Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united and not to those Individual Particles So St. Paul For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance but that Body in which these things were done How could it be said if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection as its Body that they were the things done in or by the Body Curcellaeus his Copy reads it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Fathers so took it either way it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended if there were no necessity of the same Body If there be no Resurrection of the Dead then is not Christ raised It seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before And the Apostle lays so much weight upon it that he saith if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain doth he mean if there were not the same personal Identity as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection That cannot be his meaning for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul He saith He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once What He was this It was Christ that died Yes the Person of Christ but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance but the same Consciousness and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance there was no necessity of the same Body And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body But Thomas said Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails and put my Finger into the print of the Nails and thrust my Hand into his side I will not believe The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body but there will be no such proof at the great Day And there is no Reason there should since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours but of the Certainty of it because he rose as the first Fruits Christ the first Fruits afterwards they that are Christs at his coming St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body and it is of great Consequence as to this Article to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds But some Man will say How are the Dead raised up and with what Body do they come First he shews that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation They sow bare Grain of Wheat or of some other Grain but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him and to every Seed his own Body Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that proper Body which belongs to it every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards so much inlarged and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination but it hath its proper Organical Parts which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are yet it hath been found by the most Accurate Observations that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith that we sow not that Body that shall be but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root Stalk Blade and Ear that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove that a Man is not the same because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states yet that Man would be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man And you grant that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants alters not the Identity and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant so that in things capable of any sort of Life the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity if its Organization and Life be the same and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness From whence it follows that to make the same Body no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it And you grant likewise That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body if Life were continued and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body Not from the Consciousness of the Soul but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united For saith he It is sown in Corruption it is raised in Incorruption It is sown in Dishonour it is raised in Glory It is sown in Weakness it is raised in Power It is sown a Natural Body it is raised a Spiritual Body Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be
sown in Corruption and Weakness and Dishonour Either therefore he must speak of the same Body or his meaning cannot be comprehended For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption and is to be restored with more noble Qualities For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption and this Mortal must put on Immortality I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection and that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith this is an Article of it and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body The Dispute is not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a Renovation i. e. it may be a New Life but not a raising the Body from the Dead 2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with are no less than those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Saviour The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature the latter is said Art 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person which you have endeavour'd with all your Art to perplex and confound and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment Of which afterwards The Original Question was whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas and my business was to prove that we could not because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways These are your own Words And then I undertook to shew that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties or for that Substance wherein that Property lies whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas you could come to no Certainty about them And as to Person I shew'd that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses but upon a different manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another And as to this I said that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception but whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other way for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures but there must be two Persons Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it As to Nature you say That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea which when they are found united in any Individual existing though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man or the Nature of a Man to be in him forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him which answer the â—omplex abstract Idea to which the specifick Name is given by any one which abstract specifick Idea he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals And as to Person in the way of Ideas you say that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing and so no Idea belonging to it nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstracted and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more To this you answer in your second Letter That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition But the Question is whether these be meer Words and Names or not Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person Of which I gave this evident Proof that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals every Individual must make a different Kind And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason Nothing particular that I can find But in the general you say that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing And is this all indeed Did not I tell you in these Words which I am forced to repeat on this occasion although I am very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions The Question now between us comes to this whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea or a general Name and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted The Question is not whether in forming
Ideas to go upon very different Grounds but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed and you doubt about the Sense of it Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas As in the present Case whether there can be three Persons in one Nature or two Natures and one Person what Resolution can you come to upon your Principles but in the Way of Ideas You may possibly say That where Ideas are clear and distinct there you are to judge of Revelation by them and this is what you assert in your Essay That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason there no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation which contradicts them from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once And yet there is a Person who hath lately told the World that there is one certain secret Way how by Divine Power the same Body but not the same Person may be in very distant Places at once but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret which was good friendly Advice But till it be discovered there is no judging of it Here I observe that you require clear and distinct Ideas and yet we find if a Man's Word may be taken these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct You say Your Method of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct And this is your Secret about Certainty which I think had been better kept up too For I pray in the Case now before us Are your Ideas of Nature and Person clear and distinct or not if they are then it is plain from your own Doctrine that if Revelation be pretended you are to reject it How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be preserved firm and immoveable although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed But suppose they are not clear and distinct What is to be done in a Matter of Revelation contrary to your Ideas Are you to submit to the Revelation or not Whatever God hath Revealed is most certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper Object of Faith but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no you say Reason must judge Yes Reason proceeding upon clear and distinct Ideas But suppose you have Ideas sufficient for Certainty in your Way but not clear and distinct what is to be done then In things that are above Reason you say when they are Revealed they are proper Matters of Faith What is here being above Reason Either above the Discovery of Reason as the Fall of Angels the Resurrection of the Body c. and about these you say Reason hath nothing to do What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body Or such as are above the Comprehension of Reason when discovered And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of and then you grant that they are pure Matters of Faith or they are such as you have certain Ideas of but not clear and distinct Now here lies the pinching Difficulty as to your Way of Ideas You say indeed That Revelation must carry it against meer Probabilities to the contrary because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know but is only probably convinced of is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive I pray observe your own Words you here positively say That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know So that it is plain here that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge or in clear and distinct Ideas and yet your great Complaint of Me was that I charged this upon you and now I find it in your own Words which I observed before But let us allow you all you desire viz. That there may be Certainty by Ideas where they are not clear and distinct and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas such as they are Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith when you are already certain by your Ideas of the contrary How is this possible Can you believe that to be true which you are certain is not true Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person the Question is Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith If you had said there had been only Probabilities on the other side I grant that you then say Revelation is to prevail but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true For how can you Believe against Certainty The Evidence is not so great as when the Ideas are clear and distinct but the Bar against Assent is as strong because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter Your Answer is That your Method of Certainty by Ideas shakes not at all nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith Against this I have pleaded 1. That your Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general 2. That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture Because you do not say that we are to believe all that we find there expressed but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it we are to judge that to be the true Sense But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct yet you affirm as your proper Doctrine That we may come to Certainty by Ideas although not in all Respects perfectly clear and distinct From whence I infer That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas you must judge of a Matter of Faith by those Ideas and consequently if the Union of two Natures and one Person or three Persons in one Nature be repugnant to your Ideas as I have shewed that they are you must by virtue of your own Principles reject these from being Matters of Faith And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith But you have this
proceeds so far as to question every thing in order to the discovering the true Ground of Certainty he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some Modes of Being but that which he aims at is satisfaction as to his real Existence But this wholly depends upon the Truth and Certainty of this Fundamental Maxim That Nothing can have no Operations and therefore whatever thinks or doubts or reasons must certainly be And since by another Fundamental Maxim it is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own Existence It may be said that this reaches only to bare Existence and not to the Being Men. I answer that for the Certainty as to that there are other general Maxims of necessary Use As That all different sorts of Beings are distinguished by Essential Properties That the Essential Properties of a Man are to Reason Discourse c. That these Properties cannot subsist by themselves without a real Substance And therefore where these Properties are found those who have them must be real and substantial Men. You may possibly say that these Maxims are useless because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us than our own Existence and that we have an internal infallible Perception that we are But I answer that these Maxims do not at all appear to be useless because the Certainty we enquire after is a Certainty of Reason and not of bare Perception And if it be a Certainty of Reason some Ground of Reason must be assigned for it but all that the Perception reaches to are those Acts mention'd by you I think I reason I feel pleasure and pain but the Question goes farther as to the Subject of those Acts and the Nature of that Subject whether it be a Man or not Now here lies the main Difficulty whether without the help of these Principles you can prove to any that doubt that they are Men And I shall now shew that in your Way of Ideas you cannot For 1 You suppose that we must have a clear distinct Idea of that which we are certain of in the Way of Ideas 2 You deny that we have any such clear and distinct Idea of Man 1. You suppose that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of For in your Chapter of Maxims you say that every one knows the Ideas that he has and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another Which always being so I pray mark that and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his mind that it is there and is that Idea it is and that two distinct Ideas when they are in his mind are there and are not one and the same Idea From whence you infer the Necessity of Certainty when the Ideas are clear and distinct This is so plain and clear that I wonder how you came to forget it and to think that I did you wrong when I charged you with holding clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty But of that in the Beginning of this Discourse 2. But let us now examine your Idea of Man whether that be clear and distinct or not and if not then according to your Principles very rational Men cannot be certain that they are Men. For if they have no Way of Certainty but by Ideas and you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man then they can come to no Certainty and I hope you will not deny them to be very rational Men if they follow the Way of Ideas First you shew that there can be no Demonstration in the Way of Principles what Man is Secondly that there are very different Ideas of Man some you say make the Idea of a Man without a Soul as Children do Others add Laughter and rational Discourse and these may demonstrate by general Principles that Ideots and Infants are no Men by this Maxim that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be and you have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. Others take in the Idea of Body in general and the Powers of Language and Reason and leave out shape and so a Man may be a Four-footed Creature or in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason joined that was a Man But where is the clear and distinct Idea of a Man all this while We can have no Certainty by Principles you say and you offer none in the Way of Ideas for the Ideas are very confused imperfect and repugnant to each other and so in this new Method of Certainty by Ideas we cannot be so much as certain that we are Men. But is it possible to suppose that a rational Man should talk of Certainty by Ideas and not be able to fix the Idea of a Man One would have thought this had been only an Omission in this place out of pure Zeal against Principles but certainly in other places this Idea of a Man must be made clear and distinct So far from it that in other places you industriously set your self to disprove the common Idea of a Man It could not possibly be say you that the abstract Idea to which the Name Man is given should be different in several Men if it were of Natures making and that to one it should be animal rationale to another animal implume bipes latis unguibus From whence it is plain that you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man and you endeavour to expose the sacred Definition as you call it of animal rationale which was never exposed by any Man without Cause But you conclude That we are far from knowing certainly what Man is though perhaps it will be judged great Ignorance to doubt about it And yet you think you may say That the certain Boundaries of that Species are so far from being determined and the precise Number of simple Ideas which make that nominal Essence so far from being setled and perfectly known that very material Doubts may still arise about it So that I begin to think I. S. was in the right when he made you say That you had discoursed with very rational Men who denied themselves to be Men. But this is a little too hard to deny themselves to be Men. If it had been only who doubted whether they were Men or not you could not deny them to be very rational Men because they went upon your Grounds that we can have no Certainty either by Principles or by any clear and distinct Ideas what a Man is Thus I have shew'd how inconsistent your way of Ideas is with true Certainty and of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are I now come to the Certainty of Reason in making Deductions And here I shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty which the Ancient Philosophers went