assign some Notes and Critisms and betwixt those which were of a particular right it is not necessary that any such distinction should be made Nay we may roundly affirm that those Laws of Moses which are called Political or Judicial do none of them oblige Christian Magistrates to a strict observation of them but it is lawfull for them according to their own discretion and as they shall find find it expedient for the safety and profit of the Common-wealth either to revive them into power or to make them of no effect XXXI I affirm in the fourth place That the moral Law delivered by Moses that is to say the praecepts of the Decalogue or the ten Commandements do oblige all Christians as well as Jews to the observation of them All Protestants that I do know of do with one mouth acknowledge this truth Bellarmine therefore doth us the greater injury who feigneth that we do make Christian liberty to consist in this not to be bound in Conscience to be subjected to any Law and that Moses with his Decalogue doth not pertain unto us Let him see how he can clear himself of this scandal and vindicate those of his part from this crime if we are in it For the Controversie amongst his School-men is agitated Whether Christians are bound to the praecepts of the Decalogue only as they are the Declaratives of the Law of Nature or as they were also delivered by God to Moses and by Gods Commandement given by Moses to the people of God and transmitted into the holy Books Some there are of them that do deny the one others that do affirm both And in our Churches the same diversity of opinions is to be found if it be not rather a diversity in words than in opinions For seeing they amongst themselves and we do agree with them in this which is the main of all that the Moral Law which is delivered by Moses and is contained in the precepts of the Decalogue hath the power to oblige the Consciences of Christians it will peradventure be not worth our labour from whence it doth obtain that power to oblige In my judgement they speak more unto the purpose who say that this Law of Moses doth not oblige Christians formally and as it is delivered by Moses but onely by reason of the matter as it is the Declarative of the Law of Nature and it receiveth therefore all its force of obliging not from Moses bringing or delivering it but from the Dictates of the Law of Nature which God in the first Creation did inspire into our minds and after the Fall would have it to remain in them as the Remembrancer of his will And this may suffice to be spoken of the old Law or the Law of Moses XXXII The new Law or the Law of Christ that is to say the Gospel doth contain these three things 1. Mysteries of Faith to be believed in which chapter I comprehend the promises of God by Grace 2. Sacred Institutions Ceremonial and Ecclesiastick And 3. The Moral Precepts of which I speak and universally of all of them That the Gospel obligeth none but those only who are called those only to whom it is preached For where there is no Law there can be no transgression for moraly especially in Supernaturals it is the same thing Non esse et non apparere not to be and not to appear or not to be so sufficiently propounded as it may be known The words of our Saviour are expressly to this sence Ioh. 15. 22. If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin that is they had not been guilty of despising the Gospel But it obligeth all men to whom it is preached to an obedience as well of Faith as of Life so that we are all bound to whom the Gospel is preached both to believe in Christ as our Redeemer and to obey him as our Law-giver And whosoever shall fail in the performance of these two things shall suffer everlasting punishment for the neglect of his duty XXXIII I say in the third place That the Christian Church is obliged to the Sacred Institutions that is to the preaching of the word the administration of the Sacraments the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel and the exercise of the Keyes as well of Knowledg as of Power it is bound I say in all those things which pertain to the essence of them according to the institution of Christ and the Apostles so that it is not lawful for the Church much lesse for any particular congregation or person either willingly to diminish or to change any thing at all therein But the external circumstances of the Sacred Institution are so free that any particular Church may determine of them according to Time and Place and to the custome of the People of God and as it shall seem most expedient to Edification XXXIV In the third place I affirm That the Moral Precepts of the New Testament are the same according to their substance with the Morals of the Old Testament and they are both of them to be reduced to the Law of Nature which is contained in the ten Commandements as omnia Entia realia all real Beings are reduced to the ten Predicaments But the Precepts of Christ in the new Law as the holy Fathers of the Church do every where acknowledge are in many things far more excellent than the Precepts of Moses in the old Law not onely in that respect that they are propounded more fully and clearly but because they ascend also higher and do advance the true Christian to a more eminent degree of perfection and that with most effectual inducements on both sides the past Example of Christ being propounded to him on the one side and the inestimable reward to come in the Kingdom of Heaven on the other And this most clearly may appear in those two great Duties of a Christians life commanded in the new Law viz. of loving our enemies and taking up the cross For as some have dreamed these are not so onely to be esteemed as if they were onely Counsels to a more perfect life propounded to all men under the condition of a more large reward and oblige no man under sin and punishment but those onely who by a vow have obliged themselves to the observation of them But they expresly in themselves are Precepts and properly so called and universally obliging to the observation whereof all those who profess the Name of Christ are bound under the guilt of the most grievous sin to wit the abnegation of Christ and the punishment of eternal damnation unless they truly do repent And thus much concerning the second Light of the mind XXXV The third remaineth which we call the light acquired which surely is nothing else but an addition or increase of that light whether of Nature or Revelation which was before in the minde to some more eminent degree of clearness as when the will of God the
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
not on another For by the force of Free will a man is master only of his own will and of his own Acts and not of anothers Now on the contrary he who layes a precept upon or who doth command another if he hath right to command he obligeth by commanding that man whom he commandeth but he doth not oblige himself Because a command is an Act of power and Authority and of right upon another and is fit and proper unless peradventure there be something that hinders it to induce an obligation so the Father with Authority commands the Son the Master the Servant the General the Souldier the King the people and God as a Superior commandeth man to such and such duties and by commanding doth oblige him to the performance of them IV. In the second place I suppose that the Legislative power is a power of publick Jurisdiction for it sufficeth not to the power of making Laws that a man hath a Right and power over others to prescribe unto them what is to be done unless he be invested with an external power to compel them to the performance of it and to afflict punishments on the Refusers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Ethick 10. The Law hath a necessitating power The Schoolmen therefore do distinguish that power which a Superior hath over an Inferior into that power which they call Dominative or the power of Masterdome and the power of Jurisdiction The first whereof is less and more private and not admitting an external Jurisdiction the other greater and of a more inforcing Authority These two powers do not a little differ between themselves and that in a three-fold consideration First in respect of the matter or object for the Power Dominative or of mastery is properly exercised on the more imperfect and private Commonalty as a House a School or a Family but the power of Jurisdiction on the more perfect and publick Commonalty as a City an Army a Common-wealth Secondly in respect of the End for the power Dominative by it self and Primarily is ordinated to the profit of the person indued with that power that is the master and but Secondarily and by Consequence to the good of the Commonalty as it is profitable for a Family that the master of it should grow rich Now the power of publick Jurisdiction is Primarily ordinated to the publick good of the Commonalty it self and but Secondarily and Consequently to the good of the person indued with that power which is the Magistrate himself it being profitable for a Prince that the Common-wealth should flourish Thirdly in the respect of the more effectual Administration which is greater in the power of jurisdiction than in the Power Dominative by reason of a greater coactive Power for examples sake The Master of a Family cannot so efficaciously prevail that his Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons or Servants whom he cannot correct but with a rod or Cudgel as may the civil Magistrate who by his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience by imprisonment or banishment by confiscating their Goods or by Death it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The fatherly Authority hath nothing in it that is enforcing nothing that is necessating saith Aristotle in the place newly quoted Therefore to the making of Laws every superiority is not sufficient but besides that Dominative there is required the power of Jurisdiction so properly called for the Laws cannot be made or established unless by a Person that hath a publick coactive power by this time you understand I believe that I may need no more to admonish you of it that what here hath been spoken by me concerning Laws doth absolutely pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation and not to any others unless analogically after their way the proportion that is due unto them as they come near or are more remote from their perfection V. To these two suppositions which to what sense they tend you shall easily understand from those things which presently I shall represent unto you I in the third place do now adde a responsive position viz. That the power Legislative is a power autocraâ—ical That is the power of making Laws which may oblige the Commonalty doth consist in him alone whether he be a single person as in the state of Monarchical Government or whether they be more as in other Governments who exerciseth the chief power over the whole Commonalty I will in the first place explane this position and afterwards I will confirm it And for the explication of it we are in the first place to understand that for the happiness of humane societies and the more commodious Adminstration of Commonwealths it hath pleased Almighty God the Author of Order not only to constitute a political Government that there may be Magistrates to be set over the people but also in that very Government to constitute a political Order that amongst the Magistrates themselves there might be divers degrees as well of Dignity as of Power And it is likely that the military word of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Apostle useth in the Romans hath a relation to this sence to show that there is not only an ordination of Magistrates from God but a subordination also such as is seen in a military Army VI. In the second place we are to know that in all things in which there is order to avoid a proceeding to an infinitenesse which Nature doth abhor we must at the last come necessarily to something which is the first and chiefest in that Order where we are to make a stand Therefore seeing that Magistrates of the same Commonalty are some of them superiour unto another in Dignity and power it must of necessity so come to passe that some one of them must be transcendent above the rest that the others may depend on him and he on none In the same construction the head is the highest in the body the Admiral in a Fleet and the Emperour in an Army The supreme Magistrate is only less than God himself and in governing the people committed to his charge hath neither a Superiour nor an Equal St. Peter calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Superiour St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power 1 〈…〉 13. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 1. the man in Authority And the Schoolmen 1 Tim. 〈◊〉 2. caput communitatis the head of the Commonalty in whom solely the chief command and the Majesty of the Empire doth consist and to whom all inferiour Magistrates do owe all that power which they do exercise over the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being sent from him 1 Pet. 2. 14. VII In the third place we are to know that this supreme power which we call Majesty or Autocratical that is governing all by it self according to the diverse form of Commonwealths is placed either in some one person or in more In a popular state which is called
jurisdiction do wholy attribute the universal right of the external Government of the Church to the Civil Magistrate And moreover as for these our own Disciplinarians at home Good God! what Monsters of names and opinions as full of Deformity as of Difformity have these last seven years fruitful of prodiges brought forth and nursed under the pretence of Reformation XXX I have neither the leisure nor resolution unless I should appear too troublesom to you to grapple at this time with both these Adversaries But in these as in many other Debates that opinion seemeth to be the truer and is truly the safer which is lodged in the middle betwixt the two extremes and I am confident you will be so much the more willing to imbrace it by how much it is more agreeable to the Doctrine of the English Church as also to the Laws of the Kingdom which is That the Right of making Ecclesiastical Laws is in the Power of Bishops Elders and other Persons duely elected by the Clergy of the whole Kingdom But so nevertheless that the Exercise of the same Right and Power in all Christian Common-wealthâ— ought to depend on the Authority of the supreme Magistrate both a Parte ante as the Schoolmen have it a parte post on the part precedent on the part subsequent to wit that they ought not of themselves to assemble for the making of Ecclesiastical Canons Laws unless they be called to it by his Mandate or Command or at least defended by his Authority a fâ—ll free leave being both asked obtained and being thus called and warranted their Laws or Canons to which they have consented are not ratified not have any Power of obliging untill the Assent of the supreme Magistrate be obtained by whose approbation and Authority as soon as they are confirmed they are presently to pass for Laws and do oblige the Subject And these things may suffice to be spoken of the Cause Efficient THE EIGHTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws from the Formal Cause where Of 1 The Promulgation of Laws 2 Of Laws Penal Ezra 10. 7 8. 7. And they made proclamation throughout Judah and Jerusalem unto all the Children of the Captivity that they should gather themselves together unto Jerusalem 8. And that whosoever would not come within three days according to the Counsel of the Princes and the Elders all his substance should be forfeited OF the obligation of humane Lawes as to their material and efficient Causes we have spoke enough and as much as conduceth to our present purpose in those points which have already been handled by us In this place we are to speak of such as may be reduced to the Formal kind of Causes and although peradventure not so properly if examined according to the acurate and exact Method yet in my Judgment not altogether incongruous to our Discourse on this present Subject They may all of them be reduced to two Heads The one of the publication of Lawes and the other of the penalty adjoined to them to be inflicted on Delinquents Both of which as they are expressly contained in the Text above cited The Publication of the Law in the seventh verse and the penalty of it in the eighth verse so the use of them is very necessary both by the Nature of the Law it self and to obtain the Effect of the Law For seeing the Law by its own Nature and as it is a rule of things to be done ought to have a double Power viz. A Power of Directing by shewing unto the Subjects what is to be done and what is not to be done and a Power of obliging by suggesting into their minds a necessity of obeying The Law could not duely and effectually exercise this twofold Power unless the Subject were informed what is the will of the Prince which is done by publication and understood withall by the penalty annexed to it how much it doth concern him to perform it II. Concerning the Publication of the Law the first Doubt is Whether this publication be meerly on the Account of and as it were intrinsecal to the Law That is to enquire Whether that as the Law hath the Power of directing and obliging the promulgation of it be so necessary that it wanteth of that Power unless it be promulgated Now in all this Discourse you are to understand that I take not this word Promulgation as it is used in Cicero other Roman writers but according to the received manner of speaking amongst the Schoolmen the Canonists of the latter Ages for in that Promulgation of the Antients the Law not yet established or fully made was propounded to the people publickly on three Market days of their approbation of it But the Publication of which we now speak is the Promulgation of a Law already made that the People may take notice of it I therefore shall briefly answer to the Doubt proposed and say That this Publication is so necessary and so intrinsecal to the Law that in some manner it may be called the Form of it and thereupon amongst many Authors it is a part of the Definition of it and indeed it is absolutely necessary to this that the Law may exercise the Office of a Law which is to direct and to oblige the Subjects whom it cannot direct much less oblige although made by never so just and undoubted Authority unless it be known to them and it cannot be known unless it be published For that which properly induceth the obligation is the Will and Authority of the Prince or Governor not as a single but as a publick Person and the Head of the Commonalty But unless by some publick means he shall cause his Will to be propounded and made known unto the People it cannot by any Law be manifest at least according to the interpretation of the Law that it is his Will and proceedeth from his Authority as he sustaineth a publick Person Dist 4. Sect. In isâ—is And from hence is that of the Canon Law Leges constituuntur cùm promulgantur Lawes are constituted when they are published And that also of the Civil Law Leges quae constringunt vitas hominum ab omnibus intelligidebent The Laws which do bind the lives of men ought to be understood by all which being approved by the Common Consent of all Doctors and the Dictates of Reason we need not here for the confirmation of iâ— to instance the Example of God him self solemnly pronouncing his Law unto the Israelites from the Mount of Sinai or the Practice of the most flourishing Common-wealths and Cities in the whole world who as soon as their Laws were made did in the most publick places expose them to the observation of the people engraven in Tables of Brass or Wood the words are most known which every where we meet with amongst antient Authors and to this classis pertain the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifie nothing
sincerely and openly but with all due reverence to present their just grievances to their Prince and faithfully to lay before him with what present remedies they may cure those evils that oppress them and humbly to beseech him that he would be pleased to condescend to the petions of his Subjects as he shall judge it to be most safe and advantagious to the Commonwealth and confirm the grant of them with his Royal hand And if he being thus petitioned to shall refuse they are to desist for that time from their purposes and to be content with their present affairs and Laws and that without all murmuring or the least sign of force until their Prince being throughly perswaded by his Council and Intreaties of some friends or induced by the arguments of Reasons shall renounce that pertinaciousnesse of his Spirit and give an open Ear to the desires of his Subjects XV. The Fifth Doubt Seeing that the Common good is not only the End of the Laws but of the whole politick Government Is it lawful out of any foresight or pretence of the Common good to change the present form of Government or to attempt the change thereof and how far and to whom is it lawful For Examples sake Is it lawful for the people to change a Monarchical Government into an Aristocratical or into a Democratical or on the contrary A Question of great difficulty concernment especially in these times manners in which we live For my part I will faithfully represent unto you what I think of it and will leave unto every man the liberty to think what he pleaseth I suppose only what is already granted by many and what cannot easily be denye dviz that a Monarchy by Inheritance or a successive Kingdom is absolutely the best amongst all the forms of Common-wealth and highly to be preferred above the other two This being granted I think in the first place that the people if they please may change a Democratical into an Aristocratical or into an Monarchical Government First because it seemeth to be a change for the better moreover in Democracy the chief Command is in the Power of the people so that they may determine of themselves as they themselves please provided that no Injury be done to any man Now it is most certain that by this Change no Injury is done by the people unto any one It cannot be to any other for no Injury can be done to any man in any thing to which he hath no Right neither can any Injury be done herein to themselves who of their own accord do make this Change for no Injury can be ever done to a willing Person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I think in the second place that for all these reasons the Peers of a Land also may turn their Aristocratical Government Arist 5. into a Monarchical one For it is a change into the better Ethic. 〈◊〉 and by so doing no injury is done to any man But I cannot so easily resolve you this doubt whether it be as lawful for them to convert an Aristocracy into a Democracy for although they have power to do it and it may be done by them without any injury yet it seems not to be a Commutation into a better State Thirdly I believe that the Monarchy of an elective Kingdom may be changed peradventure into any form of Government but especially into an hereditary and a successive Kingdom and that for almost the same Reasons above alleged nevertheless this ought not to be done unlesse the Kingdom by the death of him that last Reigned be vacant for otherwise it would be an injury to the present King And Secondly it ought not to be done unlesse by the joynt consent of the Peers of the Kingdom and People and of those persons who have the right of electing I think fourthly that a Monarchy by inheritance cannot lawfully be changed into an Elective Kingdom or into any other form of Government either by the people alone or by the joynt consent of People Peers and King which is the whole people in their greatest latitude unlesse peradventure there shall be such a defect in the Royal Progeny that there is not one of them remaining to challenge the Kingdom due by inheritance to him The Reasons of this opinion are First Because according to our former supposition it were a change from a better to a worse Secondly Because by reason of that exchange an apparent injury would be done to the lawful Heir Thirdly Because that not only the Exchange but because such a desire and indeavour doth seem to be quite contrary to the words of Salomon Prov. 24. 21. My Son fear God and the King and have nothing to do with them who affect new things What before I said I must in this place again repeat viz. I do not urge this as too confidently to affirm it or to cause a disputation with any man in the proof of this particular if he be of another judgment XVI The sixth doubt How may that be understood which so commonly is spoken Salus pâ—puli est suprema Lex The safety of the People is the supreme Law The reason of the doubt doth proceed from that which we propounded and proved in the beginning viz. That the End of Laws is the publick good From hence on one side it seems to follow that the safety of the Common-wealth doth depend on the strict observance of the Laws and on the other side that all observancy of the Laws ought to give place to the safety of the Commonwealth And from hence some who within these few years have brought a new Divinity and a new policy into the Church and Common-wealth have no lesse confidently than perversely collected and suggested that the Liberty which they call the Right of the Subjects for so they interpret the Safety of the People is to be preferred above the prerogatives of Kings or the enacting or establishing of Laws and therefore all Regal Power and Authority of the Laws is to stoop unto it For the resolution of this doubt you are to know that all the deceit almost on this vulgar Axiom doth arise from the Equivocation which lyeth hid in the Terms especially in that word People For the people being a kind of a Metaphorical Body may be taken two wayes as the word Body may it self Collectively as it signifies the whole Commonalty of the Republick that is both King and Subjects and Discretively as it signifies the Subjects precisely by themselves and severed from the King As when we say the King and the people So in the word Body sometimes the other Members are to be understood with the Head as when we say the Soul and the Body And sometimes the Members only are precisely to be understood the Head to be taken by its self as when we say the Head and the Body XVII First therefore I say that most precisely and by a very evil Counsel that is wrested