through desire of preserving themselves and by mumutuall feare have growne together into a civill Person whom we have called a City But they who submit themselves to another for feare either submit to him whom they feare or some other whom they confide in for protection They act according to the first manner who are vanquished in warre that they may not be slain they according to the second who are not yet overcome that they may not be overcome The first manner receives its beginning from naturall power and may be called the naturall beginning of a City the latter from the Counsell and constitution of those who meet together which is a beginning by institution Hence it is that there are two kinds of Cities the one naturall such as is the paternall and despoticall the other institutive which may be also called politicall In the first the Lord acquires to himselfe such Citizens as he will in the other the Citizens by their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves whether he be one man or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe But we will speak in the first place of a City politicall or by institution and next of a City naturall CHAP. VI. Of the right of him whether Counsell or one Man onely who hath the supreme power in the City I. There can noâ— Right be attributed to a multitude out of civill society nor any action to which they have not under seale consented II. The Right of the greater number consenting is the beginning of a City III. That every man retains a Right to protect himselfe according to his own free will so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security IV. That a coercive power is necessary to secure us V. What the Sword of Justice is VI. That the Sword of Justice belongs to him who hath the chiefe command VII That the Sword of War belongs to him also VIII All Judicature belongs to him too IX The Legislative power is his onely X. The naming of Magistrates and other Officers of the City belongs to him XI Also the Examination of all doctrines XII Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable XIII That the command his Citizens have granted is absolute and what proportion of obedience is due to him XIV The Lawes of the City bind him not XV. That no man can challenge a propriety to any thing against his will XVI By the Lawes of the City onely we come to know what theft murder adultery and injury is XVII The opinion of those who would constitute a City where there is no body should have an absolute power XVIII The marks of Supreme Authority XIX If a City be compar'd with a Man he that hath the Supreme Power is in order to the City as the humane soul is in relation to the Man XX. That the Supreme Command cannot by Right be dissolv'd through their consents by whose Compacts it was first constituted I. VVE must consider first of all what a * multitude of men gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society is namely that it is not any one body but many men whereof each one hath his owne will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd And though by particular Contracts each single man may have his own Right and Propriety so as one may say This is mine the other That is his yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude as a Person distinct from a single man can rightly say This is mine more then anothers Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude as it 's one but if all or more of them doe agree it will not be an Action but as many actions as Men. For although in some great Sedition it 's commonly said That the People of that City have taken up Armes yet is it true of those onely who are in Armes or who consent to them For the City which is one Person cannot take up Armes against it selfe Whatsoever therefore is done by the multitude must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up and that he who being in the Multitude and yet consented not nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it must be judg'd to have done nothing Besides in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person in that manner as hath been said there remaines that same â—…te of nature in which all things belong to all men and there is no place for Meum Tuum which is call'd Dominion and Propriety by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of the Naturall Laws Multitude c. The Doctrine of the power of a City over it's Citizens almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling and a multitude ruled For such is the nature of a City That a multitude or company of Citizens not onely may have command but may also be subject to command but in diverse senses which difference I did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this first Article but by the objections of many against those things which follow I discern otherwise wherefore it seemed good to me to the end I might make a fuller explication to adde these few things By Multitude because it is a collective word we understand more then one so as a multitude of meâ— is the same with many meâ— The same word because it is of the singular number signifies one thing namely one multitude but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature but to either a severall and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it Wherefore a Multitude cannot promisâ— contract acquire Right
that all controversies are bred from hence that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum Tuum just and unjust profitable and unprofitable good and evill honest and dishonest and the like which every man esteems according to his own judgement it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men and to declare them publiquely by which every man may know what may be called his what anothers what just what unjust what honest what dishonest what good what evill that is summarily what is to be done what to be avoyded in our common course of life But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes or the Lawes of the City as being the Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City And the CIVILL LAWES that we may define them are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City for direction of the future actions of his Citizens X. Furthermore since the affaires of the City both those of Warre and Peace cannot possibly be all administred by one man or one Counsell without Officers and subordinate Magistrates and that it appertains to Peace and common defence that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies to search into neighbouring counsels prudently to wage war and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the City should also rightly exercise their offices it is consonant to reason that they depend on and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in War and in Peace XI It is also manifest that all voluntary actions have their beginning from and necessarily depend on the will and that the will of doing or omitting ought depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each wherefore by evident and necessary inference we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of Peace that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to Citizens by which they may imagine that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City that is the commands of that man or Counsell to whom the supreme power is committed or that it is lawfull for to resist him or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies then him that yeelds obedience For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of naturall death another forbids it under pain of eternall death and both by their own Right it will follow that the Citizens although innocent are not onely by Right punishable but that the City it selfe is altogether disolved for no man can serve two Masters nor is he lesse but rather more a Master whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death It followes therefore that this one whether Man or Court to whom the City hath committed the supreme power have also this Right That he both * judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto peace and also that he forbid them to be taught Judge what opinions c. There is scarce any Principle neither in the worship of God nor humane sciences from whence there may not spring dissentions discords reproaches and by degrees war it selfe neither dâ—th this happen by reason of the falshood of the Principle but of the disposition of men who seeming wise to themselves will needs appear such to all others But though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power that they prove no hinderance to the publique peace Of these kind of opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place There are certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the City and that by Right they may nay ought to oppose and fight against chiefe Princes and dignities Such are those which whether directly and openly or more obscurely and by consequence require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed I deny not but this reflects on that power which many living under other government ascribe to the chiefe head of the Church of Rome and also on that which elsewhere out of that Church Bishops require in theirs to be given to them and last of all on that liberty which the lower sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to themselves for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world which did not either grow from or was nourisht by this Root The judgement therefore of doctrines whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not and if they be repugnant the power of prohibiting them to be taught I doe here attribute to the civill authority for since there is no man who grants not to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its Peace and defence anâ— it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its Peace it followes necessarily that the examination of those opinions whether they be such or not must be referred to the City that is to him who hath the supreme authority XII Last of all from this consideration that each Citizen hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in the City so as he may not employ his strength against him it followes manifestly that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands must not be punisht for as he who hath not power enough cannot punish him naturally so neither can he punish him by Right who by Right hath not sufficient power XIII It is most manifest by what hath been said That in every perfect City that is where no Citizen hath Right to use his faculties at his owne discretion for the preservation of himselfe or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded there is a Supreme power in some one greater then which cannot by Right be conferr'd by men or greater then which no mortall man can have over himself But that power greater then which cannot by men be conveigh'd on a man we call * ABSOLUTE for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City That he can unpunisht dâ—e any thing make Lawes judge Controversies set Penalties make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men and all this by Right truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted This same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Cities which are or ever have beene for though it be sometimes in doubt what Man or Counsell hath the Chief Command yet ever there is such a Command and alwayes exercis'd except in the time of Sedition and Civill War and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out of one Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute Authority
his death then the Monarch being dead the authority is confirmed in the people not by any new acts of the subjects but by vertue of the former Right for all the supreme comâ—and as Dominion was in the People but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary Monarch as in one that takes the benefit but hath not the Right But if the People after the election of a temporarie Monarch depart not from the Court before they have appointed certain times and places to convene during the time prescribed him as the Dictators in ancient times were made by the People of Rome such an one is not to be accounted a Monarch but the Prime Officer of the People and if it shall seem good the People may deprive him of his office even before that time as the People of Rome did when they conferred an equall power on Minutius Master of the horse with Quintus Fabius Maximus whom before they had made Dictator The reason whereof is that it is not to be imagined that whether Man or Counsell who hath the readiest and most immediate power to act should hold his command on such termes as not to be able actually to execuâ—e it for command is nothing else but a Right of commanding as oft as nature allowes it possible Lastly if the People having declared a temporary Monarch depart from the Court on such termes as it shall not be lawfull for them to meet without the command of the Monarch we must understand the People to be immediately dissolved and that his authority who is thus declared is absolute forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City a new unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority Nor matters it that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his Subjects on some certain times since there remains no Person now in being but at his discretion to whom the promise was made What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute Monarch who hath no heir apparent for the People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom it self doâ—h appoint Besides the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fiâ—ly compar'd to those times wherein the Monarch sleepes for in either the Acts of commanding ceases the Power remaines Farthermore to dissolve the convent so as it cannot meet againe is the death of the People just as sleeping so as he can never wake more is the death of a man As therefore a King who hath no Heir going to his rest so as never to rise again i. e. dying if he commit the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake does by consequence give him the Succession the People also electing a Temporary Monarch and not reserving a power to convene delivers upto him the whole Dominion of the Country Furthermore as a King going to sleep for some season entrusts the administration of his Kingdome to some other and waking takes it again so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch and with all retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place at that day receives its supremacy again And as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another himself in the mean while waking can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth so the People who during the time prescribed to the Temporary Monarch doth by Right convene may if they please deprive the Monarch of his Authority Lastly the King who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted give consent loses at once both his power and his life so the people who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd and the power remaines with him whom they have chosen XVII If the Monarch promise ought to any one or many subjects together by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath or without it is null for all Compact is a conveyance of Right which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter requires meet and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end Now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power and yet retaines the Power it selfe gives sufficient tokens That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it Whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the power the promise must be valued as not made i. e. of no effect XVIII We have seen how Subjects nature dictating have oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the Supreme Power We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these bonds of obedience And first of aâ—l this happens by rejection namely if a man cast off or forsake but conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other for what is thus rejected is openly expos'd to all alike catch who catch can whence again by the Right of nature every subject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement In the second place If the Kingdome fall into the power of the enemy so as there can no more opposition be made against them we must understand that he who before had the Supreme Authority hath now lost it For when the Subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands they have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each with other and what being conâ—…uer'd they promise afterwards to avoid death they must with no lesse endeavour labour to performe Thirdly in a Monarchy for a Democraâ—y and Aristocraty cannot fail if there be no successour all the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom for in such a case it were impossible to perform ought And by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty which all men have to all things to wit naturall and salvage for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill I mean liberty to subjection which Passion hath to Reason or a Beast to a Man Furthermore each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the Supreme Power namely if he change his soile which may be done two wayes either by permission as he who gets license to dwell in another Country or Command as he who is Banisht
lawfull is a seditious opinion IV. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civill Lawes is a seditious opinion V. That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion VI. That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason but alwayes supernaturally infused and inspired is aâ— seditious opinion VII That each subject hath a propriety or absolute Dominion of his owne goods is a seditious opinion VIII Not to understand the difference between the People and the Multitude prepares toward sedition IX Too great a Taxe of monies though never so just and necessary prepares toward sedition X. Ambition disposeth us to sedition XI So dâ—th the hope of successe XII Elâ—quence alone without wisdom is the only faculty needfull to raise seditions XIII How the folly of the common people and the eloquntion of ambitious men concur to the destruction of a Common-weale I. HItherto hath been spoken by what causes and Pacts Common-weals are constituted and what the Rights of Princes are over their subjects Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them or the reasons of seditions Now as in the motion of naturall bodies three things are to be considered namely internall disposition that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced the externall Agent whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced and the action it selfe So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults three things present themselves to our regard First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace wherewith the mindes of men are â—itted and disposed next their quality and condition who sollicite assemble and direct them already thus disposed to take up armes and quit their allegiance Lastly the manner how this is done or the faction it selfe But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition is this That the knowledge of good and â—vili belongs to â—ach single man In the state of nature indeed where every man lives by equall Right and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command of others we have granted this to be true nay in the first Chapter Article 9. that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evill just and unjust honest and dishonest that therefore what the Legislator commands must be held for good and what he forbids for evill and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath the supreme power in the Common-weale that is to say the Monarch in a Monarchy We have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh Chapter Article 2. out of the words of Solomon for if private men may pursue that as good and â—…n that as evill which appears to them to be so to what end serve those words of his Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy People that I may discern between good and evill Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and evill wicked are those though usuall sayings that be onely is a King who does righteously and that Kings must not be obeyed unlesse they command us just things and many other such like Before there was any government just and unjust had no being their nature onely being relative to some coÌ„mand and every action in its own nature is indifferent that it becomes just or unjust proceeds from the right of the Magistrate Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command just by commanding them and those which they forbid unjust by forbidding them but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evill desire to be even as Kings which cannot be with the safety of the Common weale The most ancient of all Gods commands is Gen. 2. 15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations Chap. 3. vers 5. Yee shall be as Gods knowing good and evill and Gods first expostulation with man vers 11. Who told thee that thou wert naked Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I coÌ„manded thee that thou shouldest not â—at As if he had said how comest thou to judge that nakedness wherein it seemed good to me to create thee to be shamefull except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne for he who doth so contemns the Law But we must distinguish That is my sinne indeed which committing I doe beleeve to be my sinne but what I beleeve to be another mans sin I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine for if I be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me if I doe it and he that commands me be by Right Lord over me I sinne not for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken I doe not therefore doe unjustly but rather if I refuse to doe it arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust which pertains onely to my Prince They who observe not this distinction will fall into a necessity of sinning as oft as any thing is commanded them which either is or seems to be unlawfull to them for if they obey they sin against their conscience and if they obey not against Right If they sin against their conscience they declare that they fear not the paines of the world to come if they sinne against Right they doe as much as in them lyes abolish humane society and the civill life of the present world Their opinion therefore who teach that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands which to them seem unjust is both erroneous and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience and it depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing Article for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evill we are the occasion that as well our obedience as disobedience becomes sin unto us III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root That a Tyrannicide is lawfull Nay at this day it is by many Divines and of old it was by all the Philosophers Plato Aristoâ—ls Cicero Seneca Plutarch and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman Anarchies held not only unlawfull but even worthy of the greatest contempt And under the title of Tyrants they mean not onely Monarchs but all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever for not Pisistratus onely at Athens but those thirty also who succeeded him and ruled together were all called Tyrants But he whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant commands either by Right or without Right if without Right he is an enemy and by Right to be put to death but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant but an enemy if by Right then the divine interrogation takes place Who hath told thee that
he was a Tyrant hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eatâ— For why doest thou call him a Tyrant whom God hath made a King except that thou being a private Person usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments but espcially to that which is Monarchieall we may hence discerne namely that by it every King whether good or ill stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement and slain by the hand of every â—…rtherous villain IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society is theirs who hold That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Arâ—ic 14. from this Argument That a City can neither be bound to it self nor to any subject not to it selfe because no man can be obliged except it be to another not to any Subject because the single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City insomuch that if the City will be free from all such obligation the Subjects will so too and by consequence she is so But that which holds true in a City that must be supposed to be true in a man or an assembly of men who have the Supreme Authority for they make a City which hath no being but by their Supreme Power Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government is evident from hence that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill that is to say the definition of what is and what is not against the Lawes would return to each single Person Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes and together with it all coercive jurisdiction which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of Government Yet this Errour hath great props Aristotle and others who by reason of humane infirmity suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of Government who thought that the constrainning Power the interpretation of Lawes and the making of Lawes all which are powers necessarily belonging to Government should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves Now although particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate yet this is onely then when the question is not what the Magistrate may but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe As when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it but his will was he should if he brake the Law else his will was he should not This thetefore that a Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes On the contrary it is evident that he is not tied to his owne Lawes because no man is bound to himself Lawes therefore are set for Titius and Caius not for the Ruler however by the ambition of Lawyers it is so ordered that the Lawes to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate but their Prudence V. In the fifth place That the Supreme Authority may be divided is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales But diverse men divide it diverse wayes For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace and the benefits of this life but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others Now because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation it happens that Subjects measuring justice not as they ought by the Civill Lawes but by the precepts and doctrines of them who in regard of the Magistrate are either private men or strangers through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes through fear falling into that which they most feared Now what can be more pernicious to any state then that men should by the apprehension of everlasting torments be deterred from obeying their Princes that is to say the Lawes or from being just There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War and Peace unto one whom they call a Monarch but the right of raising Monies they give to some others and not to him But because monies are the sinewes of War and Peace they who thus divide the Authority doe either really not divide it at all but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is but give the name of it to another or if they doe really divide it they dissolve the Government for neither upon necessity can War be waged nor can the publique Peace be preserved without Money VI. It is a common doctrine That faith and holinesse are not acquired by study and naturall reason but are alwayes supernaturally infused and inspired into mâ—n which if it were true I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith or why any man who is truly a Christian should not be a Prophet or lastly why every man should not judge what 's fit for him to doe what to avoid rather out of his own inspiration then by the precepts of his Superiours or right Reason A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good and Evil which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian world that the number of Apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite and it sprang from sick-brained men who having gotten good store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scriptures made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching that their Sermons signifying just nothing yet to unlearned men seemed most divine for he whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above VII The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government is this That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods be is in possession of That is to say such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods but also of the Magistrate himself which is not true for they who have a Lord over them have themselves no Lordship as hath been proved Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects by the constitution of Government Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken no man had any proper Right all things were common to all men tell me therefore how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate How got the
distinction between Counsel and Law from the difference between Counsell and Command Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing it self which is advised but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander For it is not properly said Thus I will and thus I Command except the will stand for a Reason Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes not for the thing it self but by reason of the advisers will the Law is not a Counsell but a Command and is defined thus LAW is the command of that Person whether Man or Court whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience as the Precepts of God in regard of Men of Magistrates in respect of their Subjects and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist may be termed their Lawes Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth Counsell to them who have no power To follow what is prescribed by Law is duty what by Counsell is free-will Counsell is directed to his end that receives it Law to his that gives it Counsell is given to none but the willing Law even to the unwilling To conclude the right of the Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives Counsell the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed II. They confound Law and Covenant who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or forms of living determined by the common consent of men Amongst whom is Aristotle who defines Law on this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the City declaring every thing that we ought to doe which definition is not simply of Law but of the Civill Law for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the consent of men nor yet the Lawes of Nature for if they had their originall from the consent of men they might also by the same consent be abrogated but they are unchangeable But indeed that 's no right definition of a Civill Law for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person one will or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills if for one person those words common consent are ill placed here for one person hath no common consent neither ought he to have said declaring what was needfull to be done but commanding for what the City deolares it commands its Subjects He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes some certain formes of living but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man and therefore are no Lawes before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell have sufficient remedy against the rest who otherwise are not likely to keep them Lawes therefore according to this definition of Aristotle are nothing else but naked and weak contracts which then at length when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power shall either become Lawes or no Lawes at his will and pleasure Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes which he ought not to have done for Contract is a promise Law a command In Contracts we say I will do this In Lawes Doe this * Contracts oblige us Lawes vie us fast being obliged A Contract obligeth of it self The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done before we are obliged to doe it But in Law we are first obliged to performe and what is to be done is determined afterwards Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City commanding every thing behoofefull to be done which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art 9. to wit that the civill lawes are the command of him whether man or Court of men who is endued with supreme power in the city concerning the future actions of his Subjects Contracts oblige us To be obliged and to be tyed being obliged seems to some men to be one and the same thing and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none indeed More cleerly therefore I say thâ—… That a man is obliged â—y his contracts that is that he ought to performe for his promise sake but that the Law tyes him being obliged that is to say it compells him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law III. They confound Lawes with Right who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law That which is prohibited by the divine Law cannot bee permitted by the civill neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law be prohibited by the civill notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right that is to say that which may be done by divine Right doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour although they cannot enlarge them now naturall liberty is a Right not constituted but allowed by the Lawes For the Lawes being removed our liberty is absolute This is first restrained by the naturall and divine Lawes the residue is bounded by the civill Law and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns and Societies There is great difference therefore between Law and Right For Law is a setter Right is freedome and they differ like contraries IV. All Law may be divided first according to the diversity of its Authors into Divine and humane the Divine according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men is twofold naturall or morall and positive naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them to wit their naturall Reason and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold Positive is that which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government and divine worship and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes his peculiar people Again the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men which alone hath obtained the title of the I aw of nature and that of Cities which may be called that of Nations but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations The precepts
whether it be a sin or not when he hath freedome to forbear it is a contempt of the Lawes and therefore by the 28. Art of the third Chapter a sin against the Law of nature Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into Active and Passive as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees which is a sinne against the Law of nature which is the Law of God or as â—…though they sinned not who sinne at their own perill Integer vitae sceâ—erisque purâ—s Non eget Mauri jaculis nec areâ— Nec venenatis gravida sagittis Fusce pharetra Sive per Syrtes iter aestuosas Sive facturus per inhospitalâ—… Caucasum vel quae loca fabulosus Lambit Hidaspis RELIGION CHAP. XV. Of the Kingdome of God by Nature I. The Proposition of the following contents II. Over whom God is said to rule by nature III. The word of God three-fold Reason Revelation Prophesie IV. The Kingdome of God two-fold Naturall and Prophetique V. The Right whereby God reigns is seated in his omnipotence VI. The same proved from Scripture VII The obligation of yeelding obedience to God proceeds from humane infirmity VIII The Lawes of God in his naturall Kingdome are those which are recited above in the 2. and 3. Chapter IX What Honour and Worship is X. Worship consists either in attributes or in actions XI And there is one sort naturall another arbitrary XII One commanded another voluntary XIII What the end or scope of worship is XIV What the naturall Laws are concerning Gods attributes XV. What the actions are whereby naturally wee doe give worship XVI In Gods naturall Kingdome the City may appoint what worship of God it pleaseth XVII God ruling by nature only the City that is to say that man or Court who under God hath the soveraign authority of the Cioy is the Interpreter of all the Lawes XVIII Certaine doubts removed XIX What Sin is in the naturall Kingdom of God and what Treason against the divine Majesty I. WEE have already in the foregoing Chapters proved both by reason and testimonies of holy Writ that the estate of nature that is to say of absolute liberty such as is theirs who neither govern nor are governed is an Anarchy or hostile state that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state are the Lawes of nature that there can be no civill government without a Soveraigne and that they who have gotten this Soveraigne command must be obey'd simply that is to say in all things which repugne not the Commandments of God There is this one thing only wanting to the complete undestanding of all civill duty that is to know which are the Laws and Commandments of God for else we cannot tell whether that which the civill power commands us be against the Lawes of God or not whence it must necessarily happen that either by too much obedience to the civill authority we become stubborne against the divine Majesty or for feare of sinning against God we runne into disobeditnce against the civill power To avoid both these rocks its necessary to know the Divine Lawes now because the knowledge of the Lawes depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome we must in what followes speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God II. The Lord is King the earth may be glad thereof saith the Psalmist Psal 97. v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist Psal 99. v. 1. The Lord is King be the People never so unpatient he sâ—teth betweene the Cherubins â—e the Earth never so unquiet to wit whether men will or not God is THE King over all the Earth nor is he mov'd from his Throne if there be any who deny either his existence or his providence Now although God governe all men so by his power that none can doe any thing which he would not have done yet this to speake properly and accurately is not to reigne for he is sayed to reigne who rules not by acting but speaking that is to say by precepts and threatnings And therefore we account not inanimate nor irrationall bodies for Subjects in the Kingdome of God although they be subordinate to the Divine power because they understand not the commands and threats of God nor yet the Atheists because they beleeve not that there is a God nor yet those who beleeving there is a God doe not yet beleeeve that he rules these Inferiour things for even these although they be govern'd by the power of God yet doe they not acknowledge any of his Commands nor stand in awe of his threats Those onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome who acknowledge him to be the Governour of all things and that he hath given his Commands to men and appointed punishments for the transgressours The rest we must not call Subjects but Enemies of God III. But none are said to governe by commands but they who openly declare them to those who are govern'd by them for the Commands of the Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd but lawes they are not if not perspicuously publisht in so much as all excuse of Ignorance may be taken away Men indeed publish their Lawes by word or voice neither can they make their will universally knowne any other way But Gods lawes are declar'd after a threefold manner first by the tacit dictates of Right reason next by immediate revelation which is suppos'd to be done either by a supernaturall voice or by a vision or drcame or divine inspiration Thirdly by the voice of one man whom God recommends to the rest as worthy of beliefe by the working of â—rue miracles Now he whole voice God thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others is called a PROPHET These three manners may be term'd the threefold word of God to wit the Rationall word the sensible word and the word of Prophecy To which answer the three nanners whereby we are said to heare God Right reasoning sense and faith Gods sensible word hath come but to few neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except particularly to some and to diverse diversely neither have any Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people IV. And according to the difference which is between the Rationall word and the word of Prophecy we attribute a two-fold Kingdome unto God Naturall in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason and which is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power by reason of that rationall nature which is common to all and Propheticall in which he rules also by the word of Prophecy which is peculiar because he hath not given positive Lawes to all men but to his peculiar people and some certaine men elected by him V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule and to punish those who break his Lawes from his sole irresistable power for all Right over others is either from nature or from Contract How the Right of governing
therefore not the Cities worship but what is done by the City is understood to be done by the command of of him or them who have the Soveraignty wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects that is to say Uniformly XVI The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article concerning the divine worship only command the giving of naturall signes of honour but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes the one naturall the other done upon agreement oâ— by expresse or tacite composition Now because in every language the use of words and names come by appointment it may also by appointment be altered for that which depends on and derives its force from the will of men can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again or abolisht Such names therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men can by the same appointment be taken away now what can be done by the appointment of men that the City may doe The City therefore by Right that is to say they who have the power of the whole City shall judge what names or appellations are more what lesse honourable for God that is say what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God and his operations Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment but naturally even as the effects are signes of their causes whereof some are alwayes signes of scorn to them before whom they are committed as those whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered and whatsoever men are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect Others are alwayes signes of honour as â—o draw near and discourse decently and humbly to give way or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit In these actions the City can after nothing but there are infinite others which as much as belongs to honour or reproach are indifferent now these by the institution of the City may both be made signes of honour and being made so doe in very deed become so From whence we may understand that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring God that is to say for Worship provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour because that is a sign of honour which by the Cities command is us'd for such XVII We have already declared which were the Laws of God as wel sacred as secular in his government by the way of Nature onely Now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning and that it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions it may be demanded farther whom God would have to be the Interpreter of right Reason that is to say of his Lawes And as for the Secular Lawes I mean those which concern justice and the carriage of men towards men by what hath been said before of the constitution of a City we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason that all Judicature belongs to the City and that Judicacature is nothing else but an Interpretation of the Laws and by consequence that every-where Cities that is to say those who have the Soveraign power are the Interpreters of the Lawes As for the Sacred Lawes we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth Chap. the 13. art that every Subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him or them who had the supreme authority but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured and therefore also he hath done it That he could it appeares hence that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht from every mans private Reason but every man can subject his private Reason to the Reason of the whole City Moreover if each Man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely or impious neither would the one seem to the other to honour God Even that therefore which were most consonant to reason would not be a worship because that the nature of worship consists in this that it be the sign of inward honour but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others and therefore is there no sign of honour but what seems so to others Again that 's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign therefore also that is honourable which by the consent of men that is to say by the command of the City becomes a sign of honour It is not therefore against the will of God declared by the way of reason onely to give him such signs of honour as the City shall command wherefore Subjects can transferre their Right of judging the manner of Gods worship on him or them who have the Soveraign power nay they must doe it for else all manner of absurd opinions concerning the nature of God and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any Nations will bee seen at once in the same City whence it will fall out that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe offer God an affront so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships God for no man worships God that is to say honours him outwardly but he who doth those things whereby hee appeares to others for to honour him It may therefore bee concluded that the Interpretation of all Lawes as well Sacred as Secular God ruling by the way of nature only depends on the authority of the City that is to say that man or councell to whom the Soveraign power is committed and that whatsoever God commands he commands by his voyce And on the other side that whatsoever is commanded by them both concerning the manner of honouring God and concerning secular assaires is commanded by God himselfe XVIII Against this some Man may demand first Whether it doth not follow that the City must be obeyed if it command us directly to affront God or forbid us to worship him I say it does not follow neither must we obey for to affront or not to worship at all cannot by any Man be understood for a manner of worshipping neither also had any one before the constitution of a City of those who acknowledge God to rule a Right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him nor could he therefore rransfer a Right on the City of commanding any such things Next if it be demanded whether the City must be obeyed if it command somewhat to be said or done which is not a disgrace to God directly but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences may be derived as for example if it were commanded to worship God in an image before those who account that honourable Truly it is to be * done For Worship is instituted in signe of Honour but to Worship him thus is a signe of honour and
increaseth Gods Honour among those who do so account of it Or if it be commanded to call God by a name which we know not what it signifies or how it can agree with this word God That also must be done for what we do for Honours sake and we know no better if it be taken for a signe of Honour it is a signe of Honour and therefore if we refuse to doe it we refuse the enlarging of Gods Honour The same judgement must be had of all the Attributes and Actions about the meerly rationall Worship of God which may be controverted and dispuâ—ed for though these kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason and therefore sins in them who command them yet are they not against right reason nor sins in Subjects whose right reason in points of Controversie is that which submits its selfe to the reason of the City Lastly if that Man or Councell who hath the Supreme Power command himselfe to be Worshipt with the same Attributes and Actions where with God is to be Worshipt the question is whether we must obey There are many things which may be commonly attributed both to God and Men for even Men may be Praised and Magnified and there are many actions whereby God and Men may be Worshipt But the significations of the Attributes and Actions are onely to be regarded Those Attributes therefore whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion that there is any man endued with a Soveraignty independent from God or that he is immortall or of inâ—inite power and the like though commanded by Princes yet must they be abstained from as also from those Actions signifying the same as Prayer to the absent to aske those things which God alone can give as Rain and Fair weather to offer him what God can onely accept as Oblations Holocausts or to give a Worship then which a greater cannot be given as Sacrifice for these things seeme to tend to this end that God may not be thought to rule contrary to what was supposed from the beginning but genuflection prostration or any other act of the body whatsoever may be lawfully used even in civill Worship for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the civill power onely for Divine Worship is distinguisht from civill not by the motion placing habit or gesture of the Body but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we doe Worship as if we cast down our selves before any man with intention of declaring by that Signe that we esteeme him as God it is Divine Worship if we doe the same thing as a Signe of our acknowledgment of the civill Power it is civill Worship Neither is the Divine Worship distinguished from Civill by any action usually understood by by the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereof the former marking out the Duty of Servants the latter their Destiny they are words of the same action in degree Truly it is to be done We said in the 14. Article of this Chapter That they who attributed limits to God transgrest the naturall Law concerning Gods Worship now they who worship him in an Image assigne him limits wherefore they doe that which they ought not to doe and this place seemes to contradict the former We must therefore know first that they who are constrained by Authority doe not set God any boonds but they who command them for they who worship unwillingly doe worship in very deed but they either stand or fall there where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawfull Soveraign Secondly I say it must be done not at all times and every where but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping God beside the dictates of humane reason for then the will of the City stands for Reason but in the Kingdome of God by way of Covenant whether old or new where idolatry is expressely forbid though the City commands us to worship thus yet must we not do it which if he shall consider who conceived some repugnancy between this and the 14. Article will surely cease to think so any longer XIX From what hath been said may be gathered that God reigning by the way of naturall reason onely Subjects doe sinne First if they break the morall Laws which are unfolded in the second and third Chapters Secondly if they break the Lawes or commands of the City in those things which pertain to Justice Thirdly if they worship not God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fourthly if they confesse not before men both in words and deeds that there is one God most good most great most blessed the Supreme King of the World and of all worldly Kings that is to say if they doe not worship God This fourth sinne in the naturall Kingdome of God by what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter in the second Article is the sinne of Treason against the Divine Majesty for it is a denying of the Divine Power or Atheisme for sinnes proceed here just as if we should suppose some man to be the Soveraign King who being himselfe absent should rule by his Vice-Roy against whom sure they would transgresse who should not obey his Vice-Roy in all things except he usurpt the Kingdome to himself or would give it to some other but they who should so absolutely obey him as not to admit of this exception might be said to be guilty of Treason CHAP. XVI Of the Kingdome of God under the Old Covenant I. Superstition possessing Forrain Nations God institued the true Religion by the means of Abraham II. By the Covenant between God and Adam all dispute is forbidden concerning the Commands of Surâ—ours III. The manner of the Covenant between God and Abraham IV. In that Covenant is contained an acknowledgement of God not simply but of him who appeared unto Abraham V. The Lawes unto which Abraham was tyed were no other beside those of Nature and the Law of Circumcision VI. Abraham was the Interpreter of the Word of God and of all Lawes among those that belonged to him VII Abrahams subjects could not sinne by obeying him VIII Gods Covenant with the Hebrews at Mount Sinai IX From thence Gods Government took the name of a Kingdome X. What Lawes were by God given to the Jewes XI What the Word of God is and how to be known XII What was held the written Word of God among the Jewes XIII The power of interpreting the Word of God and the supreme civill power were united in Moises while he lived XIV They were also united in the High Priest during the life of Joshuah XV. They were united too in the High Priest untill King Sâ—uls time XVI They were also united in the Kings untill the captivity XVII They were so in the High Priests after the captivity XVIII Deniall of the Divine Providence and Idolatry were the onely Treasons against the Divine Majesty among the Jewes in all things else they ought to obey
doe not so much care to destroy it as to conveigh it on others for removing this power they together take away Civill Society and a confusion of all things returnes There is so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief Ruler as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City that is to say so much as that Right of his may not be granted in vaine Now this kind of obedience although for some reasons it may sometimes by Right be deny'd yet because a greater cannot be perform'd we will call it SIMPLE But the obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City but mediately from hence That without obedience the Cities Right would be frustrate and by consequence there would be no City constituted For it is one thing if I say I give you Right to Command what you will another if I say I will doe whatsoever you Command and the Command may be such as I would rather die then doe it forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd much lesse is he tyed to that which to him is worse then death if therefore I be commanded to kill my self I am not bound to doe it for though I deny to doe it yet the Right of dominion is not frustrated since others may be found who being commanded will not refuse to doe it neither doe I refuse to doe that which I have contracted to doe In like manner if the Chief Ruler command any man to kill him he is not tyed to doe it because it cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant nor if he command to execute a Parent whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the Law since there are others who being commanded will doe that and a Son will rather die then live infamous and hated of all the world There are many other cases in which since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some and not by others Obedience may by Right be perform'd by these and refus'd by those and this without breach of that absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler For in no case is the Right taken away from him of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him But they who thus kill men although by Right given them from him that hath it yet if they use that Right otherwise then right Reason requires they sin against the Lawes of Nature that is against God Absolute A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion and the Citizens oppose it not for in the gathering together of many men they acknowledge the face of a City and even the unskilfull understand that matters there are rul'd by Counsell Yet Monarchy is no lesse a City then Democraâ—y and absolute Kings have their Counsellours from whom they will take advice and suffer their power in matters of greater consequence to be guided but not recall'd But it appears not to most men how a City is contain'd in the Person of a King and therefore they object against Absolute Command First that if any man had such a Right the condition of the Citizens would be miserable For thus they think He will take all spoil all kill all and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not already spoil'd and kill'd But why should he doe thus not because he can for unlesse he have a mind to it he will not doe it Will he to please one or some few spoil all the rest First though by Right that is without injury to them he may doe it yet can he not doe it justly that is without breach of the Naturall Lawes and injury against God And therefore there is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which Princes take Next if he could justly doe it or that he made no account of his Oath yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it since he findes no good in it But it cannot be deny'd but a Prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly but grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the injuries of others which if thou wilt be safe is necessary for thee to give are not all the same things to be feared for he that hath strength enough to protect all wants not sufficiency to oppresse all Here is no other difficulty then but that humane affaires cannot be without some inconvenience And this inconvenience it self is in the Citizens not in the Government for if men could rule themselves every man by his own command that 's to say could they live according to the Lawes of Nature there would be no need at all of a City nor of a common coercive power Secondly they object That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute which indeed is not true for all Monarchies and all other States are so for although they who have the chief Command doâ— not all those things they would and what they know profitable to the City the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them but the consideration of their Citizens who busied about their private interest and carelesse of what tends to the publique cannot sometimes be drawn to performe their duties without the hazard of the City Wherefore Princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right and prudently remit somewhat of the act but nothing of their Right XIV Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe for he is already suppos'd to have what he can give himself nor can he be oblig'd to himselfe for the same Party being both the obliged and the Obliger and the Obliger having power to release the obliged it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe because he can release himself at his own pleasure and he that can doe this is already actually free Whence its plaine that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes for the Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City by which if she were engag'd she should be engag'd to her selfe Neither can the City be oblig'd to her Citizen because if he will he can free her from her obligation and he will as oft as she wills for the will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the City the City therefore is free when she pleaseth that is she is now actually free but the will of a Councell or one who hath the Supreme Authority given him is the will of the City he therefore containes the wills of all particular Citizens Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes for this is to be bound to himself nor to any of his Citizens XV. Now because as hath been shewn above before the constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men nor is there that thing which any man can so call his as any other may not by the same