Selected quad for the lemma: peace_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
peace_n	king_n	say_a	treaty_n	2,145	5	9.6984	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A88684	Considerations touching the great question of the King's right in dispensing with the penal laws Written on the occasion of His late blessed Majesties granting free toleration and indulgence. By Richard Langhorn, late of the Middle Temple, Esq;	Langhorne, Richard, 1654-1679.; Langhorne, Richard, fl. 1687.	1687 (1687)	Wing L396A; ESTC R229629	25,471	35

in the same Parliament thereby intending to make the said Earl either to retract or to forbear prosecution of his Charge against the said Duke or to invalidate his Testimony And true it is that the Fifth Article of the Charge against the said Earl was That he Counsell'd and perswaded King James to Grant and to allow unto the Papists free Toleration and Silencing of all the Laws made and standing in force against them The Charge is not That he Counsell'd the King to Grant a Publick and Free Toleration But to Dispense with the Laws For Toleration and Dispensation import no more than a permission to Exercise their Religion in their private Houses and to Suspend the Execution of the Laws there mention'd for a Time. All which the said King had power in pursuance of a Treaty and Articles between Crowns upon the breach or performance of which Peace or War Common-Good or Publick-Prejudice depend to do But to Counsel a free Toleration imports an Allowance of Publick Worship which as Affairs then stood here could not consist with Publick Peace The Temper of this Nation not enduring it nor could the Papists have been secured from the Rage of the People in the Enjoyment of it And the Silencing of the Laws might import a Total Repeal of them which the King did not Claim a Right to do of himself So that this comes not to our Poynt in Question This Lord was not Impeached by Parliament nor by any appearing Concurrence of Judges nor for Advising the King to Dispense with any Penal Law for Publick-Good or where Necessity required But there is yet something more in this Case of the Earl of Bristol The whole Story is told at large by Mr. Rushworth in the Book before cited And it had this farther in it viz. That when the Impeachment was brought into the Lords House the Earl of Bristol put in his Answer to it and as to this particular Article he first denyed positively That he had Counsell'd any thing in the matter charged And then he declared fully what was done and set forth at large the matters of Fact before-mention'd as well as to what was Signed by King James and his Late Majesty King Charles the First as also the Declaration Signed by the Lord Conway by King James his Order So that in this Case there are these things worthy observation to the present purpose First That it is not probable but that the said Duke of Buckingham being the then Greatest Minister of State and Favourit to King James did Advise in all things which then passed in that Affair and particularly in the Declaration Signed by the Lord Conway But touching the Lord Conway's Signing a Declaration there can be no question Secondly That the said Earl wanted neither Wit Will nor Courage to Charge the said Duke as far and with Crimes as distastful as he could find any wherewith to Charge And that he was not fond of nor any ways obliged to spare the Person of the Lord Conway who was the Duke's Friend and must have been the Duke's most material Wittness to save him in Case the Charge against the Duke had been prosecuted Thirdly That the Parliament then sitting was as diligent in Enquiring into Misdemeanors as much displeased with the Duke of Buckingham as little tender of the Lord Conway as Secretary of State and much inclined to Enquire in relation to the too much Advancing and Stretching the King's Prerogative to the prejudice of the Subject and against the known Laws as peradventure any Parliament that ever Sett in England yet neither did Parliament nor this Earl of Bristol Charge any thing against this Duke or Exhibite any Impeachment against the said Lord Conway for Advising to Dispense with Penal Laws nor did this Parliament any way appear to prosecute the said Earl of Bristol upon this Impeachment Exhibited against him though he was thereby particularly Charged for thus Advising This seems a very probable Argument at least to prove that both the Earl of Bristol and this Parliament did Believe the King to have this Right which is here Asserted Object IX That King James when he Treated in Relation to the Match with Spain being demanded to Suspend the Execution of the Penal Laws then in force against the Papists was pleased to Answer That it was not in his Power so to do without a Parliament Answ This whole Objection is most certainly a mistake For it is evidently proved before what Opinion King James had and how well he was satisfied with and understood his Right in the point of Dispensations And how Wise and Knowing a Prince he was all Man-kind is satisfied Therefore if any thing were demanded of that King in that Treaty to which his Majesty gave any such Answer as is here Objected The demand did certainly Extend so far as to require a Total Silencing and Repealing of those Laws In which Case his Majesties Answer was most certainly True. But to suppose that King to have given this Answer where the Question or Demand was only touching a Suspension of Laws and then afterwards to have offer'd and promised a Suspension of the same Laws under his Great Seal would be with the highest Folly Self-contradiction and want of Sincerity imaginable Object X. That his now Majesty in a Speech heretofore made by him in this present Parliament did by implication agree that he had not by wishing that he had such Power as is now insisted on And when afterwards his Majesty by Advice took upon him to Exercise this Power he did again upon further Advice wave the same Answ I. This as well as the other Objections in the Case of King James if they were granted as far as the Objections can be put Nay if the Cases were That King James had and his now Majesty also past Acts of Parliament express in the point to bar themselves and the Crown of this Right the same must be only intended as to the ordinary Exercise of that Right But not of the Extraordinary Exercise thereof when the Publick Good requires the same should be Exercised which is proved by the Grounds before layd Secondly And that his Majesties proceedings are to be thus intended and not otherwise is proved by the continual Exercise of that Power in the Cases of Suspensions of Penal Laws suspended by the King 's sole Power and the Suspensions never Question'd never Complain'd of but still submitted unto and admitted as Legal namely those touching Navigation touching Importation of French-Wines and touching The Breadth of Cart-Wheels If the King had been really perswaded into a real Belief by the mistaken Advice of the Earl of Clarendon whose Opinion in Law was never esteemed of Venerable Authority at the time of his Speaking which is Objected It is clear by his Majesties Practice since that he hath found cause to alter that Belief And if his Majesty for Reasons best known to his Royal Self hath in one particular Case waved the

Arms many in England who are willing to Assist the King in this Exigency dare not bear Arms because they cannot comply with what the aforesaid Law requires Many who can comply with this Law refuse to comply and consequently pretend they cannot comply and therefore that they dare not bear Arms. But their true Reason is That they know they can have no Toleration in the business of Religion secured unto them by the King And they hope the Enemy if they overcome will for their own Interest at least make good their Promise The rest of the Nation are not able to Defend the Kingdom Now it is demanded of the Judges May the King in this Exigency Dispense with this Law and suspend all the Penal Laws in cases of Religion And hath the King a Right to do this If he cannot Then clearly the Crown and Kingdom must be Lost because our Law is in so great a Point defective If the King hath Right to do this tho' no part of the Penalty be by this Law to the King but all to the Informer Then put the same Case yet farther And suppose the Malum Prohibitum in this Law were by this Law adjudged and declared to be a common Nusance Nay suppose it were adjudged to be Felony or High Treason Hath the King in such Case a Right to Dispense and is not the King the sole Judge in this Case of the Necessity and of the Publick Good Or is the King to Call a Parliament of necessity to judge in the Point and so hazard the Ruin of the whole in expecting the meeting of a Parliament Or must he Consult the Judges and be bound by their Opinions in so great an Affair of State Necessity and the Publick-Safety It is conceived the Resolution of this Case will put an end to the whole Doubt Against these Affirmatives several Objections are usually made which are Answer'd thus Object I. That the King by his Coronation Oath and by several Promises hath pleased to bind himself to maintain all the Laws And since all men agree That Almighty God can bind himself by his Promises it is unreasonable to say the King cannot bind himself Answ I. This Objection if it proves any thing proves too much for it is as strong to take away the King's Power of Pardoning or of Dispensing with a Penal Law as to a particular person as to take away his Power of Dispensing in general But the Objectors Grant That the King hath the former Power inherent in him notwithstanding these Promises and Oath and that no Construction shall be made of them to bar him from Pardoning or from Dispensing with particular Persons therefore no Construction shall be made of them to Bar him from Dispensing generally Secondly There is no Construction to be made of any Promise of God to bind his Divine Majesty to cease to be Good and Merciful Because those Attributes are of his Essence and such a Promise would amount to a Promise to cease to be God which God cannot cease to be and therefore cannot be intended to bind himself to cease to be So neither shall any Construction be made of any Oath or Promise of the King to bind the King to cease to have the Power of Mercy because it is of the Essence of the King And it would amount to a binding himself to cease to be King which he cannot bind himself to cease to be Thirdly This Right of Dispensation is a Law in its self and so necessary and fundamental a Law in order to the Publick Good That without it and without the Exercise of it when the Common Good requires it to be Exercised The Kingdom cannot be and the King's Prerogative is Law. Therefore the King's Oath and Promises to maintain the Laws bind him to maintain and exercise this Right And to put such a Construction upon the said Oath and Promises as should bind the King not to use this Right were to bind the King to Break and to Violate the Laws and to neglect the Safety of the Kingdom Nay for the King not to exercise this Right would be to Violate his Oath and Promises and to break the Trust reposed in him by the whole Realm when they make a Law and entrust him with it as the Fountain of Mercy and Head of the Publick Good And to frustrate the Chief End of all our Laws Fourthly The Objection is therefore grounded upon a mistake of the Question For no man will or dares say That the King is bound to enforce the Execution of a Penal Law to the prejudice of the whole Kingdom or of a very notable considerable part of it Object II. That all the Judges and all who are in the Commission of the Peace are Sworn to put the Laws in Execution But if the King shall be said to have this Power he shall have it in his Power to make all these Perjur'd Answ I. This Objection as the former makes as much against the King's Power of Dispensing as to particular persons as against the Power now affirmed and so it fights against the Objectors allowed Opinion and proves nothing Secondly The Right and Prerogative in dispute is a Law so they are bound by their Oaths to submit to it and maintain it Thirdly A Dispensation in our Case is in the nature of a Temporary Repeal of a Law for it is a laying it to Sleep for a time in a Legal way consequently there is no more Obligation from the Oath objected to put a Law in Execution during the Time that the Execution thereof is by a Dispensation Legally Suspended then there is to put a Law in Execution after it is Repealed And to do either would be against the Oath objected because it would be to Act against Law. And if this be denyed it were worthy Enquiry Why the Judges who are bound by Oath as is objected and who sometimes affirm themselves obliged by Oath to give the Laws in Charge in their Circuits do nevertheless forbear to give in Charge or put in Execution several Obsolete and Antiquated Laws which have never been actually Repealed by the Legislative Power but only Suspended by the Act or by Allowance of our Kings who might have enforced the Execution of them if they had pleased and by the Consent and tacite Agreement of our Judges and whole Kingdom taken to be suspended Object III. If this Power be allowed to be in the King he may by Virtue of it Suspend all our Laws and even Magna Charta it self and then farewell all our Liberties and Properties Answ If this Objection be not grounded upon a Mistake of the Question it signifies nothing the Right asserted is a Righr of Dispensation Publick Necessity and Publick Good requiring it It is proved by the Fifth Ground before laid and the Instances urged to prove that Ground That Magna Charta hath been and may be Suspended by this Right when Publick Good requires such Suspension And what matter is

it how many Laws are Suspended at one time for Publick-Good which is the End of all our Laws Here is no other Right pretended to be maintained in the present Dispute But what is for Publick-Good and the Conservation of our Liberties and Properties Object IV. The Allowance of this Power to the King may be Dangerous in its Consequence For in Effect it makes him sole Judge in the Case And then be may use this Power by mistake to the prejudice of the Publick Answ If there be any Danger in making the King Judge in this Case And that this Danger be an Error it is not the fault of those who maintain this Right But of the Law which declares this Right to be in the King and of the whole Realm which entrusts the Power of Mercy in the King. The same Law and the same Realm entrusts the King with the Sword of Justice with the Militia and with the Power of Peace and War yet the Law was never blamed in these points nor ought the Kingdom to be charged with Folly or Imprudence for these Trusts Certain it is these Powers and these Trusts must of necessity be in some Person or Persons alwaies Visible and alwaies in Being If it be in One Single Person he is must be King If in more then we must change our Government and Laws And how safe that will be for our Liberties and Properties is not hard to judge The same Law that Entrusts these Powers in the King knowing him to be a Man Entrusts the Legislative Power in the Parliament which is composed of Men and the whole Realm Consents to these Trusts This is the Constitution of our Government And as our Law Affirms that this Trust as to the Legislative Power will not be abused and therefore says possitively That in the Exercise of the Legislative Power the Parliament can do no wrong The Law implying the Consent of the whole Realm to be included in what they do and consequently That none shall be said to be wronged in what they Consent to So the Law and the whole Realm consenting to Repose these Trusts in the King the Law affirms and the whole Realm believes That these Trusts will not be abused and therefore the Law says That in the Exercise of these Trusts the King can do no wrong The Law implying the Consent of the whole Realm to be included in the reposing of these Trusts in the King and consequently to be included in what the King does in the Exercise and Execution of these Trusts and consequently that none shall be said to be wrong'd in what they Consent unto And in Truth our Law says the King makes the Laws and is the sole Judge even in Parliament and the Lords and Commons only Assent And the King is solely intrusted with the Power of Judging and that he hath no Judge over him 22. Ed. 3. fol. 3. Object V. If this Right may be allowed the King may Licence a Common Nusance or Felony or High-Treason Answ The Question is only touching the Licensing of a thing which in its own nature is indifferent and if not prohibited by a Law might be honestly done and becomes an Offence only by being prohibited and because it is prohibited by a Law made for Common-Good And this being the true state of the Case the Objection is fully granted The King may License the doing of a thing Common-Good and Publick Advantage or Necessity requiring the Licensing of the same regard being had to particular circumstances of Time and other Reasons of State and concernments which by Law was made an Offence or Common-Nusance or Felony or High-Treason And this is so far from being a prejudice or mischief That it would be an Inconveniency not to have such a Power some where This is proved by the Fifth and Sixth Grounds before layd And for farther proof there is one instance amongst many in the Books 11. H. 7. fol. 11. Bro. tit licences 24. Where it is Resolved That whereas the Coyning of Money was an indifferent thing in it self And might have been practised by every man that pleased untill it was made an Offence by Law which makes it High-Treason The King may Dispense with that Law and licence the Coyning of Money This is an Instance of the highest nature viz. of a Malum Prohibitum made Treason And therefore other Instances are needless Object 6. If this Right be allowed where the Penalty for doing a Malum Prohibitum is given to the Poor or the Prosecutor and not to the King the King shall have power to Deprive the Subject of what the Law gives him which will be a Wrong and the King can do no Wrong Answ This Objection as the former is grounded upon a mistake of the Question which is only of Dispensing Pro Bono Publico in Cases of Common-Good and Publick Advantage or Necessity so that what at the time of making the Law which made it an Offence was fit for the Common-Good to be prohibited and made an Offence comes at the Time and in the Circumstances wherein it is Dispensed with to be a Common-Good and consequently necessary to be licensed So that admitting it were a mischief to the Prosecutor or to the Poor of some Parish to be barred of the Penalty given by the Law yet to the Publick it would be an Inconveniency not to have that Licensed which Common-Good requires to have Licensed And the known Rule of Law requires That a private Mischief should rather be suffer'd then a Common Inconvenience Consequently by this Right exercised the King does no Wrong For to prefer Publick-Benefit before the private Gain of Informers who are the Pest of the Kingdom or before the Poor of a Parish who must otherwise be kept by the Parish is no Wrong Besides the Objectors grant That the King notwithstanding this Objection may licence particular persons And they must grant That before an Action commenced the King after an Offence committed may deprive an Informer of what the Law gives by a particular Pardon Both these Rules are lay'd in the Books of 2. R. 3. fol. 11.12 1. H. 7. fol. 3. 37. H. 6. fol. 4. 5. And if it be no wrong to Pardon the Offence committed altho' there be no Pretence of Common-Good upon which the Pardon is grounded it is certainly no wrong to Dispence for Common-Good Object VII That there are no express Judgments found in our Law-Books to warrant this Right in the King And it is to be presumed That it being a Right often Claimed by our Kings and Denyed by the Subjects The Judges who by their Offices are the King's Council Learned would not have left so material a Point unsettled Answ I. Supposing this Objection were true That there were no Express Judgments found in this Case yet the Consequence doth no more follow That therefore the King hath no such Right then the contrary consequence would follow Therefore the King hath such Right For