and hauing instructed many with such Disciples and his sonnes hauing some aduantages agaynst the Christians turned their Armes agaynst the Kings of Fez and Morocco and setled themselues in their places with their Religion Prudence is next to Piety the principall part which they should haue which vndertake such an enterprize and so much the more necessary for that many times an indiscreet zeale hinders his function and ruines that which he would Establish And although that the counsels of these zealous persons succeed sometimes which notwithstanding is but seldome God hauing giuen prudence to men to serue them for a guide all hauing not deserued that God should daily imploy his power to worke miracles Ananias hauing perswaded Isates King of the Adiabones and his mother to receiue the Iewish-Religion held it fit that he should forbeare to cause himselfe to be circumcised vntill he had disposed his people But Eliazar the Gallilean prest him to do it and not to preferre the feare of men to the grace of God Which was the aduice of a Diuine more zealous then discreet the which although it succeeded well at that time their spirits being better prepared then the Prince expected yet it were dangerous to follow it in all Encounters For the Apostle commaunds that zeale should be guided by Knowledge We know in our time that this rash zeale hath done more harme to the Catholicke Religion then good I doubt whether to this inconsiderate zeale we should not attribute that opinion which some haue of the greatnes of the spirituall power by the which and their Rules they minister cause of Iealousie to all temporall powers the which they submit vnto it agaynst the ancient beliefe and the custome of former ages A proceeding quite contrary to that of Iesus Christ whom the Iewes desiring to surprize by this meanes in the crime of high treason and to bandy the Magistrate agaynst him declared openly that his Kingdome was not of this world and commaunded to yeild vnto Caesar that which was Caesars although he were a Tyrant and an Vsurper of another mans liberty After him his Apostles haue spoken of the ciuill Magistrate with honour and respect commaunding to obay him and it cannot be found that by vertue of the Spirituall power they haue aduised to attempt any thing agaynst the Magistrate It is true that among Christians the Spirituall power hath beene alwayes much respected but only when it hath beeâ—e practized in matters which are meerely Spirituall the which looseth the dignity and grace which is due vnto it when it deales in matters which are temporall terrien These be the bounds which haue alwayes beene set in France betwixt the Ecclesiasticall lurisdiction and a Regall power and with this distinction the Christian Religion hath beene preserued aboue a thousand yeares in France without any blemish But inconsideration or ambition which is vsually blind hath proceeded further to breed a Iealousie among all Christian Princes For by a consequence altogether absurd and foolish they would make the VVorld beleeue that the obedience of the Subiect towards his Prince the which being a temporall thing cannot be reputed but temporall may be prohibited by the Spirituall power the which notwithstanding hath no power nor Iurisdiction ouer temporall things The which is a meanes not only to hinder that such Princes as are distracted from the ancient beleife do not re-vnite themselues seeing they cannot do it without dimunition of their authority and power but also makes others which are not yet separated to free themselues from this subiection leaue it or fauour all which oppose themselues to this Doctrine neuer insisting vpon the errors which they may adde thereunto There is as little wisedome to â—rosse the Rules of a receiued pollicy if they were not altogether impious neyther must they presse to change the Religion of the conscience if without impiety this apparence may be preserued The ancient Christians made no difficulty to apply vnto the Diuine Seruice many of the Iewish and Pagan ceremonies In diuers changes of Religion hapned in our time Luther in Germany and Peter Martyre in England haue carried themselues more discreetly hauing retayned the greatest part of the ceremonies of the Catholicke Religion approoued therein then they which haue made their Religion bald and destitute of all ornament and to make it the more sauage and to seeme more different from the common beleife they haue changed the names and termes by an inâ—iseâ—eeâ— vanity Behold part of the principall considerations which they must obserue in the setling of a Religion Let vs now see how we are to carry our selues to preserue the ancient beleife amidst the diuersitie of other Religions which are crept into the Estate CHAP. 17. That the diuersity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate how they ought to carry themselues to preserue the ancient Beleife in the diuersity of Religions crept into the Estate IN old time the Kings of Aegypt entertayned this diuersity in Religion among their Subiects Some worshipping a Dogge others a Bird and some a Crocadile with other things according vnto their fancies which was a tyrannicall practize to the end their Subiects might not agree to controule and reforme their Actions But it is certayne that if in the Concord of an Estate consists the good and quiet of the Subiects it is more expedient to re-vnite themselues all in one Religion when they may For Religion is the cyment which binds the Quick-siluer that drawes together all the members of the Estate into one perfect vnion And contrariwise there is nothing that doth more dis-unite a people then the diuersity of opinions or the vse of diuers ceremonies in matter of Religion Hence haue proceeded the most violent and furious passions that cuer troubled an Estate and the life of men And in this poynt all other interests are so implyed as it hath drawne with it all that which makes a part of the honours goods and fortunes of men For Religion the children haue left the Fathers cause seruants haue denied their masters seruice and subiects their fidellity to Princes Finally all naturall rights and offices of humanity haue ceased whereas Religion hath resisted Euery man esteeming that which he followes to be the most pure and the true manner of worship and condemning all that which is not conformable to his beliefe VVherefore we must flye this diuersity euen in light things for that a multitude being vncapable to iudge of things by themselues nor by reason or motion in Religion suffring themselues to be carried away by chance and apparent shewes contrary to that which Faith should perswade them aboue the perception of their vnderstanding when they haue once shaken some opinion which he had in Reuerence he presently falls into the like vncertaynty of the other peeces of his beliefe which haue no more authority nor ground with him then those which they haue already shaken Finding then this diuersity in
makes way to a change A Râ—uolâ—e and Ciuill Warres dispose to a change of Religion As likewise excessiue liberty and contempt of Religion The revnion of a Countrey vnder the same Prince facilitate the setling of Religion Chapter 16. Of the parties necessary for those which will bring in a new Religion Parts and quallities necessary for such as seeke to bring in a new Religion That instruction is a powerfull meanes for the establishing of a Religion That the zeale of Religion must be accompanied and guided by discretion Of Spirituall and Temporall powers and of their iurisdiction That obseruing of the Ceremonies of an ancient Religion facillitates the establishment of a new Chapter 17. That diuersity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate How they ought to carry themselues to preserue the ancient Beliefe in the diuersity of Religions which are crept into the Estate Diuersity of Religions in Egypt There ought to be but one religion in an Estate Diuersity of religions which is dangerous in an Estate ought to be auoyded yea in the lightest matters How they ought to gouern themselues to preserue the ancient beliefe in the diuersity of Religions which are crept into the State Of the extirpation of Heresie and a new Religion in its breeding and how they ought to gouerne themselues That it is not expedient nor fitting to seeke to roote out Heresie by Armes when it hath taken footing in an Estate The tolleration of Religions in an Estate is lesse preiudiciall then a a Ciuill Warre Warre agaynst Heretickes fortifies their party and giues them great aduantages It is dangerous for a Prince to Arme agaynst his Subiects if hee bee not assured of the euent A good aduise to weaken the party of a new Sector religion Chapter 18. Of the disorders which happen in Religion and of the meanes to preuent them Chapter 19. Of the establishing of the Councell of Estate and of the Qualities and number of Counsellors Of a Councell of Estate Qualities of Counsellors of Estate The great difference betwixt an Old Counsellor and a Young for that which concernes their aduice A mixture of Old and Young Counsellors of Estate Obstinacy a wilfull vice in a Counsellor He ought to be without ambition and not depending of any other Irresolution a dangerous vice and to be auoided in a Counsellor of Estate Hee ought not to be too confident Of the change of Counsellors of Estate Of the multitude of Counsellors who are to be otherwise imployed Chapter 20. Of the plurality of Councels of State of the power of a Councell and of the order in deliuering their opinions The power of a Councell A Consultatiue voice A Deliberatiue voice Equality among Counsellors Chapter 21. Considerations for a Prince who is to bee Councelled Sufficiency and capacity necessary for a Prince Of the manner how to demand Councell To receiue Councell To examine it To resolue and execute it Of the flattery of Councellors and how the Prince ought to auoide it Of the truth and liberty which ought to be in a Councellor of Estate Of the chiefe Ministers of Estate A good course for a Minister of Estate to free himselfe duely of his charge Chapter 22. Of the forme of commanding Of the power Of the Law Diuersity of Lawes The ayme and end of the Law Qualities considerable in the establishment thereof Of the breuâ—ty of the Law Of the Princes absolute command Chapter 23. What we must auoide in the making of Lawes Of the multiplicity of Lawes and the causes thereof Of the obseruation of Lawes Of the seuerity When the Prince may dispence in following the Lawes How they ought to gouerne themselues in the seuerity Chapter 24. Of the particular Commanders of the Prince Chapter 25. Of Magistrates A distinction of the Officers and Ministers of an Estate Chapter 26. Of the difference betwixt Officers and Commissaries Considerations to be made vpon a Commission Of the person from whom it proceeds Of the direction thereof Of the charge of the Commission Of the duty of a Commissary Chapter 27. Considerations vpon the establishing of Officers and Magistrates Of the number of Officers That it is more safe to commit a businesse to many then to one That the plurality of Officers is profitable to an Estate Chapter 28. Of the Creation and Nomination of Magistrates The Creation and choice of Officers must be made by the Soueraigne and not otherwise That the charges must be distributed proportionally to the Nature and capacity of the person Principall qualities required in an Officer and Magistrate The Vices and Defects are as well to be considered as the Vertues and Perfections in the choice they will make of Magistrates and Officers Chapter 29. Of the forme and manner of Creating and making Magistrates and Officers and of the time of their charges Three kinds of Creating and making Magistrates The time of their Charges either for life then for a limited time Reasons and Considerations to make Officers for a time Other Considerations to the contrary Change of Officers and Magistrates necessary in a Popular Estate Meanes to hinder the vsurpation of the State by the continuance of Officers in great places The practice of the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice in the disposition of the great places of their Estates to hinder the vsurpation The practise of Kings and Princes vpon the same subiect That the change of Prime Officers and Magistrates is necessary for the safety of the Prince and the quiet of the Subiect Prudence required in this change That they must not giue great Commaunds to those that are borne in a Prouince Chapter 30. Of the duty of principall Officers and Magistrates In what the duty of Officers and Magistrates do consist Of their duty towards the Lawes towards the examination and interpretation thereof How a Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law In the intention of the Law Of the reason of the Law and of the scope thereof That he must hold himselfe vnto the Authority of the Law and not flye subtilties vpon equity Of the execution of the Lawes or ordinances Consideration for the sayd execution From what time and when the Law or ordinance doth bind What they are whom it binds Of the force of Lawes and Ordinances Of Custome Three things requisite to make a Custome Chapter 31 Of the duty of the Magistrates towards their Soueraigne Wherein the duties of the Magistrates towards the Prâ—nce doe consist Of the Princes commaunds and how the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the allowing and verifying thereof The Magistrate ought to obey the will of the Prince although it should be vniust The Magistrates disobedience vnto the will of the Prince is of most dangerous consequence That the Magistrate is not allowed to leaue his place rather then to verifie and publish the vniust Commaund of the Prince Causes and reasons for the which hath bin brought in the manner and Custome to verifie the
Edicts ordinances and Commandments of the Prince by the Magistrates How the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the execution of Commandments there hapning a reuocation Chapter 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another Three degrees of Magistrates and of the power of eyther of them The duty of the Superiour or prime Magistrates That it is fitting for the Prince to indurâ— the iudgment of the Magistrates Of the Kings procter The power of a Lieutenant is equall to that of the Magistrate The power of the Magistrate is of no force out of his iurisdiction Of two Magistrates equall in power and of the execution of their ordinances or iudgements vpon one anothers territories Of the execution of sentence giuâ—n by the Officer of a Forraigne Prince vpon the iurisdiction of another Of Magistrates equall in power Of a body or Colledge and of their power and Commaund one ouer another The difference betwixt opposition and Commandment That they may hinder one another by opposition before the Act or by appeale after the Act but not to commâ—nd Chapter 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to priuate persons Diuers powers of Magistrates Of their duty to priâ—ate men in giuing Iudgement Of the obedience and respect of priuate men to the Magistrate executing his office Of the Magistrate wronged When and how he may be Iudge in his owne cause Mildnesse and patience reqâ—ired in a Magistrate Prudence and Grauity without passion The duty of Magistrates Chapter 34. Of the Iustice of Commandments Rules and Considerations in the Iustice of Commandments A mixture of the Law with the will of the Magistrate Of the temper which the Magistrate ought to obserue in the Law Of the distribution of offices and dignities distribution of rewards and punishments Harmony in Marriages Harmony in the diuision of goods Chapter 35. Of the setling of the forces of an Estate Prouision of Armes and Shipping Armes offensiue and defensiue The quality of defensiue Armes That they must not be contemned They augment courage The quality of offensiue Armes Two sorts of offensiue Armes Of the beauty and ornament of Armes Chapter 36. Of Forts and of their profit for the preseruation of an Estate The scituation of Forts necessary and profitable They must be farre from the heart of the Estate They must be strong by scituation and fortification Great and in a place where they may be relieued That they must not neglect the Fortification in places which are strong by scituation Chapter 37. Of Warfare Of the aduantages of Horse and Foote Of the choice of Souldiers That they may not vse Strangers as little as may be Chapter 38. Of the number of Souldiers in ordinary Traine Bands Two sorts of Souldiers Of Subsidiaries An order to practise them in the time of peace and to preuent their Mutinies Of their numbers A meanes to draw the Subiects of an Estate without charge to the Prince and to hinder the Reuolte and Mutiny Chapter 39. Of the forme how to make a Leuie of Souldiers of the Place of the Age of the Stature and of their Vocation The particular manner of the Romans The danger of mutiny vpon the change of Captaines Of the choice the Captaine ought to make of his Souldiers Of the place whence he should take his Souldiers Of their Age Stature and Vocation Chapter 40. Of the Forces at Sea Chapter 41. Of the Riches of aâ— Estate That the power of an Estate depends of its riches What is necâ—ssary for the Wealth of an Estate Wherein the Wealth of an Estate doth consist Chapter 42. Of the causes of the abundance and wealth of an Estate That is to say in Tillage handiworkes and the commerce with Strangers Whence the abundance of necessary things doth grow Tillage well husbandred causeth abundance The cause of the neglect thereof That it is not vnworthy of a Prince Manufactures cause abundance in an Estate An aduice to multiply Workmen Three considerations for Commerce Of Merchandize which we may and ought carry to Strangers Of the transport of Gold and Siluer Of raw Matterials Of the bringing in and entry of forraigne Coine into an Estate That the course of forraigne Coyne ought not to bee allowed Merchandiâ—e whereof they should hinder the entry Chapter 43. Of the facility of Commerce Trafficke at Sea profitable and honourable Aduantages which the publique and priuate should receiue if the Nobility gaue themselues to the Commerce at Sea An order established by the Hollanders for the continuance of the Trade at the East Iâ—dies The great reputation which they haue gotten by the meanes of trade A meanes to establish the trade at Sea in an Estate Chapter 44. Of parsimony or sparing That Parsimony preserues the wealth of an Estate That it imports much for the safety of an Estate Wherein excesse doth consist Of the excesse in buildings The orders which they obserue in Flanders the lowe Countries for their buildings in Towns Of the excesse in moueables Followers Feasts and Play Chapter 45. Of the setling of the Treasure and ordinary reuenew of an Estate Of the ordinary Reuenew of demeanes and of the establishment thereof That no alienation ought to be allowed much lesse ingagements Entries and issues out of the Estate Tributes gifts and pensions Traffique in the name of the Publique To deliuer money at interest to Merchants and the aduantages which grow thereby Of the sale of Offices The soâ—rce and spring of their abuses The inconueniences which grow by the sale of Offices Chapter 46. Of Taxes and of extraordinary Leuies Imposts and Loanes Diuers formes of Taxes and Leuies Of such as are exempt from Taxes Of the place where they ought to leuie the Taxe The Introduction of Tolles tributes and imposts Of the valuing of goods practised by the Romans Abollished by Tyrants Imaginary inconueniences of the sayd valuation of goods and without reason Aduantages which would grow thereby to the State Of extraordinary Leuies Of the mildnesse profits and Iustice thereof Of casuall impositions Of Tolles and impositions vpon Suits Of Loanes Chapter 47. Of the mannaging and good husbandry of the Treasure That is to say of the regulating of the expence and of the abatement thereof Of the order of the Expence Almes The Charity of the King St. Lewâ—s That Almes neuer impouerish The disâ—harge of necessary charges in the Estate Of the wages of Officers and of Debts Recompences to the discharge of the Treasure Gifts and gratifications Establishment of publique houses and Seâ—inaries for the instruction of Youth as well in the Liberall Arts as in Mechannicke Seminaries of Piety Seminaries of Honour for the instruction of the Nobility The profit of the sayd Seminaries of Honour for the Estate Expences for the commodity and adorning of Townes and Prouinces Cutting off the Expences Of the Iustice and necessity for the abatement of Debts Chapter 48. Of such as ought to be imployed in the mannaging of the Treasure Of the choice they ought to make of such
in the which absolute commaunds are supported by force It may likewise be sayd that a Principallity is maintayned better in a great Estate consisting of persons of diuers qualities and a small Estate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Gouernment for that in a great Estate being necessary to trayne vp the Subiects to Armes to defend it it fals out vsually that he which is master of the Forces makes himselfe likewise master of the Estate as it hath hapâ—ed at Rome and in many other Common-weales Contrariwise a Prince in a small Estate is many times forâ—ed to become a Tyrant and so much the greater and sâ—uerer Tyrant as the extent of his Tyranny that is to say of his Country is the lesse hauing no meanes to draw from his Subiects without great oppression so much mony as he shall haue need of for his defence to the which all his Subiects would contribute willingly their persons and meanes if they were reduced to a republique or popular Estate CHAP. 6. Of the dependance of Estates one of another THe forme of Estates is diuers according to the dependance of those which commaund For although we treate onely of Estates that haue all soueraignty ouer their Subiects yet there are which depend in some sort of another and others which doe not hold as they say but of God and their Swords hauing no dependance of any man Estates depend of another by tribute duty honour protection or pension By tribute when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other Soueraignes the other markes of Soueraignty remaine By duty when according to some obligation they owe succours to some one be it in money or men By honour when as some Soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another yet with out preiudizing the other rights of Soueraignty By protection when as some one hath put himselfe into the protection of another to defend him whereby he is sayd to depend on his protector As for a Pensioner he seemes to depend no more of him that giues the pension nor to be inferiour to him then the other is to him For although he seemes inferiour receiuing the pension yet the other in giuing it makes shew that hâ— hath neede of his succours And when as Hâ—norius treated with the Gots and made them his pensioners Lampadias opposing himselfe sayd that it was a paction of Seruitude by the which they made the Emperour tributary to the Gots Yet I hold that this ought to be iudged by the quality and power of the Estates and by the particular conâ—entions For the succours may be so great in regard of the pension as we might easily discerne who had the aduantage in this treaty and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one to doe that which they had stipulated from him and that what they desired of another were left to his free will wherevpon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferiour to the last The markes of Soueraignty which remaine not withstanding these dependances are to giue a law to all in generall and to all in particular without the consent of any that are greater equall or inferiour To institute the principall Officers to make leuies of money and men to dispose of the principall affaires not yeelding an accompâ— to any man to giue pardon to condemned persons aboue the rigour of the Law To iudge definitiuely and without appeale to hold this power of himselfe and from no superiour To declare Warre and treate of Peace to dispose of the Treasure to coyne Money to cast Attillery to build Fortresses and such like CHAP. 7. Of the forme of Estates according to the right of those which commaund them THe forme of Estates is likewise diuers in regard of the right of such as commaund and accordingly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull as well iâ— a Principality Seignoury as a popular Gouernment The lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it or by a iust conquest or else that wâ—ich is deferâ—â—d by the Lawes the which hath eyther followed Succession Election or Lots The Lot is more proper for a popular Gouernment for that all things are equall and they seldome make vse of it in the Gouernment of a Principallity or a Seigâ—oury Yet Saul was made King by Lot And Alexanders Successours after his death diuided his Empire by Lot At Venice they draw them by Lots which are to choose the principall Magistrates But such establishments are not ordinary Succession and Election are the most ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a Principallity and Seignoury wâ—ereof it is necessary â—o know the aduantages and inconueniences which we may hope for or feare CHAP. 8. Aduantages and disaduantages of an Election in a Principallity THe Election in a Monarchy or Principallity is dangerous for the miseries which the interim or vacanâ—y doth vsually breed whilest they are about to choose a King the Estate remayning in an Anarchy without Lord or Gouernour Like vnto a Ship without a Pylot which owes his shipwracke to the first Wind. For in the meanetime Theeues and Robers vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new King commit a thousand Villanies as is often seene the See being voyd at Rome or as in Poland so as the punishment ought to be doubled for the excesse which is committed during that time Besides this in the pursuit of the Election you see many factions whereof the least is sufficient to â—uine the Estate the which not able to be reconciled they frame parties which delay the Election and continue the intâ—reigne with the disorders which accompany it But if eyther party choose whom they thinke good then growes a Ciuill Warre which continues long after This hath bin seene in the Election of Popes and Emperours and the Empire hath bin voyd eighteene yeares after that William Earle of Holland had bin slâ—ine For although â—hat Alphonso the tenth King of Spaine were chosen yet he refused this quality for tâ—e apparent danger to take the charge of aâ— Estate exposed to the will of Subiects to the enuy of Princes and to the violence of the stranger And in the meane time the wicked exceeded in all villany Moreouer in the Election an ouerture being made of many if they fall to force the most cunning and rash would carry it and the most vertuous would not hazard themselues If they make themselues Competitors and will containe themselues within the ordinary bounds he shall neuer be chosen against the hot pursuit of others who at need know well how to free themselues And be the Election made of one of the Country or of a stranger yet there are great inconueniences of either side Among those of the same Country there wil be alwaies icalousie and the one will neuer obay the other And although they be not all equall in Wealth and Vertue yet they will still presume themselues to
to him that speakes it If then the Prince will assure himselfe on that side he must encourage one or two of those which approach nearest vnto him and whom he knowes to be best affected and freest from contempt of him to deliuer freely vnto him in what manner they receiue his actions and he must choose such men of a meane fortune and are notwithstanding satisfied and content to the end that on the one side they may haue no feare to touch their Masters heart to the quicke least they should thereby lose the course of their aduancement and on the other side being of a meane condition they may haue the more communication with all sorts of people A Prince is not to be credited when he brags of his courage to attend the encounter of his Enemy for the seruice of his glory if for his profit aduancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words hauing no other effect nor aime but to pinch him by the Eare the rest of the operation being in his owne hands Wee reade in the Turkes Historie that a Bassa called by his Master to the gouernment of the Estate and made Vezir which is the first charge of the Empire next to the Grand Siegnour holding himselfe not very capable of this charge hee drew certaine Persons secretly vnto him who had charge to collect whatsoeuer they heard spoken in the Citie of Constantinople touching the gouernment of the Estate to relate it vnto him And by this meanes being aduertized of all that was found good or bad and of that which they desired to bee done or not done hee gouerned himselfe in such sort and without the helpe of any other Councell all things succeeded to his desire and accomodating his actions to the will of the people hee was admired by them who before held him to bee vncapable of this charge This may be practiâ—ed by the Prince but yet hee may not forbeare to make choise of a good Councell to examine the propositions of that which by this meanes they haue discouered to bee desired of the people In this manner it shall bee easie for a Prince to resolue bee it that hee take the aduice of euery one secretly and apart or being assembled hee cause them to deliuer their opinions openly to the end that by the communication of their aduisoes the resolution may bee more easie to take either in following the greatest number of voyces or in making choice of his opinion that seemes the best and the resolution taken the execution must follow with all possible speede Celeritie making all things easie as well for that of it selfe it is actiue and full of vigour as for that it giues no leisure to crosse a businesse in the execution before they can oppose it CHAP. 22. Of the forme of Commanding THe fourth establishment to bee made in an Estate is the forme of Commanding in the which wee must consider two things the power of the Commander and the iustice of the commandement The power of him which commands is either soueraigne or inferiour The commandement of the soueraigne is either generall or particular The generall consists in the lawes which the soueraigne establisheth vnder which wee comprehend the ordinary orders customes and statutes The law is as it were a pledge and a generall safetie which Princes giue vnto their subiects for the entertainement of contracts and their course of liuing which ought to be maintained and obserued especially amongst them for the generall good of the Estate For reason alone which God hath put into man being vnable to retaine him within the bonds of his dutie and custome to liue ill hauing made so great an impression in him as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him it hath beene needfull to imploy the authority of lawes and the force of the Prince to reduce euery man to reason for feare of punishment and by the Establishment of certaine rules to a sure order in the Estate and to confirme iudgments in Iustice. In effect it were dangerous to leaue all to the iudgment of men in the multitude whereof will grow a confusion of opinions if they had not some rule which they ought to follow and they might more easily bee carried away by hatred or fauour the which cannot happen to Law-giuers who making Lawes for the future are not transported with any priuate passion but for the publique For although that the Iudges were wise and without passion yet it is more easie to finde a small number of wise men which establish the Lawes and the for me oâ—iudging then to finde such a number as is necessary to be Iudges Moreouer the Lawes are made with mature deliberation and Iudgements are giuen suddainly according to the occurrents of affaires so as the rule is more safe taken from the Law then if the Prince gaue it himselfe The Lawes are of diuers sorts according to the diuersity of Subiects for the gouernment whereof they are made For some rule the power of Offices and Magistrates as well Ecclesiasticall as Ciuill and distinguish the function of their Charges their Iurisdiction honour and preheminence one vpon another Others rule the Treasure others the military Discipline others the generall Policy others Iustice as well in regard of the quality of persons of contracts treaties and commerce among men as for the punishment of Crimes the order and forme of proceeding in Iudgements by the parties and Iudges Some are made to contayne the Subiect in his duty towards the Prince and Magistrate and to maintayne Concord and Peace Finally the Law must haue for his principall end the good of the Estate and to prouide for all the parts thereof and for the inconueniences that may annoy it and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it Otherwise the Reuerence which hath caused it to be receiued would part and be separated fâ—om such commandments and there would remaine nothing but the sole authority and power For although they say that the will of the Prince is a Laâ— yet this must not be vnderstood of all that comes into his fancy and will to doe but onely of that which â—e may iustly desire for that the Lawes ought to be made and published to amend and correct the nature of things for the which they meane to establish them and not to second the appetite of him that makes them We must therefore consider in making of Lawes the qualities which must concurre in a Law The first is that it be according to publique honesty obseruing the dignity of persons and things that it be iust as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend which is the publique good onely as for the authority of him that makes it who in establishing it ought not to exceed the power that is giuen him There is another quality which concernes the forme to the end that Equality and proportion may be kept as in the
This shall suffice for that which concernes the generall commaunds of the Soueraigne which are made by Lawes Ordinances and other such kinde of commands CHAP. 24. Of the Princes particular Commaunds AS for the particular Commaunds which are made vpon occasions which happen dayly the forme is in a manner equall for that it ought to be constant in that which they haue first vndertaken to establish and not to change vpon euery difficulty which may happen but contrariwise they should striue to surmount alâ— the crosses which may present themselues This forme of Commaund shal be like vnto the other accompanied with seuerity being needfull to pâ—euent disobedience in small matters for that this vice like vnto others growes by degrees But aboue all hee which commaunds must deale in such sort as the Soueraigne commaund may depend wholy on him and be tyed to his Person not that the Prince should therefore draw vnto himselfe all the gouernment and the whole mannâ—ging of thâ— Estate for besides that he should find himselfe â—uer-buâ—thened and that in the multitude of affâ—ires thâ—re will be many ill cared for and worse executed â—e should chaâ—ge his Principality with euny and his subiects seeing themselues depriued of the administration of Offices would grow cold in the affections which they ought to beare him But the Soueraigne authority ought not to be imparted to any one nor the distribution of Recompences and Offices nor the absolute coÌ„mand of forces least that he to whom the Prince hath giuen this power changing his affection and will shouâ—d take occasion to aâ—tempt against the Estate hauing the commodity â—f such an aduantage whereof there are but too many examples Histories We haue treated of the Commandments of a Soueraigne power Let vs now obserue the forme of their Commaund whose power is inferiour and to whom the charges of the Estate are distributed to haue care and to watch ouer that part of the Estate which is committed vnto them CHAP. 25. Of Magistrates IT being necessary that of all the parts of an Estate there should not any remayne without gouernment one alone being vnable to imbrace all being likewise vnfit that the Soueraigne should be troubled in matters which may be done better by those which are inferiour vnto him it hath beene held necessary to giue order that this supreme authority yet without suffring any demunitiâ—n should be dispersed into many parts and that power should be giuen to a certayne number of men to heaâ—e ordayne or prouide particularly for affaires of least importance and the which are all so many branches of the Soueraignty out of which they grow and are supported as by their stemme and by the which reciprocally the Soueraignty beings forth flowers leaues and fruits The distinction of these inferiour powers is diuers according to the diuersity of the parts of the Estate For some are ordayned to free the Prince from the care and particular safety of the Prouinces and to watch ouer them as that of Gouernours Others haue the care of Religion Others of Warâ— Others of the Treasure Others of Policy others of Iustice Others of Iudgements which must be giuen vpon the controuersies of priuate persons or foâ— the punishments of crimes Others must haue an eye to the affaires abroad as Embassadours or Agents Others are destinated to assist the greatnesse of the Prince to dâ—spose of his house and traine and to sâ—rue him iâ— his Court. And as euery one of their parts is subdiuided into many others so according to these subdiuisions the charges are in themselues distinguished into functions and in this diuersity there are some which haue power to command proceeding from the sole authority of the Prince or from that of the Lawes the which haue attributed this power to the Office Others are erected for the seruice of the Estate Others for the execution of commandments Some hauing distinguished publique Offices aâ—cording vnto honour iurisdiction and command For some are without honour iurisdiction or command and in this ranke they place all those which are destinated for the seruice or execution of the superiours commandments as Registers Notaries Cryers Sergeants Trumpets and such like Others are with honour yet without power to command or to iudge as Embassadours Councells and Secretaries of Estate Receiuers of the Treasure and most part of the Officers of the Princes trayne Others haue honour and iurisdiction but no power to command as Prelates Others haue honour and power to command but no iurisdiction as the Consuls in old time at Rome and at this present the gouernours of Prouinces and the Kings Procurators Others haue honour iurisdiction and power to command and these are properly called Magistrates CHAP. 26. Of the differences betwixt Officers and Commissaries IT were a fruitlesse thing to busie my selfe here to Discourse particularly of the duties and power attributed to euery publique office For that it is diuersly practized not only in seuerall estates but also in the same Estate as it is held most expedient for the publique good to increase the power of the one and to diminish that of another And relating only that which is most generally obserued I will content my selfe to adde vnto these former distinctions one otâ—er which is drawn from the forme in the which a power is giuen to those which are imployed in publique charges For charges are giâ—en eyther by Office or by the way â—f Commission If in an Office he that hath the charge is called an Officer If by Commission he is tearmed a Commissioner The charge of an Officer is regulated by the Law or by the Edict of the erection of the office and by the letters of Commission the charge of a Commissioner is limitted This difference is betwixt an Officer and a Commissioner that the charge of an Officer is ordinary and hath a perpetuall course although that in regard of the person the Exercise be limitted to a certayne time and the charge of a Commissioner is extraordinary and reuokable at the good pleasure of him that hath giuen the Commission There are foure things to be considered in a Commission The person from whence it proceeds the Direction the Charge and the time when it is to expire In regard of the first Commissions proceed either from the Soueraigne or from his Officers or from other CoÌ„missioners deputed by the Soueraigne who may commit there happening some lawfull let vnlesse it bee forbidden or there be a question of State or of the life and honour of some persons For in this case they cannot sub-deligate For the direction a commission is directed either to an Officer or to a priuate person If to an Officer it is either a thing depending of his Office and in this case the the letters are neither Executorie of his dutie then letters of commission if the time or place be not changed and differs from that which is mentioned in the Edict of the Execution of the Office
In this concurrenceâ— the ordinary knowledge is to bee preferred before the commission euen as the qualitie of the Officer is preferrable to that of a Commissioner and the actes of the Officers more assured then those of Commissioners But if it be a matter which belongs not vnto them in regard of their Office and that there bee a difference in some circumstance then he cannot get it as an Officer but onely in qualitie of a Commissioner In the charge we must consider the end for the which it is giuen vs and the power wee haue by it The end concernes either the instruction or the knowledge of some businesse And the power regards the decision iudgment or resolutâ—â—n and the commâ—ndement for the execution of that which we haue resolued I call instuction all that which is to bee done to bring a businesse to an Estate ready to be resolued and determined The knowledge giuen vnto a Commissioner is either of factor of â—ight or of both together wherein hee shall carry himselfe as wâ—e will sheâ— by and by treating of the duty of the Magistrate towards the commandement of the Prince the power to iudge is gâ—uen either definitiuely without an appeale or without execution if there be an appeale or els with power to 〈◊〉 in executioÌ„ that which we haue resolued notwitâ—standiâ—g any opposition or appelation and without preiudice thereof For the power of Command either it is giuen the Commissioner for the execution of that which hee had ordained or the Commissioner is commanded to execute that himselfe which another had decreed hauing no power to command a third And this last kind of Commission is directed to inferior Officers who are simple executioners of the commandements of their superiors From the consideration of that which I haue said wee may gather that the duty of a Commissioner is to râ—gulate himselfe according to the termes of his Commission the which he may in no sort exceede For although that this generall clause bee inserted to carry himselfe according to the quality of persons and as hee shall see matters disposed hee may adde or diminish to the instructions that are giuen him in writing according to his wisedome and discretion Yet this must be vnderstood of the accessary of his charge and of the smallest matters for of those which are important hee may not dispose without speciall command For although they referre it to his wisedome and discretion yet the ignorance of a Commissioner were not excuseable this clause being to bee vnderstood according to the examination of an honest and sufficient man especially when it concernes the publike good of the Estate It remaines now to know when the Commission expires It ceaseth if he which granted it comes to die if the thing or person for the which the charge is giuen bee no mâ—re in being If hee which hath giuen the Commission reuokes it if the Commissioner during the Commission obtaines an Office or Magistracie equall to him who granted the Commission so as the businesse bee entire or that being begunne it may bee left without preiudice to the publique or to priuate persons CHAP. 27. Considerations vpon the Establishment of Officers and Magistrates THese distinctions knowne many other poynts are to be considered in the Establishment of those to whom this power of Commaund vnder the Soueraigne or to mannage other affaires concerning the Estate is attributed be it by Office or Commission but principally we must consider the number of those that are to be imployed The authority of him which hath established and imployed them the qualities of those whom they put into offices the forme of proceeding in these Establishments the time they ought to remayne in Authority and finally the duty of principall Magistrates aswell towards the Soueraigne and the Lawes as to other Magistrates that are equall or inferiour and towards particular persons The number of Officers or Ministers in one charge is bâ—anâ—ed by many and yet it is more safe to commit a 〈◊〉 to many â—â—en to one First for that they watch one another and as it were through iealousie euery mâ—nstâ—ies vp iâ— compaâ—â—â—n to Execute his charge the better And 〈◊〉 â—â—uer it many times happens that after they haue made Eâ—â—â—tion of some they do not answere the opiniâ—n that was conceined of them in which case there bâ—iâ—g many one helpes and releiues another The more they are the more difficulty they wil be corrupted and if aâ—y be their corruption shall haue the lesse force to commit a bad 〈◊〉 ore alone or few hauing no power to 〈◊〉 many and it is a difficult thing that all sâ—ould agree together to deceiue Morâ—ouer the ordinary iâ—conueniences as sicknesâ—e or other naturall hinderances befalling a Minister if he be alone his charge which it may be is necessary for the publique will remayâ—e in suspence and without exercise and the publique affayres by this meanes delayed not without preiudice to the Estate As for the plurality of Officers which growes from the plurality of Charges the charges being distinguished one from another so as they cannot be confounded so as this plurality is so farre from being hurtfull or preiudiciall vnto the Estate as it is profitable By this meanes no part of the Estate is neglected you content and pacifiâ— the ambition of many who liuing priuately in idlenesse would seeke to imploy themselues in some innouation and you bind them to the preseruation of the Estate for that they would feare that an alteration would change the order and by consequence impayre their authority But as in this diuersity of charges we must prouide that confusion may not trouble neyther the Officers in their charges nor priuate men in their businesse We must auoyd irresolution which is ordinary in a multitude and the tediousnesse of affayres which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another Irresolution wil be aduoyded not in reducing the affayres to the Knowledge of one alone or of two but to a competent number according to the quality of businesse and those must be vnequall to the end that the plurality of voyâ—es may decide the businesse and that they may not be subiect to be diuided in opinion The teadiousnes would be auoyded in cutting off the degrees of those which are to take Knowledge one aboue another and it seemes that two degrees would suffice But they must auoyd in the one and the other a plurality in the charge of the treasure of the Estate where the people is opprest by the fees or rights attributed to Officers the which may be done by two meanes The first in giuing more honour vnto Offices and lesse wages and fees And the other in giuing them hope to ascend by degrees vnto greater dignities This meanes likewise will serue to make the greatest affect and seeke the meanest Offices making them know that they cannot come to the greatest before they passe through the others
examined and to giue their aduice yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the conclusion it hath bin held most reasonable yea necessary to vse it in this manner The rule of wise men which cannot faile is that of two vniust things they follow that which is most iust and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater Otherwise there would neuer bee an end of humane actions If the command be so vniust as without wronging their conscience they cannot passe it some Magistrates to auoid the disobedience and not to charge their consciences in verifying it haue incerted by the expresse commaundement of the Prince many times reâ—terated The manner of verifying the Edicts ordinances and commands of Princes by the Magistrates hath beene brought in in some estates to make the people more willing to obey them Who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themselues and being more inclined to distrust and to calumniate the will of the Prince then approue it And the Prince on the other side being iâ—â—roned by importune Courtiers who without any regard of duty or of iustice nor to the good of the Estate seeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends and to get them authorized by circumuenting the Prince It hath beene held conuenient for the Prince to cause his will to passe by such solemnities to the end they might bee receiued by the people and that being examined and found contrary or preiudiciall to the publique good they might be refused by humble remonstrances which wipe away the disgrace of the deniall and serue the Prince for an excuse to free himselfe from the importunitie and iniustice of great men It remaines now to know how an Officer ought to carry himselfe in executing a command if there comes vnto him a reuocation the businesse being begun Some hold opinion that if the execution be so much importing the Estate as not being finished there would happen some inconuenience that notwithstanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed If not hee must leaue the businesse as it is But for the first it is necessary that the danger of the Estate be euedent and knowne to all Men and not to the Magistrate alone who might bee suspected to haue proceeded lightly or with spleene passing on after the Reuocation CHAP. 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another THe duty of Magistrates and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another is regulated according to the power which they haue whereof in most Estates they make three degrees The highest is of those who in some part of the Estate haue power to determine without appeale The Prince only may command them the middle sort obeyed these and commanding those which are of a lower degree who haue not any command ouer the Officers but only ouer particular persons Wee may call the first superiors or principalls the second middle or subalterne and the last inferiors The first haue power to command all Magistrates and Officers without exception or only certaine Officers subiect to their Iurisdiction They which haue power to command all in generall without execution ought not to be brought into the Estate for the change that such a power might vsually cause For there being but one degree to climbe and to make themselues Masters ambition doth teach it speedily and euery man doth the more easily indure it for that all men are accustomed to obey them The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate is to containe those that are vnder him in the termes and duties of their charges of whom he may be Iudge and not they of him in qualitie of a Magistrate but as a priuate person And as for the Soueraigne although they may iudge in their owne cause to whom God hath giuen power to dispose without Iudgment as Xenophon saith yet it is much more fitting for the Soueraigne to suffer the Iudgement of his Magistrates then to make himselfe Iudge in his own cause prouided alwayes that the businesse doth not concerne the Soueraignty or his particular person but to the end that Maiestie may not suffer diminution of its greatnesse or that the splendor of a Royall Name may not dazell the eyes of the Iudges It hath bin wisely aduised in some Estates that the Soueraigne should not plead but by his procuratour and would neuer assist in Person And as in the power of the Prince the power of Magistrates is held in suspence so in the presence of superior Magistrates the power of Inferiors hath no effect The which is vnderstood not only of superiour heads and Magistrates but also of their Lieutenants who are therein held the same thing as being but one power distributed to two Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot determine any thing his chiefe being present Yet the Magistrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his Lieutenant But that which hath bin spoken of the power of Superior Magistrates ouer their inferiors must be vnderstood in their territorie their seats and in the limits of their Iurisdiction out of which they are but priuate men without power or command Magistrates which are equall in power or haue no dependance one of another cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another But if there bee question to execute the decree or Iudgement of one in the territory of another they must vse honest intreaties and clauses of request Yet where there shall bee question of the interpretation of a decree made by one Magistrate another that is his equall may not take knowledge For euery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will And in regard of the sentence giuen by the Officer of a Forraine Prince for the execution whereof in the territory of another there should be a Commission of intreatie The iudges of this Prince to whom the Commission is directed may not examine the Iudgement least the stranger bee induced another time to doe the like anâ— to dissolue the Iudgements whereof they should demand the execution the which would bee done more through iealousie of the Estate then for any iniustice in them Yet if there bee question of honour or life they may not execute the Iudgements of forraine Magistrates if they haue not knowne the merrite of the cause and seene the informations And Princes owe this respect one vnto another for the good of Iustice not onely to punish the wicked which slie from one Estate into another but also for the Exemplary punishment which ought to be made vpon the places are bound to yeeld the naturall subiect to his naturall Prince vnlesse the Prince to whom the fugitiue is retired â—indes that hee is vniustly pursued for in this case he ought not to yeeld them Yea he is forbidden by the Law of God to restore a Bondman which is fled into another Mans house to auoid the fury of his Master But aâ—tâ—ough the Magistrate may not command his Equals yet
in a body or colledge consisting of many equall in power the greatest part may command the lesse For in this case they that are superior in number are likewise superior in power So as the lesser part cannot command the greater nor yet hinder it Yet one Tribune at Rome opposing might hinder the acts of all the rest the Romans making a difference betwixt opposition and command for that hinderance and opposition is lesse then a command and doth not induce any superiâ—â—â—â—â— like vnto a command But Colledges hauing no superiority one ouer another they cannot haue any command but they may well hinder one another this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence then from any superiority This may be grounded vpon the generall Rule of all those which haue any thing in Common amongst which he that hinders hath more force and his condition in this case is better then his that seekes to proceede and among many Lawes that which forbids is of greatest force But if before the Act a Magiâ—trate may hinder his Equall by opposition yet after the Act he cannot doe it by any other meanes but by appeale to the Superior CHAP. 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to priuate Persons THe duty of Officers or Magistrates to particular person hath two principall foundations The one is grounded on the power which is giuen to the Magistrate by the Edict or Letters of Commission the other vpon the seemlinesse which consists in the particular carriage of the Magistrates person to be able to maintaine himselfe in credit reputation and authority with those ouer whom he is to command And although that the power of all Magistrates regards generally the execution of the Law the which without the Magistrate were idle Yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others For some are bound by the Lawes and Ordinances to command and vse the power that is giuen them in that forme and manner that is prescribed them without adding or diminishing any thing And in this case they are but simple Executioners of Lawes To others they giue more liberty and leaue many things to their discretion and iudgement Wherein notwithstanding they must so gouerne themselues as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a speciall command or that may not be easily required that they are not forced by some strong and powerfull necessity or an apparent danger But in these things where the diuersity of circumstances is a hinderance that he cannot specifie or set downe in particular the power as in the arbitriment of Princes the Magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a speciall command But therein he shall auoyde to affect the reputation of pittifull as well as of cruell For cruelty although it be blameable yet it retaynes the Subiects in the obedience of the Lawes But too much Clemency causeth the Magistrate to be contemned with the Lawes and the Prince which hath made them Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pitty of the poore in Iudgement But one of the things most requisite in a Magistrate is to make the grauity of offence knowne as well to make offenâ—ers vnderstand what they haue deserued as to induce them to repentance And in doing so the punishment will haue lesse bitternesse and more profit Wherefore the principall Rule of the duty of a Magistrate to priuate persons is to vse the power that is giuen him well and priuate Men reciprically owe him all obedience in executing his charge bee it right or wrong so as he exceeds not the termes of his power or Iurisdiction For then they may contradict his ordinances by appeale or opposition and if he proceeds he must make a distintion whether the grieuance be irreparable or not If it may be repaired they shall not oppose by fact but by course of law but if it be irreparable they may oppose by fact yea with force not to offend the Magistrate but to defend the innocent As for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto Magistrates it is certaine that the Magistrate being wronged hee cannot be Iudge in his owne cause vnlesse it bee for some vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publiquely in executing his Office For in this case it is lawfull for the Magistrate being wronged to punish such Men for the offence done vnto the particular person of the Magistrate For this reason if a Body or Colledge of Iudges hath bin wronged they may censure and condemne those which haue done the offence not to reuenge the iniury done vnto them but to the Estate whose Maiesty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them As for obedience it seemes requisite that the Magistrate should carry himselfe to priuate persons with all mildnesse and patience yet in such sort as the dignitie of his place be not vilified as it would be if he should indure any indiscreete words in his presence and not take exception Or a countenance of little respect But especially as hee ought not to shew himselfe rough and difficult of excesse So he must not grow familiar laugh or ieast with priuate men but to speake little with discretion without making shew of any passion of choller Enuie Iealousie or such like which may diminish the opinion which they haue of him Wherefore to collect in few words that which concernes the duty of Magistrates they must learne to obey the Soueraigne to bend vnder the power of their superiors to honour their equals to command the Subiects to defend the poore to make head against great men and to doe Iustice to all CHAP. 34. Of the Iustice of Commanding AS the forme of commanding is diuers so is the Diuersity of power which according vnto Iustice obserues diuers Rules to make the commandments iust For in certayne things according to an Arithmeticall proportion it makes all the Subiects equall In others it enters into consideration of the quality and followes a Geometricall proportion In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion it neither follows an equality altogether nor a similitude but taking a consideration of other differences it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord And as that which they seeke most in the settling of an Estate is Concord which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with another This last proportion is followed in many things as in the forme of gouernment in the distribution of Offices honours dignities and recompences in the establishment of punishments and for the peace and greatnesse of families in Marriages and diuisions of successions But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man and in that which concernes the performance of promises which they make one vnto another or the Iudgement of that which belongs to euery man whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men of what quality and condition soeuer
the quality of goods distinguishing those that aâ—e â—ropper and hereditary to the house and those which are newly purchased giuing some aduantage to the elder aboue the younger and to the Males aboue the daughters regulating this aduatnage according to the number of his Children and leauing something in the free disposition of the Father seemes to bee more iust and more apâ—roaching to this harmoniacall proportion which ought to be followed as much as may be in all sorts of commands and Establishments And this shall suffice for the forme of Commaunding as well in that which depends of power as of Iustice. CHAP. 35. Of the Establishing of the forces of an Estate THe order which ought to bee entertained in the setling of the forces being more Military then pollitique shall bee treated here succinctly The forces whereof wee meane to speake are those by the which wee may repulse the attempts of our enemies the which if the Estate bee Maritiue would be of two sorts to the end wee may resist both by Sea and Land The prouision of armes and ships is the first part of the force some hold it the greatest treasure of a Prince and Iustiue writes that Phillip of Macedony made himselfe thereby fearfull of his enemies I know that many haue held that in a great Estate there might inconueniences happen by this great prouision of Armes for that hee that hath a will to mutine to arme those of his faction and to depriue the Prince of the meanes to make vse of this prouision will make a designe to sease vpon the place where it is kept But by the same reason wee must not draw together any treasure to supply vs in an vnexpected necessity nor to fortifie any places least that comming to loose our money and our places our enemy should grow the stronger and wee the weaker But Wisedome preuents these inconueniences the which wee must imploy to keepe these aduantages and to make vse of them before the enemy comes to seaze of them And if hee doth seaze of them wee may not therefore conclude that the prouision ought not to haue beene made but that it is his fault that hath made it not to bee able to keepe it It is certaine that a Sword or a Knife would cut him that knowes not how to handleit but wee may not therefore say that wee must neither make Sword nor Knife So in all sorts of parties there are inconueniences But those which by foresight may be preuented should not hinder vs from doing that which may otherwise serue vs. Vnder the name of Armes wee doe not onely apprehend that which serues a Man to couer him and to assaile his enemy but all carriages and necessary munitions for the Warre bee it Offensiue or Defensiue as Engines Artillery Powder Ladders Bridges Cordage and such other things whereof they haue need in many millitary Exployts and which it concernes the wisdome oâ— the Prince or Soueraigne to prouide in such quantity aâ— when he shal be assailed or would inuade another therâ— may be nothing wanting for not able to prouide such things in a short time it were to be feared that before he should recouer that which is necessary his Enemy would get such an aduantage ouer him as he shall hardly afterwards recouer it But laying aside the discourse of the diuersity of Armes and Engines of Warre I will only propound some generall considerations for the Armes fit for men whereof those which are defensiue ought to be light of carriage those that be heauy or pondrous commonly hindring more then they serue difficult to pierce and proportioned in such sort as they may not hinder the necessary motions for a Combat Many relying too much vpon their Vallour haue contemned this kind of armes as fit for men that were affraid Yet the Roman Armies in the time of Gratian hauing demanded leaue to abandon their Cuyrasses and then their Head-pieces found themselues so weak when they came to fight with the Goths as they were cut in peeces whereby it appeared that armes make a part of the force and I will adde of courage For besides that Iron is more hard to ' peirce then the flesh he that finds himselfe couered takes more courage to ioyne with his Enemy for that he is not so much exposed to blowes They reproacht a Captaine who armed himselfe compleatly that he seemed to be affraid No sayth he but I arme my selfe that I may not feare As for offensiue Armes they must be light to the end they may not tyre or weary those that vse them and likewise easie to mannage sharpe and well steeled to pierce the better and withall to continue the longer Some demaund them long to strike a farre off Philopâ—mon caused his men to vse the Pike â—e oâ— And Iphicrates made his Souldiers to carry them twice as long then they had formerly done They attribute the victory of Gostaâ—us agaynst Christian King of Denmarke to the length of the Swedish pikes which were three foote longer thâ—n those of the Danes And Guiâ—hardâ—â— writes that Vitelosi Vrsiâ—o with pikes a foote and a halfe longer then those which the Souldiers of Pope Alexander the sixt carried wonne the battaile agâ—inst them betwixt Sarra and Bassan Others haue better allowed of short Armes being of better vse in a strait or a throng as Cyrus and the Lacedemonians Besides this there are two sorts of offensiue armes some to shoote cast or dart and others which they hold continually in their hands of both which kinds they must make good prouision being all necessary in an Army The Parthiaâ—s haue many times vanquished the Romans with their Bowes fighting â— farre off And the Romans as Vegetius writes haue many times gotten great victories by the meanes of certayne long darts called Marciobarbaz There is another quality which some haue desiâ—ed in Armes that they should be faire gilt and enricht so as they may be pleasing vnto the Eye thinking that this giues courage to the Souldiers the which Xenophoâ— and Caesar haue allowed Others holding that this was of no vse but to kindle the auarice and courage of the enemy haue thought it better to haue the armes without any ornament and bare as those which strike more terrour To resolue the most expedient in this quality and contrariety we must know those whom we meane to arme and those against whom we are to fight If the first by this vanity of ornament are to be the more encouraged and that the same vanity may breed admiration and amazement in the Enemy it shall be fit to vse it But if we haue to deale with men which know what belongs to Warre we must rather seeke horror then ornament in our Armes Wherefore a Prince making prouision of Armes he shall doe better to choose those that are good then faire and simple and plaine rather then enricht as well to auoide the charge in so great a prouision which
of the lavv In the interpretation oâ— the intâ—nâ—ion of the law Examinatâ—on of the reason of the law That wee must stand to the authority of the law and make no questions vpon equity Of the execution of lawes and ordinances From what time the law oâ— ordinance doth bind 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 Of the â—â—â—ce of lawes or ordinances Of Custome Three things required to giue force to a Custome Wherein the duty of the Magistrate to the Prince consists Of the commandments of the Prince and how the Magistrate must carry himselfe in the verification The Magistrate â—ught to obey the will of the Prince although it were vniust The disobedience of the Magistrate to thâ— will of the 〈…〉 bad conâ—equence The Magistrate is not 〈…〉 the 〈…〉 of his Prince Reasons why the custome of verifying the Princes Edicts hath beene brought in by the Magistrate How the Mastrate ought to carâ—y himselfe in the execution of a commandement after a Reuocation Three degrees oâ— Magistrates and the power of either of them The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate That it is fiting for a Prince to indure the Iudgement of the Magistrate The power of a Lieutenant equall to that of the Magistrate The power of the Magistrate is of no effect out of his territorie Of tvvo Magistrates equall in povver and of the execution of their decrees in one anothers territory Of the execution of a â—entence giuen by the officer of a forraine Prince vpon anotherâ— territory Of Magistrates equal in power in a body or colledge and of their command one ouer another The difference betvvixt â—pposiâ—ion and command That they may hinder one another by opposition before the act or by appeale after the act but not by command Foundations of the duty of Magistrates to priuate pâ—râ—â—ns Diuers powers of Magistrates Of their duties to priuate persons in giuing sentence Of the 〈…〉 persons to the Magistrate executing his charge Of the Magistrate wronged when and how hee may bee Iudge in his owne cause Mildnesse and patience required in a Magistrate Discretion and grauitie without passion The dutie of Magistrates Rules and considerations in in the Iustice of comandments An harmoniacall pâ—opâ—râ—ion followed in many things An Arithmeticall proportion followed in others A Geometrical proportion in the imposition of burthâ—nsome Offices for the support of the Estate A mixture of the law with the will of the Prince Of the temper a magistrate shoulâ—â—dde vnto the law Of the distribution o◠〈◊〉 and dignities Distribution of râ—wards punishments Harmony in the diuision of goods Prouision of Armes and Shipping Armes offensiue or dâ—fâ—nsiue Quality of desensiue armes That they ought not to be contemned Quality of ofâ—enâ—iue armes Oâ— the Pike Two sorts of offensiue armes Of the beauty â—rnament of Armes The situation of Fortresâ—eâ— nâ—cesâ—ary and proffitable They must bee farre from the heart of the Estate Forts strong by situation and Art They must bee situated where they may bee relieued Of the â—â—uantages of Horse and Foote An Army must consist of horâ—e and foote Of the choise of Souldiers Wee must imploy Strangers as little as may be Two sorts of traine Bands Of the number â—of Souldiers â—oâ— the traynâ—â—nd Of Subsidiaries Order for their exercise in time of peace and to hinder their Mutiny Of the number of Subsidiaries Meanes to traâ—ne the subiects of an Estate to Warre without any charge to the Prince And to hinder a reuolte and mutiny The partiâ—ular â—oâ—â—e of the Romans 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 vpon 〈…〉 â—aptaine Of the choice which the Captaine ought to make of his Souldiers A good order if it were well obserued Of the place whence they must take the Souldiers Of the Age oâ— the Souldiers Of the statuâ—e Of his vocatioÌ„ That the power of an Estate depends of its riches Of the Lacedemonians Of the Venetians and Genoiâ— Of the Romans What is necesary for the riches of an Estate 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 an 〈…〉 Whence the aboundance of necessary things proceed Tillage wâ—ll husbaded causeth aboundance The cauâ—e of the negligence thereof That it is not vnworthy of a Prince Manufactures cause aboundance in an Estate Commerce with the stranger causeth aboundance in an Estate Three considerations for the Commerce Of Marchandize which we may and ought to carry to strangers Of the transport of Gold and Siluer Of raw stuffes Of the beginning of strÌ„age Gold and Siluer into an Estate That the course of forraâ—gne Coyne ought not to be allowed in an Estate Marchandize whbreof wee ought to sâ—op the entry The carriage of Merchandize Monopolis foâ—bidden Of the discharge of customes Faith and assurance in affairs-Speedy Iustice. That Siluer Gold are sufficient for all sorts of Coine The prise of Gold Siluer in proportion one of another To bring Mâ—rchants into credit Trading at Sea profitable and honourable Aduantages which the publique and priuate should receiue if the Nobility gaue themselues to the Commercâ— at Sea And order setled by the Hollandâ—rs for the continuance of theâ—â—r 〈◊〉 to the East Indies The great reputation which thâ—y hâ—ue gotten by the meanes of this Trade Means to setle the commerce at Sea in an Estate That paâ—simony pâ—eâ—eâ—uâ—s the â—iches of an Estate Parsimony impoâ—ts â—uch â—or the â—aâ—ety of an Estate Against excâ—sse Whe reiâ— excesse deth consist Oâ— excesse in buildings An order in the low Countries for buildings in Townes Of the excesse of moueables Excesse in a great traine A gâ—od order made by the Veneâ—â—ans â—xâ—essâ— in Feâ—stâ— Excesse of Play Of the ordinary reuenew of the Demesus and of its Estblishment That an alienationis not to be allowed much lâ—sse an ingagement Entries and going forth oâ— the Estate Tributes Gifts and Pensions Trafique in the name of the publique To deliuer monâ—y at â—nterest to marchants Of the â—ale oâ— Offices The sourse and begiâ—nâ—ng of this aâ—use Inconueniences which grow by the venallity of Offices Of Subsedieâ— Diuers formes of Subsedies and Leuâ—es Of those which ought to be exempted from Subsedies Of the place whâ—re they are to make the leuy of the Subsedies Introduction of tolles tributes and imposts Introduction for the nuÌ„bring of goods Practised by the Râ—mâ—ns Abâ—lished by Tyâ—ants Imaginary inconueniences of the nuÌ„bring of goods Aduantâ—gâ—s which will come vnto the â—stâ—â—â— Of â—xâ—raâ—rdinary lâ—uies Of casuall impositions Of customes impoâ—itions Of voluntary borrowing Of the order of the expences Almes Charities of the King St. Lewis Almes doe neuer impouerish The freeing of charges necesâ—aâ—y for the Estate Of the Fees of officers and debts Recompences to the discharg of the Treasure Thâ—â—e which are made by offices and digâ— niâ—es are to be pâ—â—erreâ— before that which is done by â—oney Gifts and gratifications A Prince must giue to many little and often * Election of publike houses and Seminaries for instruction of youth aswell in the liberall Arts as Mechaâ—â—ck Seminaries of piety Seminaries of honour for the instruction of Gentlemen The