is onely Method Q. How is it done A. The Logician by this light of artificiall Method selecteth out of this pot the definition of Grammer for that is most generall and placeth it in the first place Grammer is the doctrine of speaking well Then he taketh out of the same Oven the partition of Grammer and placeth it in the second place the parts of Grammer are two Etymology and Syntaxis Then out of the same vessel he separateth the definition of Etymology of words and joyneth it in the third place to those that go before then he seeketh out the parts of words in letters and syllables and the kinds in words of number and without number and placeth them with their transitions in their severall places And so the definitions of all the parts of Etymology together with their distributions colligations and most speciall examples he placeth in their severall places and so likewise in the Syntax This way all the Arts have proposed to themselves CAP. 19. The second example of Method by example of Poets Orators Historiographers Q. But is Method only set forth in matter of the arts and doctrines A. No it is also declared in all things which we would teach easily and plainly therefore Poets Orators and all manner of writers as often as they propose any thing to teach to their auditors do follow this way although they do not enter and insist upon it all alike Q. Give an example out of some Poet. A. Virgil in his Georgicks distâ—buteth as I said before the proposed matter into four parts and in the first book followeth common things as Astrology Meteorology and of corn and tillage this was the first part of his work then the transition is adhibited in the beginning of the second book Thusâ— far of tillage and of stars were we Now of thee Bacchus we 'l sing presently Then he writeth generally of trees as also specially of plants the second transition is adhibited to the third part but more imperfect and without an Epilogue In the beginning of the third book of Oxen Horses Sheep Goats Dogs Wee 'l sing of goddesse Pales al 's ' of him Who by Amphryso kept his sheep most trim At length in the beginning of the fourth book there is the third transition of the fourth part but also imperfect from the only preposition of their Bees Now of the eyre hony Bee I 'le speak So therfore the Poet studieth to place the most generall first the subalternate middle the most special in the last place Q. Give another poeticall example A. Ovid in Fast. useth this kind of disposition proposing in the beginning the sum of his work I 'le sing of times that passe throughout the year Fall of the stars and rising I 'le declare By and by having made imploration he determineth the partition of the year made first by Romulus into ten months which he reprehendeth When as Rooms builder did the year divide In it he made five months and five beside And a little further he adjoyneth Numa his more full Divisor But Numa neither Janus did omit Nor yet the ancient shadows out did put But to th' old months two more appointed he Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-dayes working-dayes banquet-dayes kalends nones ides at the last he followeth every month in his place and with a preface after this order he passeth from generals to the study of specials i th' whole I have you shew'd what these things be It now remains we part them presently At length after the exposition of every part the transition is joyned as in the end of the first and beginning of the second book The first part of my task is ended now The month is done my little book also Janus is done another month beginneth Another book now with that month reneweth And in every one of his books afterward the transitions are adhibited but lesse accurately Q. How do the Orators follow this Method A. The Orators in poems narrations confirmations perorations do follow this order as the nature both of the art and the order of the thing do require somtimes more studiously too Q. Give example A. Cicero in an accusation first by propounding then by parting followeth this order Questor Cu. Paxeris saith he thou hast been Consul unto this time fourteen years and from that day unto this day in which thou hast made me I call thee into judgement there was no void hour found in robbery wickednesse cruelty iniquity This is the proposition and definition of the chief matter as in this judgment most generall The partition followeth these are the years consumed in the Questorship and a Sciaticaâ— Embassage and the Urban Pretorship and in the Sicilian Pretorship wherefore this shall be the fourfold disposition on of my accusation which four parts with their particular partitions he hath also handled in their severall order and place and coupled them with transitions the three first in the third book Wherefore saith he his Questorship being shewed and his first magistracy together with his theft and wickednesse looked unto let us attend to the rest Then having expounded the faults of his embassadorship the transition to his Pretorship followeth But let us now come to that famous Pretorship those faults which were more known to those which were present then to us who come meditated and prepared to pleading This transition is more imperfect without an epilogue at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like transition to the fourth part of the Sicilian Pretorship Many necessary things O Judges I must pretermit that I may in some manner speak of those things which are committed to my trust for I have received the cause of Sicilia that Province hath drawn me unto this businesse Q. Give an example out of the same Historiographer A. Livy doth so imbrace the sum of 70. years in the beginning then divideth them by tens CAP. 20. The secrets of Method Q. It seemeth that in the diverse axiomaticall homogenes as also in the judgment of the syllogisme the notes of Method shall be as often as any thing is taught clearly but is there no other kinde of Method A. Yes when as the auditor shall be deceived in a certain part with delectation and a greater motionâ— then certain homogenes are rejected as the lights of definition partition and transition and certain heterogenes are assumed as digressions from the matter and commotations upon the thing but chiefly the order of things in the beginning is turned over and certain antecedents are put after consequents Therefore to that rule of perfect Method this may seem somwhat more imperfect the form is not only lame things being detracted or abounding things being added but also the order of iâ— being inverted by certain degrees is preposterours Q. Give an example of it A. The like the Poet maketh with a certain greater kinde of artificialness while heâ— propoundeth to himself to lead the people
threatning pains of tribunal judgment condemnation at the least of filthy ignorance and calumny will thrust us from the whole Kingdom of Philosophy as strange and unheard oâ— prescription both with hands and tongue Whither will they forbid the small cause of our wish what freedom was obtained by King Henry from the envie of so mad a Iudg or to the more solid judgment of a milder Censurer What afterward when this Logicall order had set foot in the cause of Religion was a more great offence the life and health of us being aimed at by those three civill wars will these shew no cause of our wish yea rather they do admonish That we give great thanks to the Almighty who hath ayded and protected the course of our studies hitherto neither would suffer them by any means to be interrupted Therefore I witnesse that this light of Logick will avail greatly to the studious in setting forth the truth as also to adorn the ingenuous Arts as chiefly the illustrating the heavenly mysteries of the sacred Doctrine I pray that it may grow up more and more to these things and that this Book may be happily concluded to the glory of God A TABLE OF THE Chapters in the two Books of Peter Ramus his DIALECTICA In the first Book 1. The definition of Dialectica 2. The parts and kinds of arguments 3. The Efficient procreanâ— and Conservant cause 4. The Efficient alone and with others 5. The Efficient by himself or an Accident 6. The Matter 7. The Form 8. The End 9. The Effects 10. The Subject 11. The Adjunct 12. Diverses 13. Desperates 14. Relates 15. Adverses 16. Contradicents 17. Privants 18. Equalls 19. Greaters 20. Lessers 21. Likes 22. Dislikes 23. Conjugates 24. Notation 25. Distribution 26. Distribution of the Causes 27. Distribution of the Effects whether of Kind or Species 28. The Distribution from the Subjects 29. The Distribution from the Adjunct 30. Definition 31. Description 32. Testimony Divine 33. Testimonies humane of Laws and Sentences In the second Book 1. Of Iudgement 2. Axiomas affirming or denying 3. True and False 4. The simple Axioma 5. the copulate Axioma 6. The connexed Axioma 7. The Descrete Axioma 8. The disjunct Axioma 9. The Syllogisme and his parts 10. The â—imple and contraected syllogism 11. The first kind of the simple explicate Syllogism 12. The simple explicate Syllogism 13. The first connexed Syllogism 14. The second connexed Syllogism 15. The first disjunct Syllogism 16. The second disjunct Syllogism 17. The onely method according to Aristotle 18. The first illustration of Method by examples of arts 19. The second example of Poets Orators and Historiographers 20. The secrets of Method In Laudem Scientia Dialecticae sacrae THe sacred Sciences do Praeise deserve And merit Laud because that they conserve The use of Manners also do declare What things in Man most acceptable are But 'mongst them all there 's none so high in Reach As Dialectica which reasoning doth teach This at the first from God Almighty came From Heaven descended this bright shining flame God Reason taught and Man he did inspire With Faculties which Logick doth require The Matter Precepts Form Methodical The end is Reasons use to teach t'h unlearned all Th' effects are divers which I cannot tell Except I had a tongue which did excell The Artes before confusedly did lie Till Logicks use compos'd them curiously But what do I discoursing of this thing When Praises to the worth the Learned cannot sing THE FIRST BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of Invention CAP. 1. What Dialectica is Question WHat is Dialectica A. Dialectica is the art of disputing well and in that sense is called Logick CAP. 2. The parts of Dialectica and kinds of Arguments Q. How many parts hath Dialectica A. Dialectica hath two parts Invention and Judgment Q. What is Invention A. Invention is a part of Dialectica of inventing Arguments Q. What is an Argument A. An Argument is that which iâ— affected to argue any thing such aâ— are all reasons considered a part and bâ— themselves Q. What be the Kinds A. Artificiall and Inartificiall Q. What is an Artificiall Argument A. That which argueth of it self Q. What be the Kinds A. First or derived from the First Q. What is First A. First is that which is of its own Originall Q. What be the Kinds A. Simple or Comparative Q. What is Simple A. Simple is that which is considered simply and absolutely Q. What be the Kinds A. Agreeing or disagreeing Q. What is Agreeing A. That which agreeth with tâ— thing which it argueth Q. What be the Kinds A. Agreeing absolutely or after certain manner Q. What is agreeing absolutely A. The Cause and Efâ—ect CAP. 3. The Efficient Procreant and Conservant Cause Q. What is the Cause A. The Cause is that by whose force the thing is Q. What is the Proâ—it of it A. This first place of invention is the foundation of all knowledge and he is beleeved to know of whom the cause is held As the Poet sayeth worthily The man sure happy is who cause of things doth know Q. How is the Cause divided A. Into two kinds Efficient and Matter or Forme and End Q. What is the Efficient Cause A. The Efficient Cause is that from which the thing is Q. How many kinds hath it A. There appeareth to us no true Kinds yet the great plenty of it is distinguished by certain means Q. What is that which effecteth by â—he first means A. That which procreateth or deâ—endeth Q. Give me an example out of somâ— Poet. A. Ovid 1. Remedio Amoris Therefore when thou shalt look in this ouâ— med ' cinall Art My admonition do set Idlenesse apart This causeth thee to love this doth defenâ— it still This is the cause of joy as meat somtimeâ— breeds ill Take lastly sloth away God Cupids bow is lost His torches lose their light contemn'd away they 'r tost Q. Give me a more familiar exampleâ— A. The Father and Mother procreate the Nurse defendeth Q. Give an example of this out of some Poet. A. 4. AEneid Th' art not Gods Child ne Dardanus his son Thou rather from the steep â—ard rocks didst come Of Caucasus it seemeth of that breed Hyrcanian Tygers thee with brests did feed AEglog 8. Now what this whorson love is I well woâ— It is a little busie boy begot Not of mans seed ne like to one of us But farthest Garamants and Ismarus Or rockie Rhodope as it should seem In their rough ragged hils ingeÌ„dred him Q. Do not builders and governours of Cities come under this head A. Yes Romulus the builder of the City of Rome also all other Kings Consuls and Emperors are defenders and keepers CAP. 4. The Efficient alone and with others Q. What is that which effecteth by the second means A. That which effecteth alone or with others Q. What are those others A. Some oftentimes are Principall others are helping and Ministers Q.
doubt The fallacies which are referred to a compound Axiome are those which are referred either to a disjoyned or knitting Axiome To a disjoyned axiome when the parts indeed are not disjoyned As Solomon was either a King or did bear rule To a Knitting axiome is when the parts are not necessarily knit together As If Rome be on fire the Popes chayre is burnt And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment Now followeth the second And they be either those that are referred To a Syllogism or To Method And they again are Generall and Speciall Generall which are referred to the generall properties of a Syllogisme It is either when all the parts are Denied or are Particular All parts denied As No Pope is a Divell No man is a Divell No man is a Pope Therefore And this must be answered that it is not according to the definition of a Negative syllogisme which must have alwayes one affirmative All particular As Some unlawfull thing must be suffered as namely that which cannot be taken away The stews is some unlawfull thing Therefore the stews must be suffered This is answered by the definition of a speciall syllogism which is that hath one part generall The speciall are those which are Simple or Compound The Simple is of two sorts The first is more Plain The second less Plain More plain is when the assumption is denied or the question is not particular As Every Apostle may preach abroad Some Apostle is not a Pope Therefore Some Pope may not preach abroad Also Every Pope is a Lord Some Pope may give an universall licence Therefore every Lord may give an universal licence Less plain hath one fallcy in coÌ„mon when the proposition is speciall As Some player is a rogue Every vagabond is rogue Therefore every player is a vagabond Also Some player is a rogue Every vagabond is a player Therefore every player is a Rogue The fallacie of the first kind is when all the parts be affirmative As All Pauls Bishops were ordained for unity All Arch-Bishops be ordained for unity Therefore all Arch-Bishops are Pauls Bishops The fallacie of the second kind is when the assumption is denied As Every puritane is a Christian. No L. Bishop is a puritane Therefore No L. Bishop is a Christian. Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple Syllogism Now follow those which are referred to a compound which are those which are referred either To the Connexive or To the disjoyned Of the first sort one is when the first part or antecedent is denied that the second or consequent may be â—o likewise As If any man have two benefices â—e may escape unpunished at the Bishops hands But he may not have two benefices Therefore He may not escape unpunished at the Bishops hands The second part is affirmed that the first may be so also As If every ignorant minister were put out of the Church and a Preacher in his place we should have good order But we have good order Therefore Every ignorant minister is put out of the Church and a Preacher in his place Of those referred to the disjoyned the first is when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed As Every ignorant minister is to be allowed or not But he is not Therefore he is The second kind is when the second part of the copulative negative axiome is denied that the firâ—t may be so As A non-resident is either a faithfull or unfaithfull Minister But he is unfaithfull Ergo c. And thus much of the fallacies in a Syllogisme The fallacie in Method is when to deceive withall the end is set in the beginning the speciall before the generall good order be gone confounded And finally when darknesse length and hardnesse is laboured after FINIS
viz. the beast-like heads of the multitude and therefore he deceiveth divers wayes he beginneth in the middle there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first to conclude the last he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance So as Horace saith Homer disposeth his Iliads Ne doth this man Troyes wars divide so well He alwayes maketh haste th' event to tell Even in the midst his reader he doth catch Leaves off his tract with haste from it doth snatch And thus he lies thus mingles false with true So that ne first nor midst in it I view Q. Proceede to furtâ—er example A. So Virgil taketh AEneas from Sicilia and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage and at last bringeth in his diverse troubles So the Commedian Poets although with great judgment they have distinguished their Comedies by acts and scenes yet do so effect that all things seem to be done by chance The Orators attribute all to victory Therfore this seemeth to be placed chiefly by them not so much to teach as to perswade when as also those things which do equally excell are kept even unto the last and the means are conferred into the middle according to Homers disposition FINIS A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK Containing in substance All that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three Books of that Subject Except onely what is not applicable to the English TONGUE A BRIEF Of the ART of RHETORICK The first Book CHAP. 1. That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the Iudge but chiefly in Proofes And that this Art is profitable WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse some by chance but some by method This method may be discovered and to discover Method is al one with teaching an Art If this Art consisted in Criminations only and the skill to stirre up the Judges to Anger Envy Feare Pity or other affections a Rhetorician in well ordered Common wealths and States where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing could have nothing at all to say For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question And that which the pleader is to shew and the Judge to give sentence on is this only 'T is so or not so The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker who judging of universals and future things could not be corrupted Besides 't is an absurd thing for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use It consisteth therfore chiefly in Proofes which are Inferences and all Inferences being Sllyogismes a Logician if he would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme and an Enthymeme which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme would make the best Rhetorician For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick Whether they inferre truth or probability and because without this Art it would often come to pass that evill men by the advantage of naturall abillities would carry an evil cause against a good it brings with it at least this profit that making the pleaders even in skill it leaves the oddes only in the merit of the cause Besides ordinarily those that are Judges are neither patient nor capable of long Scientificall proofes drawne from the principles through many Syllogismes and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall and shorter way Lastly it were ridiculous to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body and not to be ashamed of being inferiour in the vertue of wel expressing the mind CHAP. 2. The Definition of Rhetorick RHetorick is that Faculty by which wee understand what wil serve our turne concerning any subject to win beliefe in the hearer Of those things that beget beleefe some require not the help of Art as Witnesses Evidences and the like which we invent not but make use of and some require Art and are invented by us The beleefe that proceedes from our invention comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker partly from the passions of the hearer but especially from the proofes of what we alledge Proofes are in Rhetorick either Examples or Enthymemes as in Logick Inductions or Syllogismes For an Example is a short Induction and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme out of which are leâ—t as superfluous that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer to avoid prolixity and not to consume the time of publick business needlesly CHAP. 3. Of the severall kinds of Orations and of the Principles of Rhetorick IN all Orations the Hearer does either hear only or judge also If he heare onely that 's one kind of Oration and is called Demonstrative If he judg he must judg either of that which is to come or of that which is past If of that which is to come ther 's another kind of Oration and is called Deliberative If of that which is past then 't is a third kind of Oration called Iudiciall So there are three kinds of Orations Demonstrative Iudiciall Deliberative To which belong their proper times To the Demonstrative the Present To the Iudiciall the Past and to the Deliberative the time to come And their proper Offices To the Deliberative Exhortation and Dehortation To the Iudiciall Accusation and Defence And to the Demonstrative Praysing and Dispraysing And their proper ends To the Deliberative to Prove a thing Profitable or Unprofitable To the Iudiciall Iust or Unjust To the Demonstrative Honourable or Dishonourable The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn are the common opinions that men have concerning Profitable and Unprofitable Iust and Vnjust Honourable and Dishonourable which are the points in the severall kinds of Orations questionable For as in Logick where certain and infallible knowledg is the scope of our proofe the Principles must be all infallible truths so in Rhetorick the Principles must be common opinions such as the Judg is already possessed with because the end of Rhetorick is victory which consists in having gotten beleefe And because nothing is Profitable Unprofitable Iust Unjust Honourable or Dioshonourable but what has been done or is to be done and nothing is to be done that is not possible and because there be degrees of Profitable Unprofitable Iust Unjust Honourable and Dishonourable an Orator must be ready in other Principles namely of what is done and not done possible and not possible to come and not to come and what is Greater and what is Lesser both in general and particularly applyed to the thing in question as what is more and less generally and what is more profitable and less profitable c. particularly CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives and the abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of businesse of State IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject wherin and the ends whereto the Oratour exhorteth or from which he dehorteth The Subject is alwayes somthing in our own power the knowledg whereof belongs not to Rhetorick but for the most part